THE NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM

VOLUME 6
Muslims and Modernity
Culture and Society since 1800

Edited by
ROBERT W. HEFNER

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Unparalleled in its range of topics and geographical scope, the sixth and final volume of *The New Cambridge History of Islam* provides a comprehensive overview of Muslim culture and society since 1800. Robert Hefner’s thought-provoking account of the political and intellectual transformation of the Muslim world introduces the volume, which proceeds with twenty-five essays by luminaries in their fields through a broad range of topics. These include developments in society and population, religious thought and Islamic law, Muslim views of modern politics and economics, education and the arts, cinema and new media. The essays, which highlight the diversity and richness of Islamic civilisation, engage with regions right across the Islamic world from the heartlands of the Middle East and Asia, through new territories in Europe and the Americas. Narratives are clear and engaging and will fascinate all those curious about the momentous changes that have taken place among the world’s 1.7 billion Muslims in the last two centuries.

The New Cambridge History of Islam offers a comprehensive history of Islamic civilisation, tracing its development from its beginnings in seventh century Arabia to its wide and varied presence in the globalised world of today. Under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad, the Muslim community coalesced from a scattered, desert population and, following his death, emerged from Arabia to conquer an empire which, by the early eighth century, stretched from India in the east to Spain in the west. By the eighteenth century, despite political fragmentation, the Muslim world extended from West Africa to South East Asia. Today, Muslims are also found in significant numbers in Europe and the Americas, and make up about one fifth of the world’s population.

To reflect this geographical distribution and the cultural, social and religious diversity of the peoples of the Muslim world, The New Cambridge History of Islam is divided into six volumes. Four cover historical developments, and two are devoted to themes that cut across geographical and chronological divisions themes ranging from social, political and economic relations to the arts, literature and learning. Each volume begins with a panoramic introduction setting the scene for the ensuing chapters and examining relationships with adjacent civilisations. Two of the volumes one historical, the other thematic are dedicated to the developments of the last two centuries, and show how Muslims, united for so many years in their allegiance to an overarching and distinct tradition, have sought to come to terms with the emergence of Western hegemony and the transition to modernity.

The time is right for this new synthesis reflecting developments in scholarship over the last generation. The New Cambridge History of Islam is an ambitious enterprise directed and written by a team combining established authorities and innovative younger scholars. It will be the standard reference for students, scholars and all those with enquiring minds for years to come.
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Muslims and Modernity
Culture and Society since 1800
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Note on transliteration

Since many of the languages used by Muslims are written in the Arabic or other non Latin alphabets, these languages appear in transliteration.

The transliteration of Arabic and Persian is based upon the conventions used by The Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, with the following modifications. For the fifth letter of the Arabic alphabet (jīm), j is used (not dż), as in jumla. For the twenty first letter (qaf), q is used (not k), as in qadī. Digraphs such as th, dh, gh, kh and sh are not underlined.

For Ottoman Turkish, modern Turkish orthography is used.

For terms and names in other languages, the individual chapter contributors employ systems of transliteration that are standard for those languages. Where there are well accepted Anglicised versions of proper nouns or terms (e.g. Nasser, Baghdad, Sufi), these are used instead of strict transliterations.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSOAS</td>
<td>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSH</td>
<td>Comparative Studies in Society and History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJMES</td>
<td>International Journal of Middle East Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILS</td>
<td>Islamic Law and Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAOS</td>
<td>Journal of the American Oriental Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEMS</td>
<td>Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEJ</td>
<td>Middle East Journal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MES</td>
<td>Middle Eastern Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>REI</td>
<td>Revue des études islamiques</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZDMG</td>
<td>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft</td>
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Muslim population by percentage of total population, c. 2000
I

Introduction: Muslims and modernity: culture and society in an age of contest and plurality

ROBERT W. HEFNER

On the eve of the modern era, Islam, not Christianity, was the most globalised of the world’s religions. Muslim majority societies stretched across a broad swath of Old World territory from West Africa and Morocco in the west to China and the Malay archipelago in the east. Several pieces were to be added to the map of the Muslim world after the eighteenth century, but otherwise most of what was to become the Muslim world’s modern expanse was in place. Meanwhile, however, another international order was emerging, one driven not by the hallowed imperatives of a world transforming religion but by the demands of industrial revolution and imperial expansion. The West’s great transformations were to unleash their own globalisations, ones that were to challenge Muslim culture and society to their core.

Earlier, in the late medieval period, the Muslim world had shared with China the distinction of being the greatest military and economic power on earth. Whereas Chinese emperors dominated only the far eastern face of the Eurasian land mass, however, Muslim rulers presided over its vast central and western domains. Muslim merchants also held monopoly shares in the maritime trade that stretched from Indonesia’s spice islands through India and southern Arabia to the Mediterranean. Though jealously eying its riches, Western Europeans were but bit players in this vast mercantile ecumene. In matters of scholarship, too, medieval Muslims had inherited and expanded on the civilisational accomplishments of ancient Greece, Persia and India. Mathematics and science in the Muslim lands were the most advanced in the world.1 In the late Middle Ages Europeans had relied on Arabic translations to recover many lost classics of Greek philosophy and science. In all these

regards, Muslim societies in the Middle Ages lay at the pinnacle of Old World civilisation.

As the modern world order began to take shape, however, the longstanding Muslim advantage over Christian Europe disappeared. Western Europe’s Renaissance, Reformation and early scientific revolutions passed largely unnoticed in Muslim lands. The revolution in industry and armaments that swept Western Europe after the eighteenth century, however, allowed no such indulgence. The West’s military and political ascendancy hastened the decline of the three great Muslim empires of the early modern period, the Ottoman, the Persian and the Mughal. Western expansion also brought about the collapse or colonisation of a host of smaller Muslim states in Africa, the Middle East and Central, South and South East Asia. With these events, one thousand years of Muslim ascendancy came to a swift and traumatic end.

The Western impact was as much cultural and epistemological as it was political. For centuries Muslims had lived in societies governed by leaders identified as Muslim. With good reason, Muslims had grown accustomed to regarding their civilisation as foremost in trade, science and the arts. Suddenly and irrevocably, it seemed, the self regarding standards of Muslim civilisation were placed in doubt. The crisis of cultural confidence upset the delicate balance of power among the social authorities responsible for stewarding Muslim culture’s varied streams. The Western threat provoked loud cries for Muslim unity against the unbelievers. Although Muslim modernists quietly urged their fellows to learn from the West, conservative reformists countered that the cause of the Muslim decline was neglect of God’s law. The only way to reverse the slide, these reformists insisted, was to replace localised and accommodating variants of the faith with an uncompromising fidelity to scripture and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad.

Western hegemony eventually resulted in the introduction of new techniques of education, administration and social disciplining into Muslim majority societies. The ascent of the West also introduced new models for private life and amusement. Although some Muslim leaders rejected these innovations, many did not. From the 1800s on, Muslim societies buzzed with debate over which elements in the Western cultural repertoire were to be welcomed and which forbidden.

The rise of the West, then, presented a deeply unsettling challenge to a civilisation and peoples long confident of their place in the world. Muslim debates over what was to be done in the face of the Western challenge eventually came to focus on the question of whether, in becoming modern, Muslims must adopt the habits and values of the West or whether Muslims
have the means and duty to create a modernity of their own. Although the
details have changed, this same question lies at the heart of arguments over
religion, secularity and the modern in Muslim majority societies today.

Plurality in civilisation

Although nineteenth century Western commentators believed otherwise, the
Muslim world on the eve of the modern age did not consist of unchanging
Oriental despotisms or, even less, ‘peoples without history’. In the early
modern period (fifteenth to seventeenth centuries), the Muslim expansion
was still going strong, as new peoples were won to the faith in eastern Europe,
Central Asia, the Indonesian Archipelago and sub Saharan Africa. The Muslim
world’s external dynamism was accompanied by an equally vital internal one,
expressed in a bustling circulation of goods, ideas and people. Certainly, the
cultural traffic was heavier in some regions than others, but it was sufficiently
pervasive to ensure that across the expanse of the Muslim world people held
certain core values and practices in common. Cultural differences remained as
well, in everything from family organisation and gender relations to folk
religion and state administration. The variation illustrated an endemic feature
of Muslim civilisation: the tension between the ideal of Muslim unity and the
reality of social diversity. This cultural tension was to mark Muslim culture
and society even more deeply in the modern era.

As with other world religions, the tension between global ideals and loca-
lising accommodations had long been a feature of Muslim civilisation. Since
the age of the Prophet, Muslims had conveyed their urgent message in
different languages and cultural garbs while attempting to keep to a common
normative core. Lacking pre modern Christianity’s sacerdotal priesthood and
clerical hierarchy, Muslims could not look to a church to authorise and
stabilise their religion’s message and organisation. By the third century of
the Muslim era, however, Muslims agreed in recognising the Qurʾān and
Ḥadīth (canonical accounts of the actions and sayings of the Prophet
Muhammad) as the main sources of divine guidance. The key normative
ingredients in this corpus were known collectively as sharīʿa, the divinely
appointed ‘path’ or ‘way’. Often translated as ‘Islamic law’, the sharīʿa offered
more extensive guidance on piety and devotion than it did infractions and
punishments; the latter were never but a portion of the larger whole.

By its third century, Muslim civilisation had also developed the networked
institution of religious scholars, the ‘ulamāʾ, whose duty it was to study and
rule on the details of God’s commands. The ‘ulamāʾ are not priests in any
formal sense of the term, since they undergo no ordination and administer no sacraments. But they are religious specialists, and, as such, play an important role in matters of religious learning, scholarship and the law. For many believers, this combination of divine guidance and ‘ulamā’ authority was the foundation on which religious life was to be built.

For other Muslims, however, knowledge of the law was never all that there was to the experience of the divine. For these believers, the illuminationist devotion of Sufi ‘friends of God’ was especially attractive, because it seemed to offer a more accessible and emotive path toward knowledge of God. Indeed, for some travellers on the mystical path, Sufism was a deliberate ‘reaction against the external rationalization of Islam in law and systematic theology’. More broadly based in society than the ‘ulamā’ (at least since the founding of the great Sufi orders in the tenth century CE), Sufi masters (shaykhs, pīr, baba) and their disciples comprised a complementary and, at times, alternative stream to the legal minded current in Islamic civilisation, one that resonated deeply with the concerns of ordinary Muslims. In addition, as in northern India in the eleventh century, Senegal in the sixteenth or Kazakhstan in the seventeenth, Sufi disciples regularly migrated from sedentary homelands out into turbulent borderlands, where some served as missionaries to non-Muslims. Embedded as they were in diverse social communities, Sufi masters were often more inclined than scholars of the law to tolerate the saint veneration, spirit devotion and healing cults popular among ordinary believers. Some scholars of the law, and even some Sufi masters, decried Sufi liberalism on these matters. In most of the Muslim world, however, it was not until the changes provoked by the arrival of Europeans that the reformist view became the norm. Thereafter, shari‘a minded reformists challenged and, in some places, diminished the Sufi stream in Muslim civilisation. However, they nowhere eliminated it entirely. Indeed, the last years of the twentieth century were to witness a neo Sufi revival in many Muslim lands, centred this time in the educated middle class rather than the peasantry and urban poor.

Alongside ‘ulamā’ and Sufis, kings and governors served as the carriers of a third stream of religious culture, a courtly or imperial Islam. In the eyes of the ‘ulamā’, the ruler was responsible, not for shaping religious tradition, but merely

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for providing an environment in which the law could be implemented and the Muslim community flourish. As often as not in the pre modern period, however, rulers acted as culture makers, not merely handmaidens of the ‘ulamā’.

Anxious to preempt challenges to their authority, many rulers appointed chief jurists (muftis) to represent their interests before the ‘ulamā’, often recruiting their candidates from among members of the ruling clan rather than from the ranks of learned scholars. In Muslim South East Asia and West Africa, many leaders were so confident of their authority in religious affairs that they dispensed with the position of the mufti entirely. Not coincidentally, many of these same rulers proved lax in enforcing the shari‘a.

There was another dimension to the ruler’s stewardship of Muslim cultural tradition. The pre modern state commanded resources on a scale much greater than any other social class or institution, including the Sufis and scholars of the law. At imperial courts in Anatolia, Persia, northern India and Java, among others, rulers used their comparative advantage to sponsor cultural activities that, in their eyes, bore witness to God’s greatness even if not explicitly enjoined in the law. For proponents of imperial Islam, excellence in warfare, religious festivals, literature and science was all part of the way in which a ruler demonstrated the power and glory of Islam, as well as, of course, the piety and majesty of the court itself.⁴

This harnessing of religious interests to the cart of royal excellence was not just an instrument of political domination; it provided the social rationale and imaginative energies for some of the pre modern Muslim world’s most remarkable civilisational achievements. In a seventeen year period after the death of his beloved wife in 1631, the celebrated Indian Mughal ruler, Shāh Jahan (1592–1666), dedicated his kingdom’s resources to the construction of a magnificent tomb complex known today as the Taj Mahāl. The Taj offered detailed allegorical commentary on the Day of the Resurrection and Judgement of the Dead. ‘Every feature of the Taj…forms part of a unified whole designed to support this message.’⁵ In expressing this otherwise orthodox conviction, the Taj did something more. It gave visual expression to the idea that Islam’s majesty can be expressed through unbounded cultural genius as well as conformity to the law. For centuries, a similarly ecumenical

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conviction underlay imperial patronage of and scholarly engagement with the arts, poetry, mathematics and science. In the modern era, however, some supporters of strict constitutionist reform were to insist that activities like these have little to do with Islam, since (these reformists insist) they are not expressly demanded by God’s law. Criticisms of this sort undermined the religious idealism and inner worldly empiricism responsible for many of the finest achievements of the classical Muslim world.

From its first centuries to today, then, public Islamic culture took not one but several forms. Jurists jostled with theologians, Sufi masters, folk specialists and court officials to shape the forms of public ritual and personal devotion. At any one time or in any one place, one group’s vision might enjoy a momentary ascendancy over the others. The relative weakness of the pre modern state, as well as the segmentary diversity of Muslim societies, however, guaranteed that no single group was able to achieve an enduring monopoly over the means of religious production and the standards of religious excellence. The streams from which pre modern Muslim civilisation flowed were many, and this diversity was a source of great cultural vitality.

Notwithstanding the claims of some modern commentators, in the pre modern period there was also no de facto union of religion and state. The degree to which there was a clear and enduring differentiation of religious and political authority from the Umayyad period (661–750) on is still a matter of dispute among historians. What is clear, however, is that, lacking Christendom’s church, Muslim societies tended toward a vigorous and agonistic pluricentrism in the management of religious affairs. Rulers’ attempts to meddle in religious matters created a legacy of Sufi and ‘ulamāʾ suspicion of state

6 For the view that there was a significant separation from early on in Muslim history, see Ira M. Lapidus, ‘The separation of state and religion in the development of early Islamic society’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 6, 4 (1975), pp. 363–85; and P. Crone and M. Hinds, God’s caliph: Religious authority in the first centuries of Islam (Cambridge, 1986). In an important work, Muhammad Qasim Zaman has demonstrated that in the early Abbasid period, when the Muslim community was still just beginning to regularise the relationship of ‘ulamāʾ and caliph, the caliph continued to intervene in matters of religious law, including, at times, those of some technical detail. See ‘The caliphs, the ‘ulamā’, and the law: Defining the role and function of the caliph in the early ‘Abbasid period’, Islamic Law and Society, 4, 1 (1997), pp. 1–36. Such interventions do not detract from the fact that, from the early Abbasid period on, the institutions of the caliphate and the ‘ulamāʾ developed according to a relatively autonomous institutional logic. The caliphate and local rulers developed an array of institutions for warfare, taxation and administration, the detail of which exceeded anything specified in religious law. Just as in the late medieval West, rulers’ repeated meddling in church affairs does not deny the relative differentiation of church and state, so too the caliph’s intervention in ‘ulamāʾ affairs does not contradict the fact that religious scholarship and governance were increasingly differentiated.
interference. Their attitude was expressed in the fact that, even when invited, many prominent scholars refused to serve as state judges, on the grounds that such collaborations were corrupting. ‘Of three judges, two are in Hell’, says one tradition of the Prophet, none too subtle in its view of the moral benefits of state service.7 Stories of holy men (Sufis and scholars of the law) overcoming unjust rulers were a ‘classic theme in the Moroccan moral imagination’,8 as in other parts of the Muslim world. In folk stories and witticism, too, state appointed judges were the target of a derision rarely directed at Sufis or independent jurists. Not surprisingly, then, in pre Ottoman times, and even where rulers appointed respected jurists to serve as state legal experts, ‘they have no monopoly of giving fatwas [judgements on points of law], and the practice of consulting private scholars of high reputation has never ceased’.9

In practice, then, there was a de facto recognition of two important facts: that the scope of the ruler’s authority was different from that of jurists, theologians and Sufis, and that it was important to accept this differentiation so as to protect the latter from the corrupting intrigues of self interested potentates. Certainly, rulers were expected to play a role in the management of public religious affairs. In particular, they were charged with defending the community of believers and upholding the law. But these responsibilities were not expected to extend to formulating legal opinions or writing religious commentaries. These were the responsibility of the ‘ulama’, and, lacking an ecclesiastical hierarchy, the ‘ulama’ exercised that authority more gingerly than did their clerical counterparts in medieval Europe. The absence of a hierarchical church, and the decentred nature of religious organization generally, also created an environment inhospitable to direct state control.10

Notwithstanding these legacies, scholarly commentators on religion and governance hesitated to provide explicit normative sanction for this differentiation of state and religious authority. Whereas Christian political theory developed in an ad hoc way over the centuries, drawing on sources many of which were not at first Christian, Muslim political canons held firmly to the idea that the Prophet Muhammad and his four rightly guided successors had

10 See Sami Zubaida, Law and power in the Islamic world (London, 2003), esp. pp. 40–89. The relative autonomy of the jurisconsult community was greatly reduced in Ottoman times, which was characterised by a growing bureaucratisation and centralisation of religious education and authority. See Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The structure of power (New York, 2002), pp. 244–51.
provided an exemplary and enduring model for political affairs. Related to this view was the idea that the best expression of this divine guidance was to be found in the shari‘a, and the shari‘a itself needs no human legislation, because God is sovereign and his message is complete. However much their actions might bespeak more complex understandings, then, the guardians of the law were reluctant to take account of the facts of Muslim political history and provide normative sanction for the differentiation of religious and state authority, like that which John Locke provided for modern Christian political thought. The fact that an endemic feature of Muslim political practice was not legitimated in jurisprudence created an abiding tension in Muslim political culture, between the golden age idealism of the law and the less than ideal accommodations of the real world.

In most times and places, this tension was not so much resolved as it was displaced into a quiet pessimism concerning the inability of the real and existing world, in all its greyness, to match the shimmering ideals of Islam’s golden age. At the same time, and notwithstanding this cultural resignation, the model of the Prophet’s leadership, with its charismatic union of religious and political authority, remained intellectually accessible and richly appealing. A leitmotif of Muslim history, then, was that during periods of social turmoil, dissident religious leaders arose and invoked the idealism of God’s law to demand a more intimate union of religious and political authority. Not coincidentally, the proposed fusion could also be used to justify the overthrow of the old regime and the ascent of a new political order. The tension between canonical ideal and real world practice thus offered a latent cultural resource for reform and rebellion in the name of Islam. This restless disposition was to be recovered and amplified in modern Muslim political thought.

Here, then, was a tension at the heart of Muslim culture and politics. Although a source of great social and intellectual dynamism in pre modern times, the pluralism of Muslim culture and society was susceptible to normative attack in the name of God’s law and Muslim unity. In the restless circumstances of the modern era, challenges of this sort were to become, not just periodic, but chronic.


12 On legitimacy and rebellion in the name of God’s law, see Al Azmeh, Muslim kingship, esp. pp. 101–14; and Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and violence in Islamic law (Cambridge, 2001).
From pluralist flux to unitarian reform

Well before the tectonic shifts of the modern period, there was evidence of a slow but steady adjustment in the balance of power among Muslim civilisation’s primary cultural streams, especially between Sufis, lay Muslims and scholars of the law. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries CE, the great scholar Abū Ḥāmid Muhammad al Ghazālī (1058–1111) laid the foundation for a reformed Sufism based on reconciling the mystical path with the law. This brilliant synthesis was still generating powerful cultural reverberations centuries later, for example, in the actions and writings of reform Sufis like Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī (1563–1624) of northern India and Nūr al-Dīn al Rānīrī of Sumatra (born in Gujarat, India, some time in the late sixteenth century, d. 1666). By the sixteenth century, challenges to once popular forms of Sufi mysticism emphasising monist union with God were commonplace across the Muslim world. By the end of the nineteenth century, a non monist, reform Sufism was the norm in most Muslim lands.

There was a social organisational background to this development, one that illustrates a basic difference between Islam and Christianity as regards the stewardship of religious tradition. Since there is no church in Islam, when a reform movement emerged in pre modern times, its proponents were often inclined to take their case to either of two juries: the ruler’s court, or the network of religious scholars and adepts regarded as religious authorities. Most of the pre modern Muslim world’s reform movements used some combination of these arrangements to convey their message to a larger audience.

As with Sirhindī in northern India and al Rānīrī in Sumatra, the logic of appealing to rulers was that, in the absence of a centralised church, rulers alone commanded the resources for effecting quick and far reaching religious reform. There were risks, however, to undertaking such a course of action. Rulers presided over societies in which direct participation in public affairs, not least of all as regards religion, was limited to a social and scholarly elite. There was no ‘public’ in the modern sense, that is, a broad based audience.

13 See W. Montgomery Watt, The faith and practice of al Ghazālī (Oxford, 1953); and Ebrahim Moosa, Ghazālī and the poetics of imagination (Chapel Hill, 2005).
14 Yohanan Friedmann, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī: An outline of his thought and a study of his image in the eyes of posterity (New Delhi and Oxford, 2000).
15 See Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and anti-Sufis: The defence, rethinking and rejection of Sufism in the modern world (London, 1999); for contemporary studies, see Henri Chamber Loir and Claude Guillot (eds.), Le culte des saints dans le monde musulman (Paris, 1995).
whose opinions, albeit not formally tallied, were deemed of sufficient impor-
tance that they had in some sense to be recognised when addressing matters of
general importance.\footnote{On the idea of the ‘public’ in modern Western society and
politics, see Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the public sphere (Cambridge, MA,
1992); on Islam and its publics, see Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson (eds.),
New media in the Muslim world: The emerging public sphere, 2nd edn (Bloomington,
2003); Charles Hirschkind, The ethical soundscape: Cassette sermons and Islamic
counterpublics (New York, 2006); and Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds.),
Public Islam and the public good (Leiden, 2004). For contrasting Muslim and French views of
religion and the public, see John R. Bowen, Why the French don’t like headscarves:
Islam, the state, and public space (Princeton, 2007).}
Unconstrained by any such public gaze, Muslim rulers could change sides in a religious
dispute, at a relatively low cost to themselves but with potentially disastrous consequences for one side in the scholarly
argument. As with the wandering Gujarati scholar, Nūr al Dīn al Rānīrī, who in the
1630s enjoyed the favour of the sultan at the Sumatran court of Aceh,\footnote{See
Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay Indonesian world: Transmission and responses
(London, 2001), p. 118.} a reformer embraced by a ruler in one period might find himself out of favour
some time later. This vulnerability diminished in the modern era, as the
development of mass education and communications made officials more
sensitive to public scrutiny, and created the possibility for a more participa-
tory, though not necessarily democratic, give and take between governments,
religious elites and their publics.

The other channel through which new religious ideas were disseminated
was the network of scholars, students and pilgrims that wove together the
Muslim world’s various sub territories. As with Timbuktu in West Africa,
Cairo in Egypt, Samarqand in Central Asia and Delhi in northern India, in
the late medieval and early modern ages there were regional centres of education
and pilgrimage in all corners of the Muslim world. The flow of people,
literatures and ideas through these regional nodes was sufficient to ensure
that the cultures of pre modern Islam had distinct regional accents, traces of
which can still be heard in Islam’s Arab, Indo Persian, Sudanese and Malayo
Indonesian subcultural streams.\footnote{This recognition of the pluralised nature of Islamic civilisation is at the heart of two
comprehensive treatments of Muslim history, Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The venture of
Islam: Conscience and history in a world civilization (Chicago, 1974); and Ira M. Lapidus,
A history of Islamic societies, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 2002).} At the same time, however, the pilgrimage
centres of Mecca and Medina in the Hijāz had a special place in the Muslim
religious imagination. Pilgrims came to these centres from all corners of the
Muslim world. Many stayed several years to study under an eminent scholar
while, to make ends meet, doing some teaching or trading of their own. If and
when they returned to their homeland, the pilgrims took with them lessons learned in the holy land.\footnote{A point explored more than a century ago in C. Snouck Hurgonje, \textit{Mekka in the latter part of the nineteenth century}, trans. I. H. Monahan (Leiden, 1931 (orig. 1888 9)).}

As the Muslim world moved into the modern era, developments enhanced the influence of reform minded jurists and the law more than they did Sufis, popular Muslims and imperial Islam. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the efflorescence of a famed school of Ḥadīth scholarship and revealed sciences. Centred at first at Medina in the Ḥijāz, the movement was unenthusiastic about the hybrid accommodations recommended by proponents of Sufi, imperial and folk Islam. The tradition quickly spread to northern India, which for the previous two centuries had already been known as a centre of learning on a par with the Ḥijāz. From their base in northern India, the new Ḥadīth scholars spawned an even greater movement for religious reform, whose influence was felt as far away as Egypt, Central Asia and South East Asia.

The rapid dissemination of the Ḥadīth scholarship and the extension of the Muslim world’s centre of gravity eastward, into South Asia, were related to broader changes taking place at this time. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Indian Ocean region was in the midst of, in Anthony Reid’s famous phrase, an ‘age of commerce’ comparable in scale to that affecting Western Europe during roughly the same period.\footnote{Anthony Reid, \textit{Southeast Asia in the age of commerce}, 2 vols. (New Haven and London, 1988 93).} The trade linked southern China and Southeast Asia with India, Arabia and East Africa; the largest share of the trade passed through Muslim traders’ hands. Responding to the boom, merchants and scholars from two regions, northern India and the Ḥaḍramawt in southern Arabia, travelled to and settled in East Africa and island South East Asia. Many among the Ḥaḍramīs claimed to be sayyid descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad. Many also professed an Islam that was more legal minded and reformist than typical among the natives with whom the immigrants came to reside. Enjoying a high status in their new communities, both groups came to play a pivotal role in the reform movements that swept the Indian Ocean world from the eighteenth century on.\footnote{See Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence Smith, \textit{Hadrami traders, scholars, and states men in the Indian Ocean 1750s 1960s} (Leiden, 1997); Patricia Risso, \textit{Merchants and faith: Muslim commerce and culture in the Indian Ocean} (Boulder, 1995); and Natalie Mobini Kesheh, \textit{The Hadrami awakening: Community and identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900 1942} (Ithaca, 1999).}
Elsewhere there were other harbingers of socio religious change. In the Najd region of west central Arabia, Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb (1703–92) launched a campaign of military conquest and religious purification that, among other things, aimed to do away with the saint veneration and Sufi institutions with which popular Islam in Arabia had come to be associated. Al Wahhāb’s followers were pushed from the Ḥijāz and neighbouring territories in a series of bold military strikes carried out between 1812 and 1818 by Ottoman forces dispatched by Muḥammad ‘Ali Pasha (d. 1849), who would go on to become the modernising ruler of Egypt. Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, al Wahhāb’s followers reconsolidated their forces in the Arabian interior and, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, surged forward to recapture all but the southern portion of the Arabian peninsula, laying the foundation for the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  

For centuries, pilgrims and scholars from around the Muslim world had come to live and study in Arabia, and the activities of al Wahhāb and his followers resulted in some of these pilgrims carrying his reformist message back to their homelands. The timing was serendipitous. At the periphery of the Muslim world, European colonial armies had escalated their incursions into Muslim territories. In the face of the heightened European threat, religious reformers proclaimed that the cause of Muslims’ disunity was their deviation from God’s commands; the reformers demanded a purification of local religious practice and strict conformity to the law. The appeal resonated well in regions where European incursions and commercial growth had already unhinged the alliance of court, Sufis and scholars around which traditional Islam had been organised.

In 1803 the Minangkabau region of West Sumatra witnessed one of the first Wahhābī inspired movements outside the Middle East, later known as the Padri rebellion. At the time, Minangkabau was in the early stages of a coffee boom that was shifting wealth and power from landed aristocrats to a new and more mobile class of merchants and townspeople. Led by three locals who had lived in Mecca under Wahhābī rule, the Padri decried the accommodating compromises of the court and local elites, this in a region long known for matrilineal kinship and the high status of its women. The rebellion spread quickly, and was only suppressed when Dutch forces, new to the Sumatran interior, came to the aid of the embattled aristocrats. In a similar manner, in the 1820s the newly acquired British territory of eastern Bengal witnessed a

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22 See Madawi Al Rasheed, A history of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, 2002).
powerful reform movement known as the Farāʾīdī (Ar., al Farāʾidīyya). Eastern Bengal had long been an area of frontier settlement, and it was one of the earliest of Indian territories to feel the full brunt of colonial rule. Much like the Padri, the Faraizis challenged local rulers and local professions of Islam at a time when the religious and political elite was already reeling under the impact of the colonial advance.24

This early phase of Islamic reform, then, showed a growing impatience with the expressive refinements of imperial Islam as well as the indulgent accommodations of folk Muslims. Under the restless circumstances of the modern age, the cause of Islamic reform at times also came to serve as a form of ‘contentious politics’, whereby heretofore subordinate social groups challenged established hierarchies.25 The terms of such religiously enunciated contentions resonated especially well where rapid change had already begun to dislodge entrenched elites. The call for reform could be applied to diverse political projects. In Minangkabau, Bengal, the Caucasus and Central Asia, religious reform was invoked to resist Western colonialism. In Arabia under the Wahhābiyya and in West Africa during the Fulani jihads (led by ‘Usman dan Fodio, 1754–1817), reformism was put to the service of religious purification and state making.26 Where, finally, a Muslim establishment held on to power, as in early nineteenth century Egypt and the eastern Ottoman Empire, reformists limited their appeals to demands that Islam be purified of corruptions, within an otherwise unreformed social structure.

As in the Wahhābiyya campaigns in Arabia, Sufis were among the most frequent targets of reformist ardour. Elsewhere, however, the Sufi community had long since begun to include shari‘a minded ‘ulama‘ in its ranks. Indeed, as the reformist message spread, growing numbers of Sufis purged their devotions of questionable practices and emphasised conformity to the law. Reformed mysticism of this sort was carried to the far reaches of the Muslim world by newly ascendant Sufi orders like the Naqshbandiyya, who spread their message from Central Asia to South and South East Asia.27

25 On contentious politics, see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of contention (Cambridge, 2001).
In West Africa, India and South East Asia, reformists took advantage of the Western imposed colonial order, fanning out into newly pacified territories and establishing mosque communities among townspeople drawn to a profession of Islam ‘detached from any particular place’. With its expanded trade, urban settlement and mass education, the twentieth century was to offer an even richer field for the reformist harvest.

Colonial challenge internalised

Contrary to the characterisations of Western scholars writing in the 1950s and 1960s, then, Muslim societies in the early modern era were not lost in timeless traditionalism, but had long been in the throes of far reaching social change. The animating concerns of Islamic reform, however, were soon to undergo a basic reorientation. In their early encounters with Westerners, Muslim reformers were understandably anxious about the threat of foreign domination, but were as yet little interested in Western disciplines of learning, technology or administration. A more sustained engagement with Western culture was about to take place, however, as European imperialism pressed forward. A new generation of reformists responded to the deepening political and cultural crisis by adapting Western disciplines to the tasks of educating, organising and motivating the Muslim community.

Not all Muslim societies were subject to direct colonial rule, but all were affected by the emergence of a European dominated world system. The British East India Company took the Bengal state revenue system away from the Mughal emperor in 1765, and, by 1818, had succeeded in making the company the dominant power in India. British authority moved further east in 1874, when Britain signed treaties with Malay sultans. Their authority was progressively undermined until, in the early twentieth century, all were under some form of colonial rule. In the nearby Indonesian Archipelago, the Dutch had taken the lion’s share of the spice trade out of Muslim hands in the seventeenth century. Over the next centuries, Dutch forces seized additional inland territories, until, in the early twentieth century, they had completed their conquest of the whole of the East Indies. Not far away, the Spanish...

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29 On the Muslim Middle East in the world system prior to the rise of Western Europe, see Janet L. Abu Lughod, Before European hegemony: The world system AD 1250-1550 (Oxford and New York, 1989); on the Muslim role in the Indian Ocean region, see K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An economic history from the rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge, 1985).
captured all but the southern Philippines in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, leaving the task of pacifying the Muslim south to the United States after the Spanish American war.

Far to the north west, the Russians had annexed Siberia in 1650, then pushed south in 1715 to invade the Kazakh steppe. Through treaties, threats and conquest, they brought most of present day Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan under their rule by the end of the nineteenth century. Far to the west, from the mid nineteenth century on Europeans raced to take control of Muslim Africa. France took the lion’s share of West Africa and the Arab and Berber Maghrib. Britain took a huge swath of East Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and the Sudan. Italy captured Libya and Somaliland. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, Britain also seized the Fertile Crescent and most of the Gulf region; France acquired greater Syria. In short, by the second decade of the twentieth century, most of the once proud kingdoms of the Muslim world lay in European hands. Although not directly colonised, the strategic heights of the surviving Muslim powers, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan, also felt a growing Western influence.

Western suzerainty brought profound cultural as well as political economic changes. The Europeans put in place a new and greatly enhanced network for transport and communications. The mid nineteenth century saw the introduction of steamship travel, followed by the opening of the Suez Canal in November 1869. A few years later freight and passenger railways had reached into the once remote interiors of the Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia. The infrastructure facilitated a surge in the flow of pilgrims to Arabia.30 But the network also accelerated the movement of people and ideas to the now colonial cities of Cairo, Lahore, Bombay and Singapore. In these teaming immigrant landscapes, courtly airs and folk provincialisms were losing their allure, and the groundwork was being laid for a more reform minded profession of the faith.

The Western invention of the printing press had a slower but equally profound impact on Muslim reform. Jewish refugees from *reconquista* Spain brought presses with them when they migrated to Istanbul in the early sixteenth century. Christian Arabs in Ottoman Syria eagerly adopted the technology a few decades later. Muslim scholars remained suspicious of the new medium, however, in part because of the longstanding emphasis on

the importance of oral transmission in religious education, as well as the conviction that the recitation of the Qur’an is itself an act of encountering the divine.

A printing press for Muslim needs was finally established in Istanbul in 1727, by an immigrant Hungarian convert to Islam. Although Ottoman officials made a point of emphasising that the press was not authorised to print the Qur’an, Hadith, or legal commentaries, the ‘ulama remained wary. In the 1740s, they succeeded in getting the government to close down the last Muslim operated printing press. Mass oriented printing was to revive only in the early nineteenth century.

When his army marched into Egypt in 1798, Napoleon brought printing presses for the purpose of issuing proclamations. By the 1820s, Cairo had a Muslim controlled press that was publishing school textbooks, including some religious materials. The al Azhar University persisted in banning printed texts for several more years, but eventually embraced the new technology. By mid century, Cairo was a major centre of publication for religious texts, exporting even to Mecca. The latter town got its own press in 1883. Demonstrating a greater openness to European cultural technologies, Urdu speaking Muslims in northern India took to the new print technology with great vigour, publishing newspapers and tracts in the 1820s and, a few years later, religious books. Although the ‘ulama in many other parts of the Muslim world were slow to embrace the print medium, scholarly families like the celebrated Farangî Mahall in the north Indian city of Lucknow took enthusiastically to publishing religious texts. These were ‘sold throughout upper India and through Afghanistan in Central Asia’.

Slowly but surely, then, mass produced religious materials began to circulate beyond the learning circles of classically trained religious authorities. Some historians have suggested that by the first half of the twentieth century this development had greatly weakened the claim of the ‘ulama to be the privileged guardians of religious knowledge, undermining their authority in the religious community as a whole. The precise impact of print and new media on religious authority, however, varied. Certainly, in most Muslim

32 On the impact of print culture on authority in the Middle East, see George N. Atiyeh (ed.), The book in the Islamic world: The written word and communication in the Middle East (Albany, 1995); Bernard Lewis, The emergence of modern Turkey, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1968), pp. 50 1; and Messick, The calligraphic state, pp. 115 31.
countries, printing and book publishing contributed to the formation of a new class of religious preachers and Muslim intellectuals. Many among the new religious leadership had little or no training in the classical scholarship of the ‘ulamā’; most drew on an eclectic array of sources, including secular media and schooling, to formulate their religious message. Notwithstanding the emergence of this new class of Muslim commentators, in countries with powerful religious establishments, like India and Egypt, the changes did not so much abolish ‘ulamā’ authority as contribute to the gradual emergence of a new kind of religious scholar. The new ‘ulamā’ still studied classical texts, but now they also tried to ‘compete not unfavourably for a popular audience with new religious intellectuals’.34 The revolution in religious learning and authority was to undergo an even greater change momentarily, in the aftermath of the mid twentieth century’s programmes for nation building and mass education.

Varieties of Islamic reform

Dominated but never fully subordinated to foreign overlords, then, Muslim societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the rise of new religious movements promoting the reformation of personal piety and social mores. Most reformers echoed their eighteenth century predecessors in insisting that Muslims purge their traditions of all that was not directly sanctioned by the Qurʾān and Sunna. As the Western advance intensified, reformers demanded not only greater individual adherence to the law, but a far reaching transformation of state and society.

There were two broad streams to this new reform current, one more establishment oriented and modernist, and the other more intellectually conservative and grounded in social classes as yet little affected by new ways of learning and organising. Where, as in Egypt, Tunisia and the Ottoman Empire an indigenous establishment had survived the initial Western assault, political elites worked with a select group of religious scholars to forge a programme of reform imbued with the ideals of modernist progress. The key characteristics of this initiative were a commitment to the development of a centralised state; a modernised military; education on the European model and an Islamic activism de emphasising legal literalism in favour of a more rationalised and general religious ethic. The Young Ottomans of the 1860s and 1870s were

among the first to formulate a version of this modernist programme, as part of a larger effort to shepherd the transformation of the Ottoman caliphate into a constitutional state. In India, where British rule had by mid century stripped Muslim rulers of their powers, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (1817–98) espoused a similar programme of modernising reform, designed to provide Muslims with a moral compass even in the absence of a Muslim governed state.

In British Malaya and western portions of the Dutch East Indies (especially Sumatra, which had close ties to the Malay population in British Malaya), the *kaum muda* or ‘young group’ advocated an equally ambitious programme of Muslim ethics and social modernisation.

Some among the modernist reformers, like Sayyid Jamāl al Dīn al Afghānī (1838–97), injected a political and internationalist theme into their message, one that reflected their own cosmopolitan journeys. Although his precise background is still a matter of dispute, al Afghānī is thought to have been born an Iranian Shi‘ī. However, so as to disseminate his message more widely, early on he took to identifying himself as an Afghan and Sunni. A restless wanderer, al Afghānī made the pilgrimage to Mecca at age twenty, settled in India in mid life (where he was harassed by British authorities for his anti colonial views), emigrated to Anatolia in 1870 and then settled in Cairo in the 1870s. In Egypt he met with and influenced Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), who, as rector of al Azhar University and grand muftī of Egypt, was to become the most renowned of al Afghānī’s students. Expelled from Egypt by the British in 1879, al Afghānī spent the last eighteen years of his life trekking across India, England, France, Russia, Iran and the Ottoman Empire. Everywhere he travelled he promoted the twin causes of religious reform and the strengthening of the caliphate. Voicing what was to become a central theme in Islamic modernism, al Afghānī also called for Muslims to free themselves from the unquestioning obedience and ‘imitation’ (*taqlīd*) of religious tradition, and to recognise that Islam sanctioned the use of reason and science.

The modernist message received its warmest reception in the colonial world’s fast growing urban areas, especially among the recently disenfranchised political elite and the increasingly educated middle class. Often times, too, the

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36 On the circumstances in which this reform was initiated, see Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Islamic revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900* (Princeton, 1982).
modernist message was re mixed to address local political concerns. This was the case, for example, with the All India Muslim League, established in India in 1906 to protect the rights of Muslims in the Hindu majority society. Elsewhere, however, politics was downplayed in favour of welfare and educational programs. This was the model for the Muhammadiyah (Ar., Muḥammadiyya), a modernist organisation founded in Yogyakarta, south central Java in 1912, dedicated to improving Muslim social welfare and implementing educational reforms. With some twenty five million followers, thirty six universities, 8,000 schools and 345 medical centres, the Muhammadiyah is today the largest modernist Muslim organisation in the world.39

In other Muslim countries, reformism had a more conservative social mien, downplaying questions of state and society in favour of a more single minded emphasis on personal conformity to religious law. This strict constructionist reformism had a varied class base, but it typically drew on lower middle class merchants, detraditionalised peasants (as in West Java and northern Nigeria), and tribal groups threatened by continuing political change (as in Arabia, Jordan and Morocco). These social classes heard little of interest in modernist exhortations on the glories of modern science and intellectual renewal.

Some Islamic movements combined both conservative and modernist reform. In India, the DeobANDı movement dedicated itself to a programme of social and educational revitalisation aimed at deepening the Muslim public’s commitment to the religious law even in the absence of an Islamic state. DeobANDı schools made abundant use of European methods of finance and administration, but were much less interested in European style curricula. In the century following its founding in north India in 1867, DeobANDı scholars established some 9,000 religious schools across South Asia. More than a century later, in the 1990s, the senior Taliban leadership in Afghanistan drew heavily from the ranks of graduates of DeobANDı schools. Notwithstanding the Taliban example, most DeobANDıs have been more concerned with personal devotion than state power. Having originated in the shadow of British colonialism, the DeobANDı mainstream has accepted varied forms of governance as long as they allow ‘the goal of encouraging what is defined as core shari‘a based individual practice, coupled with a range of mundane goals’.40

39 Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The political behavior of a Muslim modernist organization under Dutch colonialism (Yogyakarta, 1989).  
In Indonesia, traditionalist ‘ulamā’, including many reformed Sufis, came together in 1926 to form the Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’ (‘renaissance of the ‘ulamā’, NU). While defending taqlīd and classical learning, NU officials quietly implemented reforms of their own. In the 1930s, some of the association’s religious boarding schools (pesantren) expanded their curricula to include mathematics, science, English and history. In the 1950s and 1960s, other NU boarding schools opened high schools with professional and vocational programmes. In the 1970s and 1980s, several schools established colleges offering degrees in business, law, education and medicine. Under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid (eventual president of the Republic of Indonesia, 1999–2001), in the 1980s and 1990s this ‘traditionalist’ organisation came to position itself as a champion of democracy and civic pluralism.

The secularist interregnum

From a comparative point of view, some among the early twentieth century’s reformists can be seen as Muslim counterparts to the ‘creole intellectuals’ that, in an influential study, Benedict Anderson has identified as the primary proponents of the secular nationalism that swept the colonial world in the early decades of the twentieth century. The creoles Anderson had in mind were individuals recruited from among the native elite, educated in European ways and then posted to the provinces to assist in colonial rule. Anderson observes that, because many of these ‘bicultural’ individuals internalised Enlightenment values, they chafed under the colonial controls that so blatantly contradicted the progressive ideals propagated in European run schools.

Muslim reformists tended to be less bicultural than the nationalist intellectuals Anderson has described. Although some were keen to promote the study of modern sciences, few among the Islamic reformists were convinced that the secular values of the Western Enlightenment could guarantee Muslim progress. Most also did not rally to the idea that the community at the heart of a modern polity should be a ‘nation’ defined in terms of imagined ancestry and culture rather than religion. Notwithstanding these differences, in one

important respect some among the Muslim reformists resembled Anderson’s creole intellectuals, in that they served as cultural brokers for the transmission of Western innovations to Muslim society. The most important of these innovations included an emphasis on general education, the provision of social welfare services and new forms of social and political organisation.

However significant the reformists’ long term contributions to Islamic renewal, during the middle decades of the twentieth century politics in Muslim majority countries was dominated, not by modernist Muslims, but by a new class of secular nationalist leaders. With the exception of a few references to the Prophet or Islamic socialism, most of the post colonial nationalists paid little heed to Islamic traditions when devising their plans for government. In economic affairs, Arab socialism, not Islamic economics, was the rallying cry in much of the Middle East during the middle decades of the twentieth century. At the urging of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the Republic of Turkey abolished the caliphate on 3 March 1924 and took measures to restrict Muslim public culture and institutions, including the all important network of madrasas.44 The world’s largest majority Muslim country today, Indonesia in the late 1950s boasted the largest communist party in the non communist world. Even in Pakistan, a country founded in 1947 as a homeland for South Asian Muslims, voters consistently rejected Islamist appeals to turn the nation into an Islamic state.

The precise tack nationalist leaders took toward Islam and Muslim institutions, however, varied from country to country. Atatürk’s republican Turkey implemented the most systematic programme of state secularisation, intended ‘to end the power of religion and its exponents in political, social, and cultural affairs, and limit it to matters of belief and worship’.45 In most other countries, however, government officials made symbolic concessions to Islamic tradition while quietly creating political institutions based on different principles. In Pakistan, the preamble to the constitution stated that sovereignty over the universe belongs to God alone. The formula deftly avoided any reference both to the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty and to the need for an Islamic state. In Malaysia, Islam was declared the religion of state, even as government and the courts made few concessions to Islamic law. Notwithstanding these mixed messages, a political reorientation of enormous proportions was taking place. While clothing the state in a few bits of Islamic garb, the newly independent states of the Muslim world presented themselves as, not

44 Lewis, The emergence, pp. 402 24; on the much changed relationship of the state and religious education in contemporary Turkey, see Sam Kaplan, The pedagogical state: Education and the politics of national culture in post 1980 Turkey (Stanford, 2006).
45 Lewis, The emergence, p. 412.
communities of believers dedicated to God’s law, but nations defined in terms of common culture and ancestry.

An inevitable consequence of nation state development was the further differentiation of state and religious authority. This was perhaps most vividly apparent in the confinement of religious law to domestic affairs. It was only in matters of marriage, divorce, adoption and inheritance that the law continued to be applied in a systematic matter.\textsuperscript{46} In the 1950s and 1960s most observers saw facts like these as indications that Muslim majority countries were well on their way to a privatisation of religion similar to that assumed to have earlier occurred in the West.

In comparisons of religious change in the modern Muslim and Christian worlds, historians and sociologists once spoke of the West’s separation of church and state as if it were the inevitable consequence of intellectual ‘disenchantment’ and modern social differentiation. Alternatively, and at even greater remove from historical realities, the separation was portrayed as the product of a quantum leap in political and cultural awareness, related perhaps to intellectual enlightenment or developments in Western science and political philosophy. More recent studies of Western religious history have shown, however, that secularisation, understood in the strict sense as the process by which religious meanings and practices are backgrounded or removed from social life (public and private), is neither uniform nor inevitable. Even in Western Europe, the pace of the process, and the degree to which religious institutions were actually separated from state, have varied widely in modern times. Some Western European countries retained state churches well into the late twentieth century; a few have state churches still today. Tax and administrative ties between church and state, like those that send a portion of each citizen’s taxes to a particular church, are also still found in many European countries.\textsuperscript{47} Rather than being the inevitable and uniform product of a modernisation juggernaut, then, the secularisation of public life in the West has varied from country to country, reflecting context specific patterns of nation building, market making and religious pluralisation.\textsuperscript{48}


\textsuperscript{47} Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf, \textit{The decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000} (Cambridge, 2003).

All this is to say that, when it come to things religious, there is no single modernity,\textsuperscript{49} nor any uniform pattern to modern religious change. There are of course some broad trends within each of the world’s major civilisational traditions. For example, in the Muslim world the secularising impact of capitalism and capitalist culture has long tended to be weaker than in Western Europe. One reason this is so is that the capitalist classes who, in some Western countries, came to ally themselves with secularising reformists did not develop to a comparable degree in Muslim countries; equally important, the merchant classes that comprised their lower ranks were often supporters of Islamic traditionalism or conservative reform. The situation was further complicated by the fact that, although Muslim civilisation has proud commercial traditions, many modern Muslims have come to see modern capitalism as an alien and imposed institution. In colonial times, this perception was reinforced by the fact that Europeans implemented economic policies that were anything but liberal, bankrupting the most efficient Muslim owned enterprises and reserving the commanding heights of the economy for themselves.\textsuperscript{50} Under these circumstances, economic globalisation in Muslim majority countries was slow to give rise to an indigenous capitalist class with a gravitational pull anywhere near that of its Western counterpart. Indeed, in many countries liberal economic programmes weakened native business classes, or pushed them into alliance with conservative Islamists.

If capitalism’s g force remained weak in most of the Muslim world, that of the state was considerably stronger, and for a while it looked as if modernising states might become the motor for an aggressive secularisation of public culture and politics. The absence of powerful towns, an independent minded bourgeoisie and a strong legal system all guaranteed that in most Muslim majority countries it was the state rather than societal classes that spearheaded programmes of modernising reform. The elites were spurred into action, not by the growing influence of an urban bourgeoisie, but by the looming threat of the West. In the face of the Western challenge, rulers in nineteenth century Egypt and several Ottoman lands initiated reforms in education, taxation, state administration and industry. Few of these paid much attention to upholding the \textit{shari`a}; indeed, many reforms disregarded the law. In Egypt under Muḥammad ʿAlī (r. 1805–48) and the Ottoman Empire during the

\textsuperscript{49} See Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, \textit{Multiple modernities} (New Brunswick, 2002).

\textsuperscript{50} For a case study of this process, see Peter Gran, \textit{Islamic roots of capitalism: Egypt, 1760 1840} (Austin and London, 1979).
Tanzimat reforms (1839–76), rulers undertook to restrict the *sharī‘a* based regulations that accorded Muslims greater privileges than their Christian and Jewish counterparts (both of whom played critical roles in the new economy), who together comprised the *ahl al dhimma*, or ‘protected’ minorities. The reforms ‘dismantled the legal hierarchy governing the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims...with the blunt justification that such steps were necessary to save the empire’.51

All these developments contributed to a greater differentiation of religious and state authority, and a relative weakening of the position of the *sharī‘a* and ‘*ulamā*’ in elite circles. But there was no wholesale secularisation; popular society was thick with religious associations and values. Equally important, even where secularising reforms were introduced, they were promoted, not in the name of the autonomy of the individual or a liberal separation of religion and state, but of an imperilled national interest. The state targeted institutions deemed vital for the nation’s defence, leaving institutions like the network of *madrasa* schools unreformed.52 The result was that, notwithstanding ambitious programmes of state sponsored secularisation in places like Republican Turkey, Tunisia, pre-revolutionary Iran and Algeria, the popular classes remained relatively religious. Under these circumstances, most states retained ‘a modest Islamic facade, incorporating some reference to Islam in their constitution such as that the ruler must be a Muslim or that the *sharī‘a* was a source of law, even when it was not’.53 To the surprise of many analysts, the final decades of the twentieth century would witness the growth of movements intent on replacing the façade with a more authentic Islamic edifice.

**Islamic resurgence**

There had always been Muslim thinkers and parties opposed to the nationalist project. However, opposition to state promoted nationalism and secularisation acquired a new urgency and social force in the aftermath of the Islamic

resurgence that swept the Muslim world in the 1970s and 1980s. Although varied in its political expressions, the resurgence challenged the nationalists’ hegemony, undercut state sponsored secularisation and re ignited the debate over the proper role of religion in public life.

The resurgence itself was the product of diverse influences, at once demographic, cultural and political. The background demographic reality was that from 1950 to 1990, the proportion of the population living in cities and towns in Muslim majority countries grew exponentially, as a result of rural to urban migration and (especially in Muslim Africa and the Middle East) exceptionally high fertility rates. The precise rate of growth varied, but most countries saw both their population and the proportion of their citizens living in towns grow by 200-300 per cent. Overwhelmingly rural in 1950, by 1990 most Muslim majority countries had 35 to 55 per cent of their people crowded into cities and towns, suffering the usual ill effects of pollution, crime and unemployment. Urbanisation and population growth converged with new media and conspicuous consumption to make the contradiction between the promised solidarity of nationalism and the reality of growing inequality all the more apparent.

As in earlier periods of urbanisation, economic development and nation making in Western Europe, the post colonial state in Muslim majority countries was not passive in the face of these changes. Like their counterparts in the modern West and East Asia, modern states in the Muslim majority countries were ‘disciplinary’ in ambition, aiming to train growing numbers of citizens in the aptitudes and mores seen as necessary for modern progress and order. At the same time, the state set out to dismantle many of the social structures through which the urban poor and the rural population had long organised their lives. There was, however, one striking exception to the state’s cultural clear cutting: institutions of Muslim worship and learning. With rapid demographic growth and the squeezing of masses of people from different regions and ethnic backgrounds into congested urban settlements, mosques and madrasas sprang up across the new social landscape. Frustrated in their attempts to realise nationalist dreams of equality and prosperity, some citizens turned to places of prayer and religious study for alternative answers to the question of how to be modern.

For an overview of demographic trends, see Brown, Religion and state, pp. 123-30; on their broader economic background, see Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the politics of development in the Middle East (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 1-26.

There was an important educational influence on the processes that took place in and around the fast proliferating network of mosques and religious schools. In the 1950s and early 1960s, nationalist governments had launched ambitious programmes of general education. Whatever their failings in economic matters, the governments’ educational programmes succeeded in creating the first generation of Muslim youth with high rates of literacy and several years of schooling. Only poor countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan failed to get on board the schooling revolution.

Some among the newly educated applied their educational skills to economic and secular ends, but others threw themselves into religious study. Most, however, lacked the ability and opportunity to study scholarly commentaries on the Qur’an and Sunna. There were, however, other texts available for study. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the development of a booming market in inexpensive Islamic books and magazines. The publications provided a means for people who had received little if any formal religious education to familiarise themselves with the fundamentals of their faith. The literature addressed subjects remote from traditional scholarship, including Muslim views on courtship and marriage, how to get rich in business while being religious and the moral perils of Western entertainments. Alongside the new Islamic media there also emerged a new class of popular Muslim preachers, commentators and advice columnists, referred to rather loosely as the ‘new Muslim intellectuals’. Most had little if any background in the traditional religious schooling. ‘Freed from traditional processes of knowledge acquisition apprenticeship to a man of learning these new autodidact intellectuals stand outside of traditional authorizing institutions, instead authorizing themselves in the process of knowledge production and dissemination.’ In this way, the repluralization of religious authority begun in the nineteenth century deepened under the influence of nation building, mass education and a restless religious resurgence.

There were, finally, transnational influences on the resurgence as well. After the oil embargo and increase in petroleum prices in 1973, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya increased their international assistance to poor Muslim countries, much of it for the purpose of building mosques, madrasas and institutions of higher Islamic learning. In West Africa, South East Asia and many other locales, these foreign sponsored educational institutions imparted a more strict constructionist understanding of Islam than had previously been the local norm.

After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, a greater portion of this Middle Eastern assistance was channelled toward political ends. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries joined the United States in providing aid to mujāhidīn fighters in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s powerful Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate managed most of this assistance, and directed the lion’s share to conservative Islamists. Although not on a scale equal to that of the Saudis, Libya, the Gulf States and Iran also became active providers of international assistance. After the Islamic revolution of 1979 80, Iran increased its aid, most significantly to Shiʿī groups in southern Lebanon. Elsewhere, however, the scale of Iranian assistance was less important than the model of the Islamic revolution itself, which had a riveting effect on activists across the Muslim world.

In sum, in the early post colonial period population growth and urbanisation converged with education, new media and conspicuous consumption to make the inequalities of the new citizenship more glaring than when most of the population lived in villages and small towns. During roughly the same period, domestic and international developments made new models of Islamic learning and piety more broadly available to the mobile Muslim masses. In these unsteady circumstances, many believers came to use mosques and madrasas as vantage points for a new and more critical viewing of public culture and society. In Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s, the state responded to the new Islamic current by implementing programmes of conservative reIslamization, in an effort to preempt challenges to its authority. In many of these same countries, however, the resurgents quickly upped the ante, recruiting Muslim professionals to provide health and educational services the state was no longer able to provide.

In popular society if not the formal political arena, then, Muslim organisations became sites for the development of a new ‘counterpublic’. It was

one premised, not on secular nationalism or (least of all) liberal individualism, but a new form of Islamic civic activism centred on individual and public adherence to God’s law.\textsuperscript{60} Some of the most powerful expressions of this aspiration were seen, not in the political arena, but in the intimate recesses of private life.

Remaking women

Nowhere have the cultural and political ambiguities of the resurgence been more vividly expressed than with regard to women. Nowhere, too, have the uncertainties of women’s status been more visible than in two foci of conservative Islamist concern, women’s dress and employment. Although the veiling of women was common in many parts of the early twentieth century Muslim world, it was far from universal.\textsuperscript{61} Head scarves and \textit{hijab} were common enough around the Arab world, particularly among women of higher standing. But Muslim women in much of Africa, Central Asia and South East Asia regarded a simple, loose fitting head scarf as more than sufficient for the purposes of personal modesty. During the middle decades of the twentieth century, secular nationalists in many countries encouraged the adoption of an even less obtrusive head scarf. As in Kemalist Turkey and Sukarnoist Indonesia, a few even recommended no head covering at all. With the urbanisation and mass education of the 1960s and 1970s, growing numbers of women were also invited out of the home and into the labour force. In West Africa, Central Asia and South East Asia, most women had never been subject to \textit{purdah} or any other drastic form of seclusion; local village markets were mostly women’s affairs. With the new education, however, some women began to dream of mobility into high status professions.

The Islamic resurgence had an ambiguous answer to these gender shifts. Many pious women began to wear more encompassing veils, covering, not only the hair and the neck below the chin, but the shoulders and chest as well. The veil became a key symbol of the new piety, and was embraced by women even in countries like Indonesia and Turkey where, prior to the resurgence, only a minority had veiled. Almost everywhere, however, the forms and


meanings of the veil remained matters of intense public debate. As in contemporary Turkey, conservative activists tended to see veiling as part of a ‘religiocultural code of behaviour prescribing the spatial segregation of men and women…and the authority of fathers and husbands over daughters and wives and of men over women’. By contrast, however, young women activists saw veiling as a vehicle of social empowerment, a tool that ‘has paved the way for the movement of female bodies through a variety of spaces that had been closed to them’. 62

The ambiguously gendered impact of the resurgence was also seen in employment and political activism. Since the 1980s, Muslim women have assumed positions of national leadership at a rate comparable or even higher than that of women in Western Europe or, especially, the United States. Women presidents or prime ministers have been elected in Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia. For the most part, however, the individuals who have assumed these roles have done so, not with broad based Islamist support, but with the backing of powerful nationalist parties. In some instances, as with Benazir Bhutto (d. 2007) in Pakistan and Megawati Sukarnoputri in Indonesia (both daughters of prominent nationalist leaders), the Islamist community has been cool to the idea of women leaders.

Notwithstanding this ambivalence, in all but the most conservative movements, women have come to figure prominently in the new Muslim activism. Women were central players in the student activist groups that helped to overthrow Indonesia’s President Suharto in May 1998. Women were also active in the grassroots organisations that helped to catapult moderate Islamist parties to electoral victory in Turkey in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Similarly, women played a key role in Iran’s Islamic revolution, as well as the post Khomeini movement for cultural and political reform. 63

Some among these women have sought to use their activist prominence as leverage for scaling up women’s rights in other spheres, including employment and citizen affairs. However, conservative Islamists insist that women’s political participation should be limited to working with other women. Above all, they argue, these activities must not lead to women exercising authority over men, or

62 White, Islamist mobilization, p. 52. For an overview of veiling trends and debates in the Arab Middle East, see Fadwa El Guindi, Veil: Modesty, privacy, and resistance (Oxford and New York, 1999).
63 On women in Iran’s Islamic revolution, see Fariba Adelkhah, La révolution sous le voile: Femmes islamique d’Iran (Paris, 1991); on women and gender debates in post Khomeini Iran, see, Ziba Mir Hosseini, Islam and gender: The religious debate in contemporary Iran (Princeton, 1999).
to anything else that detracts from a woman’s primary role as homemaker, wife and mother. Views like these will continue to run up against countervailing currents, including the ongoing movement of masses of young Muslim women into higher education. The social implications of this momentous event are just beginning to be played out. All this suggests that the ‘culture wars’ over gender and sexuality in the Muslim world are not likely to abate any time soon. In the long run, the outcome of this and other contests will depend on broader struggles over the terms of modern citizenship and the place of Islam in public life.

Modernity and reformation

A central focus of discussion among scholars writing on the political impact of the Islamic resurgence today concerns the question of whether the values and networks it fosters are antithetical to democracy or, alternately, might serve as a foundation for a distinctive Muslim variant of democracy and civil society. From one perspective, questions of this sort appear alien and contrived, the product of outsiders’ concerns, not believers’ preoccupations. After all, none of the world religions arose to promote democratic ideals. All the Abrahamic religions were established to convey a message of transcendent urgency, concerning the relation of believers to an all powerful God and, through His august revelation, a broader community of believers.

As social analysts from Max Weber to, more recently, Charles Taylor have all emphasised, however, the world religions have been central to the making of modern subjectivities and institutions. Moreover, modern Muslim intellectuals have themselves been as eager as Western analysts to assess the resources their religion offers for social justice and participation. In a Western context, Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* provides an often cited example of religion’s democratising impact, vividly expressed in the author’s observations that nineteenth century America’s churches nurtured participatory ‘habits of the heart’ conducive to democratic life. Critics have recently questioned the adequacy of de Tocqueville’s observations,
however, noting that for an association to be truly democratic it must cultivate a spirit of openness to all citizens, even those beyond its membership ranks. In the West, these sceptics observe, religious associations have sometimes fostered intolerance and exclusivity rather than civic harmony. In assessing the impact of religious associations on public life, then, one has to go beyond their mere location in ‘civil’ society and examine the values and practices they promote, and the implications of these for culture, politics and society.69

These cautionary lessons from Western history offer clues as to how to think through the implications of the Islamic resurgence for modern Muslim politics and culture. The most basic observation with which to begin is that, in terms of scale, the Islamic resurgence was an event of historically unprecedented importance. Mosques and madrasas went up in every village and town, the call to prayer marked the rhythms of the day and more women began to veil. By any measure, the resurgence was a great transformation in culture and society, marked by a vast increase in the social and cultural ‘capital’ dedicated to heightening the role of Islam in public and personal life.

The second observation is equally important, if often overlooked in Western commentaries on political Islam in the aftermath of the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. In most countries during its early years, the resurgence was not consistently or even primarily political, at least in the state centric meaning of the latter term. The majority of resurgents were concerned to promote personal devotion and a popular understanding of the importance of Islamic values in modern life. Their aims, then, were more pietist than étatist in spirit. The Muslim world was not alone in witnessing the resurgence of religion in the public sphere during these years. A similar ‘deprivatisation’ of religion was under way in many parts of the world, including Hindu India and portions of the Christian West. Developments in these traditions were equally varied in their political expressions.70

The third feature of the Islamic resurgence, however, offers the most interesting insight into the resurgence’s implications for politics, culture and


70 On the deprivatisation of religion in the West, see José Casanova, Public religions in the modern world (Chicago, 1994); on a related process in India, see Peter van der Veer, Religious nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley and London, 1994).
modernity. It is that, in light of the scale and vigour of the resurgence, it was inevitable that some actors would eventually attempt to redirect its energies toward more deliberately political ends. The resurgence created new frames for viewing culture and society, and created new networks for public activity. Equally important, with other avenues of participation and betterment closed off, believers looked to religion to improve their lot.

The Muslim politics that has resulted from this process of politicisation is anything but uniform in organisation or ambition. Some among the resurgents promote exclusive understandings of the faith opposed to democracy and equal citizen rights. Others call for a seamless union of religion and state through state mandated implementation of *shari‘a*. Proponents of the latter, more conservative variant of Muslim politics usually insist that their actions are modelled on the example of the Prophet. However, the supporters of another variant of Muslim politics, a pluralist one, insist that proposals like these overlook the fact that a richly differentiated political landscape took shape early on in Muslim history, as the community of believers evolved from a charismatic movement into a great world civilisation. Rather than fidelity to God’s commands, these critics insist, the call for a totalising union of religion and state bespeaks a modern preoccupation, one broadly apparent in the crises of modern Western history, namely, the desire to use the state to compel citizens toward pluralism denying uniformity.

Proponents of this second, pluralist stream in Muslim politics have decried the preoccupation with totalising political programmes and have called for an open and pluralistic state and society. Whether with Abdolkarim Soroush in post revolutionary Iran, Nurcholish Madjid and the ‘renewal’ (*pembaruan*) movement in Indonesia or Tariq Ramadan in Western Europe, a central theme of pluralist Islam has been the insistence that some degree of separation of state and religious authority is necessary so as to preserve the integrity of religious life itself. The proponents of Muslim pluralism thus advocate a careful separation of religious and political authority, not to privatise religion, but to protect and deepen its highest values and guarantee its continuing relevance in public life.

‘Religion forbids us from assuming a God like character’, writes the Iranian dissident (and former anti American militant), Abdolkarim Soroush. He adds:

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71 For a study of the varieties of Muslim politics, see Mohammed Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam: Religion and politics in the Muslim world* (Ann Arbor, 2008).

‘This is especially true in politics and government where limiting the power of the state, division of powers, and the doctrine of checks and balances are established in order to prevent accumulation of power that might lead to such Godly claims.’ The suggestion that those who claim to speak in God’s name sometimes confuse their own interests with those of the Creator has been a leitmotif of Muslim pluralist scholarship. In the writings of Soroush, Abdollahi Ahmed An Na‘im, Nurcholish Madjid and Khaled Abou El Fadl, among others, the critique has been used to underscore the need for a measured separation of religious and political authority. The separation that these writers have in mind is not that of French laïcisme or modern day Atlantic liberalism. It does not demand that religion be made purely private. The arrangement instead builds on a precedent latent in the practice, if not the written commentaries, of classical Islam. Civic pluralist Muslims would protect the ideals and practices of religious life by declining to grant the state a monopoly over religious affairs. Rather than a fusion of religion and state, then, the pluralists would ground public religion in citizen associations and dialogue, defending the vitality of both through constitutional government and a separation of powers.

Whether this current in modern Muslim culture and politics will become the basis for a broader reformation will depend upon more than the cogency of a few intellectuals’ arguments. Already, however, in countries as varied as Senegal, Mali, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia, we have witnessed sustained attempts to scale up Muslim supports for democracy and constitutionalism. At the same time, however, recent events have shown that the more ardent opponents of Islamic pluralism enjoy certain tactical advantages. Some show a genius for creating disciplined organisations. A smaller and even more determined minority, affiliated with groups like like al Qa'ida and the Jema‘ah Islamiyya (in South East Asia), have demonstrated an aptitude for linking local insurgencies to international networks and resources. Prior to the overthrow of the Taliban in late 2001, the arms, military exercises and

74 See, for example, Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s name: Islamic law, authority, and women (Oxford, 2001).
76 See Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, ‘An “Arab” more than a “Muslim” electoral gap’, Journal of Democracy, 14, 3 (July 2003), pp. 30-44.
ideological training provided at al QA‘ida camps in Afghanistan provided resources that proved useful for escalating insurgencies in the southern Philippines, Chechnya and Kashmir. By linking otherwise local conflicts to transnational networks in this way, the insurgents have been able to achieve an influence greatly disproportionate to their numbers in society.

If organised militants enjoy certain tactical advantages, the proponents of various forms of democratic politics have one circumstance in their favour: the pluralising nature of modern learning, markets and societies. In modern societies, the diversification of knowledge, labour and lifestyles is a common place effect of social mobility, higher education and economic specialisation. Like the universities so central to their social dynamism, modern societies require a controlled but creative diversity to flourish. Political movements can attempt to deny this distinctively modern reality. Indeed, recent history, including that of the mid twentieth century West, shows no dearth of pluralism denying adventurism. However, that same history shows that there is a high price to be paid for these initiatives, one highlighted in the breakdown of human solidarities, outbreaks of violence and a loss of hope and intellectual dynamism.

Where some form of Muslim democracy prevails, the political culture that undergirds it will likely differ from that characteristic of much of the liberal West since the 1960s. In particular, as it brings more citizens into the political arena, democratisation may have the curious effect of, not secularising the public sphere, but increasing demands for the state to play a supporting role in public morals and religious education. The precise form such collaboration across the state mosque divide takes will no doubt vary from country to country. Although far from what some secularist theorists might today regard as ideal, hybrid arrangements like these may well be the path through which democratisation works with, rather than against, the religious resurgence occurring in Muslim lands.

The long term outcome of the contest between rival streams in Muslim civilisation will also depend on broader developments in the global arena. Conflicts into which religious symbols are dragged as indices of a putative ‘clash of civilisations’ will inevitably damage the efforts of Muslim pluralists. Where a new civic pluralism comes to prevail, however, it will not be the result of Western hegemony or a secularist juggernaut. It will take hold because a new generation reaches a conclusion similar to that long implicit

77 On the perils of such a course, see Fawaz A. Gerges, America and political Islam: Clash of cultures or clash of interests? (Cambridge, 1999).
in the practice of earlier Muslims: that a measured separation of religious and political authority best serves the ideals of Islam and Muslims themselves. Far more than in the late modern West, cultural supports for democracy and pluralism in the Muslim world are likely to be grounded on religious rationales.

Over the past two centuries, Muslim societies have been in the throes of cultural changes as momentous as those that catapulted Muslim intellectuals and scientists to the forefront of Old World civilisation one thousand years ago. The scale of political and demographic change in Muslim majority countries today is also as great as any seen over the *longue durée* of Muslim history. Some among today’s developments will continue to show the imprint of Muslim exchanges with the West. But others will evidence more culturally specific concerns, such as the question of how to balance the interests of Islamic morality with individual freedoms, intellectual openness with the respect for religious tradition. Efforts to come to terms with these issues will not bring about any single pattern of Muslim modernity. However, the exercise will continue to bear witness to the elementary but awesome truth that, although the modern age has ushered in new forms of cultural contest and plurality, it has by no means diminished Islam’s vitality.
PART I

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SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS
New networks and new knowledge: migrations, communications and the refiguration of the Muslim community in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

R. Michael Feener

The nineteenth century in the historiography of Islam

Albert Hourani called the ‘long’ nineteenth century (c. 1798–1939) ‘the Liberal Age’ in Arabic thought, a period of ‘modernity’ among the intellectual elite of the Middle East first evidenced in the work of thinkers exposed to European thought such as Rifā‘a al-Ṭahṭāwī (1801–73). In such a view the nineteenth century and what is considered to be the ‘modern’ period of Middle Eastern history more generally is seen as starting with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798. However, Peter Gran has demonstrated that, well established though this periodisation may be in international scholarship, we should not lose perspective on pre-existing indigenous processes of modernisation by investing too much in such landmark divisions of time. As Gran has argued, both the economic and the cultural history of the later eighteenth century demonstrate the emergence of patterns of social transformation usually ascribed to the influence of the ‘Western penetration’ of Muslim societies actually developing indigenously for decades before the arrival of the French.

It is important to recognise such indigenous social changes as they serve to establish the local frameworks for the integration of various new technologies that were introduced through the spread of European imperial interests. At the same time, however, it is also clear that increasing European influence in

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1 I would like to thank Michael Laffan, Justin McDaniel, Henk Maier, William Blair and Tim Barnard for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
2 Albert Hourani, Arabic thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (Cambridge, 1983).
Muslim societies was a factor in the acceleration of the pace and scope of cultural and economic transformations over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Reflections of this can be seen, for example, in the modernising programmes of Muhammad 'Alî in Egypt (r. 1805 49) that were directed toward centralising the administration of the country. One far reaching effect of these changes was the dissolution of Muslim institutions that previously found their sources of funding and social autonomy through privately funded religious endowments (waqf's). The financial support of 'ulamâ associated with various madrasas in the country was progressively eroded, first by the formal taxation of waqf in 1809, and then by the state confiscation of waqf properties in 1814. Similar programmes were taken up by European powers in the various Muslim societies that came under their dominion in the later nineteenth century, and various permutations of such policies often continued through the twentieth century under the independent national governments that came to power in many Muslim majority countries.

Dramatic changes in institutional support for traditional learning had a pronounced impact on the fate of Islamic religious institutions in a number of Muslim societies in the nineteenth century. This can be seen, for example, in British India, where over the course of the 1820s and 1830s traditional Perso Islamic literary and religious culture ‘dissolved with almost shocking speed’. By the 1880s, even former strongholds of traditional Perso Islamic culture had adopted as their official language Urdu an ascendant vernacular language that was also emerging as a prominent language of cultural critique and social reform in the new print culture of the nineteenth century.

In Ottoman lands as well, the mid nineteenth century signalled an accelerated pace of reform activity and social transformation. In his study of Islamic law and Ottoman society during this period, Haim Gerber has used 1840 as an approximate date marking the end of the last phase of ‘classical’ Islam. This date closely coincides with the beginning of the Tanzimat reforms that were to introduce various programmes for the modernisation of the Ottoman state administration over the decades that followed. The Tanzimat period of Ottoman history (1839 76) was characterised not only by a new openness to

6 Haim Gerber, Islamic law and culture, 1600 1840 (Leiden, 1999), p. 133.
7 Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 1856 1876 (Princeton, 1963).
institutional and technological influences from the modernising West, but also to developments in other Muslim societies beyond their own political borders. Following the eclipse of the Mughal and Safavid dynasties (the other two major Islamicate empires of the early modern period in the first half of the nineteenth century) some Muslims from a wide array of societies around the world began looking toward Istanbul for symbolic, if not necessarily political or religious, leadership. The growing sentiment at that time among some Muslims for solidarity with the imagined community of a global umma is often referred to as pan Islamism.  

Some of the Ottoman sultans of the nineteenth century attempted to capitalise on these sympathies more than others, with perhaps the greatest energies being directed toward fostering feelings of pan Islamism under Sultan Abdülhamid II. During his reign (1876–1909) he also re-energised the Sufi networks through his relationships with prominent and highly mobile shaykhs. These included Abūʾl Ḥudā al-Ṣayyādī (1850–1909) of Syria, Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza Ẓāfīr, who led branches of the Madaniyya brotherhood in Africa, and Sayyid Fāḍī ibn ‘Alawī (1824–1900) from an Indian Ocean diaspora family tracing its origins to the Hadramawt region of southern Arabia (see below). Through such networks Abdülhamid II maintained extensive contacts with co-religionists across the vast range of Muslim societies stretching from central Sudan to the Dutch East Indies. In addition to this, Arabic sermons extolling the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II as leader of the umma were printed at Bombay and thence disseminated to be read at Friday prayers at mosques in Java. Abdülhamid II’s efforts at exerting influence on this global scale were directed not only toward advancing Ottoman interests around the world, but also toward enhancing his bargaining position vis-à-vis European powers who were increasingly encroaching upon his own realms. 

It was in these contexts that the growth and dissemination of pan Islamist sentiment was facilitated by technological advances in transportation and communication imported from the West that made possible the more extensive and rapid mobility of activists for the cause and the dissemination of their ideas.

Print, the telegraph and steam powered rail and maritime transportation fuelled processes of communal re-definition and accompanying religious

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reformulations across a diverse range of Muslim societies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Given the importance of the mid nineteenth century introduction of these new transportation and communications technologies in facilitating shifts in both the social organisation and the epistemology of Muslims around the world, this chapter will thus take up discussion at c. 1850. The globalising dimensions of the social and political developments of this period can be seen in relation to a constellation of major new and interconnected technologies: print, telegraph and steam travel. Together these various new technologies were important not only because of the ways in which they facilitated European expansion into Muslim societies in the nineteenth century, but also for the ways in which they created new opportunities for communal connections and the exchange of ideas between Muslims from different regions.

An acknowledgement of the significance of such technologies in the history of the period should not, however, be taken as implying any totalising role for technology in the shaping of events. Rather these technologies should be regarded as important factors that contributed to, rather than decisively directed, social transformations. In a recent discussion of the historiographical problem of technological determinism, Philip Scranton emphasised the need to view the history of technology in relation to both larger socio cultural processes and to 'local determinations' of the ways in which new machines were disseminated, adapted and used. Such an approach is useful in framing understandings of how certain technological developments came to have significant and diverse, culturally contextualised impacts on Muslim societies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

At times, various technological marvels of the age evoked considerable admiration from Muslim authors and religious scholars. The text of one published ruling issued by an Azhar educated Meccan mufti hailing from

11 These, of course, are only some of the new technologies that had an impact on social transformations in Muslim societies during this period. However this chapter will restrict itself to these developments due to constraints of space. In addition to these major advances in transportation and communications, other technologies have also facilitated changes both on the macro level of imagining modern states, and the individual levels of home industry and gender constructions. For more on how such changes involved the use of photography and the sewing machine, respectively, see: Carney E.S. Gavin and the Harvard Semitic Museum (eds.), 'Imperial self portrait: The Ottoman Empire as revealed in the Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s photographic albums’, Journal of Turkish Studies, 12 (1988), pp. 1 269; and Uri M. Kupferschmidt, ‘The social history of the sewing machine in the Middle East’, Die Welt des Islams, 44, 2 (2004), pp. 195 213.

what is today southern Thailand reads, ‘Wondrous things have been bestowed [by God] upon [the Unbelievers], including tools that enable them to travel through the air. They understand hot air balloons...steamships that can travel below the surface of the water like fish, and the telegraph.’

However, while some published Muslim sources from this period lavish great praise on new imported technologies, other documents reveal more subdued enthusiasm for such novelties or even their outright rejection. In commenting on examples of apparent ‘stalls’ in the social impacts of potentially transformative technologies in medieval Muslim history, Richard Bulliet has called attention to the importance of ‘cultural preferences’ and ‘local logics’ in the way in which inventions are used and distributed in diverse contexts. During the modern period, as well, technologies such as print, telegraph and steam powered transport have to be understood with relation to the specific contexts in which they impacted different Muslim societies of the period in complex and interconnected ways.

The topical, rather than strictly chronological arrangement of the material discussed below will attempt to reflect some aspects of these interconnections. Of the major technologies proliferating across Muslim societies during the latter half of the nineteenth century, print was paramount, as it was largely through this medium that other new technologies were first imagined and increasingly incorporated into local practice. Print played a central role in the development of new understandings of what it meant to be part of a wider Muslim world. Some developments in print culture—particularly the publication of newspapers—were at the same time integrally linked to and increasingly dependent upon the second major technology that will be discussed in this chapter, the telegraph. The telegraph not only served to communicate news and information across great distances to local presses, but it also developed in ways that were interconnected with both major modes of modern steam travel, as its lines were strung alongside expanding networks of railroad tracks, and underwater cables were laid by the crews of steamships.


The diffusion of these technologies and the processes of social transformation that they facilitated were diverse and uneven across various Muslim societies in the nineteenth century. Whereas in the Ottoman territories print, telegraph and steam travel all experienced rapid development after c. 1850, in West Africa, for example, the Islamisation of previously non-Muslim areas at that time generally did not make extensive use of the new technologies being introduced from a rapidly modernising West. Instead the major dynamics of Islamisation there during this period developed along the lines of such well-established means of networking as intermarriage, economic expansion, Sufi orders and military conquest. It was only in the last years of the nineteenth century after the rapid expansion of European imperial interests in West Africa that modern institutions and technical innovations began to have an impact on the processes of social change in the region.\(^\text{15}\)

Given the great diversity in the speed and degree of local developments across Muslim societies and the constraints of space for essays in this collection some regional focus is needed for this brief discussion of the impact of new technologies and new networks during this period. This chapter will focus primarily on Muslim societies of the Indian Ocean world, ranging from the Swahili towns of the East African coast through Arabia and South Asia to the Indonesian Archipelago. This expansive region has a long history of complex interconnections between local Muslim societies that were increasingly integrated into a new world system in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through the development of major technological innovations in transportation and communications. After a series of discussions of the spread and development of key technologies in Muslim societies, the impact of these changes will be explored in relation to two Muslim diasporas in the Indian Ocean world that expanded considerably during that period: Ḥaḍramī Arab migrants around the Indian Ocean littoral, and South East Asian Muslims who travelled to the Middle East for pilgrimage, as well as for extended periods of study.\(^\text{16}\)

Print technology

Print was not a new technology to all Muslim lands in the nineteenth century. Presses operated by Jewish and Christian minority populations had been


\(^{16}\) For an introduction to this vibrant centre of Muslim activity during this period, see: William R. Roff, ‘The Malayo Muslim world of Singapore at the close of the nineteenth century’, *Journal of Asian Studies*, 24 (1964), pp. 75–90.
producing texts in the Ottoman and Safavid Empires in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, respectively. However, for various reasons ranging from aesthetic concerns to social factors including attempts to avoid state censorship and resistance from ‘traditional’ scholars and guilds of manuscript copyists, print technology was relatively slow to be received among their Muslim neighbours. In 1729 the first Muslim owned press was established at Istanbul by Ibrahim Müteferrika, and by the early nineteenth century other new publishing houses were established to provide printed books to the Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire. These presses published works ranging from grammars and dictionaries to literary and Islamic religious texts, as well as original treatises and translations of European books dealing with mathematics, science, medicine, agriculture and military technology. Some of these works were produced at the behest of the state in the service of modernisation programmes, as in the case of Egypt when in 1835 Muḥammad ʿAlī appointed Rifāʿa al ʿ Ṭahṭāwī as director of his Bureau of Translation. From about 1850, however, these state sponsored endeavours were increas ingly complemented by a growing number of private publishers. Further changes in the emerging print culture of the Arab Middle East then came with the spread of printing from Egypt to the Levant, which became a major centre of Arabic book production in the second half of the nineteenth century.

18 J. T. Reinaud, ‘Notice des ouvrages arabes, persans et turcs imprimes en Egypte’, Journal Asiatique, 2nd ser., 8 (1831), pp. 333 44; and T. X. Bianchi, ‘Catalogue général des livres arabes, persans et turcs, imprimés à Boulac en Egypte depuis l’introduction de l’imprimerie dans ce pays’, Journal Asiatique, 4th ser., 2 (1843), pp. 24 61. I would like to thank William Blair for providing me with these references, and for his insightful comments on the history of printing in the Ottoman Empire. For more on the early development of printing in the Middle East, see: Eva Hanebutt Benz, Dagmar Glass and Geoffrey Roper, in collaboration with Theo Smets (eds.), Sprachen des Nahen Ostens und die Druckrevolution: Eine interkulturelle Begegnung / Middle Eastern languages and the print revolution: A cross cultural encounter (Mainz, 2002).
20 By the 1890s, Beirut had come to be seen as a publishing centre on a par with Cairo by South East Asian and Ḥadrami Arab Muslims active in the Indian Ocean scholarly networks (Michael Laffan, personal communication). The rapid rise to prominence of Arabic publishing in Lebanon involved complex interactions of Muslim reformists with local Arab Christians, as well as with European and American Christian missionary projects in the Levant. For more on this, see: George N. Atiyeh, ‘The book in the modern Arab world: The cases of Lebanon and Egypt’, in George N. Atiyeh (ed.), The book in the Islamic world: The written word and communication in the Middle East (Albany, 1995), pp. 233 53.
Muslim owned printing presses proliferated beyond the Middle East during this period as well. For example, after travelling to Mecca, Cairo and Syria in the 1870s, Sultan Sayyid Barghash brought a printing press and experienced printers back with him to Zanzibar, where he commissioned the production of print editions of Islamic texts, including classical İbâdi works. Islamic religious texts also comprised the most prominent products produced at the government printing press that was established at Mecca in 1884. This press published texts not only in Arabic but also in a number of other Islamicate languages, including Malay. In the late nineteenth century printed editions of Malay works on the Islamic religious sciences were also being produced in Cairo, Istanbul and Bombay. These Malay publications produced in South Asia and the Middle East complemented an increasing number of Arabic works that were being printed in South East Asia at that time. These included not only editions of medieval and early modern texts produced in the Middle East, but also original compositions by contemporary Haḍramī Arab scholars active within the Archipelago such as Sālim ibn Sumayr (d. 1873), whose popular didactic work, Safinat al najā was published in Arabic editions, as well as in versions with Malay and Javanese interlinear translations.

Nevertheless, print technology initially complemented, rather than displaced, older technologies of the word in nineteenth century Muslim South East Asia. Certain types of texts Malay narrative poetry (syair/derived from Ar. shi‘r) and romances (ḥikāyāt), for example continued to be produced and disseminated in manuscript form during the last decades of the nineteenth

22 Snouck Hurgronje remarked that Malay literature could take a ‘place of honour’ among the works produced by the Meccan press (Mekka in the latter part of the nineteenth century, p. 287).
24 Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur, 2 vols. and 3 supplements (Leiden, 1996), st, p. 812. Brockelmann however, curiously lists Ibn Sumayr as a ‘North Arabian’ author. The Safinat al najā is still widely available in South East Asia in Arabic editions that sometimes combine the matn (text) with commentaries by other Haḍramī scholars such as Ahmad ibn ‘Umar al Shāṭiri’s Nayl al raja‘, as well as in modern Indonesian translations.
century. These texts were generally not read silently by individuals, but rather recited aloud in group settings, often being rented for occasional performances. The expansion of modern print culture in South East Asia, as elsewhere, was thus a complex process that involved a number of mutual adaptations between the imported technologies and local traditions. This is also illustrated by the ways in which Muslims took up different types of print technologies. For example, Ian Proudfoot has demonstrated the ways in which lithography flourished among Muslim printers in India and South East Asia over the second half of the nineteenth century, as it could more easily replicate conventions of chirographic culture, while typography emerged only later. However, once the letterpress gained prominence in Malay printing, it brought considerable changes to the appearance of texts, and to readers’ relationships to them.

Print came to serve as a new medium for the publication of texts in a wide range of new genres, including novels, short stories, modern forms of bureaucratic manuals and legal/administrative documents. Discussing documents of this last type in his study of modernising transformation of the written word in Ottoman Yemen, Brinkley Messick has demonstrated that the shift from ‘spiral’ to ‘straight ruled’ texts involved more than just matters of graphic stylistics. As he argues, this signalled ‘changes in the basic epistemological structure of the document, with the principles underpinning the document’s construction and its authority’. Print also facilitated the rise of new, more immediate, formats for the written word such as the newspaper. In his study of Central Asian Muslim reform movements of the early twentieth century, Adeeb Khalid discusses the development of the periodical press as heralding fundamental changes in the relationships held between readers and texts analogous in some ways to the transition

27 For a case study of such developments in the Sundanese speaking area of West Java, see: Mikihiro Moriyama, Semangat baru: Kolonialisme, budaya cetak, dan kesastraan Sunda, abad ke 19 (Jakarta, 2005).
from ‘intensive’ to ‘extensive’ reading practices in eighteenth century Europe that is from the ‘devotional’ reading culture of traditional ‘ulamā’ to the unmediated and ‘quotidian’ practices of newspaper reading.\textsuperscript{30} Such social transformations accompanying the technological innovations of modern print culture were to have an immense influence on understandings of Islam in Central Asia and elsewhere during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The proliferation of print culture in the later nineteenth century contributed to the spread of new practices of reading and the creation of new cultural conversations in many other Muslim societies as well. Rather than the reading out loud of Islamic religious texts in formal educational settings or the performative recitations of poems and romances, new practices of silent reading and the promotion of new conceptions of ‘self improvement’ (Ar. tahrīdīb), emerged across the Muslim world from Ḫādīr māwt to Java.\textsuperscript{31} The changing readerships for printed materials of various kinds and innovations in the topics covered by them signalled the opening of new markets, as can be seen in the production of specialised ‘Ladies’ Home Journals’ in Urdu around the turn of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{32} At the same time, less demanding forms of texts were also being developed in fields that had traditionally been reserved for very specialised readerships such as law, and opened them up to more public, and politicised, discussions.\textsuperscript{33}

The rise of new, modern genres of printed texts was, however, just one of a number of ways in which rapid technological changes of the period were to have pronounced impacts upon the very nature of language and textual authority in various Muslim societies. This can be seen, for example, in the progressive abandonment of classical literary stylistics in Arabic writing over the course of the nineteenth century. When the Egyptian ‘Abd al Rahmān al Jabartî (1754–1825) critiqued the Arabic prose of the French savant employed by Napoleon to translate his proclamation on the eve of the 1798 invasion, he freely combined his grammatical and syntactical critiques of the text with disdainful remarks on Frankish barbarisms more generally, '[Unlike more

\textsuperscript{30} Adeeb Khalid, \textit{The politics of Muslim cultural reform: Jadidism in Central Asia} (Berkeley, 1998), pp. 121 7.

\textsuperscript{31} Ulrike Freitag, \textit{Indian Ocean migrants and state formation in Hadhramaut} (Leiden, 2003), p. 263.

\textsuperscript{32} Gail Minault, \textit{Secluded scholars: Women’s education and Muslim social reform in colonial India} (New Delhi, 1998), pp. 105 57.

civilized Muslims] they do not shave their heads or their pubic hair. They mix their foods...[The Frankish savant’s] statement “for a long time” is a redundant adverb.34 In the early nineteenth century matters of literary style in Arabic were still largely held to classical norms, and participation in these literary conventions was in turn viewed as a reflection of the overall personal refinement and moral character of the author. By the early twentieth century, however, stylistic influences from the technologies of the printing press (as well as the telegraph) had transformed Arabic writing in Egypt, and accompanying understandings of textual as well as broader cultural authority, in fundamental ways.35

Aside from stylistics, the dissemination of print technology also introduced substantial changes to the appearance of written language in various Muslim societies. For example, print introduced more regular and systematic use of punctuation in Arabic and other Islamicate languages. This technical development too, however, signalled significant shifts in the ways that the written word was experienced in various Muslim societies at that time. In discussing the differences between the oral recitation of manuscripts and the silent reading encouraged by printed texts, Ian Proudfoot has explained some of the effects of the ‘infiltration’ of visual punctuation into printed texts: ‘The new style imposed more strenuous demands on its reader...Its more complex signals also helped the reader navigate new text with understanding.’36 In Malay, as well as in some of the other emerging Muslim vernacular print cultures of this period, the transition from manuscript to printed texts also included a new emphasis on proper spelling that propelled both efforts to establish uniform orthographies in its modified Arabic script, and the increasing use of European characters (rümi) to represent the sounds of this Austronesian language.37 It has also been suggested that early movements for the simplification of written Turkish and the romanisation of its script were even further influenced by yet another increasingly popular nineteenth century technology, the telegraph.38

36 Proudfoot, ‘From recital to sight reading’, p. 131.
37 For an overview of these developments, see: Lars S. Vikør, Perfecting spelling: Spelling discussions and reforms in Indonesia and Malaysia, 1900–1972 (Dordrecht, 1988).
The telegraph

The telegraph was introduced into Ottoman lands during the Crimean War (1854-6), and by 1869 there were over 300 lines in service across the empire. Its foremost uses were political and military, as were those of other early telegraph lines spreading through various parts of colonial Asia and Africa at that time. As part of their broader programme of consolidating control over India in the mid nineteenth century, the British looked to the telegraph as a means of facilitating faster communications between the home country and their South Asian colonies. The construction of these lines was an important factor in establishing British political interests in the Persian Gulf, and between 1863 and 1865 their India telegraph was connected to Ottoman lines at Baghdad. The interconnection of these various imperial telegraph lines also contributed to the political integration of Qâjâr Iran in the nineteenth century. This revolution in long distance communication created the means by which news of changing conditions could be quickly communicated across great distances, which had advantages well beyond those in the interest of military and administrative officers.

Additional benefits of this new means of rapid communication were soon realised, including commercial communications and news and weather reports, allowing such material to be quickly disseminated in newspapers rolling off printing presses in Muslim societies stretching from North Africa to South East Asia. These technological developments had cultural and even literary impacts in a number of Muslim societies. For example, telegraphed newspaper reports of the Crimean War provided the raw material for romanticised retellings of the events in traditional poetry and prose genres of several South East Asian languages, including Malay, Sundanese, Bugis and Acehnese.

The rapid spread and development of telegraph technology also necessitated the development of a host of associated institutions, such as technical schools, where operators and support staff could be trained, and specialised institutions.

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39 Halford Lancaster Hoskins, *British routes to India* (New York, 1928), pp. 373-97. Selective glimpses into some of the particulars of this expansion of telegraph lines through the Middle East and South Asia can be had from: Frederic John Goldsmid, *Telegraph and travel: A narrative of the formation and development of telegraphic communication between England and India, under the orders of Her Majesty’s Government, with incidental notices of the countries traversed by the lines* (London, 1874).


factories to produce this technology locally. Modern forms of education and the creation of an extensive new body of regulations designed to administer this important element of colonial communications infrastructure also played an important role in the expansion of telegraph service in the Dutch East Indies.\(^\text{42}\) In the Ottoman Empire, the development of telegraph service fuelled incentives for the further study of French, as the early telegrams sent to, from and within the Ottoman domains in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were composed in that language.

Telegraph technology was important not as an isolated invention, but rather as an integral part of a complex of modern institutions with implications for society on levels ranging from the logistical to the legal. In his study of the development of fatwâ (judicial opinion) in the context of modernisation Jakob Skovgaard Petersen has presented a case study in the way in which telegraph technology was discussed in two early twentieth century texts which, although written by Muslim scholars of opposite ideological positions on ʿijtihād (exercise of judicial reasoning) from Egypt and Syria, nonetheless basically agreed on not only the permissibility, but also the positive benefits of the telegraph for the Muslim community.\(^\text{43}\) While the first of these dealt specifically with the use of the telegraph to communicate the appearance of the new moon and thus determination of the beginning and ending of the fasting month of Ramadān, the latter expanded discussion of this new technology to extol its more general social benefits (Ar. ʿašlaha ʿāmma) as lifelines connecting various corners of the far flung ʿumma and facilitating the work of ʿijtihād.\(^\text{44}\) These conversations within the sphere of Islamic law, however, followed earlier developments in the official statutes of Ottoman state regulations. For by that time other issues related to the telegraph had already been addressed in codified legal reforms of the Ottoman Tanzimat council, which established scales of sanctions for interfering with this new, high maintenance medium of communication.\(^\text{45}\) The spread of the telegraph in Muslim societies was thus inextricably bound up with a complex of changes in both traditional Islamic jurisprudential idioms as well as with modern administrative institutions.

42 J. E. de Meiyer, 'Een verslag over het Indische Telegraafwezen', De, 43, 1 (1912), pp. 497 507.
43 Muhammad Bakhît al Mutâﬁ (1854 1953), Irshâd ahl al milla îlā ʿithbâh al ahilla (Cairo, 1910), and Jamâl al Din al Qâsimî (1866 1914), Irshâd al khalaq îlāʾl ʿamal bi khabar al barq (Damascus, 1911), respectively.
45 Davison, 'Electric telegraph', pp. 133 65.
Railroads

As a result of its increasing involvement with European political and economic interests in the mid nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire under took plans for the expansion of railways within its territories, especially in the Balkans, following an edict of the Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839–61) in 1854. Over the next two decades the first short, primarily economic rail lines in the Ottoman Empire were supplemented by longer connections of more political and military importance, such as the lines to Syria, Lebanon and Palestine as well as the development of the Baghdad Railway. The mid nineteenth century also saw the beginnings of extensive projects of railroad construction and the establishment of regular steamship routes both to and within British India. The first rail lines were laid in the country in 1853, and by 1900 over 38,000 km of track ran through nearly every area of the subcontinent.

As we have seen from the examples of print technology, it was not only in European colonies, but also in the Ottoman Empire that Western inspired institutions of modernisation were employed in the service of Islam. During this period, rail and other modern improvements in transportation and communication contributed significantly to the growth of new centres of Islamic learning. Perhaps the most striking example of this can be found in the Deoband madrasa in northern India. In the late nineteenth century, Deoband became home to the first of a far flung network of Islamic reformist schools whose impact continues to shape important developments across the Muslim world to this day. In her pioneering study of this movement, Barbara Metcalf has demonstrated that when this school was founded in the mid nineteenth century, ‘Deoband prospered from the canals, post, and telegraph services, and most importantly, the railroads of the period.’ In this setting the railroad was a central element in a whole new constellation of inventions and institutions that opened up new spaces for the development of Islamic reformist ideals.

46 Jacob Landau, The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim pilgrimage (Detroit, 1971), pp. 7–8.
47 J. B. Wolf, The diplomatic history of the Bagdad Railroad (New York, 1973), p. 12. These were just the first stages in a rapid expansion of railways in the Middle East. In the later nineteenth century it was Egypt that rushed ahead, where trains carried 4.7 million passengers in 1890, and by 1906 annual ridership reached almost 30 million. See: Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, p. 97.
48 Ian J. Kerr, Building the railways of the Raj, 1850–1900 (Delhi, 1995), pp. 39, 211–12.
The Deobandīs drew upon the modern organisational models of colonial schools and missionary societies, and generated financial support through the new instruments of postal money orders. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the postal service also began to play an increasingly integral role in the communications between members of the scholarly networks connecting scholars in the Ḥijāz to their co-religionists in distant parts of Africa and Asia. Not just letters but also books were exchanged via post, and surviving catalogues from the period such as one from the Singapore Malay bookseller Ḥājji Muḥammad Sirāj contain extensive, detailed instructions for mail order purchasing and payment through bank and postal money orders. Nevertheless many still preferred to entrust their mail to friends and relatives, who were increasingly travelling aboard steamships and trains. As communications between Muslims from around the world were facilitated by these various means, modern technologies and institutions were further integrated into a full array of Muslim itineraries, including those of an increasing number of pilgrims to Mecca.

The creation of new spaces temporarily inhabited by pilgrims, whether on passenger decks or in railway cars, contributed to transformations in both the structure and experience of the ḥajj. Participation in these new transportation networks had complex effects upon this religious experience, both in introducing Muslims to new technologies, and in reopening traditional discussions of Islamic religious issues such as that of ritual purity. As a Persian Shiʿī pilgrim on the rail line connecting Baku to Batum in 1885 remarked: ‘In the coach, men and women, Muslims and infidels, are mixed together. There is no way to avoid it…If someone on the steamers, coaches, and trains is conscientious about [religious] precautions, it will be hard on him since [the water] will never be [ritually] pure.’

50 Ibid., pp. 235-8.
53 This can be seen, for example, in letters circulating among Ḥadramī Arabs and South East Asian Muslims in Singapore and the Indonesian Archipelago presented in Jan van der Putten, ‘Dead letters: Undeliverable Malay messages from the early 1870s’, Indonesian and the Malay World, 31.91 (November 2003), pp. 390-2.
In 1900, the construction of the Hijâz Railway was inaugurated under the auspices of the Ottoman sultan, Abdülhamid II. On one level, the railway was intended as a means by which the Ottomans could maintain their precarious control over parts of the Arabian Peninsula. However, this project differed from other railway constructions in the Ottoman Empire in that, aside from its instrumentality in serving state interests, it was publicly promoted specifically as a means by which to facilitate the speed and ease of Muslim pilgrimage traffic for the *hajj* and ‘*umra* (lesser pilgrimage).  

The Ottomans were not the only ones to promote railways as a means of transport for religious pilgrimage. In India the British colonial government employed pamphlets, posters, illustrated magazines and even motion pictures to promote railway travel for pilgrimage and tourism to popular shrines, both Hindu and Muslim. The railways were thus integrated into a complex of new technologies that interacted with traditional institutions, contributing to processes of social transformation. Such developments signalled not so much a case of ‘modern’ technologies replacing ‘traditional’ religion, but rather the emergence of innovative ways in which the further spread and ongoing reinterpretations of Islam were facilitated and transformed by new means.

In connection with support of the Meccan pilgrimage in particular, the Hijâz Railway also contributed to the legitimation and support of the Ottomans in the face of growing decentralisation and rising Arab nationalism. To this end, religious scholars with ties to the Ottoman state contributed their voices of support to the project. Echoes of this ring through a manuscript written in 1900 by Muhammad al Dimashqî, entitled *al Sa'âda al nâmiya al abadiya fil sikka al hadidiya al hijaziyya*. This text was intended to counter opposition then being expressed to the idea of a rail link between Syria and the Hijâz with such arguments as:

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56 Although the original plan was for the line to extend all the way to Mecca, construction came to an end when the line reached Medina in 1908 (Landau, *Hejaz Railway*).
58 Examples of the continuation of such processes through the middle decades of the twentieth century should also include a consideration of the role of the automobile. For example, during the rubber boom years of the 1920s, there was a dramatic increase of automotive traffic in South Sumatra from under 300 registered vehicles in 1922 to over 3,000 in 1925. With this increase in the number of cars came the construction of new roads, gasoline stations and other infrastructure. All these changes contributed not only to the rapid decline of river craft and oxcart transport in the region, but also to the spread of Islamic reformist thought and organisations among local populations. The parallel courses of these developments came to be a regular pattern in Indonesia as can be seen, for example, by the spread of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi during the 1930s. For more on these developments, see Jeroen Peeters, *Kaum Tuo Kaum Mudo: Perubahan Religius di Palembang, 1821–1842* (Jakarta, 1997), pp. 135–7.
The [Ḥijāz] Railway has many obvious advantages for populating the country, restoring life to the servants [of Allah], serving the Two Shrines [Mecca and Medina], assisting those desirous to visit both of them, promoting the scope of profitable commerce, bolstering the planning of superior agriculture, and maintaining the political balance in the wide, extensive Arab lands.\(^5\)

The Ottoman Ḥijāz Railway project was mostly funded by the state through tax revenue, but a considerable portion perhaps about one third of construction expenses were covered by Muslim donations from around the world, including support from Muslims living outside Ottoman territories.\(^6\)

These were solicited by several means, including the circulation of pan Islamic newspapers and other periodicals and even the infrastructure of the Naqshbandī Sufi order.\(^7\)

Railroads, as well as other new technologies that travelled along their routes, contributed to the creation of situations in which traditional religious networks and communal boundaries were reimagined and redrawn. This can be seen, for example, in fatwās and treatises produced by prominent Ḥadīrāmī scholars at Batavia (present day Jakarta) on the first phonographs used by Muslims in the Indonesian Archipelago. Major concerns expressed in these debates involved the possibility and potential implications of non-Muslims hearing the sound of the Qur’ān played on records or wax cylinders, and the propriety of listening to the voice of a ‘strange woman’ on the same.\(^8\)

Within a short time, however, phonograph equipment had become conspicuous even in the luggage of ḥajj pilgrims. During his 1909 train trip on the Ḥijāz Railway, the Englishman A. J. B. Wavell remarked on his fellow passengers: ‘Next to us on the other side of the carriage were two Turks, father and son, whose only luggage appeared to consist of a gramophone. This ubiquitous instrument is very popular in the Hedjaz, and many Arabic records for it are now to be obtained among them even passages from the Koran!’\(^9\)

Over the years, the administration of the Hijāz Railway continued the pattern of overlapping worldly and religious concerns, as when, in 1914, its operating budget was placed formally under the control of the Ottoman Ministry of Religious

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59 Landau, Hejaz Railway, p. 23.
60 For example, funds for this project were solicited by Jam‘iyyat al Khayr, an organisation of largely Ḥadīrāmī Arabs settled in the Netherlands Indies (Freitag, Indian Ocean migrants, p. 244).
Endowments (Tur. *evkaf*, Ar. *waqf*). The reasons for this were complex, and involved at least in part efforts to block European attempts to gain control of this strategic line, as much as Ottoman concerns for the proper administration of its finances according to the dictates of Islamic law.

Steamship travel

Like print, telegraph and railroads, the expansion of steamship routes in the Indian Ocean served further to facilitate commercial communications, as well as colonial interests. For example, in 1848 the Spanish government of the Philippines ordered eighteen small steamcraft to be sent in pieces from Europe and assembled in South East Asia for use in their campaigns to secure the predominantly Muslim southern islands of the Archipelago from ‘pirates’. A more central point in the regional rise of steamship traffic in the waters of the Indonesian Archipelago and the Indian Ocean world, however, was Aden on the south coast of Arabia. In 1837 the British occupied this port as a strategic stop on the route to their Indian territories. The town then grew as an important node in expanding European colonial networks, attracting emigrants from various parts of southern Arabia looking for work both in the harbour, and on the ships that called there. Thus new waves of Muslim migrants began to spread themselves even more extensively around the rapidly expanding maritime networks that developed in the Indian Ocean as a result of the accelerated development of steamship traffic.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 has often been seen as a watershed event in the introduction of a significantly greater volume of traffic between various Muslim societies in the region. However, beyond the mere quantitative increase in numbers of steamships plying the waters of the Indian Ocean, the increased traffic facilitated by the opening of the canal also brought with it qualitative changes in the maritime culture of the region as it introduced new dynamics to older patterns of Muslim migration in the region. For example, those who went to work on steamships in this period were not necessarily wealthy merchants, religious scholars or skilled seamen, but unskilled labourers whose duties onboard stoking the coal fires demanded no special training or background. Their social status, and their interaction with the coastal populations around the Indian Ocean littoral, was thus of a different order.

from that of many earlier migrants who often were integrated into elite circles of various port polities.

In the mid nineteenth century, the French Service Maritimes des Messageries Impériales, a major competitor to the British Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company at Aden, was hiring local crew for their steamers in that port. The French were soon followed by others interested in hiring Arabs at Aden to work as firemen on their own steamships, including those of the Austro Hungarian Empire as well as Italians, Germans and Dutch. Many of the Arab crewmen of these European steamships were from Shāfī’ī areas of the Yemen, such as the Tihāma and Ḥujariyya. Here another difference between the steamship crews and earlier South Arabian sojourners is apparent, for most of these new ‘Adenese’ sailors differed from Ḥaḍramī migrants in that many of them were not from seafaring traditions and their migrations to foreign ports were usually only temporary, with a relatively high rate of return to the Yemen.66

Despite all of these changes, however, the steamship traffic did not immediately replace sail craft in the Indian Ocean. In fact in several places the growth of steamship tonnage actually contributed to local booms in the dhow trade as these traditional sailing ships were used to move the increased volume of goods being shipped between minor local harbours and regional steamship ports.67 Erik Gilbert has also called attention to the fact that while the circuits of dhow and steam traffic complemented and intersected with each other on the East African coast, the ways in which the respective crews of sail craft and steamships interacted with the populations of the ports they visited were of significantly different orders. This was in part because, despite their larger tonnage, steamships generally required relatively smaller crews per vessel. Furthermore as steamships did not have to schedule sailings according to seasonal monsoon patterns, when they arrived in port it was usually for short periods, during which many were likely to sleep onboard rather than ashore.68 These factors contributed to new configurations of interaction that differed significantly from patterned models of relationships between Muslim migrants and local populations established in earlier periods.

The expansion of steamship traffic along the coasts of the Indian Ocean world required the development of requisite infrastructures in the ports at which they called. Steamship ports were thus often sites where a number of the technologies discussed in this chapter were incorporated into a modernising system of transportation and communication. This included railway connections to facilitate an integrated system for the transportation of people and especially of goods. 69 The telegraph also contributed to the development of another significant change in shipping that was to have a considerable effect on the transformation of Muslim diasporas across the Indian Ocean during that period namely the ‘tramp steamer’.

Unlike the steamships serving regularly scheduled routes, these vessels constantly improvised their itineraries and ports of call according to fluctuating changes in the availability and demand for cargo. Because of these irregularities, a number of crewmen Muslims and others increasingly found themselves in places where they had never intended to be before. At the same time, this dispersion of populations was even further complicated by other developments in the region supported under various European colonial auspices. By the first decade of the twentieth century, labourers from South Arabia had gone by the thousands to work British mines in Rhodesia, to staff Italian armies in Somaliland and to take up other forms of employment in the territories of the expanding European colonial empires. 70 Thus over the second half of the nineteenth century, new dynamics in migration patterns affecting Muslim communities were transforming ports all along the Indian Ocean littoral.

Hadhrami Arabs in the Indian Ocean world

All across the region, print, the telegraph and steam transport were utilised with great enthusiasm and success by members of the Hadrami diaspora. 71 This can be seen clearly in the life histories and written legacies of some of these trans oceanic travellers who traversed and envisioned these distances by combining traditional migration patterns with new knowledge of modern navigational sciences imported from the West. The way in which older and newer knowledges were being integrated by Hadramis during this late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is reflected, for example, in the

71 Freitag, Indian Ocean migrants, p. 186.
New networks and knowledge

atlas and celestial chart compiled by Sayyid ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abdallāh ibn ‘Aqīl al ‘Alawī (d. 1931) of Batavia, as well as in an Arabic text produced by the Comoros born scholar Ahmad ibn Sumayt (d. 1925). The latter recorded the geographic locations of towns in the following way:

Tarīm lies fifteen degrees, ten minutes north, forty seven degrees, fifty five minutes east, Shibām lies fifteen degrees, forty five minutes north, forty seven degrees, thirty minutes east. These parallels are being used by modern seamen today, but they are different from the Arab longitudes which refer to the Canary Islands (Jazā’ir al Khālidāt) and calculate the ship from it.

Tarīm and Shibām are important cities in the area of South Arabia known as Ḥadramawt. This system of wadis located between the Indian Ocean coast, Oman and the Empty Quarter has for centuries been a major point of emigration for Muslim merchants and scholars in the Indian Ocean world. However in the late nineteenth century new developments of technology, internal politics and regional colonial infrastructures further facilitated movement between Ḥadramawt and other areas of the Middle East, Africa and Asia. This brought increased numbers of Ḥadramī migrants to ports all around the Indian Ocean and beyond in networks that connected India to East Africa, the Comoros to Istanbul and Jeddah to Singapore.

Most of these Ḥadrami sojourners travelled primarily for economic reasons, ‘seeking the ring of Solomon’ through trade and other work. This could include even mercenary entrepreneurism, as was the case of the Ḥadramī Jam’dār troops who went to India in the service of the nizām of Hyderabad. However, in the predominantly Muslim territories in which they settled, Ḥadramis were also often active in scholarship and other religious activities. In the first years of the nineteenth century, for instance, Malay translations of Islamic religious works in Arabic began appearing from the press at Pulau Penyengat, including works by Ḥadramī diaspora authors. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the publication and sale of Islamic religious texts became the speciality of a number of Ḥadramīs living in various parts

73 Bang, Sufis and scholars, p. 52.
of South East Asia. However, even in less specifically ‘religious’ genres, writers of Arab and Ḥadramī descent made significant contributions to Malay literature over the course of the nineteenth century, examples of which include the works of ‘Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad al Mīṣrī.

Wealthy Ḥadramīs in the region contributed to pious endowments that supported a network of new institutions in places like Palembang and Singapore, and networks of scholars and shaykhs of the ‘Alawīyya ṭarīqa (Sufi order) also provided an important element of structure to the networks of religious learning in the Ḥadramawt and abroad. This high degree of involvement by Ḥadramī migrants in the religious affairs of local Muslim populations in South East Asia did not escape the notice of suspicious colonial officials. The rapid increase in the numbers of Indonesian pilgrims and new Arab immigrants to the Archipelago facilitated by the introduction of modern technologies from Europe, as well as by some of their own policies of colonial population movements, caused considerable concern to Dutch officials in the region. For example, some Ḥadramī religious leaders were suspected to have been important influences in the Aceh War (1873 1904), and in a planned uprising in Palembang in 1881.

In their attempts to control the diverse populations of their Indonesian colonies, the Dutch developed a complex congeries of pluralistic legal classifications that distinguished separate jurisdictions for Europeans, ‘Natives’ governed by a colonially constructed corpus of ‘customary law’ (adatrecht), and ‘Foreign Orientals’. As the reification of ‘ethnic’ categories under the institutional sanction of Dutch colonial law became more rigid, individuals who in earlier periods might have moved more easily across geographic and linguistic boundaries found themselves restrained within various

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77 Peter Riddell, ‘Religious links between Hadhramaut and the Malay Indonesian world, c. 1850 to c. 1950’, in Freitag and Clarence Smith (eds.), Hadhrami traders, p. 222. For further notes on other Arab authors and teachers active in the Archipelago during the nineteenth century, see Karel Steenbrink, Beberapa Aspek Tentang Islam di Indonesia Abad ke 19 (Jakarta, 1984), pp. 133 7.

78 Despite his locative patronym (nisba), it appears that his ancestors came from the Hadramawt, rather than Egypt. He was reportedly born at Palembang of Arab parents who came from Kedah and had close ties with the Ḥadramī ruling house of Pontianak. For an introduction to this figure and editions of some of his major works, see: Monique Zaini LaJoubert (ed.), Abdullah bin Muhammad al Misri Ḥikāyât Mareskalek I, II, Cerita Siam, Ḥikāyât Tanah Bali (Bandung, 1987).

79 Freitag, Indian Ocean migrants, pp. 91 6, 100 1.


sub categories of ‘Foreign Orientals’: ‘Arab’ or ‘Chinese’. This classification brought with it an increased restriction of mobility through the institutional requirements of ‘pass laws’ governing both intra- and inter-regional travel. Engseng Ho has commented on the acceleration of such developments in the late nineteenth century in terms of ‘parochialisation’ and the demise of the ‘pre-national world’ of the Indian Ocean networks.82

Reified ethnic categories came to be seen as fundamental units for the management of the diverse populations of the colonies as the mobility of some Muslim travellers across networks aroused fear and suspicion among colonial administrators concerned over the spectre of pan Islamism.83 These fears spurred the development of new ways through which mobility could be controlled in order to preserve and promote the interest of the state. In the nineteenth century other European colonial powers also began to implement policies that placed more emphasis on the policing of borders through systems of immigration and quarantine. From the last decades of the nineteenth century, responses of surveillance and control of mobility reflected both the colonial administrators’ anxiety over resistance movements evoking various forms of local Islamic religious symbolism, as well as a sometimes overwhelming fear of pan Islamism. In response to this, the Dutch kept careful track not only of Arabs in the Indies, but also of Muslims from their South East Asian colonies travelling to the Middle East.

Dutch officials at that time were particularly wary of things like the circulation of eschatological epistles of the type that were circulating all across Africa and Asia in the late nineteenth century foretelling the coming end times and admonishing Muslims to action in this time of tribulation.84 Documents of this kind came to the attention of Snouck Hurgronje (d. 1936), who was the leading European Orientalist of his day and, moreover, the principal adviser to the Netherlands East Indies government for policies concerning the Muslim subjects

84 Such ‘Mecca Letters’ concerned not only the Dutch, but other European colonial governments as well. For an example of analogous developments under the Germans in East Africa, see John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German rule, 1905-1912 (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 189-91.
of the Dutch colonies. While concerned with Muslim millenarian movements, however, Snouck Hurgronje was more interested in combating conceptions of pan Islamism that were connected to notions of an Ottoman caliphate, and in channelling Muslim activism toward educational and social reform.

Such activism was by no means restricted to colonial intervention and encouragement. One early example of a local Muslim organisation in the Indonesian Archipelago that placed considerable emphasis on education and print publication to promote its goals was the Jam‘iyyat al Khayr. This organisation was founded at Batavia in the first years of the twentieth century and recruited teachers from Tunisia, Morocco and the Sudan. However these new, non Ḥadramī Arab immigrants came to introduce new dynamics into the diaspora community of Java, as seen most strikingly in the career of Ahmad al Sūrkhātī (d. 1943), the Sudanese teacher who split from the Jam‘iyyat al Khayr to found his own school and reformist organisation, al Irshād, which came actively to oppose many of the traditional customs and privileges of the locally established Ḥadramī sayyids in the Netherlands Indies.

Through the networks that connected various corners of the Ḥadramī diaspora all across the Indian Ocean littoral news of such debates soon reached home, carried by foreign born sons of Ḥadramī migrant fathers who ‘returned’ to Ḥadramawt for visits of varying durations in increasing numbers toward the end of the nineteenth century. Such contacts facilitated developments there in areas like education reform, as can be seen through the founding of schools like the ribāṭ at Tarām an institution that was economically supported by remittances from Singapore. The ribāṭ attracted students from all across the Indian Ocean littoral, and particularly young men of Ḥadramī

86 For an overview of his positions on this, see: C. Snouck Hurgronje, Nederland en de Islâm: Vier woordachten gehouden in de Nederlandsche Indische Bestuursacademie (Leiden, 1911), pp. 78 101.
87 Records indicate that it was first founded in 1901, and gained recognition from the Dutch colonial government in 1905. See Natalie Mobini Kesheh, The Hadrami awakening: Community and identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900 1942 (Ithaca, 1999), p. 36.
88 A manuscript containing an extensive, emic history of these developments from the Irshadi side of the disputes has been published by Ahmad Ibrahim Abū Shūk (ed.), Ta‘rikh ḥarakat al ʿilām wa‘l ʿirshād wa shaykh al irshādiyyin Ahmad Muḥammad al Sūrkhātī fi Ḥadramātīya (Kuala Lumpur, 2000).
89 The continuing social effects of such visits are discussed in: Engseng Ho, ‘Hadhramis abroad in Hadhramaut: The Muwallidin’, in Freitag and Clarence Smith (eds.), Hadhrami traders, pp. 131 46.
descent for whom the important expectation of a ‘pilgrimage of return’ to the ancestral wadi became easier due to the presence of regular steamship services.90

South-East Asian Muslims in the Middle East

Rapidly improving communications and transportation in the late nineteenth century did not only move more Ḥādramīūs back and forth from Ḥādramawt, for the same infrastructure also facilitated the transport of unprecedented numbers of Muslims from the Indonesian Archipelago to and from Arabia. The Arab community at Singapore that funded schools in Ḥādramawt like the ribāṭ had gained its wealth through the management of real estate holdings as well as other extensive commercial operations that included considerable investment in the booming Muslim pilgrimage industry from South East Asia.91 By the 1880s Muslims from South East Asia had come to comprise the largest annual contingent of pilgrims to Mecca, and many of the steamships that took them there passed through Singapore.92

However, the increasing importance of steamships for Muslim pilgrimage traffic also brought a greater involvement of European imperialist institutions in its logistics and administration. By 1886 British colonial officials in India had awarded the travel agency of Thomas Cook licence to operate and oversee the logistics of South Asian Muslim pilgrims for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.93 In 1898 Dutch administrators issued new regulations requiring all ḥājj travelers from the Netherlands Indies to travel to and from Arabia by steamship from designated ports, rather than more informally in sail craft from smaller harbours that were harder to keep under colonial surveillance.94

The sheer volume of Muslim pilgrims and other travellers moving back and forth from Arabia at that time further amplified colonial fears of a global

90 Bang, Sufis and scholars, p. 63.
93 The Mecca pilgrimage: Appointment by the Government of India of Thos. Cook and Son as agents for the control of the movements of Mahomedan pilgrims from all parts of India to Jeddah for Mecca, Medina, &c., and back (London, 1886). Pages 13–19 of this booklet contain a graphic (and, in the words of the editor, a ‘highly coloured’) account of conditions on British operated steamships conveying pilgrims from Bombay to Jeddah in the 1880s.
94 This and further Dutch colonial regulations on the Muslim pilgrimage from the Netherlands Indies are summarised in: C. Spat, ‘Gouvernement en bedevaart’, De Indische Gids, 34, 1 (1912), p. 347.
Islamic opposition to European rule, which became an increasingly powerful idea in the imaginations not only of local Muslim resistance movements, but increasingly in those of the European governments as well. In the case of the Dutch, the formation of their image of Islam and its role in their South East Asian territories underwent a rapid development in the later nineteenth century, as Michael Laffan has recently demonstrated in a study of the 'Meccan plot' of 1881. At that time colonial officials in the Archipelago and diplomatic staff at the new Dutch consulate in Jeddah turned a new eye toward the activities of Islamic networks especially those of Sufi orders like the Naqshbandiyya which they feared could serve to connect Muslim movements in South East Asia to broader, pan Islamic ideologies.\footnote{Laffan, 'A watchful eye'.}

The nineteenth century was a period of intense activity connected with the teaching and practice of Sufism. Aside from established ṭarīqās such as the Naqshbandiyya, recruits from an entire wave of new orders spread out from the Arabian Peninsula from the middle decades of the century. Many of these, including the Mirghaniyya, Rashidiyya, and Ahmadiiyya, grew out of movements inspired by the North African Sufi Ahmad ibn Idrīs al Fāsī (d. 1837).\footnote{Martin, \textit{Muslim brotherhoods}, p. 9.} While those orders enjoyed considerable success in Africa, other orders, such as the Sammaniyya also gained popularity in various parts of South East Asia.\footnote{G. W. J. Drewes, ‘A note on Muhammad al Samman, his writings, and 19th century Sammaniyya practices, chiefly in Batavia, according to written data’, \textit{Archipel}, 43 (1992), pp. 73–88.} The expansion of such Sufi orders in South East Asia during the nineteenth century initially followed and thence further enhanced existing networks of Islamic schools (pesantren) in the Archipelago.

During that time, the institution of the pesantren experienced phenomenal growth and development as its links to international networks of Muslim scholarship were expanded and strengthened by improved communications infrastructure. Although there had been a long tradition of Islamic education in the region, its attractions seemed to strengthen apace as Dutch colonial control of the region expanded. This may have been in part due to the fact the pesantren were locally perceived to be independent of both the Netherlands Indies government, and the ‘official Islam’ of the local aristocracies that the colonial system had co opted. These local factors combined with a broader, global Islamic revival to produce some remarkable results in Muslim South East Asia. Precise and reliable statistics are difficult to obtain for this period, but Azyumardi Azra has estimated that between 1850 and 1900 the number of
Students in such schools studied texts in the traditional Islamic religious sciences, especially fiqh (jurisprudence) and tasawwuf (Sufism).99 Aside from standard works in Arabic produced by ‘ulamā’ in the Middle East, the pesantren curricula included works produced by South East Asian scholars in Malay and other local languages, especially Javanese. Many of the authors of these texts were Jāwī long resident in the Ḥijāz such as those described by Snouck Hurgronje in the book based on his sojourn there under the name of ‘Abd al Ghaffār in 1885.100 Aside from those among them writing in South East Asian vernaculars, however, there were also Jāwī scholars of this period who continued the well established pattern of composing their own works in Arabic.101 Foremost among them was Muḥammad ‘Umar Nawawī Tanara Banten al Jāwī (d. 1897), whose work of tafṣīr (Qur’ānic exegesis) remains in print to this day in Beirut and is used by Muslims well beyond the pesantren milieu of the Indonesian Archipelago.102 In fact, Nawawī’s integration into this broader world of Muslim scholarship extended to the point that he never returned to South East Asia, ending his long years at Mecca in 1897.

Those South East Asian scholars who did return from their periods of study in Mecca were often re integrated into local pesantren networks as teachers and became important players in debates over the ongoing re interpretation Islam of the region.103 However in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, fluctuations in the power struggles between the


100 An abridged English translation of this work is available as: Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

101 Examples of such scholars from the seventeenth and eighteenth century, respectively, include Shams al Din al Pasa’î al Sumatrānī, and ‘Abd al Šamad al Fālimbānī al Jāwī. See: C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, Samu’l Din van Pasai: Bijdrage tot de Kennis der Sumatraansche Mystiek (Leiden, 1945), pp. 245 70; and G. W. J. Drewes, Directions for travellers on the mystic path: Zakariyya al Ansārī’s Kitāb Fath al Râhîn and its Indonesian adaptations, with an appendix on Palembang manuscripts and authors (The Hague, 1977), pp. 223 4.


Ottomans, the sharif of Mecca and the Wahhābīs produced significant shifts in the types of scholars active in the Hijāz and the ideas that South East Asian students there carried home with them. For example, at the turn of the twentieth century the kaum muda reformists Djamil Djambeek (d. 1947), Hadji Rasoel (d. 1949) and ‘Abdullah Ahmad (d. 1933) returned to West Sumatra after their periods of study in the Middle East. Upon their return they began attacking what they perceived to be bid’a (‘blameworthy innovation’) in its local manifestations. Over the decades that followed, West Sumatra became an active centre of Muslim reformism promoting the use of newly available printed literature in modern schools. These schools differed in some very significant ways from the master disciple relationship of traditional Muslim education, and their modern, Western inspired model of instruction came to characterise the programmes of many Muslim educational reformers in twentieth century Indonesia.

In addition to finding inspiration in developments from the Hijāz, the West Sumatran reformers were also looking to Cairo, much as from the later nineteenth century, an increasing number of Ḥadramīs had been attracted to that city by its ascendant reputation as an intellectual centre for new, ‘Western style’ education and publishing. Dramatic increases in the number of these South East Asian and Ḥadramī students and the flourishing of Malay publishing in Cairo were further fuelled by the economic prosperity of the rubber boom during the 1920s. During that period, Cairo emerged as an important centre for the publication of Islamic religious texts that included reformist periodicals and modern books as well as traditional Islamic religious texts.

In this milieu, a new generation of cosmopolitan reformist scholars thrived, such as the Meccan born Malay Muḥammad Idrīs ‘Abd al Raʿūf al Marbawī (d. 1989). In addition to a productive career as a lexicographer and author of Islamic religious texts, Marbawī also worked as the Arabic script Malay (Jāwī) text editor for the prominent Cairene publisher Muṣṭafā al Bābī al Ḥalabī and served on the editorial board of the influential reformist journal Seruan

104 Laffian, Islamic nationhood, pp. 172 8.
105 Taufik Abdullah, Schools and politics: The kaum muda movement in West Sumatra (Ithaca, 1971).
106 Freitag, Indian Ocean migrants, p. 54.
This publication was a co-operative endeavour produced by expatriate Malay and Indonesian students that stressed the need for education and religious reform as prerequisites for future national independence.

Modernity, mobilisation and the rise of nationalism

Michael Laftan has argued for the importance of Seruan Azhar, and the Cairene milieu more generally, in the development of modern conceptions of national identity among Muslim South East Asians in the early twentieth century by highlighting ‘the deeper roots of Indonesian nationalism in an Islamic ecumenism within archipelagic South East Asia’. The experiences and ideals of South East Asian Muslim diaspora communities in the Middle East during the early twentieth century are symptomatic of larger, global movements and the broad modernising impulses sweeping much of the Muslim world during this period. Evidence of this can be seen elsewhere, for example in the 1905 constitutional revolution in Iran and the 1908 ‘Young Turk’ revolution in the Ottoman Empire. These events had pronounced impacts upon traditional ‘ulamā’ networks, including those of the Shi’i scholars in the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbalā’. Meir Litvak has argued that in their case: ‘Both events politicised the ‘ulamā’ to a higher degree than ever before. Both introduced new ideas into the shrine cities, shook the patronage bonds between teachers and students, and introduced new elements to the institution of leadership.’

Similarly, in the conclusion to her work on the Barelwī movement, Usha Sanyal has remarked on the increasing politicisation of religious practice among South Asian ‘ulamā’ in the early twentieth century. More recent research on Damascene ‘ulamā’ during this same period has shown that with the fall of Abdülhamid II in 1909, many Islamic religious scholars turned to the ascendant ideology of ‘Arabism’ as a ‘national’ ideal in addition to Salafī orientations toward Islam.

Marbawī edited the seventeenth century Jāwī fiṣḥ text al Širāf al mustaḍīm of Nūr al dīn al Rānīrī for the Ḥalabī press (Cairo, 1937), which also published Marbawī’s own monumental work of Ḥadīth commentary, Bahr al Māzī shahr bāgī mukhtaṣar šāhīk al Tirmidhī (1933 41). However Marbawī is more widely known today for his Arabic Malay dictionary Qāmiṣ Arab Malāyī (Cairo, 1931).

Laffan, Islamic nationhood, p. 3.

Meir Litvak, Shi’i scholars of nineteenth century Iraq: The ‘ulama of Najaf and Karbala (Cambridge, 1998), p. 188.


All of these examples and others could be used to corroborate Edmund Burke III’s argument that the turn of the twentieth century witnessed a major transformation in the shape of major social movement patterns as well as traditional forms of protest and resistance in many Muslim societies. These changes resulted in the gradual end of millenarian and Sufi-led revolts and forms of organisation linked to agrarian structures and local cultural traditions. By the end of the First World War, new patterns of social organisation and action were gaining prominence in the form of boycotts, labour strikes and student demonstrations, as well as in the rapid rise of nationalist ideologies in a number of Muslim majority societies.114 These developments mark the results of the dramatic period of transition during the later nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, in which a constellation of new technologies transformed the scale and structure of Muslim networks in ways that have had significant effects upon the understandings of Islam transmitted across them.

Introduction

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries European colonialism created the infrastructure for a new and more global system of economic production and exchange. In the aftermath of the Second World War, colonial capitalism gave way to less directly coercive linkages of market and state, but events have otherwise preserved a general pattern of Western economic dominance. This chapter examines the impact of the phases of economic globalisation and Western dominance since the late nineteenth century on urbanisation, industrialisation and inequality in the Muslim world. It also examines how mainstream Islam is responding to the challenges of globalisation. Special attention is given to the colonial legacies of population, urban growth and class inequalities; the implications of globalisation and international economic restructuration during the 1980s and 1990s; contrasts between oil producing and non oil Muslim economies and alleged affinities between the rentier state and political authoritarianism; the new alliance between Islamic financiers, the ‘ulamā’ and global capitalism; and the impact of today’s ‘demographic bulge’ on future trends in population and politics.

Colonial legacies

The development of the telegraph, coupled with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, ushered in the first phase of economic globalisation, 1870-1914. Movements of peoples, goods, capital and information accelerated across the globe, and the governments of the principal owners of the capital and technology in turn extended their empires for the sake of increased efficiency and to defend themselves from one another. By the turn of the century virtually all of Africa, the Middle East and large parts of Asia were under European rule, and Britain and France would complete the task of disassembling the Arab parts of
the Ottoman Empire in 1920. Maps of the world until the mid twentieth century were coloured red for Britain, blue for France, etc., obscuring the fact that the new territories they represented had once, with few exceptions, been in the dār al Islām, land under Muslim rule.¹ The exceptions were parts of tropical and southern Africa, the southern peripheries of China and the Indian subcontinent, Guyana, most of the Philippines and many other little islands. After the Spanish American War the United States mopped up remnants of Muslim resistance in the Philippines, although the French and the Italians would be pacifying parts of North Africa much closer to home well into the 1930s. Broadly, however, the first phase of economic globalisation coincided with the final collapse of Islam as a political and economic force.

The only Muslim territories to escape Western imperialism were parts of inner Asia brought under Soviet or Chinese control, buffer states such as Afghanistan and Iran, where Russian and British spheres of influence remained informal, parts of the Arabian Peninsula and the Republic of Turkey, frog marching zealously through ‘secular’ reforms in the 1920s to be as Western as possible. Within the Muslim world the Ottoman Mediterranean had most vividly experienced the forces of economic globalisation leading to political collapse. Debt crises had led in 1881 and 1882, respectively, to the French and British occupations of Tunisia and Egypt, to a multinational takeover of Ottoman finances in 1881 and to the dividing up of Morocco in 1912 between the French and Spaniards. Elsewhere in Africa and Asia, European conquests extended the territories under colonial occupation but, with a few exceptions such as Iran and the ‘jihad states’ of West Africa, Muslim states were no longer available for mortgage to international investors. In the Indian subcontinent and Indonesia, which contain roughly half of the world’s Muslim population, the British had already destroyed the Mughal Empire, and the Dutch never experienced more than local oppositions.

Globalisation served to rationalise new empires, with important consequences for the various Muslim local leaders and social intermediaries. The direct effects, however, also ran contrary to the globalisation of the Muslim world. With a few temporary exceptions, the first phase of globalisation further boxed Muslims into the various European empires, thereby disconnecting them from their own earlier ‘worldwide system of Muslim societies’.²

¹ Conversely Shāh ‘Abd al ‘Azīz (1746 1824), a Muslim reformist, issued a fatwā (legal ruling) in 1803 declaring India to be dār al ḫarb (literally ‘land of war’ in contrast to Islam’s ‘land of peace’), according to Ira Lapidus, A history of Islamic societies (Cambridge, 1988), p. 720.
² Ibid., p. 551.
Although most colonial authorities permitted the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, new barriers curtailed much of the trade and money transfers that had characterised an earlier less intensive globalisation without the telegraph.

Western ‘colonialism’, a term used here to denote political rule by a Western metropole over other populations, with or without colonists, took many forms, depending on the nationality of the coloniser but also upon the timing of the colonial conquest. The new French rulers of Tunisia, for instance, looked to Algerian models ‘more often as examples of what not to do’\(^3\) and thus did not commit the same mistakes of razing a ruling elite and ruling by military force. Occupying Morocco in 1912, a generation after Tunisia, Marshall Lyautey perfected techniques of indirect rule that preserved local elites while pacifying the country and forging new administrations to serve projects of colonisation. Indeed, distinctive differences of colonial policy even by the same coloniser in adjacent geographic areas had major implications for post colonial rule.

The most important colonial legacy was the social composition of the nationalist movement that arose in opposition to colonial rule. These movements varied across the Muslim world in the degree to which they mobilised their respective populations and in the composition of the new elites that orchestrated the mobilisation. If many of the latter were ‘Creole’, the products of Western education, they were also in varying degrees rooted in whatever remained of their pre colonial social structures. The critical social intermediaries survived to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the nature of colonial rule, the degree, for instance, to which traditional elites were retrained and used by the new colonial administration. In Indonesia, for instance, the Dutch transformed a historic ruling class of priyayi into subordinate functionaries spreading a uniform language and sense of nationality across a multitude of islands. British rule, by contrast, seriously weakened the Muslim landowners of the Mughal era.

The colonial dialectic everywhere pitted new social strata against older ones that the metropolitan power had to some degree co opted and discredited. The new nations created in opposition to colonial rule tended to become more inclusive, the longer the conflict endured between rulers and colonial subjects. As important as the longevity of colonial rule and opposition to it, however, was the degree of colonial repression. The more carefully repression was calibrated, the greater the chances for the nationalists to keep organising and extending their new civil societies, as in British India or French Tunisia. In

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Tunisia a new French educated stratum with rural roots could incorporate older classes in a relatively extensive new nation. There was time, between the colonial occupation of 1881 and independence in 1956, for three generations of nationalists, from Young Tunisians in 1908, the Destour in 1920, to the Neo Destour of 1934, to extend and deepen their dominion. But in neighbouring Algeria the repression was too severe and traditional intermediaries too thoroughly discredited by their collaboration with colonial rule for a similar dialectic to unfold. In much of the Near East, by contrast, there was too little time for constructive confrontations with the colonial power. Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, for instance, were only brought under Western rule in 1920, much later than Tunisia, yet obtained their independence earlier, before nationalism had developed intermediaries connecting the urban elites to rural bases. Iraq gained formal independence in 1932, followed by Syria and Lebanon in 1946. Consequently the new national communities achieving independence, especially in Iraq, were little more than networks of Ottoman notables and tribal leaders who had become large landowners. The military officers, recruited from peripheral strata and hence serving as intermediaries of sorts with rural populations, would, except in Lebanon, replace civilian rulers after independence—a pattern replicated in much of the Muslim world.

Indonesia, Pakistan and Nigeria, the most populous of the new Muslim nations, also succumbed to military rule shortly after independence because their respective nationalist movements did not develop more effective political intermediaries. Secular Muslim leaders in British India had broken with the Congress Party and achieved independence for Pakistan before they could build up a comparable party linking urban elites to the countryside. So also in Indonesia, the Japanese occupation cut short any potential colonial dialectic with the Dutch rulers. Nigeria developed regional parties before independence but they did not have time to link up with the more populous, Muslim hinterland to the north. Military rule came by default as a substitute for civil intermediaries, not as some inherently Islamic form of government. In Malaysia parties emerged first in response to a largely non Malay Communist insurgency and then in defence of Malay identity while delicately balancing other ethnic economic interests in a dominant one party system.

The other exceptions to military rule were countries that had not been colonised, or that had otherwise preserved a monarchical form of government

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and strong religious institutions. The Moroccan ‘Alawí dynasty (1631)—survived by accident, because the French resident general, General Augustin Léon Guillaume, had exiled the shy monarch to Madagascar in 1953 for not signing away Morocco’s sovereignty. Having unintentionally sanctified him, France was obliged, to prevent further bloodshed, to return Mohammed V to his throne in late 1955 and almost immediately grant Morocco its independence. Iran eventually lost its monarchy but still survived without military rule because it harboured a relatively autonomous religious establishment and rich varieties of intermediaries. Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey also managed for different reasons to avoid subservience to an organised military force. In Saudi Arabia contending royal factions enjoyed the support of alternate military establishments, the National Guard and the conventional armed forces. Turkish military intervention was never intended to undermine the legitimacy of a civil constitutional order, although the military did reshape it on four different occasions after 1950.

Population and urban growth

Another important legacy of colonial rule was the rise of new cities, eventually to be mega cities, like Cairo, Dacca, Jakarta, Karachi, Lagos and Lahore (including satellite cities), with over 10 million inhabitants. On balance the new public health and other services accompanying Western domination led to the largest increases of Muslim populations in their history, although as late as the 1920s at least one colonial power, Italy, was massacring them, and there is no way of knowing how many hundreds of thousands or millions of Muslims were killed in earlier times resisting Western invasions. In 1800, about the time Napoleon invaded Egypt (1798) to begin the Western conquest of the southern Mediterranean, Roger Owen estimates the populations of Anatolia and the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire to have been in the range of 11 to 12 million, with an additional 750,000 for Istanbul. By the end of the nineteenth century they had grown to 32 to 33 million, and Istanbul was counted to be 1 million in the 1906 census.

5 Populations swelled even in Greater Syria where large numbers, especially Christians, emigrated from the harsh conditions afflicting the region in late Ottoman times. The total population of the Ottoman successor states of Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Syria and Turkey reached almost 70 million in 1960 and 200 million in 2004. In this core of the Muslim world the population has increased almost twenty fold in

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the past two centuries, for the most part in the twentieth century, when the rates of increase also seemed to be accelerating. Populations doubled during the first sixty years of the twentieth century and then tripled in the most recent half century. The worldwide Muslim population reached 1.48 billion in 2003.6

A closer examination of the data reveals that in the Mediterranean, at least, the population explosion affected colonial and independent countries alike but may have given the more intensely colonised countries like Egypt a head start over Iran and Turkey. Even latecomers, however, already experienced urban development with the opening up of trade and commerce in the nineteenth century. Casablanca was little more than a fishing village in 1834 with a population of 800, but it had already expanded to 12,000 by 1913, the year after France established a protectorate over Morocco. It then expanded by 1920 to 110,000 people,7 with Muslims in the minority, as Casablanca became Morocco’s principal port. Its population in 2000 was 3,357,000.

The era of Western dominance clearly set off a population explosion, especially in the new cities, that persisted after their countries, shaped by their colonial masters, achieved formal independence following the Second World War. Table 3.1 presents the populations in 1960 and in 2003 of fifty three countries that are full members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. The Muslims constituting 11 per cent of India’s population were added because they constitute the fifth largest Muslim population after Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria and Bangladesh. In many of these countries, including Malaysia and Pakistan, the population tripled over those forty three years, as the column of the table indicates by the ratio between the two years. The average ratio was 2.7, indicating an average annual rate of growth of about 2.4 per cent.

The masses in the cities, more available for political activity, grew much faster. In 1960 the urban populations of these countries, without India, totalled slightly fewer than 100 million. The cities expanded more than six fold to a population of 598 million by 2003. The final column of Table 3.1 presents the ratio for each country of the urban population in 2003 to that of 1960. Many of the outliers are oil states that brought in expatriate labour to manage their riches in a sort of reverse colonialism. Dubai, building a huge palm shaped

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6 As calculated by Muslim Population Worldwide: www.islamicpopulation.com/index.html (retrieved 27 July 2005), from conventional sources such as the CIA Factbook. See Table 3.1 for similar results that did not include at least 40 million Muslims living in Europe and the Americas. Other sources, taking into account possible underestimates of Muslim populations in China, India and elsewhere, indicate that the real total may be as high as 1.7 billion.

Table 3.1 Populations and urbanisation of predominantly Muslim member states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference

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Table 3.1 (cont.)

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Note: four of the fifty seven member states were omitted from the table because their populations were not predominantly Muslim.

Population, urbanisation and the dialectics of globalisation

Figure 3.1 Urbanisation, 1960-2003

island in the Persian Gulf, aspired to be a global city attracting the world’s wealthiest to buy extra homes, drive Bentleys and trade international securities. Other cities like Mauritania's Nouakchott, however, reflect human misery caused by an ecological disaster. The French created the capital city out of sand near a fishing village in 1957. At independence in 1960 it had a population of about 3,000 but grew as a refugee centre from prolonged drought to about 600,000 in 1987 (out of a total Mauritanian population of 1.9 million at the time).

The cities of the largest ten predominantly Muslim states grew annually from 1960 to 2003 at more sedate rates, averaging 4.4 per cent, which was still 2 per cent higher their overall population increases. Figure 3.1 presents their trajectories of increasing urbanisation since 1960, to which is added that of the most significant outlier, Saudi Arabia. The Saudi oil rents clearly amplified urbanisation as the tribes swarmed into new cities built and serviced by expatriate labour. Only in Egypt was urbanisation apparently levelling off, in the sense that its cities simply reflected the general annual population

increases which also levelled off after 2000 to an annual 1.8 per cent. By 1960 Cairo had already surpassed the 2 million population limit set by its urban planners, and the metropolitan area of this mega city exceeded 10 million by 1999, although the lines were ever more blurred between the ‘urban’ parts of the city, neighbourhoods that were ruralised and others still that were transplanted to make way for urban development.9

In Figure 3.1 Pakistan has the only other urban population that shows some signs of levelling off (albeit with a general average increase that remains relatively high at 2.4 per cent), while Turkey and Iran are converging as among the most urbanised Muslim countries, next to Saudi Arabia, with roughly two thirds of their people living in what their countries define as cities.10 These countries together with Indonesia, however, were recording the lowest general population increases, an annual 1.3 to 1.6 per cent in the first decade of the twenty first century. With the dawn of the new millennium there was some hope that populations would stabilise and the growth of mega cities be somehow brought under control, a prospect to which this chapter will return, discussing the demographic bulge that meanwhile augurs increasing unemployment and instability.

Inequality and uneven development

Daniel Lerner reflected many of the mid century hopes for modernisation in his Passing of traditional society, published in 1958. Urbanisation was supposed to be the first broad step a society could take in a modernisation process, so that cities could then educate people and offer skills to free them from stagnant and overcrowded ‘traditional’ agriculture to work in new industries. Literacy would also expose them to the media and new forms of association that would lead, in turn, to political participation and the practice of democracy. But he noted that the timing in Egypt was already messed up: the new media radio for illiterate as well as literate populations was serving more as a means of social and political control than an agent of liberation, and industrialisation was not keeping up with the waves of migration from the countryside.11

9 Farha Ghannam, Remaking the modern space: Space, relocation, and the politics of identity in a global Cairo (Berkeley, 2002); and Janet L. Abu Lughod, Cairo: 1001 years of the city victorious (Princeton, 1971).
10 The world development indicators give their definition of the urban population as ‘the midyear population of areas defined as urban in each country and reported to the United Nations’.
The newly independent regimes did by and large pursue education enthusiastically, as modernisation theory prescribed and as Islam, of course, also encourages. Their colonial legacies varied considerably, however, and affected cultural development. Turkey, which had escaped formal colonisation, had placed the largest proportion of children living in a predominantly Muslim country in school by 1960. Gross primary school enrolments reached 75 per cent of the school age population (including 58 per cent of the girls). On the other hand Indonesia, after achieving independence in 1950, was also enrolling 71 per cent of its children (including 58 per cent of the girls). Table 3.2 shows that the major Muslim countries, with the exceptions of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, were achieving universal primary education by 2000 and, with Egypt in the lead, were making steady progress in secondary school and university enrolments. Literacy among the youth, too, steadily increased, but there were interesting variations (see Figure 3.2). The Indonesians and Malaysians led the way, followed by the Turks. The Iranians, Tunisians and Saudis were catching up in almost lockstep, as also, from much lower literacy rates, were Algerians and Nigerians. But progress in the Arab world was mixed. In Egypt, where the gross enrolment in universities reached 38 per cent in 1998, only 73 per cent of the youths aged fifteen to twenty four were literate in 1996, the last year data are available. It could not be assumed that all of the university students were functionally literate.

Egypt amplified a problem that other third world countries faced. Governments had to open the floodgates to schooling at all levels, but they did not have the resources to maintain the quality of education. Declining standards are also diffused to neighbouring countries within the Arab world. Egypt, for example, exports many indifferently qualified teachers and university professors to the Gulf countries that, as Table 3.2 shows for Saudi Arabia, rapidly increased their enrolments in response to popular demand.

The deterioration in educational quality in turn deepens social inequality. When education was scarcer but of better quality, there were greater opportunities for mobility because the children who were admitted could then advance into prestigious jobs with colonial civil services and the like. Although the system primarily benefited relatively privileged families, it offered some openings to the less privileged. In the early phases of urbanisation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, growing numbers of children from rural backgrounds were getting schooling, and they would form the backbone of nationalist parties and deepen the connections between the capital and the smaller towns and villages. But as the schools expanded beyond the staffing needs of their respective economies, the diplomas became ever less valuable,
Table 3.2  School enrolments (gross, as percentage of school age groups)

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*Note:* Some percentages may be higher than 100 because gross enrolments include all ages.


Figure 3.2. Literacy of youth (ages fifteen to twenty four), 1970-96

*Note:* Some percentages may be higher than 100 because gross enrolments include all ages.

higher ones all the more necessary and pressures all the greater to expand secondary and university education beyond any functional need for their products.

Diploma inflation and the deterioration of scholastic standards deepened social inequalities because the principal beneficiaries of the system were no longer a new middle class but rather were families that could afford private schools, preferably in the former metropole or the United States, or at least pay the public schoolmasters for special tutoring. Social inequalities ironically increased even in the post colonial systems that tried to practise socialism. After initial expansions of opportunity creating the new middle class of secondary and university graduates, the educational systems invariably outran the capacities of their respective economies to absorb the graduates. Algeria’s drive for ‘industrialising industries’, for instance, bogged down in the 1980s, and in more conservative Morocco the employment prospects of a smaller educated elite were just as dismal.

The countries, with few exceptions, were not industrialising rapidly enough to absorb their burgeoning, ever more educated and expectant urban populations. Their manufacturing bases, to be sure, steadily increased with the new late twentieth century surge of world trade and financial transfers that accompanied their formal independence. But the increases, as indicated by the value added in manufacturing, only barely kept up with urban population increases, notwithstanding even greater increases in educational enrolments. Figure 3.3 tracks this evolution in constant (year 2000) dollars of value added in manufacturing per urban inhabitant from 1970 to 2003 for the largest predominantly Muslim countries with available data. With the spectacular exception of Malaysia, they displayed relatively little progress. Saudi manufacturing, developed largely by expatriates, remained flat, in the sense that expansion barely kept up with its sky rocketing urbanisation. Egypt and Tunisia displayed the most progress and, together with Turkey, managed to surpass $500 per urban inhabitant by the end of the twentieth century. Of the other, poorer countries, only Indonesia showed significant progress, until the 1998 crisis flattened its per capita growth, while others, notably Algeria, regressed.

As long as the dominant Western powers were still challenged by the Soviet Union and supported more aid as well as trade for these contested ‘grey’ areas, their governments could try to keep up with urbanisation by supporting corresponding increases in education, administration and even public sector industry. Muslim countries in particular gained new leases on life by the dramatic changes in the international oil industry conditioned by the laws of supply and demand but sparked also by resentment against United States
support for Israel in the October 1973 war. The petroleum rich, predominantly Muslim countries generously assisted third world countries stricken by higher oil prices, especially Arab and Muslim ones. The international financial community, awash with petro dollars, further contributed by lending profusely to the rest of the third world, notably to Latin America. But few of these countries survived the international debt crisis, triggered by a Mexican default caused by declining oil prices in 1982, without undergoing major pressures for economic reform. The debt crisis painfully engaged Muslim and other third world countries, most of them non-aligned and protesting since the Bandung Conference of 1955 against dependence and exploitation, into the second major wave of globalisation.

Structural adjustment

The countries of what could be called a Mediterranean Debt Crescent, stretching from Morocco eastward through Tunisia and Egypt up to Turkey, had been sufficiently independent for their new national cultures to harbour memories of how the first wave of globalisation had struck. The new experiences at the hand
of international financial institutions resembled those of the nineteenth century, albeit without the gunboats that had supported reforms and collections on behalf of the nineteenth century bondholders. The second wave of globalisation increased pressure for economic reform across the third world as the Cold War (1946–89) faded away. Some of the Muslim allies of the United States were especially hard hit: the strategic rents of Morocco, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan had propped up their frail economies.

Governments became so seriously indebted by the early 1980s that they were obliged to go the International Monetary Fund (IMF), if they wished their international creditors to provide new funds to pay off their mounting debt service obligations. Figure 3.4 tracks the total international debt, as a percentage of GDP, of each major Muslim debtor country, with Pakistan peaking early and then Egypt, Morocco and finally Nigeria leading the way in the mid 1980s. Many countries became so heavily indebted that they could not keep rolling over their loans without offering the international financial community some evidence that they might eventually repay them. The function of the IMF was to signal such credit worthiness by establishing
stabilisation programmes to reduce their foreign exchange and budget deficits. The IMF monitored these programmes through standby and other agreements providing the debtor countries with credit in return for meeting certain conditions, such as tightening domestic credit and devaluing their currencies. Once an economy was stabilised, the IMF and the World Bank proposed various structural adjustment programmes prescribing neo liberal policies, such as reducing import duties, liberalising the banking system and privatising parts of public sector industry, as conditions for receiving more loans.

One way of comparatively assessing pressures for adjustment on these states is to examine their use of IMF credit. Although these credits were usually small, relative to the credits received from international banks, they functioned as a sort of debt power multiplier until the mid 1990s, when the IMF was summoned to bail out Indonesia, Turkey and others with ten or more billions of dollars. Until then, it seems reasonable to assume that a country was carrying out neo liberal reforms roughly in proportion to the volume of its outstanding high powered credits. Figure 3.5 charts the use of IMF credit\(^{12}\) by the debtor countries featured in Figure 3.4.

Although the biggest debtors were not always the biggest beneficiaries of the IMF’s largesse, Pakistan qualified on both counts in the 1970s and remained an important client of the IMF into the mid 1980s. Morocco also qualified on both counts. Figure 3.4 shows how its external debt rose from a manageable 52 per cent of GDP in 1980 to over 120 per cent by 1985. By this time it had been compelled to embark on major reforms, cutting administrative expenditures by freezing recruitment into the civil service. Figure 3.5 shows that by 1985 its use of IMF credit amounted to almost 10 per cent of GDP. It started structural adjustment relatively early because its finances were spinning out of control. The other big debtors in this period, however, got far less funding from the IMF and warded off the pressures. Nigeria signed several standby arrangements with the IMF but never received funding; as oil prices recovered in the late 1980s, Nigeria

\(^{12}\) The official World Bank definition is that 'Use of IMF credit denotes repurchase obligations to the IMF for all uses of IMF resources (excluding those resulting from drawings on the reserve tranche). These obligations, shown for the end of the year specified, comprise purchases outstanding under the credit tranches, including enlarged access resources, and all special facilities (the buffer stock, compensatory financing, extended fund, and oil facilities), trust fund loans, and operations under the structural adjustment and enhanced structural adjustment facilities.'
could get away without reforms. Egypt had less oil but still enjoyed the favour of the United States for having made peace with Israel. One IMF director viewed the standby negotiated in 1987 to be so lenient that he took retirement a few months ahead of schedule. The other poor and chronically indebted states were Bangladesh and Pakistan. Reeling from oil price increases in 1974 and 1979, they were almost continually engaged in negotiations about their reform obligations in an unending series of loan agreements with the IMF.

Turkey and Tunisia also had their brief periods in the early and late 1980s, respectively, when they 'caught up' with Bangladesh, borrowing over 2 per cent of GDP from the IMF. Each engaged in extensive reforms and lived up reasonably well to their commitments. With much less pressure from international financial institutions, Indonesia and Malaysia also carried out major reforms. Despite accumulating debt approaching 80 per cent of GDP in 1987, Malaysia worked its way out of the crisis by expanding its manufacturing and export capabilities. Oil revenues cushioned Indonesia, but General Suharto (pres. 1967–98) also fielded an able team of technocrats.
Algeria, given to extremes, underwent one of the most radical experiences of adjustment. It had indebted its economy for the sake of very ambitious industrialisation projects in the 1970s, supported by modest oil and gas revenues that in turn, as with Mexico, offered opportunities for high leverage from the international banking community. Figure 3.4 shows that international debt had already reached the dangerous level of 60 per cent of GDP by 1978, when President Boumediene died and was replaced by a more conservative military officer. High oil and gas revenues cushioned an expansion of consumption at the expense of investment in industry, but with the collapse of oil prices in 1986–7, Algeria faced a severe crisis. Debt reached 79 per cent of GDP in 1995, while a civil war pitted Islamists against a discredited regime. Algeria finally agreed to an Extended Fund Facility with the IMF and dismantled many ailing state enterprises in the late 1990s, at a cost of at least 400,000 jobs. The political costs could not have been borne without the distractions of a horrendous civil war (1992–8) that took the lives of over 100,000 Algerians.

Elsewhere structural adjustment was not quite as costly, but neo liberal reforms reinforced tendencies toward inequality that the more populist, egalitarian regimes had unintentionally generated by favouring higher education over functional literacy and producing ever more university graduates who were unemployable unless their families had influence.

James Galbraith has developed a measure of inequality, using Theil’s T Statistic, that analyses wage differentials within manufacturing sectors, as captured by United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) statistics. It is not about entire societies although such wage differentials arguably reflect those of other sectors of the economy as well. Unlike household surveys, which aim to measure income distribution across an entire society, they only reflect inequalities within particular sectors tracked by UNIDO, but their advantage is that they annually capture trends within these sectors, whereas household surveys are infrequent. Chronological comparisons within countries are more interesting and perhaps more reliable, too, than cross national comparisons provided by household surveys, often conducted in different ways and for different years.

Figures 3.6 through 3.8 examine the patterns of inequality in the manufacturing sector for the principal Muslim Asian, Middle Eastern and African countries respectively. Evidently successful structural adjusters do not have to suffer greater inequality as a consequence. Malaysia, the Muslim poster child for

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industrialisation (Figure 3.3), shows greater equality in the distribution of industrial wages in 1999 than in 1968. There was perhaps a rough period in the late 1980s when inequalities widened at the beginning of Malaysia’s industrial surge, but wage levels evidently evened out. So also in Indonesia, where manufacturing kept up pretty well with urbanisation, there was considerably less inequality in the late 1990s than in the early 1970s. Pakistan and Bangladesh, by contrast, reflected the gloomy expectations, shared by many critics of globalisation, of growing inequality consequent to neoliberal reform: in these poor ‘fourth world’ settings, the poor were getting even poorer.

In the Middle East Turkey and Egypt also illustrate the conventional wisdom that increasing inequality accompanies structural adjustment. It took a strong military hold over Turkey’s political life (1980–3) to get Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s reform programme implemented. During this period Turkey made a historic transition from import substitution industrialisation essentially subsidising inefficient Turkish monopolies to export oriented growth. Wages took a nosedive during this period and were levelled from the bottom, but then, with the fruits of economic reform, inequality became even more pronounced than at the time of the second oil shock of 1979. So also
in Egypt, President Anwar Sadat’s *infitāḥ* (opening up) of the Egyptian economy initially gave the public sector a new lease on life, but more painful structural adjustment, accompanied by real privatisation of substantial parts of the public sector to get debt relief after 1990, generated sharp increases in wage disparities, as well as the more visible and corrupt ‘fat cats’ and Dreamland economics of the late Mubarak (pres. 1981–2011) period. Figure 3.7 shows that Saddam’s Iraq was also adjusting and creating greater wage disparities after the end of the Iran–Iraq War. The Iranian Revolution, by contrast, brought greater equality in the industrial sector, an equality that did not, however, appear to be sustainable, given the inability of the divided government to engage in any significant economic reform. Viewed as a whole, the Middle East and North Africa, including its oil producers, averaged higher scores of inequality in the 1990s than South Asia, Latin America or even sub Saharan Africa.

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The African cases present further evidence of an association between economic adjustment and rising inequality. Tunisia, the most assiduous structural reformer in the region, illustrates a pattern of rising inequality similar to that of Egypt and Turkey. It experienced serious labour unrest in 1979 and was obliged by 1986 to embark on a major structural adjustment programme. Although there are gaps in the available Tunisian data presented in Figure 3.8, wage inequality reached the highest level, as measured by Theil’s T Statistic, of any Muslim country in our sample in 1994, before descending to levels in 1999 that still remained higher than the others. The other African cases show less clear cut patterns, and their manufacturing sectors, relative to urbanisation (Figure 3.3), were also smaller. Algeria’s revolutionary propagation of public sector industry kept wages relatively equal until the collapse of 1994, but subsequent data are fragmentary. Morocco displays a cyclical pattern with relatively high levels of wage inequality, reflecting the preservation of its colonial economy by the monarchy’s business elite. Morocco cut its budget deficits in the 1980s and 1990s but did not need to undergo the structural transformation of post socialist Algeria or Tunisia because wealthy individuals, not the state, had acquired the French settler enterprises. Despite a much smaller manufacturing base, relative to the
size of its cities, Nigerian wage scales apparently reflected growing inequality in the 1990s without undergoing much structural adjustment.

Political reform

By 1997, the year the World Bank published its World Development Report entitled *The state in a changing world*, the international financial community had come to realise that neo liberal economic reforms required strong, active states to regulate local markets and integrate them with international ones. Markets were not self regulating, and spatial metaphors between the public and private sectors were misleading. States could not simply ‘shrink’ as market forces took over, as some neo liberal fundamentalists urged.17 The World Bank now recognised that states, while getting out of most businesses, had to remain in the very important business of regulating them, requiring stronger, more flexible, responsive and adaptable administrations. States with limited administrative capacities were now increasingly challenged not only to carry out market friendly economic policies but also to develop their ‘governance’ capabilities. In effect the new national sovereignties were now threatened not only with international market forces but also with political reform. In this sense globalisation had finally come full circle from the nineteenth to the twenty first century.

This time, as in the late nineteenth century, some Muslim intellectuals, particularly in the Arab world, joined international calls for good governance. Arab social scientists, writing the first Arab Human Development Report in 2002 on behalf of the United Nations Development Programme, urged reform to make up the region’s ‘freedom deficit’ and in effect equated good governance with constitutional democracy. The Muslim governments, like those that survived the nineteenth century onslaught, continued their defensive modernisation while playing, against criticisms of lamentable human rights records, on the popular identification of globalisation with imperialism, a defensive tactic reinforced by the Bush administration’s initiative of ‘regime change’ in Iraq (2003).

The Freedom House data used by the writers of the Arab Human Development Report point to a ‘freedom deficit’ not only in the Arab world but in the much larger Muslim regions as well. While a ‘third wave’18 of

democratic transitions spread full ‘freedom’ to almost half the countries of the world, only ten of the forty six majority Muslim countries tracked by Freedom House qualified as electoral democracies in 2004; and only two, Mali and Senegal, with populations of respectively 11.7 and 10.2 million, were rated fully ‘free’. Some 188,960,000 Muslims (of a total of almost 1.5 billion) lived in ‘free’ countries, but mostly as minorities in India, the EU, the Americas and, according to Freedom House, Israel.19 Muslim countries became principal targets for governance reform if not outright regime change.

Hossain Mahdavy already recognised part of the problem in the late 1960s, at about the time Islamist politics were surfacing in response to the crushing Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in the Six Day War of June 1967 and also, more generally, to the ‘convulsions of modern times’.20 At a conference held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, in July 1967 Mahdavy, introducing the modern period, took issue with any suggestions of ‘an Islamic theory of underdevelopment’ and presented his alternative, a seminal article about economic development in ‘rentier states’. Easy oil rents, by circumventing ‘direct exploitation of the people’ by taxes and industrial discipline, could facilitate socio political stagnation and inertia … A government that can expand its services without resorting to heavy taxation acquires an independence from the people seldom found in other countries … [with] the power of the government to bribe pressure groups or to coerce dissidents … the temptations for a government bureaucracy to turn into a rentier class with its own sources of income are considerable.21

Hazem Beblawi, Giacomo Luciani and others easily converted Mahdavy’s explanation of the Middle East’s lacklustre economic development into explanations for enduring authoritarianism in the region. In 2005 Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen, seven of the sixteen most populous members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (excluding Uganda, a member since the days of Idi Amin despite its small Muslim minority) qualified as rentier states by receiving well over half of their revenues from oil and gas exports. Egypt, with Suez Canal tolls as well as significant oil revenues and substantial foreign assistance, could also qualify as

a rentier state, as might Indonesia, with oil revenues constituting one quarter of its exports, and Morocco, too, with its rents from phosphates. Of the remaining six, Bangladesh and Pakistan were very poor, Afghanistan poor and war torn, and Uzbekistan had been part of the Soviet Union. Malaysia and Turkey were the dynamic exceptions that possibly proved the rule. Might it be not so much Islam as oil and other natural resources that predestined some of these countries to economic stagnation and political authoritarianism? Some argued, for instance, that the future of democracy in Iraq depended in part upon removing control of the oil revenues from the government and distributing them directly to the people.

The proposition that substantial oil revenues hinder democracy is not, of course, borne out in countries like Norway, or the state of Texas for that matter, where the oil came on stream long after democratic institutions had been consolidated. In the newer countries of the Muslim world, however, easily earned revenues disconnected from the rest of the economy may have discouraged the development of government institutions. Saudi Arabia is a perfect illustration because it also eliminates other possible culprits like imperialism that Mahdavy wished to minimise as explanations of political or economic underdevelopment. Kiren Chaudhry argues that the new revenues in fact undercut nascent extractive capabilities of the young Saudi administration, a point that Robert Vitalis questions.22 Other cases of Muslim authoritarianism may have too many other competing explanations. Surely colonialism was a significant force in Algeria that prevented the emergence of any civil society during the formative period before independence. Possibly Algeria and Saudi Arabia respectively exemplify too much and too little colonialism for civil society to develop and democratic practices to take root, but then Tunisia, with a more constructive dose of colonialism, also turned authoritarian after independence.

Algeria and Tunisia, neighbouring one party regimes, displayed more significant economic variations than political ones, although the former was clearly a rentier state and the latter was not. They carried out similar economic policies of industrialisation and import substitution in the 1960s, but Tunisia changed course in 1969 to policies more attuned to international markets whereas Algeria, fuelled by substantial oil and gas revenues, stayed the course until 1979 and then went on a consumer spending spree, compounding subsequent problems of adjustment. Even with respect to economic policies,

however, oil may have relatively less impact than differences in their respective colonial legacies. Algeria was literally born rent seeking, as the assets of 90 per cent of the settler population, who deserted Algeria at independence in 1962, were immediately up for redistribution, years before the oil revenues came on stream. The French had prepared many earnest Tunisian administrators but few Algerians to staff the complex colonial bureaucracies. Oil revenues, exploding in 1973, amplified Algeria’s policy of building ‘industrialising industries’, and the absence of such revenues helps to explain why Tunisia prudently halted a similar policy (advocated by the same French development economist) earlier. But their respective administrative capacities are better explained by differences in their colonial legacies. The Tunisians had a stronger state that, for example, could flexibly mobilise resources into manufacturing for European markets. As Figure 3.3 shows, Algeria enjoyed a brief head start in the early 1970s but then could never catch up with Tunisia or, after 1987, with its own burgeoning urban populations.

Michael L. Ross applied an alternative to carefully selected case studies for evaluating whether oil rents really do ‘hinder democracy’.23 His multivariate cross country analysis published in the prestigious World Politics apparently ended the debate with strong econometric evidence in favour of the rentier state theory. Muslim culture was not entirely excused, however, for it still contributed significantly to most of Ross’s models explaining the absence of democracy. There was, however, one tantalising exception. When dummy variables for the country’s location in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA, defined by the World Bank to include Israel, Iran, Malta and the Arab world, minus Mauritania) or in sub Saharan Africa were added to the model, the Muslim variable was no longer statistically significant.24 Perhaps, then, the MENA and to a lesser extent sub Saharan Africa are just bad neighbourhoods for democracy, whereas almost a majority of the world’s Muslims live elsewhere, in the Indian subcontinent and South East Asia.

The debate over the rentier state continues, however. Michael Herb presented data about sources of state expenditure that better reflected the theoretical concern about taxation than Ross’s aggregate measure. Herb developed new and more convincing models, all the better validated because he could also replicate some of Ross’s findings.25 In his replications the Muslim variable also loses significance to regional location, but in his own models both

24 Ibid., p. 345.
region and the percentage of Muslims in a state remain statistically significant. The effects of the latter are very modest, however, once oil, income and neighbourhood are taken into account.

Political Islam, bubbling to the surface of many post colonial states as Mahdavy was presenting his historical paper about rentier states in 1967, had quite variable impacts upon their democratic prospects. ‘Islamism’ defies definition, other than the aspiration to ‘Islamise’ modern society, which takes many meanings. Some Islamists, including Osama bin Laden,\textsuperscript{26} take pride in Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ and accordingly reject Western democracy. In some of the supposedly ‘secular’ Muslim states, such as Algeria and Tunisia, however, more moderate Islamists, most of whom favour Western style democracy, engender authoritarian backlashes because the incumbent nationalist elites, whose deeper ideational structures had been Islamist, opposed to the secularism of their communist competitors, felt not only insecure but angered by the ignorance of upstart post colonial generations. Where, as in Indonesia, the nationalists had already massacred the secular communists in 1965\textsuperscript{6}, Islamism took gentler forms than in Algeria, where the authorities stole their electoral victories in 1992. Analysing the varieties of political Islam in their distinctive national contexts is beyond the scope of this chapter, focusing on the dialectics of globalisation, but one common thread emerged with the MENA’s petro dollar surpluses in 1974.

Distinct from and sometimes in opposition to political Islam, an economic movement of Islamic finance emerged with aspirations to reshape economic globalisation in a new image of the \textit{dār al Islām}.

\textbf{Islamic finance}

Perhaps the ‘assertion of Islamic economics … that interest is patently un Islamic … sanctifies opposition to global economic integration’.\textsuperscript{27} On the other hand, Islamic banks compete with conventional banks in the international banking system and thereby help to integrate parts of the Muslim public into the global order. As Timur Kuran observes in chapter 19 of this volume, ‘the very fact that these banks have maintained profitability for so long and attracted vast deposits proves that they have been filling a need’, namely for


Muslims, perhaps the majority of them,\textsuperscript{28} who perceive the interest paid on conventional bank deposits to be \textit{ribā}, which Islam forbids.

Islamic economics may have originated in the 1940s, as Kuran suggests, as part of the effort to justify an Islamic nation on the Indian subcontinent, but their prime institutional embodiment, the Islamic banks, originally took root in other contexts, after a short lived effort in rural Pakistan in the late 1950s. The newly independent government of Malaysia sponsored a Pilgrims Saving Corporation in 1963 that served as a precedent for creating the country’s first Islamic bank in 1983. In Egypt, also in 1963, Dr Aḥmad al Najjār, who had studied in Germany, established a system of rural privately owned co-operatives based on the German \textit{Sparkassen}. Although other Egyptians involved in these banks may have been associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, in part explaining the collapse of the experiment in 1967, Najjar does not seem to have been affiliated with any form of political Islam.

Only in the loosest sense could Islamic banking be related to the theories of Mawlānā Sayyid Abū’l A’lā’ Mawdūdī (1903–79), the Pakistani Islamist who had advocated ‘Islamising’ economics along with other aspects of social life. The bankers were also attempting to liberate Islamic jurisprudence from the colonial closet of family law, albeit only in this very narrow, yet strategic domain of banking.

Their enduring financial experiments, moreover, marked an alliance of their private sector owners princes, merchants and financiers not with Islamist politicians but rather, at least in most countries except the Sudan, with the mainstream religious ‘ulamā’ whom the Muslim Brothers and other more radical political Islamists usually opposed. Although the first of the banks to be established, the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1974, did not have a religious advisory board until 1999, those that followed proved their Islamic credentials by selecting recognised ‘ulamā’ to be members of their \textit{sharī’a} (uncodified body of Islamic law) boards. As Moncer Kahf explains, Prince Mūḥammad al Faysal initiated the practice in Egypt in 1976. He forged an alliance with a former \textit{muftī} of Egypt in order to gain President Anwar Sadat’s favour and a special law to establish the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt. Șaḥīḥ Kāmil, a Saudi businessman, took the prince’s lead. He and the prince established competing (and co-operating) transnational networks of Islamic banks, the Al Baraka Group and Dār Al Māl Al Islāmī, respectively. As they developed their networks across the Muslim world, they sought out the ‘ulamā’ because ‘unlike other Muslim intellectuals, the \textit{sharī’a}

scholars have close contacts with businessmen with small and medium sized firms and middle income earners from whom the clientele of Islamic banks is to be derived.  

As these private sector groups were forming, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) also, almost by accident, developed into an ‘Islamic’ bank. Founded as a consortium bank owned by the members of the Conference of Islamic States, it was to be a regional development bank like those of Africa, Asia or Latin America. But an unlikely founding committee of Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Somalia, none of whom would tolerate Islamic banks at home until the late 1980s, determined that the new bank should operate not just for Muslim states but, with some encouragement from Dr al Najjār, by the rules of the shari‘a. Like the Dubai Islamic Bank it consulted scholars on an ad hoc basis to gain some understanding of what these rules might be, and it worked closely with the Faisal and Baraka groups. The IDB finally acquired a board of shari‘a scholars in 2003.

Joined in 1979 by the Kuwait Finance House, which was 49 per cent owned by government ministries, the nucleus of Saudi owned transnationals rapidly invested with other partners in much of the Muslim world, albeit not in Saudi Arabia (or Morocco, for that matter), where any new institution claiming an ‘Islamic’ distinction might reflect adversely upon the ruler’s legitimacy. In its core areas of strength, however, the movement faced hard times in the mid-1980s. The Kuwait Finance House, like the conventional banks, had to be rescued by the government in 1984, in the wake of the Sūq al Mana‘kh crisis. In Egypt, so-called ‘Islamic’ fund management companies devised pyramid schemes that collapsed with the devaluation of the Egyptian pound in 1987. Although the Faisal Islamic Bank was not associated with these schemes, it lost a quarter of its total assets with the collapse of the rogue Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991.

Evidently Islamic banks could attract funds as long as they distributed profits to their ‘investor’ depositors that were competitive with interest rates offered by conventional banks. But Islamic banks did not have a sufficient array of investment instruments in these early years to generate the necessary revenues to fund their depositors, unless they engaged in risky commodity trading or parked their funds with other institutions such as the BCCI. Their principal instruments were the murābahā, a contract whereby the bank

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30 Ibid., pp. 21–2.
purchases a good for the client and sells it to him on a deferred payment basis at cost plus profit, and įjāra, or leasing, also for fixed returns. Some Islamic economists considered other instruments, such as mushāraka and muḍāraba, which were forms of equity financing akin to investment banking, to be more distinctively Islamic, but they were too risky to comprise more than 2 or 3 per cent of most Islamic banking portfolios. Profits stagnated by the late 1980s, and the market shares of these banks peaked at about 10 per cent in their strong holds, Egypt, Jordan and the microstates of Bahrain and Kuwait. Only in Sudan, where they supported Ḥasan al Turābī’s rise to power (1989–99), did they win a greater share of the deposits and total assets of a commercial banking system, all of which had been theoretically Islamised by decree in 1983.

Meanwhile, state sponsored Islamic banking in Pakistan and Iran produced only cosmetic changes in the respective commercial banking systems until 2000, when Iran permitted privately owned Islamic banks to compete with the public sector. Pakistan, obliged by law to reorganise its ‘Islamic’ system, permitted its first privately owned Islamic bank in 2002: the Al Meezan Bank rapidly gained market share, and other banks opened Islamic windows.31 So also in Indonesia, General Suharto supported the founders of the Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI) in his bid to stay in power against restive military officers. He sought their support in the legislative and presidential elections of 1992 and 1993.32 BMI and Bank Syariah Mega Indonesia, reinforced by new Islamic windows of conventional banks, were aiming for 2 per cent of the market in 2005, and there were plans to establish Jakarta as a leading Islamic finance centre, competing with Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and Bahrain.33 In Turkey five ‘special finance houses’, defined by a law passed in 1983 that Turgut Özal’s staﬀ had negotiated with Şalih Kâmil were fully integrated into the country’s commercial banking system in 1999, survived the financial crisis of 2001 and grew more rapidly than their conventional competitors to gain over 4 per cent of the market by 2005.34

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With the new surge in oil prices and revenues (1999) Islamic banking consolidated its presence in global markets. Efforts since 1990 to standardise Islamic financial instruments were bearing fruit. With encouragement from the IMF an Islamic Financial Services Board was established in Kuala Lumpur, headed by the former director of the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions, which remained in Bahrain. The Bahrain Monetary Fund took the initiative in 2000 to launch Islamic finance’s first bond issue, and it was rapidly followed by Malaysia, the Islamic Development Bank, Qatar, Kuwait, Dubai and the German state of Saxony Anhalt. Project finance also assumed Islamic as well as conventional components, and Islamic investors were acquiring an ever larger menu of choices, sponsored by Citigroup and Hong Kong Shanghai (HSBC) as well as Islamic banks. Teams of London and New York lawyers worked closely with shari’a scholars to devise new packages. The driving force consisted of Muslim investors, principally located in Saudi Arabia and neighbouring microstates, who were steadily Islamising their portfolios, diversifying away from the standard accounts of conventional banks to their new ‘Islamic’ windows, admitted in Saudi Arabia in the mid 1990s after being instituted in Egypt a decade earlier. Despite initial concern that Islamic finance might fall victim to measures against Islamic terrorism in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the threat of sanctions may have driven some Arab owned funds from North America and Europe into some of the newer ‘Islamic’ investment vehicles.

The original alliance of ‘ulamā’, princes and merchants has opened up to include lawyers and international banks intent on reducing the transaction costs of being ‘shari’a compliant’ to meet the needs of global markets. Some critics argue that Islamic finance is compromising its ethics by mimicking international financial practices too closely. Others, in the tradition of the late Ahmād al Najjār, argue that Islamic banks have lost their developmental impetus to service small Muslim businesses, for indeed (like conventional banks in most developing countries) they cater principally to wealthy individuals who place their funds outside the region.


As Islamic finance is integrated into the global financial system, however, more Muslims acquire a stake in the system and greater familiarity with the logic of savings and investments, expressed in a shared vocabulary across the Muslim world and reaching into Europe and North America. As the enterprise grows, it may also spread the realisation that the distinctively Islamic modes of finance that involve a sharing of business risks between principal and agent presuppose a transparent business environment, good corporate governance and government accountability. These banks may serve as economic educators, but they cannot generate private capital accumulation within their respective countries if investment climates remain precarious and investors dependent on political cronies for protection.

The ‘demographic bulge’

Muslim countries, like other developing ones, face a population explosion and the spectre of deepening unemployment, especially among the youth. In much of the Muslim world fertility began to decline in the 1970s and 1980s, as more women became educated, joined the work force and married later. Figure 3.9 shows that only some of the poorest African states, such as Mali and Niger, experienced little decline in fertility. In others the decline is sharp. The average number of births per woman dropped by 2003 from between 5.5 and 7 in the 1960s to little more than 2 in Indonesia, Iran, Tunisia, Turkey and Uzbekistan, not much more than France’s 1.9 births per woman. By the turn of the century women constituted 30 to 40 per cent of work forces of most Muslim countries, except Saudi Arabia. Even so, their populations of youth under the age of twenty five were still projected to be substantially above the wealthier, industrialised countries for the coming quarter of a century. And in most Muslim countries, the youth would still comprise at least 40 per cent of their respective populations in 2030, although the demographic bulge would gradually move up the age ladder under the cumulative impact of lower fertility rates. As Figure 3.10 shows, however, Muslim populations were much younger than those of the UK or the US and the youth bulges of Afghanistan, Yemen and the sub Saharan African countries were not expected to change much.

Muslim youth, however, are no longer just a subservient age category. As Graham Fuller observes, ‘Youth in the developing world is increasingly exposed to a variety of Western ideas about what youth means, even as

Figure 3.9 Fertility rates (births per woman), 1962–2002.
Note: Afghanistan data are for 1992.

Figure 3.10 Youth under twenty-five (percentage of total population), 2005–30
Source: US Census Bureau, International Data Base.
their societies undergo constant, dramatic and even destabilizing change.'

They are increasingly educated and conversant with a global youth culture that nourishes high expectations. Universities in Algeria, Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia had gross enrolments of over 20 per cent of the relevant age groups including relatively more young women than men in Iran. Their burgeoning universities, however, were suffering serious declines of quality, reflecting those of the overextended secondary school systems, and offering skills that were poorly matched with the needs of their respective economies. A majority of Saudi graduates, for instance, came from theology or education faculties. Unemployment tended to be greatest among the university educated youth, which were also fertile recruiting grounds for radical Islamist movements. As Fuller points out, ‘it is quite evident that terrorism, and especially suicide operations, are a phenomenon closely associated with youth’, notably with the college educated bombers of 11 September 2001.

The demographic bulge could be viewed as a time bomb that threatened every Muslim political economy. The MENA, with unemployment rates already averaging a record 15 per cent, seemed especially vulnerable, with Bangladesh and Pakistan not far behind. The World Bank estimated in 2004 that the MENA had to double its work force to 200 million by 2020 if the region were to cut back unemployment and meet the needs of new job seekers. Within the MENA, however, there were significant variations in the expected pools of new entrants to the labour market. Figure 3.11 presents Iran’s age pyramid of 2000, together with projections for 2025 and 2050, for illustrative purposes. As in Tunisia and Turkey, Iranian women, encouraged by the government since 1989, have taken control of their reproductive potential. Consequently, as for these other countries, the fifteen to nineteen year old cohort of 2000 (fourth tier up) is the largest of the five year segments, at least until age catches up with it in 2050. These countries are relatively fortunate because they have already received the biggest instalments of their ‘demographic gift’ of higher ratios of working age to young and retired people. Their demographic bulge works up the pyramid over time, the potentially volatile and rebellious as well as underemployed youth of 2000 moving to staid middle age and retirement by 2050. By then more workers are retiring than are entering the work force.

40 Ibid., p. 19.
41 World Bank, Unlocking the employment potential, p. 1.
Iran: 2000

Iran: 2025

Iran: 2050

Figure 3.11 Population pyramid summary for Iran

Source: US Census Bureau, International Data Base.
Figure 3.12 presents Iraq’s age pyramids, which represent delayed demographic development in Syria and Saudi Arabia as well. In these countries the base of the pyramid continues to grow, and no end to the demographic bulge is in sight until 2050. No end comes even then for Yemen, Nigeria and a number of other sub Saharan African countries, only steadily expanding bases of their respective pyramids. Present unemployment is compounded indefinitely into the future without major political and economic changes. Of course major change is under way in Iraq, and Saudi Arabia also has great potential for development. But much of the Muslim world, with far fewer resources, faces similar bulges in their expectant ranks of labour. Algeria, Indonesia and Morocco project slightly less disturbing demographic profiles than Iraq or Syria, having started earlier to control their galloping demography, but unemployment at the turn of the century was already highest in Algeria with some 27 per cent, followed by Morocco.

For some countries oil rents, rising over the first decade of the twenty first century, were a safety valve. The Saudi government, however, hired no more than one fifth of those graduating from college in 2002. Other safety valves, such as migration to Europe or to petroleum rich neighbours, were less helpful than in previous decades. Nor could technical neo liberal reforms fix the problem, as the World Bank admits: ‘Not even the most ambitious agenda for reforming the labour markets will be sufficient to achieve the employment growth required in MENA over the next few decades to reduce unemployment and absorb new entrants into labour markets.’ While championing neo liberal reforms, the World Bank concluded that the underlying problem, in the MENA at least, was poor governance, which might inspire more radical changes: ‘poor economic performance diminishes the bargaining power of autocrats and increases the strength of the opposition’. 43

The international financial community was coming to view good governance as a precondition for the rapid economic development that would be required to meet the challenge of the youth bulge. The international climate was changing, in short, in ways that made political reform less avoidable than in the 1990s, even without more armed interventions possibly being advocated by American neo conservatives. Autocrats had tended in the 1990s to roll back timid political reforms with the argument that economic development had to precede political liberalisation, but sustained

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42 John Waterbury, ‘Hate your policies, love your institutions’, Foreign Affairs, 82, 1 (January February 2003), 62, cited and confirmed by Fuller, The youth factor, 16.
43 World Bank, Unlocking the employment potential, pp. 172, 216.
Figure 3.12 Population pyramid summary for Iraq

Source: US Census Bureau, International Data Base.
development required better investment climates, for Islamic and other investors alike, that in turn depended upon more transparent and accountable government. The third Arab Human Development Report, published in 2005, described the modern Arab state as a ‘black hole which converts its surrounding social environment into a setting in which nothing moves and from which nothing escapes’.  

As long as the price of oil remained relatively high, the political economies most in need of reform in the MENA are unlikely to undergo much reform. The oil revenues of the Gulf Co operation Council countries financed real estate booms in Cairo and Beirut as well as (diminishing) inflows of workers from other Muslim countries. But opposition movements from Morocco to Bangladesh were growing qualitatively more radical while deepening their youthful constituencies.  

Opposition movements in Egypt and Iran, the most populous of the MENA states, were insisting on political reform from within their respective systems, but for how long might they remain moderate, loyal oppositions?

The origins and early development of Islamic reform

AHMAD S. DALLAL

Introduction

Early modern Islamic reform can be classified under two general rubrics: the first encompasses the eighteenth century reform activities that preceded the cultural impact of Europe. The second includes a spectrum of nineteenth century reforms that were articulated in response to this impact. Naturally, there can be no single date that marks the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the modern period, as European penetration and domination took hold at different dates in different places. Moreover, since the extent and significance of the encounter with Europe was not simultaneously appreciated in all parts of the Muslim world, the cultural eighteenth century sometimes lingered past the colonial takeover.

Traditional scholarship asserts that the eighteenth century is a century of political and economic decline and of intellectual stagnation, and that an era of political and intellectual revival and reform ensues in the nineteenth century primarily as a result of the growth of European influence in, and the resulting intellectual challenges to, the Muslim world.¹ The reaction or response to Europe became the central criterion for defining Islamic reform.² This approach has privileged one particular kind of intellectual activity, namely that which responded to the ‘European challenge’ by adapting itself to it. While the idea of economic and political decline has been largely discredited in a substantial number of studies, especially by historians of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman

² See, for example, Albert Hourani’s introduction to his Arabic thought in the liberal age, 1798 1939 (Cambridge, 1983).
provinces, the present chapter will focus on the less studied realm of culture. In this realm, the eighteenth century was characterised by intensive intellectual activities of great cultural significance. These activities continued traditional patterns of thinking but were nonetheless very original and transformative.

Already in the seventeenth century and through the eighteenth century, the central governments of the three major empires of the Muslim world, the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals, were losing some of their control over their provinces and subjects. Changes in the structures of society and economy in each of these states were also coupled with military vulnerability and loss of territory. These gradual changes culminated in the eighteenth century in a number of dramatic events that underscore the historical distinctiveness of this period. In 1718, the Ottomans signed a treaty which forced them to surrender parts of the Balkans; mindful of the weakening of its military position relative to Europe, the Ottoman state attempted to reform its bureaucracy and military by importing some of the organisational and technological practices of their European rivals. Around the same period, an Afghan invasion of Iran ended the Safavid dynasty in 1722 and, in 1739, Nādir Shāh, the new ruler of Iran, sacked Delhi and sealed the fate of an already weakened Mughal dynasty. Contrary to common assumptions, the weakening or even demise of these centralised and centralising states did not plunge the Muslim world into a period of irreversible stagnation. In the Ottoman Empire, for example, autonomous local powers with vibrant and revived economies emerged in several provinces including Mount Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Egypt. Almost invariably, historians who adopted the paradigm of decline also treated the Wahhābī movement as the representative movement of the eighteenth century. However, eighteenth century Wahhābīsm was an isolated phenomena which emerged out of the Najd, the desert region of Arabia, and managed to overrun Mecca and Medina, the cultured cities of Hijāz, due to declining Ottoman control over this region. The brief expansion of Wahhābī power was reversed through the intervention of the armies of

3 See, for example, H. Islamoglu (ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the world economy (Cambridge, 1987); R. Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the world economy: The nineteenth century (Albany, 1988). See also Beshara Doumani, Discovering Palestine: Merchants and peasants in Jebal Nablus, 1700-1900 (Berkeley, 1995); Hala Fattah, The politics of regional trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf, 1745-1900 (Albany, 1997); and Dina Khoury, State and provincial society in the early modern Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834 (Cambridge, 1997).

4 Joel Beinin, Workers and peasants in the modern Middle East (Cambridge, 2001).
Muḥammad Ṭāh, the autonomous Ottoman governor of Egypt. In addition to being a political exception, Wahhābism was not representative of eighteenth century intellectual trends. Numerous counter trends were prevalent in the eighteenth century and, in contrast to Wahhābism, these more influential movements were thwarted only after the encounter with Europe. Neither Wahhābism, nor decline are emblematic of Muslim intellectual life in the eighteenth century.

None of the revisionist approaches to the eighteenth century, however, questions the validity of using Wahhābism as a model for representing eighteenth century Islamic movements and intellectual activity.⁵ Revisionist accounts of the eighteenth century have laid much emphasis on a Sufism void of intellectual or spiritual rigour, and on the so called socio moral use of Ḥadīth, that is, on Ḥadīth as the source providing standards of individual and collective codes of conduct.⁶ This emphasis has shifted the focus of examination from the intellectual content of eighteenth century writings of Sufism or Ḥadīth to the social uses of these two disciplines. Although a large amount of the writings of eighteenth century thinkers has been published, revisionist historiography continues to focus on practical and social aspects of eighteenth century activity in a move that confirms the earlier notion that the intellectual value of eighteenth century thought is minimal.

In most regions of the Muslim world, eighteenth century thinkers preserved classical styles of thinking, but also exhibited a great awareness of a need to reorganise religious knowledge and to identify those aspects of Islam that were shared by all. The ideas and activities of some of these thinkers amount to distinct intellectual trends of Islamic thought in the pre modern period, rather than one general trend as suggested by scholarly literature. These thinkers include: Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl al Amīr al Ṣan‘ānī (1688–1769) of Yemen; Shāh Wālī Allāh (1703–62) of India; Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb (1703–92) of Arabia; ‘Usman dan Fodio (1754–1817) of West Africa; Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al Shawkānī (1759–1834) of Yemen; and Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al Šanūsī (1787–1859) of North Africa. These and other eighteenth century thinkers were famous both within and outside their

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⁵ For an articulation of the revisionist views as represented mainly in the works of Ibrahim Abu al Lughud, Roger Owen, Peter Gran and John Voll, see Reinhard Schulze, ‘Was ist die islamische Aufklärung?’, Die Welt des Islams, 36, 3 (1996), pp. 276–325.

respective regions. In India, Shāh Wālī Allāh is recognised as the most distinguished Muslim scholar that India ever produced, and contradictory schools claim to derive from and best represent his ‘true’ thought. Similarly, in Yemen, nationalist Zaydīs and Sunnis alike claim Shawkānī who, already during his own lifetime, was counted as one of the leading Muslim scholars of Yemen. Partly as a result of his political success in establishing the Sokoto caliphate, dan Fodio is also considered the most central figure in the legacy of Islamic Nigeria and in the Islamist discourse of West Africa.

The ideas developed by these thinkers were decidedly diverse; yet, diversity notwithstanding, all of them undertook bold and self consciously transformative intellectual projects. Furthermore, these intellectual projects were coupled with active social and political engagement, a fact that implies a high level of self confidence and ambition rather than utopian idealism. This is further confirmed by the high quality and quantity of the works of eighteenth century thinkers, and the dual role they assumed as reformers of tradition and also as teachers responsible for guiding an Islamic community and affecting changes of great consequence. Their confidence was manifested, among other things, in the grand intellectual synthesis of Shāh Wālī Allāh, Ṣan‘ānī’s bold confrontations with political and intellectual authorities, the successful expansion of Islam into sub Saharan Africa by Sanūsī, the building of a centralised state and social order in West Africa by dan Fodio and Shawkānī’s assertive attempt to illustrate, via theoretical analysis and historical documentation, the superiority and hence authority of later generations of Muslims. Viewed from within their own chronological and spatial boundaries, the undertakings of eighteenth century thinkers were quite successful. Subsequent setbacks engulfed the political and intellectual scenes throughout the Muslim world, yet the reasons for these setbacks were not exclusively internal, and were rooted in the stifling effects of the events that took hold of the Muslim world in the course of the colonial period.

For Orientalists and revisionists alike, Wahhābīsm has provided an accurate illustration of the paradigm of social activism and intellectual impoverishment. On the one hand, earlier studies on Islamic thought in the eighteenth century argue that there was a Wahhābī influence on Islamic thought and movements in the same and following periods. On the other hand, almost all of the revisionist histories of eighteenth century Islamic thought continue to

invoke the example of Wahhābism without questioning the validity of using it as a model for other eighteenth century Islamic movements and intellectual trends. In the following section, I will provide overviews of the careers and ideas of some of the main thinkers of the eighteenth century. Given the predominance of the Wahhābī paradigm in scholarship on the eighteenth century, I will underscore the fundamental differences between each of these figures and Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, before proceeding to identify some distinctive features of eighteenth century Islamic thought. I will then proceed to discuss the historical rupture that characterises the rise of new trends of Islamic reform in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the evolution of these trends into the twentieth century.

With its exclusive focus on the single issue of takfīr and the determination of what constitutes unbelief, Wahhābism lacks intellectual complexity and thus does not lend itself to much intellectual analysis. In retrospect, attempts made to make political and intellectual sense of the Wahhābī use of the concept of tawḥīd (the oneness of God) have not invalidated the fact that the thought of Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb himself was far narrower than the movement that he initiated. Moreover, Wahhābism, both in its social manifestation and intellectual content, was the exception rather than the norm of eighteenth century Islamic thought. Eighteenth century thinkers probed the boundaries of faith in varying ways, and provided critical evaluations of Sufi thought and practice. But, despite the diversity of their views, all of these thinkers concurred in their rejection of Wahhābī views, as well as the political movement these views inspired. One of the most pervasive discourses of the eighteenth century was a discourse against takfīr. In a marked contrast to the simple and direct Wahhābī use of the concept kufr, eighteenth century thinkers problematised this concept and ultimately curtailed or undermined it altogether.

Exclusionary puritanism: Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb of Arabia

Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb was born in the village of ‘Uyayna in Najd in the year 1703. There is little reliable information on his activities during the first four decades of his life. His longest journey was to Başra, from which he was eventually expelled. In the early 1740s, after the death of his father, he started preaching his doctrine of tawḥīd. Five years later he gained the political support of the head of the Saʿūd family residing in Darṣiyā, who used Wahhābī ideology to gradually spread his control over different parts of Arabia. Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb reportedly retired after the conquest of Riyadh and,
according to official Wahhābī accounts, devoted the last decade or two of his life to scholarship and meditation!\(^8\)

Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb’s writings are almost entirely devoted to a discussion of the concept of tawhīd. In almost every single work he wrote, Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb strove to classify people on the basis of their creed into believers and unbelievers. Political and social concerns were marginal to his agenda. He made a distinction between politics and creed, and although he recognised that in promoting his cause he was indebted to the support of the local rulers, he neither couched his teachings in political language, nor did he consider the seizure of power an aim of his movement. The only time he mentions tolerance is in reference to the excesses of rulers whom, he says, should be advised gently, and in the event that they fail to heed this advice, their injustice should be tolerated patiently. Rulers should be obeyed despite their harm and injustice. Zealotry, on the other hand, is defined only in terms of the intolerant attitude toward the political authority. Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb even distinguishes between what may be termed as injustice because of social and economic inequities, and creedal injustice (zulm al amwāl and zulm al shirk, literally the injustice of wealth and that of association). Needless to say, Wahhābī thought is focused on the second kind, whereas the first is tolerable as long as it is accompanied by tawhīd.\(^9\)

Immediate concern for the social is largely absent from the writings of Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb. Not only are tyranny and social injustice minor problems in his view, but numbers are also irrelevant and of no merit. The community may very well be represented by one man, and the Qur’ānic injunction to abide by the community (jama‘a) may refer to an earlier generation of Muslims, rather than a contemporary one. As such, unity is of no importance, and neither are the venues that guarantee the empowerment and participation of the community in deciding its future. Withholding knowledge from the masses is permissible.\(^10\) Similarly, ijtihād is not an issue which he seriously addresses. In a couple of instances he denies that he himself was a mujtahid, and asserts that in every case where he diverged from a scholar, he relied on...

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\(^8\) On the life of Mūḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb see Amīn Sa‘īd, Sīrat al Imām al Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb (Beirut, 1384); and A. M. Naṣīr; Al Shaykh al Imām Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb wa manhajuhu fi maḥāthih al ‘aqīda (Beirut, 1983).


the authority of an earlier one. He also rejects the notion that a mujtahid is needed to bypass the authoritative works of the later jurists, in order to go back directly to the tradition of the first generation of Muslims. The Qur’ān, he argues, has ambiguous and unambiguous verses; the latter are straightforward and require neither the explanation of earlier jurists, nor the interpretations of contemporary mujtahids. He thus reduces the operativeness of the Qur’ān to its unambiguous verses, and dismisses the need for the intermediary traditions, without replacing them with the empowering tool of ijtihād. Elsewhere Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb does not hide his scorn for scholarship that disagrees with his positions, and adds that the enemies of God may have a lot of knowledge and many books.\footnote{Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, ‘Rasā’il’, pp. 49, 55, 58 62; and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, ‘Kitāb Kashf al Shubuhāt’, in Sa’d, Sirāt al Imām al Shaykh, pp. 302 3.}

Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb shared none of the concerns of other eighteenth century thinkers. His enemies were Muslims who held wrong beliefs about God, not tyrants who oppressed Muslims. He separated the creedal and the political, but unlike other eighteenth century thinkers, this separation ultimately benefits the political, and fails to produce alternatives to it. His ideology was generally intolerant of many practices and beliefs of individual Muslims. In his extensive discussion of what constitutes unbelief (kufr) and the belief in more than one God (shirk), he lists numerous convictions and acts. Shirk includes supplicating pious living or dead people, seeking their intercession, making vows to them, offering sacrifices and praying at their tombs and attributing to the dead among them the power to harm or give benefit. Shirk also includes the belief in and practice of magic, astrology and divination; the use of amulets and talismans; giving shelter to innovators, and befriending unbelievers; treating rabbis and monks as lords by offering them unquestioning obedience; and worshipping God through intermediaries. In addition, someone who says, for example, ‘Take note my brother, may you never know evil’, will also qualify for kufr, since without knowledge of evil one cannot know tawhīd.\footnote{Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, ‘Rasā’il’, pp. 46 7, 64 5, 82 4, 93, 105, 108, 136, 145, 155; Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, Kitāb al tawhīd, pp. 232 3, 237 9, 257 8; Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, Kashf’, pp. 300, 312; Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, Majmū‘ al at fatāwā, pp. 34, 37, 40 4, 109; and Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, Al Kalimāt, pp. 4, 6, 45.}

It is through this emphasis on shirk and kufr that Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb introduces his theory of tawhīd. Tawhīd, he argues, is the exclusive dedication of worship to God; it is worshipping God without shirk. The mere profession of faith is not sufficient for Islam because there is a difference
between knowing the truth about God (‘ilm), actively affirming this truth (taṣdīq), and believing in it (īmān). The first two kinds of recognition are possible for unbelievers, whereas īmān involves full reliance on and fear of God; it also involves loving, hating and making friends or enemies in the way of God.  

There are, according to Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, two kinds of tawḥīd. The first is the tawḥīd rubūbī, the belief that God is the creator and administrator of the universe. This belief is held by most people, and was even held by the Arabs before the advent of Islam. The unbelievers in the pre Islamic jāhilīyya (that is, Arabs in a state of ignorance of Islam) knew God, glorified Him, believed that He was the only creator and that He alone could grant sustenance and bring life and death. They were followers of Ibrāhīm, and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, but they were still guilty of shirk because they associated partners with God in worship, and supplicated and sought the intercession of prophets, angels and pious people. They were not driven to oppose the message of Muḥammad until he initiated hostilities against them and cursed their religion and scholars. The second kind of tawḥīd demanded of humanity, and required for true Islam, is the tawḥīd ulūhī; it entails bearing witness that there is one God and that Muhammad is His messenger, ridding oneself of shirk, abandoning the worship of anything but God, devoting all worship exclusively to God and disowning the unbelievers and taking them for enemies. Recognising shirk is a prerequisite for this second kind of belief, and so is barā’a, dissociating oneself from unbelievers and unbelief in words and deeds.  

The concept of tawḥīd is thus linked in the thought of Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb to an act of repudiation, which functions as a rite of initiation into Wahhābism. The non initiated remains guilty of shirk.

Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb argued that the first battle in Islam (after the death of Muḥammad) was fought by the caliph Abū Bakr (r. 632 4) against people who claimed to be Muslims. They believed in God and in the prophethood of Muhammad, but refused to pay taxes. This act of disobedience was reason enough for fighting them. The shirk of the time of Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, on


the other hand, is graver than the shirk of the first jāhiliyya: the people who are supplicated are neither pious people nor objects that are obedient to God, and the shirk of the later generations persists in times of plenitude and hardship alike.\[^{15}\] In this framework, the Wahhābī war against the hidden unbelievers of Islam is not only justifiable, but is itself a condition for proper belief.

Far from the tolerant and rich thought of the vast majority of eighteenth century thinkers, Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb provided a grim and narrow theory of unbelief, which fails to link the creedal to the political or the social, or to generate a meaningful discourse that could justify its perpetuation as a legitimate theoretical reading of Islam. Many, if not all, of the issues discussed by Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb were taken up by other eighteenth century thinkers. A diverse range of views were articulated in the course of either responding to Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb directly, or discussing issues similar to those he addressed. Invariably, however, these views contradicted Wahhābī ideas both in their details and overall spirit. In the following section I will survey some of the anti Wahhābī views of the leading Muslim thinkers of the eighteenth century.

Social tolerance and intellectual radicalism: Muhammad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Amīr al-Ṣan‘ānī of Yemen

Muhammad ibn Ismā‘īl al Amīr al Ṣan‘ānī was one of the central figures in the tradition of Yemeni reform. He grew up in a Zaydī environment, but early in his life claimed to have become an independent thinker (mujtahid). In practice this meant that Ṣan‘ānī did not follow one particular school, but relied instead on his independent legal reasoning. For this he came under constant attacks by other Zaydīs accusing him of trying to undermine their school. In auspicious times, he served as the imām of the great mosque of Ṣan‘ā’, but during less fortunate times he was imprisoned by the rulers of the city after his enemies accused him of dropping the name of the Zaydī imams (in this context, rulers) from the Friday sermon. Later, he left his home town and country and travelled to Mecca and Medina where he became more steeped in traditional Sunnī scholarship, especially in the study of the traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad. However, his independent thinking gained him hostility even

there, and eventually he went back to north Yemen where he spent the rest of his life in relative shelter from public criticism.16

In every sense of the word, Ṣan‘ānī was a persecuted intellectual and social reformer who always managed to antagonise political as well as cultural authorities. This is why upon receiving news of Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb’s anti-establishment activities, he felt sympathy toward him and his ideas. Ṣan‘ānī assumed that the resistance of the religious and political establishments of Arabia to Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb stemmed from the latter’s rejection of taqlīd and promotion of ijtihād. Since these were the main causes that he himself championed, and for which he suffered persecution, Ṣan‘ānī also assumed that, as in his own case, the charges levelled against Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb were fabricated by zealous partisans of the schools. The main sentiment expressed by Ṣan‘ānī during this first stage was one of self assuring relief at finally finding someone who preached what he himself had preached for years.17

Contrary to Ṣan‘ānī’s first impressions, however, Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb’s political views were far from radical, and concern for social and political issues was completely absent from his thought. In contrast, Ṣan‘ānī’s teachings had strong social and religious overtones. His political involvement ranged from indirect criticism of the religious establishment working in collaboration with the state, to direct criticism of the rulers of Yemen. On one occasion, Ṣan‘ānī wrote to the Imam al Mahdī al ‘Abbās ibn al Ḥusayn (r. 1748 75) to reprimand him for buying waqf (endowment) property which, according to Islamic law, is inalienable. In his diwān, Ṣan‘ānī ridicules another imam of Ṣan‘ā’, al Mansūr Ḥusayn (r. 1727 48) for turning the Imamate into a plaything in the hands of the tribes. Elsewhere, he calls the Yemeni rulers ‘a band that went astray away from truth and guidance, and drifted toward tyranny and corruption’. Ṣan‘ānī adds that these rulers surpassed the worst kings in their corruption, and that ‘Satan happily contends and rests assured upon witnessing their actions’.18 Nowhere in all of his writings does Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb express such concern for social justice or the welfare of the people. Neither does he ever attack rulers for their social and economic policies, or even conceive of assuming the role of a moral authority in relation to them.

17 For discussions based on Ṣan‘ānī’s first and second poems about Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, see Muhammad ibn Ismā’il al Ṣan‘ānī, Diwān al Amīr al Ṣan‘ānī (Beirut, 1986), pp. 166 71 and 171 5.
18 Ibid., pp. 244 5.
Şan‘ānī composed poems on diverse themes; two of Şan‘ānī’s long poems are about Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb. In the first poem Şan‘ānī maintains that, based on what he heard, the teachings and practices of the ‘Najdī’ are ones which he himself promotes. Şan‘ānī then uses the occasion to express his own views on the doctrinal matters in question. What is notable about this poem is that it says very little about Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, who is the occasion for the poem rather than its subject. The controversy over Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb triggers the discussion, but the substance of this discussion is provided by Şan‘ānī himself, and the bulk of the poem is about Şan‘ānī’s own views. As years passed, however, Şan‘ānī learned more about Wahhābī thought, and his initial sympathy gave way to a more cynical attitude. Şan‘ānī reports that the poem in which he praised Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb was widely circulated, and that he received many criticisms for what he said in it from several people in Mecca, Baṣra and elsewhere. After a period of uncertainty, a Wahhābī shaykh arrived in Yemen, and provided Şan‘ānī with first hand access to Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb’s intolerant writings. Şan‘ānī then decided that Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb was a man who knew a portion of the sharī‘a but did not examine it carefully. Neither did he study under someone who would guide him to the right path, point out to him the useful sciences, and make him understand them. In fact he read some of the writings of Abū al ‘Abbās ibn Taymiyya and his student Ibn al Qayyim al Jawziyya and imitated them incompetently, even though they have prohibited imitation.¹⁹

After realising what the Wahhābīs were doing, Şan‘ānī felt that he was morally obliged to dissociate himself from their beliefs and acts. He thus composed a second poem which he opens by saying: ‘I withdraw the poem which I wrote about the Najdī, for I realised that he is different from what I thought him to be.’ He then goes on to chastise Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb for committing atrocities that have no excuse or legal justification. These include violating the souls and wealth of Muslims which God made inviolable, killing Muslims even by assassination, and most outrageous of all accusing the whole Muslim community in all the different countries of unbelief. In the remaining part of the poem Şan‘ānī distinguishes between two kinds of unbelief: kufr, which is a matter of judgement with no automatic legal consequence, and khurūj ‘an al Din, which entails all the penalties prescribed by the law.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 172.
Intellectual synthesis: Shāh Wali Allāh of India

Shāh Wali Allāh lived and worked in Delhi. During his lifetime he witnessed the final break up of the Mughal empire, and the rise in its place of a number of smaller and weaker states. The invasion of Nādir Shāh in 1739 and the subsequent sack of Delhi further weakened the Muslims and left them vulnerable to the aggression of the numerous non-Muslim communities of India. It is not surprising that Wali Allāh’s thought was in some measure a response to his perception of the crisis of the time.

In view of the absence of any direct mention of Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb or Wahhābism in the works of Shāh Wali Allāh, scholars have argued that informal links and influences existed between the two figures. Yet the inadequacy of such assertions can be easily verified simply by reading what Shāh Wali Allāh writes in any of his many books. The most obvious difference between Wali Allāh and Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb is that Wali Allāh is a Sufi, whereas it is hard to conceive of a more hostile attitude towards Sufism than that of Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb. Moreover, Wali Allāh was an advocate of the ideas of Ibn al ‘Arabī (d. 1240); the latter, however, embodied in the eyes of Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb all the evils of Sufism. Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb even denounced as unbeliever anyone who refrains from denouncing Ibn al ‘Arabī.

Unlike Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, Shāh Wali Allāh had serious social concerns. He was primarily interested in unity, not just as a doctrinal ideal, but as a social reality. He was thus careful not to antagonise the majority of Muslims nor to pose as a radical reformer crusading against mainstream social trends. Throughout his writings he conveys his belief that renewal does not necessarily mean going against the trend. In one of his visionary dreams he sees the Prophet who informs him that God wants

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20 For general information on Shāh Wali Allāh and his time see the introductory sections of G. N. Jalbani, Teachings of Shāh Waliyullāh of Delhi (Lahore, 1967); J. M. S. Baljon, Religion and thought of Shāh Wali Allāh Dihlawī (Leiden, 1986); Sayyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, Shāh Wali Allāh and his times (Canberra, India, 1980); also see the chapter on the eighteenth century in Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900 (Princeton, 1982). On the momentous influence of Wali Allāh on Islamic thought in India, and on the scholarly views about him, see Marcia K. Hermansen, trans. and introduction to Shāh Wali Allāh of Delhi’s Ḥujjat Allāh al bāliğha: The conclusive argument from God (Leiden, 1996), pp. xxxiii xxxvi. On the works of Wali Allāh see Mawlawi H. Hidayat Husain, The Persian autobiograph of Shāh Waliullah bin ‘Abd al Rahmān al Dihlavi: Its English translation and a list of his works, Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 8 (1912), pp. 161 75.
to bring about some unity to the blessed community through you (yajmā' shamlan min shaml al umma al marhūma bika); so beware of the common claim that a truthful person is not truthful unless a thousand friends accuse him of heresy; beware also not to oppose people in the branches [of the law] for this contradicts what the Truth wants [for you].

Whereas Wahhābī doctrine functioned as an inquisition like ideology used against ordinary Muslims, Wali Allāh’s thought was meant to further the interests of these Muslims. This is clearly manifested in Wali Allāh’s definition of belief (īmān), where he makes a distinction between this worldly and other worldly īmān. The former is the profession of faith on the basis of which worldly action is decided, whereas a person’s status in the hereafter is decided on the basis of other worldly faith. In the hereafter, cardinal hypocrisy may entail eternal residence in Hell, yet takfīr in this world cannot be predicated on a person’s intention. Takfīr is only possible on the basis of an unambiguous scriptural statement. Actions as extreme as prostration to trees, stones, idols and stars, although strictly forbidden, are not final evidence of unbelief because there is no explicit text that defines them as such. The accusation of unbelief is valid only when the person performing such forbidden acts declares them to be acts of worship, or professes his or her belief in, and obedience to, creators other than God. Wali Allāh even uses his own reading of certain historical classifications to support a conciliatory distinction between sin and unbelief. He distinguishes between the first and the second jāhilīyyas: while in the first one people denied that God is the creator, in the second one they simply turned away from Him, and failed to obey Him as they should. In contrast to Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb who asserts that the second jāhilīyya is far more serious than the first pre Islamic one, Wali Allāh clearly downplays the graveness of the errors of later generations of Muslims, and leaves no room for indiscriminately accusing them of unbelief.

In one of many references to the problem of takfīr, Wali Allāh goes so far as to distinguish between unbelief on the one hand, and rebellion and association on the other. According to Wali Allāh, prostration to a poisonous fly, a practice he once observed and commented on, is definitely forbidden, but what the people who prostrate to this fly do is not real polytheism. Even shirk,

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21 See, for example, Shāh Wali Allāh, Fuyūd al Ḥaramayn, hand written manuscript with a Persian translation by ‘Abd al Ghānī Ja’fārī (Delhi, n.d.), pp. 62 3. I am grateful to Professor Marcia Hermansen for providing me with a copy of this manuscript.


he maintains, does not rule out the belief that God is the ultimate source from which emanates the mantle of divinity on to other created objects of worship. What is noteworthy here is the circumspect manner in which Wali Allâh argues for the prohibition of standard association practices but leaves the question of the final verdict on the doer open. These actions are considered moulds or formal manifestations (qawâlîb) of association (shirk), signs by which it can be anticipated (mażān), rather than expressions of its actuality. Thus, because they suggest the possibility of association, and because the law is concerned with formal considerations, not the reality of things, these acts are prohibited. Once again, although Wali Allâh does not question the prohibition of these acts, the final verdict on the person who commits them remains open.

Political radicalism and social tolerance: ‘Usman dan Fodio of West Africa

The most cited and best studied of the jihad movements of West and East Africa is the one led by ‘Usman dan Fodio that culminated in the establishment of the Sokoto caliphate in present day northern Nigeria. Dan Fodio’s Fulani jihad was often directed against fellow Muslims whose beliefs, he argued, were tainted with innovation and heresy; this combination of militancy and an attempt to restore a pristine Islam has led many scholars to assume an affinity between the Fulani jihad and the Wahhâbî movement.

‘Usman dan Fodio was born in Gobir (in northern Nigeria) in the year 1754. His father was a learned man, and dan Fodio studied with him and with several renowned scholars of the region. He started his career as a wandering teacher in the 1770s, and through the mid 1790s he instructed people on the proper practice of Islam. By the end of this period he had acquired a wide reputation and his following increased considerably. Around the year 1795 the emphasis of his teachings and writings gradually shifted from personal instruction to a broader concern with social and political questions and a jihad, which was declared in 1804 and culminated in 1806 in the establishment of the Sokoto caliphate. He died in 1817 in the newly established capital Sokoto, but the

caliphate he built continued to flourish under his successors and to inspire many other movements in West Africa.26

In the experience of dan Fodio, communities of Muslims were plagued by two sets of inter related problems: improper practice of Islam and social injustice. It was not uncommon for Muslims to glorify stones and trees, offer them sacrifices and seek them for the fulfilment of their needs. Some claimed to be Muslims while they consulted magicians and soothsayers, claimed knowledge of the hidden, made vows at the tombs of pious people and mocked Islam and Muslims. They neglected performance of religious obligations and participated in corrupting and forbidden ceremonies. Corruption also crept into families: men married far more than the four wives allowed by the law, and the first and oldest of these wives was allowed full control of the others; inheritance was usurped by the strongest heir among the descendants of the diseased; Muslims cheated in their commercial transactions; and moral laxity and decadence prevailed. In short, Muslims emulated the customs of unbelievers in their private and public lives.27


Clearly, then, dan Fodio attacked what he considered non Islamic practices. However, despite his emphasis on the proper practice of Islam and on rejecting non Islamic practices that lead to *kufr*, dan Fodio’s primary concern was social. In contrast to Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab, creed for dan Fodio was not an aim in itself, but was an integral part of his larger scheme of social reform. Dan Fodio’s main objective was to create the kind of Muslim defined by this creed. In the first stage of his career, dan Fodio envisioned a solution for the problems of Muslims by modelling a society after the Islamic ideal. His concern for the community and his tolerance in dealing with individual Muslims fuels the positive and constructive articulation of notions of belief and *kufr*. He insists that unbelief can be discerned only through deeds, and not through what is in the heart. On numerous occasions he warns of the great danger in accusing Muslims of unbelief on account of sins, and implies that it is definitely *kufr* to accuse the whole community of unbelief. The sanctity of a Muslim’s blood and dignity is unequivocally protected by the law, and judgement about unbelief can only be made on the basis of a transmitted tradition that is not the subject of speculation or analogy. He further distinguishes between prohibited and reprehensible innovations. Muslims are discouraged and not prohibited from the latter. He strongly condemns denying the blessings (*karāmāt*) of pious people, and argues that such denials are themselves prohibited innovations. He maintains that it is permissible to seek these blessings by visiting the tombs of saints, and that this permission is confirmed by the actions of the companions of the Prophet.28

Dan Fodio’s initial move to institute an alternative order based on Islam was at least partly successful; it clearly alarmed the authorities and provoked them to take measures against the growing autonomous communities of Fulani Muslims. In the second phase of his career, dan Fodio led his community in a confrontation from which he emerged victorious. The ideological position of dan Fodio was also transformed in conjunction with changes in his political strategies. He considered the gravest problem facing Muslims in this new stage to be the hegemony of the un Islamic rule. To lead an Islamic life, he argued, Muslims had to seize power. His ideas were increasingly influenced by the belief that social ills were exacerbated by the rule of unbelievers, who forced Muslims to abide by un Islamic customs.

28 Ibn Fūḍī, *Nūr*, pp. 21, 28; Ibn Fūḍī, ‘*Naṣāʾīḥ*’, p. 588; Ibn Fūḍī, ‘*Sīrāj*’, p. 585; and Ibn Fūḍī, ‘*Tāʾlīm*’, pp. 54 5, 60 1, 69; Ibn Fūḍī, ‘*Bayān al bidʿa*’, p. 594. Dan Fodio also criticises his teacher Jibrīl ibn ‘Umar for his excessive zeal and harsh evaluation of Muslims, ‘*Naṣāʾīḥ*’, p. 589.
and laws. The targets of dan Fodio’s attacks included, as before, unjust laws and customs that sharply contradict Islamic norms. What is new in this formulation is that the rulers are held responsible for the perpetuation of this corruption. The status of a town, dan Fodio added, is the status of its rulers, and it is obligatory for Muslims to leave towns ruled by unbelievers for a land where Islam prevails. A Muslim should also refrain from commercial exchange with these towns, should not support them in any way against other Muslims and, if possible, he should participate in the obligatory jihad against them. A capable Muslim who fails to emigrate from a land of unbelief chooses to belong to that land and must bear the consequences of his or her choice.29

The apparent contradiction between dan Fodio’s early tolerance and his later sweeping takfīr is an issue which he confronted and creatively resolved. In contrast to the creedal takfīr of Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb, takfīr on the basis of the ruler is a political takfīr, which is not equated to individual unbelief. Dan Fodio wrote extensively on the difference between the laws that apply to a genuine unbeliever in enemy territories, and a Muslim residing therein. These laws addressed such questions as whether it is permissible to continue fighting a retreating Muslim as opposed to a retreating unbeliever, and the status of the person, his family and wives and his wealth once captured by Muslims. It is significant that, legally, the treatment of Muslims guilty of political kufr or loyalty to the unbelievers is similar to the treatment of Muslim criminals, and not apostates.30

The incorporation of tolerant and inclusive formulations from the first stage of his career through the ideological scheme of a radically different stage clearly indicates the seriousness with which dan Fodio treated ideology, and how his early thought, together with the transformed conditions of the later phase of his struggle, were important in shaping his later ideas about society and politics. In contrast to Wahhābī political neutrality and social inflexibility, both dan Fodio’s thought and his actual practice exhibit a model of political radicalism and social tolerance.


30 For example, while the person, children, wives and wealth of an unbeliever can be seized, the same measures can only be applied to the wealth of a Muslim captured in enemy territory; Ibn Fūḍī, Bayān wujūb, pp. 107 8 and passim. See also Ibn Fūḍī, ‘Wathīqat’, p. 242; Ibn Fūḍī, ‘Nūr’, p. 22; and Ibn Fūḍī, ‘Ta’līm’, pp. 61, 72.
The empire of the jurists: Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Shawkānī

Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Shawkānī was another Yemeni scholar of Zaydī background; he served as chief judge under three of the imams of Ṣanʿāʾ. He belonged to a long tradition of Zaydism in Yemen which was open to Sunnī Islam, not in politics alone, but in serious efforts to rework the doctrines and the laws of the school. Shawkānī witnessed the changes in the international and regional political scene of his time, and was directly involved in dealing with the political ramifications of these changes. He was an erudite, prolific and original writer, who wrote over 150 books. The influence of Shawkānī’s thought extended beyond Yemen and his own lifetime. His professed followers include Ṣidīq Khān al-Qanūjī (d. 1890) in India and Sanūsī of North Africa.31

Like Ṣanʿāʾī before him, Shawkānī had limited initial sympathy for some of the puritanical Wahhābī doctrines; yet, ultimately, he was at radical odds with Wahhābīsm. Wahhābīs are discussed in several biographies in Shawkānī’s Al Badr al tālī in connection with individuals who were politically involved in the unfolding events of Ḥijāz under the Saʿūd family. Significantly, there is no separate entry for Ibn ʿAbd al Wahḥāb in this book which is devoted to celebrate the virtues of Muslims after the seventh century of hijra; it would seem that, in Shawkānī’s assessment, Ibn ʿAbd al Wahḥāb did not merit inclusion in this book. One individual involved in the politics of Ḥijāz in the Wahhābī period is Ghālib ibn Musāʾīd, the šarīf of Mecca and its governor.32 Ghālib’s authority was challenged by the ruler of Najd, ʿAbd al ʿAzīz ibn Saʿūd. After some attempts to fight back, Ghālib eventually gave in and joined the Wahhābīs, but kept on oscillating between them and the Ottomans. Shawkānī notes that tribal groups that come under the control of the Wahhābīs observe the rituals of Islam; he further notes that many of the Syrian nomads living between Ḥijāz and Saʿda have pledged obedience to Ibn Saʿūd, either willingly or out of fear, and have since started to observe the religious obligations, whereas before the

31 Aside from the recent book length study by Bernard Haykel, Revival and reform in Islam: The legacy of Muḥammad al Shawkānī (Cambridge, 2003), there is little scholarship in European languages on Shawkānī; see Husayn ibn Ṭāhir al-ʿAmri, The Yemen in the 18th and 19th centuries: A political and intellectual history (London, 1985). Also see ‘Abd al Ghanī Qāsim Ghālib al Shirajī, Al Imām al Shawkānī: Ḥayāṭahu wa fiḥrūhu (Beirut and Sana, 1988).

32 For the following analysis based on Ghālib’s biography see Shawkānī, Al Badr al tālī, vol. II, pp. 4 24.
Wahhābī takeover, they hardly knew anything about Islam, and barely knew how to profess the *shahāda* (bearing witness that there is no God but God and that Muḥammad is His Prophet). Clearly, therefore, for this change the Wahhābīs are to be credited.

Any positive assessment of the role of the Wahhābīs implied from this account is quickly dissipated when Shawkānī abruptly remarks that ‘they [the Wahhābīs] believe that anyone who is not under the authority of the state of the leader of Najd and who does not obey his commands is outside the pale of Islam (*khārij ‘an al Islām*). Shawkānī adds that despite his success in spreading their control over new territories, he has received disturbing reports about the behaviour of Ibn Saʿūd. Foremost among these is that Ibn Saʿūd considers violable the blood of a person who pleads for help from anyone but God, be it a Prophet, saint or anyone else. Shawkānī agrees that if such pleading comes from someone who truly believes in and worships the dead person to whom he or she supplicates, or from someone who relies on the dead more than God, then this pleading is tantamount to unbelief. He further maintains that if a person does not repent, then his blood and wealth are violable like other apostates. Yet this seeming confirmation by Shawkānī of the Wahhābī stand on intercession in effect amounts to a rejection of this stand: in contrast to the qualifications stipulated by Shawkānī, Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb had devoted most of his meagre writings to prove that no qualification whatsoever would vindicate a person who invokes the dead, irrespective of the actual intentions and beliefs of this person.

Shawkānī’s criticism of Wahhābī ideas takes more direct forms. Immediately following the above discussion, he reports that the leader of Najd ‘considers lawful the shedding of the blood of a person who does not attend the congregational prayer; if this is true’, Shawkānī adds, ‘then it is in disagreement with the rules of the divine law’. All along, it seems that Shawkānī tries to maintain a distance and to air critical views of extreme Wahhābī ideas while avoiding a direct confrontation with the threatening neighbouring power of Ibn Saʿūd. Shawkānī, it seems, was trying to disarm the Wahhābī state, by depriving it of creedal ideological claims against the imamate of Ṣanʿāʾ, while pointing out the problematic ideological claims of the Wahhābīs. Generally, Shawkānī’s assessment of the Wahhābīs was conditioned by two considerations: that their opponents were not necessarily better than them; and that his response to the Wahhābīs must be carefully worded to allow him to diffuse the political tensions arising from ideological and political differences between the Saudi state and the imamate of Ṣanʿāʾ.
An additional factor that conditioned Shawkānī’s assessment of the Wahhābīs was his own dislike of nomads, and his positive disposition toward disciplining them. The Wahhābīs, therefore, represented to Shawkānī a possible means of imposing such discipline over the unruly nomads of Najd. Shawkānī maintains that nomads pose a continuous threat to the social order of Muslim cities, are fundamentally alien to urban Islam and are a source of zeal and social strife. It is thus understandable that Shawkānī should turn against the Wahhābīs when it became evident that, instead of controlling it, they were imposing the hegemony of vulgar nomadism on urban Islam.

In one exchange with a scholar from Najd who came to Ṣanʿā’ and presented him with a set of questions, Shawkānī discusses the juxtaposition of the words ʿimān (belief) and ʿshirk (association) in the Qurʾān (Surah Yūsuf 12: 106). After a long theoretical discussion, Shawkānī concludes that ‘it is correct to say that true belief (ʿimān) can coexist with hidden association (ʿshirk) in some believers, and that belief in the general sense of the word can coexist with true association as was common among the people of the jāhiliyya’. This view is diametrically opposed to the Wahhābī negative definition of faith as the absence of any practical trace of association or unbelief. Thus, despite his pragmatic engagement with Wahhābīs, Shawkānī unambiguously opposed the central premise of Wahhābī ideology. This opposition applies equally to the evaluation of the living as well as the dead. In contrast to the Wahhābī dissociation from alleged unbelieving Muslims, even after they die, Shawkānī maintains that ‘One who scrutinizes his own religion and busies himself with his own faults has enough to keep him busy from slandering dead people and cursing those whose status before the Creator of all creation he does not know.’

In further opposition to the Wahhābī use of the concept of tawḥīd, Shawkānī ascertains that a person who freely utters the word of tawḥīd right before s/he dies is definitely destined to paradise. This, Shawkānī adds, is the result of the ‘benevolence of God which he assigns to whomever He desires. If anyone denies this, we say to him this has been established to be true on the authority of the Prophet of God … despite your nose.’ Shawkānī then adds that ‘Some people went out of their way to no avail in order to reject this sound tradition, and other sound traditions with similar meanings … Some

have tried hard to make it conditional on the absence of an impediment, yet none of these attempts have even a trace of knowledge in them. \[35\]

To be sure, Shawkānī was strict in delineating what constitutes unbelief, but he was equally adamant in restricting the practical legal implications of this delineation. Put differently, Shawkānī exhausted all possible ways of restricting the possibility of taking legal action against a Muslim who may be accused of unbelief or other major religious offences. An imam, Shawkānī argues, is not required to impose the ḥadd penalty on a person merely on the basis of reports that he did what is punishable by this penalty. Furthermore, as a general rule, the sanctity of the privacy of a Muslim should deter the imam from further investigation of alleged violations of the divine law. Moreover, according to Shawkānī, textual evidence whose import is to avert the imposition of penalties is stronger than evidence in support of their imposition (awlawiyat mā yadra’ al ḥadd ‘alā mā yūjibuhu). Shawkānī also notes that the execution of a ḥadd penalty requires both the confession of the doer of the act that is punishable by this penalty, and the legal testimony against him. Therefore, the divine law, as Shawkānī understands it, militates against the condemnation of individual Muslims. Moreover, it is possible to pass a theoretical judgement that a certain person is not a Muslim while at the same time desisting from executing the legal implications of this judgement. In fact, according to Shawkānī, this is the universal rule that governs the treatment of Muslims unless a particular individual expressly denounces Islam and publicly pronounces his or her unbelief.\[36\]

Sufism: the old and the new

One aspect of Islamic culture that has been commonly invoked in revisionist histories of the eighteenth century is the so called neo Sufism: a kind of Sufism characterised by the tendency to emphasise a Muhammad oriented mysticism, and to harmonise Sufism with the formal, legal teachings of Islam. The term is used to refer to a demysticised Sufism which, in the words of Fazlur Rahman, is ‘nothing else but the postulates of the orthodox religion’.\[37\]


\[36\] Shawkānī, Nayl al awtār, vol. IV, pt 7, p. 158.

Following Rahman, numerous historians have asserted that this neo Sufism is central to all pre modern reform movements. Various studies characterise neo Sufism in terms of the rejection of popular Sufi practices; rejection of the philosophical mysticism of the great Sufi thinker Ibn al ‘Arabi; rejection of the strict Sufi hierarchy (the murshid murūd / teacher disciple relationship); and the rejection of imitation (taqlīd) in legal matters. On the other hand, this neo Sufism supposedly is characterised by initiation into mass organisations; union with the Prophet and a Muḥammad oriented mysticism (Ṭariqa Muḥammadiyya); legitimisation through chains of authority (silṣila) going all the way to the Prophet; willingness to take political and military action in defence of Islam; emphasis on Ḥadīth; and the right to exercise independent legal reasoning (iṣṭiḥād). In short, the term neo Sufism is used to refer to Sufi movements that make deliberate e
orts to distance themselves from excessive Sufi practices, and to conform to ‘orthodox’ beliefs and practices. As such, eighteenth century Sufism is viewed as void of its spiritual dimensions, and as merely a mass movement in the service of legalistic Islam.

While these assertions about neo Sufism are stated without evidence, several elaborate studies have been written to illustrate the inadequacy of the paradigm of neo Sufism for understanding actual developments in eighteenth century Sufism, both at the social and the intellectual levels. Among the many criticisms levelled against this concept is the evidence for a continuing and pervasive influence of Ibn ‘Arabi both at the levels of high as well as popular Sufism. These studies also point out that the said anthropocentric tendencies of the Muḥammad oriented Sufism were already introduced by Ibn ‘Arabi himself in the thirteenth century, and that this kind of Sufism can be, and in fact most of the time was, a deeply mystical principle that reinforces rather than undermines the spiritual, imaginative dimension of Sufism. Critics of the concept of neo Sufism have also noted that the rejection of imitation (and of legal schools or madhhab) which accompanies the emphasis on the Ṭariqa Muḥammadiyya is not replaced by personal legal researches, but remains present in the practices of these movements.


judgement which has recourse to reason; in other words, this kind of mysticism does not represent a shift from a notion of authority which stands above individual reason to one which is personal; rather, the alternative is the notion of personal access to God.

To be sure, Sufism continued to thrive in all of its varieties in both popular and elite circles. A wide spectrum of Sufi writings was also produced in this period. Yet, despite some innovation in Sufi thought, there were no radical departures from older patterns of Sufi thinking and practice. With the exception of Wali Allâh, the attempts of eighteenth century reformers to confront the crises of their societies did not rely on a reformulation of Sufi thought. For example, the great Sufi master of the early eighteenth century, ‘Abd al Ghanî al Nâbulsi (d. 1731), was aware of critiques of Sufism, but did not attempt to reformulate it or reform it from within; rather, he defended commonly held esoteric beliefs and practices as well as more complex philosophical Sufi concepts. Additionally, he attempted to reconcile Sufism with orthodox, legalistic understandings of Islam.39 At the other end of the long eighteenth century, Sanûsi relied on traditional Sufism to mobilise and organise Muslims, but reserved his intellectual reformative views for the subject of Ḥadîth. At a much later period in the long eighteenth century, ‘Abd al Qâdir al Jazâ’îrî (d. 1883) propounded a model of political radicalism and traditional Sufism.40 The foundations of eighteenth century reforms, therefore, were not strictly related to Sufism. In this sense, neither the emergence of so called neo Sufism, nor the Wahhâbî rejection of Sufism was characteristic of eighteenth century reform. In contrast to what is implied in the term neo Sufism, eighteenth century Sufism was neither void of spiritualism, nor was it subservient to the dry legalistic forms of Islam. Many of the reformers were either active Sufis or had some affinity with Sufism, which they practised in traditional ways. Yet, those reformers who criticised prevalent Sufi beliefs and practices did not conform to the Wahhâbî model for this critique. In fact, despite their different views on the subject, all of the main reformers of the period distanced themselves from Wahhâbî like hostility toward Sufism.


40 For a contrast between his traditional Sufism and radical politics see, for example, ‘Abd al Qâdir al Jaza’îrî, Al Mawaqif, 3 pts in 2 vols. (Damascus, 1966); ‘Abd al Qâdir al Jaza’îrî, Ḥusâm al din li qaṭ’ shubah al murtaddîn, manuscript Landberg MSS 405, Beineke Library, Yale University.
In the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, both Shāh Walī Allāh and Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al Sanūsī attempted to reconcile Islamic legalism and spirituality. Yet despite their comparable final objectives, each had his own distinct method of recasting Sufism in the course of an attempt to vindicate it and establish its legitimacy. Walī Allāh’s defence of Sufism did not prevent him from criticising Sufi excesses.41 His creative interpretations, however, were far more important than his criticism. To start with, he argued that the silence of the law on such subjects as Sufism does not mean they cannot be pursued. The common sciences of his time, Walī Allāh maintains, are the demonstrative sciences (burḥān) used especially in theology, the transmitted sciences (samʿ), that mark the sciences that are specifically Islamic such as Ḥadīth and the gnostic or mystical sciences (wijdān). This third subject, Walī Allāh adds, is universally accepted among Muslims; it either stands above other sciences in the authority it commands amongst Muslims, or, when not explicitly recognised, has penetrated the contents and idioms of all other forms of religious knowledge.42 Sufism, therefore, is not just legitimate but also unavoidable.

Yet despite this argument in defence of the possibility of higher Sufi knowledge, Walī Allāh’s reform project was not primarily concerned with establishing the legitimacy of Sufism and the superiority of mystical knowledge. Rather, his main aim was to resolve conflicts resulting from exclusive claims of intellectual authority, and to demonstrate the relative legitimacy of each of the various intellectual disciplines. His discourse on Sufism, therefore, was neither meant to establish the superiority of the Sufis over the jurists or the traditionalists, nor to produce a ‘neo Sufism’ which is subservient to legalistic Islam.

Another purpose of Walī Allāh’s reform project was to resolve the internal conflicts within Sufism itself. On one of several similar occasions, Walī Allāh describes a visionary encounter with the Prophet Muḥammad in which the Prophet informed him that, as in the case of the legal schools, all the Sufi orders (tariqās) are equal. Walī Allāh further describes similar ‘general provisions’ which were bestowed on him from the Prophet; the translation of these general provisions in specific cases constitutes, according to Walī Allāh, the substance of revival. Walī Allāh also maintains that in this encounter, the Prophet appointed him imam and confirmed the theoretical as well as practical validity of both his particular Sufi tariqā and his legal school. The

Prophet however, informed Wālī Allāh that this new *tariqa* and school of law which are suitable for all Muslims and not just a select few are only acceptable on the condition that they do not constitute an added cause of disagreement and conflict among Muslims.\textsuperscript{43}

The writings of Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al Sanūsī represent yet another distinct project of revival. Sanūsī was born in 1787 in Mustaghānīm in Algeria.\textsuperscript{44} He received his early education in his home town and later in Fās before he went on pilgrimage to Mecca; there he met and became a loyal disciple of ʿĀḥmad ibn Idrīs al Fāsī, founder of the Idrīsīyya order. After Fāsī’s death in 1836, Sanūsī founded his first zāwiyā (Sufi lodge) on Mount Abū Qubays outside Mecca, but he had to leave it because of opposition and pressure from local scholars and politicians. In 1840 he headed back to North Africa. In the year 1842 he established his first headquarters on al Jabal al Akhdār, halfway between Tripoli and the Egyptian border. From this zāwiyā, Sanūsī dispatched missionaries to the southern and western parts of Libya, where the presence of Ottoman or French authorities, the strong orders of North African cities and the influence of the Azharite scholars were minimal. Between the years 1846 and 1853 he went on a second long pilgrimage to Mecca, and soon after his return he moved his headquarters further south to Jaghbūb, where he spent the final years of his life. Upon his death in 1859, tens of zāwiyās were already established throughout Libya and elsewhere in Egypt, Algeria and the Sahara. The spread of the Sanūsīyya continued under the leadership of the founder’s two sons, and was only halted by the expanding French power.

Sanūsī provides a third example of a strong and active commitment to Sufism, although with a much different emphasis than Wālī Allāh or Nābulūsī. Sanūsī led a movement organised largely along Sufi lines. He wrote extensively on Sufism, yet although he dedicated some of his writings to a discussion of its intellectual content, he was more interested in formal descriptions of Sufi orders, and in defending some Sufi related notions and practices.\textsuperscript{45} In one of his books on Sufism, he describes the rituals of initiation

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\textsuperscript{43} Wālī Allāh, *Fuyūḍ al Ḥaramayn*, pp. 30 2, 49.


and the prayer formulas of some forty Sufi orders, suggesting that they are equally valid ways to reach the same objective. Unlike Wali Allah, he does not try to justify or reconcile the differences between the various contradictory Sufi concepts, and attempts instead to resolve contradictions between Sufism and legal Islam.

In his writings, Sanusi focuses on the formal task of legitimising Sufi practice against Wahhabi like criticisms, and on the organisational aspects which formed the backbone of the Sanusiyya enterprise. Sufi knowledge is construed not in terms of discussions of the substance of the Sufi experience, but as a systematically rationalised conduct. Beyond his organisational ingenuity, however, Sanusi’s main reform ideas are in the field of Hadith and not intellectual Sufism. It is thus understandable that, despite all of his praise of Sufi knowledge, he does not confer the title ‘the inheritors of the prophets’ (warathat al anbiya’) on fellow Sufis, but bestows it instead on the traditionalist scholars of Hadith.

On the opposite end of the spectrum of reformative attitudes towards Sufism, Shawkani was adamant in his critique of many Sufi practices, but he reflected on his own position regarding individual Sufis and reformulated this position over the course of his intellectual career. In one such instance of self reflection, Shawkani intimates that earlier in his life, while still in the prime of his youth, he had written an anti Sufi poem, but that he retracted what he said in that poem in his mature days. In this account, Shawkani attributes his change of heart to the realisation that the proper worship of God is not done through accusing other Muslims of unbelief (lam yatabbadni Allah bi takfir man kān), and that it is far better to busy oneself with one’s own faults than with those of others (tūb li man shaghalathu ‘uyubuhu). This moral stand aside, however, Shawkani justifies his change of mind by reverting from the criticism of individual actors to the criticism of the committed acts, from the specification (takhshiš) to the generalisation (ta’mīm) of rulings.

The regional character of eighteenth-century reform

One of the most central ideas asserted by revisionist historians of the eighteenth century is that of continuity between the eighteenth century and the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One view maintains that eighteenth century reform

and modern fundamentalism are linked by virtue of a shared ‘fundamentalist mode of Islam’ which presumably continues to unfold from its formulations in the eighteenth century to the modern period. Proponents of this thesis maintain that several Islamic, ‘socio moral’ reform movements were active in the eighteenth century, that these movements were not inspired by the encounter with Europe and that they laid the foundation for an indigenous ‘fundamentalist’ tradition which continues till today.\footnote{For uses of the term ‘socio moral’ see, for example, Rahman, ‘Revival and reform in Islam’; Rahman, Islam and modernity; and Voll, Continuity and change. The main Scholarship on the continuity thesis is by John Voll; see, for example, Continuity and change; ‘Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab world: Egypt and the Sudan’, in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms observed (Chicago, 1991), pp. 345 402; ‘Muhammad Hayyä al-Sindi and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhåb: An analysis of an intellectual group in eighteenth century Madina’, BSOAS, 38, 1 (1974), pp. 32 9; ‘The Sudanese Mahdi: Frontier fundamentalist’, IJMES, 10 (1979), pp. 145 66; and ‘Hadith scholars and tariqahs: An ulama group in the 18th century Haramayn and their impact in the Islamic world’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 15, 3 4 (1980), pp. 264 73.} To be sure, advocates of this view do not deny the effect of the encounter with the West on modern reform, but they still maintain that the eighteenth century had its autonomous agents of innovation and its own brand of original renovation and renewal, and that this indigenous tradition is partly responsible for modern renewal and fundamentalism. However, this attempt to trace the roots of modern Islamic reform to the eighteenth century fails to recognise that the problems that informed the reform ideas of the eighteenth century bear no resemblance whatsoever to those that inspired and drove later reforms. The most noticeable absence from the thought of all the major thinkers of the eighteenth century is Europe. Even when some of these thinkers were aware of infringements on Muslim lands, they did not appreciate the extent of the threat these infringements presented, nor did such events influence their thought: Europe, as a cultural challenge, was completely absent. Of course, the exact opposite is true of later Islamic thought, where the challenge of Europe drives all the famous thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The responses to Europe echoed in the ideas of these thinkers ranged from rejecting Europe in all of its political and intellectual dimensions, to striking a compromise and adopting some of the European institutions, and all the way to embracing these institutions wholeheartedly. In all cases, they were responses or reactions to what became the ever present reality of European hegemony.

To substantiate the continuity thesis, reference is often made to an informal network of teachers and students in the Haramayn (Mecca and Medina). Advocates of this view further maintain that, although there were no formal
organisational links between eighteenth century movements, the ideas of
the scholars in this network were preached in various parts of the Muslim
world, providing a measure of intellectual coherence and family resem-
brance among these movements. In contrast to this focus on transregional
networks of scholars, I note the development of regional reform traditions
that drew heavily on local learning and canons. The various universal visions of
eighteenth century thinkers had their roots in earlier regional traditions. Along
with many peripatetic scholars who travelled in the eighteenth century in
pursuit of knowledge, the major thinkers of the eighteenth century either
travelled after their ideas matured and their views were articulated or they
did not travel at all, and they were educated within deeply rooted regional
traditions. It is thus possible to speak of an Indian school of thought, a Yemeni
school and a West African one. It is perhaps even possible to claim that ground
breaking intellectual contributions were made within the context of mature and
erudite regional traditions, whereas the intellectual contributions of travelling,
apprentice scholars, important as they were from a social perspective, were
derivative. The regional rootedness of the main reform traditions, however,
does not imply that their intellectual horizons were limited or parochial. Quite
the contrary, regional traditions were revitalised by opening them up to the
legacies of other Muslim regions and schools of thought. Although eighteenth
century thought introduced significant departures from traditional epistemolo-
gies, these departures were generated from within the tradition and did not
derive from alternative cultural systems.

Despite their shared anxieties, the reformers of the eighteenth century
proposed to address the problems of their time in diverse ways. Within the
context of a shared and universal Islamic intellectual tradition, each of the
reform projects of the eighteenth century had its distinct regional character.
To be sure, the cultural specificity of various regions of the Muslim world was
not a novel development of the eighteenth century. However, acquisition by
various intellectual traditions of a specifically regional character reinforced the
territoriality and specific political conditions of each geographical region.
Moreover, the emerging reform projects as well as ideologies of political
reform were shaped by and geared toward the specific traditions of their
respective regions of origin. Thus, peculiar and distinct cultural undertakings
reinforced the proto political identities, starting in the regional states which
had developed local traditions of governance as well as set traditions of
interacting with their surroundings, and on to local jihad movements that

50 See, for example, Voll, Continuity and change, p. 38 and passim.
attempted to replace regimes accused of specific kinds of disorder. This is not to say, however, that the regional character of eighteenth century thought amounted to the formation of national identities. Contrary to many contemporary assertions in both scholarly works and nationalist discourse, the reformers of the eighteenth century were not national heroes, nor were they the precursors of the later ideologues of the nationalist movements.  

More important than the emerging regional, proto political identities was the fact that the education of the most notable thinkers of the eighteenth century was local. Shawkānī, for example, did not travel outside Yemen, and Wālī Allāh travelled to the Ḥaramayn as a mature scholar and exchanged information with local scholars he met on his trip. Both thinkers were educated within deeply rooted traditions and, above all, articulated their views in relation to the problems and potentials of these traditions. Furthermore, the teachers of these thinkers were almost exclusively local. Of course, all drew on a shared Islamic intellectual legacy, yet this legacy was vast, and the choices were always informed by local experience even as they attempted to open up and transform regional traditions. What applied to eighteenth century thought applied equally to the practical aspects of movements and ideologies. For example, dan Fodio did not travel outside of a relatively small part of West Africa, and his peculiar mélange of ideas was carefully customised to deal with a specific set of social and political problems.

This is not to say that travel and networking did not exist in the eighteenth century as it always had in previous centuries. Rather, what characterised the eighteenth century was that, alongside the age old pattern of travel for the pursuit of knowledge, there emerged movements and intellectual traditions which were primarily regional in character. The most compelling scholarship of the eighteenth century was produced within these regional traditions. It is even possible to posit a dichotomy between major traditions, which were mature, self confident and decidedly local, and minor traditions, which were promoted by wandering scholars and which, despite their social significance,

51 For an excellent corrective to the common historical narratives that portray the reign of Muhammad ‘Alī Pasha as the beginning of Egyptian nationalism see Khalid Fahmy, All the pasha’s men: Meḥmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt (Cambridge, 1997).
53 Wālī Allāh’s main scholarly exchange in the Ḥaramayn was with Abū Ẓāhir al Kūrānī al Kurdī, the son of the famous scholar/teacher İbrāhīm al Kurdī. In the licence he issued to Wālī Allāh, Abū Ẓāhir writes that the former requested authorisation to report parts of Ṣahīḥ Bukhārī and other classics although he had no need for it, since he had already achieved mastery over the texts and contents of these works from what he learned from his father and teachers in his own homeland. Quoted in ‘Ubayd Allāh al Sindī, Al tamhūd li ta‘rīf A‘immah al tajdīd (Haydarabad, 1976), p. 443.
were intellectually derivative. The main intellectual contributions were made by scholars who, in addition to their direct and deep involvement in the political and social affairs of their own regions, were locally educated; their ideas were definitely hybrid and heavily indebted to diverse elements of the vast Islamic legacy, but were not the product of a universal pan Islamic intellectual movement.

While the aims of defending and empowering larger sectors of society were shared by many eighteenth century thinkers, the reform ideas of these thinkers as well as the practical mechanisms employed to effect these ideas were highly localised. Aware of the radical nature of their interpretations of religious doctrines, these thinkers attempted to spread their innovative ideas by intensely engaging the dominant local traditions of the regions in which they lived and operated. Thus, for example, both Ṣanāʿī and Shawkānī directed a disproportionate amount of their critical ideas against Zaydism, the dominant tradition of highland Yemen, although the implications of their ideas as far as traditional Sunni thought is concerned were at least equally radical. Similarly, the peculiar issues addressed by Wali Allāh are explainable in terms of intellectual developments specific to Indian Islam.

Some eighteenth century thinkers also resorted to networking to reinforce their ideas. However, whether their founders travelled or not, the most influential networks established in the eighteenth century were regional. The prime examples of network building are the Sokoto school networks of dan Fodio, the Sanūṣi network of settlements stretching from the Mediterranean coast of present day Libya into sub Saharan Africa, and the network of Shawkānī’s students who were appointed throughout Yemen in influential positions in courts, schools and other institutions.

The vital characteristic of the post jihad state of ‘Usman dan Fodio and its indispensable requisite was the network of schools and administrative

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54 In some cases, the regional character of education was consciously advocated in pedagogy: for example, Shawkānī speaks of books and intellectual traditions which are specific to each region that ought to be consulted by the students of these regions. Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al Shawkānī, Adāb al ṭabāb wa muntahā al ṭārīb (Dār al Arqam, 1981). In a kind of social and economic regionalism, Shawkānī recognises and suggests solutions for the particular problems of Yemen. Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al Shawkānī, ‘Al Dawā’ al ‘ajil fi daf’ al ‘aduw al ša’īl’, in Al Rasī‘il al saḥafiyya (Beirut, reprint of the 1930 edition), pp. 27–38; he also argues that ‘the imam ought to spend (yarradd) the alms taxes (ṣadaqāt) (paid) by the rich (members) of a (certain) region on the poor (members of this same region)’. Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al Shawkānī, Al Darārī al mudiyya sharḥ al durra al baḥiyya (Cairo, 1986), pp. 214–16. Thus Shawkānī recognises, in theory and not just in practice, the existence of regional knowledge, regional politics and regional economic interests.
centres spread throughout the realm of the Sokoto caliphate. The jihad led by dan Fodio culminated in the formation of a central state on the ruins of an old social and political order. The Sokoto caliphate was a state in which political power was delegated, but whose unity was guaranteed by the diffusion of a heterogeneous body of legal and administrative professionals. The key to this uniformity was education, a strategic weapon dan Fodio deployed on several levels. Through his efforts to spread literacy among his followers, dan Fodio sought to forge a common social identity which included and superseded the preceding fragmented identities of the region. As part of his educational programme, he provided training for a team of legal and administrative professionals, who allowed the new state to function in accordance with its ideals. All of the sources of dan Fodio’s intellectual inspiration belong to the classical heritage of medieval Islam, which he refers to and quotes extensively and uncritically. Dan Fodio did not lack erudition but, unlike other eighteenth century thinkers, he was not interested in reforming the received intellectual traditions: his emphasis was on reviving or reforming actual Islamic society. He did not study classical Islamic political theory to resolve its contradictions, but to derive from it a model for individual and social life. He sought not to reform the content of Islamic education, but to employ it in the reformation of his own local society.

Sanūsī’s small empire provided yet another example of a unique, regional networking system. Tens of settlements spread along a trail which started in present day Libya and extended into sub Saharan Africa. During his own lifetime, Sanūsī founded some sixty lodges in which the religious and worldly affairs of the community were managed. The religious obligations of the members of the community were defined to include, in addition to expected spiritual activities, education, labour, defence and trade. Typically housing fifty to a hundred members, and often considerably more, the lodges were also integrated into the larger communities in the midst of which they were established. Tribes invited the Sanūsiyya to establish these orders, and donated the lands for the lodges as well as surrounding agricultural land for

economic sustenance; they also sent their children to study at the lodges. Equally significant is that authority in each lodge was shared between the Sufi shaykh, who was sent by Sanūsī to oversee religion and education, and the wakil, who represented the local tribal authority. The organisational break through that is responsible for the success of the Sanūsiyya order was an innovation not just in the context of African society but also in relation to earlier Sufi organisations. The Sanūsī settlements were thus integrated into local communities but also formed a coherent whole which shared economic interests, patterns of social and political organisation and authority, as well as religious doctrine and practice. The lodges mediated between tribes and, more important, provided organisational principles that superseded tribal loyalties. Moreover, while accommodating local traditions, the Sanūsiyya order introduced the Islamic model of quasi urban, settled communities into regions still under tribal sway.56

This physical network of settlements bore little resemblance to the intellectual network emanating from the Ḥaramayn or to the educational and administrative network of the Sokoto caliphate. It is noteworthy that, although Sanūsī travelled and lived many years in Ḥijāz with his teacher Ahmad ibn Idrīs, he did not study with the Ḥaramayn scholars. Moreover, although the two never met, Sanūsī was greatly influenced by Shawkānī’s thought, especially in the views on ijtihād and Ḥadīth. In all likelihood, Sanūsī became familiar with Shawkānī’s ideas during his stay in Ḥijāz; this however, did not happen through direct contact, or via a Ḥaramayn network of scholars. More important is that Sanūsī translated Shawkānī’s intellectual influence into a distinctive social experiment which could not have been imagined by Shawkānī. While the latter’s only interest in Sufism was critical, Sanūsī was primarily a Sufi, and a network of settlements organised along the lines of Sufi orders provided the main vehicle for achieving his reform objectives.

Eighteenth century Islamic pedagogy was also regionalised. The local character of teaching subject matter and methodologies was re
eected in the advocacy of regional curriculums and in a tendency to generate, either through translation or new composition, a local corpus of Islamic educational literature written in local languages. In fact, a first step towards the promotion of regional education was the recognition that travel was no longer necessary

56 On sources for the study of Sanūsī, and on Sanūsī’s organisational activities in Cyrenaica see Vikør, Sufi and scholar on the desert edge, pp. 4 19, 132 60, 181 217. For more on the life and education of al Sanūsī see Ahmad Ṣidqī al Dajānī, Al Ḥaraka al Sanūsiyya: Nash’atuha wa numuwwuha fi al qarn al tasi’ ʿashar (Cairo, 1967).
for the pursuit of knowledge.\textsuperscript{57} This subject is systematically treated in Shawkānī’s \textit{Adab al ṭalab}, a book which deals exclusively with various aspects of all levels of education. In his discussion of the requisite education of a \textit{mujtahid} who issues rulings, Shawkānī lists a number of disciplines and suggests specific books that are useful in this regard. Shawkānī is careful, however, to remind his reader that none of the recommended books has authority in and of itself, and that these sources, which are familiar to Yemenis, may have counterparts in other parts of the Muslim world; he further maintains that these books are recommended to the Yemeni student because he is likely to ‘find experts on these books and not other books … unless he relies on self instruction and not on studying with teachers. If this [student] grows up in a region where [scholars] specialise in other than these books, then he ought [to study] what the specialists of this region work on’. However, according to Shawkānī, the emphasis on the regional character of various institutions of learning and of canons is not meant to endow any particular set of texts with ultimate authority; rather, the regional character of the tools of learning underscores their relative authoritativeness, or rather utility, while the knowledge deriving from these parochial traditions remains, in Shawkānī’s view, universal.\textsuperscript{58}

The emergence of regional traditions is also evident from translations into and compositions in vernacular languages. Both dan Fodio and Walī Allāh promoted the study of Arabic as the indispensable requisite for the study of all the other religious sciences. Dan Fodio’s schools taught Arabic, and competence in the language was a distinguishing trait of the experts that manned the educational and administrative centres of the Sokoto caliphate. Moreover, all of dan Fodio’s numerous treatises in which he advanced his own legal and political views were written in Arabic. In addition to these relatively advanced works, dan Fodio also wrote many tracts in the language of Fulfulde, in an attempt to promote basic Islamic education among a population that did not speak Arabic.\textsuperscript{59} Many of these texts were written in a rhyming style to facilitate their memorisation. Both his Arabic and Fulfulde works were based on and derived from classical Islamic writings in Arabic. However, both kinds of writings acquired peculiar regional characteristics: the Arabic writings on account of their treatment of problems specific to West Africa, and the standard Islamic writings on account of their composition in the local language of Fulfulde.

\textsuperscript{57} See, for example, Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl al Šan‘ānī, \textit{Irshād al muqāqād ilā tawsīr al ‘amal bil ijtiḥād} (Beirut, 1992), pp. 11 12, 22 4.
\textsuperscript{58} See, for example, Shawkānī, \textit{Adab al ṭalab}, pp. 107 8, 113 24.
\textsuperscript{59} See Brenner and Last, ‘The role of language in West African Islam’. See p. 444 for reference to 500 poems in Fulfulde that were composed in nineteenth century West Africa.

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Likewise, Wali Allâh’s extensive œuvre was produced in two languages. Many of his books are written in a mix of Arabic and Persian, with alternating paragraphs or sections. More revealing than this alternating style, however, is his translation of what he considered to be the main scriptural sources of Islam into Persian, the language of the educated elite in India; these are the Qur’ân (Fath al Raḥmân fi Tarjamat al Qur’ân), the Muwaṣṣaṭ of Mālik (d. 796) (Al Muṣaffâ) and sections of the Šaḥiḥ compilation of Prophetic traditions of al Bukhârî (d. 870). In content as in form, Wali Allâh gave a major impetus to the shaping of a distinct regional Islamic tradition.

The ruptures of the nineteenth century: Islamic reform in the shadow of the West

In contrast to these independent reform activities, a different breed of Islamic reform emerged in the course of the nineteenth century in response to Europe. For the most part, eighteenth century reforms were precipitated by gradual, long term changes. However, in the second half of the nineteenth century, most reforms were in response to sudden social changes and ruptures. Shaped, as it were, by the encounter with Europe, nineteenth century reform was first triggered by the increasing material threat of expanding European powers, but gradually reflected an increasing awareness of the cultural and intellectual challenges brought about by this encounter. In most instances, the first such reforms reflected the desire of Ottoman political elites to reform the state and its institutions in order to contain the European threats to the Ottoman Empire. In the 1840s, new laws regulating commerce and land ownership were introduced in Istanbul and Cairo, and in 1857, the Ottoman, administrative Tanzimat reforms were primarily concerned with strengthening the institutions of the state. In this early phase, many Muslim thinkers viewed the institutional and legal reforms introduced by the Ottoman state with suspicion. One of the main reasons for this apprehension was that many of these reforms were capitulations by the Ottoman state surrendered under the pressure of European consuls and diplomats; furthermore, as a consequence of some of these reforms, Christians enjoyed a preferential treatment that was denied to the Muslim subjects of the empire.  

60 For example, an increasing number of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire were treated as subjects of various European consulates, and were thus exempt from paying taxes that were imposed on Muslims. See, for example, Roderic Davison, ‘Turkish attitudes concerning Christian Muslim equality in the nineteenth century’, American Historical Review, 59, 4 (1954), pp. 844–64. On Ottoman reforms in general, see Roderic Davison, Nineteenth century Ottoman diplomacy and reform (Istanbul, 1999).
To some extent, therefore, the attitudes towards the reform of state elites, on the one hand, and religious thinkers, on the other, were not identical. In response to this discontinuity, religious reform was advocated by some Ottoman elites as a way of accelerating the pace of political and institutional reform. However, some of the earliest ideas about reform were articulated by Muslim scholars dispatched by the state on official educational or diplomatic missions to Europe. One of the earliest systematic reflections on reform in the context of the encounter with Europe was articulated by the Egyptian scholar Rifā‘a Rāfi‘ al Ṭaḥṭāwī (d. 1873). In 1826, Muḥammad ‘Ali Pasha, the autonomous Ottoman governor of Egypt, sent a group of students to study in France, partly in response to a French request, but primarily as part of his efforts to acquire French practical knowledge which he could then use to modernise the Egyptian military and other state institutions. Al Ṭaḥṭāwī was charged with providing religious guidance to the Egyptian delegation during its stay in Europe. Upon his return five years later, al Ṭaḥṭāwī wrote an account of his observations and impressions of France, and outlined a vision of reform derived from these observations.61

The young al Ṭaḥṭāwī received traditional religious education, but his ideas about reform suggest no need for reforming religious thinking and education, and focus exclusively on the need to build a modernised state whose institutions are modelled after the French ones. Put differently, al Ṭaḥṭāwī was not concerned with religious reform. Instead, he provided extensive discussions of the desired forms of organising the state, as well as the various sectors of the economy, including industry, commerce and agriculture. To a great extent, al Ṭaḥṭāwī’s approach mirrors the modernising project of Muḥammad ‘Ali’s state, which did not concern itself with reforming the traditional Islamic education of al Azhar University, and focused instead on building a parallel, modern educational system independent of it.

Al Ṭaḥṭāwī invokes Islam only to disparage the religious beliefs of the French, or to assert that Muslims are not prohibited from availing themselves of French practical and scientific knowledge. Like al Ṭaḥṭāwī, the writings of the Tunisian vizier Khayr al Dīn al Tūnisī (d. 1890) advocate a vision of organisational modernisation and reform; unlike al Ṭaḥṭāwī, however, al Tūnisī articulates an Islamic rationale for this reform. In his book Aqwām al masālik li ma‘rifat aḥwāl al mamālik, al Tūnisī provides

a model of reform which is based on an elaborate description of the structure and organisation of the modern European states. However, according to al Tūnisī, this reform has an Islamic component, one which is rooted in the concept of public interest or benefit (maṣlaḥa). The modernisation of the institutions of the state is thus conceptually legitimised as a necessary means of preserving the collective interests of Muslims, and procedurally as an exercise of independent reasoning (ijtihād) in matters pertaining to public affairs. As such, religious reform becomes a perquisite of political reform.62

Elsewhere in the Muslim world, alternative visions of engaging Europe in the course of the modernisation project were articulated. In India, Sayyid Ahmad Khān (1817–98) championed the establishment of modern institutions, including the Aligarh College modelled after British educational institutions. Ahmad Khān also advocated the collaboration with British colonial rule as a way of preserving the privileges of the Muslim minority in India. Furthermore, he maintained the need for a modern interpretation of Islamic scriptures in the light of the findings of modern science, and undertook a new interpretation of the Qur’ān which is consistent with the laws of nature.63

More than any of the above thinkers, however, Islamic reform in the nineteenth century is associated with the names of Jamāl al Dīn al Afghānī (1838–97) and Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), along with their junior associate Muḥammad Rashīd Rīdā (1865–1935). In contrast to Taḥtāwī who claimed the authority to propose a reform project on the basis of his knowledge of the structure of the modern French state and society, these men fashioned their careers and wrote as religious scholars, and asserted the authority of their reform projects on the basis of the religious authority they claimed. Moreover, both Afghānī and ‘Abduh were able to attract a significant following amongst Muslims, and to utilise the press to spread their ideas all over the Muslim world. Both were also familiar with European modernity and progress, as well as the momentous impact of European colonial policies in the Muslim world.

Many aspects of the life of al Afghānī are shrouded in mystery.64 By most counts, he was born and raised in Shi‘ī Iran, but he probably adopted the name

63 See, for example, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, The causes of the Indian revolt, with an introduction by Francis Robinson (Karachi and New York, 2000). See also Azīz Ahmad, Islamic modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964 (London, 1967).
64 For a concise overview of the life and career of al Afghānī, and a sample of his important writings, including his writings on philosophy, response to Renan and critique of the Neihiri sect, see Nikki Keddie, An Islamic response to imperialism: Political and religious writings of Sayyid Jamāl al Dīn ‘al Afghānī‘ (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1983).
Afghaní to conceal his background and to bolster his chances of appealing to Sunnī Muslims. Despite numerous seeming contradictions in his writings and intellectual posture, a number of constants characterised the career of al Afghaní. Right from the beginning of this career, al Afghaní was consistently opposed to colonialism in general, and British colonialism in particular; furthermore, he was a political agitator advocating an Islamic solidarity which would empower Muslims in their struggle against colonialism. Al Afghaní’s attempts to mobilise against foreign occupation of Muslim lands was usually coupled with political intrigues and instigations against Muslims rulers. His political activism recurrently brought him into contact and conflict with authorities, whom he boldly criticised and plotted against, and these conflicts invariably forced him to move from one country to another in search for receptive audiences and following. He took residence in virtually all the major capitals of the Muslim world, and was an active player in the political life of Iran, India, Afghanistan, Egypt and Turkey.

For most of the 1870s, after he was expelled from Istanbul, al Afghaní lived in Egypt; there he cultivated a circle of associates and followers, including his closest associate Muhammad ‘Abduh, and in 1879 he was expelled from Egypt after two years of intensive instigation against the British occupation. In the opening years of the 1880s, al Afghaní landed in India where he wrote a critique of the Neichiris, the followers of Sayyid Ḥamad Khān. In this critique, al Afghaní comes across as a defender of religion and pan Islamic sentiments. However, between 1882 and 1884, he travelled to Paris and wrote a famous apologetic response to the French thinker Ernest Renan in which he concedes that all religions, including Islam, are obstacles to social progress. During his stay in Paris, al Afghaní met up again with ‘Abduh, after the latter was exiled from Egypt in the wake of the anti British ‘Urbī revolt (1879-82); for about a year, al Afghaní and ‘Abduh published Al ‘Urwā al Wuthqā, arguably their most influential publication. In the mid 1880s, al Afghaní travelled to Iran from which he was eventually expelled in 1891; and in 1892 he was invited to Istanbul by the pan Islamist Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II, but he soon fell out of favour with his patron, and had to contend with significant constraints on his political activities for the remaining years of his life.

Al Afghaní lived in a period of continued efforts to modernise the Muslim states and their institutions under the political and intellectual influence of Europe. Simultaneously, however, European colonialism continued

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to undermine the political independence of Muslim countries. Al Afghānī’s reform project, both at the intellectual and political levels, was articulated in response to these two currents. At the intellectual level, he did not undertake a systematic reconstruction of religious thought, and his views on religion were often random and contradictory. For example, in his writings on philosophy and science, and in his response to Renan, he underscores the role of reason in the revival and progress of Muslim societies, and even suggests that this positive role of science and reason is needed to overcome the negative effects of religion. However, in his response to the Neichiris, he opposes the naturalistic interpretations of Islam advocated by the followers of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān on the grounds that these interpretations undermine the unity of Muslims. Yet, despite this seeming contradiction, a common thread in the analysis of al Afghānī is his contention that Islam, reformed or otherwise, is the key shaper of the identity of Muslim societies and the primary force in their struggle against colonialism. Once again, al Afghānī’s primary concern was not with an abstract reconstruction of Islamic religious thought, but with the tangible interests of actual historical communities of Muslims. Throughout the many stages of his career, he promoted Islamic solidarity in the face of colonialism, and while his religious ideas betray some contradiction, his political objectives were remarkably consistent. Above all, the legacy of al Afghānī is his ability to mobilise a popular as well as elitist awareness of the need for political and religious revival, and to politicise Islam in the modern context of colonialism.

Muhammad ‘Abdūh66 was raised as a traditional Egyptian religious scholar at a time when religious education was losing ground to the newly established secular educational institutions. His early, relatively modest professional trajectory took a turn in the 1870s when he cultivated a close relationship with Afghānī during the latter’s residence in Egypt. In this period, whatever his convictions may have been, ‘Abdūh assumed a junior role to Afghānī and embraced the pan Islamic political project of his senior associate. Especially in the last two years of his residence, Afghānī delivered a series of public, anti British speeches which drove the authorities to expel him from Egypt. ‘Abdūh was implicated by his association with Afghānī, an association which continued after the latter’s expulsion, and subsequently after ‘Abdūh’s exile in the wake of the anti British ‘Urābī revolt in 1882. After his exile, ‘Abdūh travelled

to Tunisia and Beirut, and eventually met up with Afghānī in Paris. There, the two men published *Al ‘Urwā al Wuthqā*, a popular pan Islamic periodical that attempted to raise awareness amongst Muslims about the nature and dangers of colonialism, and ways of combating it. The publication addressed Muslims collectively as a united national entity, and posited European (specifically British) colonialism as the primary threat facing the Muslim world.

Whereas Afghānī’s fortunes declined after this period, ‘Abduh moved on to a different phase in his career. The two men parted ways in 1887, at which time ‘Abduh went back to Cairo and, with the support of his British friend Lord Cromer, he was appointed grand mufti of Egypt. After an intense partnership with Afghānī, ‘Abduh’s return to Egypt marked a change of heart and a definite transformation in his political and intellectual outlook. Contrary to Afghānī’s consistent stand and to the views he himself advocated in his early career, after his return to Egypt ‘Abduh adopted an internalist approach to reform which diverted the focus of his activity from resistance to colonialism towards reforming the self, even if this were to be achieved with the aid of the British colonisers. Colonialism, ‘Abduh now contended, was a symptom of the intellectual decline of Muslims and not the cause of this decline.

Modern scholarship often asserts that a primary objective of ‘Abduh’s reform activities was directed at reforming the religious educational system in general, and the al Azhar University in particular. Much of this reform effort, however, was aimed at securing financial support for religious education, a sector which was neglected ever since Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha invested the bulk of the relevant state resources in the building of alternative, secular educational institutions. In contrast to this focus on fiscal reform, ‘Abduh paid less attention to the structure of the religious educational system or to the content of this education. A somewhat clearer articulation of an intellectual agenda of reform can be gleaned from works such as ‘Abduh’s *Risālat al Tawḥīd* (Treatise on the Oneness of God), published in 1884. The subject of this book was Islamic theology (*kala*m*), and it represented a divergence from treatments of this subject in traditional Islamic scholarship; however, this divergence was primarily in the organisation of the book and the presentation of its material, and not in the ideas expounded in it. In fact, towards the end of his life, ‘Abduh published another treatise on theology which, in form and in content, conformed to traditional Islamic scholarship in this field.

Perhaps the clearest articulation of ‘Abduh’s reform ideas can be found in his Qur’ānic exegetical work, published serially in the journal *Al Manār*, and latter collected under the title *Tafsīr al Manār*. This work was not meant as an exhaustive interpretation of all of the Qur’ān, and ‘Abduh’s primary focus was
on selected verses that deal with the natural order as well as human nature. In his exegesis, ‘Abduh argues that Islam is a religion which conforms with and reinforces the natural order. Here too, ‘Abduh does not present many original metaphysical ideas, and what makes his discourse somewhat distinct is the primacy he gives to the ethical aspects of Islam. Above all, however, the primary drive that animates much of ‘Abduh’s reform project in the post Afghānī phase of his career is his systematic attempt to reconcile traditional and modern institutions; providing new interpretations of Islamic law and scriptures to give Islamic legitimacy to secular, European institutions introduced by the nation state. It is in the course of this undertaking that ‘Abduh invoked the principle of public interest (maṣlaḥa) as a source of legislation in Islam, and as a means to modernise Islamic thought and enable it to meet the challenges of modern life. One effect of this idea was to justify systematically all the new institutions of the modern state on the grounds that it is religiously incumbent on Muslims to borrow these institutions, since public interest is tantamount to law (al maṣlaḥa shar’). ‘Abduh’s particular mode of reconciling tradition and modernity in the interest of the latter had one unanticipated result: in effect it expanded the functional domain of religion into areas which were not previously covered by Islamic law. Ironically, the initial purpose of ‘Abduh’s efforts was to find a way around the restrictions of the law; however, his insistence on providing Islamic legitimisation for each and every institution of the modern, European nation state in effect produced a pervasive and all encompassing Islamic discourse that claims, without historical justification, to cover all aspects of life, the discourse of ‘Islam as a complete way of life’.

Many of ‘Abduh’s ideas were published in Al Manār. This journal was published for about four decades, and had a wide readership amongst Muslim intellectuals throughout the Muslim world. Its chief editor was Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā, a loyal disciple of ‘Abduh and the compiler of his history and much of his ideas.67 Riḍā went from Lebanon to Egypt to work with ‘Abduh, and he published Al Manār under his direction. Despite his unwavering loyalty to his teacher, however, Riḍā’s ideas underwent significant transformations after the death of ‘Abduh, in yet another sign of the fluid character of what is often termed modern Islamic reform. After the death of ‘Abduh, Riḍā continued to publish Al Manār, but not without significant

changes in its tone and focus. With its entrenched penetration of Muslim lands, Riḍā expressed increased concerns about the threat of colonialism to Muslim identity, a threat no longer limited to the military and political spheres, but one that extended to the cultural sphere as well. Initially, Riḍā put much of his hope in the revival of the power of the Ottoman caliphate as the primary defence against an expanding Europe. The ending of the caliphate, however, delivered a major blow to the hopes and aspirations of Riḍā and many of his Muslim contemporaries. And as a result of this disappointment and intensified sense of insecurity, the focus of Riḍā’s writings shifted from ‘progress’ and intellectual reform to the preservation of the Islamic identity.

In contrast to the openness and confidence of the intellectual projects of the thinkers of the eighteenth century, the twin legacies of Islamic reform at the beginning of the twentieth century were the idea of Islam as a complete way of life, and the defensive focus on the preservation of the cultural identity of Muslim societies. In the nineteenth century, Muslim reformers articulated a project of reforming the state and its institutions as a way to reform and revitalise their societies. The failure of this project and its multiple offshoots provided the context for shaping the main trends in the twentieth century Islamic politics of identity.
Reform and modernism in the middle twentieth century

 JOHN O. VOLL

Introduction

An Egyptian student and his friends believed that a wave of atheism and debauchery flooded their country following the First World War. In their view, materialism, imperial occupation and weakness of religious leaders caused a crisis for Muslims. When this young man, Ḥasan al Banna (1906-49), received an assignment to teach in Ismailia, in the Suez Canal zone, he went with a determination to awaken people to ‘the enormous dangers confronting the very essence of their religion because of the advance of licentiousness and apostasy’.¹ Preaching in coffee houses and in private homes, he gained a significant following. Then, in 1928, he joined others in establishing the Muslim Brotherhood (Al Ikhwan al Muslimin). This organisation quickly became a well known association dedicated to Islamic reform and its creation is a milestone in the emergence of new styles of Muslim organisations. The Muslim Brotherhood is in many ways the prototype of modern activist Islamic organisations.

The Brotherhood was not alone in the Muslim world during the fifty years after the First World War as an organisation dedicated to religious renewal. From South East Asia to North West Africa, people like al Banna worked to counter what they believed to be Muslims’ weakness in the face of Western military power and the challenges of modernity. The movements took many forms but these individuals and groups are not simply a stubborn conservative resistance to encroaching modernity. Instead, they are a dynamic part of the modern experiences of the Muslim world.

The middle decades of the twentieth century are years of major transformations in Muslim societies. Sometimes people view this period as a time

when the Islamic dimension of states and societies was diminished by rival perspectives and world views, like nationalism, secularism or radical materialism. At that time, scholars in the West understood modernisation to involve an inevitable secularisation of societies and speculated about the nature of future ‘religionless’ societies, both Western and non Western. While the changes of the mid century decades did undermine, if not destroy, the old modes of life that characterised Muslim societies before the modern era, religion did not disappear. Instead, old style associations sometimes transformed themselves rather than disappearing and new modes of organisation, like the Muslim Brotherhood, emerged. Developments in the mid century decades laid the foundations for what both Muslims and non Muslims recognise as the ‘resurgence of Islam’ in the final decades of the twentieth century.

**Mid-century Muslim reforms and global trends**

The end of the First World War marks a new era in world history. During the following five decades, broad trends shaped the opportunities and limits of Muslim reformers. In political terms, although the modern nation state mode was emerging as dominant, a variety of political regimes still seemed possible in the 1920s. However, by the end of the 1960s, the modern style, territorial nation state was the conceptual framework for statehood in virtually all the world. Older transnational visions of pan Islamic political community or local principalities were replaced in practical terms by states attempting to operate in the nation state model. This transformation provides the political framework for movements of Islamic reform.

A second major theme is the evolving definition of modernity. In the 1920s, the assumption that modernisation and Westernisation were the same dominated the thinking of reformers throughout the world. However, by the late 1960s, modernisers in many societies worked to create distinctive versions of modernity, representing what S. N. Eisenstadt calls ‘multiple modernities’.²

Initially among Muslim thinkers and activists, the challenge involved efforts to show the compatibility of Islam with modernity in its Western formats. However, in the inter war period, debates within the Muslim world about the relationships between Islam and modernity became debates about how to define an authentically Islamic modernity. By the 1960s, these debates involved defining the relationship between Islam and the emerging radical

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nationalism, often seen at the time as a struggle between conservatives (and ‘fundamentalists’) and new radical ideologies of nationalism.

These two broad trends, the transformation of political systems and the redefinition of the relationship between religion and modernity, shaped the history of Muslim movements of reform and modernism. In some movements the visions tended to be state oriented. The alternatives concentrated on social transformation. While no movement was purely political or purely societal, the distinction between movements of ‘statist Islam’ and ‘civil Islam’ is an important key to the broad spectrum of Islamic reformism.

The inter-war era: imperialism and identity

An Algerian intellectual, Farhat Abbās, engaged in a famous exchange in 1936 with a reformist religious scholar, ‘Abd al Hāmid ibn Bādis. This public debate reflects major issues of Muslim reform in the inter war period. Abbās wrote:

If I had discovered an Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist … Yet I will not die for the Algerian homeland because such a homeland does not exist … We have once and for all dispersed the storm clouds of fantasy in order to tie for ever our future to that of the work of France in this land.

The reformist scholar responded that the Muslim population of Algeria ‘is not France; it cannot be France; it does not want to be France’, as he had earlier argued that the authentic symbol of Algeria is Islam.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the debates about politics and identity were defined by the realities of European imperialist domination of the Muslim world. Anti-imperialism increasingly was defined in terms of nationalism, with its attendant problems of defining the local nation. Similarly, the conditions shaped the ways that Muslims could determine the relationship between Islam and modernity: could one be both Muslim and modern?

The Algerian debate reflects the complexities of the issues involved. Difficulties in defining new national identities are obvious. The alternatives posed were assimilation into the imperial identity or definition of the Algerian nation in terms of the non national identity of Islam. Both were, in effect, not ‘national’ in orientation. However, when effective Algerian opposition to

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3 See, for example, the analysis in Robert W. Hefner, ‘Varieties of Muslim politics: Civil vs. statist Islam’, in Fu’ad Jabali and Jamhari (ed.), Islam in Indonesia (Jakarta, 2002), pp. 136–51.

French rule developed following the Second World War, it was nationalist rather than either of the alternatives posed in the 1936 debate. Debates of this type took place throughout the Muslim world in the 1930s, bringing together issues of opposition to imperialist rule, definition of national identity and the attempted articulation of a synthesis of Islam and modernity.

Although activist Islamic groups were among the prominent movements organising opposition to Western imperial domination in the nineteenth century, there were few old style jihads after the First World War. New organisations of reformist activism, like the Muslim Brotherhood, and movements of Islamic modernism displaced the old modes of Islamic activism and reformism. The real competition took place between these Islamic groupings and the emerging forces of more secular nationalism and materialist radicalism. Some movements of Islamic modernism and reformism focused their attention on shaping political life in their countries, while others concentrated on spiritual and social dimensions of society.

**The caliphate and transnational Islam**

The first major issue for many Muslims following the First World War concerned the political dimensions of Islamic life. Muslims were forced to face the problem of defining the nature of the transnational Muslim community. In the first centuries of Islamic history, the Muslim community was ruled in actuality and then nominally by the caliph (al khalifā) or ‘Successor to the Prophet’ as head of the community. By modern times the caliphate had become an image of an ideal polity, rather than an operating political system. However, during the nineteenth century, Ottoman rulers began to emphasise their claim to the title of caliph as well as sultan. Many Muslims around the world came to view the Ottoman ruler as the spokesperson for Islam in international affairs. When the Ottoman Empire was defeated, these Muslims feared that the victorious allies would bring an end to the caliphate.

In India this concern was the basis for one of the first modern style Muslim movements of the inter war era. The Khilāfat (khilāfa is the Arabic term for caliphate) movement mobilised large numbers of people in India, protesting against British policy, and worked closely with the developing Indian nationalist movement. The Khilāfat movement was short lived, with the British imprisoning its major leaders and then, in 1924, the new Turkish government

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of Mustafa Kemal abolishing the office of caliph while creating the modern nationalist (and secular) Turkish Republic.

For a time, the issue of the caliphate attracted some attention. A series of international congresses in the 1920s was organised by different groups hoping to benefit from being able to determine the nature of a new caliphate. Later congresses in the 1930s tended to focus on issues of opposition to imperialism rather than the caliphate. By the time of the Second World War, the caliphate and political pan Islam had ceased to be causes that could mobilise large support, being replaced by nationalist movements of a regional or local nature.

**Modernist reforms in the Arab world**

Muslim reformist and modernist efforts continued in the Arab world, despite the failure of formal pan Islam. However, the major political developments involved nationalist movements and most of these movements were more secular than religious in their perspectives. The vision of the desired independent state was most frequently seen in terms of having an independent, modern style nation state.

Some efforts to establish states on an Islamic model rather than the nation state were undertaken. The best known of these efforts was a continuation of the strict reformist tradition established in the Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth century by the teacher, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab (1703–92). At the beginning of the twentieth century, a third state in this tradition was created by ‘Abd al ‘Aziz ibn Sa’ud (1880–1953), a descendant of the chieftain who had joined with Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab. Initially, the new state was based on conquests, careful inter tribal diplomacy and the unifying authority of the Wahhabī tradition. Ibn Sa’ūd developed a powerful military organisation called the Ikhwān (Brothers) consisting of tribal warriors who were resettled in agricultural communities, where they received strict religious and military training. By the 1920s, the Saudi state controlled much of the Arabian Peninsula, including Mecca and Medina, and gained international recognition. As the state stopped its expansion and began to consolidate, the Ikhwān and the hard line Wahhābīs revolted and were suppressed in 1928–30.

‘Abd al ‘Azīz reshaped the state in more modern forms, proclaiming it to be the ‘Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ in 1932, while maintaining the foundation of a strict interpretation and implementation of Islam in the society. This effort contrasted sharply with other reform efforts at the time, especially the secularising and Westernising programmes of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in the new republic of Turkey.
Elsewhere in the Arab world in the inter war era, European imperial powers were firmly establishing control. One interesting counter movement combined a history of renewal efforts with opposition to imperial rule. The Sanūsiyya Ṭarīqa had been established in the mid nineteenth century by Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al Sanūsī (1787-1859). It became an important force in maintaining social order in the central Saharan regions. When the Ottomans withdrew from Libya before the First World War, the Sanūsiyya became the major vehicle for organising opposition to the Italian invasion. Following the war, leaders of the order continued to lead the fight against the Italians until they were crushed by 1932. The Sanūsī programme was neither nationalist nor intellectually modernist, but it represented one of the rare examples of effective organisation of military opposition to imperialist expansion in the inter war era.

The major projects of modernism and reform involved the challenge of creating an Islamic modernism that was both authentically Islamic and conceptually modern. While these efforts sometimes had direct political implications, European imperial rule set limits. The major form of this modernism in the inter war era is the Salafi movement which continued the work of people like Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905).

In Egypt the reform efforts took many forms. The most direct continuation of ‘Abduh’s tradition is in the work of his student and associate, Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935). Riḍā continued the publication of al Manār, which was read throughout the Muslim world. Most Egyptian intellectuals interested in Islamic issues developed more secular perspectives. ‘Alī ‘Abd al Rāziq (1888-1966) published a study in 1925 in which he argued that the caliphate was the product of historical developments and not a necessary part of Islam. While modernists in the ‘Abduh tradition dealt with a wide range of topics, they tended to ignore issues related to the status of women in Muslim society, whether modern or traditional. An important start had been made by an associate of ‘Abduh, Qāsim Amīn (1863-1908), whose books Taḥrīr al marʿa (The Liberation of Women, 1899) and Al Marʿa al jadīda (The New Woman, 1900) aroused much controversy. However, by the 1920s, secular liberals rather than Islamic modernists became the major advocates for women’s rights.

During the 1920s, many organisations dedicated to the renewal of religion, like the Young Men’s Muslim Association, were formed. They were soon eclipsed by the Muslim Brotherhood, which was established by al Bannā in 1928. Al Bannā described the nature of the organisation in a message to members in 1943: ‘You are not a benevolent society, nor a political party, nor a local organization having limited purposes. Rather, you are a new soul in...
the heart of this nation to give it life by means of the Qur’an.” Its major goal was Islamisation of society rather than overthrowing or gaining control of the state. It was a new style of Muslim organisation in which lay persons rather than religious scholars provided the leadership and the definition of goals. Most of its members were urban, with some familiarity with modern economic and social life.

Similar developments occurred in other parts of the Arab world. Salafi writers were important in intellectual life. Some moved in more nationalist directions, defining Islam as an important part of Arab identity. Shakīb Arslān (1869–1946), a Syrian activist, viewed the Arab revival as the necessary precursor to the revival of the broader Muslim community. Muḥammad Kurd ‘Alī (1876–1952), a Kurd from Syria, reflected the importance of scholarship in historical and literary studies in movements of intellectual reform, and helped to establish the Arab Academy in Damascus.

In Morocco, Muslim modernism took more explicitly political forms. ‘Allāl al Fāsī (1906–73) began as a youthful critic of French rule in the 1920s and in the 1930s created a sequence of political associations that culminated in the establishment of the Istiqlāl Party in 1943. Al Fāsī was a strong advocate of Islamic modernist reforms as well as a major force in the Moroccan nationalist movement. In Algeria, the major reformist organisation was educational and less directly political. The Association of Algerian ‘Ulama` was established in 1931 and its leader ‘Abd al Ḥāmid ibn Bādīs (1889–1940) was the leading Muslim reformist who engaged Farḥat Abba`ṣ in the debate over Algerian identity.

Throughout the Arab world in the inter war era, individuals and groups presented Muslim reformist ideas and programmes. These reformers were not political revolutionaries. They did, however, reframe the debates about Islam in the modern world. At the beginning of the twentieth century, these debates involved conflict between Salafi reformers and conservatives opposed to the new programmes. By mid century, the arguments were between the reformers, who now spoke for explicitly Islamic positions, and more radical secularists and nationalists.

Islamic reform in Sudanic and sub-Saharan Africa

In Muslim societies south of the Sahara, some important reform efforts represented actions that reshaped existing modes of organisation into modern associations. While some new style Islamic organisations were created, these new style
groups did not have the same importance as groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. In the context of the new political units defined by imperial conquests, African responses to both imperialism and modernity tended to be defined within the new ‘national’ units. Most ‘statist’ movements were domestic and ‘national’ rather than religious and most visions of reform were relatively secular.

Sufi brotherhoods were numerous and influential and, in most cases, represented the conservative continuity of social and religious life. However, some orders reshaped themselves in ways that made them effective modern organisations. In Senegal in the late nineteenth century, Ahmadu Bamba M’Backe (c. 1850 1927), a scholar in the Qa´diriyya Sufi tradition, organised his followers (muruṭṣ) into the Muruṭṣiyya. In the context of the establishment of French rule and the beginnings of the integration of Senegal into the global economy, the Muruṭṣs became active in commercial agriculture and the Muruṭṣiyya became an influential part of the colonial society. Neither nationalist nor intellectually reformist, the order illustrates an organisational reformism that is an effective adaptation to changing modern conditions.

In the Nile Valley, British rule in Sudan was the context for transformation of both a Sufi brotherhood and a messianic political theological tradition. The largest Islamic organisation was the Anṣār, the movement of the followers of the nineteenth century Sudanese Mahdī. The state established by the Mahdī had been defeated by the British in 1898 and a son of the Mahdī, Sayyid ‘Abd al Rahmān al Mahdī (1885 1959) reorganised the movement as a popular religious association. He became an important sponsor for modern educated Sudanese and the patron for one of the two nationalist movements in the country (the one advocating separate independence for Sudan). By the end of the Second World War, the Anṣār were in a position to establish the Umma Party, which quickly became the largest political party in the northern Sudan.

The major rival of the Anṣār was the organisation of the followers of Sayyid ‘Alī al Mirghani (1878 1968), the leader of the Khatmiyya Ṭarīqa. The Khatmiyya has its origins in the early nineteenth century and was among the major opponents of the Mahdī. Sayyid ‘Alī became an important advisor to the British rulers and organized his followers into an effective association. He became a patron of the alternative nationalist movement, which advocated unity with Egypt. Following the Second World War, his followers established the other major political party in the northern Sudan, emerging as the National Unionist Party (NUP) in 1952.

In other parts of Africa, Muslim organisations tended to remain in older patterns of activity. While some Muslim intellectuals were impressed by the Salafi tradition, their impact was limited. It was not until the years following
The Second World War that new styles of associations became important. Even in those years, outside Sudan, there were few political parties based on Islamic foundations rather than ethnic, national or classes bases.

Reformers in South and South-East Asia

In British India, political issues defined the nature of Islamic reformism during the inter war period. The collapse of the Khilāfat movement in the mid 1920s forced Muslim leadership to make some critical decisions. The establishment of the All India National Congress, late in the nineteenth century, created an Indian nationalist organisation. However, in 1906, some Muslims established the All India Muslim League to defend Muslim rights against the Hindu majority. The choice for Muslims between the two nationalist options was blurred briefly with the strong Hindu support for the Khilāfat movement. However, by the 1930s, the choice between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League was again clear.

Some of the leaders of the Khilāfat movement, like Abu’l Kalām Āzād (1888 1958), continued in the Indian nationalist movement. Āzād was an active scholar of religious studies and wrote an important commentary on the Qur’ān, but he opposed the concept of a separate Islamic nationalist movement and the creation of a separate Muslim state. However, the Muslim League re emerged as the dominant voice for Muslim interests. When the League’s president, Muḥammad Iqbāl (1877 1938), advocated recognising Muslim separate identity, the movement for the partition of India gained strength. In 1940, under the leadership of Muhammad ‘Alī Jinnāh, the League passed a resolution formally advocating the establishment of a separate Muslim state in India.

Beyond the political arena, Indian Muslim reformist intellectuals shaped Islamic modernist thought far beyond the boundaries of British India. Two major figures were Muḥammad Iqbāl and Mawlānā Sayyid Abū’l Aʿlā’ Mawdūdī (1903 79). Iqbāl’s international influence was based on his efforts to provide a framework for Islamic thought that was equally grounded in Muslim tradition and the major Western schools of philosophy. The breadth of the appeal of his thought is illustrated by the praise that he received from ‘Alī Shariʿatī. This radical Iranian Shiʿi intellectual of the 1960s identified Iqbāl, an Indian Sunnī, as being ‘among those illustrious, intellectual, human visages who have been gifted to humanity by the fertile culture of Islam’.7 Iqbāl’s

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major book, *The reconstruction of religious thought in Islam*, is one of the most important documents of Islamic modernism.

Mawdūdi was a young activist in the 1920s and his experiences led him to mistrust nationalism. He wrote extensively about the need for Islamic renewal and established a strong position that opposed both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. By 1941 he became convinced of the necessity of creating an organisation that could support his programmes of reform and he helped to establish the Jamāʿat i Islāmī (JI). Like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the JI was a distinctively modern association dedicated to the renewal of Islam. The JI’s self description is that

it is neither a *religious* party in the narrow sense commonly understood, nor is it a *political* party as defined in the contemporary meaning of the term. It is an ideological party based on the principle that the whole life is to be organized according to a comprehensive and global code of conduct … It is the standard bearer of the revolutionary call of Islam.\(^8\)

One of the largest Muslim organisations, Tablighī Jamāʿat, arose out of Hindu Muslim tensions during the inter war period. In the 1920s, Hindu missionary organisations began to target Muslim tribal peoples in northern India, and some Muslim leaders responded with the creation of missionary organisations of their own. Mawlānā Muḥammad ʿIlyās (1885–1944), a conservative scholar in the Deobandī tradition, began the Jamāʿat in 1926. Its goal was to reawaken a sense of Islamic faith and practice and its methods were simple. Theological debates were avoided and people were simply encouraged to follow the requirements of the faith. Members were expected to engage in missionary work, with personal contact and house to house campaigns being the key. Mawlānā ʿIlyās strictly avoided involvement in political issues. Awakening religious experience in individuals was more important than socio political programmes of institutional reform. The organisation won many followers and under the leadership of Mawlānā Yūsuf (1917–65), Mawlānā ʿIlyās’s son, began a spectacular global expansion during and following the Second World War.

In South East Asia, the Salafī tradition of ʿAbdūh was already strong in the 1920s. The histories of two organisations established before the First World War reflect reformist developments. The Sarekat Islam was formed in 1912 by a group of Muslim businessmen concerned by the economic power of Chinese traders. With its emphasis on Muslim unity, it worked closely with a more

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reformist group formed in the same year by Ahmad Dahlan, the Muhammadiyah. Its programme was an Islamic modernist one emphasising social welfare and education rather than political activity, opposing religious syncretism and advocating the Salafi approach of reason based analysis of the fundamental sources of Islam. Muhammadiyah developed a network of schools and social centres with millions of members by the 1930s.

Soon after the First World War, Sarekat Islam (SI) emerged as one of the largest nationalist movements in South East Asia, but the identification of one wing of the organisation with the emerging communist movement and internal divisions undermined its appeal. By the 1930s SI lost most of its supporters and more secular nationalists gained followers. Students returning from overseas and local activists formed the Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (PNI) in 1927, and among its leaders was Sukarno (1901-70), who became the personification of Indonesian nationalism not identified with a particular religious tradition.

Conservative Muslim scholars, concerned by the successes of Islamic modernism and secular nationalism, established the Nahdlatul ‘Ulama’ (NU; Reawakening of the ‘Ulamâ’) in 1926 with the goal of strengthening traditional teachings through a network of scholars and schools. While the teachings were theologically traditionalist, the organisation was the agent of a major progressive transformation of the old style religious schools, pesantran, in Indonesia. NU established a complex alternative to Salafi modernism and more secular nationalism. Although traditionalist in tone, its programmes were socially progressive, and although it was primarily apolitical, significant groups within the organisation provided support for early modes of nationalism. The interactions of the groups emerging in the 1920s set the framework for Indonesian social and political action following the Second World War.

In British controlled Malaya, the strength of Salafi reformism is reflected in a series of important publications, beginning with the establishment of al Imam, in 1906, and continuing with a wide range of journals and books throughout the inter war era. In both Malaya and Indonesia, a core of reformists, who became known as the Kaum Muda (Younger Group), competed with the religious establishments (Older Group or Kaum Tua) in shaping Muslim education and general opinion. While large organisations were formed in Indonesia, reformism tended to be confined to more informal groups of urban intellectuals in Malaya. The competition of the old style political and religious elite with the Kaum Muda was complicated by the issue of Malay rights in a socio economic context in which non Malay groups, like the Chinese, were becoming dominant. Many of the new educated elite
allied themselves with the older religious and political establishments, as issues of both religious reform and nationalism became associated with affirmations of Malay identity. In the process, more secular nationalists lost influence because of associations with emerging communist movements, and more explicitly modernist Islamic reform was absorbed into the ethno religious movement of Malay nationalism.

Modernism in the ‘Northern Tier’ and Central Asia

In the ‘Northern Tier’ of the Middle East and in Central Asia, the opportunities for movements of Muslim reform were limited. This broad region was distinctive in the Muslim world by being either independent or under the control of non-Western European empires. Independent rulers in the Northern Tier undertook significant programmes of Westernising and secularising reforms that limited Muslim activism. The large Muslim populations in China and the former Russian empire (and then the Soviet Union) faced distinctive challenges of survival that at times preempted modernist reform efforts.

Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) was the most successful Westernising ruler in the Muslim world. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, Kemal organised a nationalist resistance to the victorious allies. At first, Kemal worked with international Muslim leaders like the head of the Sanūsiyya Taʾrīqa, Sayyid Aḥmad al Sharīf (d. 1933), as well as domestic Muslim notables. However, with the establishment of the republic and the abolition of the caliphate (1924), a series of measures secularising law and the state ended with the constitutional declaration of a secular state.

A Kurdish revolt led by shaykhs of the Naqshbandiyya Taʾrīqa in 1925 led to a suppression of all Taʾrīqa. While some like the Tijāniyya maintained an underground existence, few Islamically identified associations had any influence. One movement of reform was established by Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1876–1960). He advocated an integration of Western technology with Islamic faith. After 1925, his followers operated within informal study groups rather than through a centralised association.

In Iran, the Westernising programmes of Reza Shāh (1878–1944), who came to power following the overthrow of the Qājār dynasty in 1921, similarly suppressed explicitly Islamic reform efforts. Although Iranian ‘Ulamā’ had been active in the protest movement of 1890 and the constitutional revolution of 1905–6, Reza Shāh was able to suppress ‘Ulamā’ activism in the interwar era. Iranian intellectuals advocating reform tended, in this same era, to articulate their visions in more secular or Marxist terms.
In the Russian (Soviet) and Chinese empires, there were distinctive developments within the large but subject Muslim communities. Jadidists, an Islamic modernist movement with nineteenth century roots, supported the Russian Revolution and for a time played a role in the establishment of the Bolshevik regime in Muslim majority areas. Mir Said Sultangaliev (d. c. 1930) worked to synthesise Islamic cultural identity and communism in a Muslim national communism. He and other nationalist communist intellectuals disappeared in the Stalinist purges. Some Jadidists worked with more traditional elements in Central Asia in the Basmachi movements, which organised militant opposition to the establishment of Bolshevik rule in Turkestan. Basmachis believed that Islam could provide the basis for liberation of the East. The movement was effectively defeated by 1923.

Muslim reform in China had a long history, with important roots in eighteenth century movements of renewal. Such efforts were often associated with Sufi brotherhoods, especially the Naqshbandiyya. Following the overthrow of the Qing, the last imperial dynasty, in 1912, many modern style Muslim associations and a periodical press developed. In the fluid conditions of the early republic and inter-war period, Muslim warlords became important political figures, and their patronage aided a variety of Muslim groups.

An important reform movement was begun by Ma Wanfu (1849-1934), who studied in Arabia in the late nineteenth century. Inspired by the Wahhābī and Salafi movements, he worked to reform Chinese Muslim life and thought. The result was the Yihewani or Chinese Ikhwān movement. Although initially separatist, the movement became associated with a Muslim warlord and became less political in its aims. During the 1930s, important Yihewani teachers like Hu Songshan (1880-1956) became more nationalist, in the face of the Japanese invasions, while maintaining a scripturalist approach to religious teaching.

Muslim movements of reform and modernism during the inter-war era were important extensions of nineteenth century Salafi modernism, concentrating on intellectual and social reforms. The political arena was dominated in most areas by non-Muslim imperial control and most nationalist movements were not primarily defined by issues of explicitly Islamic identity. The importance of the relationship between nationalism and Muslim reform becomes even stronger in the decades following the Second World War.

Nationalism, radicalism and Islam in mid-century

Zaynab al Ghazālī (1917-2005) highlighted the competition between Muslim activism and nationalism as it developed by the 1960s. She was founder of a
Muslim women’s organisation and worked closely with al Bannā. In her mind, Gamal Abd al Nasser, the hero of popular Arab nationalism in the 1950s, was an evil despot (al ṭāghūt) ‘whose hands were stained with the blood of true monotheists and who was the adversary of God and believers’.9 When Nasser suppressed the Brotherhood, she aided jailed activists and led groups studying the work of Sayyid Qūṭ. 

Sayyid Qūṭ (1906–66) argued that nationalism and socialism did not start with the affirmation of pure monotheism and represented belligerent unbelief or jāḥiliyya. He stated that Muḥammad could have led a movement of Arab national unity, but ‘God knows that this is not the way. The way is not to free the earth from Roman despotism and Persian despotism only to replace it with Arab despotism.’10 This is one of the opinions specifically cited by an Egyptian parliamentary investigation committee in 1965 when it recommended the punishment of Qūṭ and others for crimes of against the state.11

Qūṭ’s execution with little public protest in 1966 was a climax in the competition between nationalism and explicitly Muslim ideologies. As most of the Muslim world achieved political independence, the model of the new polities was basically the modern nation state. Issues of national identity assumed importance and old style religious identities were being displaced. In the 1960s, Qūṭ’s ideas were marginal in the world of activist social and political visions, even though his perspective gained a global following during the final quarter of the twentieth century.

Islamic modernism and reform developed in important ways following the Second World War, even though they appeared to lose influence to more secular, leftist and nationalist movements. New modes of association, generally following the pattern of the Muslim Brotherhood, emerged, reshaping the nature of popular Islamic life. Many were state oriented in their definition of goals and programmes. Other groups and individuals concentrated on the development of a ‘civil Islam’ involving the transformation of the faith and life of the community rather than the political regime. These movements were important in redefining modernity in Islamic terms, within the frameworks of the emerging ‘multiple modernities’. In ways not recognisable at the time,

10 Sayyid Qūṭ, Ma‘ālim fi al tāriq (Cairo, 1980), p. 28. One of the numerous translations of this important work is Sayyid Qūṭ, Milestones (Indianapolis, 1990).
these developments laid foundations for what was to become the ‘Islamic resurgence’ of the final decades of the century.

Islamic activism in the Arab world

At the end of the Second World War, the struggles for independence and then for the building of strong ‘nation states’ dominated politics and most efforts for social transformation. Nationalism itself was changing. Early movements tended to be elite based, even when, as in Egypt, they had mass following. Most Arab countries became independent under the leadership of this old style, more conservative nationalism, and a major struggle was between the older nationalist elite and a more radical, sometimes socialist or Marxist, nationalism of a new generation. The major symbol of this was the Egyptian revolution of 1952, which established a regime under the leadership of Nasser that became the heart of pan Arab radical nationalism.

The most visible Islamic organisation was the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Its mass organisation enabled it to be a political force in the old monarchy and, after a brief period of partnership with the new regime, it became the major source of opposition to Nasserism. The movement produced a radical wing that developed in the 1960s primarily in Nasser’s prisons. Its leading figure was Sayyid Qutb, who argued that the existing regimes were so steeped in unbelief (called jähiliyya or ‘pagan ignorance’) that the only course for the true believers was militant opposition or withdrawal from society. The main Brotherhood organisation rejected Qutb’s views, adopting a programme of quiet development in civil society, but his concepts became a core of later militancy.

The example of the Muslim Brotherhood inspired Islamic activists elsewhere. The oldest of these organisations is the Brotherhood in Syria, created by students returning from Egypt. Following the Second World War, Syria was ruled by old style nationalists, and the Brotherhood competed in the 1950s with two movements of pan Arab radicalism for popular support, the Ba’th Party (which originated in Syria) and the growing popularity of Nasser. When Syria briefly joined Egypt in the United Arab Republic (UAR, 1958–61), the Brotherhood was suppressed. In the Ba’th dominated regime that emerged during the 1960s after the collapse of the UAR, the Brotherhood remained in opposition.

In Jordan and Sudan, in contrast, the Brotherhood organisations became important legal participants in the political systems. In Jordan, the Brotherhood was established as a religious organisation with the approval of the king in 1946. King Hussein (1935–99), the young ruler who came to the
throne in 1953, developed a pragmatic alliance with the Brotherhood against the radical nationalism that threatened all conservative Arab regimes. Although the Brotherhood remained legally a religious and charitable organisation, it was an influential political force and helped to sensitise Jordanian political leaders to Islamic issues.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan began in secondary schools and was formally organised as the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ in 1954. It did not participate directly in the politics of the first era of civilian rule (1956-8). However, during the military regime of Ibrāhīm ‘Abbūd (1958-64), the Brotherhood joined the civilian parties in opposition and played a role in the peaceful revolution that restored civilian rule in 1964. In the second era of parliamentary politics, the Brotherhood was under the leadership of Ţa’ās al Turābī (b. 1932), an Islamic activist with a doctorate from the Sorbonne. The political party that he formed, the Islamic Charter Front, was small but influential in placing the issue of an Islamic constitution as a priority on the national political agenda.

In other parts of the Arab world, Islamic organisations became more nationalist. In Morocco, Salah influenced leaders like ‘Allāl al Fāsī joined with more secular nationalists to establish the Istiqlāl Party in 1943. The party became the major mass based nationalist organisation rather than a movement of Islamic modernism. In the politics of independence in the 1960s, there was no political group that could compete with the prestige of the monarch in representing Islamic identity in Morocco. Similarly, the Sanūsiyya Ṭariqa became the base for the state when Libya was created in 1951 with the head of the Ṭariqa as King Idrīs (1890-1983). The order had become the symbol of Libyan identity rather than Islamic renewal and was suppressed when Idrīs was overthrown in 1969 by Mu’ammar Qadhāfī. In Tunisia and Algeria, the Salafi groups of the inter war era tended to be absorbed in the major national parties that emerged as the voices of nationalism and then the one party rulers in independence.

Following the Second World War, the Arab states that were dynastic with basic Islamic or tribal rather than ‘national’ identities experienced major transformations. However, these dramatic changes were not primarily part of the processes of explicitly Islamic reform or modernism. Instead, they tended to force the monarchies closer to the nation state model. The most visible Islamically identified state, Saudi Arabia, was abruptly changed from the conservative state of ‘Abd al ‘Azīz to an oil rich monarchy. No ‘Saudi nationalism’ developed but the Saudi enterprise was the establishment of a modern state within the framework of a conservative Wahhābī perspective. Under the leadership of King Faysal (r. 1964-75), administrative structures
were modernised and Saudi Arabia became the leading alternative force in regional politics to the power of the radical nationalist states. Even in this most conservative of regimes, the nation state model for domestic and international relations shaped policies.

**Islamic reform in Sudanic and sub-Saharan Africa**

Following the Second World War, decolonisation transformed state and society in sub-Saharan Africa. Nationalism was defined from the outset by the new, modern educated elite with radical visions for the future. However, as African states gained independence by the 1960s, they operated within the boundaries set by imperialism and the new states were the direct heirs of the imperial administrations. Movements based on pre-existing ethnic or religious identities were almost inevitably in tension with the new ‘national’ identities of independence.

The few ‘national’ Islamic parties had little impact, even in Muslim majority areas. The Muslim Congress Party in Gambia, for example, was established in 1952 but merged with a national party by 1960. Communal identity parties like the Muslim Association Party in Ghana were usually banned or absorbed into the structures of the emerging one party nationalist state. Muslims had been leaders in organising nationalist resistance to the imposition of Ethiopian control in Eritrea in the 1940s through the organisation of the Muslim League. However, in 1958, the Muslims who organised the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) recognized the necessity of a secular nationalist programme.

In some areas, parties based on existing Muslim organisations had significance. Among the most important of these were the Umma and National Unionist Parties in Sudan, based on the Mahdist organisation and Khatmiyya Tariqa. In northern Nigeria, the Sardauna of Sokoto and the amirs, who formed the base for British indirect rule, provided the support for the establishment of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in 1951. The NPC worked with two other Nigerian regional parties to establish the national government of independence but this coalition was overthrown by military coups in 1966. Subsequently, no organisation effectively mobilised Muslim political action, although Muslims were a major force in Nigerian politics.

Muslim political organisations in Africa tended to represent communal interests and were not active forces in developing programmes or concepts of explicitly Islamic reforms or modernism. Such reform movements were primarily the product of interactions with groups in the Middle East. Students and pilgrims inspired by Salafi and Wahhabi ideas or the programmes of the...
Muslim Brotherhood worked to reform their own societies. In West Africa a small but significant ‘Wahhābī’ movement established schools and associations that challenged local religious practices and laid a foundation for more long term reforms. Throughout Africa numerous cultural associations helped to create a stronger awareness of more cosmopolitan Islamic perspectives. Most did not depart from the main lines of those perspectives although in a few places, new approaches were beginning to be defined. Such was the work in Sudan of Maḥmūd Muḥammad Ṭāḥā (1909–85), who defined a rethinking of the nature of traditional Islamic law by distinguishing between the Meccan and Medinian revelations. His followers were organised in the Republican Brotherhood by the 1970s.

Islamic reformism in South and South-East Asia

The experiences in Indonesia, former British India and Malaysia show the diversity of possible state oriented Islamic reformism, and non political modernism. While the statist groups reflected Western modes of political modernity, civil Islamic groups worked for Islamic modes of modernity.

An old style effort to create an Islamic state through militant jihad took place in Indonesia in the turmoil resulting from the Japanese surrender. Fighting first against the returning Dutch and then against the newly independent nationalist state, Dar al Islam movements to establish old style Islamic states were only defeated after long struggles in western Java (1948–62), the Celebes (1950–65) and Aceh in northern Sumatra (1953–61). The more secular nationalist state led by Sukarno defeated this mode of statist Islam and positioned Islam beneath the ‘Five Principles’ (Pancasila) guiding state and society.

In British India at the end of the Second World War, Muslims were divided. Some leaders like Abu’l Kalām Āzād continued to support the Indian National Congress. This modernist style of Islam opposed a politicised Muslim nationalism and sought a communal identity in a more secular state. Others followed the lead of Mawdūdī and his then recently established (in 1941) JI. Mawdūdī articulated a vision of a renewed Islamic community in which modern institutions could be Islamised. He mistrusted the secular nationalism of the Muslim League, which advocated the establishment of a separate Muslim state, Pakistan. In the negotiations for independence, the partition idea won and in 1947 Pakistan became an independent, self identified Islamic state with two parts, in the eastern (Bengal) and north west regions of former India.

In terms of Islamic reform, important developments took place, with Indian Muslim intellectuals articulating ways of defining Islamic institutions in
communal rather than statist terms, and Mawdūdī emerged as a major global intellectual force in defining a distinctive Islamic mode of modernity. However, as an experiment in statist Islam, Pakistan’s experience showed that, in the mid twentieth century, a shared Islamic identity could not overcome ethnic and regional differences, and in 1971, East Pakistan (Bengal) seceded to form Bangladesh.

A third statist approach developed in Malaya. In the early 1950s some people in the Malay nationalist movement, fearing compromises with non Muslims in the cause of nationalism, established an independent Islamic political party, Partai Islam se Malaysia (PAS). PAS combined advocacy for the establishment of a state implementing shari‘a with support for distinctive recognition of Malay language and culture. By the end of the 1960s, PAS was the most credible opposition to the dominant national political coalition, United Malays National Organization (UMNO). It presents an interesting example of a synthesis of statist Islamic reformism and ethno nationalism.

Two movements emerging at the end of the 1960s in Malaysia reflect the interaction of ethnicity, politics and Islamic modernism. In May 1969 intercommunal riots involving Malay demands for greater economic and cultural recognition shook Malaysia. In the aftermath, student activists under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim (b. 1947) worked for Malay rights, but increasingly he came to define Malay rights in Islamic terms. In 1972 he was a founder of the major Muslim youth organisation, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), advocating modernist Islamic renewal. A second group, Dar ul Arqam, reflected a conservative reformism. Established in 1968 by Shaykh Ashaari al Tamimi, who believed, like Quṭb in Egypt, that society was irredeemably unbelieving, its members withdrew from society to establish isolated communes. In contrast to Quṭb, Shaykh Ashaari did not advocate militant jihad.

In Indonesia and Pakistan, the major Islamic organisations worked for Islamic reform in both politics and civil society. During the Second World War, Japanese authorities encouraged the establishment of a federation of Muslim groups, Masyumi, which became a political party following the war, advocating recognition of shari‘a and restrictions on popular religious syncretism. In 1952, NU withdrew and established its own party, leaving Masyumi as the party of Muhammadiyah and regional Islamic groups. In the parliamentary elections of 1955 the two Islamic parties gained more than 40 per cent of the votes. However, control of the government remained with the nationalists led by Sukarno, who moved rapidly toward one party domination. In Pakistan, JI participated in parliamentary politics but without much success.
in the 1950s and the military regime of Muḥammad Ayyūb Khān (1958–69) brought an end to openly competitive politics.

While JI had little direct political impact, it kept the issue of implementing Islam as an important item on any Pakistani political agenda. More broadly, JI, especially through the influence of Mawdūdī’s writings, became a major international voice for defining an authentically Islamic modernism. In contrast, while NU and Muḥammadīyah did not have high global visibility, they expanded their systems of schools and social support institutions within the framework of a non-statist modernism. These efforts created the basis on which they could, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, be identified as ‘the bulwarks of moderate Islamic civil society’.

Modernism in the ‘Northern Tier’ and Central Asia

Islamic modernists in the Northern Tier and Central Asia faced the challenges of secular Westernisers and authoritarian Marxist regimes following the Second World War. The major concerns were those of preservation rather than reform.

In Turkey, a multi-party system was established following the Second World War. The largest opponent of the Kemalist Party, the Republican People’s Party (RPP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), was the Democrat Party, which was created in 1946 and won the general elections of 1950 on a programme of relaxing statist controls, including those on certain aspects of religious life. A number of smaller parties were also organised, including the Nation Party (Millet Partisi) in 1948. In the next two decades that party won 3 to 6 per cent of votes in parliamentary elections and experienced both reorganisation and being banned. It advocated conservative nationalism and relaxation of secularist controls on religious practice. By the early 1970s, it lost its more religious elements to the newly created National Salvation Party (Milli Selâmet Partisi), organised in 1972 by Necmettin Erbakan (b. 1926), with a programme that emphasised economic modernisation as well as socio moral reconstruction.

Other Muslim reformist groups avoided political activity and concentrated on social and devotional life. Some of the older Sufi orders maintained a careful extra legal existence. An important newer movement was the followers of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. He worked to articulate a synthesis of a mystical mode of Islam and modern science. His movement was a network of


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study groups and interested individuals rather than a centralised organisation and had a large following throughout Turkey by the time of his death.

In Iran the old lines of interaction between the monarchy, ‘ulamā’ establishment and the more secular modern educated intellectuals left little opening for significant movements of Islamic reform and modernism following the Second World War. One of the few new Muslim organisations was the Fidā’iyyān i Īslām, established in 1945. It was a militant group advocating strict implementation of shari‘a in a state dominated by the ‘ulamā’. Its major activity was a series of murders of secularist intellectuals and government leaders. Initially it had the support of Ayatollah Abu’l Qāsim Kāshānī (1882 1962), but he broke with the group in the early 1950s. Although suppressed, some of its followers remained part of a militant underground in Iranian politics.

Ayatollah Kāshānī was one of the few politically activist religious scholars. He supported the movement led by Mohammed Musaddiq to nationalise the British company that controlled Iranian oil in 1951, but then gave support to the return of the shah, who had lost control but was restored in a coup in 1953. Somewhat later another religious leader gained political prominence. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini opposed the shah’s reform programmes in the early 1960s and went into exile. These actions represented political opposition but not a significant articulation of Islamic reformism or modernism. That type of activity only developed in the late 1960s with the work of activist intellectuals like ‘Ali Shari‘ati (1933 77) and Ayatollah Mahmūd Tāliqānī (1910 79), and Khomeini’s work in exile.

In Soviet Central Asia, the major effort was simply maintaining some sense of Muslim identity, not reform. Among the Muslims in China, the major change was the victory of the communists. In the new political system, ethnic minorities received official recognition and ten of the recognised ‘nationalities’ were Muslim. Nine were ethno language groups and the tenth were Hui (Chinese speaking and culturally similar to the majority Han Chinese). From time to time, separatist movements developed, sometimes building on the foundations of the older Sufi brotherhoods. These were reformist to the extent that they attempted to affirm an ethno Islamic rather than a Chinese identity.

In addition, there were continuations of intellectual efforts to create a synthesis of Chinese cultural traditions and Islam within the framework set by communist ideology and modernity. An important example of this effort is the work of Ma Jian (1906 78).13 He studied in Egypt in the 1930s and became

13 This section is based on the research of Haiyun Ma. See Haiyun Ma, ‘Patriotic and pious Muslim intellectuals in modern China: The case of Ma Jian’, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 23, 3 (Summer 2006), pp. 54 70.
an active spokesperson for Islam in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He worked to transform the traditional Muslim education to include both Arabic and Chinese language proficiency and intercultural understanding. While Muslim modernists in other parts of the world concentrated on issues of relations between Islam and the West, Ma Jian worked within the framework of Muslim Confucian relations to create an identity of a modern Chinese Muslim citizen.

In the quarter century after the Second World War, the major issues faced by Islamic reformers and modernists involved definition of world view and identity in the context of political systems defining themselves in the framework of modern nation states. From Ḥanṭūb to Ma Jian, the relationships between Islamic movements and the state shaped visions of what an Islamic society should be in the world of the mid twentieth century.

**Transnational elements**

One important aspect of transnational Islam following the Second World War was the phenomenon of cosmopolitan intellectuals whose ideas transcended national and cultural boundaries. They developed conceptual frameworks that went beyond the main lines of earlier modernist thought, sometimes paralleling the development of Western intellectual movements identified as ‘post modern’.

Malek Bennabi (1905–73) bridged the inter war and post Second World War eras. Born in French Algeria, he combined an old style informal Islamic education with French engineering training, and a familiarity with Salafist thinking of the 1930s. Following the Second World War, he worked to change what he considered the stagnant mindset of Muslims that made them ‘colonisable’, presenting a methodology for understanding Islam that involved historical and textual critical analysis.¹⁴ He joined the Algerian revolutionary movement in the 1950s and became director of higher education in the new state.

Fazlur Rahman (1919–88) was born in British India and received his doctorate in Islamic philosophy from Oxford University in 1949. During the 1950s he taught in Britain and Canada, gaining a reputation as an expert in medieval philosophy and historical methodology. In 1962 he became the director of the newly established Central Institute of Islamic Research in Pakistan, where his pioneering work in Islamic hermeneutics brought him international

¹⁴ Two of his most influential books are *Vocation de l’Islam* (Paris, 1954), and *Le phénomène coranique* (Algiers, 1947).
recognition, but also the opposition of religious conservatives, and he was forced to leave. He taught in the United States for the rest of his life. He argued that it was essential to distinguish between normative Islam which was unchanging and historic Islam, which is the result of human responses to the normative in the changing contexts of time and place.15

Two younger Muslim intellectuals in the 1960s were laying the foundations for important redefinitions of Islamic traditions. Mohammed Arkoun (b. 1928) is an Algerian scholar who also began as a medievalist. During the 1960s he was influenced by people like Franz Fanon but his work was primarily apolitical, in creating methodologies and conceptualisations for Islamic studies in the modes that later were labelled as ‘post modernism’. The second, ‘Ali Shari’atî, had a stronger political impact by providing important intellectual foundations for the Iranian revolution of 1979. He came from a family of religious scholars. In 1960 he went to Paris where he studied sociology. When he returned to Iran, he became a well known teacher and public intellectual. He rejected the rigidity of the religious establishment and defined a Shi’î version of the Salafi call for return to the practice of the early Muslim community, i.e., a return to the Islam of ‘Ali, the son in law of the Prophet Muhammad and the ideal ruler of Shi’î theology, and a rejection of the state established religion. He proposed a new ‘sociology of Islam’ as the foundation for a renewed Islamic society.16

The global nature of the Muslim community in the 1960s is emphasised in the life of Malcolm X (1925–65). During the first half of the twentieth century, many distinctive sects emerged among African Americans. Some of these utilised names and terms from Islam but had no real connection with the broader umma. The most prominent of these by 1960 was the Nation of Islam, organised under the leadership of Elijah Muhammad as a movement of black separatism. Its most visible minister was Malcolm X, who converted to the Nation while in prison. He travelled to Muslim countries and gradually became convinced that the racism of the doctrines of the Nation was opposed to Islam, with the climax coming when he went on hajj in 1964. His break with Elijah Muhammad in 1964 marked an important step forward for Sunnî Islam among African Americans and his murder in 1965 gave this new development an important martyr and symbol. Malcolm X quickly became a global symbol for a ‘Third World’ perspective in Muslim societies around the world.

15 See Fazlur Rahman, Islamic methodology in history (Karachi, 1965), and Fazlur Rahman, Islam and modernity: Transformation of an intellectual tradition (Chicago, 1982).
Throughout the half century following the First World War, despite the rise of local nationalisms and distinctive regional developments, a sense of a global Islamic community continued. Some of the organisations of the interwar era expanded into global operations. Tablíghī Jamaʿat under the leadership of Mawлānā Yūsuf, Mawлānā Ilyās’s son, became a global organisation with millions of members by the 1960s and it continued its emphasis on personal religious development and avoidance of political involvement in any country or cause.

The limitations on Muslim unity are illustrated by events at the beginning and end of the half century after the First World War. The issue of the caliphate attracted worldwide Muslim attention in the 1920s, but the resulting Khilāfah movement and pan Islamic congresses were ineffectual in the face of secular nationalism and imperialism. At the end of the period, in the late 1960s, another issue gained global Muslim attention. The Israeli victory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and its occupation of all of Jerusalem shocked Muslims. In response to this occupation and, in particular, to an attempt by a fanatic to burn the al Aqṣā Mosque, a summit meeting of leaders of Muslim states was held in 1969. The result was the establishment of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which became the international organisation of Muslim states.

The OIC co-ordinates the activities of Muslim states in many different fields. However, it is an organisation of states whose Charter affirms the principle of ‘respect of the right of self-determination, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of Member States’. The transition from the transnational efforts of the 1920s to the explicitly modern state basis for the OIC reflects the broader trends of the growing strength of ‘national’ identities and state power in the Muslim world.

Sayyid Qutb’s battle in the mid-1960s could appear, in the contexts of that time, to be the last stand of an anti modern, anti Western movement. However, the intellectuals, ideas and movements of the half century between the First World War and the early 1970s present a different picture when viewed at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The ‘religionless’ global society predicted by some did not emerge and some scholars who had articulated secularisation theory affirmed the failure of that theory.  

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17 Article II. The text of the Charter can be found on the OIC web site, www.oic.org.
Some of the movements of that era laid foundations for radical political activism during the later era of the ‘Islamic Resurgence’. Others created new perspectives and approaches that opened the way for concepts of an Islamic modernity in a world of multiple modernities. The Muslim world of the early 1970s was very different from that of 1920. Old style imperialism was over and isolated cultural preserves could not be maintained in the growing pressures of an increasingly global Muslim community.
6
Islamic resurgence and its aftermath
SAÏD AMIR ARJOMAND

The victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran on 11 February 1979 was as surprising as the establishment of the first modern theocracy in world history by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran that followed it in the same year. On 6 October 1981, Khālid al-Islāmbūlī, a member of al Jihād organisation, stopped the truck under his command during a military parade in Cairo to assassinate President Anwar Sadat (pres. 1970–81) in the reviewing stand, and then shouted, ‘I have killed Pharaoh!’ With these stunning events, an undetected religious revival in the Islamic world, ongoing for some two decades, suddenly became conspicuous by its sharp political edge. It was most commonly referred to as ‘the resurgence of Islam’, although other similar terms were also used to describe it. In December 1991, the overwhelming victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in the Algerian national elections provoked a military takeover and a decade of savage civil strife in Algeria that marks the hazy end of the period surveyed in this chapter.

The Islamic resurgence thus noted for its dramatic manifestations at its mid point around 1980 can be viewed as a continuation of the earlier trends surveyed in preceding chapters. But it was also rooted in major contemporary processes of social and political change in the second half of the twentieth century. Socially, Islamic resurgence had deep roots in the processes of urbanisation, spread of literacy and higher education and expansion of the public sphere by the media of mass communication. Politically, it was decisively conditioned by state and nation building and modernisation, and especially by political mobilisation and the need it created for culturally rooted political ideologies. Islamic resurgence is thus entwined with rapid social change in the Muslim world and a distinctive phenomenon of the era of the nation states, which in some respects peaked in the latter half of the 1990s.
Social roots of religious revival

The theory of modernisation posited secularisation as its main impact on religion, and thus hampered our understanding of the contemporary invigoration and transformation of Islam. We can, however, identify three processes of modern social change which were in fact conducive to a broad revival of religious activity throughout the Muslim world. These processes are interrelated and overlap chronologically, but can be analytically separated into the following: (1) urbanisation; (2) the development of transport, communication and the mass media (the internet appears at the end of our period) and the consequent enlargement of the public sphere and (3) spread of literacy and education.

Urbanisation

The elective affinity between urban strata and congregational religions of salvation was noted by Max Weber in his sociology of religion. This historical association between congregational religion and urban life is evident in early Christianity, when ‘pagan’ literally meant rural, and remains firm in Islam down to the present. In its classic pattern, cities with their mosques and madrasas constituted centres of Islamic orthodoxy; the tribal and rural areas, a superficially penetrated periphery inhabited by those ‘most stubborn in their unbelief and hypocrisy’ (Qur’an, 6.98). Movement from the tribal and rural periphery to the urban centres was associated with increasing religious orthodoxy and a more rigorous adherence to the central tradition of Islam.

The historical relationship between urban life and congregational religiosity holds for the period of rapid urbanisation after the Second World War as well. Most of the Islamic world experienced rapid urban growth, with the urban population variously increasing from about one third around 1960 to just over one half in the early 1990s, and this growth was accompanied by a renewed vitality of religious activity. Building of new mosques and growth of religious associations was a salient feature of this urbanisation. There is a great deal of evidence from the recent past and the contemporary period that social dislocation migration from villages to towns is accompanied by increased religious practice. Religion can arguably provide a better basis for satisfying the quest for the reconstitution of community in the urban setting than ethnicity and, through such an effort, set in motion movements of religious revival. Islam is not alone in responding to this communitarian need in the contemporary world. In Latin America, notably, there has been considerable spread of grassroots Catholicism in the ‘Base Ecclesiastical
Communities’ and a phenomenal growth of Evangelical Protestantism in the cities. During the two decades preceding the Islamic revolution, the expanding urban centres of Iran typically sustained an increasing vitality in religious activities of various kinds: visits and donations to the shrines and pilgrimages to Mecca greatly increased with economic prosperity, while religious associations mushroomed among laymen and the number of mosques per capita in the rapidly expanding Tehran doubled between 1961 and 1975. Mosque building and growth of religious networks seem to have outpaced urbanisation in most Muslim regions of the world. A similar association between urban growth and increased religious activities such as spread of Qur‘anīc schools, religious activities of guilds and the growth of the religious associations can be found throughout the Middle East, the sub Saharan Muslim Africa and elsewhere.¹

Decline of popular Sufism in the Muslim world, including Maraboutism in North and West Africa, is a correlate of an important feature of urban religiosity in contemporary Islam, namely the growth of Islamic orthodoxy and orthodox reformism in the cities. This intensive penetration of popular religion and culture by movements of return to the scriptural foundations of Islam is not new in the history of Islam. Medieval Ḥanbalī preaching can be considered the prototype of this type of movement, and it comprises the renewal (tajdīd) movements in Sufism in the early modern period, and Wahhābism and its offshoots in the eighteenth century. The common feature of these kindred movements is the intensive Islamisation of social life through orthodox purification of popular religion. Since the nineteenth century, we find this type of Islamic movement associated with the spread of literacy and expansion of the public sphere. Similarly, we see intensive Islamisation of syncretic popular Islam in Indonesia on the periphery of the Muslim world, initiated by the Muhammadiyah, a reformist organisation founded in the Indic capital city of Yogyakarta in 1912 and boasting some 25 million members by the 1990s. The trend has been characterised as ‘scripturalism’ and can also properly be called ‘fundamentalism’,² but the designation used in this chapter will be ‘orthodox reformism’.

² See Clifford Geertz, Islam observed: Religious development in Morocco and Indonesia (New Haven, 1968), for ‘scripturalism’; S. A. Arjomand, ‘Unity and diversity in Islamic fundamen
The media of communication

The advent of books, periodicals and newspapers creates a public sphere in which the literate members of society can participate. The institution of public debates and lectures adds to the vigour of activity in the public spheres whose boundaries are thus extended to include some of the semi-literate. It has long been taken for granted that the creation and enlargement of the public sphere is conducive to the rise of socio-political movements. However, it is just as possible for the arrival of the media of communication to give rise to religious movements, as has been the case in the Muslim world.

As was pointed out, orthodox reformism as a form of urban religiosity in Islam predates the Islamic resurgence and has been covered in earlier chapters. Nevertheless, the important movements from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that fed into the Islamic resurgence of the 1960s to 1990s should be identified. One instance is the Islamic revival in British India, especially under the leadership of the ‘ulamā’ of Deoband in the last four decades of the nineteenth century. The Deobandi orthodox reformists availed themselves of the new technologies of communication: printing and other media of communication for missionary purposes, making effective use of mail, money order services and above all cheap methods of printing, and opened an office for issuing fatwās (authoritative opinions) (dār al iftā) to respond to practical religious questions from the public. A better known instance of orthodox reformism in the Middle East and North Africa in the early decades of the twentieth century is the Salafiyya movement. Like the pan-Islamism and reformism of Jamāl al-Dīn Ḥafṣānī and Muḥammad ʿAbduh from which it originated, the Salafiyya movement was closely bound to the spread of publicistic activity and journalism in the Middle East and North Africa.

The orthodox reformist trend continues in our period with added vigour. The two mass based South Asian movements born in the 1920s, the Tablíghī Jamāʿat in the Indian subcontinent and the Nahdlatul Ulamā’ in Indonesia, grew enormously in our period, both vying for the claim to being the largest Muslim organisation in the world with memberships of over 30 million each in the last decade of the century. The Tablíghī Jamāʿat is the true heir to the Deobandi orthodox reformism, encourages itinerant missionary work by its members and is known for its massive annual gatherings. The first of these, held in Mewat in 1941, had been attended by 25,000; the 1988 gathering in Raiwind near Lahore attracted no fewer than 1 million Muslims from over ninety
countries. The Tablighī Jamā’at has firmly and consistently rejected politics and ideological readings of Islam. The Indonesian Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’, founded in 1926 by clerics who taught at rural Islamic schools (pesantren), was also firmly non-ideological. By contrast, it did become involved in politics from the late 1930s onward and launched its own political party in 1952. Even so, it recruited politicians not affiliated with it as long as they defended Muslim interests and were approved by its religious board. As we shall see, its antipathy to ideology enabled it to lead Indonesia’s transition to democracy after 1998.

The geography of orthodox reformism in our period also brings out the importance of the physical channels of communication, such as roads and railways, for the spread of the movement. Islamic associations and their missionaries often spread along the main railway routes and major roads as they were built. The Wahhābiyya movement in French West Africa, for instance, spread along the newly built and improved roads, and the Wahhābī missionaries set up their centres close to the major roads and railroads. At the international level, too, the continuous improvement and declining cost of transportation has greatly increased the number of pilgrims to Mecca, and of missionaries from Africa and Asia to the main centres of Islamic learning in the Middle East. Through the late 1970s, al Azhar was the most important such centre of learning for West African movements. Since the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran, Qum has become a competitor with the consequence that Shi‘ism is spreading in Senegal, Nigeria and elsewhere in the region.

**Education**

Despite wide regional variation, all Muslim countries have experienced a considerable spread of literacy and expansion of higher education at the same time as rapid urbanisation, and the growth of literacy and education have independently contributed to the Islamic revivalist movements. Between 1965 and 1990, to give a striking example, literacy rate jumped from 40 to 90 per cent in Indonesia, while the number of high school graduates increased from about 4 to over 30 per cent of the population. An increase in the publication and circulation of religious books and periodicals, and the growth of Islamic associations in the universities, are correlates of this process. The growth of Islamic associations among university students in the 1970s throughout the

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Muslim world, and in countries as different from each other as Egypt, Malaysia, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, was striking. By the early 1980s, every Egyptian university had its Islamic association with its own amīr (commander), and Islamic student groups, including the so-called Salman groups, had mushroomed in the Indonesian state university campuses. It should be noted that university students and graduates in technical fields and the natural sciences predominated in these Islamic university associations in the 1970s and 1980s.

An interesting aspect of the phenomenon of Islamic activism among the intelligentsia, created by the recent expansion of education, was its connection with our previous processes. With urbanisation and migration into metropolitan areas, many young people moved from small town and rural areas into the cities to go to universities, and become Islamic activists in the newly expanding public sphere. The public sphere centring around universities, which is the scene of activity of the new generation of students attracted to Islamic resurgence, was keenly politicised. Sample evidence suggests that the majority of university Islamic activists in Egypt and of the female Islamic activists in the Maghreb in the 1970s came from small towns or villages and remained attached to their families, and the same is true of those student activists who participated in the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran. The evidence for such social mobility among the university activists in Egypt is considerable indeed, and the same holds for those student activists elsewhere who became leading Islamic ideologues and thinkers, such as Rashīd Ghannūshī in Tunisia and Nurcholish Madjid in Indonesia.⁴

The impact of national integration and political mobilisation on Islam

Varieties of Islamic revival, which were sustained by urbanisation and the spread of literacy and education, must now be put in the context of the major political changes of the second half of the twentieth century. Their political context can explain the sharp political edge of Islamic resurgence. The relevant interrelated processes of political change can be analytically divided into national integration and the increased and largely uninstitutionalised involvement of the Muslim masses in politics. These processes were

accompanied by the spread of the international political culture and institutions to the Muslim world, and the Islamic reaction to them.

For most Muslim countries in this period, the political dimension of Islamic resurgence, especially its pronounced ideological character and the revolutionary radicalism of its extreme wing, can be explained as a consequence of sudden national and political integration in the absence, or with limited development, of political institutions. Islamic resurgence was distinctively conditioned by contemporary mass political participation that resulted from rapid national integration and enlargement of the political society, where participation in politics was usually not constitutionally regulated and often took the form of clandestine or open opposition to the regime. This distinctive feature of Islamic resurgence was first characterised as ‘political Islam’ by its native critics and proponents, while the outside observers often use the French initiated term ‘Islamism’ to label it. The former term is used in this chapter, but not exclusively. Political Islam denotes a politicised reading of Islam, whose pronounced ideological character accounts for its novelty within the Islamic tradition. Although the greatest affinity of political Islam is with the Ḥanbalī and Wahhābī fundamentalist traditions, under the above mentioned political conditions common to all Muslim countries, even Shi‘ism, the arch enemy of Wahhābism, generated its own brand of Islamic political ideology, and one that has found constitutional embodiment in Iran and proved the politically most viable to this date.

For many decades before our period, a variety of entrenched and aspiring political elites who were and thought of themselves as Muslims produced the trend called ‘Islamic modernism’. Their political outlooks and ideologies could be called Islamic, but in fact, Islam played a subsidiary and sometimes only a decorative role in them. These include pan Islam, Islamic nationalism, justifications of parliamentary democracy in Islamic terms and, finally, Islamic socialism. However, the situation changed in our period (roughly the last third of the twentieth century), when national political mobilisation and integration politically conditioned the contemporary religious revival. This political conditioning resulted in attempts to tap the spontaneous vitality of religious

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sentiment and activities in those settings for political ends and by means of emergent Islamic ideologies. Orthodox reformism in rapidly expanding cities with increasingly literate populations lent itself to political ideologisation with particular ease.

The emergence of Islamic political ideologies

The political conditioning of the contemporary religious revival came about mainly through the agency of the lay intelligentsia. A new social group of publicists, journalists and university students and graduates created a radical Islamic ideology in contradistinction to the secular political ideologies of liberalism, nationalism and socialism. Orthodox Islamic reformism and Islamic modernism formed the immediate background of the emergence of Islamic political ideologies. The pioneer in the intellectual breakthrough from orthodox reformism to Islamic ideology was Mawłānā Sayyid Abū’l A‘lā Mawdūdī who died in 1979. Mawdūdī carried out the basic breakthrough in the construction of a coherent Islamic political ideology in the 1930s and early 1940s, in fact, largely before he began his political career by founding the Jamā’at i Islāmī in Lahore, became its amīr (commander) in August 1941 and remained in Pakistan after its creation in 1947.

Mawdūdī conceived the modern world as the arena of the ‘conflict between Islam and un Islam’; the latter term was equated with pre Islamic polytheism or ignorance (jāhiliyya), and comprised modern creeds and political philosophies whose predominance necessitated the revival of Islam. He considered Islamic modernists a fifth column determined to corrupt Islam from within, and was alarmed that Muslims would be seduced away from Islam by nationalism, a false philosophy and a Western phenomenon. He was equally hostile to communism and fascism, but admired the ability of these movements to instil enthusiasm and commitment in their members and did find in them an instrument which could be adopted by the Islamic revivalist movement. This instrument was ideology, and Mawdūdī set out to create a coherent and consistently Islamic ideology. This ideology, as propounded in the works that Mawdūdī refers to as the ‘Manifesto’ of the Islamic movement, was pervaded by ‘Allah’s absolute sovereignty’, inferred from such Qur’ānic verses as ‘Verily, His is the creation and His is the command’ (7.45), and diametrically opposed to the spirit of ‘un Godly civilisations’ namely man’s unbridled autonomy. The most novel feature of Mawdūdī’s ideology was the contention that Islamic revival is impossible without the creation of an Islamic state, conceived as theocracy (hukūmat i ilāhiya) based on the sovereignty of
God. He went further, however, declaring that ‘the acceptance and admission of the de jure sovereignty of God is Islam and its denial is kufr (infidelity).’

Mawdūdī searched for Islamic answers to about a dozen constitutional questions considered essential as the organisational principles of the Islamic state, which he described as a ‘theo democracy’. The hidden secret of the Islamic ideology of Mawdūdī and all the subsequent ones inspired by it in Egypt, Iran and elsewhere is the crucial importance of the unspoken but assumed conditions of modern politics, and especially of the Western inspired political paradigms of the nation state. This extensive implicit but unacknowledged Western political input accounts for the radical novelty of political Islam within the Islamic tradition. In its quest for authenticity, political Islam thus paradoxically became modernising and innovative by using Islamic scriptural sources to answer new constitutional and political questions.

Mawdūdī’s Islamic ideology became a major social force only a quarter of a century later in our period and under the impact of the processes of social change discussed in this chapter. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, founded in 1928, was groping in the same direction. It shared a number of important features with the Jamā’at i Islāmī, including being inspired in its organisation by the hierarchical model of a Sufi order, but it did not achieve anything like the degree of ideological consistency until Sayyid Qūṭb’s later writings in the 1960s, by which time the works of Mawdūdī were translated into Arabic, Persian and other languages. In the late 1960s to the mid 1970s, Iran produced a much more syncretistic and Marxist influenced blend of Islamic ideology in the works of ‘Alī Shārīʿātī. But in the 1970s, the main features of Mawdūdī’s Islamic ideology were adopted by Muḥammad Bāqir al Ṣadr in Iraq and given a heavy clericalist twist. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s militant mullās in Iran elaborated this Shi‘ī version of Islamic ideology after the Islamic revolution of 1979. Mawdūdī had also set the trend for the appropriation of the modern myth of revolution by political Islam. It is interesting to note, however, that the method of the Islamic revolution did not involve domestic politics but rather the call to the unity of God. Furthermore, Mawdūdī’s vigorous participation in the politics of constitution making in the newly created state of Pakistan assured his commitment to constitutionalism, and he rejected violence as the

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means of bringing about the Islamic revolution. His appropriation of the
modern political myth of revolution therefore remained verbal.\(^8\) The
Qurʾānic justification of revolutionary violence had to await Nasserist repres-
sion in the name of Arab socialism and was smuggled out of his jail by the
sisters of its chief architect, Sayyid Qutb, and published two years before his
execution in August 1966.\(^9\)

**Violence and Islamic revolutionary radicalism**

The paradoxically modern feature of political Islam, it has been suggested above,
is the result of its conditioning by the modern bureaucratic state as well as rival
secular political ideologies. The political conditioning of Islamic resurgence also
included the increasing conviction of the bankruptcy of East and West, of
capitalism and socialism, but it was Marxism as a total ideological system that
served as the adversary model and dialectically shaped the Islamic ideology. In
the face of these aggressively secularist policies of the Middle Eastern states in
the 1960s and 1970s, the appropriation of the modern political myth of revolution
was no longer merely verbal and became pivotal, giving birth among Sayyid
Qutb’s followers to what will be called ‘Islamic revolutionary radicalism’.

According to Sayyid Qutb, as a result of the mixing of the fundamental source
of Islam with various alien sources, the ‘Muslim community is now buried under
the debris of the man made traditions of several generations and is crushed
under the weight of those false laws and customs that are not even remotely
related to the Islamic teachings’.\(^10\) Rejection of foreign accretions in search of
authenticity led Qutb to the fundamentals of Islam as the exclusive basis for
political order and normative regulation of politics, with some surprising results.
He argued that the profession of faith according to the canonical formula,
bearing witness to the unity of God and the prophethood of Muhammad, and
the belief in the ‘Five Principles’ were not the defining mark of a Muslim
believer. The believer in addition had to reject all man made laws and govern-
ments, which were the foundations of the new paganism. The true believers, the
elect, were to organise themselves into ‘vanguard’ groups apart from the new
society of ignorance (jāhiliyya) and repeat the original pattern of establishment of
Islam through withdrawal/migration, jihad and conquest of power.

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8 Abu’l A’lā Mawdūḍi, *Process of Islamic revolution* (Pathankot, 1947); Seyyed Vali Reza
9 Sayyid Qutb, *Ma‘ālim fi’t tarīq* (Cairo 1964). See also Yvonne Y. Haddad, ‘The Quranic
justification for an Islamic revolution: The view of Sayyid Qutb’, *MEJ*, 37, 1 (1986),
The transformation of Mawdūdī’s influential ideas into this Islamic revolutionary ideology was conditioned by the monolithic secular state of Nasser’s (pres. 1954–70) Egypt. The utopia of the Islamic state, central to the Qutbist revolutionary ideology, is not intelligible without reference to the anathematised state. This new conception of God’s government (ḥākimīyya) on the basis of the Shari’a by Quṭb and the Islamic revolutionaries had no counterpart in medieval Ḥanbalism or in Salafī orthodox reformism, and was born in reaction to the repudiated monolithic secular state. Furthermore, although the neologism ḥākimīyya derived from Mawdūdī, the totalitarian thrust of Quṭb’s ideology in response to Nasser’s Leviathan secular state found no counterpart in Mawdūdī’s Islamic constitutionalism. Quṭb’s reading of the Qurʾān, in sharp contrast, hinged on the very notion of the ḥākimīyya of God. The means for achieving this utopia was none other than the means advocated by the Kharijites of the first century of Islam: withdrawal/migration on the prophetic model, followed by revolutionary warfare to reconquer the lapsed society of Ignorance.

Quṭb’s spirit of revolutionary asceticism spread among the Islamic militants who formed a few so called takfīr (excommunication) organisations in the mid 1970s. This earliest manifestation of Islamic revolutionary radicalism coupled the excommunication of the society of Ignorance with an agenda that recalled the prophetic sequence of call (da‘wa), emigration (hijra) and jihad. This markedly sectarian feature of the affirmation of Islam against its corrupt internal enemies had been common to the puritanical Kharijite sects. According to the founder of a takfīr organisation, Shukrī Muṣṭafā, every Muslim who heard the call of his Society of Muslims and did not join was an infidel. The new Islamic revolutionary radicalism found its most forceful expression in a tract by the engineer M. A. S. Faraj, The neglected duty, which stated the creed of President Sadat’s assassins. In this remarkable justification of tyrannicide, which was apparently influential among young clerics and lay activists alike, Faraj offered a Quṭbist view of the contemporary Muslim world as one of ignorance where the believers were constantly forced to submit to earthly idols. ‘The idols of this world can only be made to disappear by the power of the sword.’ Faraj argued that the Muslim rulers had suppressed the

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11 It should be pointed out that the Qutbist revolutionary ascetics themselves, however, seemed unaware of the striking similarity between their ideology and Kharijism and resented the comparison. The similarity was, however, noticed and highlighted by their learned clerical opponents.

Islamic law since the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, replacing it with the laws of the infidels, as the Mongols had done. These secularising rulers, who were Muslims only in name, had forced the believers to live under the laws of the infidels. They were indeed ‘apostates’ and had to be killed, as the punishment for apostasy in Islamic law is death. The absent, neglected duty of contemporary Muslims was to wage jihad against these internal enemies of Islam. Departing from the definition given to the category by Muslim jurists, Faraj thus adopted jihad to justify revolutionary violence. The appropriation of the modern myth of revolution by the Islamic radicals was complete, and made them revolutionary professionals.

The shah and Sadat were likened to the pharaoh as the earthly claimants to divinity and opposed to Almighty God; and the Ba‘th the ruling party in Syria and Iraq has been likened to the Mongols. The Party of God, the spearhead of the new politicised search for the fundamentals, was to eradicate ignorance and to establish an Islamic society. To this end, revolutionary armed struggle to kill ‘apostate’ rulers, overthrow un Godly rule and establish an Islamic government were preliminary steps. This advocacy of tyrannicide and Islamic revolution by Qutb and his radical followers set them apart from other Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. A fortiori, all this is a far cry from orthodox reformism of the Salafiyya. The replication of the historical pattern of the conquest of pagan Arabia under the leadership of the Prophet had taken the place of the recovery of the pristine Islam as transmitted by the Traditions of the pious ancestors.

As we have seen, lay Islamic intellectuals thus launched political Islam and led the movement in its first decades. It did not take too long, however, for Muslim clerics who saw their status and traditional institutional power seriously eroded by the modernising states, to move into the market for political ideologies created by the expansion of the public sphere. A new breed of Muslim clerics thus began to compete with lay Islamic ideologues, making their first significant appearance in the more clericalist Shi‘i Islam in the 1960s and 1970s. In Iran, clerical intellectuals played a significant role in the Islamic publicistic movement with the writings of Sayyid Mahmūd Ṭāliqānī and Murtadā Muṭahhari. This paved the way for the assumption of the leadership of the revolution against the shah of Iran by Khomeini and his clerical students for whom he had expounded his ideas on Islamic government (ḥukūmat i islāmī) on the basis of the wilāyat i faqīh (authority of the religious jurist) in a series of lectures while in exile in Najaf in 1970. It should be noted, however, that the spectacular success of the Islamic revolutionary movement in overthrowing the shah in Iran owed little to this belated development of Islamic
ideology. Khomeini’s immense institutional asset, which has no counterpart in Sunnī Islam, was the existence of a Shī‘ī religious hierarchy independent of the state. Without a similar institutional asset, the Shī‘ī clerics of Lebanon followed the example of their Iranian colleagues and founded the Ḥizbullah (Party of God) in 1982. Although the party was devoted to the eventual implementation of Khomeini’s theocratic government, it organised its paramilitary wing as a Leninist revolutionary organisation and had no compunction in changing the name of its governing body from the Shura Council to Politburo, and as we shall see, it developed in a very different direction in the 1990s.

The Sunnī clerics, who lack an independent hierocracy and are more dependent on the state, nevertheless followed their Shī‘ī colleagues’ suit and became conspicuous in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1970s, the Egyptian takfīr groups had been hostile to the ‘ulamā‘, and a prominent cleric was one of their earliest victims. The blind cleric, Shaykh ‘Umar ‘Abd al Raḥmān, who had formed his Jamā‘at i Islāmī and defended the lay proponents of the new jihad, was something of an exception. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, we encounter the conspicuous popular shaykhs and prayer leaders such as Shaykh ‘Abd al Ḥamīd Kish, Shaykh ‘Abd al Rašīd Saqr and Shaykh Maḥmūd Mutawalli al Sha‘rāwī in Egypt, and others like them in the rest of North Africa. Another important clerical publicist with a more global orientation was the Azhar trained Egyptian, Yuṣuf al Qarāḍāwī, who had moved to Qatar in the 1960s and extended his publicistic Islam beyond mosques into the modern media such as television, which were used to broadcast practical fatwās. Notable in this regard has been his participation since 1996 in al Jazeera’s programme, The Sharī‘a and Life (al sharī‘a wa‘l hayāt). This new clerical leadership was important for popular mobilisation. In the Middle East, however, it tended to have a traditionalising effect and has tended to dampen ideological formulations and highlight the publicistic concerns of orthodox reformism. As we shall see below, a contrasting pattern of clerical leadership can be found in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Like the leaders of the movement, recruits to political Islam come from different social backgrounds. As an integrative social movement, political Islam tended to recruit its members both from the newly mobilised groups and individuals from all strata of society, and from social groups and strata dislocated or threatened by industrialisation and the modernisation of states. In this respect, it is similar to the pattern of recruitment by the inter war European nationalist and fascist movements in a period of accelerated urbanisation, spread of literacy and higher education, and in national integration. The social heterogeneity of political Islam is well illustrated by the dual
leadership of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, with Professor Abbasi Madani representing the socially upwardly mobile intelligentsia, and Shaykh Ali Belhadj, prayer leader of a mosque, representing the threatened and disgruntled traditional bourgeoisie.

The politics of Islamic resurgence in different nation-states

Although state building, national integration and political mobilisation are common throughout the Muslim world, there is considerable variation in the character of political regimes, on the one hand, and state policies towards the Islamic movements, on the other. In other words, the degree of pluralism of the political regime and the extent of accommodation or political integration of the Islamic movements affect the choice of oppositional political Islamic groups between constitutional pragmatism and revolutionary radicalism. (These two factors are inter related as the monolithic regimes also tend to be exclusionary.) In societies characterised by religious pluralism, Islamic resurgence is also correlated with sectarian strife, often under clerical leadership.

Accommodation versus revolution

As the following cases show, partial political integration tends to give rise to political pragmatism and splinter ideological radicalism, while political exclusion fosters Islamic revolutionary radicalism. Furthermore, the character of the regimes and inclusion or lack thereof in the political process also affects the possibility of an intellectual clerical alliance among the leadership of Islamic oppositional groups.

The Jamā‘at i Islāmī had a major impact on the process of Islamisation in Pakistan in the 1970s as an opposition party. The Constitution of 1972 preemptively entrusted the Council for Islamic Ideology with preparing programmes for extensive Islamisation of Pakistani society which only stimulated the opposition to propose the complete nizam i mustafa (prophetic order) in 1977 that led to the overthrow of the government of Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto. The Jamā‘at remained integrated into the Pakistani political process under General Muhammad Zia ul Haq (1977–88), and the prominent Jamā‘at leader Khurshid Ahmad became one of Zia’s confidants. Mawdūdī himself lived to approve the execution of Bhutto and approve Zia ul Haq’s first Islamisation initiatives. This political integration was enhanced when the Jamā‘at was given four cabinet posts in 1978, and continued with ups and downs after Zia’s death to May 1992, when it was one of the three partners in the ruling coalition. Electoral
participation by the Jamāʿat i Islāmī and its full integration into General Zia’s regime resulted in vehement opposition to its lay leadership by the Pakistani mullās active in politics. By contrast, total exclusion from the political process under the monolithic regimes of Iran under the shah and Algeria under the one-party National Liberation Front regime was conducive to a revolutionary alliance between lay Islamic modernists and politicised ayatollahs. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was suppressed in 1954 and totally excluded from the political process under Nasser. The Islamic revolutionary radicalism of Sayyid Qutb was thus born out of total exclusion from the political society. So was Shiʿī clericalist revolutionary radicalism in Iran after 1963. The Islamic revolution of 1979 under Khomeini’s leadership changed total exclusion to full integration, indeed complete control of the state. Shiʿī revolutionary ideology, developed in total exclusion from the political society under the monarchy, accordingly gave way to clericalist but nevertheless pragmatic and begrudgingly modernised constitution making under the Islamic regime.

The vicissitudes of political Islam in Egypt also demonstrate that integration into the parliamentary political process is likely to produce a rift between moderates and radicals, whose alliance is important for the success of an Islamic revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood’s suppression and exclusion from the political process ended under Sadat, and the period of its de facto integration began in 1976, when seven of its members entered the Egyptian People’s Assembly as individuals. In the last months of his life Sadat condemned the Muslim Brotherhood alongside the Qutbist radicals for causing the Muslim Coptic clashes of June 1981. This conflation was a grave mistake, or Mubarak (pres. 1981) must have thought so when he resumed the rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood. The parliamentary position of the Muslim Brotherhood was improved by its alliance with the New Wafd in 1984, which resulted in a gain of eight seats with two Islamic sympathisers as independents, and even more significantly, with the Liberal and Socialist Labour Parties in 1987, which was dubbed the ‘Islamic alliance’ on account of the adoption of the Muslim Brothers’ slogan, ‘Islam is the solution’, and secured the Brothers thirty six seats. This de facto political integration, at every stage, split the Qutbist vanguard groups from the Brotherhood, whose participation in the elections they vehemently condemned. In exchange, the condemnation of the Qutbist extremists by prominent Muslim Brothers effectively contributed to the marginalisation of the revolutionary radicals.\footnote{Abdel Azim Ramadan, ‘Fundamentalist influence in Egypt: The strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the takfīr groups’, in M. Marty and R. S. Appleby (eds.), \textit{Fundamentalisms and the state} (Chicago, 1993), pp. 162–78.}
Partial integration of Islamic political parties has been easiest in monarchies which enjoy considerable religious legitimacy, notably Jordan’s Hashemite dynasty as descendants of the Prophet, and Moroccan kings who, since independence from France, were accepted as ‘the commander of the faithful’. In Jordan, the above mentioned inverse relationship between integration and ideological radicalism holds in the case of the full integration of the Muslim Brotherhood into parliamentary politics. In 1989, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic Action Front won twenty three seats in the Lower House of Parliament. Between January and June 1991, the Muslim Brotherhood leaders were among the seven ministers from Islamic groups who entered the cabinet, and controlled the ministries of Education, Religious Affairs, Health and Social Development. The number of Muslim Brother deputies declined slightly in the 1993 elections to sixteen seats, with a few other deputies who had run independently for the Muslim Brotherhood. Meanwhile, political Islam and revolutionary radicalism were successfully contained within informal neo Salafî networks.

The history of Muslim Brotherhood in the Sudan, however, offers some thing of a counterexample. Dr Ḥasan al Turābī, the leader first of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood and, since 1986, of the National Islamic Front, was a pragmatic politician, adept at operating under alternating military and democratic regimes. In 1989, he traded junior partnership in the democratic government of Śādiq al Mahdî for unencumbered dominance under the Islamicised military regime of General ‘Umar al Bashîr. The new partnership originally resembled the relationship between Zia ul Haq and the Jamā‘at i Islāmî in Pakistan until Turābī began the unsavoury experiment of turning his organisation into the mobilisational arm of Bashîr’s Islamicised military regime. He also moved in the direction of Islamic internationalism, considering Colonel Qadhāfî military mobilisational ‘republic’ (jamā‘hīriyya) an alternative to Western democracy, and invited Osama bin Laden to move to the Sudan, which the latter did in 1991. This intrusion of transnational influences is similar to other instances considered in our final section.

On the other hand, a truly striking example of the moderating influence of integration in the political process can be found in the changing position of the Ḥizbullāh in Lebanon in the 1990s. Sayyid Ḥasan Naṣrallāh was elected its leader in February 1992 with a programme of ‘Lebanonisation’ with the approval of the party’s spiritual guide, Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍl Allāh, who now considered Islamic government a contingent rather than a necessary goal of the Islamic movement. The Ḥizbullāh decided to participate in the parliamentary elections of 1992, 1996 and 2000, while establishing an expanding programme
of social and welfare services for Shiʿī and Christian communities. The Iranian revolutionary guards left after Israel’s evacuation of southern Lebanon in 1996, allowing the reorientation of the Ḥizbullah to Lebanese politics and civil society. The Ḥizbullah did well in the municipal elections of 1998, and in the parliamentary elections of 2000, when it won nine of the twenty seven seats reserved for the Shiʿī, together with one Christian and two Sunni seats, and became a major player in Lebanese post civil war democracy.

The meteoric rise and ideological rigidity of the Front Islamique du Salut in Algeria in the period 1988–91 is instructive not only because it broadly supports our exclusion hypothesis, but also because it suggests that the absence of political pluralism may foster Islamic revolutionary radicalism despite some co-optative integration. Until the constitutional reform of 1989, the monolithic Algerian state propagated a totalitarian political socialist ideology. The followers of the inter war Salafi leader, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd ibn Bādis, had been influential in the formation of the Front de Libération National in 1954. After independence, Islam was nationalised, as were land and industry, and was culturally accommodated, with many Islamically oriented intellectuals being co-opted by the NLF regime. The spectacular victory of the Algerian Islamists in the elections for the provincial and municipal councils in June 1990 suddenly brought them into the Algerian political process. The violent clashes of June 1991, however, demonstrated that this partial political integration did not result in pragmatism overnight. During the fateful national elections of 26 December 1991, the Front Islamique du Salut stood firm by its official motto: ‘No constitution and no laws; the only rule is the Qurʾān and the law of God’, and remained uncompromising in its advocacy of an Islamic state. After it was assured of 188 seats in the first round (against the ruling Front de Libération National’s 15), President Chadli Benjedid (pres. 1979–92) declared a state of emergency and stepped down on 11 January 1992, and the government annulled the elections. This abrupt ending of incipient democratic pluralism by the military coup inaugurated a decade of savage civil war that claimed over 100,000 lives and which the Islamists eventually lost. Our comparisons with Iran and Egypt underline the significance of the lay clerical alliance that doomed the attempt by Algeria’s monolithic regime to open up, and suggest that the unabated radicalism of the Algerian Islamists can be interpreted as the inherited anti pluralist and totalitarian discourse of national liberation perpetuated by the state under which they had lived for so long.

Perhaps the most interesting case of the effects of varying degrees of political integration and regime openness on Islam can be found in Indonesia. Like other political parties in the 1950s, the Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’ had not just expanded its membership but also affiliated with various organisations in civil society such as associations of youth, workers, farmers, students and women. It participated in the military civilian alliance that carried out the mass killings of some half million Indonesian communists and their sympathisers in 1965, and welcomed General Suharto’s New Order (1966–98). During the 1957–59 debates in the Constitutional Assembly, the Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’ had followed the lead of the Masyumi, the other major Islamic party in Indonesia which was banned in 1960 and whose outlook corresponded most closely to Pakistan’s Jamā’at i Islāmī, in demanding the establishment of an Islamic state. Under the New Order regime, Abdurrahman Wahid, the grandson of Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’’s founder, assumed the organisation leadership and capitalised on its civil orientation to advocate a ‘civil Islam’ in a pluralistic polity. Responding to Suharto’s policy of suppression of political activities hand in hand with the encouragement of Muslim society based organisations, the Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’ joined the state created and composite Party of Unity and Development in 1973. In 1984, however, Wahid persuaded the Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’ to accept the pluralist ‘Five Principles’ (Pancasila) as its sole foundation, as demanded by the government, and had no difficulty in announcing its withdrawal from politics and return to the original charter of 1926 as an organisation devoted to social and religious welfare. Wahid also took the lead in establishing the Democratic Forum in March 1991. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, the Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’ formally returned to politics, and Wahid was elected president of Indonesia in 1999–2000 and briefly led its transition to democracy.15

Islamic resurgence and sectarian strife
In the 1980s and 1990s, Islamic resurgence was accompanied by a sharp rise in sectarian violence in religiously plural Muslim societies. Politicisation of sectarian identities and sectarian strife and clashes with religious minorities thus emerged as a compliment to or substitute for Islamic ideologies. Over 200 people were killed in sectarian violence in the Punjab Province of Pakistan between 1989 and 1994, another 200 died in a ‘five day war’ in the North West Frontier Province in 1996, and some seventy more died in the first ten days of

August 1997 in anticipation of the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the country. The first stimulus to politicisation of sectarian identities came from the Islamic revolutionary movement in Iran and in the context of Zia’s Islamisation policy. ‘Allāma ‘Ārif Ḥusayn al-Ḥusaynī, who had been studying in Najaf during Khomeini’s exile there and had been expelled with a large number of other Shi‘ī clerics by Saddam Hussein in the mid 1970s, spent some four years in Qum before returning to Pakistan in 1978. In 1980, he helped Muftī Ja‘far Ḥusayn, a prominent figure in the Shi‘ī community, to found the Tahrik i Nifaz i Fiqh i Ja‘fariyya and organise its protest demonstrations to demand exemption from the payment of zakāt (religious tax) to Zia’s government. He took over the leadership of the organisation after Muftī Ja‘far’s death in 1983 and retained it until his assassination in August 1988. Sunnī mullās responded by setting up some dozen militant sectarian organisations. The most notable of these is the Sipah i Sahabah Pakistan, founded by a Deobandi cleric, Mawlana Haqnaqwaz Jhangvi (assassinated in 1989) to demand that the Shi‘ī (over 15 per cent of the population) be declared non Muslim. (The successful agitation to declare the Ahmādis non Muslim in the 1970s was the training ground and rehearsal for many of Jhangvi’s militant clerics.) The Sipah i Sahabah Pakistan recruited members in the cities and was supported by the associations of local traders which often spread its calls for strikes and marches from the main bazaars. While extolling the virtues of the Prophet’s companions (ṣaḥāba) in competition with popular Shi‘ī eulogies of the imams, the Sipah i Sahabah launched an ambitious publication series in 1994, designed to refute Shi‘ī beliefs and practices and to collect and publish fatwās declaring the Shi‘a infidels.

At this point the rapid expansion of the madrasas fuelled sectarian strife by sharply increasing the supply of militant mullās. The number of madrasas in Punjab, for instance, more than doubled in the decade and a half after 1980, with the number of seminarians (Taliban) increasing much faster. The Jamā‘at i Islāmī had opened its first madrasa in Lahore in 1976, and there were seventy-five of them by 1990. These had a major influence in introducing the body of seminarians to political Islam and its ideological discourse, while the Afghan War made for the militarisation of the madrasas in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. With little prospects for a professional clerical career, which was furthermore slow and demanding, young militant clerics inflected political Islam in the direction of sectarianism. The Deobandi ‘ulamā, who had, in the 1970s, discovered anti Ahmādī agitation a useful avenue to politics and a convenient means to paper over their old opposition to the creation of Pakistan, now took the lead in the anti Shi‘ī sectarian inflection of
political Islam. In the latter half of the 1990s, when war torn Afghanistan was to fall to the Afghan and Pakistani graduates of Deobandī madrasas of the North West Frontier Province, who called themselves the Taliban, sectarian violence became a marked feature of Afghan civil strife, resulting in the massacre of the Shi‘ī Hazara as well as routine sectarian persecution under the Taliban theocratic regime, which was designated the Islamic emirate of Afghanistan, with Mulla ‘Umar as its ‘commander of the faithful’.

In Nigeria, there have been violent clashes between Muslims and Christians, and particularly serious ones in Kano between 1980 and 1985 and again in the early 1990s. Clerical leadership appears to have contributed to the exacerbation of Muslim Christian conflict, and to inter Muslim sectarian strife. The former grand kadi of northern Nigeria, Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, for example, founded the Jama‘atu Izalatul Bidia Waikamatus (Izala) in 1978. The Izala militants have been responsible for recurrent sectarian clashes with members of the Tijānīyya and Qādirīyya Sufi tariqas since the 1980s. The Council of Ulama and their counterpart, the Christian Association of Nigeria can also be said to bear much of the responsibility for making the constitutional enforcement of the Sharī‘a the focus of sectarian strife in the 1980s, and for setting in motion the trend that resulted in the stampede of the twelve northern Nigerian federal states to declare Sharī‘a their state law by the last year of the century. In Egypt, similarly, there were recurrent clashes between the Islamic groups and the Copts after June 1981.

4. Political Islam beyond the era of the nation-states: the incipient impact of globalisation

In our period, we also witness the incipient impact of globalisation on Islamic resurgence, and trends transcending the dominant nation state parameters make their first appearance. The international order of the era of the nation states provided the framework for trends transcending its sovereign units, and the Muslim world was no exception. An interesting feature of globalisation is that the unfolding of anti global sentiments can take the form of particularistic, variety producing movements, which seek local, regional or civilisational legitimacy but, nevertheless, have a global frame of self reference. The reactive trends set in motion what can be called ‘Islamic defensive counter universalism’.

Counter-universalism

Global integration induced many Muslims to emphasise their unique identity within the frame of reference of their own culture, which can be said to be at
once universal and sub global. Muslims have sought to appropriate universalistic institutions for Islam by what might be called Islamic cloning: ‘Islamic science’, ‘Islamic human rights’, ‘Islamic international system’ and so on. We also see a trend, led by Saudi Arabia, towards setting up international charities such as the Muslim World League and the International Islamic Relief Organisation, and above all, a variety of organisations modelled after the United Nations and its offshoots.

The most notable of the cloned international organisations is the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which was founded in 1969, with continued financial backing of Saudi Arabia, and has fifty seven countries as its members. The cloning is unmistakable. Not only is the charter of the OIC derived from the UN charter, but it has an Islamic Development Bank (modelled after the World Bank), a Commission of the International Crescent (corresponding to the Red Cross) and an Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (corresponding to the UNESCO). In 1980, the OIC voted to establish an International Islamic Law Commission to secure representation of the Islamic viewpoint before the International Court of Justice. The OIC also set up the International Islamic University Malaysia as a modern university for the study of Islamic subjects in accordance with global standards.

On the other hand, transnational Islamic resurgence caused the rejection of the assertion of the universality of human rights, and generated an official Islamic alternative. This Islamic alternative was embodied in the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. As is to be expected in an imitative document, much of the legal terminology of the international human rights conventions was swallowed while quite a number of rights were in substance nullified. This resulted in a number of internal contradictions. The Cairo Declaration offered no guarantee of religious freedom, prohibiting instead any form of compulsion or exploitation of poverty and ignorance to convert anyone to atheism or a religion other than Islam. While endorsing the Cairo Declaration, the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in April 1993 also confirmed ‘the existence of different constitutional and legal systems among [the] Member States and various international or regional human rights instruments to which they are parties’.16 This acknowledgement left open modest insinuation of the international law on human rights into national laws in Egypt and elsewhere.

Similarly, the technological revolution in mass media of communication, one of the most powerful engines of globalisation, was already having a transformative impact on contemporary Islam. The episode that best illustrates the impact of the media on a globally integrated Muslim world was the worldwide reaction to the publication of *Satanic verses* by Salman Rushdie in 1988. The protests and burning of his book by indignant Muslims began in Bradford, England. These were broadcast throughout the world and stimulated violent protests in Pakistan and India. In a particularly low point of the Iranian post-revolutionary politics in February 1989, after the book had been banned in India, South Africa, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, Iran’s supreme leader Khomeini broadcast his famous *fatwā* condemning Rushdie, a non-Iranian writer who lived in England, to death for apostasy, and clerically controlled Iranian foundations immediately put a bounty on his head.

**Transformations of political Islam**

Political Islam, too, was being profoundly affected by the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, and by the global trend called the ‘third wave of democratisation’ that followed the collapse of communism in 1989. This effect, however, was in two opposite directions: the globalisation of Islamic revolutionary radicalism and justification of global jihad, on the one hand, and de-ideologisation of political Islam and its reorientation away from the state and toward civil society on the other.

Nowhere is the mark of the era of the nation state on political Islam more visible than in the internalist orientation of the movement for Islamic revolution, and in the Islamic radicals’ definition of the object of jihad as revolutionary struggle. As defined by Faraj and the Qutbist revolutionaries, the individually incumbent ‘neglected duty’ was jihad against ‘the near enemy’ namely, the modern idol of the secular state and its head. Global concerns, foremost among them the liberation of Jerusalem, were secondary to the overthrow of that monolithic idol (*tāqūt*) within each Muslim nation state. It was with this internalist orientation that Ayman al-Zawahiri, still in his teens, was personally inspired by Sayyid Qutb to form a jihad cell in 1967 for his high school friends. The organisation he thus set up for the new ‘Islamic vanguard’ grew to become Egypt’s most deadly, the Tanzīm al-Jihād. Throughout this period, Zawahiri affirmed that ‘the road to Jerusalem goes first through Cairo’. With the declaration of jihad against the Soviet Union and the Soviet backed regime in Afghanistan in the 1980s, however, and the

recruitment of Muslims from South Asia, the Middle East and the West to fight it, the international use of violence was widely legitimised. The globalisation of political violence and Islamic transnational terrorism gathered momentum with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which drew the jihad militants from Afghanistan and elsewhere to Bosnia from 1992 to 1996, and the anti Russian rebellion in Chechnya after the break up of the Soviet Union, which continued into the new century. In the latter half of the 1990s, Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan and formed the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, in which he was joined by Zawāhirī, and applied Sayyid Qūṭb’s idea of the ‘vanguard’ of the Islamic movement to a global counter elite who would be methodical and follow a set of rules or ‘the principle’ (al qā’ida) in waging jihad now a global jihad against ‘the far enemy’, the United States of America.

The Islamic ideologies of Mawdūdī and Qūṭb had been formulated in the age of total ideologies, notably communism and (in Mawdūdī’s case) fascism. The third wave of democratisation and the global demise of totalitarianism in 1989, following upon the failure of socialism in the Middle East in the preceding decades, amounted to a complete change in the international political culture. This new climate created new global conditions to which political Islam had to be adapted. It had to become less collectivist and obsessed with the creation of an Islamic state and to reorient its communitarianism toward civil society and accommodate capitalism. In addition, the new environment fostered the return of justifications of democracy in Islamic terms typical of the Islamic modernism of the first half of the century. Like the massive Islamic organisations of Indonesia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt operated a large number of benevolent societies, including clinics attached to more than 20,000 non governmental mosques. In the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood reinforced its orientation toward civil society and concentrated its energy on gaining control of professional associations, beginning with elections to the board of the medical association in 1984, and by the 1990s, Muslim Brothers were present in all major professional associations. This effort was so successful that the Brothers decided to boycott the parliamentary elections of December 1990. In 1992, the Muslim Brotherhood was in control of the medical and bar associations and used its network of clinics and benevolent associations to outshine the government’s bumbling response to the Cairo earthquake. In October 1994, medical doctor and former amīr (commander) of the students’ Islamic association Essam al Eryan organised a conference on Freedom and Civil Society for the Muslim Brothers, who formally adopted democracy in 1995. The younger generation which was pushing the Muslim
Brothers in the new direction did not yet gain the upper hand in the 1990s, however, and some of them split to form a new Wasat (Middle) Party in 1996.

Already in 1970, the leader of the Indonesian Islamic student movement, Nurcholish Madjid, had broken with the political Islam of his mentor and Masyumi ideologue, Mohammad Natsir, denouncing the idea of the Islamic state (negara Islam) as the ‘sacralising’ of what is actually profane in Islam. To preserve what was truly sacred in Islam, the political had to be ‘secularised’.

Madjid, however, was ahead of his time, and was expelled from the movement. It was not until the 1990s that the generational break between Natsir and Madjid first signalled in 1970 became solid and the latter’s call for secularism and rejection of the ‘mythology’ of the Islamic state was taken up by the younger generation of Islamic intellectuals and thus became a major force in the movement for democratisation after the fall of Suharto. In the Middle East, it was the Islamic intellectuals in the Islamic Republic of Iran who led the break with political Islam in the early 1990s. In 1992, the lay Islamic intellectual, Abdolkarim Soroush, made a radical break with the revolutionary characterisation of Islam as an ideology by his predecessor, ‘Ali Shari’ati in a critique of the Islamic revolutionary ideology, arguing that Islam as a world religion is ‘richer than (farbatar) ideology’. An ideological society, he argued, stifles free enquiry and intellectual development, whereas Islam as a world religion allows for a variety of different interpretations that open the road to intellectual creativity.

Soroush proceeded to advocate his idea of ‘Islamic secularism’ which bore a striking resemblance to Madjid’s. At about the same time, the cleric Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistarî rejected the fundamental premises of ‘political jurisprudence’ by arguing that since the time of the Prophet, fiqh was never constitutive of political order and always pragmatic and designed to answer practical questions that arose within the framework of existing political regimes. More generally, Mujtahid Shabistarî proposed a hermeneutic approach to Islamic law and religion. This led to the popularisation of the idea that different ‘readings’ (singular, qirā’at) of Islam were legitimate, and to an equally radical break with the twentieth century apologetic Islamic modernism by Soroush’s advocacy of religious pluralism in the latter part of 1990s. The advocacy of Islamic reform by Soroush and Mujtahid Shabistarî paved the way for the movement for political reform led by President Sayyid Muhammad Khātamî (pres. 1997–2005), who gave currency...

18 Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 116–19.
19 Abdolkarim Soroush, Farbatar az ‘ulūluzhî (Tehran, 1373), pp. 95–115.
to Mujtahid Shabistarī’s principle of acceptability of different ‘readings’ of Islam and endorsed Soroush’s idea of ‘democracy’, presuming it to be compatible with the wilāyat i faqīh. He argued that democracy in Iran, where the majority of the population are assumed to be religious, rule by the people would naturally be ‘religious democracy’ (mardum sālārī yi dīnī). Although the reform movement can be said to have failed politically, it had a profound and lasting cultural impact.

In Indonesia, Iran, Egypt and elsewhere in the Muslim world, the break with the political Islam of the era of resurgence was accompanied by the acceptance of democracy by a significant section of the younger generation of Islamic activists. For them, Islam was no longer to be the basis of the political order and constitution but only a limitation to and qualification of democratic governance and constitutional government.
This chapter provides an overview of Islamic transnationalism in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Its primary concerns are to provide the reader with a typology of the various sorts of Islamic actors whose activities and world views seek to transcend state boundaries, while also identifying the wider significance of these movements for the historical study of the modern Muslim world. Particular attention will be paid to the ways in which globalisation processes—especially the dramatic increase in communication and the flow of peoples across borders—have interacted with historical practices and concepts in the Islamic world to give rise to what might be understood as a new Muslim transnationalism.

It would perhaps be worthwhile at the outset to say something about the analytical distinction between ‘transnational’ and ‘international’—two terms that in the minds of many readers will be largely synonymous and interchangeable. In conventional academic usage, the term ‘international’ connotes the idea of relations between formally sovereign entities (e.g. bilateral diplomacy). The notion of transnationalism, on the other hand, seeks to downplay the importance of the state as the ‘official’ embodiment of the nation in favour of an emphasis on non-governmental actors that work across sovereign boundaries but whose activities do not involve—or perhaps even seek to challenge—the formal state. As the processes of globalisation evolve and deepen, some scholars have suggested that ‘transnationalism’ serves as a better description of world politics conducted by an increasingly wide range of non-governmental social forces organised across sovereign boundaries.\(^1\) To emphasise the transnational, then, is to move away from an exclusive focus on state actors so as to include newly emerging (or, as we will see, pre-existing)

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\(^1\) Thomas Risse Kappen, *Bringing transnational relations back in: Non-state actors, domestic structures and international institutions* (Cambridge, 1995).
This chapter will begin by providing a brief history of Islamic transnationalism and then move on to outline a typology of contemporary transnational Islam. It will identify the major categories of Muslim actors whose work and activities transcend national boundaries including intergovernmental and state sponsored organisations, educational institutions, intellectual and scholarly networks, non governmental organisations (NGOs), political parties, radical groups, pietistic and mystical brotherhoods and key individual personalities (intellectuals, ideologues and activists). The latter part of the chapter will briefly explain the significance of contemporary Muslim transnationalism for wider Islamic history by identifying several key themes around Muslim identity, the reconfiguration of religious authority and Islamic alternatives to globalisation.

A brief history of Islamic transnationalism

There has been a strongly cosmopolitan impulse within Islam since the time of the Prophet Muḥammad (d. 632) in the seventh century CE. In this sense the history of Muslim transnationalism as attested by chapters in the earlier volumes of the *New Cambridge History of Islam* significantly predates the formal establishment of nation states in the modern era. The Qurʾān itself enjoins Muslims to engage in international relations: ‘We … made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other’ (49:13), and in a famous prophetic tradition, Muḥammad exhorts the believers to travel as far as China in search of knowledge. The Word quickly became social reality in the early years of the Muslim community as Islam spread rapidly from its humble origins in the western Arabian oasis town of Medina to encompass virtually the entire modern Middle East, Persia, Northern Africa and even Spain. Over successive centuries, the religion would spread to West and East Africa, into the Indian subcontinent and across to the archipelagoes of South East Asia. The notion of the *ummah* the community of believers, potentially global in scope was hence central to the theory and practice of Islam from the very beginning.

Yet we should not overestimate the extent to which this concept expressed the existence of a meaningful polity. Political factionalism emerged in the Muslim community soon after Muḥammad’s death, and although the *ummah* enjoyed a period of unity under the first four caliphs (*khulafāʾ*; sing. *khalīfa*) or ‘successors’ to the Prophet, dynastic politics soon took over as the lands
under Muslim control grew by several orders of magnitude. Although the caliphate system (khilâfa) existed formally until its abolition in the wake of the First World War, it had ceased to name a single political community by about the tenth century CE. Despite this political fragmentation, transnationalism flourished in the medieval Islamic world. Where formal relations between Muslim polities were often characterised by competition, rivalry and external invasion, there emerged at the level of the social a rich cosmopolitan milieu of merchants, travellers and itinerant scholars of whom the famous Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (d. 1328) is perhaps the best known example. Janet Abu Lughod speaks of the maritime trading routes linking the Middle East and Asia in the fourteenth century as a nascent ‘world system’. The Indian and Mediterranean oceans became the conduits of a vibrant commercial and intellectual exchange over the next centuries. With African Sindis in India, Ḥadramī merchants from Yemen in the Malay peninsula, and Dagestani scholars in Arabia, a Muslim multiculturalism emerged along the littoral coasts of these vast seas. While mercantile life was certainly the driving animus behind much of this transnationalism, the emergence of centres of excellence in Islamic education in Cairo, Bukhara and Samarkand, for example also gave rise to a strong measure of scholarly nomadism. And as the pilgrimage (ḥajj) that constitutes one of the religion’s Five Pillars came to encompass more and more cultures, annual gatherings in Mecca served as a living testimony to the diversity of the umma.

Muslim transnationalism assumed a more overtly political character again from the mid eighteenth century when, in response to European colonialism, various Muslim scholars and political activists began a programme of religious revitalization one that also sought, in part, to bridge differences between various Muslim sects and factions. Beginning with Shāh Wali Allāh (d. 1762) in India and Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhaḥ (d. 1792) in Arabia, this renewalist trend sought to purify Islam by expunging the influence of Sufism and other forms of what was seen as malignant innovation (bid‘a). By the mid nineteenth

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2 Ira Lapidus, A history of Islamic societies, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 2002).
4 Patricia Risso, Merchants and faith: Muslim commerce and culture in the Indian Ocean (Boulder, 1995); Leila Fawaz et al. (eds.), Modernity and culture from Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, 1890 1920 (New York, 2001).
century this reformist impulse took on a distinctly modernising flavour through the contributions of figures such as Jamāl al Din al Afghānī (d. 1897). Afghānī, a Persian who, throughout his active career, spent periods of time in Egypt, France and Ottoman Turkey, best embodies the political dimension of this reformist impulse. Afghānī observed that by the mid 1800s, Muslims the world over were subject to colonial occupation by various European countries. His solution was to combine a drive to modernise Islam so as to render it compatible with the norms of Western science and technology with an appeal to a new transnational political activism among Muslims—a programme that became known as pan Islam. Although Afghānī managed to exert certain influence over the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909), he eventually fell out of favour and the nationalist agenda associated with the Young Turks and later Mustafa Kemal (d. 1938) came to dominate the political agendas of most Muslim countries. It is worth noting, however, that key Islamic reformers and Islamist ideologues such as Muḥammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905) a disciple of Afghānī and Mawla Ṣayyid Abūl A‘lā Mawdūdī (d. 1979) in Pakistan were both, at times, associated with pan Islamic ideals. With the secular nationalism of Kemal on the rise, the political dimension of Muslim transnationalism once again entered a period of decline.

No event better captures this crisis than Kemal’s abolition of the caliphate in 1924. The future of Muslim polity become a subject of heated debate among scholars and various attempts to regenerate global forums for Muslim discourse in the interwar years, such as the various Muslim congresses, failed to take hold. Over the next thirty years, political Islam became increasingly oriented along national lines, with individual movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood founded in Egypt in 1928 seeking to counter the secularising trends associated with modern nationalism in the Middle East. The loss of Jerusalem in the Six Day War of 1967, the oil crisis of 1974 and Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1979 prompted short periods of renewed Islamic globalism in the political arena. Nevertheless, and despite the efforts of Islamic intergovernmental groups such as the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) founded in 1969, national interests have tended to predominate over geopolitical unity in relations between Muslim nations. By the same token, individual Muslim nation states have employed transnational organisations as

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proxies to further their geopolitical aims as has been the case, for example, with Saudi Arabia and the Muslim World League.\textsuperscript{10}

Defining transnational Islam in the contemporary world

It quickly becomes clear that if one were to include under the rubric ‘transnational Islam’ any group whose ideas or activities cross national boundaries in some respect, this category could easily come to resemble a comprehensive inventory of the entire contemporary Muslim world. In the interest of cohesiveness, therefore, and also out of a desire to maintain the distinctiveness and utility of transnational Islam as an analytic concept, the coverage in this chapter will limit itself to those Islamic social movements intrinsically transnational in nature or whose primary modes of organisation and activity transcend the boundaries of nation states.

The Tablīghī Jama‘at (‘Tablīghīs’; see below), for example, is closely tied to the Indian subcontinent in terms of its intellectual heritage and leadership. Its central message of universal pietistic renewal, however, has led it to establish centres and to dispatch itinerant da‘wa (missionary or ‘call’) groups across multiple continents. It is in this sense that a group such as the Tablīghīs could be regarded as a transnational Muslim social movement, while Ḥaraka al Muqāwama al Islāmiyya (HAMAS), the Palestinian Resistance Movement, whose core goals and agenda are tied exclusively to the territory of Palestine, would not be seen as such for our purposes.

The multiple forms and trajectories of transnational Islam

It would perhaps be useful at this point to provide a typology of contemporary transnational Islam. It is possible to identify perhaps seven distinct, broad categories of Muslim transnationalism today, several of which subdivide into further types. It should also be noted that in a good number of cases, broad areas of overlap and intersection between these categories exist within individual groups and movements.

‘Traditional transnationalism’: Sufi and pietistic networks

Sufi (mystical) networks, perhaps the most historically durable form of Muslim transnationalism, have existed since the second century following the death of the Prophet. These brotherhoods (tariqa) have constituted important structures of social order in many Muslim societies throughout various eras and have operated across borders for centuries. Indeed, the most influential Sufi networks operating today—groups such as the Naqshbandiyya and the Qadiriyya—have been around for at least five centuries. Despite a relative decline in the Middle East during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the face of orthodox revivalism, Sufism has enjoyed a huge resurgence in recent years, most notably among Muslim communities located in Europe and North America. We should also note that during this period of relative dormancy in the Arab world, the brotherhoods were thriving in regions such as Central, South and South East Asia. During the latter part of the twentieth century various waves of post colonial migration and transnational labour patterns associated with increased globalisation have transplanted various Sufi orders and their followers. The Naqshbandiyya order associated with the Cyprus based Shaykh Na’zim, for example, can claim a widespread global following. A rich set of transnational practices linking Britain and Pakistan has emerged around the cult of the living saint Zindapir.11 It is these more fluid, personal and informal linkages, then, which provide an entry point for our discussion of contemporary transnational Islam.

The brotherhoods generally display features associated with traditional forms of social authority, such as the leadership of a charismatic, hereditary shaykh who accepts an oath of allegiance and tutelage from a disciple (murid). Most notable, perhaps, for its sheer social ubiquity, contemporary Sufism penetrates all walks of life and often transcends class and clan. Its influence, for example, is to be found in the public administration and private education of Turks via, respectively, the Adalet ve Kalkinma (AK) Party and the Fethullah Gülen movement, the political economy of Senegal through the Tijaniyya brotherhood’s ownership of the peanut industry and the daily devotional and social lives of Muslim immigrant communities in the United Kingdom and the United States via entrepreneurial Sufi networks looking to keep in step with expanding diasporas. New technologies of communication and travel have permitted the centralised authority of traditional shaykhs to become

11 Pnina Werbner, Pilgrims of love: The anthropology of a global sufi cult (Bloomington, 2003).
thoroughly transcontinental. It is not uncommon for the leaders of the brotherhoods today to lead a highly itinerant existence, circulating constantly between global headquarters, regional offices and the local lodge (zāwiya) in many countries.

Another important phenomenon within this category of ‘traditional’ transnationalism is the pietistic groups. These are best exemplified in the contemporary world by the Tablighī Jamā’at (TJ) movement, first established in India in 1927. Generally regarded as conservative traditionalists, Tablighīs take it as their mission to encourage Muslims across the umma’s many sub communities to observe the tenets of faith and practise appropriate forms of worship. Wandering bands of TJ followers are often dispatched on da‘wa missions by regional offices throughout the world not seeking primarily to make conversions to Islam, but rather to renew the piety and assure the correct devotional practice of existing Muslims.

While the social significance of both Sufi networks and pietistic groups is clear in terms of their breadth of global reach and popularity, scholars differ as to the political significance of such movements. While the influence of Sufism as a socio-religious force has certainly been integrated into politics, economy and education (as alluded to above), the brotherhoods rarely take overtly political stances. Rather, they would be more likely to seek to widen their influence by gaining the interest and eventual membership of local leaders and opinion makers. The TJ, likewise, describes itself as an apolitical organisation whose orientation eschews the machinations of power and wealth. The vast majority of its followers hold to this ethos. There have nonetheless been instances in which followers on the margins of TJ have become involved with political activists organised through the religious seminaries (mainly in South Asia) in which TJ’s religious conservatism was initially articulated.

Broad-based Islamist ideologies

In contrast to the mystical and politically quietist tendencies described above, we can identify several broad intellectual and ideological tendencies that emerged in the Muslim world during the twentieth century and which today continue to animate several of the more activist and politically engaged (hence ‘Islamist’) movements and individuals to follow in subsequent categories. Olivier Roy speaks of two key ideological trends in twentieth century Islamism: the Jamā’at al Ikhwān al Muslimīn or Muslim Brotherhood

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12 Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed.), Travellers in faith: Studies of the Tablighī Jamā’at as a transnational Islamic movement for faith renewal (Leiden, 2000).
The new transnationalism: globalising Islamic movements

(MB; est. 1928) movement out of Egypt, and the Jamāʿat i Islāmī (the ‘Jamāʿat’; est. 1941) trend out of Pakistan. These differ primarily in terms of the audiences to which they have tended to appeal rather than in their intellectual and programmatic substance although one can certainly speak about different areas of emphasis in each. The Sunnī Arab world has proved most fertile for Muslim Brotherhood thinking, with branches of Hasan al Banna’s (d. 1949) original Egyptian group established throughout the Middle East by the late 1980s. Some of these offshoots such as Hamas in Palestine, al Nahḍa in Tunisia and the National Islamic Front (al Ḥabba al Islāmīya al Qawmiya) in Sudan went on to become prominent Islamist parties within their respective national settings.

The Jamāʿat i Islāmī, by contrast, has been most prevalent among South Asians and members of South Asian immigrant and diaspora communities meaning that its influence is to be found primarily in Pakistan, India, East Africa, the Caribbean and the United Kingdom. The Jamāʿat has been very closely associated with the ideas of Mawdūdī and it is fair to say that in many cases followers have come to the movement through an encounter with his ideas rather than the other way around. The Islamic Foundation (est. 1973) in Leicester in the UK, for example, began life as a Jamāʿat publishing offshoot seeking to make Mawdūdī’s writings available to the rapidly growing South Asian Muslim diaspora in England. Since then it has moved on to embrace themes and approaches outside the Jamāʿat’s canon, but still maintains close leadership ties with the central party in Pakistan.

There is an important point to be made about the distinction between, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood or its various branch chapters as organisational entities and what we might term ‘Muslim Brotherhoodness’ as the description of a broad and prominent intellectual orientation which produces a diverse range of actual political platforms and agendas in the Arab world and beyond. It is possible to look at individual national branches of the Brotherhood and to understand their positions and actions in the context of the domestic political landscape of, say, Jordan or Egypt. ‘Muslim Brotherhoodness’, however, is not coterminous with the policies or activities of any one or even the aggregate of these individual parties. Rather, the intellectual milieu of the MB is a more generic world view that emphasises the social distinctiveness of Muslims, the importance of public religion and a broad model for socio-political mobilisation. It does not in and of itself necessarily lead to calls for the establishment of Islamic states or political/legal

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13 Olivier Roy, The failure of political İslām (London, 1994).
orders based on religion although this is certainly a route taken by many of its more prominent exponents over the years.

Likewise, the essentials of the the Jamā‘at i Islāmī programme were formulated in the context of Muslims living as minorities in British India and so its initial impulses like those of the MB were simultaneously about decrying Western interference in the Muslim world while seeking to define a distinctive public role for religion in society. The distinction between the general tendencies and the organisational manifestations of these two broad approaches is a crucial one to make in order to avoid the assumption that all movements or leaderships that have at one time been influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood share the goals of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood party.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs): charities, da‘wa groups and advocacy networks

Within the Muslim world can be found a broad range of organisations whose nature and purpose correspond very closely to the conventional model of NGOs that is, non-profit entities formally independent of state control organised around advocacy of a particular issue or agenda. It is also worth mentioning that most NGOs operate according to a formal constitution or a set of by laws, and do not unlike various Islamist parties generally seek to obtain political power. For the sake of clarity, it is most useful to emphasise the issue advocacy and formally constituted structure of these groups in order to differentiate them from other manifestations of transnational Islam. Muslim movements that operate under the NGO rubric represent a vast range of interests and normative programmes, many of which as will be seen are at odds with each other.

Muslim transnational NGOs might be seen to sub speciate into four additional categories:

(1) Humanitarian and charity organisations such as Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) and Muslim Aid, that offer disaster relief and development assistance throughout the world, generally with an emphasis on those areas in which large numbers of Muslims are present. Both organisations have headquarters in the UK, but maintain field offices and engage in programming throughout the Muslim world. Like their Christian counterparts (e.g. Lutheran World Relief), these charities cite a religious basis and inspiration for saving lives and providing humanitarian assistance, but generally operate along the same lines and according to the same standards as ‘secular’ relief organisations such as Save the Children. Both
Muslim Aid and IRW, for example, are signatories to the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross/Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, and both maintain varying levels of affiliation with relevant United Nations bodies and non governmental co ordinating agencies in the UK.

(2) Da‘wa and Islamic solidarity organisations such as the Rabīṭat al ‘Ālam al Islāmī or Muslim World League (MWL; est. 1962) and the Nadwa al ‘Ālamīya lil Shabāb al Islāmī or World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY; est. 1972). These groups both maintain offices in a wide range of Muslim majority countries and also in nations with significant Muslim minorities, such as the United States and Canada. Their emphasis is primarily on da‘wa activities, seeking to promote Islamic teachings and provide religious information to Muslims as well as to present the religion to non Muslims. Some national branches of the MWL have also become involved in the establishment and organisation of Islamic schools in various countries. As its name suggests, WAMY’s work focuses primarily on global Muslim youth culture and Islamic solidarity amongst young Muslims. To this end they organise regular international football tournaments, educational exchange programmes and Muslim scouting camps. While MWL and WAMY are formally non governmental entities, most observers cite strong Saudi connections in both cases. The secretary general of MWL, for example, is always a Saudi and it is believed that the programmatic agendas of both organisations are strongly influenced by the kingdom leading some to raise questions about the extent to which the Islamic solidarity they promote is confined to the strongly Salafi Wahhābī variant of Islam found within the Saudi establishment.14

In this regard, it might be said that these organisations display certain of the characteristics described under the state sponsorship category below.

(3) Issue advocacy groups such as Women Living under Muslim Law (WLUML). WLUML was founded in 1984 in response to a number of incidents in which women across several countries in the eyes of the organisation found their rights (defined by WLUML primarily according to universal human rights standards) denied in the name of implementing ‘Muslim law’. WLUML uses this latter term to emphasise the extent to which religious jurisprudence in the Islamic world is often derived from multiple human (hence ‘Muslim’) interpretations of divine essence (‘Islam’). Although WLUNML has no formal secretariat, it maintains an

international co-ordination office in London and major regional outlets in Pakistan and Nigeria. Its model of operations corresponds very closely to what some scholars of international relations have termed ‘transnational advocacy networks’.\textsuperscript{15} Like other rights based organisations such as Amnesty International, WLUM\textsc{l} operates an alert and information service to publicise instances of women’s rights being denied in the name of religious law. The group’s regional affiliate in Nigeria was closely associated, for example, with the international profile that developed around the case of Amina Lawal, a women sentenced to be stoned to death for adultery in 2002 – a conviction that was later overturned. WLUM\textsc{l} also produces publications and educational materials in a variety of languages, which aim to provide basic information about rights and advice for women about how to handle situations of legal discrimination.

(4)\textsuperscript{16} Scholarly networks such as the International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT) and the faculty and alumni networks associated with institutions such as the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). IIIT was established in 1981 as a transnational Islamic ‘think tank’ and a forum for encouraging research and scholarly publication in areas relating to the advancement of Islamic thought. With headquarters in Herndon, Virginia, outside Washington DC, IIIT has developed a global intellectual agenda around the ‘Islamisation of knowledge’, hosting numerous conferences, mainly in the United States and the Middle East, and publishing a wide variety of books on this theme. The Institute operates branch offices in various Muslim countries, including Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan and Nigeria, while its headquarters receives delegations of visiting scholars from Central Asia, the Balkans and the Philippines.

The International Islamic University Malaysia was established in 1982 through the sponsorship of eight member countries of the OIC as a global resource for tertiary Islamic education. Based just outside Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, IIUM\textsc{o} offers a wide range of degree programmes across multiple faculties and disciplines and its faculty and students (including a fair number of non Muslims) represent the full diversity of the umma. It has evolved into an important site for pan Islamic networking, and a space in which multiple nationally and culturally mediated interpretations of Islam mingle. That said, the academic programmes at IIUM have tended to advance a fairly

\textsuperscript{15} Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, \textit{Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics} (Syracuse, 1998).
orthodox agenda in terms of religious knowledge, reflecting a general tendency towards religious conservatism in the university’s sponsoring countries and host nation. Similar institutions exist in Pakistan (the International Islamic University in Islamabad), Saudi Arabia (the University of Medina), and of course the great forebear of Islamic educational cosmopolitanism, al Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt.

Personified transnationalism: intellectuals, activists and ideologues

In addition to the groups, movements and institutions outlined thus far, it is possible to identify a number of individual Muslim figures whose ideas have found global appeal in recent years in much the same way that activists and scholars such as al Banna and Mawdūdī had done in the middle to later part of the twentieth century. In some cases, these persons have sought to build institutions and movements around themselves. Several important recent exponents of this approach are:

Hasan al Turābī a Sudanese intellectual, activist and politician, Turābī was for many years the secretary general of the Islamic Charter Front Sudan’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (see below). In addition to his advocacy of Islamism in Sudanese domestic politics, Turābī organised a series of conferences in the early 1990s under the rubric of the Popular Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC). These events brought together representatives from a wide range of Islamist movements in the Arab world such as HAMAS, Ḥizbullah and the Algerian Islamic Jihad. While Turābī as president of the Conference billed these gatherings as instances of international Islamic solidarity, there are some who have suggested that they also served to permit fundraising, alliance formation and coordination between militant Islamists.16 PAIC might be understood as a form of neo pan Islamism, in this instance targeting secular national Arab regimes rather than European imperialism as per Jamāl al Din al Afgānī’s efforts in the late nineteenth century. Turābī sought to position himself as the chief steward and ideologue of this transnational movement, but his own political fortunes and the changing landscape of Islamist politics in the latter 1990s ensured that PAIC was short lived.

Osama bin Laden a well resourced alumnus of the Afghan mujāhidīn struggle against Soviet occupation in the 1980s, bin Laden formerly a Saudi citizen of Yemeni background sought in the early 1990s to establish

a network of Salafi jihadi radical groups under the organisational auspices of al Qā‘ida (The Base; see below). This group’s notoriety was ensured by a set of spectacular attacks on iconic targets in the United States on 11 September 2001. While bin Laden himself lacks formal religious credentials, he has made significant use of new media (internet, satellite television) to position himself as a deterritorialised populist revolutionary. His legitimacy hence stems not so much from a capacity to issue authoritative fatwās, but from his willingness and ability to confront directly what he sees as a new Western (and particularly American) imperialism in the Muslim world. While active support for his approaches is not widespread, he serves as an iconic representation to some Muslims (and even many non Muslims) of the possibility that global power structures can be challenged by those who perceive themselves as victims of global power.

Yūsuf al Qaradāwī is an Egyptian religious scholar based in Qatar who trained at the venerable al Azhar in Cairo. While his early intellectual formation like Turābī’s was in the tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood, he has sought in recent years to articulate a more cosmopolitan understanding of Islam that speaks to the unique problems of the modern world while remaining firmly grounded in the traditions of Islamic law and scholarship. Qaradāwī became a household name in the Arabic speaking world during the 1990s through a popular programme on al Jazeera satellite television called ‘Islamic law & life’, in which he would directly engage issues such as medical technology and sexuality. His approach also gained him a strong constituency outside the Arab world, particularly among young Muslims in the West and in countries as far flung as Indonesia and Mauritania. Translations of his books into local languages have consistently been top sellers in Islamic bookstores across the world.

One does not, of course, want to risk overstating the importance of a single individual. It is therefore more tempting to suggest that Qaradāwī’s greatest contribution lies not in his ideas, but rather in the institutions he has created and the cross national collaborations he has fostered among Islamic scholars. Qaradāwī has helped to develop a sustainable infrastructure for the growth and propagation of what might be seen as a form of ‘cosmopolitan Islamic traditionalism’ through a global network of websites, such as the popular Islam Online, and regionally based research and outreach centres, of which the European Council for Fatwa and Research in Ireland is the best known. In recent years Qaradāwī has played a key role in the establishment of the International Association of Muslim Scholars, a network of leading representatives from various Islamic schools of thought orthodox and
non majoritarian alike seeking to counter radical movements (see below) who claim to hold a monopoly over authentic Islam. Qaraḍāwī’s voice was also prominent within the proceedings of the 2005 International Islamic Conference in Jordan, a gathering of the world’s leading Muslim scholars that sought to reaffirm intersectarian tolerance.

_Tariq Ramadan_ born in Switzerland, Ramadan is the great grandson of Muslim Brotherhood founder al Banna. Trained in both Western philosophy and traditional Islamic sciences, Ramadan emerged in the mid 1990s as a leading voice among young European Muslims. His core message was one of civic and social engagement, encouraging young Muslims in the West to participate in the mainstream of life of their host societies rather than to ‘ghettoise’ themselves, as had their parents during the first generations of Muslim immigration to Europe. While insisting that one’s commitments as a Muslim and one’s obligations as a citizen of, say, France were not mutually incompatible, Ramadan’s work reveals an inevitable debt to his family’s Muslim Brotherhood affiliations when he cites the importance of religion as a normative compass for public life a position that put him at odds with the intellectual and policymaking establishments in France. Ramadan has also emphasised the idea that Muslims living in the West are in a position to define the future of Islam by virtue of the freedoms that they enjoy. As a social activist, Ramadan has also sought to draw connections between the Islamic emphasis on social justice and the general goals of the anti globalisation/global justice movement. Like Qaraḍāwī, he is viewed by a growing constituency of admirers around the world as a Muslim intellectual who addresses the contemporary, lived experience of Islam in a globalising world, while remaining ‘authentically Islamic’ by virtue of his family’s heritage and his emphasis on the continued importance of tradition and jurisprudence.

**Intergovernmental organisations**

The major Islamic intergovernmental association is the OIC, founded in 1969 as a multilateral forum in which Muslim majority countries could discuss and find solutions for issues of import to the wider Muslim world. Although often billed as a space of pan Islamic unity, individual state interests have often dominated OIC debates where issues of geopolitical substance have come before the Organisation. A notable exception would be the aftermath of the 1973 Arab Israeli War and the ensuing energy crisis, where the OIC emerged

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17 Tariq Ramadan, _To be a European Muslim_ (Leicester, 1998).
to speak with a relatively unified voice. The organisation is loosely modelled on the United Nations and, indeed, its institutional structure mirrors certain aspects of the latter organisation. The OIC, like the UN, possesses a number of specialised agencies and affiliated bodies such as the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), whose mission is modelled on UNESCO but with an emphasis on issues of Islamic culture. Another specialised organ, the Islamic Development Bank (est. 1975), provides financing for development projects in the Muslim world that adhere to the principles of Islamic banking and economics. The OIC holds regular meetings at a variety of levels up to head of state, but has tended over the years to become identified more with the rhetoric rather than the practical implementation of Islamic unity. With many of the organisation’s key bodies headquartered in Saudi Arabia, the OIC’s history has also served as a useful vantage point from which to observe the evolution of relations between the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ of the Muslim world, and the competition for influence of various Muslim powers (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan).

State sponsorship of Islamist activism and religious propagation

Individual countries in the Muslim world have also been involved in promoting various aspects of transnational Islam in the contemporary period. Saudi sponsorship of organisations such as the Muslim World League and provision of funds for a wide range of Islamic causes abroad (including groups such as HAMAS) are well known. The kingdom has also financed the building of mosques and religious schools (madrasas) throughout the Muslim world with varying levels of strings attached in terms of what kind of Islam gets propagated through these channels. This phenomenon is often cited as evidence that the Saudi state has actively promoted the spread of its own highly literalist and ultra conservative brand of ‘Wahhābī’ Islam. Often, however, the transnational circulation of these funds are more directly tied to a host of relatively autonomous Islamic charities that have operated out of the kingdom with very little regulatory oversight by the Saudi government. That said, it is indeed the case that some of this money has been channelled under the direct auspices of members of the Saudi royal family.19 Large amounts of Saudi sourced funds also end up in the hands of charities and pious foundations (waqfs) whose activities are solely of a humanitarian nature. Iran and Pakistan have also sought to

sponsor and channel funding to co-religionists abroad, in the name of both geopolitical interest and sectarian unity. One can think here of Tehran’s support for groups such as Ḥizbul-lāh in Lebanon and various Shī‘ī entities in Iraq post 2003 and Pakistan’s support for insurgent movements in Afghanistan during the 1990s and in Kashmir over several decades.

‘Deterritorialised’ radical groups: khilafists and Salafi-jihadis

Since the 1950s, there have emerged a number of radical Islamist movements whose aspirations are not defined in national terms but rather in terms of a renewed global Muslim polity. These ‘deterritorialised’ movements, as some scholars have labelled them, operate on a transnational basis and often rely on the infrastructural trappings and distributive capacities of capitalist globalisation (e.g. communication technologies, open borders) in order to sustain their activities.20

While Osama bin Laden and his al Qā‘ida network is certainly the most prominent among these groups, his is not the first movement in the late twentieth century to pursue a global Islamic revolution. Ḥizb al Tahārī (HT; Party of Liberation) was founded in Jerusalem in 1952 by Taqīuddīn al Nabḥānī, with the explicit aim of re-establishing a caliphate premised on the implementation of religious law (sharī‘a) for all Muslims. Its founding coincided with the ascent of Arab (secular) nationalism and the group was driven underground, finding little popular support in the Nasserist climate. HT resurfaced on British university campuses in the 1990s to recruit primarily amongst young second and third generation South Asian immigrant Muslims.21 At the same time, the party began to find support in some of the newly emerging Central Asian republics.22 In recent years HT has found significant popularity in South East Asia and a new lease of life in Europe after 11 September 2001. HT’s organisational structure closely resembles the cell model found in various Marxist and Maoist movements in the twentieth century, with a centralised global leadership operating out of Damascus and Beirut that theoretically coordinates the work of a number of provincial subunits.23 While the group still holds to its ultimate goal of a renewed

caliphate (*khilāfā*) hence their designation here as a ‘khilāfīst’ movement in contrast to conventional Islamists they publicly espouse a gradualist approach that emphasises the evolution of Muslim support over time. HT claims to eschew violent methods in favour of advancing its agenda via normal politics (where possible) or through the method of *nuṣra* (assistance) that is, gaining the support of influential figures within the political and security establishments of target states.

Bin Laden’s al Qā‘ida, while seeking to effect a similarly radical rupture in the global political order, differs significantly from HT in terms of its organisational model, methodology and doctrinal stance. The Salafi jihadi tendency that characterises al Qā‘ida represents a marriage of two methodologies one a jurisprudential and theological orientation (Salafism) and the other (jihadism) a doctrinal commitment to active, armed struggle.24 Whereas HT is run according to a centralised party structure, al Qā‘ida is the core of a broad and diffuse global network of regional and local affiliate groups, many of whom maintain little in the way of sustained formal linkages with the central leadership. In many regards, it makes more sense to speak of al Qā‘ida as a world view or ‘brand name’ rather than an organisational unit although it does possess demonstrable capacity to plan and implement a variety of operations through *ad hoc* alliances with like minded organisations. Whereas HT focuses on sustained political struggle over a long period of time, al Qā‘ida emphasises the imperative of jihad in the present.

While the coverage of individual groups and movements within this typology is by no means exhaustive, these seven categories taken together account for the vast majority of contemporary Muslim transnationalism. The categories themselves are ideal types rather than perfect models of social reality. There exist significant examples of transnational Islam that do not fit easily or even predominantly into any single category but which rather embody important aspects of several types found above. One such ‘hybrid’ organisation of particular importance would be the social movement and transnational education network organised around the Turkish populist preacher and religious entrepreneur, Fethullah Gülen. The Gülen movement embodies elements of Sufi personal renewal and orthodox pietism combined with an emphasis on modern education and development.25 Drawing on the teachings of the early twentieth century reformer Bediüzzaman Said Nursi

and the subsequent Nurcułuk movement, Gülen has sought to combine Islamic ethics with modern (secular) education.\textsuperscript{26} His works consist of a number of books that are closely read by his followers and disciples and, more concretely, an attempt to export his distinctive model of the Muslim society via a vast network of schools stretching from central and south eastern Europe throughout Central Asia. These schools are based on a secular curriculum of arts, sciences and foreign languages, but the teachers in the schools are all generally members of the Gülen movement.\textsuperscript{27}

Transnationalism, globalisation and the Muslim world: key themes

After this descriptive inventory of transnational Islam, it would be useful to conclude by briefly considering the wider significance of these actors. How does increased Muslim transnationalism in the contemporary era interface with other trends in the wider Islamic world? What is the import of this global activity in terms of how it affects traditional Islamic concepts and practices? From the various examples of Muslim transnationalism examined above, four key themes emerge.

First, there is the question of whether the new global consciousness associated with increased Muslim transnationalism may lead some Muslims invoking Benedict Anderson’s well known idiom of nationalism to ‘reimagine the umma’.\textsuperscript{28} Although the idea of the umma has existed in the Islamic lexicon for centuries, the diversity and political schisms of the Muslim world have made it difficult for the term to refer to the social reality of global Islamic unity. As new technologies of travel and communication, however, bring far flung corners of the Muslim world into greater contact with each other, there is the possibility that world Muslims—many of whom share the experience of living in impoverished conditions and who see their way of life under threat from large scale social forces—may find it both possible and attractive to understand themselves as part of a single global community.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Şerif Mardin, \textit{Religion and social change in modern Turkey: The case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi} (Albany, 1989).
\item \textsuperscript{27} Bekim Agai, \textit{Zwischen Netzwerk und Diskurs: Das Bildungsnetzwerk um Fethullah Gülen} (Schenefeld, 2004).
\end{itemize
Second, and following on from this first point, it is nonetheless manifestly clear that Muslim transnationalism has not in any sense eroded the inherent pluralism of Islamic discourse—quite the opposite, in fact. Today more than ever, Muslims around the world have access to multiple voices and interpretations of Islam, many of which emanate from settings quite distinct and far removed from their own. This fact has significant implications for the changing nature of religious authority in the Muslim world. The barriers to participation in public Islamic discourse have declined significantly over the past decade and traditional ‘ulamāʾ have to contend with a growing class of ‘new Islamic intellectuals’ who may not possess formal religious training but nonetheless have access to core texts and the technologies required for engaging in public critique. There is also now at work in the Muslim world a process through which the spatial provenance of religious knowledge becomes relativised in a dualistic and in some senses seemingly contradictory fashion. This is perhaps best captured through a term coined by the sociologist Roland Robertson who spoke of globalisation being best understood in its cultural aspects as a process of ‘glocalisation’. Through this somewhat unwieldy neologism, he seeks to capture the sense in which globalisation allows not only the importation into local contexts of ideas with universalist pretensions, but also the fact that inevitably such ideas are adapted and mediated to suit the new climates into which they enter—in other words, the global becomes localised. Part and parcel of the same process, of course, is the possibility that highly localised idioms of Islam can more easily find their way into global spaces to be consumed by Muslims in distant and disparate settings.

It might be argued that in the Muslim world today we see a great many examples of ‘global Islam’ in search of local supporters. The activities of Yusuf al Qaraḍāwī offer a clear example of just such a phenomenon. If, as it has been presented, his work represents an attempt to reassert a form of lowest common denominator orthodoxy in the Muslim world, this must in part be seen as a reaction to the fact that Muslim transnationalism has reconfigured the geography of authoritative knowledge in the Muslim world. While the Sunnī tradition of the Middle East may have constituted the historical centre of gravity in Islamic learning, it can be argued today that a wide range of voices from areas in what have traditionally been seen as the ‘periphery’ of

29 Dale F. Eickelman and Jon Anderson (eds.), New media in the Muslim world: The emerging public sphere, 2nd edn (Bloomington 2003); Roy, Failure of political Islam.
Muslim world have emerged as innovative challenges to stagnant orthodoxy in the Middle Eastern core. Muslim scholars and activists in, for example, Indonesia, South Africa, Iran and Switzerland can all claim significant global followings in the wider umma.\textsuperscript{31}

Third, the rise and increasing salience of the many non governmental actors examined above raises the question of whether the era of state controlled or ‘state patrolled’ Islam is coming to an end. While governments in countries such as Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan have never been able completely to co opt religious forces through various forms of ‘state Islam’, it can be argued that the new Muslim transnationalism combined with the increasing permeability of borders puts the regulation of religious discourse and activism even further beyond their reach. This trend meshes well with wider arguments about globalisation that cite a decline in the structural capacity of the state.\textsuperscript{32}

Finally, there is the possibility that the new Muslim transnationalism covered in this chapter represents the opening up of a space in which distinctly Islamic alternatives to globalisation or perhaps Islamic modes of globalisation might begin to emerge alongside and in agonistic yet constructive interaction with ongoing processes of economic integration. Rather than constituting a final ‘clash of civilisations’ before the ‘end of history,’ it is possible to see ‘Muslim globalisation’ as representative of the possibility that any future global culture in the longue durée might emerge dialogically rather than dialectically.\textsuperscript{33}


\textsuperscript{32} Robert J. Holton, Globalization and the nation state (Basingstoke, 1998).

\textsuperscript{33} Samuel Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order (New York, 1995); Francis Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man (New York, 1993).
Overview

Major Muslim immigration to Europe began as part of the colonial ventures of the nineteenth century, but in multiple ways Islam has long been part of Europe. Images of infidels in the Holy Land galvanised support for the Crusades and the Papacy. Islam directly shaped societies in southern Spain and the Ottoman Balkans. Life in the Mediterranean world long involved collaborations among Muslims, Christians and Jews. This history has left strongly ambivalent attitudes towards neighbouring Muslim majority lands. The debates in the early 2000s over Turkey’s future in Europe reveal the perduring emotional associations of ‘the West’ and ‘Christendom’, and remind us that many Europeans considered, and some still consider, Islam to define Europe’s southern boundaries.¹

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Muslims moved from the periphery into the centres. French conquest of Algiers in 1830 led to extensive settlement in Algeria and to control over Morocco, Tunisia and parts of western Africa. British and Dutch efforts to regulate trade and production in South and South East Asia grew into direct or indirect rule over the majority of the world’s Muslims. Some Muslim subjects of these empires eventually travelled to the metropolis for work or study.

Immigration on a large scale only began when Western Europeans sought to import low paid workers from abroad. This process began in France towards the end of the nineteenth century, much earlier than elsewhere because of France’s close ties to its African territories. Other states and their industries recruited workers in the reconstruction years immediately following the Second World War, and many of these workers happened to be Muslims. Although initially this recruitment was for temporary work, by

the 1960s families had begun to settle in Europe. By 1974, the global economic recession had led most countries to curtail labour migration, allowing further immigration only for family reunification or political asylum. This rapid policy shift in fact increased the permanent Muslim presence in Europe, as families sought to reunify on European soil. The recession itself directly increased resentment of migrants and their children, who now were viewed as competitors for scarce jobs rather than sources of needed, cheap labour. ²

During the 1980s the religious identity of these new residents became more apparent to other Europeans. Younger Muslim men and women, frustrated at the difficulties they found in gaining employment and equal rights, turned to religion as a source of positive self identification. Islamic political movements in Iran, North Africa and South Asia raised the general level of awareness of religion as an important force in social life. The rise of political Islam encouraged Muslims in Europe to form religion based associations, but it also heightened fears of Islam by other Europeans.³ By now more and more Muslims were arriving in Western Europe as refugees from conflicts in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Bosnia.

Isolated acts of political terrorism in the 1990s and the early 2000s further fuelled fears of Islam in Europe. Although many Muslims were exploring new pathways into economic, political and social positions in Europe, radical preachers began to attract some young Muslims from poorer suburbs, and a very few of those young men ended up fighting in Afghanistan or Iraq, or committing acts of violence at home. The 2004 Madrid train bombings, the 2005 London subway explosions and the assassination of the Dutch journalist Theo Van Gogh in 2004 led increasing numbers of residents of these countries to question their national models of integration.⁴

In the 1980s and 1990s, Muslims across Europe created national Islamic organisations in order to speak effectively with each country’s political leaders. Increasingly, these organisations took public positions based on Islamic ideas and norms rather than only on the basis of universalistic ideas of equality. This shift of justification for their arguments coloured subsequent debates on fundamental questions about the appropriate relationship of Islam to citizenship in European societies. How public should Muslims be in their exercise of religion? What is the state’s responsibility to facilitate worship, sacrifice or pilgrimage? What place should Islam have in public schools? Should Muslims

² Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, L’immigration en Europe (Paris, 1999).
³ Gilles Kepel, Allah in the West: Islamic movements in America and Europe (Stanford, 1997).
living in Europe develop distinctive norms and practices? These debates only became possible once all parties realised and accepted that Muslims were, and would continue to be, an important part of the national landscape.

Although this general narrative about Muslims in Europe holds for most parts of the continent, specific national experiences have varied widely. Countries have vast differences in the length and depth of Muslim presence, ranging from Bosnia’s long Muslim history and France’s two centuries of engagement in North Africa, to the much more recent movement of Muslims into northern Europe in the 1960s. Moreover, the precise social contours of migration in each country have shaped the ways Muslims have adapted to their new homes. Germany’s Muslims came overwhelmingly from Turkey, but Turks had little previous experience with Germany and virtually no German cultural capital on arrival, leading many to form Turkish language enclaves. By contrast, Muslims in Britain mainly came from South Asia, arrived with knowledge of the language and social institutions of the host country and joined other people from former colonies (and with similar Anglophone cultural capital) in creating new voluntary associations.5

Each European country also has its own particular ‘opportunity structures’, or ways of doing business and ideas about how one should act. Most immigrants (Muslims and others) have adapted to these structures. France’s centralising laïcité (secularism) has meant that the state tries to control Islam from Paris and to keep signs of Islamic affiliation out of public institutions. Britain’s laissez faire localism led Muslims to organise mainly in towns and neighbourhoods, and permitted a wide range of public expressions of Islamic opinion. Most countries have tried to identify one or more national level Muslim groups as interlocutors, or to create new such bodies. Germany, Belgium, Spain and Italy grant recognition and varying degrees of support to religious organisations; these general policies regarding religions have led Muslim groups to compete to win state recognition. The Dutch legacy of loose top level integration among distinct, religion and politics based ‘pillars’ initially encouraged Muslim enclaves, but the rejection of that legacy by many Dutch public figures has led them to criticise Muslim isolation. Similar about faces characterise Sweden, Norway and Denmark. In former Ottoman areas of south eastern Europe, Muslims are recognised as ‘nations’ within multi religious states.6

5 Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating identities: States and immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton, 2002).
6 Jan Rath, Rinus Penninx, Kees Groenendijk and Astrid Meyer, The politics of recognising religious diversity in Europe: Social reactions to the institutionalization of Islam in

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It would be a mistake to assume that because some of these distinctive national features have deep historical roots, European countries first developed their own ideas of national belonging in isolation, and only afterwards dealt with foreigners and cultural differences. To the contrary, today’s European nation states fashioned themselves through their conquests, empires and engagements with neighbours and immigrants. In the late nineteenth century, France became a trans Mediterranean, post Catholic state in desperate search of unity as a nation. Britain developed a sense of imperial statehood and subjectivity superimposed on ethnic and national identities. Germany fashioned an ethnic and exclusivist notion of nationality out of its conflicts with neighbouring states. The Netherlands incorporated religious pluralism into its sense of itself, while Sweden, Norway, Italy and Spain each forged senses of national belonging that included membership in a state church. Muslims entered societies that already had developed particular ways of understanding and controlling their cultural and religious differences.

Within any one European country Muslims have engaged with Islam in a wide variety of ways. Many have adapted to the privatised norms of religiosity dominant in Protestant areas of Europe, while others have adopted a more public form of Islamic life. Sufi brotherhoods have found followers in most countries and have maintained ties to home sites in Pakistan, West Africa, Morocco and elsewhere. The Tablighi Jama’at, a transnational movement based in northern India that seeks to persuade Muslims to adopt a more orthodox understanding of the faith and to travel in order to convince others, has established bases in most countries, as have the Saudi funded World Muslim League and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Although this chapter focuses on immigration, many Europeans have converted to Islam, and converts played a particularly important role in the 1970s and 1980s in bridging between newcomers and established institutions, a

role also played by Catholic priests and Anglican and other ministers who lent prayer space to Muslims or intervened on their behalf.  

The colonial past in the present

France

Although a number of European states had colonial dominions, it is only in the cases of Britain and France that Muslim immigrants came mainly from their own overseas territories. These cases, along with Germany, will receive longer treatment here to illustrate the range of ways in which Muslims and European countries have responded to each other.

France has a long history of direct engagement with Muslim societies, most importantly through French settlement in Algeria. Invaded in 1830, it was, by its 1962 hard fought independence, the home to French and other European settlers of the third and fourth generation. From 1871 on, French policy was fully to incorporate Algeria into France, while leaving Muslims as second class subjects, though holding out the tantalising prospect of citizenship.  

The geographical proximity and intensity of colonial rule facilitated circular labour migration beginning in the late 1880s. During the First World War, thousands of Algerians were recruited to fight or to replace drafted French workers. The Great Mosque of Paris, built in the 1920s, was intended to display France’s goodwill toward Muslims and to manifest France’s desire to become a great Muslim power. The Mosque has always been under both French and foreign control; even today its leader is appointed by the Algerian government.  

The war that led to Algeria’s independence in 1962 left bitterness and resentment on the part of French former settlers and Algerians, but increased the rate of emigration to France. By 1972 about 800,000 Algerians, including speakers of Arabic and Berber speakers from Kabylia, lived in France.  

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Tunisia and Morocco also were under French rule but as protectorates: Tunisia from 1881 to 1956 and Morocco from 1912 to 1956. Muslims from these two countries came to France in large numbers, and were more likely than Algerians to bring religious training with them; consequently, they were more likely to become mosque imāms and heads of religious schools. By the beginning of the twenty first century, about two thirds of France’s 4 to 5 million Muslims had their origins in North Africa; the remainder had ties of immigration or heritage to former French territories in West Africa and the Indian Ocean, or to Turkey.

When Muslim working men came to France in the 1950s and 1960s, they were housed in large public housing units or settled in poorer neighbourhoods in the suburbs of Paris, Lyon and other large cities, or in the centre of Marseille, often benefiting from kinship ties to earlier migrants. Although immigrants from one country sought out one another, this has been less the case for their children, who are more likely to identify with other Muslims, or other ‘Maghreb people’ (a category that is itself the product of immigration). For many Muslims born in France, it is the experience of being discriminated against as North African or ‘Arab’ that creates their sense of ethnicity.

National leadership positions to some degree have divided along ethnic lines but these tendencies can change and are not absolute. The largest federation of Islamic associations, the Union of French Islamic Organisations (UOIF), has a Tunisian leadership but the membership is multinational and its close international ties are with the Muslim Brotherhood. The National Federation of French Muslims (FNMF) is close to Morocco but began under the leadership of converts to Islam. The Great Mosque of Paris is controlled from Algiers but began under Moroccan patronage. The common Arabic language facilitates cooperation across these origin groups, as does the shared reference to the Mālikī legal school. Turks have not had the same historical ties to France and (as in Germany) remain more ethnically segregated, while many Muslims from Senegal and Mali have distinct forms of religious practice tied to Sufi orders in West Africa. Although in most other countries the transnational movement for predication Tablighī Jama‘at is dominated by South Asians, in France the membership is mixed. French mosques are

14 See the examples in Xavier Ternisien, La France des mosquées (Paris, 2000).
16 Jocelyne Cesari, Musulmans et républicains: Les jeunes, l’islam et la France (Brussels, 1998);
17 As in Soares, ‘An African Muslim saint’.
generally open to people from multiple places, and Islamic institutes and schools do not favour any particular ethnic group.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus, with the exception of some Sufi orders and Turkish mosques, the Islam that most Muslims in France encounter does not have a strongly ethnic character. The major dividing lines are between generations, as some younger men and women seek a form of Islam that is free from the cultural baggage brought by their parents from their ‘country of origin’. The vast majority of these young people seek to find pathways into full participation in French society.\textsuperscript{19}

Those pathways have been pre-conditioned by the opportunity structures available in France, which include a strong distinction between the public and private spheres, limits on the roles played by voluntary associations and a cultural emphasis on homogeneity that can disguise racism in the cloak of complaints about an insufficient Muslim movement toward ‘integration’. The idea that all French people should strongly resemble one another in the public sphere produces an emphasis on ridding public institutions, especially schools, of religious and ethnic markers (thus the ‘headscarf affairs’ that have recurred since the late 1980s) and a more generalised disapproval of the public display of religious distinctiveness.\textsuperscript{20} At the same time, the voluntary associations through which many French Muslims work to build religious and cultural institutions are supposed to bring people into harmony with the general will, best expressed by the state, and not to serve as sites for the expression of distinctiveness or for resistance to state policies.\textsuperscript{21} Muslims thus face considerable pressure to couch their aspirations and activities in terms of cross ethnic concerns, and by and large they do so.

Public intellectuals, media and associations play major roles in debates among Muslims about the future of Islam and in efforts to influence state policies. At least since the building of the Paris Mosque in the 1920s, the French government has sought to control Islam as part of both foreign policy and domestic policy, a dual emphasis found, for example, in the efforts beginning in the 1970s by interior ministers to domesticate and centralise the governance of Islam in France by creating a quasi state body (by early 2003 this body was


\textsuperscript{20} John R. Bowen, \textit{Why the French don’t like headscarves} (Princeton, 2006).

the French Council of Islam, CFCM) and their simultaneous consultations with the governments of the relevant Muslim countries regarding these policies.²²

Britain

Despite the long history of colonial dominion in South Asia, it was only in the years after the Second World War that a large Muslim presence developed in Britain. Unskilled workers were needed in textile towns and in the London area. As members of the Commonwealth, South Asians moved freely in Britain until 1962 (with the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act), and those with knowledge of the country organised the migration of networks of people from South Asian villages and neighbourhoods directly into specific neighbourhoods in Britain. Limiting migration in 1962 only meant that (as in other countries), Muslims became more likely to settle as families under the family reunification clause.²³

By 2000, there were about 2 million Muslims in Britain. About one half traced their origins to today’s Pakistan; Bangladesh and India provided the next largest numbers. Many of these Muslims came from just two districts in South Asia, Mirpur in Pakistan and Sylhet in Bangladesh.²⁴ About 60 per cent of UK resident Pakistanis were from Mirpur, and in some cities with large Pakistani populations this percentage is higher. Pakistanis have been the most active and visible in British Muslim affairs and organisations, adding to the erroneous public perception that Muslims are Pakistani (analogous to the French perception that Muslims are North African Arabs). These Muslims concentrated in a small number of places. Nearly half of British Muslims live in the London area, and most of the others settled in Bradford, Birmingham and a small number of other large industrial cities. Furthermore, people from the same origins also tended to end up in the same cities and neighbourhoods: half of all Bangladeshis ended up in London, and the Mirpur migrants settled in certain districts of Bradford and other cities.²⁵

²² Pascal Le Pautremat, La politique musulmane de la France au XXe siècle (Paris, 2003), pp. 278 308; John R. Bowen, ‘Does French Islam have borders? Dilemmas of domes
The Sunnī Muslims (85 per cent of the Britain’s Muslims) tend to follow one of several tendencies with roots in South Asia: the reformist Deobandīs, the Sufi influenced Barelwīs, the Ahl i Ḥadith (who, as the name implies, urge a focus on Qur’ān and Ḥadith as sources) and the Tablīghī Jamā’at. Even this proliferation of names occludes the common historical ties of many South Asian movements to the northern Indian Deoband school. Northern India is perhaps the most religiously fissiparous part of the Muslim world, and these tendencies toward division were replicated in Britain.26

The divisions of British Muslims by country of origin and by religious affiliation are reproduced on the local level through the social organisation of mosques. Despite the recent creation of broad umbrella organisations (such as the Muslim Council of Britain, representing about 400 ‘mainstream’ mosques and associations) and publications (such as Q News and Muslim News), British Muslims tend to worship and interact with people who share their ethnic background and their specific Islamic affiliation. Furthermore, although the secular cycles of immigration may produce some movement away from South Asian identifications and toward British ones, other processes move in the other direction, replicating Pakistani micro politics within British cities and developing new relationships between the continents, for example through intercontinental marriages. The rise of independently funded Islamic schools, sixty by 2000, also facilitates processes of bonding to achieve internal solidarity.

Bradford’s history provides one example of this process in detail, although each city has its own specific demographic story.27 Early Muslim migration to Bradford was by single men who made few demands in the religious sphere and settled in mixed fashion. But the families who began to arrive in the late 1960s chose to live close to others from the same communities of origin. As more and more mosques were built, they became more specific in their religious affiliation, adding to divisions within the city. Voluntary associations also usually had an ethnic or regional base, a tendency exacerbated by British public policy that awarded funds to organisations that identified themselves as representing ethnic or racial minorities.28 Along another social dimension, what in Pakistan were local caste groups, biradari, became in Bradford the basic electoral units for getting out the vote in municipal elections.29

27 Lewis, Islamic Britain, pp. 49–75.
29 Lewis, Islamic Britain, pp. 72 5, 220 1.
Throughout Britain, mosques played increasingly important social roles as migration became more family centred. By the 1980s they had begun to make local demands on religious grounds, in contrast to the claims based on racial or ethnic discrimination made by the state subsidised associations. In Birmingham, for example, the rise of mosque influence coincided with a greater receptivity by city authorities to demands that schools take into account Muslim sensibilities regarding matters of dress, provision of halal meat and the content of the religious curriculum. The decline in government funding for local associations weakened the earlier ethnic based associations and left the field to the self supporting mosque associations.30 The cascade of events that began in 1989 with the Rushdie affair dramatically raised the Islamic profile of Muslim communities, making the role of mosques even more important.

Notwithstanding the trend toward a more Islamic profile to Muslim immigrants’ demands, many South Asian Muslims retain a ‘package’ of ethnic and religious signs.31 Urdu remains both an important link to northern South Asia, and a vehicle for religious instruction. In that sense, it maintains an ethnic or regional consciousness in a way that knowledge of classical Arabic does not. Arabic can be understood as a vehicle for Islamic knowledge that transcends place; Urdu inevitably retains its South Asian association. The enclave existence of some Pakistanis also maintains the ethnic dimension to Islam, as do transcontinental marriages, which accounted for over half the marriages taking place in the 1990s in cities with high Muslim concentrations.32

Either despite or because of their specific sense of being British minorities, British Muslims have played active civic and political roles. The majority of British Muslims either are citizens or, as immigrants from Commonwealth countries, they have the right to vote. They also participate more actively in local political affairs than do other residents of the United Kingdom, and in major cities they exercise a good deal of political power through the Labour Party.33 Because most of the issues directly affecting religious life are local issues in Britain providing halal food at public events, ensuring the school religious curricula reflect Muslim interests, planning for mosques Muslims can be said to have gained a significant place in British politics because they

30 Nielsen, European Islam, p. 42.
32 Lewis, Islamic Britain, p. 217.
have organised locally, even if they remain underrepresented at the national level. In some cities, separate school guidelines are issued to schools with large Muslim populations.

Modood argues that British immigrants have achieved a level of civic impact much greater than in France and Germany. He explains this difference by a number of opportunity structures in Britain, including the strong sense on the part of many immigrants that they were British and had a right to be. Modood points to the political assertiveness of the initially dominant immigrant group, the West Indians, which set the tone for the South Asians. The relative ease of making changes through local associations also positively reinforced efforts by immigrants to enter public life, but this ease also allowed many Muslims to remain divided along ethnic and religious lines.34

The 7 July 2005 London bombings suggested to many that apparently well integrated British Muslims could be led to commit violent acts at home in the name of Islam, and led some to call for stricter controls on speech. Others criticised the full face and body covering called the niqab as a symbol of separation from society. But if France’s debates remain within the context of laïcité, those in Britain retain a commitment to multiculturalism.

The new strangers

Germany

In a number of other countries, recent Muslim immigrants entered lands unused to Islam and often unused to ethnic differences among citizens. In contrast to France and Britain, Germany developed an ethno national idea of citizenship in the nineteenth century, which left it resistant to the idea of citizenship through naturalisation.35 More precisely, people of German descent who moved to Germany during the twentieth century were considered to be not immigrants but returned Germans. People of other descent, such as the Turkish Muslims who began to arrive in large numbers in the 1960s, were expected to leave after their work permits had expired.

When Germany began to recruit temporary workers in the 1950s to fuel its economic recovery, it sought them from the ring of countries in the southern

35 Brubaker, Citizenship and nationhood, pp. 114 37.
periphery, from Portugal to Turkey. The Muslims who arrived from Turkey had no particular historical relationship or acquaintance with their new host country. Turks grew from a small portion of the temporary work force in the early 1960s to its most visible component by the 2000s. Turks tended to remain in Germany longer than did other groups, and when in 1973 Germany allowed only family reunification immigration, it was the Turks who took the greatest advantage of this opportunity. By 2000 there were about 2.4 million Turks in Germany, about 2 million of whom were Turkish citizens.36

The Turkish immigrants of the 1970s were mainly urban males with little education. Whereas many of the Muslims arriving in Britain and France knew the language of their former colonial rulers, people living in Turkey had no reason to learn German. Many Turks arriving in Germany could not read Turkish either, and they turned to Turkish television and radio programmes for information.37 They tended to reside in enclaves, gathering for prayer, Sufi chanting and discussion of religious and social issues. Nearly all planned to return to Turkey (although many only did for their own burial); in any case, it was relatively difficult to acquire German citizenship.

By 1980, the major Turkish Islamic organisations had gained control of mosques and associations in Germany.38 They found it easier to operate in Germany than in Turkey, whose strongly secularist governments had discouraged Islamic organisations since 1961. Among the multitude of these organisations were the Millî Görüş (associated with the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) of Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey), a number of Sufi groups and several subgroups of the Nurculuk reform movement, including that associated with Fethullah Gülen. Among the more radical groups was the Kaplan movement led by Cemalettin Kaplan and then by his son Metin Kaplan (expelled in 2004), which advocated the creation of an Islamic state, and the fascist ‘Grey Wolves’ (Bozkurtlar). In each city, as more mosques were created, each congregation became increasingly defined by their loyalty to one of these movements.39 By 1985 the Turkish state had created its own

38 Werner Schiﬀauer, Die Gottesmänner: Türkische Islamisten in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 2000).
German branch of the Turkish Office of Religious Affairs or Diyanet, but by then the other organisations had cemented their control over Muslims throughout the country.

Whereas in France the centralising but laïc logic of state religion relations leads successive governments to try and create a quasi religious, quasi political body to handle Muslim affairs, and in Britain the state sees no need to have official representation by Islamic groups, Germany grants the status of public corporation to religious bodies, a status that gives them rights to provide religious materials to be used in public school teaching, to have a say in religious television programming and to speak officially on religion to the government. However, inter group rivalries have prevented any one German group from gaining state recognition. In 2000 a Millî Görüs group did obtain Berlin court recognition as a religious society for purposes of supplying teaching materials to public schools. In most German states (Länder), public schools are required to offer religious education in consultation with the proper religious bodies, and the question of who determines the content of Islamic education remains one of the most contentious issues in Germany.\(^{40}\)

Islamic groups in Germany use written and electronic media to stake out positions vis-à-vis each other and also vis-à-vis their counterparts in Turkey. The Alevis, for example, trace their allegiance to ‘Ali, the Prophet’s son in law and fourth caliph, and have developed distinctive forms of worship that do not involve attending mosques. They celebrated the secular Turkish state as a bulwark against Sunnī repression, but in the early 2000s they became wary of that state’s rapprochement with Sunnī groups. In Germany, they have mounted a steady public campaign to make the very features that distinguish them from Sunnī Muslims—avoiding mosques, gender mixing—proofs that they are the closest of all Muslims to German values.\(^{41}\)

Muslims’ history in Germany has been recent and shallow, and has combined with Germany’s own ethno nationalist sense of identity to slow Muslim processes of adaptation. The capture of mosques by Turkish religious groups also has oriented Muslim life in Germany towards Turkey, as has the ample

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use made of open access channel Turkish language television broadcasts. Schiffauer reports that in the early 1990s he could find not one sermon among all those available on cassettes in bookstores that discussed problems of Muslims in Germany in contrast to France, where this is the topic of most of the hundreds of cassettes for sale.42

Differences across countries in the history of Muslim immigration also have given distinctive contours to social science reflections on Islam in each country.43 For example, the French colonial legacy has led some French specialists to see Islamic movements primarily through the lens of the anti colonial struggle, while others prefer to see Islam through the lens of laïcité.44 French debates about pluralism and republicanism are played out in part through studies of Islam. Studies on Islam in Germany (where there is no equivalent set of colonial reflections) turn on the question of whether Islam can adapt to enlightenment and modernity questions which indeed are central to debates among Germans about their own society’s past, present and future.45

Netherlands and Belgium

The opportunity structures in the Netherlands were created in opposition to the centralized and laïc French model. In the early twentieth century the Protestant and Catholic Churches developed distinct ‘pillars’ of church, school and political party, outside the direct control of the state, to which the Socialist Party added a political pillar. One important element of this system was state support for private (‘particular’) schools.46 Although small numbers of Muslims moved to the Netherlands from the Dutch East Indies in the early twentieth century, it was only after the Second World War that large numbers of Muslims came to the Netherlands for work, and they came largely from Turkey and Morocco, thus facing the same problems of low cultural capital in their new countries as did Turks in Germany. By 2002 Muslims numbered about 730,000 or slightly less than 5 per cent of the population.47 Each ethnic group established its own

42 Schiffauer, ‘Islamic vision’.
43 Adrien Favell, Philosophies of integration: Immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain, and edn (Houndmills, 2001); Nikola Tietze, Jeunes musulmans de France et d’Allemagne (Paris, 2002).
44 François Burgat, L’islamisme au Maghreb (Paris, 1995), and Kepel, Fitna, respectively.
45 Bassam Tibi, Islam and the cultural accommodation of social change (Boulder, 1990).
mosques in major cities. Utrecht, for example, has two Turkish mosques, two Moroccan ones and one for Surinamese Muslims. Languages for sermons are correspondingly different: Turkish, Arabic, Urdu for South Asian origin Surinamese and Dutch for Indonesians and Javanese speaking Surinamese.\textsuperscript{48}

Only in the 1980s did the Dutch government recognise that Muslims would remain as a component of the society, and developed policies to encourage integration while retaining group cultural characteristics (thus in contrast to the French approach). But Muslim demands for recognition as another religion defined culture, akin to the other pillars, came at the very moment when many Dutch people thought that their society should discard the pillar system for a greater emphasis on equal, individual rights. As in Germany and France, the display of Islamic identity in public schools has been a source of controversy in the Netherlands. Some headmasters and school boards have prohibited headscarves, but more often found a compromise. Ironically, given the venerable Dutch history of private religious schools and the French insistence on the integrative role of the public school, in the early twenty first century it is in the Netherlands that people see Islamic private schools as an impediment to necessary processes of integration, and in France that some people see such schools as a solution to the problem posed by headscarf wearing Muslim public schoolgirls.\textsuperscript{49}

Belgium, like Germany and unlike the Netherlands, funds those religions that it recognises and supports religious instruction in public schools. In 1999 it became the first country to create successfully an elected Muslim council to oversee fund distribution. But Belgium’s version of multiculturalism has exacerbated anti-Muslim sentiment. By dividing the country into three regional language communities with authority in education and culture (Flemish, French and German speaking), Belgium highlighted the role of linguistic and cultural identity in citizenship. Muslim residents (primarily from Morocco and Turkey) who publicly display their Islam or speak a language other than the dominant one in their region have difficulties acquiring Belgian nationality because they are thought to demonstrate insufficiently their cultural integration.\textsuperscript{50} It is probably Belgium’s ethno nationalist politics that encouraged the recent rise of identity movements based on common Arab heritage rather than on religion or country of origin.

\textsuperscript{48} Landman, ‘Islam in Benelux’, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{49} Sunier and van Kuijeren, ‘Islam’, pp. 151 5.
Scandinavia

In Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the short period of labour migration (from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s) was succeeded by an influx of refugees in 1980s and 1990s. The Muslim workers came from Turkey, Pakistan, Albania, Morocco and elsewhere, and each group created its own mosques and associations. The Iranian revolution in 1979 and wars in Palestine, Lebanon, the Balkans, Iraq and Somalia sent diverse, relatively small groups of Muslim refugees toward Scandinavian countries because of those countries’ reputations of welcoming asylum seekers.

The Swedish government assumed a ‘caretaker’ role toward Muslim immigrants. State policies combined an emphasis on equality and free choice with an emphasis on the private nature of religion. Sweden’s policies toward cultural difference were shaped by the history of state engagement with the Lutheran Church. In order to counter the influence of that church, the late twentieth century state supported other religious congregations, including several national confederations of Muslim groups. These confederations receive state aid and have a direct say in state policies on immigration and integration. As in the case of France, Sweden’s policy of aiding national level bodies has favoured those Muslim leaders with leverage and funding from international religious groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Millî Görüs.

Norway also supports religious groups, but does so by distributing money from a general tax to individual local congregations, which in the case of Islam means local mosques. The Norwegian system promotes a congregational form of mosque membership and keeps power localised. Danish policies toward religion, by contrast, have involved recognition of the Folk Church as a unifying, though weak, spiritual authority, and the marginalisation of all other religions.

By and large Scandinavians have had less experience with cultural diversity in their societies than have France, Britain or the Netherlands, and the Muslims who settled in Sweden, Norway and Denmark had little in common with their new hosts. Relations have been more brittle than elsewhere, as

evidenced in the relatively rigid stand taken by Danish officials after the 2005 publication of cartoon caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad.  

Spain and Italy

Although parts of Spain and Italy were once Muslim, the Muslim presence today is largely due to recent immigration. (However, regional autonomy movements in once Muslim southern Spain recently have attracted converts to Islam in the name of regional heritage.) Spanish Muslims are nearly all Moroccans, and Spain has suzerainty over two cities located geographically in northern Morocco. After Franco’s death in 1975 Spain began to extend formal recognition to religions other than Catholicism, but divisions among Muslims meant that agreements were not reached until 1992. As a result of the agreement, Muslims have rights to religious holidays, tax benefits, Islamic mosques and cemeteries and the inclusion of Islamic materials in public school teaching. No direct financial assistance is provided, however, except for teachers’ salaries, and the provisions have been slow to be implemented.

Muslim immigration to Italy also occurred very late, in the 1980s, and Muslims came from many different countries, with Morocco, Albania, Tunisia and Senegal providing the largest numbers. This diversity has meant that the large federations vying for political influence have drawn from multiple ethnic sources, and it also probably explains the relatively major role played by converts in Italian Islamic activities. Since 1984, Italy has a system of formal recognition or ‘agreements’ with religious bodies other than the Catholic Church (similar to Spain’s) but divisions among Muslims and, more importantly, widespread anti-Muslim sentiment (heightened by the Northern League’s campaigns in 2000) have kept the state from extending recognition to Islam.

Rethinking both Europe and Islam

Europeans of all sorts are currently questioning the identity of Europe and the place of Islam in a present and future Europe. The entry of Turkey into the

54 On Sweden, see Allan Pred, Even in Sweden: Racisms, racialized spaces, and the popular geographical imagination (Berkeley, 2000).
European Union would mean that European Muslims of long residence would outnumber immigrants, and would challenge older narratives about the history of ‘Europe’ vis-à-vis ‘the East’.

Of course, some Europeans have always been Muslims, in Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Bulgaria. Islam’s place in south east Europe shifted over the centuries as a function of the balance of forces among the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church and the Ottoman Empire, and national heritages are thought through in terms of those histories. In Bosnia, debates about the national past have involved differing narratives about how and why various sectors of society converted to Islam from one or the other Christian population. The Ottoman millet system left its legacy in the Balkans in the form of an identification of religious affiliation with national community, and a looser association of either with membership in a particular state.\(^{58}\)

Elsewhere in Europe, non-Muslims became aware of the Muslim components of their societies at about the same time the mid 1980s as Muslims entered into debates about the best ways to adapt Islam to the West, and Europeans into debates about the best ways to adapt nationhood to Europe.\(^{59}\) As Europeans were making more permeable the borders between states, and challenging the boundaries separating the western founding members of the EU from the newer blocs of states to the east, Muslims were increasingly defining their future in terms of both citizenship in Europe and full participation in transnational deliberations among Muslims about politics, law and religion.

Muslims and other Europeans are particularly concerned about the status of Islamic law and broader Islamic social norms in Europe.\(^{60}\) Debates regard a wide range of rules, on banking, diet, marriage and forms of dress. Some rules, such as those enjoining Muslims to eat halal food and wear Islamic garments, pose no particular logistical or legal difficulties in Europe but sometimes run into particular objections on grounds of national or institutional philosophies. In many countries, school heads object to allowing Muslim women to mark their religion by wearing headscarves or to providing halal dishes in the school

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58 Tone Brinda, Being Muslim the Bosnian way: Identity and community in a central Bosnian village (Princeton, 1995).
canteen. In France, a nationwide ban on such scarves and other religious signs in public schools was enacted in March 2004; in Britain, the debate has turned on the admissibility of the niqab, which covers most of the face.

Other Islamic rules pose mainly logistical difficulties. The sacrifice of a sheep or goat on the 'Id feast day is difficult to carry out when millions of Muslims live in urban areas. Islamic banking is growing in Britain but stagnant in France. One can expect that governments, working under Europe level rules, will develop ways to provide more abattoirs and more Islam friendly lending institutions.

For other elements of Islamic norms and law, however, the difficulties are legal and ethical, though not insurmountable. By the early 2000s one sees efforts both to rethink European rules to accommodate Islam and to rethink Islamic norms for Europe, particularly with respect to family law. An initial level of response has been to develop relations of equivalence between Islamic and European laws. In Britain, Muslims have harnessed British legal norms to shari'a based obligations, as when the promise to pay mahr (the gift to the bride required in Islam) is enforced in a British court. Muslims have also constructed informal and distinct sets of practices while observing the requirements of European laws, as when Muslims marry and divorce both in courts and in separate religious ceremonies. Some Muslim public figures, among them the well known Muslim speaker Tariq Ramadan, have said that a legal marriage already is a Muslim marriage because both are contracts though with distinct surface forms.

A different response is to speak of a 'shari'a of minorities', to declare some Islamic norms to be inapplicable in Europe because Europe is something other than dār al Islām, the abode of Islam. The idea of two or more 'abodes' underpins the 1999 fatwā on mortgages by the European Council for Fatwa and Research, a collection of jurists of various nationalities who now reside in Europe. The Council is led by the highly influential Egyptian jurist, Shaykh Yūsuf al Qaradāwī. The Council ruled that conditions of necessity justified exempting Muslims in Europe from following the rules forbidding interest bearing financial practices.

63 Tāriq Ramadān, Dār ash shahāda: L'Occident, espace du témoignage (Lyon, 2002).
64 Yūsuf al Qaraḍāwī, Al ḥalāl wa al harām fi Islām, trans. as Le licite et l'illicite en Islam (Paris, 1997); Alexandre Caeiro, La normativité Islamique à l’épreuve de l’Occident: Le cas du Conseil européen de la fatwa et de la recherche (Paris, 2003); Conseil européen des fatwās et de la recherché, Receuil de fatwās (Lyon, 2002).
A distinct approach seeks to ‘ethicise shari’a’ in its social dimensions. The director of the Bordeaux mosque, Tareq Oubrou, has distinguished between obligatory ritual (‘ibādāt) and social norms (mu‘āmalāt). Oubrou argues that rules for ritual do not change but social norms may be realised either as law or as ethics, depending on the political context within which one lives. In a country with Islamic law and social institutions, social norms are realised as law. In countries such as France, where such realisation is impossible, Muslims must ‘ethicise’ these norms.66 This search for general principles as a bridge across cultural and legal divides sometimes is developed as the study of the ‘reasons, objectives, goals’ of the sacred texts, the maqāsid of the Qur’ān.67

These broad trends in Islamic reasoning suggest a Europe wide (or perhaps transatlantic) set of reflections on Islam, but they must be seen alongside the specific structures, ideologies and histories of migration. These histories have produced distinct configurations of Muslim lives in each of the countries and regions of Europe, and we can expect them to continue to shape the development of Islamic thought.

67 Muhammad Khalid Masud, Shatibi’s philosophy of Islamic law, rev. edn (New Delhi, 1997).
Muslims in the West: North America

KAREN ISAKSEN LEONARD

The North American contexts

In North America, unlike Central and South America where Islam remains an insignificant force, Muslims are overtaking Jews as the principal non-Christian minority group. Canada and the United States have certain similarities: both are predominantly Christian nations with relatively high levels of religious belief and practice and neither country has an establishment church. The twentieth century saw important changes in the religious landscape of the two countries. The mainline Christian denominations so important in the Anglo Saxon Protestant world have been weakened, in the US by rising educational levels, intermarriage and movement to new localities, and in Canada by growing numbers of people disassociating from organised religion. A second trend is the growing importance of women in religious arenas traditionally dominated by men. Women in America arguably participate more in Christian religious activities and institutions and exercise greater moral authority in religious and civic institutions. Third, particularly in the US, special purpose religious groups have increasingly organised along conservative and liberal lines, mobilising political coalitions on issues like homosexuality and abortion. Fourth, the public dimensions of religious culture in both countries have expanded.¹

Initial scholarship on Muslims in America saw similarities between the Muslim communities in Canada and the US. Scholars focused on Arabic speaking Muslims in the eastern and midwestern US and Canada,² partly because both immigrant Muslims and scholars of Muslims in America

2 Abdo A. Elkholy, The Arab Moslems in the United States: Religion and assimilation (New Haven, 1966); Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Adair T. Lummis, Islamic values in the United
overlooked the indigenous African American versions of Islam developing in the US and partly because early organisational efforts by Arab Muslims linked Canadian and US immigrant populations. The Federation of Islamic Associations (FIA) was founded in 1953; the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA) was founded in 1963 and developed into the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) in 1982 (see Table 9.1).

The composition of the Muslim populations and the national policies shaping their development in Canada and the US also differ. The religious landscape in the US has historically been more diverse and decentralised than that of Canada. National ideologies are differently nuanced: the US sense of ‘manifest destiny’ has Christian religious overtones, while Canada’s churches teach that good Christians make a ‘good’ nation. By the end of the twentieth century, scholarship on the two nations and their Muslim populations followed national boundaries. Recent scholarship in the US may still emphasise immigrant Muslims or treat African American Muslims separately, but there is a tendency to see US Muslims as an evolving national political community. In Canada, scholars emphasise specific regional Muslim populations and tensions between categories based on religion and ethnicity.

Canada: Muslim diversity and directions

Muslims in Canada are almost all immigrants rather than indigenous converts. Canada was a popular destination for (post British Empire) Indian and Pakistani Muslims, but it has also drawn immigrants from Lebanon and Syria, and, more recently, refugees from Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Somalia and Ethiopia. South Asians (some from East Africa) and Arabs are the largest groups, approximately 40 per cent and 20 per cent of the Canadian population.


Table 9.1 American Muslims

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Founding date</th>
<th>Institution/organisation</th>
<th>Initial location</th>
<th>Other information</th>
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<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Moorish Science Temple</td>
<td>East Coast, Midwest</td>
<td>founder Noble Drew Ali</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Nation of Islam</td>
<td>Detroit, Chicago</td>
<td>founders Wallace Fard Muhammad, Elijah Muhammad</td>
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<td>1975 Warith Deen Mohammed, Elijah Muhammad’s son, becomes leader of main body</td>
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<td>1981 Louis Farrakhan splits off and reclaims the old name, Nation of Islam</td>
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<td>1980s main body renamed American Muslim Mission; 1990s, renamed Muslim American Society</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2001 main body renamed American Society of Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>MANA, Muslim Alliance of North America</td>
<td>East Coast, Midwest</td>
<td>Siraj Wahaj, head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920s</td>
<td>Ahmadiyyas from India, missionaries to African American Muslims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>FIA, Federation of Islamic Associations</td>
<td>Midwest, Canada</td>
<td>Lebanese immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>MSA, Muslim Students’ Association</td>
<td>Midwest, Canada</td>
<td>Arabic speaking foreign students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>ISNA, Islamic Society of North America</td>
<td>Plainfield, Indiana</td>
<td>grew out of MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>ICNA, Islamic Circle of North America</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Pakistani Jama‘at i Islami Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>UMA, United Muslims of America</td>
<td>East Coast</td>
<td>Sh’i national coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>American Muslim political organisations and coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>MPAC, Muslim Public Affairs Council</td>
<td>Los Angeles, California</td>
<td>multi ethnic leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>AMA, American Muslim Alliance</td>
<td>Fremont, California</td>
<td>South Asian leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>AMC, American Muslim Council</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Arab leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>CAIR, Council on American Islamic Relations</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Arab leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>AMPCC, American Muslim Political Coordinating Council, coalition combining the four above.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>AMT, American Muslim Taskforce on Civil Rights and Elections, coalition of ten to eleven groups</td>
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</table>
Muslim population respectively. Refugees from Somalia arrived in the late 1980s and early 1990s and number over 30,000 in Toronto alone. As non Asian and non Middle Eastern blacks with a strong Islamic identity, they are making an impact on the evolving Muslim community in Canada.5

Canada had no formal immigration policy but excluded ‘social undesirables’ by administrative discretion until 1962, when amended immigration regulations provided for universal admission according to skills, family unification and humanitarian considerations. At the turn of the twenty first century, it was easier to migrate to Canada than to the US. Canada also offered easier attainment of permanent residence and citizenship and had no country quotas to limit admissions. In 1991, the Canadian population was 17 per cent foreign born. The percentage was higher in cities, 35 per cent in Vancouver and 40 per cent in Toronto. The rapid influx of immigrants and refugees has produced a relatively young Muslim population with a high birth rate, and the high proportion of refugees has also produced a bipolar distribution of Muslim socio economic status.

Canada promoted a white dominated version of cultural pluralism, but the new immigrants spurred adoption of an official policy of multiculturalism in 1971. The Canadian state takes an interventionist stance, explicitly supporting the maintenance of ethnic cultures. A 1988 Multiculturalism Act not only provided for the protection and enhancement of ancestral languages but stressed equal opportunities for employment and advancement. Canada privileges the nation of origin for its multicultural categories and the dominant ideology sees religious identities as voluntary and individualistic. Muslims must use nation of origin categories, not religious ones, to secure state funding and influence policy decisions. Religious institutions with constitutions, governing boards and regular elections to office benefit from certain taxation and incorporation policies, but such features are new to most immigrant Muslims.

The Muslim minority’s rise to public prominence has raised issues ranging from the delivery of appropriate social services to the resolution of religious tensions. For example, the Canadian branch of ISNA co operated with the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada in support of denying spousal pensions to homosexual partners.6 In Ontario, where more than half of Canada’s Muslims reside, a government proposal that Muslims could elect to follow shari‘a or

Islamic law for domestic family issues was controversial. There are also religious accommodations, as the board chairman of the Cambridge, Ontario, Islamic centre and mosque pointed out: ‘The mezzanine for the ladies, the social gatherings, a gym for the boys and girls would not have been found in mosques “back home”. But there is nothing un-Islamic about adapting to North American culture.’ Most writers emphasise the positive thrust of Canadian Muslim identity.7

The United States: Muslim diversity

A nation of immigrants like Canada, the US has the largest foreign born population in the world, 19.6 million in 1991. However, this figure is only 8 per cent of the country’s total population. The US Immigration and Naturalisation Act of 1965 reversed decades of discrimination against non Euro American immigrants, setting annual quotas by nation of origin for immigrants with preferred skills or those seeking family reunification. In the US version of cultural pluralism, equal rights are extended to all citizens but the state has a ‘laissez faire’ approach to ethnic communities and plays no major role in recognising and supporting ethnic cultures. The substantial black population and a heritage of racism based on slavery and ‘frontier society’ encounters with Native Americans and Chicanos combines with a strong emphasis on individualism to set the parameters for identity politics.

Muslims in the US are not only numerous8 but come from many back grounds. African Americans, South Asians and Arabs are the largest groups. African Americans constitute some 30 to 42 per cent of American Muslims.9 African American Muslims led the way in securing legal rights for Muslims in the US and African American men are the single largest source of converts.10 African

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8 Religion is not reported in the US census: see Karen Isaksen Leonard, Muslims in the United States: The state of research (New York, 2003), pp. 4, 147 (n. 1), for estimates ranging from 1 to 8 million Muslims.
9 Fareed H. Numan, The Muslim population in the United States: A brief statement (Washington, DC, 1992), puts African Americans at 42 per cent, South Asians at 24.4 per cent, Arabs at 12.4 per cent, Africans at 6.2 per cent, Iranians at 3.6 per cent, South East Asians at 2 per cent, European Americans at 1.6 per cent and ‘other’ at 5.4 per cent. Ilyas Ba Yunus and M. Moin Siddiqui, A report on the Muslim population in the United States (New York, 1999), puts ‘Americans’ at 30 per cent, Arabs at 33 per cent and South Asians at 29 per cent.
Americans were also the earliest Muslims in America, as many slaves were certainly Muslims but could not maintain their families and religious traditions.

African Americans turned to Islam in the early twentieth century, seeking to escape Christianity and white domination. Noble Drew Ali’s Moorish Science Temple and Elijah Muhammad’s Nation of Islam, the first such movements, were original and inventive as the founders did not know Arabic and had no English translations of the Qur’an. Both movements asserted ‘Asiatic’ racial identities, explicitly rejecting slave, Negro and African identities. They changed ‘slave’ names by replacing them with X or adding El or Bey. They adopted Orientalist versions of Turkish and Middle Eastern fashions and external markings (many such visual symbols came from the Freemasons and the Shriners). Noble Drew Ali proclaimed his followers to be Moorish Americans and Asiatics, while Elijah Muhammad proclaimed his followers to be Asiatic Blacks. Relations with immigrant Muslims were not close, and sometimes not only whites but ‘Brother Moslems from the East’ were barred from Nation of Islam temples.\footnote{Ernest Allen, Jr, ‘Identity and destiny: The formative views of the Moorish Science Temple and the Nation of Islam’, in John L. Esposito and Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (eds.), Muslims on the Americanization path? (Atlanta, 1998); C. Eric Lincoln, The Black Muslims in America (Boston, 1961); E. U. Essien Udom, Black nationalism: A search for an identity in America (Chicago, 1962); Aminah Beverly McCloud, African American Islam (New York, 1995).}

The Temple and the Nation tried to locate their religious roots in Morocco and the Middle East, but they were often denied recognition as part of world Islam. In the 1920s, Ahmadiyya missionaries from British India brought English translations of the Qur’an and instructions about the Five Pillars of the faith to many African American Muslims. W. D. Mohammed took over the Nation of Islam from his father Elijah Muhammad and renamed it many times, most recently as the American Society of Muslims. Mohammed has changed the group’s earlier beliefs and practices and it is generally recognised as part of Sunni or mainstream Islam. Despite the Ahmadiyya’s early effort to bring indigenous and immigrant Muslims together, differences based on class, race, gender and national origin keep many recent Muslim immigrants and African American Muslims apart.\footnote{Ihsan A. Bagby, ‘A profile of African American masjids: A report from the National Masjid Study 2000’, Journal of the Interdenominational Theological Center, 29, 1 2 (2001 2), pp. 205–41.}

These African American Muslim movements were separatist in orientation. African American Muslims sometimes called for fulfilment of their US citizen ship rights, but at other times sought to opt out of the nation. The early
Moorish Science Temple and Nation of Islam were essentially separatist movements, and members of the latter declined to vote or serve in the military; separatist tendencies remain in some African American Islamic movements. Questions asked on a mosque based survey conducted in 2000 showed that African American Muslims judged the US more harshly than other Muslims, yet they were also the Muslims most engaged in outreach and social service activities. Even Louis Farrakhan’s small breakaway Nation of Islam explicitly works to improve US racial policies.

Arab immigrants, the majority of them Lebanese or Syrian Christians, came from the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century. As the Ottoman Empire was frequently referred to in the West as ‘Turkey’, and Asia Minor was a familiar part of ‘Turkey’, the immigrants were called both ‘Turks’ and ‘Asiatics’. These names caused problems with eligibility for naturalised citizenship, restricted until the 1940s to free whites or blacks. People from the Middle East were ‘white’ in successive census racial classifications, but in 1910 the Census Bureau classified them as ‘Asiatic’ by nativity. Arabs were twice denied citizenship, declared not to be ‘free white persons’ in 1909 and 1914 (both decisions were reversed on appeal).

The early Arab Muslim immigrants and their children engaged successfully in local and state politics where they settled in large numbers, especially in Dearborn and Detroit, Michigan. Arabs ‘assimilated’ much as other immigrants did, the second generation turning to the English language and, like some of the first generation Muslim foreign students, often marrying outside ancestral communities. As in Canada, mosques incorporated to qualify as tax exempt religious institutions, with constitutions, membership lists and elected boards of directors. ‘Congregationalism’ was said to produce Americanisation of religious practices: imāms were called upon for counselling on immigration and marital problems, social events took place in mosques and women participated conspicuously in activities. Above the local level, Arabs formed national organisations based on both language and religion (Table 9.1).

13 Ihsan Bagby, Paul M. Perl and Bryan T. Froehle, ’The mosque in America: A national portrait’, 26 April 2001, released through the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), Washington, DC. The survey was part of a national project involving forty religious denominations; the Muslim component was sponsored by four organisations, CAIR, ISNA, ICNA (the Islamic Circle of North America) and the Ministry of Imām W. D. Mohammed, indicating a major coalition effort by Arab, South Asian and African American Muslim leaders.

14 Mattias Gardell, In the name of Elijah Muhammad: Louis Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam (Durham, NC, 1996).

15 Elkholy, The Arab Moslems; Nabeel Abraham and Andrew Shryock (eds.), Arab Detroit: From margin to mainstream (Detroit, 2000).
South Asian Muslims arrived in force only after 1965 and became one of the three major Muslim groups. Like the Arabs, their racial status was somewhat ambiguous. Asian Indians had qualified for US citizenship as Caucasians but in 1923 were declared ‘not white’ and ineligible for citizenship; legislation passed in 1946 changed this status. In the early twentieth century, South Asian immigrants, including Muslims, were at first called ‘Hindus’ (from Hindustan), and the census gave them varying designations. After 1965, Indian and Pakistani immigrants successfully lobbied for an ‘Asian Indian’ census category. South Asian (and Arab) Americans, including Muslims, disagree about whether to identify and affiliate as whites or non-whites.

The demographic shift in sources and numbers of Muslim immigrants after 1965 interrupted the perceived pattern of steady Muslim ‘assimilation’ to American society. Many of the post 1965 Arab and South Asian Muslim immigrants remained ambivalent as to whether to become American citizens. But in the 1980s their national leadership decided to encourage citizenship and participation in American politics. In the last decades of the twentieth century, religious and political groups built professionally staffed national organisations (Table 9.1), sometimes in competition with each other and sometimes acting together. Critiques of American foreign policy dominated the early goals of many organisations, but a shift towards the rights and responsibilities of Muslims in the US began in the 1990s.

Today, the national American Muslim religious and political coalitions argue for the inclusion of Islam as part of Western civilisation and the American religious landscape. They advance this argument because they are approximately equal in number to Jews in the US and because Islam is one of the three historically connected Abrahamic monotheistic religions. American Muslim discourse positions Islam as a partner with Judaism and Christianity, emphasising the shared religious teachings and values that should make Islam an integral part of America’s expanding civil religion.

Arab and South Asian Muslims provide most of the national organisational leaders, representing the largest immigrant groups. The Arabs are far more diverse, coming from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Jordan and Morocco (and, in smaller numbers, from many other places). South Asian Muslims are almost all from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, with a shared subcontinental history of recent British colonial rule. First generation South Asian Muslim Americans are taking a conspicuous lead in American Muslim politics. Highly educated and relatively homogeneous in terms of class, most South Asian Muslims are fluent in English, having been educated in that
Iranian Muslims, highly educated and similarly well placed, are overwhelmingly secular in their orientation as many fled to North America at the time of the 1978–9 Iranian revolution; also, they are Shi‘i, the minority sect within Islam and American Islam.

South Asian Muslims have some advantages in the American political arena. Indian Muslims, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis share a heritage of political struggle with white colonial rulers. The most numerous, Indian Muslims, are accustomed to being a minority in a democratic, pluralistic nation; other South Asian Muslims, in contrast to Middle Eastern Muslims, also have some experience with democratic politics. South Asian Muslims are also better positioned with respect to the American media and public, since American foreign relations with South Asia are less politically charged than with the Middle East.

The United States: leadership patterns and sources of authority

South Asian and Arab Muslims dominate the national leadership of Muslim organisations like ISNA and the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA). Islam has no centralised clergy, mosques operate independently of each other and mosque attenders may be only 10 to 20 per cent of American Muslims. Therefore, religious developments should not be equated with mosque activities. Yet mosques are the most prominent sites of religious activity, and Arabic speakers, who often also are more proficient in sharī‘a and fiqh (Islamic law and jurisprudence), dominate many mosque functions and in teaching the young. Muslims from South Asia, however, have stimulated the building of local mosques and the mobilisation of Muslims on religious and political issues. African American Muslims remain largely separate and distinctive in many practices, including patterns of leadership and gender participation in mosques.

While earlier Muslim immigrants had adopted congregational practices and ritual accommodations associated with Christianity and Judaism in America,
the post 1965 immigrants have raised issues of adaptation again. Many recent immigrants saw this as ‘Americanisation’ of Islam and hoped to avoid it. However, American versions of Islam are being formulated in ongoing dialogues with other members of American society. These emerging constructions of self and community are being partially shaped by the debates over who should represent and interpret Islam in America.

Like Islam itself, the ‘Muslim community’ in the US is not monolithic, and in matters of religious law, pluralism has long been characteristic and accepted. The four main Sunnî schools of law (Mâlikî, Shâfî‘î, Ḥanafî and Ḥanbalî) and the leading Shî‘î school (Ja‘farî) are all represented among American Muslims. There are Ithnâ ‘Asharî Shî‘î (chiefly Iranians and Iraqis), smaller Shî‘î groups like the Iṣmâ‘îlîs and Zaydîs, sects like the Aḥmadiyyas and Druze whose Islamic identity is contested, and Sufis, whose charismatic leaders teach mystical strands of Islam. The Sufis in the US are very diverse, but many are Euro American converts.  

The problems associated with the understanding and practice of shari‘a and fiqh in America derive partly from the scarcity of scholars of Islamic law and partly from the emergence of new spokespeople who are well schooled not in Islamic civilisation and law but in medicine, engineering and other modern professions. Leading scholars of fiqh in the US like Khaled Abou El Fadl, Professor of Islamic Law at UCLA, and Taha Alalwani, who headed the Fiqh Council of North America and the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (SISS) in Leesburg, Virginia, for many years, urge that the context should strongly shape decisions about Muslim practices in America and disapprove of the application of Islamic legal decisions made elsewhere. Abou El Fadl, from Kuwait, was educated in Egypt and the US. Alalwani, from Iraq, headed ISNA’s Fiqh Council from 1986 to the early twenty first century. This Council has not been accepted as authoritative by all immigrant Muslim scholars and is criticised by African American Muslims for being composed of naturalised Muslims who know little about American law. In 2004, the Council was expanded to include Shî‘î and female fiqh scholars. SISS offers a Master of Arts in Islamic Studies (an American style graduate programme) and trains imāms for the US armed forces and prison systems.

New Muslim spokespeople in the US, primarily South Asian and Arab men with modern professional training, are speaking authoritatively and publicly

on legal issues ranging from citizenship and voting to marriage and family law. Some describe these new spokesmen as 'boss Muslims' or 'professional Muslims'. Others charge that they have been influenced by the Wāḥābī puritanical strand of Islam so strongly associated with Saudi Arabia, one that erases reliance on the schools and methods of traditional Islamic legal scholarship.  

Muslim mobilisation in the US does involve Islamic legal discourse and practice. As recently as 1986, national Muslim leaders advised residing only temporarily in dār al kufir, or the place of unbelievers (the US). But by the end of 1986, ISNA began urging Muslims to take US citizenship and participate in politics. Avoiding the polarising terms dār al Islām (the place or abode of Islam) and dār al ḥarb (place of war), American Muslim politicians use designations like dar al amān (place of order) and dar al ‘ahd (place of alliance) that reflect South Asia and the new South Asian American leadership. Earlier Arab American leadership drew on movements in the Arab world like the Salafiyā and the Muslim Brotherhood.

American Muslim discourse now includes explicit discussions about the compatibility of Islam, democracy and human rights, likening the Islamic tradition of shūrā (mutual consultation) to democratic institutions in the West. ISNA helped to form a national shūrā council in 1993 that was said to include 65 per cent of all mosques in North America. The presidency rotated annually among the heads of ISNA and ICNA and two leading African American Muslim groups, those led by W. D. Mohammed of Chicago and Imām Jamil Al Amin (the former H. Rap Brown) of Atlanta. (This rotation has broken down, since Al Amin was arrested for murder in 2000 and subsequently convicted and W. D. Mohammed reportedly withdrew from the shūrā in 2000.) There are regional experiments with shūrās as well, usually trying to set common dates for the beginning and ending of ‘Īd observances (Arab based congregations often use Saudi Arabian sightings of the moon to deter mine the timing of observances in North America while South Asians prefer local moon sightings).

The new spokespeople and new kinds of media (print, radio, TV, audio and video cassettes, DVDs and the internet) have reinvigorated Islamic discourse,

21 Khaled Abou El Fadl, And God knows the soldiers: The authoritative and the authoritarian in Islamic discourses (New York, 2001).
developing a wider role and mainstream audience for Islam in the US. Reaching the masses means presenting Islamic doctrine in accessible terms. As elsewhere, American Islamic discourse has ‘become reframed in styles of reasoning and forms of argument that draw on wider, less exclusive or erudite bodies of knowledge’. 23 This is sometimes a point of criticism with respect to mosque leadership, as leaders are said to have medical, business or computer technology training rather than Islamic knowledge and wisdom. Modern technology has reinforced the authority of the new spokesmen and decreased reliance on fiqh scholars and traditional clerics like the imāms employed in mosques by the lay boards of directors.

As American Muslim leaders build organisations and institutions with professional staffs and bureaucratic procedures, they have been defining the community in ways that emphasise their own role and marginalise leaders and groups less like themselves. In 2001, a highly publicised national survey of mosques sponsored primarily by new spokespeople omitted some Shi‘ī (the Ismā‘īlī followers of the Aga Khan), the Ahmadīyyas (until recently accepted in the US as Muslims) and the Nation of Islam led by Louis Farrakhan. Defining a mosque as any organisation sponsoring Friday prayers and other Islamic activities, the survey included student groups on campuses but over looked the large African American Muslim congregations in American prisons. Also in 2001, the first systematic poll of American Muslims designed to cover participation in public life defined the community similarly and weighted African Americans at only 20 per cent of the American Muslim population, a serious underestimate. 24

The new spokespeople for Islam in the US have been attempting to create a more unified Muslim community. In leadership positions in many mosques and in the increasingly powerful Muslim political coalitions, they are changing the inward foci of national origin communities and reaching out to other Muslims and the American public. Before 11 September 2001 the stance of most American Muslim political leaders was overwhelmingly optimistic, proclaiming that American Muslims would play a major role in ‘reconstruction’ of the United States and of the international Muslim umma, since they had a ‘head start’ over those in Europe in becoming citizens and participants in public life. The national Muslim political groups formed a coalition in 2000

and urged an American Muslim bloc vote for the Republican Bush/Cheney ticket, placing its emphasis on American foreign policy in the Middle East.

**The United States: changes after 11 September 2001**

The tragedy of 11 September 2001, and evidence that Islamic extremists carried out the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon changed the trajectory along which American Muslims were moving. The earlier tendencies of American Muslim leaders to narrow the boundaries of the community, de emphasise the interpretative breadth of Islamic law and emphasise foreign policy issues at the expense of domestic ones have been reversed. The new tendencies are being strongly shaped by non Muslim politicians and the mainstream American media as Muslims are increasingly drawn into national politics.

American Muslims were initially silent, hoping that Muslims had not been responsible for the murderous attacks. President Bush began meeting with Muslim religious leaders almost immediately and visited the leading mosque in Washington, DC, but it was not one of the new spokespeople whom President Bush chose to stand on the White House lawn with him on 20 September 2001. Shaykh Hamza Yusuf, a white convert and a scholar of Islamic law, was one of six religious leaders and the only Muslim to meet with the president that day, lamenting that Islam had been hijacked. The White House and the media called upon scholars and others outside the Muslim political organisations to speak about the true meaning of jihad, Islamic views of terrorism and similar topics, while the leaders of American Muslim political organisations found themselves on the defensive.

American Muslim leaders were in a quandary. Some managed to see 11 September as an opportunity, citing increased media time and close work with government agencies. Copies of the Qur’ān were sold out in bookstores all over the US and many Islamic centres and mosques held open houses. Most Muslims, however, saw 11 September as a major setback for Islam in America. Many indigenous converts felt betrayed. W. D. Mohammed, leader of the largest African American Muslim body, renamed his Muslim Society of America the American Society of Muslims and advised his followers to ‘blend in’. Then in 2003 he stepped down, leaving the organisation leaderless.

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American Muslims generally proclaimed their loyalty and tempered their previously strong criticisms of US foreign policy, only to be confronted with the bombing of Afghanistan, a worsening situation in Israel and Palestine and the war in Iraq.

The first few years of the twenty first century have witnessed deepening conflicts among American Muslims, particularly between immigrant Muslims and indigenous or African American Muslims. A new African American Muslim national organisation, the Muslim Alliance of North America or MANA, was formed in 2001. The current leader of MANA is Siraj Wahaj, a charismatic Sunnī imām from the Al Taqwa mosque in Brooklyn. He and other influential African American Sunnīs had been conferring with indigenous leaders like Shaykh Hamza Yusuf since 1999. Criticising the national immigrant led organisations for their failures to address indigenous Muslim concerns, their focus on overseas agendas and their efforts to become part of the dominant or white mainstream culture, MANA’s leaders maintain a critical stance toward American society. MANA defines ‘indigenous’ as any one who is native to America, including second generation immigrants.

What began as a ‘gender jihad’ in the US in the 1990s has led to a ‘progressive Muslim’ movement in the twenty first century, and immigrant indigenous tensions have increased over this development as well. The gender jihad initially featured women from both immigrant and indigenous Muslim backgrounds, with African Americans prominent among the Muslim feminists writing about Islamic law and jurisprudence. Amina Wadud called for a radical and continual rethinking of the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth. She argues that much now considered divine and immutable in the shāri‘a is the result of a long, male dominated intellectual process. Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons, an African American and a Sufi, wrote of ‘seeking to separate Islam, the religion, from culture, tradition and social mores’. 26

The gender issue is central to the cosmopolitan or progressive movement in American Islam being led by fiqh specialists and other scholars of Islam. The fifteen contributors to an influential volume, Progressive Muslims, include many immigrants with academic degrees from all over the world and four American converts, two of them African American women. In the volume, Kecia Ali and Moosa Ebrahim go further than Wadud and Simmons (above) in questioning the patriarchal basis of Islamic law; new books by Amina Wadud

and Kecia Ali continue to push for re-evaluation of the Qur’an and Ḥadīth.°°°

Open discussions of gender and sexuality are even more controversial, initiated most conspicuously by the website muslimwakeup.com. The Progressive Muslim Union of North America was formally established in 2004, and its website (progressivemuslims.com) explicitly recognizes as Muslim anyone who so identifies herself or himself, including ‘those whose identification is based on social commitments and cultural heritage’. The Union also affirms ‘the equal status and equal worth of all human beings, regardless of religion, gender, race, ethnicity or sexuality’.

The progressive Muslim movement is having an impact on the national immigrant-led organizations. The activist Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) made progressive Islamic thought the theme of its 2004 convention and an issue of its journal, The Minaret, focused on progressive Islam and Muslims. Islamic Horizons, the journal of the more conservative ISNA, started a series on its own history by focusing on the Muslim women who nurtured the MSA and helped develop ISNA.°°° Some women are being appointed to national leadership positions. Most significantly, Dr Ingrid Mattson was elected president of ISNA, the Islamic Society of North America, in 2006.

The deepening conflicts between immigrant Muslims and African American Muslims seen organizationally in MANA are also reflected in academic battles over Islamic law and jurisprudence. A respected African American Muslim scholar of Islamic law (and MANA board member), Sherman Jackson, has publicly attacked Khaled Abou El Fadl (now linked to the progressive Muslim movement), claiming that he and other immigrant intellectuals are ‘American Muslim romantics’ trying to appease the dominant culture by presenting an acceptable ‘universal’ and progressive version of Islam. He accuses them of overlooking the justifiably different African American interpretations of Islam and African American needs for social justice. Jackson calls for different versions of Islam tailored to constituencies strongly marked by race, class and histories within the nation, asserting that the Prophet Muhammad was sent for all peoples, at all times and in all places, and that there are not only New and Old World realities but different realities within the New World. Jackson sees Islam’s pluralistic legal traditions as enabling interpretative communities to adapt Islam to their circumstances. He proposes to use Islamic law to justify polygyny (to ease black women’s


°°° Islamic horizons, May/June 2003.
poverty), Islamic punishments for adultery (when it destroys and impoverishes black families), violence (in the face of the overwhelming and unjust state power exercised by Israel against the Palestinians) and affirmative action (rather than reliance on Islam’s commitment to equality).29

As the boundaries of Muslim America and the numbers of authoritative spokespeople for American Muslims have expanded since 11 September 2001, differences once suppressed have become open. The American government and public no longer recognise the leaders of the American Muslim political organisations as the only spokespeople for American Muslims, and some degree of education about Islam and variation within it has taken place among both Muslims and non-Muslims. There are pressures on Muslim leaders even from their own followers to broaden their constituencies by generation and gender and to put greater emphasis on American values, training and political issues. In the aftermath of 9/11, spokespeople for Islam now represent a wide range of Islam’s sectarian, intellectual, artistic and legal traditions. The gender jihad and a progressive Muslim movement have grown, and African American Muslims are mounting organisational and legal challenges to immigrant Muslims. While young American Muslims, like their elders, are very diverse, many are confidently asserting strong identities as both Muslims and Americans and developing new coalitions on campuses and in communities.30

These developments are taking place in the context of closer American Muslim engagement in US political and religious life. Tensions between the goals of American Muslims and those of mainstream US politicians are significant on both foreign policy and domestic security issues. National American Muslim organisations increasingly allege violations of the civil rights of Muslims and Arabs and express concern about profiling by religion and/or national origin, issues that concern many other citizens of the US and draw Muslims and non-Muslims together.


New frontiers and conversion

ROBERT LAUNAY

Introduction

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, despite Europe’s superior maritime and military power, Islamic commercial networks established along the fringes of the Islamic world, notably in Africa and South East Asia, remained in place, linking the interior with coastal ports. These fringes were not exactly ‘frontiers’; in most cases, a substantial Islamic presence had existed for centuries. However, the majority of the population was not Muslim. These areas were to become the arena of substantial conversion to Islam in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in large measure because of and not simply despite the imposition of European hegemony.

The nature and extent of Islamic expansion along these fringes depended on the interplay of various factors: the social organisation of specific local societies; the prior history of Islamisation and of the integration of Muslims into these societies; and the ways in which different regions of the world were ultimately integrated into European dominated global economic networks. In South East Asia as well as East Africa, the spread of Islam was inextricably linked to maritime trading networks, with Islam initially confined to ports along the coast. However, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, most of the interior of Java was at least nominally Islamic, although Islam was still expanding to parts of the Sumatran interior. At the outset of the modern era, Muslims in East Africa remained exclusively along the coast, and it was only in the course of the nineteenth century that Islam began to expand into the interior. By


contrast, Islam had come to West Africa by means of the trans Saharan trade, and was far more entrenched in the interior than along the coast. The rapid growth of the transatlantic slave trade in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries irrevocably shifted patterns of trade in favour of coastal ports.

This chapter will focus on Islamic expansion in West Africa over the course of the last two centuries. Given the historical, cultural and ecological diversity of the area, this was hardly a uniform process. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Islamic trade networks had spread from the Sahel throughout much of the West African savanna, and in some cases into the forest regions bordering the Guinea Coast. In the powerful state of Asante, Muslim traders and clerics enjoyed positions of influence in the kingdom, and were permitted to recruit local converts (though without much success). States and chiefdoms in the savanna/sahel region were characterised by hereditary social categories: a warrior aristocracy; Muslim clerics and merchants; ‘casted’ occupational groups notably blacksmiths, leather workers, sculptors and praise singers and the peasant majority. Slaves constituted a sizeable proportion of the population in larger states. So called stateless peoples lived on their peripheries, at times incorporated as tribute paying commoners, or more often systematically raided for slaves.

The religion of Islam was by and large the hallmark of hereditary groups occupying specific niches in the overall political economy of the region, members of dispersed clerical and mercantile networks who maintained a distinct identity in the places they settled. These groups were not necessarily committed to the active conversion of other sectors of society. The influential teachings of the early sixteenth century scholar al-Hajj Sa‘lim Suware enjoined peaceful relations with rulers who allowed Muslims to live in compliance with the strictures of the Sunna. Such collaboration was not only profitable for merchants, for whom the ruling groups represented clients for luxury goods as well as suppliers of captured slaves, but also for clerics, who provided ruling groups with charms, remedies and other forms of supernatural assistance. Ruling groups might also convert to Islam, as in the empires of Mali, and Songhai, though not in their successor states. Rulers of many of the Hausa city states considered themselves Muslim. In some of the most heavily Islamised areas, notably the Senegal River valley and parts of Hausaland, a significant proportion of the peasantry may also have professed Islam. In such cases, there seems to have been a religious double standard; ruling groups and peasants were not generally expected to conform as strictly to clerical norms of practice.

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Islamic revolutions in the nineteenth century

Beginning in the eighteenth century, the *modus vivendi* between clerics and rulers was seriously disrupted in some regions. The first of these challenges was mounted in the Futa Jalon highlands of modern Guinea, where Fulbe clerics ousted their Mande rulers. Whatever the underlying economic issues, the takeover was justified in religious terms, on the grounds that it was improper for Muslims to submit to the rule of unbelievers. These claims were extensively formulated in writing, both in Arabic and Pulaar, allowing the message to circulate freely outside as well as within the boundaries of the state.\(^4\)

The example of Futa Jalon was emulated in the Futa Toro in Senegal, and, most spectacularly, in northern Nigeria, where ‘Usman dan Fodio successfully revolted against the kingdom of Gobir and established the Sokoto caliphate which overthrew most of the Hausa kingdoms and expanded beyond.\(^5\) In 1818, Ahmadu Lobbo Bari established a Muslim state in Masina in the Niger Valley.\(^6\) In the mid nineteenth century, al Ḥājj ‘Umar Taal launched another holy war from his homeland in the Futa Toro. Repulsed by the encroaching French military, he pushed eastwards, overthrowing the Bamana kingdoms of Kaarta and Segu but also attacking the Muslim state of Masina which the Umarians eventually annexed after a bloody campaign in which ‘Umar himself perished.\(^7\) His contemporary Maba Diakhou established a Muslim state along the Gambia River.\(^8\)

These movements were interconnected. All of their leaders were Fulbe, even though many of the region’s clerics belonged to other, ethnically and linguistically distinct clerical networks, notably Hausa and Mande/Soninke. Hausa and Mande clerics were closely associated with trade networks that depended on maintaining amicable relations, if not active co-operation, with local rulers. The Fulbe diaspora was pastoral rather than mercantile. While Fulbe clerics were sedentary, they were proportionately less urbanised and far less integrated into the political fabric of local states. While some Hausa and Mande clerics expressed sympathy with the jihad movements, others were


unenthusiastic and even hostile. There was a considerable scholarly polemic for and against jihad, with notable (and politically powerful) Islamic scholars Muḥammad al Kaneimi of Bornu and Ahmad al Bekkay al Kunti in the Sahara objecting vigorously to the jidahists’ claims.

The explicit aims of the jihads were, first, to ensure the religious credentials of rulers in states with significant Muslim populations; and second, and less consistently, to uphold strict standards of observance of religious conduct within the Muslim population as a whole. Conversion of unbelievers the overwhelming mass of the peasantry in these polities was not a major preoccupation, even in the Sokoto caliphate, the most spectacularly successful of all these movements. South western Nigeria constituted a notable exception. Jihadists established Muslim rule under the aegis of Sokoto in the Yoruba town of Ilorin in 1817. Other Yoruba towns hosted substantial Muslim minorities, initially members of Hausa or Fulani merchant and clerical networks, but increasingly Yoruba converts as well.

The transformation of the ṭarīqās

At the same time that jihad leaders were attempting to construct a new kind of Islamic state, certain Sufi shaykhs began to institutionalise new forms of ṭarīqa affiliation, paving the way for a quieter but more durable transformation of Islamic practice. Under the older paradigm, Sufism was a form of esoteric knowledge exclusive to clerics. It was possible to belong to several ṭarīqās as well as to different branches of the same ṭarīqa (often translated as Sufi ‘brotherhood’). The first to introduce the new paradigm was Shaykh Sīdī al Mukhtar al Kunti, based in the southern Sahara. Sīdī al Mukhtar transformed the ṭarīqa from a loose network of clerics into a hierarchically structured organisation with himself and his sons at the apex, followed by members of his own group, the Kunta. He also made explicit claims about the superiority of his dhikr (‘remembrances’; sacred formulae recited by members of Sufi ṭarīqās) over all others. Although the Qādiriyya Mukhtarīyya was confined to the (admittedly considerable) political, commercial and religious network of the Kunta, its influence was felt well beyond these limits.

The remarkably rapid spread of the Tijaniyya from the Maghrib to West Africa reinforced these structural changes in Sufism. The tariqa made exclusive claims on the allegiance of its adherents, aggressively asserting the superiority of its dhikr. \(^{12}\) `Umar Tal adopted the wiir in Futa Jalon before embarking on the ḥājj. On his return, he was to link initiation into the order with active participation in his jihad. \(^{13}\) As khalīfa (designated successor of the founder of a tariqa or one of its branches) of the order in West Africa, he placed himself at the apex, allowing him to mobilise followers more effectively. This hierarchical structure was to provide a paradigm, allowing the conversion of Sufi orders into mass movements. However, in some areas the older paradigm of an esoteric Sufism restricted to clerics continued to hold sway. \(^{14}\)

Colonialism and conversion: French and British policies

Paradoxically, one of the most unintended consequences of colonial rule was a phenomenal surge in conversions to Islam among populations who had heretofore been indifferent if not resistant. \(^{15}\) The attitudes of the French and British administrations towards Islam as well as towards Christian missionaries were admittedly distinct, partly due to the prior colonial experiences of each country, partly to the role of religion in metropolitan politics. The French had encountered significant Muslim resistance in Algeria, where Sufi tariqas notably the Qādiriyya were instrumental in mobilising resistance. On the other hand, the great Indian insurrection of 1857 pitted more Hindus than Muslims against the East India Company. Throughout the colonial period, the French remained apprehensive that Islam might serve to mobilise opposition to French domination. At the same time, French politics at home was characterised by a struggle between aggressive secularism and the Roman Catholic Church. With the triumph of the secularists, the French colonial service tended to keep its distance from missionaries, especially when civilians replaced the military administration in the early twentieth century. At the same time, evangelical Christianity was vigorously expanding in Britain and in

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the colonies, and was able to exert considerable political influence. British missionaries preceded the colonial administration among the Yoruba of Nigeria.\textsuperscript{16} While the relationship between the colonial administration and the missions was hardly free of conflict, they operated in a far more complementary fashion than in French colonies; schools were often operated by the missions. The glaring exception was northern Nigeria, where the British treated the Hausa/Fulani amirs as functional equivalents of Indian maharajahs, maintaining their royal courts, and severely restricting missionary access to the region on the grounds that it might arouse Muslim animosity.

The French systematically attempted to distinguish between friendly and hostile Islamic groups and individuals.\textsuperscript{17} Despite the almost total absence of armed Islamic resistance outside Mauritania, they kept all Muslim clerics, even rural Qur'\textsuperscript{a}nic instructors, under strict surveillance. Especially in the early decades of the twentieth century, the French dealt heavy-handedly with prominent clerics whom they deemed uncooperative. Ahmadu Bamba M\textsuperscript{\textregistered}Backe, founder of the Murid branch of the Q\textsuperscript{a}diriyya in Senegal, was deported to Gabon from 1895 to 1902, and again exiled in Mauritania, only returning to his native region in 1912.\textsuperscript{18} In 1911, Cerno Aliu, wali (literally a ‘friend of God’; can be used as a title for a holy man) of Goumba in the Futa Jalon, was tried and condemned to death, although he was already in his eighties and in ill health.\textsuperscript{19} In 1925, Shaykh \textsuperscript{H}amallah, founder of a rival branch of the Tijaniyya in Nioro, near the border between Soudan (modern Mali) and Mauritania, was exiled for ten years, and again deported to France in 1941, where he died in prison.\textsuperscript{20} Many of his followers were also arrested, and others systematically harassed. However, the vast majority of Islamic leaders, including Ahmadu Bamba (despite his deportation), reached a modus vivendi with the French administration.\textsuperscript{21} During the First World War, the French actively solicited and received declarations of support from Islamic leaders.

\textsuperscript{16} J. D. Y. Peel, \textit{Religious encounter and the making of the Yoruba} (Bloomington, 2000).
\textsuperscript{19} Harrison, \textit{France and Islam}, pp. 68–89.
\textsuperscript{20} Benjamin F. Soares, \textit{Islam and the prayer economy: History and authority in a Malian Town} (Edinburgh, 2005).
In spite of French apprehensions, no written Islamic documents critical of colonial rule from the first part of the twentieth century have come to light in francophone Africa, whereas Muslims in the Gold Coast (modern Ghana) and in northern Nigeria formulated scathing critiques of colonial rule in Arabic and Hausa, despite the relatively tolerant attitude of the British administration towards Islam.  

The political economy of colonial conversion

The colonial transformations of the political, economic and social domains of West African society were far more important in explaining the expansion of Islam than the intentional religious policies of the colonial powers. The most immediately affected were military elites, who were rendered redundant by the colonial state’s monopoly on violence. The status of chiefs was not always adversely affected; those who were astute (and unscrupulous) enough to broker effectively between the colonial administration and local populations actually augmented their power. Differences between French policies of ‘direct rule’ and British ‘indirect rule’ mattered less than the capacities of individual rulers to make themselves useful without provoking unrest.

The activities of merchant and clerical elites were less obviously affected. However, for those who depended on slave labour, the abolition of slavery constituted a serious economic disruption. Indeed, the French, fearing a Muslim uprising, delayed the official liberation until 1908, although many slaves had already taken the initiative; in the region of Banamba in the Niger Valley, thousands walked off in 1905 and 1906. The effects of liberation were tempered by the fact that many ex slaves had neither places to which to return nor the means to support themselves independently. In some regions, especially in the Sahara and the Sahel, ex slaves remain to this day socially and economically subordinate as clients to their ex masters. This was especially true of northern Nigeria, where slavery was not legally abolished until 1936. Even so, the impossibility of acquiring new slaves through purchase, raiding or warfare radically altered the dynamics of dependence.

At the same time, the colonial economy was acquiring its own dynamics, geared towards the export of raw materials. Well before the conquest of much of the interior, the ‘legitimate’ trade in tropical oils supplanted the transatlantic

slave trade. African cultivators in particular seasonal migrants from the interior turned to the production of peanuts along the Gambia River. Saint Louis, the capital of Senegal at the time, was emerging as a commercial hub, attracting permanent settlers who formed a new commercial elite specialising in trade with the (as yet unconquered) interior. Whatever their ethnic, religious and social origins at the outset, they adopted a resolutely Muslim identity in Saint Louis, successfully lobbying the French administration to institute an official Muslim tribunal. 23 (This last accomplishment did not set a precedent, except within the ‘four communes’ of Saint Louis, Dakar, Rufisque and Gorée whose inhabitants technically enjoyed the status of French citizens. Elsewhere, the French unlike the British consistently resisted the establishment of official Islamic tribunals.) These Senegalese developments heralded three fundamental patterns which were to influence the Islamisation of the region as a whole.

(1) The emergence of a plantation economy, particularly along or near the coast partly because of the ease of transportation, but also because certain crops (notably coffee and cocoa) only flourished in the forest zones, and which attracted migrant labourers from the interior.
(2) The growth of large urban centres as alternative poles of migration.
(3) The creation of new commercial networks, centred around colonial plantations and cities.

This reconfiguration of the regional political economy coincided with an equally radical restructuration of African identities. The colonial classification of subjects in terms of ethnicity ‘tribe’ or even ‘race’ in colonial parlance came to be accepted and ultimately embraced by the subjects themselves. Migration to plantations or to urban centres fostered the adoption of macro identities, ready made as it were by the colonial administration. By the same token, colonial rule instituted qualitatively new conceptualisations of religious identity. Religious identities were effectively triangulated Christian, Muslim or ‘animist/fetishist’. This new logic of identities, ethnic and religious, opened up a space, a kind of religious ‘public sphere,’ which greatly facilitated the Islamisation of parts of West Africa.

**Senegal: the rise of mass Sufism**

Lat Dior, ruler of the Wolof state of Cayor, is best remembered for his quixotic and fatal attempt to halt the construction of a railroad from Dakar

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to Saint Louis. The event neatly encapsulates the demise of African systems of authority and the emergence of new systems of transportation which were to transform the rural Senegalese economy. The railroad opened up the country side between the Gambia and Senegal River valleys to peanut cultivation. The power vacuum left by the defeat of warrior elites left the prestige and author ity of Sufi shaykhs untouched if not enhanced, and they were able to assume leadership by transforming the ṭariqa into mass movements, recruiting affil iates at all levels of society, and not simply networks of clerics. By joining a ṭariqa, an individual now owed exclusive loyalty to the shaykh who had initiated him, and ultimately to the founder of the order or his khalīfa.

The most celebrated case is that of the Murīds, disciples of Ahmadu Bamba.²⁴ Murīd shaykhs founded a network of rural communities, attracting a host of displaced individuals, including many freed slaves. Some of these communities, known as daara, consisted of unmarried young men whose energies were largely devoted to cultivating peanuts on their shaykh’s planta tion; such labour was construed as a form of religious devotion. However, most communities founded by the Murīds were ordinary villages whose inhabitants voluntarily donated a substantial part of their harvest to their shaykh. For ex slaves, this did not after all constitute a radical change from previous practice, except that the tribute was voluntary rather than coerced and that in this way they accrued religious merit. In any case, it is clear that they, and not only their shaykhs, benefited economically from the peanut boom.

The Murīds were not the only ṭariqa by any means to benefit from peanut cultivation. Mālik Sy established his headquarters at Tivaouane, along the railroad from Dakar to Saint Louis right in the heart of the peanut producing zone.²⁵ Ibrahīm Niasse, the son of one of his followers, established an inde pendent branch of the Tijañiyya, deliberately fostering international links and establishing a very sizeable following in Nigeria, Niger and as far away as Darfur.²⁶

In Senegal, a majority of the population came to affiliate with one ṭariqa or another, so that they came to dominate what might (problematically) be called civil society. The Murīds in particular were associated with Wolof ethnicity. This is not to say that religious and ethnic identities coincided in any mechan ical sense. On the contrary, the Murīds contributed substantially to the

²⁴ See n. 18 above.
²⁵ Robinson, Paths of accommodation, pp. 195 207.
²⁶ Roman Loimeier, Islamic reform and political change in northern Nigeria (Evanston, 1997), pp. 19 103.
'Wolofisation' of much of Senegal. In any case, by no means all Wolof joined the Muridyya; many became Tijani or were initiated into other branches of the Qadiriyya. The transformation of the tariqas into mass movements was by no means limited to Senegal, but penetrated other colonies as well, notably Mali, Nigeria and Niger. However, the Islamic hegemony exerted by the tariqas in Senegal was *sui generis*, a feature of the particular history of Islamisation in the colony.

**Côte d’Ivoire: Islam as ethnicity**

Islamisation in Côte d’Ivoire provides a salient contrast with the Senegalese case. Before the colonial period, Muslims constituted an important minority in the northern half of the territory, as clerical, merchant and (in some instances) warrior elites. Because trade across the ecological frontier between forest and savanna was so lucrative, groups along both sides of the frontier colluded in impeding Muslim penetration of the forest zone. Colonial rule opened the frontier to Muslim merchants from the north. The initial impulse to migration into the forest zone was the trade in commodities consumed by Africans – kola nuts, salt, woven cloths. However, the forest zone was well suited to the development of plantation agriculture of commodities exported to Europe. The pioneering efforts were situated in the Gold Coast, where significant quantities of cocoa were being exported by the 1890s. The practice quickly spread across the border to southeastern Côte d’Ivoire, gradually extending westward, involving coffee as well as cocoa. The plantations attracted seasonal migrant labourers from the north, particularly from Upper Volta (modern Burkina Faso), especially since heavy handed French colonial attempts to encourage cotton production in the savanna floundered miserably. At the same time, Muslim merchants from the north purchased or leased land from lineage heads in forest areas and invested in their own plantations. The plantation economy fostered the rapid growth of new towns in the south, attracting further streams of immigrants. The construction of a railroad between Abidjan and Ouagadougou facilitated such movement, and even more so the introduction of motor transport on a large scale, especially after the Second World War.

Because Mande speaking Muslim merchants had immigrated very early in the colonial period to the forest zone in order to expand the reach of long distance commercial networks, they acquired control over much of the ‘informal’ mercantile sector of the economy of southern Côte d’Ivoire. (To the west of Côte d’Ivoire, from Ghana to south western Nigeria, Hausa speaking Muslim merchants acquired a similar hegemony in the ‘informal’ sector.) However, this
network of Mande Muslim traders, ‘Dyula’ as they came to be known, was far more open in the twentieth century than a century before. Non Muslim Mande speakers (the overwhelming majority at the outset of the twentieth century) automatically became ‘Dyula’ by converting. In some instances, freed slaves or groups of ‘caste’ status were the first to avail themselves of these new opportunities (as they had nothing to gain by remaining at home) and achieved considerable prominence and prosperity in the trading sector. Nor was the process limited to Mande speakers; other peoples from the north became ‘Dyula’ by adopting Mande patronyms, speaking Mande (at least in public) and of course converting to Islam. In southern Côte d’Ivoire, ‘Dyula’ ethnicity and Islam were more often than not amalgamated. Although Mossi migrants from Upper Volta were somewhat less readily absorbed into the Dyula network in Côte d’Ivoire (or the Hausa network in Ghana), many also converted to Islam.

The development of an urban ‘Dyula’ ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire resulted in the standardisation of Muslim practice, not only in the forest zone but also in the home communities. This entailed the abandonment of practices which might be construed as un Islamic, notably initiation for adolescent boys, excision ceremonies (though not the operation itself) for girls. The practice of delivering long sermons in Dyula on specified occasions, most notably at funerals, spread from the towns of the south throughout the Islamised hinterland in the north. However, this association of Islam with Dyula ethnicity strongly discouraged conversion among the peoples of southern Côte d’Ivoire (though of course there were idiosyncratic exceptions) for whom Islam was identified as a doubly ‘foreign’ religion.

Reform: challenge from within

The very rapidity with which Islam expanded in the twentieth century raised the stakes in the competition for leadership of the Muslim community. Initially, such competition took the form of acrimonious rivalry between different Sufi ṭarīqas or between different branches of the same ṭarīqa. Violent clashes between partisans of the Tijānī Shaykh Ḥamallāh and of the ‘Umarian Tijāniyya led to the shaykh’s deportation, though usually rivalry did not escalate quite so dramatically.

After the Second World War, a new class of leaders emerged who in turn challenged the Sufi shaykhs and the clerical establishment en bloc.

Occasionally, this took an explicitly political turn, as when Cheikh Toure, leader of the Union Culturelle Musulmane in Senegal, accused the Islamic establishment of collaboration with the colonial authorities. For the most part, however, the critique was on specifically religious grounds, arguing that Muslim clerics in general and Sufis in particular constituted illegitimate intermediaries between God and ordinary believers, and that they engaged in a variety of practices which were contrary to Islam, such as the fabrication of amulets. In Mali, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, the impulse for reform came from a group of young men trained at al Azhar, who formed a movement they called Subbanu al Muslimūn (or simply 'people of the Sunna'), but which hostile French administrators dubbed 'Wahhābī'. An ideologically similar movement, the ‘Yan Izala, under the aegis of Abubakar Gumi, emerged somewhat later in northern Nigeria. Gumi was originally a member of the entourage of Ahmadu Bello, the most powerful political leader in northern Nigeria until his assassination in 1966; only after Bello’s death was Gumi able to enunciate a critique of the ṭarīqa in Nigeria which, like the ‘Wahhābīs’ in francophone Africa, polarised the Muslim community.

The reformers also introduced a radically new paradigm of Islamic education, modelled (consciously or not) on Western schooling, with classrooms, grade levels and curricula. Most radically, these schools taught Arabic as a foreign, rather than just a liturgical, language, with an initial emphasis on vocabulary and grammar rather than on the memorisation and recitation of sacred texts. More recently, founders of such schools have astutely dissociated them from the militant anti Sufism of an earlier generation, often adding in the process a variety of secular subjects—French or English language instruction, arithmetic which constituted invaluable skills for graduates in search of employment.

Muslims and Christians

At the same time that Islam was expanding in West Africa, Christianity was winning converts in its own right. This did not automatically entail competition, to the extent that certain regions and ethnicities came to be

29 Loimeier, Islamic reform.
overwhelmingly Muslim or Christian. Even in those areas where both Islam and Christianity made substantial inroads, the two religions might reach a comfortable *modus vivendi*; the Yoruba of western Nigeria are the outstanding example of such coexistence. Still, within the context of the colonial and, even more, the post-colonial state, religious communities competed with one another for resources: government assistance in building churches or mosques; official recognition of religious schools; air time on government media.

By and large, neither Muslims nor Christians have been very successful in attracting converts from the other camp. On the other hand, adherents of traditional religions are prime targets for conversion, and the race for ‘pagan’ souls very definitely constitutes one arena where Islam and Christianity are in open competition, particularly since the stakes are high; the greater the number of adherents, the greater the claim to state resources and recognition, as well as (in democratic regimes) votes. Until relatively recently, strategies for attracting converts to each religion have been radically different. Whereas Christianity relied on professional missionaries, Islam tended to win converts by incorporating groups and individuals into Muslim communities. However, Muslims eventually adopted Christian missionary strategies in some cases. Not surprisingly, Nigeria, where religion was most acutely and acrimoniously politicised, paved the way. As part of a campaign to unify northern Nigeria both politically and religiously, Ahmadu Bello undertook conversion campaigns in the Middle Belt, sometimes provoking an anti-Islamic reaction.\(^{31}\)

Somewhat less controversially, certain Muslim clerics embarked on campaigns to eradicate ‘pagan’ spirit possession cults in Mali.\(^{32}\) In the 1980s, Muslim organisations in Côte d’Ivoire launched conversion campaigns in the forest zone, though hardly with spectacular results.\(^{33}\) At the same time, Pentecostal and Charismatic Protestant churches have rapidly been gaining ground in West Africa, pursuing highly aggressive campaigns of proselytisation along with a militantly anti-Islamic discourse.\(^ {34}\)

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Religious polarisation has been particularly acute in Nigeria, where the government’s decision to join the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in 1986, as well as the recent application of *shari’a* law in some northern states, have led to violent clashes between Muslims and Christians. Anti Muslim riots have also erupted in Côte d’Ivoire, though these reflect regional and ethnic tensions rather than explicitly inter religious conflict. The mass media are increasingly providing an arena where these rivalries are played out, not only between Muslims and Christians but between groups and individuals within each religious community vying for spiritual (if not political) authority. Until the 1990s, control over the air waves was rigorously controlled by central authorities, but pressures from foreign governments and aid agencies have led to the liberalisation of the media, and the rapid expansion of opportunities to use radio, television and increasingly the internet (not to mention audio and video cassettes) to disseminate various religious points of view. The electronic media no doubt constitute Islam’s newest frontier in West Africa.

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PART II

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RELIGION AND LAW
Piety and authenticity

The Islamic revival of the later decades of the twentieth century featured the call for the application of the \textit{shari'a} as its central plank. Two general features of this advocacy should be noted at first:

- The context of the call for the application of the \textit{shari'a} is the nearly two centuries of reform and secularisation of modernity and the formation of the modern nation state. ‘Fundamentalism’ is a phenomenon of modernity and secularisation: it is the drive to Islamise modernity and to roll back secularity. In so far as the Islamic movements are successful in entering mainstream politics and legislation they end up in various compromises with the conditions of modern society.

- There is no consensus as to what constitutes ‘applying the \textit{shari'a}'. Whenever an Islamic government or authority claims to be applying divine law (such as Iran, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia), some group or party challenges this claim and asserts a rival model of what constitutes the \textit{shari'a}. The \textit{shari'a}, then, is always the subject of ideological contests. The fragmentation of religious authority and the multiplicity of sources of \textit{fatwa} (ruling), including internet sites, amplify these contests.

With this background in mind we may discern two overlapping strands in this advocacy.

1. **Piety:** the idea that a Muslim must live in accordance with what God had decreed, and the \textit{shari'a} is precisely the embodiment of God’s commands. This is perhaps best exemplified in the idea of \textit{ḥākimiyya} in the thought of Sayyid Qūṭb (d. 1966), which he adapted, in turn, from Mawlānā Sayyid Abū’l A’lā’ Mawdūdī (d. 1979). According to this view Islamic government is a central pillar of the faith because it provides the conditions for Muslims
to be ruled by what God has revealed (ḥākimiyat allāh, the sovereignty of God). The alternative, which, in their view, prevailed in the world, including the supposedly Muslim world, was the rule of man by man, with man made law. This, for Qutb, was idolatry and tyranny. By this principle all Muslim rulers were heretics or apostates and had to be removed\(^1\). This idea of the application of Islamic law as a necessary condition for faith and piety is widely prevalent, but not always with the radical and revolutionary implications of Qutbic thought. This stance is characteristic of modern Salafism, conservative Islam (more to follow), which is often apolitical, except in pressing governments for wider application of the shari‘a and the institution of religious discipline and censorship.

(2) **Cultural authenticity**: many thinkers in the Muslim world consider law to be a central pillar of their culture and society. Muslim law, in this perspective, is part of the patrimony and heritage (turāth) of the Arab or Muslim nations. Modern law systems not deriving from the Muslim past are seen as colonial implantations, alongside other measures which detract from the authenticity and viability of the nation. The ‘restoration’ of the shari‘a, then, becomes a crucial measure in reviving national dignity and authenticity. This is well illustrated in the following pronouncement by a leading Egyptian jurist:

[The shari‘a] constitutes the spinal column of the Islamic civilisational project. If this spinal column were to be shaken, then Islamic civilisation will disappear and become a transformed image of Western, Buddhist or some other civilisation. No one in the world has the right to prevent a community from founding its legal, educational and cultural regime upon its heritage (turath) ... In our country it is colonialism which has, for a hundred years, suppressed the law founded upon the Islamic shari‘a ... As a community which has a history and a heritage, we have the right to be governed and educated in conformity with this heritage.\(^2\)

Similar arguments are advanced by intellectuals who came to Islamism from leftist and anti imperialist positions, and saw in Islamism a continuation of the quest for true independence from the West. Prominent examples in

\(^1\) This argument is stated in its clearest form in Sayyid Qutb, *Ma‘ālim fi‘l tarāq* (Cairo, 1980); see also Sami Zubaida, *Islam, the people and the state: Political ideas and movements in the Middle East*, 2nd edn (London, 1993), pp. 51–5.

Egypt were Muḥammad ‘Amāra and ‘Ādil Ḥusayn. For these two thinkers, the restoration of Islamic law is a civilisational programme, part of the search for a peculiarly Arab/Islamic frame of thought, knowledge and social organisation.

This trend also tends to be critical of the literalist and narrow version of the shari‘a held by Salafists, both radicals and conservatives. ‘Amāra, for instance, argued that the shari‘a is not in itself ‘law’, but a general social programme which forms the frame for legislation. This theme will be elaborated in what follows.

The historical background

The modern history of legal reform in the modern state, and the religious reformist ideas which accompanied and justified it, form the background to contemporary themes and projects in legal thought. The historical legacy from the Islamic polities is the tradition of fiqh: the compendiums of formulations and judgements of the legal schools over the centuries. This is not codified law from which judgements are derived, but treatises on the derivation of principles and judgements from the canonical sources, with its own methodology and ratio legis. Principles and methods peculiar to each school limited the scope within which judgements could be reached by judges and muftīs. This corpus of law and its institutions were in the hands of jurists, fiqāhā’, who were trained and qualified in these disciplines. The rulers generally supported the personnel and institutions of law, but (theoretically) played no part in the process. Theoretically, legislation emanated from God, through his revealed sources and the (inspired) conduct and utterance of his Prophet. It was the trained doctors of law who assumed the function of deriving principles, judgements and procedures from these sources. The ruler, however, had the prerogative of issuing decrees on matters of administration, defence and security. These often extended to matters covered by the sacred law, notably taxation. But the theory was maintained that these decrees did not contradict divine ordinances. At the same time, opposition and rebellion against a ruler could be legitimised by reference to infractions of the shari‘a, especially on fiscal exactions in times of hardship.

4 ‘Amara, in Jawda (ed.), Ḥiwarāt, p. 70.
This division between the *shari‘a* of the ‘ulamā‘ and the decrees, *qanūn*, of the ruler has had the cumulative consequences of making the *shari‘a* a predominantly *private* law applying to the affairs of the subject, such as family affairs and commercial transactions (as well as the ‘*ibādāt*, or ritual and worship functions). Although the *shari‘a*, in principle, covers matters of state, qualifications and functions of rulers and their administrators, taxation, land holding and war and peace, these matters have remained largely theoretical and ritual, subordinated to *raison d‘État* as decided by the ruler and his functionaries. This aspect has important consequences for the modern application of the *shari‘a*, as we shall see.5

**Transformations of modernity**

The main thrust of modernity and the modern state is the unification and étatisation of law. It becomes state law, incorporated within state bureaucracies and judicial institutions, typically a ministry of justice overseeing a system of courts with functional specialisation and organised in a hierarchy of competence and authority.6 Crucially, the state assumes the function of legislation, through an elected legislature or by empowered tribunals, such as a council of state or a ‘revolutionary’ council. In some countries, notably Egypt, a supreme court is the ultimate arbiter on legality and constitutionality of legislation and government policy.

The contents of these codified state laws derived, for the most part, from European codes, but often with some reference to the *shari‘a*, especially in matters of personal status. Some legislators, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, were hesitant about the wholesale incorporation of European laws and sought a compromise by which unified and clear law codes would be derived from the *shari‘a*. Such was the project of the Ottoman Mecelle (Ar. *Majalla*) in the 1860s which codified the civil transactions elements of the *shari‘a* into modern state law. Its chief architect, Cevdet Pasha, a cleric turned politician, expressed its rationale in the following terms:

Thus, certain persons took up the idea of translating French [civil] codes into Turkish for judgement in the *nizami* courts. This idea was not acceptable because changing the basic laws of a nation would entail its destruction. The

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5 For an elaboration on these themes, see Sami Zubaida, *Law and power in the Islamic world* (London, 2003), ch. 3, ‘The Shari‘a and political authority’, pp. 74 120.

'ulamā' believed that those who had gone astray to hold such Frankish ideas were unbelievers. The Franks, on the other hand, used to say 'bring forth your code; let us see it and make it known to our subjects'.

The codification of the shari‘a was the compromise to resolve this dilemma. But the codified shari‘a, torn out of its religious context of clerics and texts, appeared remarkably similar in form and content to the 'Frankish' civil law it was meant to supplant. Legislators and politicians of the twentieth centuries embarked on similar enterprises. ‘Abd al Razzaq al Sanhūrī, a prominent Egyptian jurist, embarked on the 'Egyptianisation' of law, as part of the full independence of the legal system from European privileges in the 1940s. He formulated the codes of the Egyptian civil law, drawing on shari‘a principles, as well as other, mainly European, legal traditions. He also wrote constitutions and codes for other Arab states, notably Iraq. President Sadat, confronting the Islamic tide of the 1970s and anxious to demonstrate his own religious credentials, amended the Egyptian constitution to make the principles (mabādi‘) of the shari‘a the primary source of legislation. This was clearly at odds with the actual Egyptian positive law, and has remained a source of controversy and contest ever since.

Few countries, notably Saudi Arabia, have kept law (theoretically) outside the state sphere and in the hands of the ‘ulamā’ and their institutions, ruling in accordance with the books of fiqh. The rulers, then, reserved to themselves the issuing of regulations for administrative and economic matters, leaving the clerics to rule on the affairs of the subjects and the punishment of their infractions, much like the historical model of Muslim states. The crucial difference is in the nature of modern trade and finance, which is global and cannot be encompassed within the transactions rules of the shari‘a. These are entrusted to appointed commercial tribunals.

Dilemmas of the shari‘a in modern applications

A central problem facing modern legislators and reformers who draw upon the shari‘a is that it constitutes, for the most part, private law. It is also a law

8 See Enid Hill, Al Sanhouri and Islamic law, Cairo Papers in Social Science, 10, 1 (Cairo, 1997); Nathan Brown, The rule of law in the Arab world (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 59–76.
9 See Zubaida, Law and power, pp. 166–70.
10 On the legal system of Saudi Arabia, see Frank Vogel, Islamic law and legal system: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden, 2000).
which developed in the context of historical agrarian and commercial socie-
ties, quite distinct from the conditions of modernity. Its provisions for state
affairs, of administration, taxation and war and peace are mostly archaic: they
remained largely theoretical in the history of Muslim states, which operated
pragmatically in accordance with current situations. As such, these shari‘a
provisions did not evolve in relation to practice, and hardly relate to the
exigencies and methods of the modern state.

Penal law may be seen as an exception, in that the Qur‘an and the historical
corpus have quite specific prescriptions and penalties for specified infractions.
These, however, pose many problems for the modern legislator. One is the
limited range of infractions which are specified, many of them different from
modern forms of crime. It specified common theft, for instance, but not
embezzlement. This together with corruption and fraud can be included in
a general category of mufsid, spoiling or corrupting, closely tied to ‘enemy of
God’, both punishable by death. But this becomes a catch all category, used,
for instance, in the Islamic Republic of Iran for political ‘crimes’.

Another problem is that with its background as private law, much of the
provision of penal law requires private suits brought by one party against
another, and often settled by payment of diya or compensation for damage.
There is no concept of public prosecution and state interest in the rule of law,
except in matters of the security and authority of the ruler and the religion.

A third, and most important problem is that of the compatibility of
penal provisions with modern sensibilities and international public opinion.
Historically, the doctors of law and judges showed reluctance in resorting to
corporal punishments of amputations and beheadings. Jurists and judges specified high levels of proof and evidence, and stipulated all kinds of conditions for applicability. Modern thinkers and jurists sympathetic to the shari‘a but reluctant to apply its penal provisions, have invoked this historical tradition of restraint in the use of drastic corporal penalties. The tribunals of rulers, the military and the police were much freer in executions and amputations. In the modern context, authoritarian rulers who resort to the shari‘a for their legitimacy, such as successive Pakistani and Sudanese leaders, have made a special point in applying these punishments liberally to demonstrate their piety and their contempt for Western opinion. But for reformers and modern thinkers these penalties pose a problem for liberal and humane values.

Family law, regarding marriage, divorce, children and inheritance, became the area most appropriate for the application of the shari‘a in the modern state, and most modern Muslim states have incorporated elements or versions of it in their legal systems. Many countries, such as Egypt, Iraq and Morocco, instituted special shari‘a courts, with religious personnel and procedures until the 1950s, when these matters were integrated into a unified legal system which included some shari‘a derived provisions. This area of law acquired a modern label to distinguish it from other forms of civil transactions: al aḥwāl al shakhsīya, a translation from the English idiom of ‘personal status’. At the same time the provisions in historical fiqh of the orthodox schools were amended to accommodate the exigencies of modern life and sensibilities. Questions such as those of multiple wives and of unilateral divorce by the husband coupled with strict restrictions on initiation of divorce by the wife, all these posed difficult problems for the reformers. Reforms employed various devices derived from classical fiqh but alien to it, such as talfiq (pick and mix from different schools), istihṣān (jurist’s preference) and istislah (public interest), to allow the legislator to pick and choose and mix between the provisions of the classical schools in order to reach the most ‘liberal’ formulation on these issues. Waves of reforms altered shari‘a provisions to give a little more favour to women and children and their financial rights in the marital home, as well as more leeway for wives to initiate divorce and secure custody of children. These measures were always controversial and challenged by conservative as well as radical advocacy of the shari‘a.

**Types of response**

Faced with these dilemmas, legislators, political activists and intellectuals have responded in a variety of ways, which constitute legal thought and ideology in the modern world. I shall try to classify these responses, but should note first an important distinction between those who are concerned with the ideas and professions of the law on the one hand, and the ideologues advocating and debating forms of Islamic government and the law within it. Islamists in the Qutbī strand, for instance, show scant attention to the practical issues of legislation and judicial systems, whereas their counterparts in the Muslim Brotherhood include ‘ulamā’ and lawyers who are concerned with these practical matters. Another general point is that most of the modern responses, with the possible exception of some conservative ‘ulamā’, sideline or reject the

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historical fiqh tradition in favour of ijtihād (exercise of reason) going back to the ‘original’ sources of Qurʾān and Sunna.

The Salafist response

Salaf refers to the righteous ancestors, the Prophet and his Companions. Salafists are those who hark back to those examples, embodied in the Qurʾān and the Sunna, for guidance on worship and conduct, rejecting historical accretions they consider alien to the pure religion. At the present time, these doctrines are common to conservatives as well as radicals in the Qutbīst mould. They both seek to emulate the ancestors, only the conservatives do not seek the political and social upheavals favoured by the radicals.

The most notable example of this response is the legal system in Saudi Arabia. Wahhābism, the official doctrine of Saudi Islam, is the most influential and widespread Salafist current in the modern world, propagated by the ample resources of the kingdom. Equally, Saudi Islam has spawned the most prominent jihadi militancy, springing from the same orthodoxy but directed against what is perceived as hypocritical betrayals of its principles. Conservative Salafism, partly through Saudi influence, constitutes the legal ideology and practice of many social groups in the Muslim world and among Muslims in the West. In particular, conservative Salafism is the favoured ideology of the devout middle classes everywhere.

In the Saudi state this form of conservative Salafism is instituted into the legal system and ideology. Religious law and procedure are, theoretically, applied without concession to modernity. This project creates numerous tensions with the running of a modern economy, not to mention society, which gives rise to a number of hybrid legal institutions. Law is, theoretically, not codified, but left in the hands of the ‘ulamāʾ and their institutions. But Wahhābī doctrine had generally rejected historical fiqh and the four Sunnī schools in favour of a selective adaptation from the Ḥanbali tradition, primarily from Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). Saudi ‘ulamāʾ, then, developed their own Wahhābī school, with strict literalist interpretations of sacred sources.

The main tension facing the Saudi model revolves around the economy: it is not possible to run a modern economy and banking institutions involved in

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14 See Vogel, Islamic law and legal system, for an account of the Saudi legal system and the ideas behind it.
international networks with the arbitrariness of ‘ulamā’ based non codified law. The ban on dealing with interest was a particular hindrance. These areas of commercial and financial transactions were simply withdrawn from the legal system and confined to commercial tribunals. This has been an issue of regular tension between government and ‘ulamā’.  

It is noteworthy that in countries like Egypt, where the law had been unified and codified as state law, most advocates of the application of the shari‘a do not favour this model, but want to Islamise the existing legal system. Most are also circumspect about the Qur’anic penal code and devise various formulae for avoiding it. Some argue that the code was historically specific and inappropriate under current conditions. Others argue that these punishments are only applicable in a totally just Islamic society, which has not yet been achieved. Legal professionals are the most reluctant to accept such a traditional judicial system as it would dispense with their training and qualifications.

Salafi conceptions of religion and law have been prominent in the Muslim diaspora in the West, featuring in the satellite media and the internet. Perhaps one of the most influential figures in these milieus is Shaykh Yūsuf al Qarādāwī, an Egyptian with Muslim Brotherhood background now based in Qatar. His treatise on the shari‘a and religious conduct is expounded in his book, Al Ḥalāl wa‘l ḥarām fi‘l Islam (The licit and the illicit in Islam), as well as in regular satellite broadcasts and ḥāfatwā on the net. His prescriptions are socially conservative, regarding, for instance, the veiling of women and their subordination to their husbands (the French translation of the book was, for a time, banned in France, because it allowed the husband to beat his recalcitrant wife). At the same time, it departs from the rigidity of the Saudi ‘ulamā’ on issues which touch the diaspora Muslims, such as relations with non Muslims, and forms of mortgage. He has also ruled against the jihadi violence against civilians (except in Israel). Within this framework shari‘a prescriptions are underlined as a means of maintaining Islamic identity and solidarity in plural societies, but with some dispensations in relation to exigencies and sensitivities of modern Muslims.

16 Vogel, Islamic law, pp. 279 308.
17 See arguments in contributions to Jawda (ed.), Ḥiwarāt, particularly Shaykh ‘Abd al Karīm, pp. 81 9, and Muḥammad ‘Amara, pp. 67 80.
19 Yūsuf al Qarādāwī, Al Ḥalāl wa‘l ḥarām fi‘l Islam (Beirut, 1978), trans. into English by Kamal El Helbawy, M. Moinuddin Siddiqui and Syed Shukry as The lawful and the prohibited in Islam (Indianapolis, 1982).
Modernist and reformist responses

Movements of reform, as well as secularist projects, have attempted since the nineteenth century to relativise Qur’anic and traditional provisions in order to adapt them to what they saw as modern contingencies and sensibilities. We have already discussed some of these responses in connection with the search for authenticity, and mentioned modern thinkers such as Muḥammad ‘Amāra and ʻĀdil Ḥusayn. Similar ideas regarding the historical relativity of the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth are held by more secular intellectuals, such as Ḥusayn Aḥmad ‘Amin, Muḥammad Saʿīd al Ashmāwī and Naṣr Ḥāmid Abu Zayd. Some of those Egyptian intellectuals, while emphasising their religious adherence, believe in the separation of religion from government. They are critical of the call for the shari‘a, arguing that Islamic tradition, from the earliest periods, adapted the law to the exigencies and interests of their time.

The critique from a historical angle is elaborated by Ḥusayn Aḥmad Amin, a distinguished intellectual and retired diplomat who wrote an interesting set of essays in the early 1980s, critical of the ideas and programmes of the Islamic current, from a modernist and humanist Muslim point of view, including a critique of the call for the application of the shari‘a. Ḥusayn Aḥmad Amin is in favour of following the Holy Book and Prophetic example, but asks what is it in these sacred sources which may constitute law? If by the shari‘a is meant the historical accumulation contained in the books of fiqh, then these are largely the product of human designs and judgements in accordance with contingencies, interests and needs, developed in a variety of social and historical settings, much of it deriving from diverse custom and practice. Rules and judgements derived directly from the Qurʾān are few, and these, in any case, should not have the status of unvarying laws. The conduct of the Prophet himself and his close associates and immediate successors gives us an indication of the status of these maxims. Later Qurʾānic verses, for instance, were deemed to have overruled earlier ones (on the matter of the licity of wine, for example), all during the first twenty odd years of the existence of Islam; what about the changes which occurred over fourteen centuries? Wine drinking and dealing in interest are both forbidden in the Qurʾān, but is this prohibition in the nature of law? Or is it a caution to the believer to work for the salvation of his soul? And why is wine drinking subsequently made into a punishable offence, but dealing in interest only sanctioned by invalidating any contract which

21 Ḥusayn Aḥmad Amina, Ḥawlah al daʿwa ilā tāḥbīq al sharīʿa al Islamiyya (Cairo, 1987).
22 Ibid., p. 189.
stipulates it? These are maxims to regulate man’s relation to his maker, and have priority over the rules which regulate social relations. If the orthodox caliph ‘Umar, a Companion of the Prophet, asks Amīn, could reverse Prophetic precedent, then why not the modern legislator? This kind of historical relativity is typical not only of secularist opponents of the call for the application of the shari‘a, like Amīn and Ashmāwī, but is equally common amongst modernist advocates of the shari‘a like ‘Amāra, as we have seen. Modernist advocates of the shari‘a also seek discursive strategies which allow malleability of interpretations in relation to government and public affairs, on which, as we have argued, the historical shari‘a is deficient. Many have employed the concept of maṣlaḥa, or public interest, which has proved to be a most useful permissive category that allows wide adaptations, and deserves some careful consideration.

**Maṣlaḥa: the genealogy of a concept**

*Maṣlaḥa,* variously translated as ‘public interest’, ‘utility’ and ‘expediency’ is a central concept in the history of Muslim legal thought and practice. It arises in the endeavour of the jurists to shape the law in relation to the exigencies of their time, but within the limits imposed by the sacred sources and traditions, as well as the methodology of fiqh. The most important early protagonist of this concept was Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al Ghazālī (d. 1111), who derived it from the theological premise that ‘The shari‘a was revealed to further the good of the believers’23. This view, in turn, rests on theological assumptions. The earliest centuries of Islam spawned the debate between the literalists (Ẓāhiris) who insisted on the literal meaning of revelation as the word of God, and their opponents (primarily the Mu‘tazila) who insisted on the employment of reason in the understanding of revelation, a controversy which lives on in our time. The literalists insisted that God’s will and purpose were incomprehensible to humans, whose duty was to follow and obey without questioning. This view became enshrined in the dominant theology of Ash‘arism,24 prevalent to the present day, and implicit in modern Salafism (though most Salafis would dismiss all forms of theology as arrogant speculation). The line of thought originating from the Mu‘tazila argued that God had endowed humans with reason to determine what is right and just, as

24 For a discussion of these issues see W. Montgomery Watt, *The formative period of Islamic thought* (Edinburgh, 1973), pp. 303 18.
demonstrated by the moral sense of good people even before the revelation.\(^\text{25}\)
It was legitimate, then, to employ this reason to work out the purpose and intention of God’s commands, which could not be contrary to fairness and justice.

Ultimately this line of reasoning was rejected by the mainstream theologians and jurists, and Ash‘arism became the theological orthodoxy. Yet elements and assumptions from the rationalist approach seeped into juristic argument. Al Ghazālī, for instance, following the principle enunciated above, advanced the highly significant and influential concept of *maqāṣid al sharī‘a*, the intentions of the *sharī‘a*, that is of the Divine Legislator. The general aims of the *sharī‘a* were the protection of life, property, mind, religion and offspring of the believers.\(^\text{26}\)

These interests of the Muslim community as a whole must be the primary aims of the *sharī‘a*. According to this view, human reason must play a part in the formulation of the law and the solution of legal problems, but it cannot transcend the dictates of revelation. Reasoning on *maṣlaḥa*, then, as with forms of *qiyyās* (analogical reasoning) must be strictly confined within the limits of the text and the tradition. Careful methods of induction from the accumulated weight of Qur’ānic themes and injunctions and prophetic narrations were to be employed in formulating arguments in terms of *maṣlaḥa*. The concept of *maṣlaḥa* and the methods it dictated were to be further developed by subsequent jurists, notably the stern Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), but most elaborately in the work of the Andalusian scholar Abū Ishāq al Shāṭibi (d. 1388).\(^\text{27}\)

He elaborated on the concepts of *maṣlaḥa* and *maqāṣid*, and advanced careful methods of induction to arrive at conclusions and judgements on their bases.

**Maṣlaḥa** in modern legal thought

In the context of the dilemmas posed by modernity for religious legal thought, *maṣlaḥa* has proved a useful tool for the modernists and reformers trying to reconcile religious *sharī‘a* principles with modern exigencies. It featured prominently in the work of Muḥammad ‘Abduh, the father of modern reformism, and was a dominant concept in the legal thought of his disciple Rashīd Riḍā.\(^\text{28}\)

His resort to the concept will illustrate the shifts effected by the contexts of modernity.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., pp. 209 52.
\(^{26}\) Hallaq, *History*, p. 112.
\(^{27}\) Muhammad Khalid Masud, *Shāṭībi’s philosophy of Islamic law* (Islamabad, 1995); Hallaq, *History*, pp. 162 206.
The discourse of medieval jurists was addressed primarily to their own milieu and possibly that of the parts of the ruling elites. Their arguments and judgements were tightly controlled by the traditions and precedents of their madhhab or school and its founding texts, as well as careful induction from the sacred sources, following particular methods and conventions of reasoning. The contexts of modernity, starting in the nineteenth century, represented radical departures from these conventions. The political context became that of the modern nation state, including its legal institutions. The prominent ‘ulamā’, notably the reformists, became publicists, addressing their judgments and interpretations to a wide literate public, in the context of political and ideological contest. Muḥammad ‘Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā were foremost in this field.29 Riḍā in particular aimed to retain the shari‘a as the primary source of legislation, as against the intrusion of the modern state, but within the institutions and legislation of that state. He was thus opposed to the conservatives and traditionalists on the one side (and highly critical of Azhar ‘ulamā’), and to the afandiya and the mutafarnijīn (those following Frankish or Western ways) on the other. The first part of his project was to adapt the shari‘a to the exigencies of the age, and that is where maṣlahā played an important part. This concept of maṣlahā was developed in the new context of public advocacy through the new print media, in particular his own influential magazine, Al Manār. The audience was no longer the milieu of scholars and jurists (they became, for Riḍā, the ‘backward’ antagonists to be reformed), but a general literate public, and one subject to diverse advocacies, many of them secular and secularist in thrust.30 The fatwās enunciated in Al Manār and subsequently in the compendium of his fatwās also departed from the traditional form of brief answers to questions: they became lengthy essays aimed at campaigning within this general public. In that context al maṣlahā al ‘amma acquires the connotations of ‘public interest’ in relation to the nation and the homeland, as well as to the umma as the community of faith. Riḍā’s project and theory for a new khilāfa, caliphate, also bears these marks of modernity. His caliph was not to be the historical model of the religiously sanctified despot, but of a modern spiritual leader and supreme mujtahid,


comparable to the Catholic pope, a religious authority coexisting with the multiple nation states of the Muslims.  

The new context transforms the discourses of *maṣlaḥa* from the historical *fiqh* milieu to that of cut and thrust of modern politics and ideology. In the historical context, *maṣlaḥa* had been a subordinate principle, merely a guide to *qiṣṣā* when a choice was to be made between possible interpretations. For Riḍā and the modernists after him it becomes in itself a positive principle of decision. In the modern context, *maṣlaḥa* as ‘public interest’ was to be defined and determined in a hybrid discourse, invoking *fiqh* principles, but eclectically, and ultimately determined by the exigencies of social and ideological conditions in a secularised public space. The politicisation of *maṣlaḥa* also opens up its definition and determination to social conflicts and political contests. ‘Public interest’ in any context is the subject of such contentions.

The substance of Riḍā’s argument in favour of *maṣlaḥa* proceeded as follows. God, in his revelation, laid down strict rules for cult obligations, *ʿibādāt*, such as prayer and fasting, and these are fixed for all time. For the transactions of everyday life (*muʿāmalāt*), however, the sacred sources only laid down general and broad principles, leaving much of the detail to the reason and discretion of humans on the bases of their particular conditions and necessities (*darūra*, for Riḍā, almost synonymous with *maṣlaḥa*). The general assumption as regards matters not covered by specific texts or rules is *ibtāḥa*, permissiveness: what is not explicitly prohibited or regulated is assumed to be licit and subject to human preference and reason. What, though, of matters that are subject to a clear and unambiguous textual ruling? This is an awkward question for all reformers and modernists. Riḍā’s responses are typical. He first asserted that such clear textual rules are binding. These, however, can be subject to modifications on the bases of more general principles of the *sharīʿa*, ascertained through a survey of the overall body of texts and their intent (resorting, implicitly, to the notion of *maqāṣid*). Texts and traditions which are not so clear and unequivocal are subject to interpretation in terms of necessity and interest. Overall, these principles in Riḍā’s work seem to give the legislator a wide scope of discretion in dealing with the sacred sources and formulating law in relation to perceived conditions and exigencies of modern life.  

In the words of Malcolm Kerr, ‘this equation of interest and necessity, put forth in such a manner as make formal deductions from the revealed

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31 Hourani, *Arabic thought*, pp. 239 44.  
sources only a secondary consideration of what the law should be, amounts to an affirmation of natural law’.

Riđa is typical of the modern reformers operating in political and ideological fields determined by the nation state and a largely secularised public sphere. In order to retain the pertinence and authority of Islam they strive to extend Islamic discourse to cover secular institutions derived from European models. One consequence is to secularise and relativise religious discourse. But another, in Dallal’s words,

In so doing, however, the reformers had to expand the functional domain of religion into areas that had not previously been covered by it. So, while the initial purpose of the reformers was to bypass religion, or at least loosen the rigid understanding of Islam, their insistence on providing Islamic legitimation for each and every institution of the modern, European nation state in effect produced a pervasive and all encompassing Islamic discourse that claims, without historical justification, to cover all aspects of life. This process and line of reasoning have, in effect, given impetus to modern Islamism and its totalising claims. We can see elements of it in the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Turābī

One of the most important Islamic thinkers and public figures of recent times is the Sudanese Hasan al Turābī. His thought provides a good example of the use of maslaha in a modern Islamist context, with totalistic claims for Islamisation of society, and in particular, the state and public life.

Turābī proposes a categorical rejection of historical fiqh in favour of contemporary ijtihamād. Not for him the selective adaptation of Ibn Taymiyya, al Shāṭībi or Najm al Dīn al Ṭūfī favoured by Riđa and sundry Salafīs. Historical fiqh, for Turābī, had neglected the Islamic regulation of public affairs, leaving that to the rulers and their servants and concentrating on the private trans actions of the subjects. The imperative for Muslims in the modern world is precisely to bring religious law and principles into public life, in short, to Islamise the state and its institutions. Historical Muslim rulers did not
intervene much in the affairs of society, leaving it largely to communal and religious regulation. This is not the case with the modern state, whose agencies penetrate all aspects of society, including the intimate domestic sphere. It becomes imperative, then, to Islamise this modern state in order for its citizens to be able to lead a religiously correct life. Historical *fiqh* does not help in this task, and modern Muslims must engage in *ijtihād* to develop religious and legal thought and policy equal to the task. A liberal expansion of the notion of *maṣlaḥa* becomes an essential part of this *ijtihād*, as we shall see presently.\(^{36}\)

The theological reasoning behind Turābī’s formulation is to distinguish between the one and unvarying religion, *dīn*, and the different styles of religiosity, *tadayun*.\(^{37}\) This is a common ruse of the modernists, a means of preserving the eternal truth of religion, while at the same time giving them selves the liberty of shaping it in relation to interests and ideologies. This eternal and fixed *dīn*, then, becomes illusive, because it is only knowable and accessible through the fallible and variable modes of human comprehension, subject to historically and socially specific cognitive, cultural and linguistic modes. Historical *fiqh*, for Turābī, constituted part of the forms of *tadayun* in previous generations, and modern Muslims must now find their own. What is more, these previous forms are obsolete, as we have seen, because they neglect public law and matters of government. Turābī also rejects or sidelines the *fuqahā*: *ijtihād* in his thinking is not necessarily the function of these professions, but should be open to any Muslim with the necessary knowledge of the law and the Arabic language (another common advocacy of the reformers). Indeed, personnel drawn from modern educated professionals and scientists would be ideally suited to ascertain the *maṣlaḥa* of the com munity and the laws and regulation necessary to serve the public interest.\(^{38}\)

Having rejected *fiqh* and *fuqahā*, then, what methods and concepts of *ijtihād* did Turābī propose? Like other theorists of *maṣlaḥa*, Turābī resorts to the principle of *maqāṣid al shari‘a*, the aims of the law, which allows the use of reasoning in *al qiyās al wāsī‘*, wide ranging analogy. In addition, Turābī asserts the principle of ‘*ibāḥa*, all activities that are not expressly forbidden and regu lated must be assumed to be licit. What happens, then, if specific and categorical texts go against the *mujtahid*’s prognosis of the public interest? This is always an awkward question for the modernists, and they invariably respond evasively.\(^{36}\)

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\(^{36}\) These themes pervade every chapter of Turābī’s *Tajdīd*; he set up the programme in the first chapter, pp. 4-15.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., pp. 66-72.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., pp. 95-114.
Turābī, at first insisting on the binding obligation of clear textual injunctions, then makes exceptions if the clear conclusion of these injunctions poses great hardships for the believers and the community. Then, it would seem, considerations of maṣlaḥa must prevail.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 40 3; Hallaq, History, pp. 228 30.}

Given the nature of ijtihād and mujtahids as envisaged by Turābī, the products are bound to be diverse, and Turābī welcomes this plurality and difference. Each conclusion of ijtihād is in the form of a proposal presented to the community which is the ultimate arbiter. It is a kind of populist conception of ijtihād, completely at odds with its historical conception as the product of professional religious knowledge and authority. I shall return presently to this concept of religious ‘democracy’.

Hallaq has reservations about Turābī’s method, which he considers to be too vague and indeterminate and ultimately subjective.\footnote{Hallaq, History, pp. 226 31.} The proposals and methods are often assertions not supported by textual quotations or by rigorous argument. I should like to take this further and show the political and ideological implications of its subjectivity.

Turābī is primarily a political thinker and activist who has played a central role in Sudanese politics in the later twentieth century, as well as being a leading light in global political Islam. Islamic government proceeding in accordance with Islamic law is the cornerstone of his advocacy. He is also a champion of ‘democracy’, but with a particular conception of it. Democracy in Sudan or any Muslim country, for Turābī, is bound to be Islamic democracy: any other form is unthinkable. Democracy, for him, is bound by the concepts of shūrā and ijma‘, consultation and consensus. He insists, however, that these processes should apply to the whole Muslim community and not just to elites, as was the case historically.\footnote{Turābī, Tajdīd, pp. 13 16.} This becomes a creed of Islamic populism. There is an ambiguity in this conception of democracy: is it imperative that it must be Islamic? Or is it a statement of fact that democracy for Muslims is always religious? There is a suggestion of the latter: if Muslims have a free choice of government, then their government will be Islamic. The insistence on the consensus, ijma‘, of all the people of a country leads to a plebiscitary concept of democracy: the Islamic government puts its propositions for law and policy (products, presumably, of educated ijtihād) and the citizens vote on them. Pluralism is confined to the Islamic realm, and secular politics is excluded, indeed inconceivable in an Islamic country.
We end up, then, in Turabî’s Islamic democracy whose Islam is the product of the educated subjectivity of authoritative mujtahids. The mujtahid in government, then, can pronounce on what is the correct Islam, but subject to a popular plebiscite. This could easily develop into an arbitrary authoritarian populism, which was the development discernible in Sudan in the years of Turabî’s dominance. He lost in the power struggle that ensued, and a more conventional military dictatorship was established in the name of Islamic government.

Maşlaḥa in the politics and law of the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic faced many difficulties in reconciling the shari‘a, which was the raison d’être of Islamic government, with the exigencies of a modern state ruling a complex society and economy. It resolved many of these problems piecemeal, often by reference to zarūrat, necessity or emergency.\(^{42}\) The conflicts over certain issues, especially to do with private property, raged between parliament pursuing government policy legislation and the Guardian Council, charged with ensuring conformity of such legislation with the rules of the shari‘a. One of the first issues faced by the authorities was that of taxation. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in his pre-revolutionary writing on fiqh, followed the regular line of Shi‘i jurisprudence in declaring state taxation illegitimate. The only legitimate taxes in Islam are zakāt, alms charged on those who own certain kinds of wealth and goods, khums, due from believers to their chosen senior cleric whom they follow, jizya, a poll tax on tolerated non-Muslims, and kharāj, a tax on certain categories of agricultural land. Anything beyond that is a transgression on the property of the believers.\(^{43}\) It was, of course, impossible to finance the requirements of a modern state on the bases of these selective charges, especially that the zakāt and the khums were not payable to the state but to religious authorities (and the Islamic state did not take on these authorities and merge them with itself). In practice, in the early years of the Republic, the status quo ante prevailed with respect to taxation, while arguments raged in parliament and the religious fields on the question. Direct taxation was finally regularised by law in 1988, after years of wrangling and argument. During the previous years Khomeini and his

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42 The main source on the politics of legislation in the Islamic Republic is Schirazi, Constitution; see also Ziba Mir Hosseini, Marriage on trial: A study of Islamic family law (London, 2000); Zubaida, Law and power, pp. 182–219.
spokesmen regularly supported the principle of state taxation, in contradiction to Khomeini’s pre revolution pronouncements and to general Shi‘i traditions. ‘[T]axation is a means in the service of achieving the goals of the Islamic state’, declared one spokesman. In the face of Khomeini’s determined support the Guardian Council abstained from ruling on the issue.\footnote{Ibid., p. 239.}

The Guardian Council, however, was not so reticent in vetoing many policy bills, mostly on issues of property, passed by parliament and sought by the government, notably on land reform and labour law.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 176–87, 206–15; Zubaida, Law and power, pp. 210–13.} The matter was resolved in 1988 with a definitive fatwā from Khomeini, in a letter to Khamenei, then president, in which he installed the concept of maşlaḥa definitively in the vocabulary and the institutions of the Republic: ‘[The Islamic state] is a branch of the absolute trusteeship of the Prophet … and constitutes one of the primary ordinances of Islam which has precedence over all other derived ordinances (ahkam e far’iyyeh) such as prayer, fasting and the pilgrimage.’\footnote{Quoted from Keyhan, 31 August 1988, in Schirazi, Constitution, p. 213.} That is to say, the government has the prerogatives of the Prophet and can suspend any element of the shari‘a, including cult practices, or ‘iḥādāt, which, as we saw, were considered fixed and unvarying by the Sunnī advocates of maşlaḥa.

This ruling by Khomeini was subsequently enshrined, through the new Constitution of 1989, in a new council of state called Majma‘i Tashkhis i Maşlaḥat i Nizām, Council for the Assessment of the Interest (Maşlaḥat) of the System (known in English as ‘the Expediency Council’). This body could override the Guardian Council, which judged strictly in accordance with their identification of shari‘a rules. Indeed, under the presidency of Rafsanjānī (pres. 1989–97), the veteran and influential politician, it became a powerful body with legislative powers. Thus, maşlaḥa was written into Islamic government in Iran as a means of evading the strictures of the shari‘a on public affairs. This is all the more remarkable because Khomeini was the guardian of a Shi‘i fiqh tradition which, unlike the Sunnī schools we discussed, had rejected maşlaḥa as innovation and tantamount to an admission that the shari‘a did not cover all aspects of life.\footnote{Schirazi, Constitution, p. 233.} The prerogatives that Khomeini gives to the Islamic government do not even pretend to be limited by text or method of derivation: it is entirely discretionary.

We saw how Turābī, unable to extract an Islamic public law from the historic shari‘a, abandons it in favour of the liberating concept of maşlaḥa.
Khomeini, in the actual practice of Islamic government, does something similar. But both take this step while retaining a concept of a binding Islam which must regulate public affairs, thus ending up in arbitrary powers of government, person or elite who claim to speak for Islam.

The scientific modernists: *fiqh* as sciences

The appeal to science as support for religion has been a regular theme in Islamic reformism since the nineteenth century. Islam, it has been argued, is a rational religion which embraces scientific inquiry and has no contradiction with it. We consider here some recent appeals to science in critical and innovative contributions on Muslim law.

Abdolkarim Soroush in Iran and Muḥammad Shaḥrūr in the Arab world are two different thinkers who have in common an appeal to modern science, its terms, motifs and technologies, as model and simile for the construction of Islam in the modern world. In so doing they both undermine historical *fiqh* and literalist conservative and radical movements in Islam, in favour of modern constructions, bringing in the forms of knowledge and authority of modern physical and social sciences.

Soroush

Soroush came to prominence in Islamic Iran, but also in Iranian and scholarly quarters in the West, as a critic of the clerical doctrines and authorities of the Islamic Republic. With an academic background in the philosophy of science, he brings modern philosophical and science elements into his attempts at a critical reconstruction of Islam in relation to politics, society and law. His contribution to *fiqh* is predominantly negative: the thrust is to question the authority of clerics and their tradition in favour of a modern social science approach. He also criticises the centrality of *fiqh* and the law to the Islam of the clerics. He appeals to the Islamic traditions of theology, philosophy and mysticism, arguing they are more central to religion and spirituality. The effect is to undermine the clerical claim to superior knowledge and authority, which rest on their competence in the legal craft.

Soroush is an ambitious thinker, drawing on a vast repertoire of Western philosophy, Islamic sciences, *fiqh* and mysticism. This compendium does not always lead to clear argument or lucid accounts. For our purpose we can draw the main points of the argument regarding *fiqh* and religious knowledge. He starts from the argument, widely shared among modernists, that while...
religion as such, including the shari'a, is of divine origin and complete, the knowledge of religion is human, relative to other forms of human knowledge, and as such socially and historically contingent: 'Shari'at is an eternal, heavenly and divine commandment, but our knowledge of Shari'at is a human, earthly and changeable rule in the sense that it is interrelated with theories of other human knowledge and involves constant evolution and development.'

Fiqh, as knowledge of the shari'a, is a 'consuming', as against 'productive', science: it draws on other sciences or forms of knowledge. In the past it drew on theology and philosophy: in modern times it must draw on current forms of knowledge in the human sciences. This is especially necessary as law relates to society, the economy and politics, which are the subject matter of those sciences. Implicitly, and even unintentionally, new forms of knowledge constitute an ambient environment for fiqh, with which it enters into hermeneutic symbiosis. As a form of knowledge, then, fiqh must not only draw forms of knowledge and expertise from the human sciences, but also be subject to the canons of scientific validity. Its arguments and conclusions must be subject to verification/falsification.

In other contexts Soroush goes further and makes fiqh redundant. Fiqh is concerned with law which originated in historical time in relation to nomadic and primitive societies. The shari'a, by contrast, is about ethics, derived from religion as faith. The shari'a lives, then, in men’s hearts, armed with faith in tackling the problems of modern circumstances. Morality, as commanded by religion, is not legislation but internalised norms of conduct deriving from divine command. Historically, under traditional forms of rule, humans were subject to authority which specified obligations, not rights. Under these conditions, religious obligations were enforced as ‘God’s rights’, huqūq al-lāh. Modern citizenship, by contrast, is about rights as well as obligations. In effect, Soroush declares fiqh to be redundant! Legislation in modern society should follow the needs and requirements of that society, as determined by the enquiry of modern social sciences. Ijtihād is allowed by Shi‘ī tradition only for the furū‘ (branches) of fiqh, not its usūl or principal sources, and such ijtiḥād can only be carried out in accordance with a strict methodology, only accessible to trained mujtahīds. Soroush argues that ijtiḥād should be all encompassing, to examine the roots and not just the branches, and to be

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48 Quoted in Ashk P. Dahlen, *Islamic law, epistemology and modernity: Legal philosophy in contemporary Iran* (New York and London, 2003), p. 289. This is the most comprehensive book in English on the work of Soroush with extensive quotations and references.

49 Ibid., ch. 7, especially pp. 287–95.

50 Ibid., p. 236.
carried out by persons qualified in the modern sciences who have expertise in relevant fields.\textsuperscript{51} In effect, Soroush wants to disqualify the clerics from the field of law, which becomes totally secularised. What remains of Islam in relation to conduct is the \textit{shari'ā}, conceived not as legislation, but as a system of ethics related to faith and a desire to know and please the Divine. \textit{Shari'ā} is then part of the other pursuits of faith, of theology and mysticism.

In this perspective Soroush targets the clerics and their claims. The clerics have made a profession of religion, he argues, and it is the source of their livelihood. As such they have vested interests in maintaining their forms of knowledge, and, above all, their authority over the law, and through it over government.\textsuperscript{52} Religion becomes ideology instead of a spiritual path. Soroush’s ultimate target is Khomeini’s doctrine of \textit{wilāyat i faqīh}, which underlies the ideology of clerical power and legitimacy in the Islamic Republic. Religion, in his argument, should be separated from government and power, and restored as spirituality, worship and practice. The \textit{shari'ā} in this perspective is reshaped in accordance with knowledge and expertise derived from modern science and especially the human sciences (which are generally denigrated by religious authorities). \textit{Taqlīd} (emulation by the Muslim of a chosen \textit{marja’} or authority), the cornerstone of clerical authority in Shī‘ism, becomes redundant, as any Muslim with knowledge and expertise can pursue his or her own \textit{ijtiḥād}. Indeed, \textit{taqlīd} is totally rejected by Soroush as an abdication of reason.

No wonder the ruling clerics have combated and persecuted Soroush. Intellectually Soroush does not pose a real challenge to the clerics. The whole edifice of \textit{fiqīh} rests on the theology of divine authority commanding human conduct. Knowledge of the scriptures and traditions, the craft of the clerics, is the key to divine command. To deny this simple principle by appeal to science is to depart from the central Islamic paradigm and to embrace secularism. In the Iranian context of religious rule Soroush’s claims are the ultimate subversion. Soroush, of course, has been persecuted and his ideas suppressed, not because of a coherent intellectual challenge, but a potent political one. His appeal is to a generation which grew up under the Islamic Republic and largely rejects its claims of religious authority. At the same time Soroush does claim some Islamic legitimacy by virtue of his disquisitions into the Islamic sciences and the traditions of theosophy and mysticism, which he asserts against the claims of the centrality of the law and the clerics’ power.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., pp. 224 5, 236 7.  
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 250.
It should be noted that Soroush’s ideas can be classed under the now popular but vague category of ‘post Islamism’. Part of this tendency is the rejection of the earlier Islamist quest for the Islamic state, enforcing the Divine Commands, in favour of the Islamic community, of shared piety, springing from internal faith and ethics, rather than subject to external coercion.

Muḥammad Shaḥrūr

Muḥammad Shaḥrūr appeals to science as a source of vocabularies and similes in terms of which the šari‘a can be modernised. Unlike Soroush he does not attempt to bypass the text, but to read it in novel ways which make innovation possible. Like other modernists, Shaḥrūr aims at achieving a permissive frame work for re formulating Islamic law in accordance with perceived modern conditions. To that end he resorts to some novel concepts, partly borrowed from scientific terminology, with which to read the Qurʾān and the Sunna. He advanced the theory of Limits. It states that there are two distinct principles in Qurʾānic formulations: hanīfiya and istiqāma. Istiqāma has a straightforward meaning of ‘straight’ or ‘right’, as in the recurring term in the Qurʾān: al ṣirat al mustaṣḥim, the straight path, that is the path of correct conduct as decreed by God. Hanīfiya is more complicated: it is generally understood to also mean or connote correctness and precedence, as in al dinu al hanīf. Shaḥrūr, however, through some creative etymology, assigns a meaning to it as ‘curvature’, the opposite of ‘straightness’. He argues that curvature is the pattern of movement in nature, as we see in the hyperbolic and elliptical paths of motion. Human nature (fitra) inclines to curvature. The straight path, as commanded by God, specifies upper and lower Limits within whose range the curvature can move. Legislation, then, occurs in the dialectical movement between curvature (nature) and straightness (God’s limits). The legislator at any particular point of time has a range of possibilities of developing rules between and within the Limits. The rules of division of inheritance, for instance, specify upper limits for the man’s share and a lower limit for the woman’s: legislation is free to move between these. Amputation of the hand of the thief is an upper limit which should not be exceeded, but could be mitigated in relation to specific social conditions (not at all clear why such mitigations are not a disobedience to a

54 Muḥammad Shaḥrūr, Al Kitāb wa’l Qurʾān: Qirā‘a mu‘āṣira, (Cairo and Damascus, 1992); Hallaq, History, pp. 245 53.
55 Shaḥrūr, Al Kitāb, pp. 445 52.
56 Hallaq, History, p. 248 50.
specific and clear commandment). On the thorny issue of polygyny, Shahhrur engages in similar exegeses as many modernists regarding the Qur’anic text allowing and qualifying four wives being tied to the question of orphans and the administration of their property. It is then deduced that multiple wives related either to orphan girls or to widows with young children, and not to marriage in general.57 Quite apart from this conclusion, the one and the four become, then, lower and upper limits, open to the legislator to determine.

For Shahhrur the task of modern legislator is that of *ijtihaad*, defined, not as ‘interpretation’ but ‘a process whereby legal language is taken to yield a particular legal effect suitable to a particular place and time’.58 Rules of the *shari’a* which come from elements of the life of the Prophet and his companions which were specific to his time and place are not binding on modern Muslims, who must proceed with their legislation in accordance with their own conditions, but following the principles and methods of the theory of Limits and the dialectical movement between straightness and curvature. On all matters in which there is no specific commandment (such as taxes and administration) then legislators are free to act in accordance with the circumstances of their time and place.

For Shahhrur, the historical practitioners of *fiqh* sought fixed rules based on the canonical sources, whereas his method of dialectical movement between limits allows for a dynamic programme of legislation. Shahhrur advances the analogy of a football match in which the play proceeds within and between the limits of the field. The jurists played only at the limits of the field and avoided its wide expanses.59

Shahhrur advances an interesting argument regarding the novelty of Islam as a source of legislation. Other religions, he argued, such as Judaism and Christianity, are rigid and do not allow the flexibility to time and place which he assigns to his religion. That is why secularisation was a necessary condition for modernity and progress in Europe. But Islam, it would seem, is exempt.

Hallaq, who is critical of all other modernists and utilitarians on grounds of the subjectivity and arbitrariness of their methods and arguments, is enthusiastic about Shahhrur: ‘His, then, is a unique contribution to the re interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunna in particular, and to law as a comprehensive system in general.’60 Part of the admiration is for Shahhrur’s drawing on the natural sciences. Shahhrur is, indeed, impressive in the novelty

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57 Ibid., p. 251.
58 Ibid., p. 247.
59 Ibid., p. 252.
60 Ibid., p. 246.
of his approach. But does he avoid the subjectivity and arbitrariness of other modernists?

The idea of a tension between natural inclinations (‘human nature’) and social or religious norms and the various compromises between them is commonplace, both in ‘common sense’ and in social and political theory from Hobbes to Durkheim. To put it in terms of ‘straightness’ and ‘curvature’ only adds a scientistic aura and Islamic vocabulary to the formulation, but little else. The discretion Shahrūr allows the modern mujtahid/legislator is no less subjective just because it is put in the language of limits. Why is the upper limit in the punishment of theft or adultery negotiable when it is clearly stated in the text? The traditional jurists stipulated various conditions which made the penalty less likely, but they did so in accordance with principles and methods which Shahrūr rejects, instead allowing the legislator subjective licence with regard to the commandment. Shahrūr adds one more, admittedly novel and lively, formulation to that of the many modernists in modern history and reaches very similar conclusions to his predecessors despite the novelty of the method.

Conclusion

Contemporary discourses on the shari‘a and its application emanate from diverse sources, each with its own motive and project. The context for these claims and debates are social and political interests and ideologies. Let us recap on the main types of actors so identified and their typical claims:

- Radical Salafists, with a political programme, sometimes jihadist and militant, for the establishment of an Islamic polity whose mainstay is the application of the shari‘a. The calls for the establishment of a universal khilâfā is one variant. These tend to be messianic rather than practical programmes, which take the shari‘a to be an unproblematic given, and are not concerned with the process of legislation and a legal system.

- Conservative Salafists, those aiming to Islamise society by establishing social and political controls over family, sexuality, education, cultural expression and public space. These are typically the ‘pious bourgeoisie’ of business people, professionals and some ‘ulâma’ who occupy positions of influence and notability, which they use to pressure governments, already suffering from deficits of legitimacy, to implement their programmes into law and practice.

- Cultural nationalists, for whom the enactment of the shari‘a as state law is a mark of cultural authenticity and the ultimate step in banishing colonial
Western implants in their society. These actors, typically intellectuals and politicians, face the dilemma of deriving a modern legal system with an emphasis on public law from a historical legacy of predominantly private law, much of it not pertinent to the issues faced by modern administration. We considered the example of Ḥasan Turābī and his identification of this problem, which he solved through the permissive category of maṣlaḥa. We saw how doctrines woven from this concept have played such an important part in the strategies of widening the claims of the šariʿa over issues of modern state and society, but at the expense of evading basic concepts and exigencies of a divine law.

- ‘Post Islamists’: those who aspire to adhere to God’s commands in worship and in social affairs, but who argue that such conduct must emanate from the internal motives and faith of the believer, and not enforced by state law. They overlap with the previous category in emphasising ethics and values against enforced norms, but are more specific on the norms required of the believer.

- Critics: these range from outright secularists to liberal Muslims. They agree that government and legislation should be separated from religion, and that Islam did not specify a system of government. Such advocates have been under constant attack from an increasingly Islamicised public. Farag Fuda, the Egyptian critic of the call for the šariʿa, was assassinated in 1992, and Nasr Ḥāmid Abu Zayd was dragged before the courts as an apostate and required to divorce his (Muslim) wife. Islamic Iran has spawned some of the most outspoken and articulate critics, notably Abdolkarim Soroush, who also conceives of Islam as a faith and ethical doctrine, open to ijtihād by modern intellectuals, challenging the authority of the ‘ulamā’ in speaking for Islam and the law.

The historically evolved fiqh developed a system of concepts and discursive strategies, with its own logic and methodology. Mutations of the law in relation to the exigencies of social and political life were accommodated within these concepts and methods. What we see in the modern age is a radical departure from these ideas and methods in favour of theories and ideologies articulated to modes of thought and arenas of contest generated by the politics and cultures of modernity. Politics and ideology are superimposed upon religion and law and become the moving forces of the dialogues around the šariʿa.
Chapter 1 of this volume sketches the central role played by Islamic law or shari‘a throughout the history of Islam and in the modern era. Islamic law is axiomatic to the religion, defining the religion at its most orthodox, delineating ritual practice, framing the ethics of the individual believer and the mores of the believing community and laying down a path to salvation. But Islamic law is also more: it was the framework for the laws and legal systems of a major part of the known world for over a millennium. Its age old significance as source of law still resonates widely in legal as well as religious matters until today. This chapter focuses on shari‘a as law and constitution in modern times.

The pre-existing Islamic legal and constitutional model: siyāsa shar‘iyya

As mentioned previously in this volume, Islamic law, in formulations that emerged gradually over the first five centuries of Islamic rule, developed an effective constitutional theory based on two complementary functions: the religious scholars or ‘ulamā‘ expounding and defending their interpretation (fiqh) of the religious law (shari‘a), and the state embodied usually in the person of the ruler with his court. The evolved theory became known by the name siyāsa shar‘iyya from about the fourteenth century, but its rudiments had been operative long before. While defined and articulated by ‘ulamā‘, it derived from and subsisted in the scholars’ ongoing negotiation with rulers, beyond the reach of books. It held that while ‘ulamā‘ and ruler both served a single higher sovereign, God, whose law is shari‘a, they did so in distinct ways. What were these distinct functions?

The function of the ‘ulamā‘ was to define God’s law. They established as orthodox a vision of the texts of the Qur‘ān and Sunna as a self contained
verbal message to mankind, one which, most importantly, conveys divine
commands creating a law governing all human acts for eternity. They held
that this law, the shari’a, may be known only either from its literal words
properly understood or from indications in those words discernible by the
learned through a method known as ʿijtihād. In effect, the scholars defined
shari’a in such a way that scholars alone could know it. For similar reasons
they declared that only those of sufficient learning could serve as qādis, the
judges applying the scholars’ law.

What was the function assigned to the ruler under the operative constitu-
tional theory? The state had the task of wielding worldly power and authority
in defence of God’s law and the Muslim community, often labelled siyāsa or
governance. Obviously, ruling over empires, waging wars, collecting taxes
and keeping civil peace are roles beyond the reach of the pious scholars in
their studies. So are provisioning mosques and appointing and compensating
state officials including judges. But what about the roles of determining the
applicable laws (legislating) and settling disputes (adjudicating)? If only the
ʿulamāʾ are competent to know the law, should not these roles be performed
solely by ʿulamāʾ? As it turned out, in these spheres fiqh itself delegated to the
state an essential function complementary to its own. As for legislating, it was
acknowledged that the state need not apply each and every ruling issued by
scholars, who were, after all, rarely unanimous on any point. Rather, the state
is free to make legal provisions serving the general good (maṣlaha) as long as
these provisions do not contradict the shari’a in any fundamental way (a test
left broadly ambiguous). Hence, while the ‘ulamāʾ sought to determine the
purport of revealed texts, theoretically largely disregarding contingencies, the
state did the reverse: it pursued utility first and consulted the texts only post
hoc and then only to avoid giving them fundamental offence, a far cry from
literal obedience. As such the ruler could, more easily than the ‘ulamāʾ with
their eternal and transcendent law, embrace contingency, change, approx-
imation and expediency. In adjudication as well, the state—being the source
of the worldly power of state officials including judges since it alone can
appoint them and enforce their pronouncements—was free to create courts as
public need required, including special courts to administer decrees of the
state.

Partly for reasons of history, but more for reasons of their distinct inherent
capacities, the roles of scholars and of the ruler in legislating and adjudicating
became specialised, with the result that legal systems ruled by siyāsa
theory became almost bifurcated, bipedal. While shari’a covers all human
acts, yet the law elaborated by the scholars, the fiqh, emerged as most
comprehensively developed for matters first of private, then family, then civil, then communal and only lastly state concern in a sense building outward from private law towards public law. Thus the fiqh and the institutions to apply it such as the courts of the qādis specialised in the legal realms of ritual, family, charitable trusts (waqfs), contract and commerce, tort, property, public behaviour and some tenets of criminal law (especially the Qur'ānically defined qiṣāṣ and ḥudūd). On the other hand, the legal sphere of siyāsa administered and enforced by rulers, officials and non qādi courts tended to govern the more public aspects of law, such as the general criminal law, state revenue and taxation, state organisation, the conduct of war and international law.

Siyāsa sharʿīyya theory also covered the most basic constitutional question, the legitimacy of state rule. While originally Sunnī fiqh pinned a ruler’s legitimacy on his personal merits and the manner of his selection, under siyāsa sharʿīyya theory his legitimacy depended on his effectiveness in upholding sharīʿa. Indeed, the theory in evolved form disregarded merit and selection process to the point of bestowing legitimacy on whoever gained power and according his acts an efficacy, de facto, equivalent to those of a canonical caliph. Rulers’ shortcomings in religious knowledge and rectitude an expectation that became self-fulfilling were supposed to be made up through the ‘ulamā’ moral influence on ruler and populace. While taking these positions was practical and perhaps inevitable, still, piety and tradition insisted on portraying them as a falling from the ideal, which remained that of a single pious, virtuous, scholarly and all powerful caliph ruling a unified Muslim world. Such studied ambivalence toward actual rulers, portraying all actual authority only as unwilling compromise with reality, was a crucial element in enabling Islamic legal and political theory to accommodate the real world.

In practice the legitimacy of states was continually brokered through the complementary roles of rulers and ‘ulamā. ‘Ulamā could stand aloof from and critique the ruler’s failings, if their reputation, professional position and popular following allowed it; or they could bow to the inevitable and serve ruler and state since otherwise sharīʿa would not be enforced or religious rites observed. Rulers could choose to rely for legitimation on deference to sharīʿa and ‘ulamā within the bounds of practicality or else hit upon other, non sharīʿa dependent, legitimacies such as prowess in jihad wars or some form of charismatic rule. Systems continually negotiated workable legitimacies through such paired choices between cooperation and competition, cooptation and conflict.
This constitutional system endured for centuries, affording a means by which the ideals of Islamic law were brought into practical relation to the day to day needs of state legal systems. A dynamism of complementary interests generated an inexhaustible fund of meaning for many possible working compromises between ideal and real.

Five premises of pre-modern systems

It is useful to stop at this point to identify five basic premises or characteristics of the late medieval system of laws and government, as described here and in other chapters in this volume. These premises will help us below in discerning ways in which Muslim legal systems of today have preserved or abandoned traits of the constitutional system just described, and also in comparing modern Muslim systems with those of liberal democratic states world wide.¹ They all concern certain *shari‘a* derived normative assumptions about law and government widely held in pre modern times. They are primarily Sunnī; but they can be largely applied to Shi‘ī legal systems too where these have existed.

The five premises are as follows. The first premise is the belief that *shari‘a* is *self executing*: it applies of its own force, addressed directly, without intermediary, to every believing individual. No worldly institution plays any essential role. The Qur‘ān speaks immediately to everyone, frequently with commands. Open it, read a command (about inheritance, marriage, witnessing, paying alms, praying) and one feels bound by that command as if it were addressed directly to oneself. Note how this premise relates not just to belief but to command, to law.

The second premise holds that, notwithstanding the last premise, human beings have a vital role in *shari‘a*‘s application. This is because *shari‘a* is *transitive*: besides being a moral duty that the hearer must fulfill himself, it is also a law that the hearer must enforce on himself and on others over whom he wields power or influence. In other words, the *shari‘a* offers its discrete commands with the fundamental implication that individuals are obliged to do their best to uphold it, enforce it, see it enacted, not only on themselves but in this world. Human beings are God’s vice regents (*khalīfās*) enjoined to rule by what God has revealed, to judge by truth and to order the good and forbid the evil.² Moreover, some of these commands define the structure and scope

¹ Perhaps because they arise from comparisons with modern law, they are not (except for the last) anything acknowledged by the tradition, or anything of which it was usually self aware.

of power itself (husband and wife, ruler and subject, judge and litigant, etc.), and thus shari‘a incorporates authority, governance and politics. A hadith declares that everyone is a shepherd and has a flock, and all are held to account for their flock.3

The third premise is that shari‘a is textual: to know God’s law is an exercise not of politics, collective deliberation or, again, of an institution, but of textualist interpretation—an effort to ascertain what is the most likely verbal meaning of the revealed text. For this textualist exercise, the most important qualification is certain types of textual knowledge and skills, namely, the capacity to do ijtihād. Unlike determination of divine law through a positivist legal process, reliance solely on the texts if done with epistemological rigour leaves the law almost always underdetermined; texts always leave room for disagreement. Since the texts contain the whole of the law (God’s revelation being completed with the Qur‘ān and Muhammad), then, if scholars find after lengthy study that the texts either are silent or leave multiple possibilities, no world existing authority may fill the gap or settle the dispute; God alone knows the final answer; human beings are left with only plausible guesses. In this way textual indeterminacy is a marker for transcendence.

Together the three premises so far hold out the ideal of the textual revelation as sovereign over all aspects of human life including every level and phase of social life, among them power and domination. Clearly, these premises are highly idealised in their statement. In practical terms they correspond to a regime of law in which religious legal scholars had gained the ideological upper hand and striven to give the law and constitution of Islamic states a form in their own image. They clearly operate to diminish the legal and constitutional autonomy of the state. Since, under the first and second premises (that shari‘a is self executing and transitive), the law engages individuals and not institutions, the state held no monopoly over law or its enforcement. In the wide sphere of civil law, individuals and groups enjoyed much autonomy. The third premise, textualism, since it deprived the state of authority to determine the divine law, left it monopolising worldly power but limited in its authority to shape the law to its own liking or to wrest a religious legal legitimacy from often resistant scholars.

The fourth and fifth premises relate to the legal system, or how shari‘a is actually brought into force. The fourth premise is contingency of decision in shari‘a. This starts from the question how, when divine law is rarely known to a certainty, any human actor may legitimately enforce divine law on anyone?

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3 Al Bukhārī 1:160 (Jum‘a), 4:233 (Aḥkām); Muslim (Imāra 20, 21).
Or, what transforms this diffuse law into concrete rulings that can claim, in the name of the religion, to bind consciences, especially coercively? The traditional shari’a answer is that such a transformation occurs in one of two ways. The first is through ijtihād by a scholarly judge: when in deciding a particular case he chooses a rule as the one that most likely in his opinion corresponds to the transcendentally true (but impossible finally to determine) shari’a ruling for that case. Such a decision has religiously binding force, but only for that particular instance, with no precedential effect. The second way is when the ruling institution, in siyāsa shari‘yya mode and ideally after consulting scholars, decrees law that in its view serves welfare and does not contradict shari’a; in that case the Qur‘ānic obligation to obey those in authority makes obedience religiously binding. Note that neither of these forms of enforcement ‘speaks for God’, or claims its result to be absolute truth. The way theory justifies them is ultimately worldly: action being needed, debate must ultimately come to an end.

Finally, the fifth premise is siyāsa shari‘yya, the political and constitutional theory and practice discussed above, of compromised state legitimacy based on a dualistic legal system opposing scholars and rulers, its rulings only by delegation part of the shari’a. This theory and system emerged hand in hand with the premises above.

**Modern transformations in legal systems**

To return now to modern times, Chapter 1 of this volume instructs us how, beginning about 1850, most legal systems framed by siyāsa were rapidly and radically transformed. Ruling regimes, possessed of novel powers under the new centralising dispensation brought about by the advent of modern political, bureaucratic and technological forms and means, used the opportunity to roll back the rights and privileges of the ‘ulamā’. The realms of law assigned to the scholars’ law rapidly shrank, their place taken by state issued compilations deriving from Western laws. At the same time the religious courts lost jurisdiction. After a short time the shari’a, the ‘ulamā’ and the religious courts remained in control only over the laws of the family and religious endowments (waqfs). At first the family law continued to be applied as before, by ‘ulamā’ in their religious courts, but eventually in most countries even the family law underwent codification by the state and application by law trained judges.4

4 While modern codes reflect the old shari’a law most densely in the sphere of family and waqf law, borrowings from shari’a can also be found elsewhere in civil and criminal law.
Only in Turkey did this transformation carry on to the end, to supplanting 
shari‘a altogether and abolishing religious law and courts. But in most coun-
tries the façade of siyāsa shari‘iyya legitimacy was never wholly abandoned. As 
long as the state applied shari‘a law in one sphere at least the family one 
could argue that the rest was merely a gross expansion, under the stress of 
extraordinary times, of the ruler’s power to legislate in the interests of the 
general utility. Even this justification has, except among legal specialists, 
largely eroded from memory. What is left is a sense that by degrees a part 
of the old system, itself already a compromise, has now usurped nearly the 
whole, and that the principle of divine sovereignty over the state and its laws, 
though never rejected, is vestigial to the point of irrelevance. A resulting sense 
of malaise opens a wide door for movements calling for return to shari‘a and 
decrying legal importations as ungodly arrogations, forced by alien powers, of 
God’s own sovereignty.

In contrast to such states (which we might call ‘semi secular’), there are 
two other types of Islamic states. A second type is states one might label 
them ‘traditionalist’ that still manifest the old siyāsa shari‘iyya model, never 
having experienced the transformation of their legal and constitutional 
systems in the manner of the majority. Examples here are Saudi Arabia; to 
a lesser extent Afghanistan (pre Marxist and post Taliban); and the small 
states of the Persian Gulf littoral though these are now transforming rapidly. 
A third type of state, which we might call ‘radical’, are those states that, after 
a revolution or coup, transformed themselves from one of the other two 
types and asserted themselves as Islamic in a new, more radical sense. The 
examples here are Iran after its revolution of 1979, Sudan for some years after 
its Islamist coup of 1989 and Afghanistan under the Taliban from roughly 

Let us explore as case studies two of the states just mentioned Saudi 
Arabia and Iran each a clear example of its type, employing the five precepts 
above to analyse and contrast their character. These states apply Islamic law to 
a greater degree than any other states in the world. In their commonalities and 
their contrasts, therefore, lie many lessons for the significance of shari‘a as law 
and constitution in today’s world.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia, representing the traditionalist type, never experienced a modern 
drastic shift of its legal system towards Western legal forms and institutions.
Though the country was created only in 1932 after the unification of the Arabian Peninsula by ‘Abd al ‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ūd, its legal origins extend back to an event over 250 years ago. In 1745 Muḥammad ibn Sa‘ūd (r. 1746–65), King ‘Abd al ‘Aziz’s ancestor and founder of the Saudi dynastic line, formed an alliance with the founder of the Wahhābī religious reform movement Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb (d. 1792). Each agreed to support the other in spreading the rule of a puritanical and reformist Islamic state in which Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb would guide religious matters and Ibn Sa‘ūd would reign. This pact was consciously the fulfilment of the theory of siyāsa shar‘iyya of the Ḥanbalī legal scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328).

This pact survives today in the form of a legal and constitutional system built explicitly on the co-operation of Wahhābī ulamā’ and the king to uphold the rule of Qur‘ān and Sunna. While in external, formal legal terms the king holds all power in the kingdom, yet, because the king’s authority rests on the obligation to apply sharī‘a and because the authoritative interpretation of sharī‘a is in the hands of ‘ulamā’, his power is in reality powerfully checked in matters of ‘ulamā’ specialisation at least by the intangible authority of the sharī‘a.

To give the clearest example, Saudi Arabia professes to lack a legislative branch of government, since, it is said, the Qur‘ān and the Sunna are the law (and constitution) of the kingdom. Saudi Arabia has, however, a counterpart to legislative power in the king’s power to issue, by decree, ‘regulations’ (sing., nizām). The king’s power is circumscribed by the old siyāsa shar‘iyya norm: a nizām to be valid must be both useful for public welfare and not fundamentally contradict, but rather supplement, what the ‘ulamā’ have already determined is the divine law. While there are numerous nizāms, they tend to be short and specific interventions in the otherwise prevailing body of law drawn from Ḥanbalī fiqh. Many of them concern only the novel legal institutions of the modern day (e.g. banks, companies with legal personality, traffic laws) or the bureaucratic trappings of the modern state (e.g. civil service, passports). One nizām has particular dignity: the 1992 Basic Law explaining how the government is organised.5 It gives explicit formulation to the siyāsa shar‘iyya theory of government:

The constitution [of the Kingdom] is the Qur‘ān and the Sunna of His Prophet. (Art. 1)

Rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia draws its authority from the Qur’ān and the Sunna of His Prophet. These two are sovereign over this law and all laws (niẓāms) of the state. (Art. 7)

The courts shall apply in cases brought before them the rules of the Islamic shari‘a in agreement with the indications in the Qur’ān and the Sunna, and the laws issued by the ruler that do not contradict the Qur’ān or the Sunna. (Art. 48)

The King shall undertake the governing (siyāsa) of the nation in accordance with siyāsa shar‘iyya in fulfilment of the rules (ahkām) of Islam. (Art. 55)

The result of this system of laws is that the great bulk of Saudi law is simply fiqh. Uncodified fiqh supplies the law governing family, property, commerce, contract, tort and crimes, as well as filling gaps in and among niẓāms. This law can be learned only from observing how the Saudi ‘ulamā‘ choose generally to apply the body of interpretation of Islamic law received from late medieval and early modern times. Operationally, the laws of the kingdom are what learned scholars say they are; thus, Saudi law is a jurists’ law. Like Wahhābīs before them, Saudi jurists usually favour the Hānbalī school, and therefore the best written authorities on Saudi private and criminal law are several important Hānbalī texts written hundreds of years ago. But the law of Saudi Arabia continues to evolve beyond those sources as individual Saudi judges and mufīts exercise their powers of interpretation or ijtihād, usually within the frame work of Hānbalī principles.6

That Saudi law is jurists’ law shows in several striking characteristics of the Saudi legal system comparatively. First, in other systems in the world statutory enactments supersede pre existing common or customary law principles, even if these are considered longstanding or basic. But in Saudi Arabia it is the reverse: if an individual judge so decides, rules of the shari‘a law, if strongly established, can assume virtually constitutional status and overrule divergent royal legislation. Another result is that any legal opinion of a respected private scholar, even one who died long ago, can be argued to be as much the law of Saudi Arabia as the law routinely applied by the courts, and can be validly and irreversibly implemented by private parties in their own affairs.7

In outline the Saudi Arabian legal system meets the requirements of the siyāsa shar‘iyya theory, and pays homage to each of the five premises of

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traditional *shari‘a* systems identified above. Taking them in order, first (*shari‘a* is self executing), a conventional believer in Islam loyal to the Saudi system can hold that, despite the thoroughly modernised forms of Saudi government, the legal order it upholds is the same legal order that he applies to himself in prayer or fasting. Second (*shari‘a* is transitive), he can believe that king and ‘ulamā’ legitimately exercise, by delegation ultimately from God, powers to choose particular interpretations and implementations of *shari‘a* and to enforce them on him, just as he chooses and applies rules for persons for whom he is responsible. Third (*shari‘a* is textual), the source of Saudi law to him is the texts interpreted by scholars, whom he respects in degrees according to his perception of their piety, integrity and learning. Despite all this, the believer realises that, fourth (contingency of decision), in enforcing the law the doings of ‘ulamā’ and ruler fall within the human, contingent and temporal sphere, lacking a guarantee of divine perfection, and that, as in every government, corruption and abuses occur. And lastly, under the fifth premise (*siyāsa shari‘iyah*), for him the state’s and scholars’ legitimacy rises or falls based on their record of respecting *shari‘a*, perceived as upholding justice and serving the public good. The system is far from flawless or the epitome of the ideal Islamic state, yet that is neither required nor expected.

Viewing all this one realises how inaccurate it is to analyse this system using the template of liberal democratic governments. If one attempts to do it, easy but false conclusions readily follow such as that, since the king controls all three branches of government, his power has no check or balance; that, since there is no separation between church and state, the king must be the head of the religion and decide what is orthodox; that a king’s failures in private virtue make him unfit to claim such Islamic rule; or that since many of the most influential ‘ulamā’ perform various functions within a government organised on modern lines headed by the king, they must have lost their traditional authority and been co opted.

Since a still largely traditional *fiqh* law is so foundational in the Saudi system, Saudi Arabia is resistant to criticism and calls for change on grounds of human rights, particularly as to freedom of worship (it upholds capital punishment for apostasy and outlaws public exercise of other religions), status of women (besides the well known gender inequalities in Islamic family, criminal and procedural law, Saudi Arabia prohibits women from driving, travelling abroad without a related male or appearing in public unveiled; morals police enforce public propriety), criminal law (it applies penalties of beheading, amputation, stoning and lashing) and political participation (it restricts rights of association, and elections are held only for half the seats of provincial assemblies and with
voting and candidacy restricted to men). The country has, however, begun processes of reform, including an appointed consultative council gradually augmenting its powers, provincial elections, broad civil and criminal procedure statutes, an investigative judiciary corps, a fortified bar, statutory guarantors of legal counsel, official channels for dissent and human rights organisations. In the late 1990s Saudi Arabia acceded to several important international human rights conventions, but mostly with general reservations favouring Islamic law.

Iran

Iran offers a starkly contrasting case study, as one of the radical states mentioned above, states formerly modernised using Western legal models which, after violent upheaval, claim to install a pure Islamic state.

One far reaching contrast with Saudi Arabia is that Iran is Twelver (Imāmī) Shi‘ī in adherence, while Saudi is rigorously Sunnī, this difference entailing broad divergence in doctrinal constructs. Viewing Shi‘ism traditionally, three sets of tenets stand out as contrasting to Saudi and Sunnī conceptions. One is the repudiation of any existing state as wholly illegitimate, for the reason that, in Shi‘ī thought, power belongs exclusively to the God appointed infallible imam; co operation with actual rulers can only be on the most grudging terms. But this contrast can easily be exaggerated, since Sunnī co operation with the state, as we have seen, also presents itself as a compromise with regrettable facts. And, under favourable conditions, under Shi‘ī rulers willing to entrust Shi‘ī ‘ulamā’ with authority, the relationship between the ruler and Shi‘ī scholars could be mutually respectful and co operative. In Qājār Iran of the middle and late nineteenth century, theories were launched by which the ruler and ‘ulamā’ shared a delegation from the Hidden Twelfth Imam of worldly authority the ruler over power, the ‘ulamā’ over knowledge a theory roughly congruent to Sunnī siyāsā shar‘iyya. But, no doubt, among Shi‘ī ‘ulamā’ withdrawal from politics and the state represents the norm, and involvement the exception, while for Sunnī ‘ulamā’ it is the reverse.

A second set of Shi‘ī tenets resulted, in the eighteenth century, in the formation of a semi formal hierarchy among ‘ulamā’, through the development of the notion that every lay person must follow the guidance of the most learned living mujtahid, a personage assigned the title marja‘ al taqlīd, meaning

8 El’, art. ‘Mardja’ i taqlīd’ (J. Calamard).
‘resort for legal emulation’. Other scholars capable of ijtihād occupy ranks below the marja‘ but remain in theory free to practise their own ijtihād; this entails that even the marja‘ cannot dispense ultimate religious truth, which remains transcendental. Differences as to who is the most learned scholar have ordinarily resulted in more than one scholar at a time holding such rank, often with differing geographic spheres of influence. All this has little correspondence with Sunnī theory, and gives Shī‘ī ‘ulamā’ greater (but far from complete) cohesion and intelligibility as a body, as well as greater flexibility deriving from their emphasis on the ijtihād of living scholars.

The third crucial doctrinal difference, related to the last, concerns the sources of revenue accruing to the ‘ulamā’. Sunnī scholars through much of their history enjoyed some means of support independent of the state, chiefly from education and administration of waqfs. But from the nineteenth century these sources of income, as well as income from state offices, diminished rapidly as states nationalised and largely secularised many ‘ulamā’ functions. For Shī‘īs, on the other hand, the nineteenth century brought greater means than before. Exploiting earlier doctrinal proposals, they secured for themselves the right to collect and distribute, on behalf of the Hidden Imam, the khums, a tax of one fifth of the believer’s annual income after expenses, much of which could be spent on their own institutions.10

These tenets, along with other circumstances, actually helped a relationship between ruler and scholars emerge in Qājār Iran (1794 1925) similar to the Sunnī siyāsah shar‘iyya framework, with the ‘ulamā’ enjoying political influence and financial and institutional autonomy. Meanwhile, by the mid nineteenth century in Sunnī lands the scholars’ position in the siyāsah framework was swiftly eroding, as legal systems assimilated Western form and content. But such changes were not long in coming to Iran as well, beginning with the Constitutional Crisis of 1905 9. ‘Ulamā’ took vigorous but contrasting positions on the issue of constitutionalism, many favouring it as a fit method to restrain the Qājār ruler, others opposing it as a harbinger of secularism. The Iranian constitution of 1906 7 assigned to a council of ‘ulamā’ power to veto

legislation for conflict with *shari‘a*. But with the emergence of Reza Shāh (r. 1925–41) and the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–79), Iran experienced vast increases in the power of the state and rapid secularisation, becoming a ‘semi secular’ state as discussed above.

Moving closer to the 1979 Iranian revolution Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989), notably in his 1970 work *Wilāyat fī faqīh* (Guardianship of the jurist), makes the starkest possible break with two of the Shi‘ī tenets above, that ‘ulamā’ only sparingly, and by exception, become involved in state functions, and that truth remains transcendent over even the ‘ulamā’ hierarchy. For Khomeini, the imam’s right to rule ‘continues’, and during occultation of the Imam is delegated to the ‘ulamā’ and indeed not to all ‘ulamā’ but to one of them who possesses not only learning but political acumen. Such a jurist should assume wilāya (guardianship) over the state and society in the name of the occulted Imam. To claim the delegation to the ‘ulamā’ of general rulership, and not just certain specific legal and administrative tasks, is an innovation in Shi‘ī history. ‘*Ulāmā* and *fiqh* shift from withdrawal from politics to activism, political struggle becoming a vital religious obligation. Moreover, Khomeini asserts that even scholars must obey the ruling jurist, presumably for the sake of political unity. The existing notion of the *marja‘ al taqlīd* (Khomeini himself was already one *marja‘* of several), to whom lay people owe obedience and many scholars habitually defer, is invoked implicitly, but now to support binding obedience to a scholar ruler.

In arguing for a jurist ruler, Khomeini posits *fiqh* and those who know it as the only law and legal system an Islamic state needs. This is despite a fact of which he was well aware that *fiqh*’s provisions as to governance are scanty and vague, and that history has provided ‘ulamā’ and *fiqh* (especially Shi‘ī) with next to no experience or qualifications in actual governance. Thus, the normal avenue by which Islamic states of the past accommodated expediency, moral approximation and contingent, temporal fact the grudging but efficacious embrace of de facto rulers is deliberately expelled from his system. This is to

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12 Also titled Ḥukūmat-i islāmī (Islamic government).
repudiate the experience of Islamic states for over a millennium: that fiqh and the skills of ‘ulamā’ do not suffice for the successful governing of states, and that complements to them must be found among other laws and legal actors not rigidly bound by fiqh.

With the Iranian revolution Khomeini’s theory of guardianship of the jurist became enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Khomeini, having spearheaded the revolution, became the head of state as Supreme Leader. The Constitution is eclectic, combining elements of populism, republicanism and wilāyat i faqīh, with many internal tensions and contradictions. Yet the Supreme Leader, chosen from among those qualified as marja‘ al taqlīd by a council of elected experts, holds overwhelming powers. Art. 110 provides that he declares war, is commander in chief, appoints the supreme judicial authority and other powerful state posts and supervises the ‘proper execution’ of state policies. Khomeini himself frequently exercised supra constitutional powers, including legislating and even informally amending the Constitution itself, and was accorded virtually the authority of the Hidden Imam himself. Member of the ‘ulamā’ generally are assigned key powers under the Constitution, usually appointed by and reporting to the Supreme Leader. ‘Ulamā’ occupy six of twelve seats on the powerful Guardian Council, and hold power to veto legislation passed by the popularly elected parliament for conflict with the laws of Islam (Art. 92). The same Council has the power to approve candidacies for political offices (under Arts. 99, 110), and has exploited this power to curtail political opposition to ‘ulamā’ rule. Art. 4 enjoins that all laws and the constitution itself must comply with ‘Islamic criteria (maqāyir)’, as determined by the scholars of the Guardian Council, and Art. 72 prohibits laws contrary to the ‘sources (üşūl)’ and ‘rulings (ahkām)’ of Islam. Under Arts. 167 and 170 judges are enjoined not to enforce government laws ‘in conflict with the laws or norms of Islam’, and, where no statutory provision exists, to deliver judgement ‘on the basis of authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwas’.

As we did for Saudi Arabia, let us employ the five premises (see pp. 304 5 above) to analyse law and legal system in Iran as framed by the theory of wilāyat i faqīh and by the 1979 Constitution, taking the premises in order. First (shari‘a is self executory), while shari‘a continues to bind believers directly and of its own

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force, a *marja‘* who serves also as a head of an Islamic state wielding worldly powers tantamount to those of a present imam does represent a vigorous institutionalised power to define religious legal truth intermediate between God and the believer. No equivalent exists in orthodox Sunnī legal theory or practice—not even the eighth and ninth century eponyms of the Sunnī schools of law. Second (*shari‘a* is transitive), in Iran as in Saudi Arabia, a believer in the system can readily accept, as religiously valid, the authority of the state and the ‘ulamā’ to enforce the divine law on him, just as he himself applies it to those under his authority. Unlike in Saudi Arabia, however, law generated by the state in the name of Islam, not *fiqh* itself, defines the scope of those higher authorities. Third (*shari‘a* is textual), the source of Islamic law for the Iranian citizen is not only textual interpretations by scholars (as in Saudi Arabia), but also the Supreme Leader’s powers under *wilāyat i faqiḥ* which enable him, in the name of Islamic law itself, explicitly to overrule all other *fiqh* and ‘ulamā’. Pausing here after these three premises, we observe that while all of them apply in Iran as much as in Saudi Arabia, there is in each case the difference that the state claims crucial religious legal roles that elsewhere belong solely to non-state *fiqh* and ‘ulamā’: in effect, religious legal functions are far more formalised or positivised. As for the fourth and fifth premises (contingency of decision and *siyāsah shari‘yya*), we find that the Iranian system as initially framed by Khomeini and the Constitution seeks to diminish or even reject them. The revolution surged with ambition to overcome old compromises and at long last achieve an ideal. When Khomeini claimed to be both head of state and universal *marja‘* (and for many, representative of the Hidden Imam himself), and when state laws are anointed as Islamic by both ‘ulamā’ and the Supreme Leader, any sense that legal determinations are at best contingent or even *ad hoc*, and not themselves realisations of Islamic justice, is eroded. And *siyāsah shari‘yya* or its Qājār era analogues are not invoked by the revolutionary state, since it claims full legitimacy as applying only pure text inspired *shari‘a* and being led not by ignorant or impious rulers but by ‘ulamā’ themselves. (Such contrasts not only with Saudi Arabia but with past patterns of law and constitution in Islamic history can be exhibited also, with local variations, by the handful of other radical Islamic states that have emerged.)

The experience of the Iranian Republic after its launch is highly instructive. It shows clearly how received *fiqh* and the ‘ulamā’ fell short in meeting the legal needs of the Republic. Here there are two major points. First, most pre-revolutionary statutory laws remained in place, notably including the monumental Civil Code (1928, 1935), altered only in details directly opposed to Islamic law such as interest. Entirely new codes are few, the notable exception
being a new penal code drawn from Islamic law appearing in 1982, including the harsh ḥudūd and qīṣāṣ penalties, accompanied by a code of criminal procedure in 1982 using fiqh evidentiary rules. Even in family law, while the former shah’s 1967 and 1975 liberalizing Family Protection Act was harshly criticised and left in legal limbo, comparably liberal reforms have emerged by piecemeal enactments. Despite Art. 170 of the Constitution, courts rarely apply uncodified Shi‘ī law, apart from certain writings by Khomeini.20

Second, when parliament attempted, usually with encouragement from Khomeini, to fulfil redistributional promises of the revolution by enacting legislative projects of broad economic change, it found itself clashing repeatedly with the Guardian Council, which vetoed legislation on grounds of conflict with Islamic principles protecting private property and regulating individual transactions.21 The deadlock in the end could be resolved only by drastic constitutional revision, engineered by Khomeini himself shortly before his death. This involved adding a powerful third legislative body to the system, the Council for Ascertainment of State Expediency (majma‘ i tashkhiş i mašlahat i niẓām), its members appointed entirely by the Supreme Leader (Art. 112). This council is charged to override, on grounds of state or collective expediency, Guardian Council legislative vetoes. As acknowledged at the time by Iranian scholars, this innovation employs a Sunnī notion, that of mašlaḥa (utility) which is, as we have seen, the linchpin of siyāsa shar‘iyya. In 1988, during the same crisis, Khomeini memorably declared that establishing the Islamic state is not a ‘secondary (thanawīyya)’ commandment justified as a necessary means to the Islamic order, but rather a ‘primary (awwaliyya)’ commandment deriving from revealed sources (like ritual law or civil law), and indeed it is among the most important primary rules, with priority even over prayer and fasting. Thus, with this perspective, laws of the Republic may remain Islamic even if they disregard shari‘a norms.22 All these events are strong testimony to a general proposition: a governance denominated complement to textualist qh will prove necessary whenever a traditionally defined shari‘a aspires to be law of the land.

Also, Khomeini’s effort to make religious politics a central endeavour of Shi‘ī ‘ulamā’ failed, although insiders to the regime of course defend it. ‘Ulama’ opinion has swung strongly against wilāyat i faqīḥ theory, at least in

21 Schirazi, Constitution, pp. 175–205.
Khomeini’s formulation, and many reclaim the old orthodoxy of quietism in politics. Moreover, ‘ulamā’ have prevented Shī‘ī orthodoxy from becoming nationalised and positivised by the Iranian state. The state fought, and is fighting, these battles still. ‘Ulamā’ opposing wilāyat i faqīh and criticising ‘ulamā’ rule are subjected to vilification, house arrest, assault and, in the hands of an extra constitutional clerical court, even trial and severe sentences. Khomeini’s chosen successor as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Muntazirı was pushed aside because he demurred from excesses of wilāyat i faqīh. Yet, despite all efforts to quell opposition, Khomeini and his ‘ulamā’ supporters were unable to secure as a successor to Khomeini any scholar of the rank of marja’. The Constitution had to be amended to remove the marja‘ condition so that Ali Khamenei could take office. Subsequent efforts to unite the function of marja‘ with the function of Supreme Leader abysmally failed, as Shī‘ī scholars and faithful have largely rejected Khamenei as marja‘, much less as sole marja‘, and chosen several others, many of whom reject wilāyat i faqīh and espouse political quietism. Treatises and instruction abound among scholars that modify or reject wilāyat i faqīh. With these developments the Shī‘ī religion and religious law remain transcendent over the state, Iran is denied completion as a theocracy, fiqh has conceded ground to expediency and ‘ulamā’ regain their separation from rulership. With all this the age old profile of siyāsā shar‘iyya seems to be re emerging, and Iran seems to be reverting from the radical model above to the semi secular one. Indeed, if the struggle to diminish clerical power and to democratise the Republic succeeds and does so while sincerely invoking Islam and shari‘a, Iran could possibly attain the as yet unprecedented status of a ‘reformist’ Islamic state, a state able to undermine the text and ‘ulamā’ sovereignty over religious law entailed by the first three premises.

Conclusion

Islamic law continues to have formative influence on the lived laws and legal systems of Muslim states. In many locales the trend is toward reshaping legal

26 Space does not permit exposure of several dramatic reassertions of siyāsā shar‘iyya models in recent constitutional developments in Egypt, Afghanistan and Iraq.
structures in the name of *shari‘a*, at least symbolically. This trend should not be equated with the increase in extremist fundamentalism, but taken as something far more deep seated and benign. After all, the episode in which *shari‘a* and its ideals for public and private legal life have been largely confined to the sphere of family law began only between five and fifteen decades ago.

As legal forms invoking *shari‘a* emerge, they will do so in very different ways than in the pre modern past. The systems discussed here Saudi Arabia and Iran may or may not exemplify stages in that evolution. Still, the legal structures and conceptions by which *fiqh* in past and present has been reconciled with the everyday must not be ignored. Even where such ideas and institutions are no longer remembered or cultivated, they (or analogues to them) seem capable of emerging on their own. Understanding the forces that compel them will be needed for understanding Islamic law regimes of the future.
Introduction

European colonialism and its aftermath have drastically transformed the basis and nature of political and social organisation within and among ‘territorial states’ where all Muslims live today. This transformation is so profound and deeply entrenched that a return to pre-colonial ideas and systems is simply not an option. Any change or adaptation of the present system can only be sought or realised through the concepts and institutions of this domestic and global post-colonial reality. Yet many Muslims, probably the majority in many countries, have not fully accepted some aspects of this transformation and its consequences. This discrepancy seems to underlie the apparent acceptance of the possibility of an Islamic state that can enact and enforce shari‘a as such, and ambivalence about politically motivated violence in the name of jihad. This chapter seeks to clarify and redress this discrepancy through an examination of the question of citizenship which has far reaching implications for political stability, constitutional governance and development at home and international relations abroad. In particular, I will argue for human rights as a framework for highlighting and mediating the tension underlying this discrepancy in present Islamic societies.

It is important to be clear from the outset on the key concept of shari‘a, as the normative system of Islam, how it has evolved in the past and can, I believe, legitimately change over time. The primary sources of shari‘a are the Qur‘an (which Muslims believe to be the final and conclusive divine revelation) and Sunna (traditions of the Prophet), as well as the experience of the first polity established by the Prophet in Medina in 622 CE. Other commonly accepted sources of shari‘a include consensus (ijmā‘), reasoning by analogy (kyās) and juridical reasoning (ijtihād) when there is no applicable text of Qur‘an or Sunna. But these were matters of juridical methodology for developing principles of shari‘a, rather than substantive sources as such. The
early generations of Muslims are believed to have applied those techniques to interpret and supplement the original sources (Qurʾān and Sunna) in regulating their individual and communal lives. But that process was entirely based on the understanding of individual scholars of these sources, and the willingness of specific communities to seek and follow the advice of those scholars. Some general principles also began to emerge through the gradually evolving tradition of leading scholars at that stage which constituted early models of the schools of jurisprudence (madhhab) that evolved during subsequent stages of Islamic legal history.¹

The more systemic development of shariʿa began with the early Abbasid era (after 750 CE), and continued for the next two centuries. This view of the relatively late evolution of shariʿa as a coherent system in Islamic history is clear from the time frame for the emergence of the major schools of jurisprudence, the systematic collection of Sunna as the second and more detailed source of shariʿa and the development of juridical methodology (usul al-fiqh). All these developments took place about 150 to 250 years after the Prophet’s death. In other words, the first several generations of Muslims did not know and apply shariʿa in the sense this term came to be accepted by the majority of Muslims up to the present time. Shariʿa in this sense is the product of human understanding of the Qurʾān and Sunna according to a specific methodology that was developed by scholars two to three centuries after the death of the Prophet. That traditional or historical understanding of shariʿa can be reformed or modified in response to the changing needs of Islamic societies, but that should be done according to a clear and coherent methodology. Methodological reform is therefore prerequisite for substantive reform of shariʿa.

The three fold premise of this chapter can be stated as follows. First, human beings tend to seek and experience multiple and overlapping types and forms of membership in different groups on such grounds as ethnic, religious or cultural identity, political, social or professional affiliation and/or economic interests. Second, the meaning and implications of each type or form of membership should be determined by the rationale or purpose of belonging to the group in question, without precluding or undermining other forms of memberships. That is, multiple and overlapping memberships should not be mutually exclusive, as they tend to serve different purposes for persons and

communities. Third, the term ‘citizenship’ is used here to refer to a particular form of membership in the political community of a territorial state in its global context, and should therefore be related to this specific rationale or purpose without precluding other possibilities of membership. Proposing this three fold premise is not to suggest that people are always consciously aware of their multiple memberships, or appreciate that they are mutually inclusive, with each being appropriate for its specific purpose or rationale. On the contrary, it seems that there is a tendency to collapse different forms of membership, as when ethnic or religious identity is equated with political or social affiliation. This is true of the coincidence of nationality and citizenship in Western political theory that was transmitted to Islamic societies through European colonialism and its aftermath.

Thus, official or ideological discourse regarding the basis of citizenship as membership in the political community of a territorial state did not necessarily coincide with a subjective feeling of belonging or independent assessment of actual conditions on the ground. In other words, political allegiance was assigned rather than being the product of free choice. Such tensions existed in all major civilisations in the past, and continue to be experienced in various ways by different societies today. For our purposes here in particular, the development of the notion of citizenship in the European model of the territorial ‘nation’ state since the eighteenth century tended to equate citizenship with nationality. This model defines citizenship in terms of a contrived and often coercive membership in a ‘nation’ on the basis of blood relations, shared ethnic, religious or cultural identity and political allegiance that was assumed to follow from residence within a particular territory. In other words, the coincidence of citizenship and nationality was not only the product of a peculiarly European and relatively recent process, but was often emphasised at the expense of other forms of membership, especially of ethnic or religious minorities. To avoid this confusion I prefer to use the term territorial state to identify citizenship with territory, instead of with a nation state that can be misleading in identifying people with a state that may be oppressing them.

As a result of colonialism of the Americas, Africa and much of Asia, European models of citizenship of a territorial state have come to dominate ‘national’ politics and ‘international’ relations, including those within and among present Islamic societies. This model has become so entrenched that it cannot be changed except through its deliberate internal transformation as the basis of domestic constitutional order of all societies as well as

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international law. Present Islamic societies need to accept and fully implement this system before they can transform it in order better to realise their right to self determination in terms of an Islamic identity or sovereignty. Even notions of identity and sovereignty that can be the basis of claims of self determination are now founded on the same conceptual framework and political realities of the present post colonial world in which all Muslims live.

It may be hypothetically possible to ‘imagine’ an alternative system for organising internal politics and inter communal relations, but that system would probably also have its own problems for Muslims and non Muslims alike. On the one hand, agreement on an alternative system is unlikely among Muslims themselves, as clearly demonstrated by the fact that they have all chosen to continue applying European models after independence. On the other hand, non Muslims are unlikely to accept an alternative if it will threaten their interests or violate their rights as citizens of the same state, or in international relations. It is therefore more desirable and realistic first to integrate and improve the application of the present system before seeking to redress any problems a society may have with it. In attempting to do so, however, Muslims must realise that the realities of domestic and international relations would not permit changes that are detrimental to human dignity and social justice for all human beings in domestic politics and international relations. Regarding citizenship in particular, a transformative approach that is consistent with the pragmatic and humane concerns of the totality of the population is both desirable as a matter of principle and politically necessary.

From this perspective, the term citizenship is used here as an affirmative and proactive sense of belonging to an inclusive pluralistic political community. As a legal and political principle, this conception of citizenship seeks to regulate possibilities of various forms of ‘difference’ among persons and communities, without distinction on such grounds as religion, sex, ethnicity or political opinion. This term is intended to signify a shared cultural understanding of equal human dignity for all, as well as fully inclusive and effective political participation to ensure the accountability of government for respecting and protecting all rights of equal citizenship. In other words, I define citizenship in terms of the principle of the universality of human rights as ‘a common standard of achievement for all people and nations’, according to the Preamble of the 1948 United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The normative content of this principle and mechanisms for its implementation are set by international customary law as well as treaties. In my view, this whole system is necessary for providing a globally shared understanding of the rights of the citizens of every territorial state, and their practical application.
The desirability of this understanding of citizenship throughout the world can no doubt be founded on a variety of considerations, including purely pragmatic realities of power relations within and among societies as indicated earlier. But this does not exclude the possibility, indeed necessity in my view, of multiple religious, philosophical and/or moral foundations for a definition of citizenship that is consistent with universal human rights norms. For example, the Golden Rule, which can be called the principle of reciprocity (mu'awada) in Islamic discourse, combines moral and pragmatic considerations. Treating each other with mutual respect and empathy is required by a shared moral sensibility among different religious and philosophical traditions, in addition to being prerequisite for realistic expectations of reciprocal treatment. Thus, persons and communities everywhere should affirm a shared conception of equal citizenship in order to be able to claim it for themselves at home and abroad. That is, acceptance of an understanding of citizenship on the basis of universal human rights is the prerequisite moral, legal and political basis of its enjoyment.

While this reasoning clearly indicates that all human beings should accept this conception of citizenship as the basis of their own entitlement to it, many Muslims may still feel the need to justify it from an Islamic point of view. As I have argued elsewhere, this and other concerns about the validity or authority of a human rights framework can be addressed through an internal discourse within different cultural and religious traditions. However, since agreement on universal standards does not preclude flexibility and variation in detailed specification of those norms in particular situations, the relationship between the universal and local can also be mediated through internal discourse. Such mediation is needed, for instance, in balancing the rights of individuals to personal autonomy and freedom of religion, on the one hand, and communal rights to cultural self determination, on the other. That internal discourse, however, cannot realise its objectives without being matched by a global cross cultural dialogue in pursuit of similar objectives within and among other societies. Since there is a dialectical relationship between domestic and international factors in this process, Muslims are unlikely to strive for a

human rights based understanding of citizenship unless they can see that other societies are engaging in corresponding efforts.

Muslims have already accepted and experienced the principle of equal citizenship for all and its human rights basis under domestic constitutional law and international law, and are participating in the broader processes of defining and implementing universal human rights. These international standards and processes are, in turn, contributing to defining and protecting the rights of citizens at the domestic level. The relationship between citizenship and human rights is therefore inherent to these two paradigms, which are mutually supportive of each other. That is, citizenship is defined from a human rights perspective which is determined through people’s active exercise of their citizenship. This view, it should be conceded, assumes that the governments which engage in the formation of international customary law and negotiate and ratify human rights treaties are representative of their citizens, which is obviously not true of some parts of the world. But it should also be emphasised that a human rights approach to citizenship will contribute to realising that assumption by promoting more democratic governance, where it is lacking or deficient.

In the next section I will examine the traditional Islamic notion of dhimmihood, which signified protection of some basic rights and limited communal autonomy for specific groups of non Muslims (ahl al dhimma), in exchange for their submission to Muslim sovereignty. As I hope to demonstrate through that brief review, that system is simply untenable as the basis of citizenship of the territorial states where all Muslims live today. The third section of this chapter will include an overview of the transition from dhimmihood to modern conceptions of citizenship in some post colonial Islamic societies. In that section I will also explore ways of consolidating and promoting this process in the interest of political stability, development and democratic constitutional governance of all present Islamic societies. This transformation toward a modern conception of citizenship that is indigenous and humane, legitimate and forward looking, should be a high internal priority for all Muslims, regardless of European colonialism and despite post colonial Western hegemony.

Dhimmihood in historical perspectives

The following review of the traditional dhimmihood system requires clarification of two elements of methodological confusion which underlie some apologetic Islamic discourse that misrepresents shari’a principles or subjects them to immediate and arbitrary reformulation to suit the polemical
objectives of the author. First, our focus here is on how the founding scholars of shari‘a have actually understood relevant texts of the Qur‘an and Sunna in a systematic manner. That is, we need to be clear on the way in which general principles and detailed rules of shari‘a, as commonly understood by Muslims today, were actually formulated, and should therefore be distinguished from alternative interpretations that may be proposed now. One must first be clear on existing shari‘a principles of dhimmihood, before speculating about how they can be reformed today. Second, any proposed reform must follow a clear and systematic methodology, instead of arbitrary selectivity among different sources because such claims can be repudiated by simply citing the counter sources. It is not helpful to cite texts of the Qur‘an and Sunna that apparently support equality for non Muslims without addressing texts that can be cited in support of the opposite view. In other words, the reform methodology one is proposing must include an explanation of sources that are against the proposition one is advocating as well as sources that support it.

The traditional system of dhimmihood as it was actually developed by Muslim scholars was part of a world view that determined political allegiance on the basis of religious affiliation, in contrast to modern notions of national or territorial affiliation. As such, that view sought to shift political allegiance from tribal ties to an idea, Islam, thereby making membership in the political community accessible to all human beings who accept that belief. Believing themselves to be the recipients of the final and conclusive divine revelation, early Muslims assumed that they had a paramount and permanent obligation to propagate Islam through jihad, which included military conquest. Accordingly, the founding scholars of shari‘a maintained that Muslims should offer Islam peacefully to begin with. If that offer was rejected, then they should fight unbelievers into submission, and impose on them what Muslims believed were the imperative precepts of Islam. That system was therefore premised on a sharp distinction between the territories of Islam (dār al Islām) where Muslims ruled and shari‘a was supposed to prevail, and the territories of those at war with Muslims (dār al ḥarb). The underlying vision was that the obligation to propagate Islam, through military as well as peaceful means, remains until the whole world becomes dār al Islām. That view was no doubt encouraged by the remarkable initial success of Muslim conquests, from North Africa and southern Spain in the west, to Persia, Central Asia and

5 Example of this methodological confusion include A. Rahman I. Doi, Non Muslims under shari‘ah (Islamic law) (Lahore, 1981); and Maimul Ahsan Khan, Human rights in the Muslim world: Fundamentalism, constitutionalism and international politics (Durham, NC, 2003).
northern India in the east, within decades of the Prophet’s death. But as the practical limitations of indefinite expansion became clearer over time, Muslim rulers had to conclude peace treaties (ṣulḥ) with unbelievers which scholars acknowledged as legitimate, thereby accepting the inviolability of the territory of those at peace with Muslims (dār al ṣulḥ).\(^6\)

In accordance with that original model of Muslim/non Muslims relations developed during the seventh and eighth centuries, shari’ā classified all human beings into three main religious categories: Muslims; People of the Book (ahl al kitāb, those who are accepted by Muslims as having a revealed scripture, mainly Christians and Jews); and unbelievers. The status of People of Book was extended by some Muslim scholars to Magians, for example, on the assumption that they had a revealed scripture.\(^7\) But the basic scheme remained unchallenged or modified from a shari’ā point of view, whereby Muslims were the only full members of the political community, and People of the Book were partial members. Unbelievers (kāfir) did not qualify for any legal recognition or protection as such, unless granted temporary safe conduct (amān) for practical reasons such as trade and diplomatic representation.

The term dhimma referred to a compact between the state ruled by Muslims and a People of the Book community whereby members of that community were granted security of their persons and property, freedom to practise their religion in private and communal autonomy to govern their internal affairs. In exchange, the community of People of the Book undertook to pay a poll tax (jizya) and observe the terms of their compact with the state. Those granted dhimma status were encouraged to embrace Islam, but not allowed to propagate their faith. Common features of compacts of dhimma included restriction on participation in the public affairs of the state or holding public office that entailed exercising authority over Muslims. However, the actual terms of these compacts varied over time, and their practical application was not always consistent with their theory for a variety of pragmatic reasons, as illustrated below. But members of dhimma communities were by definition not entitled to equality with Muslims, who themselves did not have full citizenship in the modern sense of the term. Unbelievers were presumed to


\(^7\) Muhammad Abū Yūṣuf, *Kitāb al kharāj* (Cairo, 1963), pp. 128 30.
be at war with Muslims (owing allegiance to dār al ḥarb), unless they are granted temporary safe conduct to travel through or reside in territories ruled by Muslims (dār al Islām). The status and rights of those belonging to territories which had a peace treaty with Muslims (dār al ṣulḥ) were determined in accordance with the terms of that agreement.

These features of the dhimmihood system are mentioned here in the past tense because they are neither practised nor seriously advocated anywhere in the world today, though it remains an integral part of shari‘a until removed in a methodologically sound manner, as I propose in the last section of this chapter. It should also be noted, however, that that system was neither openly challenged nor fully applied throughout Islamic history. Since the historical experiences of different Islamic societies in this regard were too varied and complex to be reviewed here, I will briefly illustrate the point with reference to the cases of Islamic India and the Ottoman Empire. This review should also provide some background and context for the transitions from dhimmihood to citizenship in the post colonial era, discussed in the last section.

Islam first came to northern India through military conquest in the seventh century and continued to spread into the subcontinent through cultural interaction as well as military means for the subsequent millennium.8 For our purposes here, it is reasonable to assume that the traditional dhimmihood system was at least nominally recognised by the Muslim rulers of Indian territories to the extent that they generally accepted the authority of shari‘a and followed principles of administration prevalent elsewhere in Islamic domains at the time.9 But that did not necessarily mean strict compliance with all aspects of that system, notably during the reign of Akbar which lasted most of the second half of the sixteenth century.

As in other Islamic regions, however, scholarship of the time tended to assert idealised or contradictory trends, rather than present an accurate view of actual practice.

For instance, Ziauddin Barani (d. c. 1357), one of the earliest Indian Muslim scholars to write on these issues, insisted on the centrality of shari‘a, but also justified secular laws and administration among Muslims.10 He glorified the

9 Qureshi, ‘Muslim India before the Mughals’, and ‘India under the Mughals’, pp. 303, and 527.
Muslim Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazna (r. 998–1030) for his commitment to the extirpation of idolatry by destroying Hindu temples, raiding Hindu kingdoms and mass slaughter of Hindus. He praised him for suppressing heretical views among Muslims as well as infidels, and ruling strictly according to *sharīʿa*. Yet, although Barani considered the pre-Islamic Iranian tradition of governance (*pādīshāhī*) as a sin that is contrary to Islam, he also conceded that a ruler needed to follow that system in order to govern effectively but should atone for this offence by performing religious duties in an exaggerated manner to ensure his own salvation. To Barani, the good Muslim sultan should not be content with merely levying the *jizya* and *kharāj* (agricultural tax) on Hindus, but also establish the supreme position of Islam by overthrowing infidelity and slaughtering its leaders, the Brahmans. From this perspective, he deemed any action intended to promote the interests of Muslims to be good, however injurious it may be for others, and that which violated, ignored or overlooked the demands of Sunnī Islam as tyrannical and wrong. Even regarding Muslims, Barani represented the world view of the immigrant Turkish ruling elite who viewed Muslims of Indian origin in extremely negative terms. Thus, he advised the Muslim sultan to employ only ‘high born’ Muslims (*ashraf*) in his administration, and condemned ‘low born’ Muslims (mostly converts from ‘low’ and ‘middle’ caste Hindus and Buddhists) as inherently inferior, who were made this way by God.

While upholding the supremacy of *sharīʿa*, Barani allowed for non-Muslims to be taken into the service of a Muslim state, albeit within limits, on grounds of necessity and expediency as the administration of the country would not be possible without Hindu support. He permitted the Muslim sultan to resort to secular regulations (*zawabit*), if necessary, and saw that as reinforcing and complementing *sharīʿa*, rather than replacing it. This was also the actual practice of Muslim sultans, like Mahmūd of Ghazna who employed Hindus in his army. While accepting Barani’s negative views of the Hindus, Sultan Shamsuddin Iltutmish (r. 1206–36) practised co-existence because Muslims in India were too few to wage total war to force the infidels either to embrace Islam or to face death. Sultan Ghiyasuddin Balban (r. 1266–87) kept scholars like Barani at a safe distance, while Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughlaq (r. 1324–51) appointed Hindus to numerous high posts.

To summarise, the fact that Muslims were a minority in India made many of their rulers and scholars constantly concerned about the threat of the ‘corrupting’ influence of ‘idolatrous’ Hinduism and of the impact of local

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customs and beliefs. Exaggerating points of difference and potential conflict was therefore the way to set Muslims apart, and promote their sense of identity and superiority. Traditional Islamic jurisprudence provided little guidance, as the various religious traditions of India (later on indiscriminately labelled together as ‘Hinduism’) were not mentioned in the Qur’an at all, in contrast to Christianity and Judaism. Nevertheless, Muslim rulers adopted a pragmatic approach by accepting the Hindus as akin to the People of the Book, and as such to be treated as dhimma communities. Many Islamic scholars acquiesced in this position because it was impossible to treat the Hindus like the idolaters and polytheists of pre Islamic Arabia (mushrikun) to be killed if they rejected Islam. Unlike the Shafi’i and Hanbali schools of Islamic jurisprudence, Hanafi scholars in general supported this position, arguing that all non Muslims, other than Arab ‘idolaters’ and apostates, qualified for dhimma status. This did not settle the debate on the legal position of the Hindus, however, and throughout the centuries of Turkish and Mughal rule in India there were scholars who insisted that the sultans should embark on a full scale massacre of the ‘idolaters’ and ‘polytheists’, but few rulers took that advice seriously. Sultans also generally resisted advice to impose extremely harsh and degrading treatment of Hindus as a policy that is required by shari’a.

The Ottoman Empire dominated most of south east Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa from its humble beginnings in the early fourteenth century until its gradual decline during the nineteenth century and final demise after the First World War. The remarkable success of the Ottoman sultans is generally attributed to their ability to accommodate the extreme diversity of their extensive empire through skilful combination of formal fidelity to shari’a and Islamic legitimacy in general with administrative flexibility and innovation. In theory, the Ottomans claimed allegiance to the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence, which upholds the basic premise and principles of the dhimmihood system outlined above. But they also modified that theory by asserting the caliph’s discretion in the interpretation and implementation of shari’a principles. In practice, there were significant departures from the Hanafi theory for administrative expediency, especially

15 Colin Imber, Ebu’s su’ud: The Islamic legal tradition (Edinburgh, 1997).
regarding the treatment of Ottoman subjects and religious minorities.\textsuperscript{16} The outcome of the Ottomans’ mediation of the competing demands of shari‘a principles and pragmatic expediency can be outlined as follows.

From a formal point of view, the status and rights of all Ottoman subjects were supposed to be governed by the \textit{dhimmihood} system on the basis of communal religious affiliation (\textit{millet} in Turkish). Sunnī Muslims had the most privileged position, less so for Shi‘a Muslims, while People of the Book enjoyed the protection of the Muslim sultan as long as they recognised his sovereignty. Christians and Jews were allowed to keep and practise their religion within prescribed limitations, were not supposed to serve in the army, ride horses or carry arms, hold high ranking office or be active in public political life in general. They were required to dress in distinctive style, pay jizya and live in segregated communities, especially in the cities. But these rules were not strictly enforced in practice, and exceptions were sometimes very broad or significant, as when members of \textit{dhimma} communities were employed in high ranking and sensitive positions as ambassadors, governors and ministers in the cabinet, and exempt from the jizya and dress requirements.\textsuperscript{17} Requirements of dress code and carrying visible signs of identity were also part of a general Ottoman policy of segregation by class, profession and ethno religious identity that were not limited to \textit{dhimma} status as such.\textsuperscript{18}

The internal and external relationships of each \textit{dhimma} community were regulated primarily by its own leadership, subject to the overriding jurisdiction of the Ottoman state. Those communities were segregated on grounds of religion and sect, whereby Gregorian Armenians, Protestants and Catholics were considered as different religious communities, and lived in separate neighbourhoods, with their own churches and schools, under their respective legal jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{19} The Greek Orthodox Church enjoyed the highest level of autonomy and prestige in the \textit{millet} structure, with the Patriarchate in Istanbul as the religious, judicial and financial headquarters of all Greek Orthodox communities throughout the empire. The Synod Council of the Patriarchate, consisting of archbishops and high ranking priests, controlled both religious and secular (worldly) affairs, including censorship of all books

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., pp. 73–97.
\textsuperscript{18} Serif Mardin, \textit{Türkiye’de toplum ve siyaset} (Istanbul, 1995), pp. 100–1.
written in Greek on any subject. The Armenian Patriarchate also enjoyed significant autonomy in the religious, administrative and judicial affairs of its community, though lower in prestige than its Greek counterpart.

Jews were another important part of the Ottoman millet system, especially as that population gradually increased by immigration from Hungary (1376), France (1394), as well as from Spain and Italy throughout the fifteenth century.20 However, as Jews did not have a clerical hierarchy like Christians, the representative role of the Grand Rabbi of Istanbul was not officially confirmed until 1835. Though the whole Jewish community in the Ottoman Empire was considered as a single millet, Jews organised themselves in separate communities (kahals), according to the preceding origins and cultural affiliations, each with its own contacts with the Ottoman state. Each kahal was responsible for collecting taxes and delivering the required proportions to the Ottoman treasury, spending money for community activities, regulating kosher food services and punishing offenders. Each local Jewish community had its own synagogue, rabbi, teacher, school, hospital and cemetery, and many of them had judicial councils called Bet Din, headed by a rabbi chosen by the community.21

As a general rule, therefore, the Ottoman state did not generally interfere in the internal affairs of dhimma communities. A member of those communities would have been born, married, divorced and died according to the religious and customary law of his or her community which also governed other legal matters, economic and social relations. It was possible for a church community to try and sentence an offender to prison, and then deliver him to Ottoman authorities for the execution of the verdict. But shari’a and the Ottoman state had overriding jurisdiction in criminal law and other matters beyond the issues assigned to the communal jurisdiction of dhimma communities. In addition to the jurisdiction of state courts in disputes involving a Muslim party, members of dhimma communities sometimes preferred to go to those courts for a more favourable outcome than was likely before their own authorities. For example, it was easier for Christian and Jewish women to obtain divorce before shari’a courts, and then take the decree to their respective communal authorities to enforce it.22 Christian and Jewish communities

20 Ibid., p. 1001.
were also subjected to symbolic restrictions, like the prohibition of the public performance of religious rituals in Muslim neighbourhood, or housing specification, all to signify the inferiority of dhimma communities and their members. However, some of the administrative measures taken by the Ottoman state, like relocation of Christian and Jewish communities from the provinces to Istanbul and limiting their residence to specific neighbourhoods, were motivated by the economic interest of the state or as a result of social conditions. Forced relocations were also sometimes imposed as individual or collective punishment.  

The dhimmihood system is now obviously totally untenable as illustrated by the case of Sudan where failure to acknowledge this reality has resulted in decades of destructive civil war in the southern part of the country. When considered in its proper historical context, however, that system not only reflected prevalent standards of governance and inter communal relations throughout the world at the time, but also compared favourably to other systems. It can also be argued that an alternative view of inter communal, now international, relations has not yet been firmly established, as illustrated by the illegal colonisation of Iraq by the United States, supported by the United Kingdom and some other countries in March 2003. That invasion and occupation constitutes a serious regression to colonialism because it was the unlawful usurpation of the sovereignty of the country through military conquest, regardless of subsequent developments. Nevertheless, since I believe that there is no viable alternative to the rule of law in international relations and protection of human rights everywhere, the question for me is how to uphold these global imperatives despite such regressive conduct by major powers. This can only be achieved, in my view, when each society upholds the values of equality and the rule of law in its own domestic and foreign policies, and thereby having the moral and political standing to demand the same from other societies. For our purposes here, this means not only the formal abolition of the dhimmihood system from a shari‘a point of view, but also the repudiation of its underlying values by Muslims so that they can more fully internalise and implement modern notions of citizenship as defined in this chapter.

From *dhimmihood* to human-rights-based citizenship

As indicated in the first section of this chapter, a human rights based view of citizenship is used in this chapter to emphasise that the substantive norms and procedural/process aspects of this status should be derived from or at least consistent with present universal human rights standards. The essential purpose of human rights is to ensure the effective protection of certain fundamental entitlements for all human beings everywhere, including countries where they are not provided for as fundamental constitutional rights in order to safeguard them from the contingencies of the national political and administrative processes. In view of the tension between this idea and the principle and practice of national sovereignty, however, it is critical for human rights standards to be acknowledged as the product of international agreement. Moreover, the challenge of these rights to a strict view of sovereignty would not be plausible or credible without the promise of international co-operation in the protection of human rights. The claim of the international community to act as arbiter in safeguarding certain minimum standards in this regard is not credible without the corresponding commitment of its members to encourage and support each other in the process. That role is also more likely to be accepted by a state when it is the collective effort of all other states, rather than simply the foreign policy objective of another single state or groups of states.

Accordingly, the distinguishing features of human rights for my purposes here are universal recognition of the same rights and international co-operation in their implementation. For our purposes here, human rights documents do not define citizenship as such, but several of those principles are relevant or applicable. These include the fundamental principles of self-determination and equality and non-discrimination on various grounds including religion provided for by Article 1(2) and (3) of the Charter of the United Nations of 1945, which is a treaty that is legally binding on all Islamic countries today. The same principles are reaffirmed in subsequent human rights treaties which have been ratified by the vast majority of present Islamic countries. These include Articles 1 and 2 of both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of 1966. These two Covenants and other human rights treaties also provide for specific human rights, like equality before the law and protection of freedom of religion, to which non-Muslim citizens of Islamic countries are equally entitled.25

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From this perspective, the case for a coherent and principled commitment to citizenship can be made through a combination of three themes. The first theme is the actual transition from *dhimmihood* to formal citizenship in the post colonial era, and the second is how to sustain and develop that transition through methodologically sound and politically sustainable Islamic reform in order to root constitutional and human rights values in Islamic doctrine. The third element is the consolidation of those two themes into an indigenous discourse that transcends the present various dependencies of the post colonial condition. I will now briefly outline those transitions in India and Turkey to illustrate their reality for all Islamic societies, highlight elements of an Islamic discourse about them and conclude with some reflection on the combination of pragmatic and normative aspects of citizenship, beyond *dhimmihood* and the post colonial condition.

The Muslims of India, despite their diverse ethnic and cultural origins (immigrant Turkic, Afghans, Persians and Arabs as well as native converts of various backgrounds), gradually evolved traditions of toleration and coexistence that facilitated their interaction and assimilation with other religious communities of the subcontinent. The system of state employment and administration developed by Akbar incorporated all interests and groups into the same graded hierarchy. But a combination of technological and administrative stagnation, civil wars and regional invasions slowly resulted in the disintegration of the Mughal Empire during the eighteenth century. Efforts to halt the advance of British colonialism, like those of Shāh Wālī Allāh (1703–62) to revive the notion of a *sharī‘a* state as well as the jihad movement of Sayyid Ahmad Shāhīd Barelwī (1786–1831), Ḥājjī Shari‘āt Allāh (1781–1840) and Ḥājjī Muḥṣin (1819–62) all failed. Economic dislocations flowing from the expanding influence of the East India Company, coupled with changes in revenue and judicial administration introduced by British administrators in the late eighteenth century contributed to the decline of the power and authority of Muslims. Through a range of political, military and economic strategies gradually to expand its influence, the British crown finally assumed control of government throughout India by the mid nineteenth century. Some Muslim leaders, like Sayyid Ahmad Khān (1817–98) adopted a positive attitude to British and general Western influence, but also reflected the discrepancy I referred to at the beginning of this chapter. He combined a commitment to the modernisation of India as a united nation with elitist suspicion of popular democratic institutions. His effort to mobilise Muslim opposition to the Indian National Congress also represented a precursor to the politics of the struggle for independence that culminated in the partition of
India and Pakistan by 1947. It is not possible to review those developments here, except to note that they reflect both Hindu resentment of earlier Muslim hegemony, including elements of the dhimmihood system, and Muslim apprehensions of Hindu domination. Ironically, while so many Muslims elected to remain citizens of India, the partition did not necessarily achieve all the benefits of citizenship for the Muslims of Pakistan. In both countries, the concept of citizenship needs to be further developed, and its practice better secured against the risks of simplistic religious binaries of Hindu and Muslim.

As outlined earlier, the flexibility and fluidity of the Ottoman millet system already represented a far reaching and irreversible retreat from traditional notions of dhimmihood in response to pragmatic economic, military and social realities. Those pre-existing realities probably facilitated and were in turn enhanced by the processes of Western penetration and Ottoman capitulations that eventually transformed the empire and set the scene for the transition of Turkey into a secular republic by the 1920s. Another factor to note in that process is the rise of nationalist movements among Muslims, for example, Arabs and Albanians, as well as among Christian minorities, which resulted in the establishment of territorial states based on the modern principle of citizenship. While protracted and gradual, the most significant shift in Ottoman policy and practice started with the Tanzimat decree of 1839 which began the process of officially affirming the legal equality of all non Muslim and Muslim subjects of the sultan. Though the 1839 Tanzimat decree did acknowledge shari'a as the law of the empire, the Ottoman decree of 1856 simply asserted the equal status of non Muslims, abolished the jizya, prohibited derogatory treatment or reference to dhimma communities and their members, without any reference to Islamic principles. Various aspects of the modern principles of equality before the law and non discrimination on grounds of religion were enacted in Articles 8 22 of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876. Those principles were consolidated by subsequent constitutional development during the rest

28 Gülsoy, Osmanlı gayrimüslimlerinin askerlik serüveni; and Krikorian, Armenians in the service of the Ottoman Empire 1860 1908.
of the Ottoman Empire, and further entrenched during the Republican era since 1926.

Similar processes of transition to those of India and the Ottoman Empire evolved throughout the Muslim world during the twentieth century, and came to be formally entrenched during the de colonisation processes after the Second World War. As a result, notions of *dhimmihood* are neither practised nor advocated anywhere in the Muslim world which has been fully integrated into the present international system of territorial states. Although these transformations have been formally instituted by European colonialism, all Islamic societies have voluntarily continued the same system after independence. Far from expressing any reservations or attempting to modify this system at either the domestic or international level, states ruling Islamic societies are now activity engaged in the operation of this system at home and abroad. But the tension with traditional notions of *dhimma* and its underlying values persists, as illustrated by controversies in Indonesia about whether it is permissible for Muslims to extend Christmas greetings to Christians or enter into inter religious marriage, civil war in southern Sudan and homicidal riots over the enforcement of *shari‘a* in northern Nigerian states since 2001. In my view, this persistent tension calls for supporting and legitimating transitions to citizenship through methodologically sound and politically sustainable Islamic reform.

The main premise of a viable Islamic reform process, I suggest, is that Muslim belief that the Qur‘ân and Sunna are the divine sources of Islam does not mean that their meaning and implementation in everyday life is independent of human interpretation and action in specific historical context. In fact, it is simply impossible to know and apply *shari‘a* in this life except through the agency of human beings since it is expressed in a language (Arabic in this case) and relates to specific historical experiences of actual societies. Any view accepted by Muslims as being part of *shari‘a* today or at any other time, even if unanimously agreed, necessarily emerged out of the opinion of human beings about the meaning of the Qur‘ân and Sunna, or the practice of Islamic communities. Such opinions and practice became part of

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\(shari'a\) through the consensus of believers over many centuries, and not by the spontaneous decree of a ruler or will of a single group of scholars. It therefore follows that alternative formulations of \(shari'a\) principles are always possible, and can be equally valid if accepted as such by Muslims. Moreover, a sound reform methodology should also address the two concerns indicated at the beginning of the preceding section of this chapter. First, reform efforts must be clear about pre-existing principles of \(shari'a\) as established by Muslim scholars, and not confuse them with possible reinterpretations. Second, avoid arbitrary selectivity among competing Qur'ān and Sunna texts, without addressing texts that can be cited in support of the opposite view.

An Islamic reform methodology that is based on the above premise and meets the noted requirements is that proposed by Ustadh Maḥmūd Muhammad Ṭāḥā, who argued for a shift in the basis of social and political aspects of \(shari'a\) from verses revealed in the Medina phase to those revealed during the Mecca period. To simplify and summarise, the rationale of this proposed shift is that Mecca revelations represented the universal message of Islam, while those of Medina were a specific response to the historical context of human societies at the time. Ustadh Maḥmūd also demonstrated in his writings how notions of aggressive jihad and discrimination against non-Muslims that underlie the dhimmihood system belong to the Medina and not the Mecca phase of revelation. In this way, this methodology is able explicitly to set aside those verses as a matter of \(shari'a\), though they remain part of the Qur'ān, thereby presenting a coherent and systematic criteria for selecting applicable verses, instead of the arbitrary selectivity of Islamic apologetics I criticised earlier. Conversely, relevant revelations during the Mecca period, he argued, can support the development of a modern concept of citizenship from an Islamic point of view.\(^{34}\) While I find this approach very convincing, I remain open to similarly sound methodology that is capable of achieving the necessary degree of reform.

But assuming that a reform technique is methodologically sound, why should it be deployed to abolish the traditional dhimmihood system? One reason already emphasised in the first section of this chapter is the Golden Rule, or Islamic principle of reciprocity: Muslims must affirm equality for others in order to be entitled to the same. A second reason that was implied in the preceding review of historical experiences is that it is hypocritical to


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uphold this system in theory while fully realising that it has neither been observed in practice nor is it likely to be workable in the future. Maintaining such unrealistic interpretations of shari‘a in theory while discarding them in practice seriously undermines the credibility and coherence of Islam itself as a religion. A third reason is that it is not possible to know whether or not Muslims would accept the formal abolition of dhimmihood from a shari‘a point of view until such proposals are freely and openly presented to them. To allow for the possibility of open and free debate of such issues among Muslims it is necessary to maintain complete and unconditional freedom of opinion, expression and belief. Human beings are not responsible for their decisions and actions unless they have freedom of choice, which cannot be exercised without the ability to present and evaluate all relevant information, to debate and assess different arguments.

All of this requires that public authorities maintain law and order, regulate debate and reflection, and adjudicate disagreements in accordance with fair and reasonable principles that are implemented by transparent and accountable institutions. It would therefore follow that securing constitutional democratic governance and protection of human rights is not only necessary for the religious freedom of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of the present territorial state, but for the survival and development of Islam itself. Indeed, freedom of dissent and debate were always essential for the development of shari‘a because it enabled ideas to emerge and consensus to evolve around them until they matured into established principles through acceptance and practice by generations of Muslims in a wide variety of settings. Instead of prior censorship that is inherently counterproductive for the development of any Islamic doctrine, it is critical to maintain possibilities of innovation and dissent as the only way for religion to remain responsive to the needs of the believers.

Even assuming the possibility of methodologically sound Islamic reform and good reasons for seeking a constitutional and human rights framework for citizenship, it may still be argued that this proposition is unrealistic or dangerously naïve when its premise and requirements are not accepted by the major states and religious/cultural traditions of the world. From this perspective, it can be said that the colonisation of Iraq by the United States, United Kingdom and a few other states mentioned earlier not only violates international law,

but also challenges the very possibility of the rule of law in international relations. Without that possibility there are no bases for the binding force of human rights norms or for the authority of international institutions for their application. The best Muslim response to such negative developments, in my view, is the consolidation of pragmatic factors and Islamic reform into an indigenous discourse that transcends the present various dependencies of the post colonial condition. In the final analysis, Islamic societies must accept full responsibility for their right to self determination in order finally to achieve complete political independence and moral maturity, despite earlier colonialism and current Western hegemony. The ultimate challenge raised in this chapter is for Muslims themselves, though they need to cooperate with others in upholding principles of international legality and universality of human rights at home and abroad, as emphasised earlier.
The ‘ulamā’: scholarly tradition and new public commentary

MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMAN

Introduction

In modern times, the traditionally educated Muslim religious scholars, the ‘ulamā’, often lament that their distinctive institutions have ceased to exist or to matter much, that their writings no longer receive the attention their religious expertise merits and that, in any case, their intellectual stature hardly compares with the major figures of earlier times. At least in this instance, observers and scholars of modern Islam tend to take the ‘ulamā’ at their word. It is true, of course, that the impact of colonial rule and the emergence of the post colonial nation states have radically altered all facets of life, including the religious. Even when Muslim societies are governed by fellow Muslims rather than by a colonial regime, the terms on which, and the sphere in which, religion is to operate are defined by the state rather than by the ‘ulamā’; and the state itself is governed by a ‘modernist’ elite that is the product not of institutions of traditional Islamic learning, the madrasas, but rather of Westernised colleges and universities, with their own sense of what Islam means and how to make it compatible with the conditions of modernity. Other college and university educated Muslims, the ‘Islamists’, have sought a radical reinterpretation of the foundational Islamic texts, and the public implementation of Islamic norms, by challenging not only the modernist constructions of Islam but also the intellectual tradition of the ‘ulamā’. In many cases, the ‘ulamā’’s institutions of advanced learning have been altered beyond recognition, and the shari’a, the central focus of the ‘ulamā’’s dis courses, has itself been radically transformed since the onset of colonial rule.

2 Nathan J. Brown, ‘Sharī’a and state in the modern Middle East,’ IJMES, 29 (1997), pp. 359 76.
Yet the ‘ulamā’ have continued to guard and cultivate their scholarly tradition not only as the basis of their own authority but also as what they consider to be the only proper way of interpreting Islamic norms and of enabling the larger community of Muslims to live according to them. Despite numerous challenges to their authority, and many lost battles, the ‘ulamā’ have not easily or necessarily ceded ground to other religio political actors in the public sphere and, in many contemporary Muslim societies, they have in fact come to enjoy considerable prominence. Central to their conception of authority, to their religio political roles and indeed to their conception of Islam itself is their scholarly tradition. What does this tradition look like in the modern world, and especially since the beginning of the twentieth century? How have the ‘ulamā’ modes of discourse evolved in responding to the changes around them? How is religious authority articulated in and through these discourses? Answers to such questions often vary with the different social, political and religious contexts in which the ‘ulamā’ have remained active. How have the ‘ulamā’ remained active? But the scholarly tradition of the ‘ulamā’ is also self consciously cosmopolitan, and this makes it possible to elucidate its evolving facets in a broadly comparative framework.

The scholarly culture of the modern ‘ulamā’

The memoirs of Manāẓır Aḥṣan Gīlānī (d. 1956), who had come for advanced studies to the madrasa of Deoband in 1912, and who later distinguished himself as an intellectual historian of India, offer a vivid portrait of the culture and discourses of the ‘ulamā’ at the beginning of the twentieth century. This madrasa, known by the name of the small north Indian town in which it is located, was founded in 1867 as part of a ‘reformist’ effort to help Muslims, then newly subject to British colonial rule, lead their lives according to the foundational Islamic texts as refracted through the norms of the Ḥanafi school of Sunnī law. Most Muslims of South Asia have always been adherents of this legal school (madhhab), but the founders of the Deoband madrasa, and the reformist movement it has come to represent in South Asia and beyond, saw many local practices as contravening ‘proper’ Islamic conduct. What was new was not the tension between local customary practices and textually supported legal norms, however, but the political context in which

3 See Zaman, The ulama.
4 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, ‘The scope and limits of Islamic cosmopolitanism and the discursive language of the ‘ulamā’’, in miriam cooke and Bruce Lawrence (eds.), Muslim networks from Hajj to hip hop (Chapel Hill, 2005), pp. 84 104.
5 Manāẓır Aḥṣan Gīlānī, Ḩāṭa i Dār al ‘Ulīm main bīte huwe din, ed. I’jāz Aḥmad A’ẓamī (Deoband, n.d.).
this and other tensions found themselves in the latter half of the nineteenth century. After centuries of Muslim rule over large parts of the Indian subcontinent, Muslims, along with the Hindus and other inhabitants of India, were now colonial subjects. The reformist project of Deoband, and of the thousands of madrasas which eventually came to share the 'Deobandi' orientation with the parent madrasa, was to provide authoritative guidance to whoever would listen to them in an age of radical change; other, rival orientations were emerging at the same time and under not dissimilar stimuli. Gilani’s memoirs allow us to see how the foundational texts that were at the heart of this reformist project were studied by those who were subsequently expected to provide religious leadership to the larger community.

Over the course of the twentieth century, many Deobandi scholars have written commentaries on the Qur’an and on canonical collections of Ḥadīth, and have done so in self consciously continuing a centuries old tradition. The commentaries vary widely in their scope and quality, as they always have, some little more than notes from lectures on Ḥadīth as transcribed by devoted students, others life long projects that have culminated in monumental, multi volume works. Among those whose lectures on Ḥadīth he attended at Deoband, Gilani offers the most detailed account of Muhammad Anwarshah Kashmuri (d. 1933), a prominent scholar who taught at Deoband for many years before leaving it to head a madrasa and a research academy in Gujarat in western India. Kashmuri’s lectures on the Sahih of al Bukhāri (d. 870), as transcribed by a student, were later published in four volumes; another series of lectures, on the Ḥadīth collection of al Tirmidhī (d. 892), later became the basis of a major six volume commentary by another student.

Among Kashmuri’s pedagogical concerns, as Gilani describes them, was to provide detailed expositions of a broad array of questions occasioned by the Ḥadīth materials under consideration. These expositions had to do, for instance, with the legal implications of the Ḥadīth reports; how a medieval commentator like Ibn Ḥajar (d. 1449), who belonged to the rival Shafiī school of law, had interpreted particular reports in al Bukhāri and how Ḥanafi

6 On the Deoband madrasa and the reformist orientation it represents, as well as others with which it has competed, see Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India: Deoband, 1860 1900 (Princeton, 1982).
7 On these commentaries, see Zaman, The ulama, pp. 38 59.
8 For a study of Kashmuri’s life and thought, see ‘Abd al Rahmān Kondū, Al Anwar: Shaykh al Ḥadīth Ḥadrat ʻallama Muhammad Anwarshah Kashmuri ki sawāmīḥ ḥayāt awr kamālāt wa tajālliyyāt (Delhi, 1976).
scholars had or ought to have interpreted the reports in question; on what grounds particular beliefs and practices were to be regarded as matters of ‘certainty’ rather than only of ‘probable’ knowledge, and so forth.\footnote{Gīlānī, Ihāta, pp. 78-141, especially pp. 80, 99-101. Also cf. Anwarshāh al Kashmīrī, Iṣfār al mulḥūdīn fi ḍarūriyyāt al dīn, 2nd edn (Dabhel, 1988), pp. 5-6.} This is by no means an unusual sample of topics. Indeed, they were, and continue to be, discussed not just in awareness of a long history of debate on them but precisely in conversation with that history. What is most important about this conversation across the generations is not the ingenuity of the commentaries that result from it but the fact that new generations are trained in how to carry it on. And yet, for all their stylised features, and a series of themes and questions that madrasa students would not have found hard to anticipate, conventional modes of discourse did not foreclose opportunities for a certain innovativeness if only to settle new scores alongside old ones.

A commentary on Ḥadīth might also be a medium for extensive discussion of the Qurʾān, of course, and, in Kashmīrī’s discourses, the settling of new scores is evident especially in his view of how not to think of the Qurʾān. There are those who want to believe that knowledge of all sorts is to be found in the Qurʾān, that inasmuch as God is omniscient His word, too, can be nothing short of all encompassing.\footnote{Gīlānī, Ihāta, pp. 112-13, 118-29.} To Kashmīrī, however, this view of the Qurʾān might be well intentioned but it was misleading; and Qurʾānic verses according to which ‘not a thing, fresh or withered, but it is in a Book Manifest’ (6:59) did not suggest, as it did to some others, that all sciences could be found in the Qurʾān.\footnote{Ibid., p. 118. The translation from the Qurʾān follows A. J. Arberry, The Koran interpreted (New York, 1996).} The Qurʾān’s concerns, Kashmīrī argued, are with the universal principles of life,\footnote{Gīlānī, Ihāta, pp. 118-19.} not with the laws governing the actual working of the universe.\footnote{Cf. al Kashmīrī, Fayd al bārī, vol. II, pp. 384-5.} Indeed, far from anticipating future scientific discoveries, the Qurʾān spoke to its first audience in terms that were intelligible to them, even if this meant that some of the Qurʾān’s metaphors would appear wanting in light of subsequent developments in human knowledge. Keeping the realm of the human intellect and that of faith separate was to allow each to flourish unencumbered by the other.\footnote{Gīlānī, Ihāta, p. 129.}

It is worth asking who the intended target of Kashmīrī’s attack is in his denial that the Qurʾān encompasses ‘everything’. It would be anachronistic, of course, to see this as a response to Islamist appeals to the Qurʾān as the
complete and definitive ‘solution’ to all social and political ills, for such slogans had yet to acquire the currency they had later in the twentieth century. Muslim modernists appear to be a more plausible target. Noted for their keenness to reinterpret the ‘spirit’ or ‘essence’ of the foundational texts and Islamic institutions according to what they take to be the imperatives of modernity, not a few of them have also been tempted to establish the compatibility between Islam and modern forms of knowledge by reading modern science into the Qurʾān. But though Gilānī does not say so, there may have been yet another intended target as well. Since the late nineteenth century, a new religious orientation among some Sunnīs in South Asia has sought to make a clean break with the long established schools of law in making possible an unmediated access to the Qurʾān and the normative example of the Prophet. Scholars leading these ‘People of Ḥadīth’ (Ahl i Ḥadīth) have been vehement in critiquing the reliance of the Sunnī schools of law, and especially of the Ḥanafīs, on the opinions of their legal authorities rather than directly on the foundational texts, and they have continued medieval intra school polemics in asserting that Ḥanafī legal norms are often at variance with the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth. Ḥanafī scholars of South Asia have taken such charges seriously, and a great deal of Deoband’s intellectual energy, both in classrooms of the madrasa and in the ‘ulamā’ s writings, has been concentrated on refuting the allegations of the Ahl i Ḥadīth. Though indigenous to India, the Ahl i Ḥadīth share much with the similarly oriented Salafī movement in the Arab Middle East; and the writings of the Yemeni scholar Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al Shawkānī (d. 1834) have exerted considerable influence on both the Ahl i Ḥadīth of South Asia and the Salafīs world wide. Indeed, Shawkānī’s writings were among the first to be printed at the initiative of the Ahl i Ḥadīth in the late nineteenth century. Underlying his insistence on the necessity for a direct recourse to the foundational texts in order to arrive at new legal rulings (ijtihād), rather than simply following the

17 Cf. Muḥammad Ḥusayn al Dhahabī, Al Ṭafṣīr wa’d muḥāṣṣirūn, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1961 2), vol. III, pp. 163 85; J. J. G. Jansen, The interpretation of the Koran in modern Egypt (Leiden, 1974), pp. 35 54. Sayyid Ahmād Khān (d. 1898), the pioneering Muslim modernist of South Asia, denied that scripture and science could ever contradict each other, which meant, in effect, that the former had to be interpreted in light of the latter in a manner that any apparent contradiction ceased to exist. On his approach to the Qurʾān, see Christian W. Troll, Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A reinterpretation of Muslim theology (Delhi, 1978), pp. 144 222.

18 On the Ahl i Ḥadīth, see Metcalf, Islamic revival, pp. 264 96.

19 On Shawkānī, see Bernard Haykel, Revival and reform in Islam: The legacy of Muḥammad al Shawkānī (Cambridge, 2003).

settled opinions of the schools of law (taqlīd), was Shawkānī’s conviction that ‘he who zealously follows the Qurʾānic verses and the Ḥadīth reports … will find in these two what he seeks’. He had gone on to warn the sceptics: ‘If you disqualify this contention, and consider it arrogant, and you say what many have said, viz. that the proofs of the Book and the Sunna are insufficient for all contingencies, then you yourself have committed a sin … and an injury.’

This is precisely the sort of view that Kashmīrī would have wanted to deny.

Unlike Shawkānī and the Ahl i Ḥadīth, on the one hand, and Muslim modernists, on the other, Deobandī ‘ulamā’ have remained firm adherents of the necessity of taqlīd. Sunnī ‘ulamā’ in other modern Muslim societies may have been rather less avid in defending their school against detractors, but the generality of the ‘ulamā’ have continued to adhere to the established doctrines of their particular school of law. And yet, as scholars of Islamic law have come increasingly to emphasise, an insistence on staying within the overall perimeters of taqlīd does not necessarily preclude important adjustments to changing times and emerging needs. Such adjustments need not be characterised or claimed as ijtihād in order to be significant, of course; but even the ‘ulamā’ who insist on the authority of taqlīd as the guarantee of their tradition’s stability do not necessarily eschew ijtihād in more limited forms. This is as true of the pre modern ‘ulamā’ as it is of Kashmīrī and, indeed, of many more recent figures.

In the Fayḍ al bārī, the commentary on al Bukhārī, Kashmīrī argues, for instance, that the foundational texts of the shariʿa often put forth pronouncements of a general nature but it remains for the mujtahids, those capable of ijtihād, to elucidate the various ways in which, or the levels at which, those pronouncements are to be understood or implemented. Ijtihād becomes necessary precisely because these matters of detail are left unspecified; by the same token, a lack of specification in the foundational texts not only explains but also justifies disagreement among the jurists in how they approach the texts in question.

There is no reason to suppose that ‘ijtihād’ refers here to any grandiose conception of the practice that had once existed in Islam’s first centuries but had long since become extinct. The sense here is that of a continuing effort to understand the Qurʾān’s general prescriptions complete with the jurists’ ongoing disagreements on their precise implications.


22 For references, see Zaman, The ulama, pp. 17 21, 98 9.

Just as an emphasis on the overall framework of taqlīd does not preclude limited forms of ijtihād, so too, for Kashmīrī, is the authority of earlier modes of discourse not binding in all respects. The idea that one might interpret the Qur’ān ‘according to one’s opinion’ (tafsīr bi’l ra’y), rather than according to the teachings of the first Muslims, has long carried considerable opprobrium in exegetical circles. To Kashmīrī, however, the traditional stigma of following ‘mere opinion’ in interpreting the foundational texts applies only when one is ignorant of the views of the forebears, of the Arabic language and of the relevant sciences; otherwise, he asks rhetorically, ‘what prevents the scholars from bringing forth the meaning of the [foundational] texts after careful consideration of the context and with attention to the true sense of the words, understood in conformity with the beliefs of the forbears?’

Scholarly understanding of the foundational texts ought to be anchored in an earlier and ongoing tradition, but that need not take the form of specific textual proof in support of every single interpretation. This view is as much a defence of earlier Ḥanāfī scholars against the charge that their interpretations were insufficiently grounded in textual proofs as it is an effort to accommodate new interpretations by latter day scholars.

And yet, inasmuch as the new interpretations are tied to a scholarly expertise and to the beliefs of the forebears, there also is the evident concern here to rule out the more radically innovative exegeses. Indeed, Kashmīrī’s openness to the possibility of new exegetical and legal approaches is accompanied by the insistence that matters comprising the ‘necessities of religion’—that is, beliefs and practices affirmed by the most authoritative of Ḥadīth reports and by the consensus of the community—do not admit of any ‘interpretation’ at all. In rendering such interpretation inadmissible, Kashmīrī sought to ensure, for instance, that groups like India’s Aḥmādis, who see themselves as Muslims but believe that the sect’s founder, Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad (d. 1908), was a prophet, are not accommodated within Islam by assuming that they have simply misconstrued certain Islamic beliefs. Inasmuch as they contravened a fundamental tenet of Islam, the finality of the prophethood of Muḥammad, theirs was not merely an errant interpretation, but grounds for their outright exclusion from the fold of the Muslim community.

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24 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 150. Kashmīrī makes this point at the outset of his commentary on al Bukhārī’s ‘Kitāb al tafsīr’.
26 On the Aḥmādis, see Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy continuous: Aspects of Aḥmādī religious thought and its medieval background (Berkeley, 1989).
the sort of attention towards Muslim modernists or other Muslim minorities such as the Shi‘a as he did towards the Aḥmadīs,27 the logic of his position had menacing implications for many more than the Aḥmadīs. And it is probably not fortuitous that the Jāmi‘at al ‘Ulūm al Islāmiyya, a leading Deobandī madrasa of Karachi, Pakistan, founded by one of Kashmīrī’s most prominent pupils, would later be at the forefront of sectarian polemics not just against the Aḥmadīs but also against the Muslim modernists and the Shi‘a.28

We have analysed Kashmīrī’s discourses on the Ḥadīth and the Qur‘ān at some length because they offer an illustration of how these foundational texts have been approached by the ‘ulamā‘ well into the twentieth century. For all the peculiarities of Deobandī reformism, of a Ḥanafī identity, and of the challenges the ‘ulamā‘ saw in the face of colonial rule, this manner of approaching texts, of continuing a conversation with generations of intellectual forebears, and of maintaining both continuity and a degree of flexibility in an ongoing tradition is hardly unique to this illustration. And yet, the particular manner in which Kashmīrī approached the study of the Qur‘ān and Ḥadīth at Deoband was not necessarily how every other scholar of Ḥadīth there, or at other madrasas, did so. Not all or even most ‘ulamā‘ either write formal, scholarly exegeses of the Qur‘ān and Ḥadīth or have students who compile their discourses in that form. Among those who have written such commentaries, the particular positions espoused in the course of an ongoing engagement with the scholarly tradition vary a great deal. The commentary on the Qur‘ān by the Egyptian reformer Muḥammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905) and his Syrian disciple Muḥammad Rashīd Ridā (d. 1935) is, for instance, highly critical of fellow ‘ulamā‘ and, by the same token, often boldly departs from views conventionally espoused by the ‘ulamā‘ (e.g., in its invocation of maṣlahā or ‘public interest’ as the basis of rethinking important facets of the shari‘a).29

Kashmīrī was much more conservative in his views, his commitment to the

27 Two of Kashmīrī’s books were a direct product of his anti Aḥmadī zeal: these are Ikfār al mulḥidīn (see n. 11, above) and Al Tāṣrīḥ bi mā tawī`tara fī nuzūl al masīḥ, ed. ‘Abd al Fatīḥ Abū Ghudda, (Halab, 1968).


authority of his Ḥanafi school of law once leading Rashīd Riḍā on a visit to Deoband in 1912 to ask derisively if Ḥadīth itself had ‘turned Ḥanafi’ at the hands of the Deobandī scholars.30 But even when innovativeness hardly recommends itself to him for its own sake, Kashmīrī’s discourses on the importance of not being always constrained in understanding the foundational texts by what the inherited tradition had to say points to the possibility of new perspectives. And the insistence that the Qur’ān ought not be seen as the repository of all knowledge can itself be construed as allowing ‘secular’ knowledge to coexist with the religious.

Articulating authority in new modes of discourse

Many more scholarly commentaries of the sort we have analysed in the foregoing were being written at the time Manāzīr Aḥsan Gīlānī was attending Kashmīrī’s study circles in the early twentieth century than they were towards the end of the twentieth century.31 The genre has nevertheless continued in existence. Muḥammad Yūsuf Bānūrī, the founder of the aforementioned Jāmi‘at al ‘Ulūm al Islāmiyya, wrote a major commentary on a classical collection while basing himself on Kashmīrī’s lectures on this work.32 Muḥammad Taqī ‘Uthmānī, the vice president of the Dār al ‘Ulūm madrasa of Karachi, has published a commentary on the Ḥadīth collection of Muslim ibn al Hajjāj (d. 875), which continues an unfinished commentary by another Deobandī luminary, Shabbīr Ahmād ‘Uthmānī, who had himself been a student of Kashmīrī.33 And Taqī ‘Uthmānī has been instrumental in the publication of the Ḥadīth collection of Muslim ibn al Hajjāj (d. 875), which continues an unfinished commentary by another Deobandī luminary, Shabbīr Ahmād ‘Uthmānī, who had himself been a student of Kashmīrī.33 And Taqī ‘Uthmānī has been instrumental in the publication of the Ḥadīth collection of Muslim ibn al Hajjāj (d. 875), which continues an unfinished commentary by another Deobandī luminary, Shabbīr Ahmād ‘Uthmānī, who had himself been a student of Kashmīrī.33

But even when specialised commentaries on the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth were being produced and published in greater numbers, other commentaries had begun to be addressed to a broader audience.35 The Tafsīr al Manār, the

30 Kondu, Al Anwar, p. 554.
32 See n. 10, above.
33 Muḥammad Taqī ‘Uthmānī, Takmilat fath al mulhim, 3 vols. (Karachi, 1407).
34 Zafār Ahmād ‘Uthmānī, Ḥadīth collection of Muslim ibn al Hajjāj (d. 875), which continues an unfinished commentary by another Deobandī luminary, Shabbīr Ahmād ‘Uthmānī, who had himself been a student of Kashmīrī.33
35 An example is the explication of various themes in the first third of the Qur’ān by Maḥmūd Shaltūt, the rector of the Azhar of Egypt (1958 63). Maḥmūd Shaltūt, Tafsīr al Qur’ān al karīm: Al ajza‘ al ‘ashara al ‘īlā, 4th printing (Cairo, n.d.). On Shaltūt’s
commentary by ‘Abduh and Riḍā, takes its name from Riḍā’s journal, *Al Manār*, in which this work was first serialised. Few among the modern ‘ulamā’ better exemplify the effort to reach broad audiences while simultaneously continuing to cultivate the scholarly tradition than does Ashraf ‘Alī Thānawī (d. 1943), however, arguably the most influential of Deobandī scholars in the twentieth century. It was at Thānawī’s instance, and under his direction, that the massive *F̄ā’āl sanan* was written. Another project initiated under his guidance was the *Aḥkām al Qur’ān*, a collaborative work concerned specifically with elucidating the Qur’ān’s legal content and belonging to a genre long familiar in exegetical circles.36 Thānawī himself is the source of a large number of legal responsa, *fatwās*, and many more bearing the imprimatur of the Deoband madrasa were issued by his students and disciples. He is also the author of the *Bihishṭ Zewar*, still a bestseller in Muslim South Asia, which lays down in minute detail the proper beliefs and practices that ought to characterise the entire life of a Muslim woman.37 If some of his writings were addressed to fellow scholars and others to lay readers, some, like the *Bāyān al Qur’ān*, his translation of and commentary on the Qur’ān, combined more than one audience.38 The commentary itself is also primarily addressed to the ordinary believers. Yet any given page of this multi volume work contains not only the space devoted to verses of the Qur’ān in Arabic with their Urdu translation and a commentary on them in Urdu; the bottom of

36 *Aḥkām al Qur’ān*, 5 vols. (Karachi, 1987). Completed and published long after Thānawī’s death, the first two volumes were written by Zafar Āhmād ‘Uthmānī (the author of the *I’lā’āl sanan*), volumes III and IV by Muḥī Muḥammad Shafī’, and the fifth volume by Muḥammad Idrīs Kandahlawī. In an important recent work on the Qur’ān commentary of al Tha’labī, Walīd Saleh has suggested that we ought to distinguish between ‘encyclopedic’ commentaries, of which al Tha’labī’s work is a major instance, and ‘madrasa style’ commentaries, which were ‘not simply monovalent interpretations of the Qur’ān … [but] more of a shorthand summary of the encyclopedic commentaries’. Walīd A. Saleh, *The formation of the classical tafsīr tradition: The Qur’ān commentary of al Tha’labī* (427/1035) (Leiden, 2004), p. 21. This distinction, though useful in some instances, assumes a greater homogeneity of the texts produced in or intended for madrasas than seems warranted, however. And it is hardly clear that works like the *I’lā’āl sanan* or the *Aḥkām al Qur’ān* both produced in the milieu of the madrasa are not latter day examples of the encyclopedic genre of the commentary. The same is also true of Ṭabātābā’ī’s commentary, on which see below.


the page broaches issues, in Arabic, concerning the linguistic difficulties of the verses in question as well as Ḥadith reports and other scholarly discussions relevant to them. These materials, Thānawī writes, are intended for scholars and madrasa students, and they are in Arabic precisely to keep them out of the reach of the common believers. On the margins of the page, finally, are mystical interpretations, in Arabic and in Urdu, relevant to the Qurʾānic verses appearing on that page.

It is not just a multiplicity of discourse that such works quite literally put on display, however; it is also the many facets of the scholar’s religious authority. Part of this authority derives from the specialised writing in the Arabic language which affirms the scholar’s credentials not only in the milieu of the madrasa but also for those readers to whom it is expressly intended to remain inaccessible. This lay audience is instructed, moreover, to read even the parts written for them under the guidance of the ‘ulamā’. There is nothing subtle here about the insistence of the indispensability of the ‘ulamā’ for the rectitude of the community. The choices Thānawī makes in his exegesis underscore this further. The exegesis in Urdu, addressed primarily to a lay audience is, he says, based only on how the Ḥanafīs have understood otherwise contested matters; and the variety of exegetical opinions is eliminated to adopt only what Thānawī sees as the most preferable ones. Such matters of disagreement now appear only in the Arabic portions of the commentary and glosses, meant for the madrasa audience. Where his disciple Zaḥrār ʿUthmānī had to write the monumental Flāʾal sunan to establish the conformity of the Ḥanafī legal norms with the classical corpus of Ḥadīth, Thānawī does so simply by creating an image of exegetical unanimity for what he takes to be the benefit of his lay audience. For many modern ‘ulamā’, these are complementary ways of constructing, defending and displaying religious authority—sometimes juxtaposed in the very same work. Also juxtaposed here, as noted, are elements of a mystical commentary which do not merely alert the reader to the fact that Thānawī is also a Sufi master and that his words carry authority in that capacity, too but also that Islamic mysticism and sharīʿa scholarship are in perfect harmony.

The challenge of modern education

It is hard to imagine the influence ‘ulamā’ like Thānawī have exerted in South Asia and beyond, during their lives and long after their death, without the

40 Ibid., vol. I, p. 4.
possibilities made available by print, no less than by the growing numbers of people who were becoming literate in an ever expanding school system. But the factors that have made it possible for the ‘ulamā’ to discover and nurture new audiences have equally brought about the emergence of other sorts of intellectuals. These intellectuals are diverse in background and orientation, and include, though they are not limited to, the modernists and the Islamists. The degree to which they have demonstrated an acquaintance with the pre modern Islamic scholarly tradition also varies a great deal. Yet they often share much in their view of the ‘ulamā’ as antiquated, as cultivating a lifeless tradition and, consequently, as a serious impediment to ‘reform’. To the ‘ulamā’, for their part, the challenges that confront Islam in the modern world have come not just from the impact of colonial rule and from the ability of Western states and cultures to continue shaping post colonial Muslim societies, but equally from the new intellectuals in these societies and from those often with a similar social and educational background most receptive to their appeal.

While the ‘ulamā’ have seldom welcomed the sort of critical challenges that those with a modern education often pose to them, they have also made sustained efforts to respond to their doubts and questions. Thānawī, for instance, devoted a short treatise, Al Intibāḥāt al mufīda, to both addressing such queries and to pointing to the dangers represented by the modernist approach to Islam. One such danger, as he sees it here, is the desire always to seek a ‘rationale’ for legal rulings. Basing legal rulings on their supposed rationale is perilous, he says, and not just because one might misrecognise it; the danger lies equally in the temptation to seek the imagined rationale irrespective of the ruling in question, with the practice of the sharī‘a being reduced to people’s individual understanding of its purposes. Yet it was not long after this work that he wrote a three volume book, Al Ṭaṣālīh al ‘aqlīyya li’l aḥkām al naqīyya (Rational reasons for the transmitted legal rulings), in which he sets out to offer precisely the sort of reasons he had earlier insisted must never be delved into. There are ‘rational’ explanations

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43 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 31ff.
here even for various purification rituals,\textsuperscript{44} or why particular rituals are performed in the way they are\textsuperscript{45} or why the amount of the obligatory alms tax (\textit{zakāt}) varies according to the items on which it is due.\textsuperscript{46} Thānawī continues to insist that the law does not need such ‘rational’ justifications to be binding, but the fact that he offers them nonetheless is instructive. The reasons underlying particular rulings are offered in the conviction that Islam is, indeed, a rational religion and that the ‘\textit{ulamā}’ \textit{can}, if they choose, offer adequate explanations for any given rule or practice. As such, this catalogue of rational explanations is a mark of the ‘\textit{ulamā}’\textquoteright s self-confidence just as it is of the self-sufficiency of Islam not only in regulating all facets of life but also in providing good reasons for any and all of its rulings.

But there is also a sense in which this confidence shows clear signs of strain. Thānawī acknowledges as much when he notes that, with the ‘independent mindedness’ that modern education has engendered, people often remain dissatisfied unless rational explanations are provided to them and simply to try to dissuade them from pursuing such reasons is not likely to be very effective.\textsuperscript{47} The belief that dialectical or philosophical proofs might be as necessary for the intellectually sophisticated as they are misplaced for ordinary believers is no less familiar to Thānawī than it was to many of his medieval forebears. The problem with refusing and then offering ‘rational’ justifications for legal rulings is, however, that it is the very \textit{same} audience those educated in modern, Westernised institutions to whom Thānawī wants both to refuse and to offer the justifications in question. Lurking behind this dilemma is an ambivalence that he shares with many other ‘\textit{ulamā}’: even as he sees the modern educated as prone to unsettling what ought to be a stable Muslim identity, they also comprise an audience that could, under the guidance of the ‘\textit{ulamā}’, be brought to the right path and through whom the interests of the larger Muslim community might effectively be advanced in a changing world.

Irrespective of how comfortable or successful they have been in this enterprise, the ‘\textit{ulamā}’ have continued to address the ‘doubts’ they see as arising in conditions of modernity. One of the most impressive works of the twentieth century that aspires to do precisely this is \textit{Al Mizān fi tafsīr al Qurān} by the Iranian religious scholar Muh.ammad Ḥusayn Ṭabarabātī (d. 1981). This twenty volume exegesis has remained widely influential among the Shi‘a.

\textsuperscript{44} Ashraf \textquoteleft\textquoteleft Áli Thānawī, \textit{Al Maṣāliḥ al `aqliyya li`l ahkām al naqliyya}, 3 vols. (Lahore, 1964 (first published in 1915 16)), vol. I, pp. 22 73.
\textsuperscript{45} Cf. ibid., vol. I, pp. 79 154.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., vol. I, pp. 171 5.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., vol. I, p. 18.
Ṭabāṭabāʾi did not quite fit the criteria by which religious authority is typically acquired and asserted in the Shiʿi religious establishment. While the study of Ḥadith is at the centre of advanced learning in Deobandi and other madrasas of South Asia, expertise in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) remains the mark of religious authority in the Shiʿi madrasas of Iran and Iraq. Ṭabāṭabāʾi’s central interests lay, however, in Qurʾān commentary and philosophy rather than in law.48 Even as he disavows any intention as, of course, would any self-respecting exegete to impose topics on the Qurʾān that might be extrinsic to it, his commentary is arguably the most ambitious philosophical reading of the Qurʾān in the modern world. The overriding concern that motivates Ṭabāṭabāʾi’s venture is not merely to show the compatibility between philosophy and the teachings of the Qurʾān; it is also to address the actual or imagined questions of his modern interlocutors. Many of Ṭabāṭabāʾi’s philosophical discussions throughout this commentary are clearly intended for those well-acquainted with medieval Islamic theology and philosophy, that is, for people beset by ‘doubts’ within the madrasa. Such doubts were of varied provenance, with Marxism often at the forefront of the worries of many ‘ulamāʾ at the time this work was being written.49 But there is much else in Ṭabāṭabāʾi’s commentary by way of ‘ethical’, ‘sociological’ and ‘historical’ discussions, often under sections explicitly labelled as such that seeks to address the concerns of a larger audience educated in modern, Westernised institutions.50

Tradition and public commentary

An ability to appeal to people with a modern education has come to be more than a desideratum for the ‘ulamāʾ; it has also become a crucial part of their


50 Examples of sections marked ‘sociological’, ‘historical’ and ‘ethical’ are found throughout the commentary; these are often juxtaposed with sections titled ‘philosophical discussion’, as well as with others that offer both an overall explanation of the cluster of verses being commented on and an account of the reported sayings of the Prophet and the Shiʿi imams on matters relevant to the verses. For a statement of his method, see Sayyid Muhammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾi, Al Mizān fi tafsīr al Qurʾān, 20 vols. (Beirut, n.d.), vol. 1, pp. 4, 14, esp. 13, 14.
own claims to religious authority. This is so, in part, of course, because of the ‘ulamā’’s awareness that any effort to be heard in the public sphere must be predicated on being able to address the increasing numbers of people educated in secular institutions in the ‘language of the age’. Then there are the changes that the ‘ulamā’’s institutions of learning have undergone during the course of the twentieth century. In some cases, notably in Egypt with the thoroughgoing reform of the Azhar in 1961, new departments have been added to this millennium old seat of learning to complement traditional Islamic with modern, secular education, even as the content and the styles of imparting Islamic learning have themselves continued to evolve. Yūsuf al Qaraḍāwī (b. 1926), a Qatar based Egyptian religious scholar, had, for instance, studied at the Azhar before the 1961 reforms, though he received his Ph.D. from this institution (1973) after these reforms had come into effect. Irrespective of the degree of his own exposure to modern styles of education, it is a carefully cultivated effort to speak to those reared in modern institutions of learning that has helped make him one of the most influential of the Sunnī ‘ulamā’ at the turn of the twenty first century.

A prolific scholar and preacher, Qaraḍāwī has disseminated his views not only in print but also through the internet and satellite television. He has written on matters of ritual practice, economics, Islamist politics, legal norms as they relate to modern life (including life as a Muslim minority in contemporary Western societies), and, not least, on globalisation. This choice of themes is clearly intended to showcase the fact that the ‘ulamā’ do, indeed, have much to say on issues of contemporary relevance to modern Muslims. The resonance of his discourses also rests on a recurring theme of ‘centrism’ (wasatiyya). In his political writings, he has railed against Western, and

51 For a related point, cf. Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim politics, pp. 70, 72.
52 Yūsuf al Qaraḍāwī, Al Muslimūn wa l ‘awlamā (Cairo, 2000), pp. 6, 137, 144, 149.
especially American, ‘neo colonialism’ and sought to unite Muslims against the political challenges facing them,\(^{56}\) but he has also repeatedly warned against the dangers of radical Islamism. In his conception, an ideal Muslim society is founded on a shared allegiance to the ‘constants of the community (thawābit al umma) in its belief, thought, and practice’,\(^ {57}\) yet it is open to change and cultivates diversity.\(^ {58}\)

Qaradāwī’s orientation may broadly be characterised as ‘Salafi’ in that his legal discourse assumes an unmediated access to the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth rather than being canalised through a particular school of law. But unlike many other Salafis, as well as the Ahl i Ḥadīth in South Asia, he is not dismissive of the Sunnī schools of law; and his defence of the jurist’s ‘opinion’ (ra’y) is not dissimilar to that of Anwarshāh Kashmirī.\(^ {59}\) Qaradāwī seeks, however, to draw on the collective resources represented by the schools of law without being constrained by their boundaries. And where the scholars committed to the authority of, say, the Ḥanafī school of law would see this procedure as unacceptable in its admixture of varied legal norms and methods, ‘ulamā’ like Qaradāwī find nothing unprincipled in it as long as the norms and methods deployed are in consonance with the foundational texts. It is in this way that Qaradāwī seeks to make and keep Islamic law receptive to change. But where he differs from many Salafis, as well as from many a modernist and an Islamist, is in also insisting that the historically articulated legal tradition remain a central part of the effort to discern and implement God’s law.

Inasmuch as it is Qaradāwī, as a traditionally educated religious scholar, who provides guidance on how to think about the adaptability of Islamic law, his writings like those of Thānawī clearly serve to bolster not just his own authority but also that of the ‘ulamā’ in general.\(^ {60}\) This is especially important, of course, in case of people with a college and university education, to whom Qaradāwī has sought to bring home a new recognition of the ‘ulamā’’s relevance as interpreters of the religious tradition but also as a bulwark against extremist constructions of that tradition.\(^ {61}\) His pronouncements are not

\(^{56}\) Al Qaradāwī, Al Muslimūn wa'l ṣawlamā, pp. 9–86 and passim.

\(^{57}\) Yūsuf al Qaradāwī, Kayfa nata'āmal ma'al turāth wa'l tamadkhub wa'l ikhtilāf (Cairo, 2001), pp. 43–4.

\(^{58}\) Zaman, ‘Common good’, pp. 145–8, for the relevant references.

\(^{59}\) Cf. al Qaradāwī, Kayfa nata'āmal, pp. 70–1.


without their share of ambiguity, however. Assurances about a flourishing diversity in a truly Islamic society seem, for instance, to presuppose a shared commitment to Islamic norms, as he construes them, as the condition of tolerating differences. Nor is his overall emphasis on a path of political moderation free of instances where the resort to militancy is tolerated or condoned. Whether his effort to reach new audiences also entails a serious rethinking of facets of the Ulama's scholarly tradition, rather than of dexterously repackaging crucial facts of it in what he calls 'the language of the age', is also less clear in the substance of Qaraḍāwī's thought than it is in the rhetorical flourishes that accompany it. There nevertheless is a recognition here that the continuing relevance of the Ulama is predicated on the degree to which they are self-consciously responsive to the needs of the larger collectivities they inhabit—a recognition that constitutes an important challenge to fellow scholars.  

This challenge has had many formulations in varied contexts, perhaps none more influential in the twentieth century than Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's (d. 1989) rethinking of certain aspects of the Shi'i juristic tradition to argue for the Ulama's leadership roles in the struggle for an Islamic state. Like Anwarshāh Kashmīrī's lectures on classical works of Ḥadīth at Deoband, Khomeini's work originated as lectures to advanced madrasa students in 1970, while he was in exile in the Shi'i holy town of Najaf in Iraq. The dominant Shi'i view has long been that the leading jurists offer broad religious and legal guidance to the community in the imam's absence; but political authority, necessary for the public implementation of the shari'a, properly belongs only to the imam and, while offering some guidance to those who wield coercive power, the jurists can best serve the interests of Islam by keeping their distance from the government. Khomeinī argued, however, that inasmuch as God intended the shari'a not to be in abeyance, Muslims ought to strive actively towards its implementation rather than wait for the imam to return and do so. And he argued that since the people most knowledgeable in the shari'a ought to be responsible for its implementation, it was to the jurists that this responsibility fell. The jurists, or the most learned

64 See, for instance, al Qaraḍāwī, Risālat al Azhar, passim; Skovgaard Petersen, 'Global mufti', p. 156.
among them, were thus obligated also to provide political leadership, a role Khomeinī himself came to fulfil as he spearheaded the Iranian revolution and guided state policy during the decade that followed it. The significance of this doctrine of the ‘authority of the jurist’ (wilāyat al ḥalāl) lies not merely in the fact that it came to be enshrined in the constitution of post revolution Iran or that it is at the heart of debates on the scope and limits of religious authority in the contemporary Iranian public sphere. As Shahrough Akhavi has argued, its importance also consists in demonstrating a continuing evolution in the ‘ulamā’’s doctrinal positions. ‘In that sense, the Khomeinists’ reinterpretation of wilāyat al ḥalāl comes as a “wake up call” to … [other leading scholars] who do not agree with Khomeini and his supporters. They are on notice that they had better take the revisionist arguments seriously, and make their own counter arguments, based on contemporary times and circumstances.’

In modern and contemporary Islam, neither the revisionist discourses nor the responses to them have come exclusively from the ‘ulamā’, of course. Nor are they the only people who write elaborate commentaries for a specialised audience, any more than the new religious intellectuals are alone in producing objectified ‘Islamic books’ purporting to package the true spirit or real essence of Islamic teachings on any given topic for a lay readership. Some ‘ulamā’ still write commentaries of the sort discussed earlier in this chapter, but many more participate in the production of these Islamic books. Other genres of scholarly writing have meanwhile continued to emerge. Doctoral dissertations in the ‘Islamic universities’ of Saudi Arabia, the Azhar of Egypt and in other institutions of higher Islamic learning, often subsequently published as books, represent new ways of establishing scholarly credentials, for instance. These dissertations have often focused on producing critical editions of medieval works on the Qur’an, Ḥadīth and Islamic law. But many a dissertation has also provided a detailed study of particular topics relating to the Islamic religious tradition, with titles such as ‘The Sunna in the third century A.H.’; ‘The science of Ḥadīth in Mecca in the Mamlūk era’; ‘Ibn Taymiyya’s contribution to Ḥadīth studies’; ‘Historical reports in the Fatḥ al bārī [Ibn Ḥajar’s commentary on

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67 No commentary has been more influential in the twentieth century than the work of the Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), Fi ḥilāl al Qur’an, 6 vols. (Beirut, 1973–4); trans. M. A. Salahi and A. A. Shamis as In the shade of the Qur’an, 8 vols. to date (Leicester, 1999). On the phenomenon of Islamic books, see Yves Gonzales Quijano, Les gens du livre: Édition et champ intellectual dans l’Egypte républicaine (Paris, 1998).
al Bukhārī’s Ṣaḥīḥ regarding the Rāshidūn and Umayyad caliphathe; ‘Exegetical reports in the Ṭath ṭal bārī’; ‘Juristic readings of al Bukhārī’s Ṣaḥīḥ as the basis for proselytism’, etc.70 Present minded concerns are not self evident in such works. Yet they not only reflect new models of scholarly specialisation in Islam on a par with specialisation in any other field or discipline or new ways of cultivating the religious tradition; they also help bolster particular religio-political orientations. The last of the above mentioned titles (‘Juristic readings of al Bukhārī’s Ṣaḥīḥ as the basis for proselytism’) is, in fact, common to at least a dozen dissertations, each focusing on a part of the al Bukhārī canonical collection. All were completed at the Faculty of Proselytism and Information at the Imām Muhammad ibn Sa‘ūd University in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia.71 And all are very much part and product of longstanding, if increasingly contentious, efforts by the Saudi religious establishment to disseminate particular (Salafi) views of Islam at the global level.

Such studies represent a bridge of sorts between writings formally structured as commentaries on earlier works and the Islamic books meant for a lay consumption. But the former have themselves proved to be malleable, bringing together not just different modes of discourse but also varied audiences. Some of Qaradāwī’s recent work again offers probably the best illustration of this. In a series of books, he has sought to ‘treat diverse intellectual issues of law and legal theory, faith and practice where the [true] path might have become obscured’, all while basing himself on a short tract of Ḥasan al Banna (d. 1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. Al Banna’s tract, ‘The twenty principles’, gives a bare outline of matters that different Islamist activists can take as their shared platform; and Qaradāwī has taken one or a few of these very succinctly stated principles as the basis of the several volumes he has published in this series.72 For all its peculiarity a series of

70 For a comprehensive bibliography of published works on Ḥadīth as well as of unpublished theses and dissertations, see Muhammad Khayr Ramaḍān Yūsuf, Al Mu ‘jam al muṣannaf li mu‘allaqāt al Ḥadīth al sharīf, 3 vols. (Riyadh, 2003). The titles I mention as illustrations are listed in vol. I, pp. 34 (#42), 35 (#44), 80 (#260), 375 (#1425), 376 (#1426), 388 91 (#1480 92). This work is itself a continuation of an earlier bibliographic study by Muhyyī al din ‘Aṭīyya et al., Da‘īl mu‘allaqāt al Ḥadīth al sharīf al muḥbīʿa al qadīma wa’l jādīfa, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1995).


72 Works published in the series include: Yūsuf al Qaradāwī, Nahw wahda fikriyya li ‘āmilin li’l Islam (Cairo, 1991); Yūsuf al Qaradāwī, Al Marjā’iyya al ‘ulūy fī’l Islām li’l Qur’ān wa’l sunna (Cairo, n.d. (c. 1992)); Yūsuf al Qaradāwī, Al Siyāsā al shar ‘iyya fi daw’ muṣūṣ al sharī‘a wa maqāṣidhī (Beirut, 2000); Yūsuf al Qaradāwī, Kayfa nata ‘āmil; Yūsuf al Qaradāwī, Fuṣūl fī ‘aqīda bayna ‘l salaf wa’l khalaf (Cairo, 2005). For a brief description of this series, see al Qaradāwī, Al Siyāsā al shar ‘iyya, pp. 5 9; the quotation is from ibid., p. 5.
extended commentaries by a traditionally trained religious scholar on the work of an Islamist ideologue this project signals the degree to which clear boundaries have sometimes become blurred between different groups of activists and intellectuals in the Muslim public sphere. At the same time, however, it also illustrates the continuing adaptability of the ‘ulamā’’s exegetical tradition. And it suggests that the ‘ulamā’’s long history of trying to incorporate varied trends within their scholarly culture has continued to find novel expressions.

73 On this aspect of the pre modern scholarly tradition, elucidated with reference to the eleventh century exegete al Tha’labi, see Saleh, *The formation of the classical tafsīr tradition*, pp. 14-23 and passim.
Overview on Wahhābism, colonialism and Sufi networks

Institutional Sufism from the nineteenth century to today can be assessed under three discrete but related rubrics: Sufi Africa, Sufi Asia (including the Middle East) and Sufi America. If this accent is locative, it is also temporal, marking the nineteenth twentieth and now twenty first centuries by Sufi developments in particular parts of the globe. Overarching and connecting these subsets is a common theme: Sufism/neo Sufism intensifies Islamic loyalty, while also distinguishing Sufi from non Sufi Muslims, by underscoring the unique status of the Prophet Muhammad.

A single question demarcates Sufi from non Sufi Muslims: is the Prophet Muhammad alive or dead? For non Sufi Muslims, the question is itself a mark of heretical intent. Of course, the Prophet is dead, and with his death in seventh century Arabia there ceased to be any human mediator between the living and the dead. What the Prophet bequeathed to his followers was the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth, sayings that later became codified as Sunna, his own model of exemplary conduct. Sunna complemented, even as it amplified, the Qur’ān. Together the Qur’ān and the Sunna have been interpreted by the ‘ulamā’. There is no authority in Islam apart from the books and the learned custodians of the books. To the extent that the Prophet lives, it is through his legacy in books, preserved and mediated by the ‘ulamā’.

But for Sufis, the Prophet continues to live as an active agent in every historical epoch. He intercedes for the faithful in heaven, but he also appears to his most devout followers, that is, to saints or Sufi masters, in dreams and even occasionally in wakeful moments. He lives also through the institutional trajectories, or ṭarīqas, i.e., the brotherhoods, that Sufi masters or shaykhs direct. He is as available to the ordinary believer as he is to the advanced saint.
Sufis of all generations have held this view of the living Prophet, yet the nineteenth century witnessed a more explicit, and more openly public, awareness of the Prophet as the crucial link between God and humankind. It has been etched in the phrase *al ṭarīqa al Muḥammadiyya*. *Al ṭarīqa al Muḥammadiyya* was identified both with the North African movement of Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al Sanūsī and with the north Indian movement of Sayyid Aḥmad Shahid Barelwī. What underlies *al ṭarīqa al Muḥammadiyya* in both cases is not just loyalty to the Prophet but connection to his reality (*al ḥaqīqa al Muḥammadiyya*) and to his light (*al nūr al Muḥammadi*). There is no denial of the mystery and meaning of Prophetic mediation, such as Wahhābī teaching would require, but there is also no substitution of the Prophet for God, which would entail blatant *kufr*, or unbelief. ¹

At the same time that the overt stance of Sufi or neo Sufi advocates becomes more pronounced in the nineteenth century, it becomes more pronounced in the context of a world transformation known as European, and then Euro American, modernity. Neither Sufism nor neo Sufism can be understood as social movements apart from the material context of Euro American modernity. Euro America is crucial for understanding Sufism/neo Sufism, just as it is for analysing all institutional expressions of Islamic loyalty during the past two centuries. The accent is double: the weight of colonial conquest and the wealth of Muslim networks. Each defines and qualifies the other. Together they provide the basis for Sufi, and also neo Sufi, self expression as social movements.

The nineteenth century provided elements of continuity, and also incentives for change, in institutional Sufism. The impact of Wahhābism has been exaggerated. To the extent that Sufi derived movements, such as the Barelwī jihad in the Punjab and the Farāʾīdīs in Bengal, are labelled Wahhābī, their actual nature is occluded: the former was an early protest against British influence, but also Sikh ascendancy, in northern India, while the latter was at once a class movement against Hindu landlords and a reassertion of Sufi (specifically Qādirī) norms and values.²

More importantly, beyond India, from West Africa to South East Asia, from the late eighteenth century until now, the Muslim world witnessed a vigilant

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effort to redefine and internalise the boundaries of Islamic loyalty. The Wahhābīs were not so much an inspiration as they were a product of the wholesale changes afoot. Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb (d. 1792) offered what amounts to a carping, narrow notion of unbelief. The eponymous founder of the Wahhābī movement acknowledged three kinds of tawhīd as integral to the intellectual defence of Islamic belief: tawhīd al rubūbiyya, tawhīd al ulūhiyya and tawhīd al šifāt. He scarcely mentions the last, however, since it focuses on the oneness of God as projected through the beautiful names ascribed to Him in the Qur’ān, and these same beautiful names were the linchpin of Sufi reflection and practice. Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb bracketed them from his outlook, focusing instead on the distinction between the first two kinds of tawhīd: tawhīd al rubūbiyya and tawhīd al ulūhiyya. The first acknowledges God as creator and lord of the universe. Arabs from ‘the age of ignorance’, prior to the advent of Islam, were acknowledged as monotheists in this sense: they worshipped God as One, but they associated others with Him, or sought other lofty figures whether angels or prophets to mediate with Him on their behalf. They were guilty of shirk, i.e., idolatry, and so they could not and did not worship God in His transcendent solitude. Professing tawhīd al ulūhiyya, true believers had to dissociate themselves from the quasi monotheists, even as they ignored the ultra monotheist Sufis. Not only did true believers have to dissociate themselves from all other believers but they also had to repudiate their fellow monotheists, exposing the error of their words and the damage of their deeds.\(^3\)

The project of purifying Islam was internal as well as external in its focus. While shirk was evidenced in the material forms of graves or amulets, kufr, i.e., disbelief, was a disease of the heart. Nourished in secret, it had to be constantly confronted: it required not just individual but collective vigilance of the most intense nature. Kufr could only be subdued by persistent attack on all those who did not self-identify with Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhāb and his teaching. That included not just Sufi masters and their followers but also all devout ‘ulamā’ and fiqahā’, i.e., jurists, who derived their authority and projected its value within the traditional schools or madhhabs.

In other words, most observant Muslims became the enemies of Wahhābī ideology. For all Sufi oriented elites, as also most ordinary believers, the touchstone of devotion remained the Prophet, but not the Prophet solely as

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a human messenger sent by Allah to seventh century Arab pagans. The Prophet, from the Sufi perspective, was also a majestic, omniscient, metahistorical presence, alive from Preexistence (ābad) to Postexistence (āzal). Exemplary persons, also known as saints (awliya), especially the loftiest of saints (aqtab), were thought to share in this same timeless omniscience. Hence intercession with the Prophet, as also with the saints, was deemed to be part of Divine Grace.  

One could trace the origin and development of such Sufi beliefs to the great proponents of sainthood, themselves deemed to be saints from the storied past, whether Ibn ‘Arabî, Jalâl al Din al Suyûtî, or Shâh Walî Allâh. What distinguishes neo Sufism is not so much abrupt doctrinal shifts from their illustrious predecessors, whether independent or in response to Wahhabî influence, but rather a gradual accommodation at once complex and local to the multiple challenges of a colonial order. It included new transregional mobility, new local institutions, new multilingual forms of education and also new print networks. Colonialism, not Wahhabism, became the midwife of neo Sufism, or ‘the third wave of institutional Sufism’.

Colonial rule paradoxically served to strengthen as well as weaken Muslim networks. While the French in West Africa undermined networks by breaking down connections between specific local Muslim groups (Berbers and Arabs), they ironically fostered the revival of these groups in resistance to European domination. Indeed, the same networks that opposed European rule also linked Muslims to the metropolitan capitals of France and England. Education, both secular and religious, was crucial in expanding Muslim networks, including but not solely those promoting Sufi loyalty, throughout Africa and Asia. Education included more than curricular content; it also inscribed usage of European languages in new contexts. During the nineteenth century, French and English became regional linguae francae for Muslim communities, sometimes displacing local Muslim languages, whether Urdu, Persian, Pashto or Bengali. Owing to its liturgical prestige, Arabic was the major Muslim language to retain its prestige during the colonial period, and one could argue that its prestige, along with the prestige accorded Persian


5 On arguments for and against the term ‘neo Sufism’, consult Rex S. O’Fahey and Bernd Radtke, ‘Neo Sufism reconsidered’, Der Islam, 70 (1973), pp. 52–87. For an alternative to neo Sufism, one can use, but again within quotation marks, ‘the third wave of institutional Sufism’.
and Urdu, were enhanced, especially for Sufi minded Muslims, through the print revolution (examined below).

The nineteenth century: Sufi Africa

“The nineteenth century was Muslim Africa’s Sufi century.” Is this provocative statement, from the most prominent historian of East African Sufism, true? And if it is true, what are its implications for Sufi orders and their response to the twin challenge of colonialism and Wahhābī/Salafī opposition?

Especially in nineteenth century Africa, colonial rivalries as well as competition between the ṭarīqas were crucial to understanding the role of institutional Sufism. The French, like their British rivals, were uncertain how to engage the brotherhoods. Mauritania provides a case instance of their unending dilemma. The attitude of the French to Islam in Mauritania fluctuated between a general sympathy and a limited backing for certain marabouts amongst the alleged ‘Berber’ zāwiya, i.e., hostels. They were obsessed with the threat of a pan Germanic and pan Islamic alliance; in it they deemed Sayyid Ma’ al ‘Aynayn (d. 1905) to be playing a particularly important role. Foreign Arabic papers were occasionally banned from internal circulation, the zāwiya were closely watched, mail was sometimes censored and Arabic higher education suffered. Differences between the Qādiriyya and the Tijāniyya brotherhoods were exploited wherever possible. In French West Africa, up until the First World War, Islam or the Islamic Peril became close to an obsession of French foreign policy. Where the French allowed and at times encouraged madrasas to be built, it was principally to facilitate tribal control and to simplify their constant observation of tribes. The encouragement of certain marabouts to visit their flocks in adjacent Black Africa was in part shrewd policy, in part cosmetic. It was aimed at impressing a far wider Muslim public. Some Tijānī leaders, such as Shaykh Ḫamallāh, vigorously rejected the French. Repeatedly deported or under surveillance, he died in obscure circumstances in January 1943 and a number of his followers, as well as two of his sons, were executed.

The legacy of Ma’ al ‘Aynayn also projected his anti colonial stance. When Ma’ al ‘Aynayn died, his principal zawiyah was desecrated but his sons did not retire from the struggle. Descendants of Ma’ al ‘Aynayn, and more especially his son, Murabbih Rabbuh (d. 1942), became master planners and part executors of attacks on French posts. They were not alone. Even while the French were building new madrasas in Mauritania, beyond Mauritania in other parts of West Africa, dissident marabouts were able to maintain and expand their networks of resistance to colonial rule.

Indeed, it is possible to argue that the greatest expansion of Islam in sub Saharan Africa took place in the colonial period, particularly under the British in Nigeria and the Sudan and the French through central and western Africa. Ironically colonial administrators did not co operate in every instance with their missionary counterparts. Often they strained to develop institutions and practices that enabled their Muslim subjects to be peaceful participants in the colonial project. They co opted portions of the Islamic legal and educational systems. They tried to control the mechanisms, and also the participants, in the annual pilgrimage. They hoped to create colonial forms of Islam. The best known creation was islam noir, the Black Islam, that the French held up as characteristic of French West Africa. The French tried to outdo the British in India, and also the Dutch in Indonesia, in projecting themselves as a Muslim power advocating the interests of their Muslim subjects against those of their colonial rivals.

The dominant narrative for the nineteenth century places the Hijāz, especially Mecca and Medina, within the Wahhābī camp from the late eighteenth century, yet a number of Sufis and Sufi minded ‘ulamā’ populated the Holy Cities and formed study circles there that were well attended by pilgrims and others, from Asia and Africa as well as the Mediterranean basin. Moreover, the Wahhābī sack of the Haramayn, destructive though it was, was followed by over 100 years of reoccupation by Egyptian/Ottoman forces at odds with Wahhābī, and later Salafi, ideology. Early nineteenth century Mecca remained a cosmopolitan site, the nodal point attracting multiple networks of Muslim saints and jurists, merchants and travellers. Among the North African saints who found themselves in Mecca on the cusp of the nineteenth century was Ahmad ibn Idrīs al Fāsī (d. 1837). Ibn Idrīs’s influence pervades several of the new orders that drew inspiration from him and later became clustered as

9 On Ma’ al ‘Aynayn, the most extensive account appears in Bradford G. Martin, Muslim brotherhoods in nineteenth century Africa (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 125 51.
standard bearers for neo Sufism, primary among them the Mīrghanī and the Sanūsī brotherhoods.  

The profusion of neo Sufi orders should not conceal a key element that links them to all preceding orders: their founders competed with one another for the mantle of spiritual excellence. Nominally, they followed the same supreme master and accepted the same initiatory lineage, yet in fact, they were spiritual rivals for the hearts and minds of their contemporaries.

The Mīrghanīyya or Khatmiyya is named after an eighteenth century shariʿf, or descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad, whose family came from Central Asia. As a youth Muḥammad ʿUthmān al Mīrghanī was initiated by Ibn Idrīs but sparred with Ibn Idrīs’s other chief disciples, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al Sanūsī and Ibrāhīm al Rashīd. Which of them was best suited to succeed Ibn Idrīs? The question took on urgency with the death of Ibn Idrīs in 1837: faithful to the Sunna, or exemplary behaviour of the Prophet Muḥammad, Ibn Idrīs had died without naming a successor. His legacy therefore was contested, and because of his Sharifian credentials, al Mīrghanī was supported by many of the Meccan notables.

Al Mīrghanī, in common with al Sanūsī, followed the example of Shāh Wali Allāh from Delhi and Ahmad al Tijānī from Fez (and Cairo). Like these earlier saints, he claimed that his order included all the orders but also superseded them. The Naqshbandiyya, the Shāhīdīyya and, of course, the Qādirīyya, one of the oldest and most prestigious of the foundational Sufi orders, were deemed to be of value but their value was reduced next to the spiritual power of the Mīrghanīyya.

Nor did inter ṭariqa rivalry end with al Mīrghanī’s success in the Ḥijāz over his Idrīṣī contemporaries. He also opposed Muḥammad Ḥamd ibn ʿAbd Allāh when the latter declared himself as Mahdī in the Sudan. After the British destroyed the Mahdist state in 1898, his descendants were able to reap the advantages of al Mīrghanī’s ‘loyal’ advocacy of true Islam against the upstart, and rebellious, Mahdī. The tale of the Mahdī’s own dalliance with Sufism, and then his later sublimation of its principal tenets, anticipates the odyssey of Ustadh Mahmūd Ṭāhā (d. 1985) a century later, also in the Sudan.  

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11 O’Fahey, *Enigmatic saint*, pp. 130–52, analyses the relationship between Ahmad ibn Idrīs and his two principal disciples.
Ibn Idrīs’s other main successor was Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al Sanūsī. Sanūsī had the advantage of having been taught by Ibn Idrīs in Mecca and also in Yemen. He had been initiated into several orders—the Shādhiliyya, the Darqāwiyya and the Tijāniyya—before he met Ibn Idrīs in Mecca in 1826. A spiritual vision from the Prophet confirmed Sanūsī in his resolve to become Ibn Idrīs’s disciple. In the authority Ibn Idrīs conferred on his prize disciple, he included proficiency in Prophetic traditions, Qur’ān commentaries and jurisprudence along with Sufism. Among the several Sufi orders to which Sanūsī was initiated was al ṭarīq al Muḥammadiyya. Sanūsī then became the eponymous founder of his own Sufi order, the Sanūsiyya. The order provided a rallying point against both Ottoman influence and European inroads. When Sanūsī died in 1859 his successor, Sayyid Muḥammad al Mahdī, took over the leadership of 146 Sanūsī zāwiyas. The struggle against the Italians continued under Mahdī and his son, who became King Idrīs of Libya. The Sanūsīs played a critical role in precipitating an early Italian withdrawal from Tripoli, during the Second World War.¹³

Competing with Idrīsīs and other orders, especially in West Africa, were the Tijāniyya. The Tijāniyya trace their origins to a Moroccan master, Shaykh Abū al Ḥabīb Ahmad al Tijānī (d. 1815). Though a relatively late order, the Tijāniyya challenged, and competed successfully, with what had been till then the dominant order in West Africa: the Qādiriyaa.

The Tijāniyya exemplify what is new about neo Sufism. It was less doctrinal innovations than creative repackaging of elements from previous generations, especially those linked to Ibn ‘Arabī. Just as the Prophet had been in direct contact with Ibn ‘Arabī, inspiring, for instance, one of his seminal works, Fuṣūṣ al hikam, in a single night’s dream, so Shaykh Ahmad al Tijānī saw himself inspired by the Prophet, not just in dreams but also in a waking state. In one of his many Prophetic visions, Shaykh Ahmad saw himself confirmed for a role that Ibn ‘Arabī had earlier claimed: he was designated as the seal of the saints, just as Muhammad had been designated the seal, or final capstone, of all preceding prophets. Shaykh Ahmad went further in paralleling his experience to that of the Prophet. He pronounced his order as unique and superior to its antecedents, just as Islam had fulfilled and surpassed all previous monotheistic religions. These were huge claims. They amounted to a mandate for proselytisation, among other Muslims as

well as among non Muslims. Not surprisingly, they elicited confrontation with rival ṭarīqas, whose leaders saw themselves as the better conduits of Divine Favour than Shaykh Ahmad.\footnote{On the Tijāniyya, the shortest account is provided by Mervyn Hiskett, \textit{The development of Islam in West Africa} (London, 1984), pp. 250–6, but it should be supplemented by Abun Naṣr, \textit{The Tijāniyya}, as well as by Jean Louis Triaud and David Robinson (eds.), \textit{Tijāniyya: Une confrérie musulmane à la conquête de l’Afrique} (Paris, 2000).}

In their rivalry with the Qādiriyya and the Idrisiyya, the Tijāniyya benefited from French colonial rule. Intent to impose a peace on western Africa, French officials needed the Sufi masters or marabouts as their intermediaries. They supported the marabouts as long as both the marabouts and their disciples paid taxes, respected colonial laws and pursued farming as their major source of income.

The Tijānīs illustrate the force of colonialism as well as the emergent profile of neo Sufism. Based in West Africa, they reflected the French presence at many levels. Their resistance was fortified through increased participation in the pilgrimage, itself fostered by new patterns of communication that facilitated rather than reduced networks of travel and patronage to the Haramayn. They met the challenge of French education, aggressively pursued by the colonial authorities, through alternative forms of Islamic social organisation and higher education in a broad range of religious and non religious topics. The new colonial situation spurred the adoption of Western teaching methods as well as curricula in the madrasa: while the language of instruction could be, and often was, Arabic, the range of topics expanded to meet the demands of French West African society as Tijānī leaders experienced them.\footnote{On how colonial co-optation actually worked in one phase of the Tijāniyya, consult David Robinson, ‘Malik Sy: Teacher in the new colonial order’, in Triaud and Robinson (eds.), \textit{Tijāniyya}, pp. 201–18.}

But not all the Tijānīs were co-opted by the French as al Mīrghanī and his followers had been co-opted by the British. Some, like ‘Abd al Qādir al Jazā’irī (d. 1883), were co-opted by the French, even serving as their surrogates, but then later broke off relations and actively opposed them. Among African Sufi leaders who opposed the French consistently was al Ḥājj ‘Umar al Fūrī, or al Ḥājj ‘Umar Taal. He became a Tijānī in the 1820s when, en route to the Pilgrimage, he met another Tijānī master, Muḥammad al Ghālī. He studied with al Ghālī till he obtained a licence (‘ijāza) from him. Returning to West Africa, he preached among the Hausa. He followed the early precedent of another western African opponent of the French, ‘Usman dan Fodio, also a Sufi activist, and made Sokoto his base, but by the time he actually undertook
the jihad in 1855, he had made many Muslim enemies. Betrayal by fellow Muslims not only weakened but defeated him: al Ḥājj ’Umar Taal was killed in 1864 by rival Muslims. Nor did his offspring share his antipathy to the French: his son and successor, Ahmadu Tāl, and even more his grandson, Saydu Nūru Tāl, became proponents of the French ‘civilising mission’ (la mission civilatrice). 16

The nineteenth century: revivalist Sufi movements outside of Africa

Whether measuring successful resistance or failure to resist colonial forces, one cannot concede the nineteenth century entirely to Sufi Africa, or to African Sufis. There were revivalist movements in other parts of dār al Islām. Like those in Africa, they had indigenous roots and issues as well as foreign, colonial provocations. The two most often linked to Sufism are the Mujāhid movement of Sayyid ʿAbdul ʿAzīz Dihlāwī in northern India (Rāy Bārelī) and the Farāʾidīs. Sayyid ʿAbdul had begun as a local soldier frustrated by British inroads into his native region. Giving up military service, he moved to Delhi and began studying with Shāh ʿAbdul ʿAzīz Dihlāwī, son of the major north Indian reformer Sufi, Shāh Wālī Allāh Dihlāwī. He became a Sufi initiate, with powers to initiate others. Among his followers were members of Shāh ʿAbdul ʿAzīz’s own family and close supporters. He moved towards an agenda of armed conflict with Sikhs in the Punjab, but first decided to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. Announcing his intent before he went to the Ḥijāz, he attracted numerous followers, especially in eastern India. He met with Wahhābīs in Mecca, strengthening his resolve to conduct jihad. On his return, in 1826, he undertook the jihad. He enjoyed initial success, occupying the major Afghan city of Peshawar, but internal disputes as well as external confrontation weakened his movement. He had to withdraw from Peshawar in 1830, and was killed in armed conflict with Sikhs the following year.

The other major north Indian Sufi related reform movement was the Farāʾidīs, under Ḥājjī Shariʿat Allāh (d. 1840). Again inspired by an 1821 pilgrimage to Mecca, then subsequent residence in the Ḥaramayn, its leader was a Bengali ʿālim, or religious scholar, who was also a Qādirī adept. Ḥājjī

16 For al Ḥājj ’Umar Taal, the exhaustive study is David Robinson, The Holy War of Umar Tal. The Western Sudan in the mid nineteenth century (Oxford, 1985), and also see Hiskett, The development of Islam in West Africa, pp. 227 32.
Sharī’at Allāh did rail against the *bid‘a* (or innovation) of his co religionists, and he did urge his followers to centre their faith on the basic duties (*fard*); and to discard all else, yet he also encouraged the practice of *dhikr* or remembering God, and it seemed that his intent was to resist the economic exploitation of Hindu landowners more than it was to create a new Islamic order or to expel the British.  

Nor was Central Asia lacking for Sufi derived movements in the nineteenth century. An entirely new era in the history of the Naqshbandiyya in Anatolia and in Central Asia began with the rise of the Khālīd branch in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Before the emergence of the Khālīdiyya, the Naqshbandis were certainly prominent and respected, both in Istanbul and elsewhere, but they never came close to enjoying the near monopoly on Sufi activity that they exercised in Central Asia. The Khālīdis, however, made the Naqshbandiyya the paramount order in Turkey, a position it retained even after the official dissolution of the orders.

Illustrative of the power of Sufi networks, Mawlānā Khālid Baghdādī (d. 1827) was a Kurd who obtained initiation into the Naqshbandiyya Mujaddidiyya in Dihli at the hands of Ghulām ‘Alī Dihlawī (d. 1824). Though he supported Ottoman rule in Kurdistan, Ottoman bureaucrats regarded the new movement with suspicion. One of his successors, ‘Abd al Wahhāb al Sūṣi, did succeed in making inroads among the Ottoman elite. Like other key figures in the history of the Ottoman Naqshbandiyya, he recruited numerous ‘ulamā’ as well as bureaucrats and men of letters. Successors to Mawlānā Khālid allied themselves with the Ottoman state, and their emphasis on the *shari‘a* provided a point of stability both needed and sought during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909), but it was never possible for the Naqshbandis to preempt the favour shown to competing orders by royal as well as administrative members of the Ottoman hierarchy.

It was beyond the Ottoman state that the Khālīdī branch of the Naqshbandiyya attracted followers from all parts of Anatolia, so much so that they could boast an influence equal to, or even greater than, their Mevlevi rivals in Konya. Elsewhere, in the Middle East the Khālīdiyya supplanted almost entirely all other branches of the Naqshbandiyya while in Kurdistan it

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wrested supremacy from the Qādiriyya to become the chief order of that region.

But the most powerful and enduring legacy of the Khālidī Naqshbandiyya may have been in the northern Caucasus. Nineteenth century Czarist Russia was determined to root out the resistance of Imām Shāmil and the rugged mountaineers who were his devout supporters. Already in the late eighteenth century they had pursued jihad against superior Czarist forces, but in the early nineteenth century a regional branch of the Khālidī Naqshbandiyya became the lodestone of Muslim loyalty in Chechnya and Daghestan. Naqshbandī warrior shaykhs led by the legendary Imām Shāmil fought a protracted war of attrition against Russian forces. The Muridist Insurrection, named after his followers, lasted from 1824 to 1855. After its ‘final’ defeat in 1859 many of the Naqshbandī leaders were exiled, or forced to emigrate, yet unrest in Chechnya continued. It provided a venue for the Qādiriyya: though hardly a new order, they made new inroads into Chechnya and Ingushetia. In some cases, the Qādirī masters converted marginal Muslims to a revitalised Islamic observance channelled through Sufi practice. In other cases, they reclaimed and mobilised those who previously had followed Imām Shāmil and the Khālidī Naqshbandiyya. Again, Russian authorities imprisoned or exiled their leaders, yet they could not prevent, and indeed may have facilitated through their extreme repression, a joint Naqshbandī Qādirī uprising against the state in 1877-8. The Sufi rebels lost the battle but the war continued, and, even more importantly, local support for the brotherhoods and for their leaders grew. It was a pattern that continued well into the twentieth century, giving the northern Caucasus a claim that, at least in political terms, it was they who marked the end of the nineteenth century as a Central Asian Sufi century.¹⁸

The nineteenth century: a note on South-East Asian Sufi orders

South East Asia too was notable for the activities of its Sufi networks during the nineteenth century. In a broad sense, networks that linked Sufi masters across the Mediterranean world had expanded with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, but the colonial world that produced British and Dutch competition in South East Asia also increased the number of Malay Muslims taking the Pilgrimage. As Islamic learning in Arabic deepened, so did the reflex to

¹⁸ For a detailed, well documented treatment of the Khālid Naqshbandiyya, see EI’, art. ‘Naḵshbandiyyā’ (Hamid Algar).
impose a Wahhābī type orthodoxy on urban circles of Sufism in Java and Sumatra. The most oft cited movement is the Padri reform movement that took place in West Sumatra between 1784 and 1837. Like the Farā‘īdī movement in Bengal, it combined Sufi and Wahhābī impulses; in this case, affiliation with the Shaṭṭārī brotherhood spurred a jihad movement against both internal and external enemies. Also parallel to the Farā‘īdī movement there were internal enemies: feudal nobility caused economic hardship among agricultural classes, at the same time that the Dutch and English colonial powers represented a political as well as an economic challenge to Sumatran Muslims.

Also like other regions of the Muslim world, South East Asia in the latter half of the nineteenth century saw open competition between Sufi orders, in this case, the Shaṭṭārīs and a Qādārī Naqshbandī subgroup. The latter came to Sumatra in increasing numbers through a network based in Mecca under the leadership of an Indonesian master, Aḥmad Khatīb Sambas. In the interim period between the recapture of Mecca/Medina from the Wahhābīs in 1813 and its surrender to the Saudis in 1916, many faqīh minded, or juridically oriented, Sufi masters thrived in the Haramayn. Aḥmad Khatīb Sambas was one such master, together with his rival, ‘Abdussaḥmad Palembang of the Sammānī order.¹⁹

The twentieth century: Sufi Asia

Despite the intense activity of brotherhoods in Central, South and South East Asia during the nineteenth century, the weight of scholarship, and perhaps physical evidence, upholds the claim that the nineteenth century was indeed Muslim Africa’s Sufi century. The twentieth century, however, produced a series of new developments that moved beyond Africa and its many Sufi brotherhoods. While O’Fahey’s apt provocation offers a thumb nail summary of Sufism in the nineteenth century, it invites a retort for the twentieth century: ‘To the extent that the nineteenth century was Muslim Africa’s Sufi century, then the twentieth century became Muslim Asia’s quasi Sufi century.’

In brief, what characterised the twentieth century was the presence and influence of Sufi orders, despite the absence of governmental support for Sufism and also the appearance of groups that often opposed Sufism while adopting Sufi principles. The twentieth century filtered the experience of the brotherhoods, often diluting the Sufi project of interiorisation and transcendence while at the same time repackaging some of the instrumental features that accounted for the brotherhoods’ success.

Arguably, it was five major events that defined Islam in the public square of global politics during the past century: the Young Turk revolt of 1908, the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the Muslim Brotherhood of Ḥasan al-Banna, launched in 1928, the Iranian revolution of 1978 and the al-Qāʿida bombings of the 1990s. Yet none of these five events, or the forces they unleashed, involved Sufism. Instead, they projected the opposite of Sufism, either an avuncular secularism as with Young Turks and communists, or a tide of Salafi/'Alid nostalgia, with the Brethren, the terrorists and the mullahs directing their ire against morally tainted Western targets. Beneath the surface, and often outside the gaze of the media, much was happening, however, that suggested lingering Sufi influence. It either emanated from Asia or took place in Asia.

The twentieth century: Sufism in South Asia

If the twentieth century is deemed to be Muslim Asia’s Sufi century, then a major aspect of that recuperated Sufi identity is due to the influences from the Asian subcontinent, what had been India under colonial rule, and then after Partition in 1947 became first two competitive nation states: India and Pakistan, and after 1971 three rival states: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Among the layers of Sufi identity in twentieth century Muslim South Asia were residual traces, coded revaluations, and explicit retrieval of the legacy from the major brotherhoods, but especially the Chistiyya.

Residual traces came from a surprising source: Mawlanā Sayyid Abū’l A’lā’ Mawdūdī, founder and leader of the revivalist organisation, Jamāʿat i Islāmī. Not only did Mawdūdī admire the Chisti giants of the past, even while deploiring contemporary saint worship, but he also benefited from the central notion of tajdīd or revival, projecting himself as the mujaddid or renewer of the current age. Perhaps most surprising were the poems found among his personal effects after his death in 1979; they included some highly allegorical Sufi verse.
The coded revaluation of Sufi categories came through a group often viewed as anti Sufi or ‘fundamentalist’: Tablíghí Jamā’at founded by Mawlānā Muḥammad Ilyās (d. 1944).20

The Mawlānā came from a family of ‘ulama’ and Sufis in northern India. Trained as an ‘ālim, he went on his second Pilgrimage in 1925, then remained in the Haramayn for another five months. He returned to Delhi and to the mosque founded by his father in proximity to the most famous Sufi shrine in Delhi: Ḥasrat Niṭāmuddīn. The principal custodian at Niṭāmuddīn, Khwāja Ḥasan Niṭāmī, had begun his own Tablíghī Mission among the untouchables, but Mawlānā Ilyās directed his project to a group of rural Muslims: the Mawātīs, an illiterate and half converted tribe living in the eastern regions of Delhi. By the 1930s he had expanded his mission to include the merchant classes of Delhi, and during ensuing decades it became an all India, then a global movement. While its membership is difficult to estimate, it convenes annual meetings in Pakistan and Bangladesh that number over 2 million persons in each, with lesser but still sizeable attendance at other meetings in India, England and North America.

It is best regarded as a quasi Sufi movement, despite its overt hostility to traditional Sufism, and especially to the lively cult activities at Ḥasrat Niṭāmuddīn in Delhi. The purpose of the Tablíghī movement is at once apolitical and individualist. Unlike the Jamā’at i Islām of Mawdūḍi, the Tablíghī Jamā’at eschews engagement in political issues or advocacy of political parties. It fosters reform of the individual by attention to six points. The first two points are simply the profession of faith (kalima) and the five daily prayers (ṣalāt), but the intent is to make the kalima part of one’s inner being, not a mere verbal formula, and the next four points reinforce that intensity of faith (ımān). They stress remembrance of God (dhikr), reciting praise of the Prophet, invocation of God and supplication of forgiveness at least a hundred times each day, in addition to ṣalāt or the ritually prescribed five prayers. That practice of continuous remembrance then makes possible the last three points: to respect other Muslims, to make one’s intent pure and

sincere and finally to dedicate time to work with other like minded Muslims in propagating the true faith.

Despite the rejection of institutional Sufism, and in particular their opposition to neo Sufi groups such as the Barelwīs, the Tablíghí six point programme redirects the Sufi ethos into a popular movement. Mawlānā Ilyās, both by training and temperament, was at home with the male isolation of khānqāh life as well as the intellectual rigour of madrasa teaching. He had called his movement ‘a khānqāh on the move’, advocating moral development for the masses and not just for intellectual elites. He communicated with his followers through letters (maktūbā) but also through moral dialogues (malfūthāt), a distinctly Sufi literary genre. Among the six points, the double accent on dhikr and sincere intent (ikhlaṣ i niyya) echoes the Chistī world view, just as the periods of withdrawal from ordinary life includes a chilla or forty day period, incumbent on advanced Tablíghīs as it once was on Chistī virtuosi, to perform once a year.

The Tablíghīs eschew the hierarchy of a master disciple relationship that characterises Sufi brotherhoods, and they have also projected their networks of male emissaries on a transnational scale that facilitates movement while minimising administrative duties. Yet modern communications, from print to cell phone, from airports to email, define their activity as much as it does non Sufi or non Tablíghi Muslims.

A further tangent of South Asian Sufism in the twentieth century explicitly embraced the Sufi legacy of the past. It also embraced politics, including nationalism, in the name of a higher principle: devotion to God and the Prophet. Sābirī Chistī masters in Pakistan embodied this approach. Deviating from the precedent of their pre modern predecessors who largely avoided urban spaces and networks of royal patronage in favour of a life of spiritual quietism and withdrawal in rural locales, three Sābirī Chistī masters Muḥammad Dhawqī Shāh, Shahīdullāh Farīdī and Wāhid Bakhsh Rabbānī entered the contested public sphere to stake their own claims to Islamic authority and authenticity. Though it is clear that their principal loyalties and commitments were directed to their duties as teaching shaykhs, they also recognised the need to defend the Sābirī Chistī tradition in public forums. Dhawqī Shāh is the most prominent of the three.

Evoking the model of political engagement established by his nineteenth century predecessors Ḥāji Imdādullāh Muḥājir Makkī (d. 1899) and Rashīd Aḥmad Gangūhī (d. 1905), both linked to the anti Sufi Deoband movement, Dhawqī Shāh drew on his expertise as a journalist to inscribe a new vision of Chistī Sābirī identity through a diverse range of publications. The shaykh went even further in his political activism. Attending the first meeting of the Muslim League in Karachi
in 1907, he formally joined the organisation in 1940 and became a confidant of Muḥammad ‘Alī Ālmāh from 1937 to 1947. Dhawqī Shāh wrote a series of letters to Pakistan’s future leader, in which he sacralised the Indo Muslim past. ‘Hindustan is the inheritance of the Chistis’, he reminded the secular Ālmāh. Even those who were neither Chistis nor Sufis understood the appeal of this spiritual lineage; it was as though a single principle had guided and preserved the Indo Muslim community from the eleventh to the twentieth centuries: dedication to the saintly mediation of Chisti masters.21

Neither the Chistis nor any Sufi brotherhood dominated the transregional, multilingual subcommunities of Indo Pakistani Islam. Yet legacies from the Sufi past do provide traces of memory and nodes of loyalty that persist beyond the headline concerns with political Islam or extremist ideologies.

The twentieth century: Sufism in Turkey and Central Asia

Amplifying the claim that the twentieth century was marked by Asian Sufis was the residual impact of the Naqshbandiyya in Turkey and beyond Turkey, in Central Asia. A Khālidī Naqshbandī shaykh had already distinguished himself by fighting, together with his followers, in the Russo Ottoman war of 1877. This example of military engagement was followed by several other Naqshbandī shaykhs who fought on various fronts during the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence. Nonetheless, the Naqshbandīs found themselves denied legitimacy under the Turkish Republic: all the Sufi orders were proscribed in September 1925.

Even after the Republic reforms Khālidī shaykhs continued to be active in Turkey. Despite surveillance and often detention by state officers, Naqshbandī devotees became actively involved in national politics, first through the National Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi) and then its successor, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). Yet the continuing importance of the Turkish Naqshbandiyya derives, above all, from their spiritual practices conforming to Mawlānā Khālid and his successors.22 In this respect they are both rivals and allies of the much newer Nurculuk movement.

22 See EJ, art. ‘Naqshbandiyya’ (Hamid Algar), and on the role of Naqshbandīs (Tur. Nakşîbindis) in Turkish politics, as also the parallel profile of the Nurculuk movement, consult Heinz Kramer, A changing Turkey: The challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington, DC, 2000), pp. 57–69.
Nurcs are followers of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (d. 1960). Like Khalid Naqshbandi, he was a Kurd born in eastern Turkey. Said Nursi did not even begin to speak Turkish till his late teens. He was initiated into the Naqshbandis, but instead of pursing the role of a traditional shaykh, he redirected his spiritual energy towards education. He believed that modern education was not incompatible with Islamic principles. He supported the constitutional movement, and also Atatürk in the Turkish War of Independence that followed the First World War (1919 22). Yet he was continually portrayed as a covert ally of political enemies of the Kemalist state, and forced into exile, he committed himself to writing the lengthy Risâle-i Nur. At once a vast commentary on the Qur‘an and an application of the Sufi principle of outer/inner to the natural world, it became the basis for what is known as the Nurculuk movement. It recentres public and private life on the pillar of Islamic ethics, addressing the range of contemporary problems with a plea for social and economic justice. 23

The Nur movement tried to remain aloof from national politics, but it did become embroiled in the National Salvation Party (1973 81) and then in the 1980s it inspired the Fethullahcilar movement, named after its founder, Fethullah Gülen. His project, like Said Nursi’s, tried to reconcile religious and secular elements under the umbrella of an Islamic version of scientific positivism. It was an educational experiment that extended beyond Turkey into Central Asia and also the Balkans, again following the Sufi networks of the revitalised Naqshbandi order. Its strongly religious tone brought it into conflict with the military establishment, as also with civilian advocates of a secular ethos, but it remains a core part of what some have described as the creeping Islamisation of Turkish public life.

The impact of Sufism beyond Turkey did not recede with the advance of communism. The Naqshbandis were only one of several orders to have subgroups within those parts of Russia that became Soviet Central Asia after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Other brotherhoods included the Qâdirîs, the Yâsavis and the Kubravîs. All these orders, along with other non Sufi Muslim organisations, were proscribed under communist rule. In their place was set a bureaucracy of ‘official’ Islam, its representatives committed to projecting a statist religion, even if in some individual cases they were devout Muslims as

well as members of the Communist Party. Yet the orders did not disappear. While Azerbaijan remained Shi‘i dominant, other majority Muslim regions in Central Asia, the Middle Volga and northern Caucasus, were Sunnī in outlook and often Sufi in practice. Most of the leaders of these brotherhoods went underground, functioning as a parallel Islam, openly condemned by the Soviet appointed official Islamic establishment but still attractive to practising believers in Central Asia and adjacent regions. The very survival of Islamic loyalty in the former Soviet Union indicates that the anti religious propaganda disseminated by specialists of the Kremlin could neither exterminate nor correct Sufi dissidents. Visitation to saints’ shrines was effectively proscribed, Qur‘ānīc instruction by living masters was also curtailed and Muslims, whether Sufi or non Sufi, when drafted into the Soviet army, were forced to eat pork and also to drink vodka as a rite of survival.

One question persists: to what extent did the vital force of institutional Sufism remain after more than eighty years of proscription, persecution and counter education in the USSR? The answer varies, and it varies according to region. In places with a strong tomb cult history, such as Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, Sufism has regained a role in private devotion and also public life after 1989. In other regions, such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Sufi practice of dhikr, along with public observance of ṣalāt, is much less evident or widespread.\footnote{Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics and commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union (Berkeley, 1985), pp. 150 6. The notion of ‘parallel Islam’ is problematic, leading the authors to evoke a Soviet version of the ‘Islamic Peril’, yet their broad geopolitical range of evidence provides rare insight into the regional distribution of Sufi brotherhoods in nineteenth century Russia and twentieth century Soviet Union.}

The one place where Sufi Muslim identity remains vital as a core of resistance to Czarist, Soviet, now Russian rule is Chechen Ingush territory. Following the Bolshevik revolution, it was Soviets rather than Czarists who became the occupying enemy in the northern Caucasus. From 1918 to 1923 the rebels tried to create an independent Muslim state in Daghestan. Though they failed, and their movement was severely repressed from 1923 to 1926, the resistance continued sporadically until the Second World War when Stalin made a momentous decision: deport the entire Chechen and Ingush populations to Siberia and Kazakhstan. Yet some escaped to the mountains, where they have continued their ‘terrorist’ reorganisation and resistance till now.

The actual number of murīds in the brotherhoods is almost impossible to ascertain, but at least one Soviet source allowed that despite the 1944 deportation of the mass of Chechens to Siberia, for every 10,000 present day
Chechens who would subscribe to officially sanctioned atheism there would be 200,000 250,000 Sufi murīds. Whatever the outcome of their political struggle it is impossible to deny that Islam in the northern Caucasus has survived due to the tenacity and organisational skill of the brotherhood leaders. Not just in the northern Caucasus but throughout Central Asia it is the orders which have not only saved Islam as belief and as way of life but also projected it as a nationalist culture, to be defended at all times against every Russian adversary. From the Khālīdī Ṣuḥābbīd in the nineteenth century to the Chechen Daghestan network of the twenty first century, Ṣuḥāb resistance in Central Asia has marked Russia as well as Islam.

The twentieth century: South-East Asian Ṣuḥāb orders

Finally, the twentieth century witnessed a continuation of patterns begun in the nineteenth century, with the Ḥijāz based network of reform minded teachers influencing the nature of Ṣuḥāb activity in the archipelago. Relying on the new print culture, credentialled Islamic scholars from Indonesia who either resided in the Ǧāmīʿ or returned home after long stays there, attacked the authority of institutional shaykhs. The Naqshbandīs, whose influence had expanded in the last half of the nineteenth century, were challenged for their authenticity, and they in turn critiqued the bona fides of their challengers.

At the same time as these debates and exchanges were taking place between traditional scholars, a new wing of Islamic reform organisation emerged in Yogyakarta. The Muḥammadiyyah was founded as a benevolent organisation in 1912, but it gained adherents throughout Java and also Sumatra in succeeding decades to become one of the major Muslim movements in contemporary Indonesia. Though Muḥammadiyyah members criticised certain Ṣuḥāb practices, their leaders refrained from a wholesale condemnation of institutional Sufism and in West Sumatra, there was at least one major Naqşbandī master who also promoted Muḥammadiyyah principles and belonged to its local chapter.26

Indeed, the sharp ideological edges that may be detected elsewhere become softened, even invisible, in Indonesia. Most of the twentieth century conflicts

25 See ibid., pp. 49 67, for the proportionate estimate of atheists to believers but also for an expanded analysis on the notorious difficulty of calculating how many practising Sufis there are in the Chechen Ingush region.
involving Sufi orders were within rival ṭarīqas, not between Sufi masters and their reformist opponents. The popular Muhammadiyah leader, Ḥamka, subscribed to ‘modern taṣawwuf’, that is, a Sufi ethos and world view divorced from the tomb cult and ritual practices of the orders. Many upscale urban Indonesians, whether students or mobile and highly literate young professionals, find in the traditional orders a resource for their own religious formation as modern day Muslims.

The twentieth century: Sufi Africa

On the ledger of institutional Sufism the activities and influence of African Sufis that marked the nineteenth century did not disappear in the twentieth. Two orders in particular the Tijāniyya and the Murūdiyya continued the legacy that had made the nineteenth century Sufi Africa’s peak century, even as they combated Wahhābism within Islam and colonialist strictures from without.

Indeed, an uneasy trust between local Tijāniyya and the French authorities worked to the programmatic benefit of some Tijānī, such as the Niassene Tijāniyya of Senegambia/Senegal. Far from collaborating with the French, the Niassene Tijāniyya used French support to Islamise the Senegalese hinterland, to spread their order at the expense of others, and to outflank colonial authorities whenever/wherever possible.

Peanuts provided the common commodity, and peanut farming the common industry that benefited both parties and made the alliance work. The French administrators encouraged the cultivation of peanuts by constructing a railway that linked the hinterland to the sea. Tijānī disciples would travel to distant parts to cultivate peanuts but also, in their ‘spare time’, to give religious instruction to would be converts.

The Tijāniyya increased in number and influence under French rule. They also expanded to Nigeria. It was during a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1937 that ʿIbrāhīm Niass (d. 1975) met the emir of Kano in northern Nigeria. He persuaded the emir that he was the pole of saints, the top of the spiritual hierarchy in a Sufi world view. He also relied on the distinctively Tijānī view of ḥayāl or Divine Grace, namely, that it is linked hierarchically to the Muḥammadan Truth, channelled down through the seven heavens to the Prophet Muhammad, and then through him to Shaykh ʿAlīmad al Tijānī and to his successors. It, and it alone, is the most direct route to Divine Grace.

The triumphalist brand of Tijānī Sufism enabled the Niass subbranch to spread from Kano through the rest of black Africa, especially after the Second
World War. It was not only charisma and teaching, however, but also location and networking that helped. Kano in Nigeria, like Kaolack in Senegal, was a key commercial centre. It remains till today the largest industrial and commercial axis in western Africa, and so the Tijānīs, like other Sufi orders, benefited from layering their spiritual network with material, specifically commercial, interests. It was an intensely reciprocal relationship: Tijānī missionaries were involved in trade. Their location at the apex of northern Nigeria political economy helped reinforce their spiritual credentials and influence. They maximised both profit and the Prophet in their networking.\(^{27}\)

And the networks of Tijānīyya influence expanded across the Atlantic. Just as local celebrations reinforce intra regional solidarity and link Tijānīs from major Arab states to their West African co-religionists, so there are relations with American zāwiyas or local nodes, all of whom connect to an immigrant spiritual leader, the grandson of the founder, Shaykh Hassan Cisse. While a student at Northwestern in the 1970s, he related to needs of African Americas. From the early 1980s, he developed a following in New York, Chicago and Atlanta, establishing further zāwiyas in each.\(^{28}\)

Still another example of a networked West African ṭarīqa is the Muridiyya.\(^{29}\) Mamadou Diouf has analysed the Senegalese Murīd trade diaspora as a vivid example of Sunnī Sufi networking in his essay on vernacular cosmopolitanism. Tracing the history of a West African Sufi brotherhood from its foundation in the nineteenth century to the present, Diouf claims that the network grew ‘by offering a new religious form, a new memory and new images to peasant communities that had been disrupted and severely disturbed by colonial military campaigns (and) epidemics connected with the Atlantic slave trade’.\(^{30}\) Concurrently engaged in exclusivist mystical practices and an international peanut business prized by the French, they were able to reconcile Islam with colonial modernity. Theirs was what Diouf calls ‘a unique cosmopolitanism consisting in participation but not assimilation, thus organizing the local

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not only to strengthen its position but also to establish the rules governing dialogue with the universal’. A major phase in the spread of the Murid network came in the 1970s when drought drove peasants into the Senegalese cities and later overseas. They wove an immense global network linked to their spiritual capital of Tūbā, with economic and distribution centres in Sandaga and Dakar. Wherever they went they established a firm discipline and an unbreakable trust.

What took place in the Senegalese trade and spiritual network provides a model case of the integration of Muslims as Muslims into the contemporary global economy. Muslims were able to turn to their advantage oppressive structures that colonial powers had put in place. Networks provided the means and also the limits for Sufi brotherhoods: only those groups with resources and mobility could project abroad, and remain religious agents on a global scale in the twenty first century.

The twenty-first century: Sufi America

And precisely due to the expanded influence of transnational networks the twenty first century may yet become the century of Sufi America. If the nineteenth century was Sufi Africa (despite Sufi developments elsewhere) and if the twentieth century was Sufi Asia (secular and Islamist appearances notwithstanding), then how can the twenty first century belong to Sufi America? A new spiritual imperium is emerging in the shadow of the military political empire of American expansionism. The ascendant West may be peaking in this century, but its twilight comes in the Information Age. The Information Age magnifies and projects networks from the prior two centuries, but it does not accord equal weight to all nodes on the Information superhighway. The sequel to Muslim Africa’s Sufi century, and Muslim Asia’s quasi Sufi century may be Euro America’s Sufi millennium, ushered in on the internet by Mevlevi and Akbarian devotees from the New World.

To the extent that traces of Islam and Sufism will pervade the twenty first century, they may follow the path of the print revolution. So pervasive was the print revolution, in fact, that one could argue it redefined what is most distinctive about Sufism, and also neo Sufism. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the emergence of Sufism as a topic in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been the publicising of a previously esoteric system of teaching through modern communications media. Today, Sufi orders and shrines in

\[31\] Ibid., p. 686.
Muslim countries produce a stream of publications aimed at a variety of followers from the ordinary devotee to the scholar. Just as the recording industry democratised the private rituals of samaʿ (listening to music) for a mass audience (see below), the introduction of print and lithography technology made possible the distribution of Sufi teachings on a scale far beyond what manuscript production could attain. In the case of Ibn ʿArabi’s Arabic works, when they first emerged into print early in the nineteenth century, suddenly a work that had existed in at most a hundred manuscripts around the world (and those difficult of access) was now made easily available at a corner bookstore through print runs of up to a thousand copies.32

The publicising of Sufism through print (and, more recently, electronic media) has brought about a remarkable shift in this tradition. Advocates of Sufism have defended their heritage by publishing refutations of fundamentalist or modernist attacks on Sufism. In this sense the media permit Sufism to be contested and defended in the public sphere as one ideology alongside others. The numerous publications of the South Asian Barelwis, for instance, defend the devotional practices of Sufism against scripturalist attacks from the rigorous Deoband school. Likewise, leaders of Egyptian Sufi groups have responded directly to reformist criticisms posed to them by newspaper editors: countering that Sufism is at the core of Islam, they defend Sufi rituals as well as the master disciple relationship. Through modern public media, Sufism has ceased to be an esoteric community constructed largely through direct contact, ritual interaction and oral instruction.

Yet the dissemination of Sufism through mass printing has exacerbated the tension between local and transnational networks of Muslim loyalty. There is an inescapably local element to any Sufi tradition or order. It is expressed by devotion to particular shaykhs, ritual at certain shrines and writing in local languages. This very concreteness of local networks exists in tension with universal notions of community. As Sufis attempt to trump the systematic ideologies of reformist critics, they stake a claim to the key symbolic capital of the Qurān and the Prophet Muḥammad through polemical and academic publications, yet actual Sufi lineages continue to depend on face to face contact and real communities that are of necessity more limited.

32 In much of what follows I am indebted to the insights and data provided by Carl W. Ernst in his pioneering essay, ‘Ideological and technological transformations of contemporary Sufism’, in miriam cooke and Bruce Lawrence (eds.), Muslim networks from Hajj to hip hop (Chapel Hill, 2005), pp. 191-207.
Limits to institutional Sufism

The deeper implications of the open secret of Sufism may be that the orders themselves are no longer the only, or the best, vehicle for communicating the treasure of the divine that absorbed their original founders. ‘The future of the ṭarīqas is one thing’, observes Michel Chodkiewicz, perhaps the leading authority on Muḥī ad Dīn ibn ‘Arabī, but ‘the future of Sufism is another matter, which can not be gauged on the basis of statistical evaluations.’

The history of the ṭarīqas, according to Chodkiewicz, has always been characterised by a double movement of expansion and institutionalisation. Insofar as true disciples are few, the resulting high public profile of the major ṭarīqas has led to the profanation rather than sacralisation of their core mission. To the extent that neo Sufism has marked certain practices as superstitious, and contrary to the shari‘a, their current leaders have embraced a chastened piety that ignores the literary legacy of the past, even in some cases substituting the Qur’anic commentary of Sayyid Qūṭb for that of Ibn ‘Arabī and his school.

The climate of internal policing leads Chodkiewicz to hypothesise that in the twenty first century one might see a Sufism beyond the ṭarīqas. Just as Sufism had once been a reality without a name before the appearance of the ṭarīqas, so now it could be that the ṭarīqas will become historical vestiges from the Sufi past. What may emerge in their place will not be a clandestine Sufism but rather an anonymous Sufism.

Flexible, light, without signs, banners or processions, it will be based in restricted places where very few disciples, wisely chosen, follow a master whose authority proceeds not from the claims of a regular order but rather from his commitment to reinvent the model of a spiritual family. It is with such Sufis, in their silent witness, rather than in the noisy display of the great orders, that Sufism will without doubt remain a vital element in the heart of Islam in the twenty first century.

In a sense, the vision of silent Sufism which Chodkiewicz projects has already been nurtured by a kind of European gnosis that is Sufi derived and popularly disseminated. The French mystic René Genon entered the Shâdhili ‘Alawīyya order in 1912 and remained a devotee till his death in Cairo in 1951. The Swiss Frithjof Schuon followed suit, and founded his own sub order the Maryamiyya, now based in Bloomington, Indiana. While neither is a mass

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movement, they, along with other academic popularisers, such as Martin Lings, William Chittick and Chodkiewicz himself, have given a transnational profile to metaphysical Sufism that goes well beyond the earlier importations of Idrīs Shāh, an Afghani Naqshbandī, who established his own Society for Sufi Studies in post Second World War London and became perhaps the first Sufi bestseller in the English speaking world.34

Sufi music and popular culture

In the twenty first century, both in North American and Western Europe, Sufism as expressed in music and film, on DVDs and the World Wide Web, seems destined to remain a niche industry, capturing the hearts of new audiences who gravitate to spaces of meditation, where the spirit is revived, the self reinvented.

The wedding of spiritualism and commercialism is not unique to Sufism but it has affected the latest phase of mystical Islam. Music is a case in point. It is integral to Sufi practice, except for the most austere orders. Yet contemporary Sufi musical production does not emanate from the traditional Sufi brotherhoods. It is, instead, a reconfiguration of cultural products for resale on the mass distribution market; it is a dimension of pop culture.

In recent years, Sufi music has been the subject of a new appropriation that may be called ‘remix’. In World Music albums, international festivals and fusion performances, Sufi music has been performed in contexts never before envisioned. To take but a single example, the qawwālī music of Pakistani singer Nusrat Fateh ‘Ali Khan (‘Must Must Qalandar’) was remixed by the British hip hop group Massive Attack in 1990 to become an international dance hit with a strongly reggae flavour. At the same time, performers who were once low status service professionals catering to the spiritual experience of elite listeners have made the shift to become box office superstars who are regarded as spiritual personalities in their own right. A glance at the top twenty-five recordings listed under Sufi music by online bookseller amazon.com indicates the remarkable variety and profusion available to the world of consumers today. But this is best described as a cultural and commercial appropriation of Sufism rather than as the dissemination of Sufi teaching and authority.

The apparent paradox of publicising an esoteric tradition is nowhere more apparent than on the internet, where the open secret of mysticism must be reconfigured in terms of what are basically advertising paradigms. There are today a host of Sufi websites that proclaim themselves to interested internet surfers, offering everything from detailed textual materials online to boutiques of unusual products. Some of these are related to traditional Sufi orders, such as the Ni‘matullahi, Naqshbandi, Ria‘i, and Chisti orders (see http://world.std.com/~habib/Sufi.html). Sometimes they appear to prolong and perpetuate the authority of the printed text, as one can see from the extensive devotional and spiritual treatises available online, in English translation, in the elaborate websites of the American Naqshbandi order led by Shaykh Muhammad Hishâm Kabbânî (www.sunnah.org/). This website also features extensive polemics directed against fundamentalist forms of Islam, and the name itself indicates an attempt to appropriate the key symbolic term of the Prophet’s moral example (Sunna).

A different example of Sufi virtual presence is the Mur‘idiyya, cited earlier for their intense networking from West Africa to North America. On their website (http://khidmatulkhadim.org), they promote goals such as building Tūbā Maṣjids or temples of worship and Mur‘id community settlements worldwide, and establishing Tūbā Learning Centres, Tūbā Boarding Schools and Khādimu ar Rassūl Cultural Centres promoting educational exchanges with Tūbā, but they also target a US base, hoping to establish study groups, prayer and dhikr circles throughout the US and elsewhere, in order to provide Mur‘id religious, cultural and spiritual education to anyone interested in learning about Islam al Mur‘idiyya. They are especially keen to make a commercial network that overlays and reinforces their spiritual network in the USA, so that among their other goals are: (1) to organise fund raising for Tūbā and generate hādiyya (charity), (2) to establish trading businesses that promote Tūbā products in the USA and elsewhere and also (3) to establish financial institutions such as Mur‘id Holdings, Mur‘id Credit Unions, Mur‘id Community Development Venture Funds and Mur‘id Banks and Insurance Companies.

Variation in the kind of internet presence maintained by different Sufi brotherhoods constitutes a challenge for groups that were traditionally defined by granting access to esoteric teachings reserved for a spiritual elite. Like the Mur‘idiyya, more and more Sufi websites publish English language publications of the leading masters of the order, whether or not the readers are prepared to absorb the secret of the spiritual master. In fact, some Sufi web sites are tantalising advertisements of spiritual authority, using sparing
amounts of text, graphics and occasionally photographs to convey the powerful mediating effect of Sufi masters and lineages; their primary interactive goal is to get the viewer into direct personal contact with the Sufi group.

Yet internet representation does not completely displace earlier forms of communications and technology. The history of technology indicates that older cultural forms persist alongside newly introduced forms of communication. Well after the introduction of writing, and even after the invention of printing, oral forms of culture have persisted up to the present day. The vast majority of participants in the Sufi tradition in Muslim countries are still from social strata that have very little access to the most modern forms of electronic communication, and many are indeed illiterate. Lower class devotees who attend the festivals of Sufi saints in Egypt and Pakistan are not represented on the Web. Authors of Sufi websites tend to be members of cosmopolitan and globalising classes: either immigrant Sufi leaders establishing new bases in America and Europe, immigrant technocrats who happen to be connected to Sufi lineages or Euro American converts to Sufism in one form or other. Outside America and Europe, the chief locations for hosting Sufi websites are predictably in high tech areas like Australia, South Africa and Malaysia.

The spread of new communications media has had unforeseen effects in allowing popular culture to trump ideology. South Asian Muslims who came to the United States after the liberalisation of immigration laws in 1965 have tended to be middle class technical and medical specialists who gravitated towards reformist and fundamentalist forms of Islam. Their college age children have been unexpectedly enchanted by the world music phenomenon; large numbers of them are discovering Sufism through the powerful music of Nuṣrat Fataḥ ʿAlī Khān and others. In view of the overwhelming anti Muslim media bias, the stunning popularity of the Sufi poetry of Rūmī is another surprising embrace of a manifestation of Islamic culture although, to be sure, Rūmī’s Muslim identity is frequently underplayed or elided in favour of a universalist spirituality. Remarkably, in the face of Saudi financed forms of anti Sufi traditionalism, there are increasing signs of interest in Sufi devotionism in American Muslim communities.

Sufism beyond Islam?

In addition, Sufism is no longer just for Muslims. Two of the Sufi groups that succeeded in late twentieth century America and seem poised to continue their growth trajectory in the twenty first century are the Sufi Order in the West and the Bawa Muhaiyadeen Fellowship. The Sufi Order in the West,
now known as the Sufi Order International, is the oldest modern presence of Sufism in Europe and America, dating from the early years of the twentieth century. It was begun by the Indian master Pir Inayat Khan (d. 1927) and continued by his son and successor, Pir Vilayat Khan (d. 2004). Pir Inayat was trained as a Chistī master but then reformulated Sufism as a universal religion detached from normative Islam. To his followers, he represented a new kind of missionary, attempting neither to proselytise nor to convert, asking no one to change his or her religious beliefs. Though he did transmit a repackaged version of traditional Sufi wisdom, he also pointed out its compatibility with all of the world’s religions. His teachings have been elaborated and expanded by Pir Vilayat Khan, but they have also been channelled through American devotees, notably Rabi’a Martin and Samuel Lewis.35

Bawa Muhaiyadeen (d. 1986) is a Qādirī master from Sri Lanka who moved to the USA in 1971, then acquired a following of both Muslim and non Muslim devotees. He was buried just outside Philadelphia, where his tomb has now become a place of pilgrimage. He goes even further than Pir Inayat Khan or the Sufi Order International in disengaging himself from the beliefs and rituals, the world view and the praxis, of normative Islam. The broad and eclectic nature of his appeal (www.bmf.org) will continue to fuel the question of whether or not he is residually Muslim, though the evidence of his most popular print publication places him squarely within institutional Sufism, and one group of his followers are self identified as Muslims.36

Neither the Sufi Order International nor the Bawa Muhaiyadeen Fellowship seems to fulfil the predictions of anti Sufi fundamentalists that Sufism will erode Islamic loyalty. Moreover, their edgy universalism is balanced by groups whose leaders insist on Sufism as the true essence of Islam. They include the Shādhilī, Qādirī, Tijānī, Naqshbandī, Jarrahī, Chistī and Ni‘matullahī orders, all of which have a virtual presence as well as branches in the USA. Sufism has arrived indeed, it flourishes as a battleground of competing identities, announced, proliferated and performed through all the new forms of communication available in the Information Age.

35 Many valuable insights into the Sufi Order International can be found in Pirzade Zia Inayat Khan (ed.), *A pearl in wine: Essays on the life, music and Sufism of Hazrat Inayat Khan* (New Lebanon, 2001).

36 In contrast to the website assertions of non denominational universalism, note M. R. Bawa Muhaiyadeen, *Islam and world peace: Explanations of a Sufi* (Philadelphia, 1987), where the accent on Islamic loyalty, especially through ‘the light of Nur Muhammed’, pervades his discourse, especially in explaining *ittihad* (unity), pp. 97 110. Bawa Muhaiyadeen’s Qādirī affiliation is also proclaimed on the outside of his mosque.
Whatever the future bodes, it seems likely that American Sufism will not dominate the twenty-first century, any more than Asian Sufism exhausted the appeal of Islam for the twentieth century or African Sufism precluded its rivals and its successors in the nineteenth century. American Sufism will be maligned by fundamentalists; it will be condemned as irrelevant by modernists; and it will be eagerly pursued in rival paths by persons from multiple backgrounds with diverse agendas and little in common except their commitment to the Path. Yet American Sufism will retain a surplus of meaning, even as it provides a highly resilient symbolism in a myriad of local contexts, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Through private networks, diverse publications and chameleonic pop culture, American Sufism will sustain nodes for virtual communities across the globe. It will ensure that Sufism continues to define both Islam and spirituality even when both are contested, as they certainly will be, for the remainder of this century and beyond.
PART III

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT
Islamic political thought over the past two centuries might best be studied around the theme of a new era in which all parts of the Muslim world responded to alien intrusion. Western hegemony reached different parts of the Muslim world at different times and differed in its intensity, but it was well under way by 1800. In the process the various Muslim polities (whether empires or states or lesser units) all faced a new reality that led in most cases to outright Western colonial rule, a development that reached a peak in the peace settlement following the First World War. Only Afghanistan, parts of Arabia, Iran and the Anatolian core of the Ottoman Empire (now Turkey) escaped colonial rule but they experienced their own forms of persistent Western pressure.

Thereafter came decolonisation, mainly achieved in the two decades following the Second World War. Even with formal independence, however, the perception, not lacking in some reality, of the Muslim political leadership and their populations has been that they are controlled by the alien other.

As the timing and pattern of the Western intrusions differ so also did the circumstances within the diverse Muslim world make for different responses. The Ottoman Empire in 1800 had existed for roughly a half millennium, possessed a long established government staffed by Muslims who ruled over a multi ethnic and multi religious empire with, however, a considerable Muslim majority. While thenceforth vulnerable before a threatening Europe, the Ottoman Empire, until its end after the First World War, remained a going concern, and the political thought generated there was within the context of an existing if beleaguered state. Neighbouring Iran, even more beleaguered and serving as the principal pawn in the ‘great game’ played throughout the nineteenth century pitting the Russian behemoth against the British leviathan, also had centuries of continuity as a political entity. In both the Ottoman Empire and Iran the essential factor stimulating political thought was how to strengthen the existing state.
Egypt and Tunisia offer a variant on that pattern. Geography and history had combined to create in both countries distinctive polities for centuries (Egypt for millennia). Both had been de jure provinces of the Ottoman Empire since the sixteenth century, but were virtually independent de facto. Political thought there at least until they fell to colonial rule in the 1880s followed the Ottoman pattern of concern about shoring up the existing state. Morocco had also been for centuries politically organised along relatively fixed territorial boundaries.

By contrast, the Muslim government of the Mughals was a spent force by 1800, and the Muslim population over whom they had ruled represented only a small minority scattered throughout Hindu India. Muslims in India with no Mughal state that could be saved looked to different political options.

Other Muslim areas largely skipped the period of seeking to strengthen the existing state against the alien onslaught and instead found themselves being given new political shape under colonialism. This would apply to what are now Indonesia and Malaysia as well as the Muslim states of Central Asia.

Islamic West Africa was emerging from a dynamic religio-political change of the sort that had characterised the Muslim world since time out of mind (brilliantly interpreted centuries earlier by Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406). This was the jihad induced state building process led by ‘Umar dan Fodio (1754–1817) that created the Sokoto caliphate. A similar pattern of religio-political challenge from the periphery had marked Arabia (Wahhabiyya) and then, later in the nineteenth century, the messianic movement of the Sudanese Mahdiyya.

Reforming the state

In the Ottoman Empire including its two autonomous provinces, Egypt and Tunisia, and in Iran the political elites were positioned to respond in both thought and deed to the challenge coming from Europe.

The Ottoman Empire embarked on a serious effort to import European ideas and institutions, mainly military at first but branching out into the areas of civil administration, taxation, law codes and education. These were essentially top down ventures fought over and carried out by a small circle that made up the governing elite. They were not responses to pressures from the larger society that remained resistant to the notion of a more centralised government capable of playing a more intrusive role in daily life. Such, at least, was the case with the Muslim majority. The various non-Muslim populations were in different measure attracted to the lure of European
support for their attaining equality with Muslims in the Ottoman state if not even outright independence.

This situation challenged existing notions of Islamic political thought. Why were such alien borrowings necessary? How is one to explain that a non Muslim state might be more powerful, more efficient, even more just than a Muslim state?

The 1839 Hatt i Şerif of Gülhane, customarily taken as inaugurating the era of the Westernizing Tanzimat reforms (1839 76), offers one example of how these political innovations that had been tried even earlier, indeed since the reign of Selim III (r. 1789 1807), could be justified. It was issued as part of the desperate Ottoman campaign of announcing domestic reform in order to secure European, especially British, support against Egypt’s Muḥammad ‘Alī (r. 1805 48) who, having wrested Syria from Ottoman control earlier in the decade, threatened now to march on Istanbul. The European diplomatic community was even invited to attend the proclamation of the edict. Yet, this decree paints a strictly internal picture of an Ottoman state that had been powerful and prosperous so long as it was guided by the Qurʾān and the shariʿa. Then starting 150 years ago (thus 1689) ‘because of a succession of difficulties and diverse causes, the sacred shariʿa was not obeyed, nor were the beneficent regulations followed’. The reforms proclaimed, guaranteeing security of life, honour and property for all, Muslim and non Muslim, plus a regular system for both taxation and military conscription, were presented not as foreign borrowings but a return to those days when the shariʿa was followed.

Seventeen years later, the second great edict of the Tanzimat period, the 1856 Hatt i Hūmayun, never once mentioned the shariʿa but proclaimed equal opportunity access to employment and education for Muslims and non Muslims alike while stating that legal cases between Muslims and non Muslims would be heard before mixed tribunals. This decree contained as well such pregnant phrases as ‘the position which my [the sultan’s] empire occupies among civilized nations’, ‘the kind and friendly assistance of the great powers, my noble allies’, and ‘my desire … to effect the happiness of all my subjects, who in my sight are all equal … and united to each other by the cordial ties of patriotism’.

These two decrees, both by what they say and what they ignore, illustrate major themes of Islamic political thought emerging in the Ottoman world at this time. The 1839 decree makes borrowing from alien sources more palatable by depicting these changes as simply a return to the sound rules of statecraft prevailing in earlier time when the ‘sacred shariʿa’ was obeyed. The 1856
decree indicates the desire (or, more accurately, the need) to accommodate Europe, to become one state among many ‘civilised’ states, embraces the notion of equality and evokes the idea of patriotism.

What was missing in the 1839 decree that ignored the need for alien borrowing and the 1856 decree that slighted the Islamic political heritage was provided in the political tract written by the Tunisian statesman (and later, for a short time, Ottoman grand vizier) Khayr al Din al Tūnisī (d. 1890). His Aqwām al masālik fi ma‘rifat ‘ahlwāl al mamālik (The surest path to knowledge concerning the conditions of countries), sets out the Westernising reformist political philosophy. Appearing both in Arabic (1867) and French (1868) with a later translation into Ottoman Turkish (1878), The surest path called on conservative forces within the Ottoman Empire to embrace the needed reforms as being consistent with Islam and on Europe to accept that such a reformed Empire deserved support. Blending a classical Islamic expository style (replete with citations from the Qur’an, the Ḥadīth corpus and such Muslim scholars as al Mawaḍḍi (d. 1058), Ibn Taimiyya (1268 1328) and Ibn Khaldūn) with extensive references to European sources as well, Khayr al Din presented an argument that can be summarised as follows. The early Muslim polity was exemplary and serves as a model for later generations. The decline from this ‘golden age’ at the end of the Abbasid period was later reversed by the Ottoman Empire in the age of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520 66) (in Ottoman usage, Kanuni, or lawgiver). The later Tanzimat era has now ushered in another period of getting back to these fundamentals. Muslims are enjoined to learn from and adapt the wisdom of others. Did not Muhammad take the advice of Salmān the Persian who suggested an innovative military tactic at the crucial battle of the Trench (627)? The great material advances of present day Europe are in large measure borrowings from the success the Muslim polity achieved in earlier times. Nor is it to be thought that Europe’s present strength and prosperity is in any way linked to Christianity. The most backward polity in Europe is the Papal State. Muslims and non Muslims using reason should both be able to attain good government. Muslims using reason guided by the divine shari‘a should be able to do even better. The Tanzimat reforms ‘are based on two pillars justice and liberty both of which are sources in our own Holy Law’. Such reforms leading to good government can only be achieved and sustained when the ruler, guided by the precepts of the shari‘a is advised and held in check by the ahl al ḥall wa’l ‘aqd (those of loosening and binding) through shūrā (consultation).

The political programme set out in The surest path was not only representative of Tanzimat thinking, but it also prefigured the kind of historical
reconstruction emphasised in the Islamic modernist movement (the Salafiyya) led by the Egyptian Shaykh Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905). Such thinking involved creative adaptation (or, as critics would charge, distortion) of traditional Islamic norms. According to orthodox interpretations of the shari‘a Muslims and non-Muslims were not equal. Nor did traditional Islamic thought about international relations accept such notions as the Ottoman Empire being one state in a cluster of ‘civilised’ states of different religions and cultures. The notion of justice was, indeed, a bedrock Islamic principle from earliest days but liberty (ḥurriyya) traditionally was simply the antonym of slavery.

To see the germ of a parliamentary system in the early Muslim community involves an anachronistic stretching of concepts with shūrā expanded to embrace the idea of a parliament, and the ahl al-ḥall wa‘l-‘aqd (never precisely identified in earlier Muslim thought but presumably being only the ‘ulamā‘) becoming the parliamentary representatives of the people. The bay‘a is in this way interpreted as a delegation of authority by the sovereign people to the ruler (this is perhaps not such a stretch of the earlier meaning which did signify a contract, not an oath of allegiance). Even the idea of exercising independent judgement in legal interpretation (ijtiḥād), classically narrowly confined to the ‘ulamā‘ if allowable at all), justified parliamentary legislation.

All this adds up to a plausible, even ingenious, ideological reformulation, fitting new ideas into that predominant Islamic motif which depicts the period of the Prophet Muhammad and the four rightly guided caliphs as the time when God’s plan for state and society was best realised. That golden age thus provided the needed model for what was to be recovered. Such an idea can be very revolutionary since it calls into question the legitimacy of existing institutions. It was being employed for quite revolutionary purposes to create a more powerful and efficient state leading ultimately to imported notions of sovereignty and citizenship. Evoking a sacralised past can, however, buttress a conservative or even reactionary orientation, for to seek solutions in that sacralised past is to reject the notion that alien or modern institutions or ideas might provide the answer. The answer is, instead, to be found in that paradigmatic past.

In either case, the framing of ideas in a thoroughly Islamic idiom has been a significant characteristic of modern Muslim political thought throughout the Muslim world. It was even more evident with the Islamic reformist movement (Salafiyya) of Egyptian Shaykh Muhammad ‘Abduh that was, of course, directly treating theological issues. The more strictly political thrust of that movement was to undercut traditionalist resistance to change with what
amounted to a double barrelled argument that Islam rightly understood was consistent with modern values which were, most important of all, prefigured in the teachings and experience of the time of the Prophet and the rightly guided caliphs. The very title given the group, Salafiyya (ancestors, forefathers) is meaningful. As a conceptual vessel the Salafiyya thus contributed to a bifurcated ideological progression. With more emphasis on that sacred past the Salafiyya can be seen as contributing to the intellectual formation of the Muslim Brethren and its many fundamentalist offshoots. Tilting toward the presumed modernity of an Islam that stresses the use of reason, *ijtiḥād* (independent judgement), and considerations of *maṣlaḥa* (public interest) Salafiyya sets the stage for a Westernizing liberal constitutionalism.

**Constitutionalism**

A constitutionalist ideology and the actual creation of constitutions and parliaments emerged in these years not only in the Ottoman Empire, but also in Egypt, Tunisia and Iran. Tunisia came first. There the bey issued an edict in 1857, promising a constitution that was actually promulgated four years later only to be suspended in 1864. An Ottoman constitution was promulgated in 1876, suspended in 1878 and then restored in 1908 when the Young Turks brought down the autocratic Sultan Abdülhamid (r. 1876 1909). Khedive Ismā‘īl (r. 1863 79) established a parliamentary body, the Majlis Shūrā al Nuwwāb (Consultative Chamber of Deputies) and in the last years before the 1882 British occupation the reformers produced a national reform project (*lā‘iḥa waṭantiyya*) and a draft constitution. Iran had its constitution (*qānūn i asasi*) during that famous period of the constitutional revolution from 1905 to 1911.

All of these cases involved efforts by the Westernising reformers to assert greater control by reining in the arbitrary ruler. In Egypt and Iran there was as well a greater involvement of people outside of government making the developments somewhat comparable to the unfolding of events in the French Revolution. The ideological arguments favouring a constitutional regime included indirectly but powerfully the works of such individuals as Rifā‘a Rāfī‘ al Ṭahṭāwī (1801 73), chaplain to the study mission Muh.ammad ‘Alī sent to France in the 1820s. His book on the France he got to know included a positive account of the parliamentary system, not to mention a daring description of the 1830 French Revolution. Khayr al Din’s *Surest path*, mentioned earlier, ironically was published three years after the Tunisian constitution had been suspended, but it influenced events elsewhere. In all three
other examples, the fiery rhetoric against autocracy advanced by Jamāl al Dīn al Afghānī (1838-97) played a role, and for Iran there was also the political journalism of Malkam Khān (1833-1908) whose newspaper bore the significant name Qānūn (Law).

The politics of protest was especially marked in the case of Iran. The Tobacco Revolt of the 1890s was a strikingly successful boycott of the foreign company the shah had unwisely granted a monopoly in the production and distribution of tobacco. In the following decade two critical events leading to the constitution involved the tradition of bast (taking asylum in a place secured from governmental intervention such as a mosque or, in this age of intrusive foreign presence, a foreign legation). This, however, was not the asylum of an individual or at most a small group but a crowd. The second even greater bast had 14,000 Iranians camping on the grounds of the British Legation.

Many of the ‘ulamā’ supported the constitution and served as deputies in the majlis. Later, a prominent mujtahid (cleric deemed sufficiently learned to interpret Islamic law and theology and serve as a source of inspiration to others), Fadl Allāh Nūrī (d. 1909), had second thoughts after the drafting of the constitution and led others in protesting that a secular constitution was not compatible with Islam. Other ‘ulamā’, however, argued the contrary, and Muḥammad Ḥusayn al Nā‘īnī (1860-1936) later wrote a compelling political treatise Tanbih al umma wa tanzih al Milla dar asās va usūl i masrūṭīyāt (An admonishment to the nation and an exposition to the people concerning the foundations and principles of constitutional government). This work is based on a short book published in Cairo in 1900, Tabā‘i al Istibdā‘ (The nature of tyranny) written by the Syrian Al Kawākibi (see below). That book, in turn, was largely taken from Della tirannide (1800) by the Italian Vittorio Alfieri (1749-1803), yet another example of the general movement of political ideas from Europe eastward.

Article II of this constitution provided that a committee of not fewer than five mujtahids should be established to ‘carefully discuss and consider all matters proposed in the Majlis … (and reject) any at variance with the sacred laws of Islam’. Here in germ was the kind of clerical rule brought to fruition in the Islamic Republic of Iran established seventy two years later under the aegis of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his doctrine of wilāyat i faqīh (governance of the jurisconsult).

From this constitutionalist experience in Iran emerged a great valuation placed on the idea of representative government, an antipathy to arbitrary rule and a predilection for seeing an alien infidel hand, either open or hidden, in politics. Something of the same intellectual legacy resulted from these other
largely abortive constitutional movements. The much later Tunisian nationalist movement organised in the early 1920s adopted the name Destour (as the Tunisian constitution had come to be called). And one of the first acts of the successful Young Turk revolution was to restore the constitution and the parliament.

Nationalism and pan-Islam

Two political ideologies arising in the nineteenth century advanced quite different ideas of the nature and boundaries of the political community. One was nationalism in its several different varieties, the other pan Islam. The former was a borrowing from Europe, the latter a response to the increasingly tight noose of European colonialism. The former would involve the break up of empires into nation states. The latter presented the last great Muslim empire, that of the Ottomans, as the protector of Muslim peoples.

Nationalism

The pressures making for the break up of the Ottoman Empire into would be ‘national’ units were part and parcel of the more general European development ushered in by the French Revolution and Romanticism. The ideological and political forces that would lead to the break up of the Austro Hungarian Empire, and the creation of Germany and Italy were equally at work in the Ottoman Empire, beginning in the majority Christian areas of the Balkans. The reconfiguration of group identity and political ties basic to nationalism is illustrated in the case of Greece which achieved independence from Ottoman rule in the 1820s. Those intellectuals who wrote the script for that emerging ideology discovered a glorious Greek past, championed the role of the common man and aspired to a more cohesive political community made up of citizens, not subjects, with rulers coming from the (Greek) people, not posted from a remote imperial capital. And on a more down to earth level the bold dream of those leaders who would revolt against empire to achieve nation became a reality given European support. Yet, the independent Greek state, brought finally into existence by European diplomacy (1829 30) that followed European military intervention, contained a population of some 800,000 while well over 2 million Greeks (defined by language and religion) remained under foreign rule a sobering commentary on the difficulties of fitting would be ‘historical nations’ into recalcitrant geography.
To counter this threat of European supported separatist nationalism the Ottomans strove to create an Ottoman patriotism shared by all. This was consistent with the stated aims of the Tanzimat for political equality of Muslims and non Muslims. With, however, losses to independence movements in the Balkans and to European colonialism in the Arab world the population remaining under direct Ottoman control was becoming increasingly Muslim. This facilitated the idea of a common ‘Muslimness’ as the base of political community, and this helps to explain the ideology of pan Islam. There also emerged Arab and Turkish nationalist ideologies.

As for Arab nationalism this move ‘from Ottomanism to Arabism’¹ is an outstanding example of the ‘constructed’ or ‘imagined’ nature of nationalist movements as illustrated by the Greek case. Arabism also involved a reconfiguration of group identity not religious but ethno linguistic. That reconfigured group the Arabs were to realise their proper destiny only by having their own political community, their own nation state. This necessarily involved a rewriting not just of group identities and loyalties but of history. The Arabs over the centuries of Ottoman rule had not seen themselves as a colonised people dominated by alien ‘Turks’ (the age old European tendency to describe the Ottoman Empire as ‘Turkey’ and its rulers as ‘Turks’ has contributed to this anachronistic confusion). Indeed, pace the still influential but faulted argument presented by George Antonius in *The Arab Awakening* (1938), most Arabs accepted Ottoman rule to the end.

The Arabism that was ‘constructed’ had at hand effective building materials. The ideological underpinnings came from the Arab literary and cultural awakening (the Nahda) that drew on the body of ideas from the European Enlightenment, the French Revolution and Romanticism, all of which served to increase among Arabs the sense of Arab distinctiveness. The very popular histories and historical novels of Jurjì Zaydàn (1861 1914) are one striking example of a constructed nationalist pedigree.

The Islamic aspect of Arab nationalism is mixed. Arabism’s ideologues early and late have included a disproportionate number of Christian Arabs (e.g. Zaydân), and this movement was clearly intended to foster a political community that transcended the Muslim/non Muslim divide. In retrospect, Arabism can be seen as a plausible next step for Arab Christians as the idea of Ottomanism faded.

At the same time, Islam could be ‘nationalised’ into Arabism. That God’s Revelation had been delivered in Arabic by an Arab to Arabs made it easy for advocates to see no conflict between Islam and Arabism. Adding to the conflating of Arabism and Islam was the prime importance that ‘Abdulwahab’s Salafiyya attributed to those earliest years when the umma was indeed an Arabo-Muslim entity. So, too, did the political writings of such figures as ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1854–1902) who combined his attacks on the presumed tyranny of the Ottomans with an appeal for an Arab caliphate. Even the Ḥadith of the Prophet Muhammad affirming that ‘love of the homeland (ḥubb al-watān) is an article of faith’ served to elide nationalism and Islam.

Arabism was at first largely confined to the Fertile Crescent. Egypt, whose land and people make up surely the most nearly ‘natural’ nation imaginable, had its own national awakening advanced by, among others, ‘Abdallāh al-Nadim (1844–96) and the leader of the Watāni Party, Mustafa Kamal (Muṣṭafā Kāmil) (1874–1908). Yet, Kamal’s strand of Egyptian nationalism was in one way diluted, for he played the pro-Ottoman card at times in his confrontation with the British occupation of Egypt (since 1882). Only later did Arab nationalism extend to Egypt (peaking during the years of Gamal Abd al-Nasser) and to other Arab countries. Even so, there has remained in Egypt’s political thinking a strong sense of Egyptianness.

Arab nationalism expanded over time to embrace the entire Arab world winning out over contending ideologies such as the idea of Greater Syria championed by Antūn Saʿādah (1904–49), a Christian Arab. Arabism became the dominant political discourse in the Arab world following the First World War (the Wilsonian idea of the self-determination of nations and the Allied plan to break up the Ottoman Empire into presumed natural nations being yet another indicator of the Western intellectual contribution to Middle Eastern nationalisms).

A full-throated Arab nationalism came later from the pen of Sāṭīʿ al-Ḥuṣrī (1880–1968). Turkish was his mother tongue, Arabic a second language and to the end of his life he spoke Arabic with a heavy Turkish accent. It was as late as 1919 when he took his own road to Damascus to join the Arab movement. The Baʿth Party founded in Syria in the early 1940s provided other ideological spokesmen including Michel ‘Aflaq (1910–89) (another Christian) and Śalāḥ al-Dīn al-Bayṭār (1912–80) who integrated what may be described as a mix of European Romanticism plus socialist and fascist ideas into their programme.

The political pull, but also the limitations, in Arab nationalist thought are to be seen in the number of efforts made to merge existing Arab states on the road to that goal of Arab unity. Most significant was the union of Egypt and
Syria in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic, but broken up by Syrian secession in 1961. Less significant and even rather quixotic have been the several unity efforts advanced by Libya’s Mu’ammar al Qadhafi. Yet another recent example of Arabism’s failures as a mobilising ideology has been the case of Syria and Iraq in the era of Ḥāfiz al Asad (pres. 1970–2000) and Saddam Hussein (pres. 1979–2003) Both states, ostensibly ruled and ideologically guided by the same Ba’th Party founded on the fundamental principle of Arab unity, confronted each other as bitter enemies.

Even so, the ideology of Arabism did create political movements based on the idea of Arab unity, did foster efforts at mergers of existing states and did bring into being (1945) a kind of unity with the Arab League (although by design a league of sovereign states).

Viewed from another perspective today’s eighteen Arab states generate limited nationalist ideologies built around their individual states. Moreover, in their constitutions and in other ways these states publicly acknowledge belonging to the larger Arab world.

As for Turkish nationalism, ideas of Turks as a people with their distinctive language, culture and history had emerged throughout the nineteenth century, stimulated by the works of a few European scholars who singled out the Turks or Turkish for study. All this, however, had faint impact on the ruling elite or opinion moulders. There was, as with the Arabs, a literary and cultural ‘awakening’ among those whose language was Turkish, but those who would create the Republic of Turkey in the 1920s remained to the end determined to maintain the empire. Yes, there were Turkish nationalists in the revolutionary Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti), in power during the critical years of the First World War. The most important was Mehmed Zia Gökalp (c. 1875–1924) whose writings offered a coherent argument for Turkish nationalism matching what al Ḥusri did for Arab nationalism (both relying heavily on European thought). Still, as late as 1919–20 the National Pact, the basic charter that set the lines for what became the Republic of Turkey, spoke only of ‘Ottoman Muslims’. The word ‘Turk’ was never mentioned. The role of one man, Mustafa Kemal (who later adopted, and deserved, the sobriquet Atatürk or Father Turk), in what happened thereafter was critical. He rejected what he saw as the chimera of pan Turanism (union of the Turks of Anatolia and the Turkic peoples of Central Asia), an ideology that may be compared to, and was to some extent inspired by, pan Slavism. Atatürk rejected as well pan Islam and then in 1924 abolished the office of caliph. Scorning an accommodation with the remnant Ottoman government under the thumb of the Allies in Istanbul, he set about fighting for and defining
a distinctive Turkish nationalism. But for this one man, developments in those crucial years following the Ottoman defeat in 1918 would have been quite different. Perhaps there might not even have been a Republic of Turkey.

Still, there were political ideas and political groups predisposing acceptance of the radical shift that Atatürk brought about. The earlier Young Turk idea of saving the empire had involved a considerable Turkification. The lack of any effective response to the call to jihad issued by the sultan/caliph in 1914 discredited pan Islam. Also, events of the war years (the Arab revolt, the Armenian massacres) made even more attractive the idea that Turks and what was to become Turkey provided the essential core remaining after all else was stripped away. Even today Turks see themselves not just juridically but effectively as successors to the Ottoman Empire. The move from Ottomanism to Turkism had a certain logic.

Pan-Islam and the caliphate

Pan Islam as an ideology evokes the name of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838–1897), the peripatetic revolutionary activist who spent a life preaching the unity of all Muslims and plotting against British imperialism and Muslim despots. An Iranian, he took on the name al-Afghānī to conceal his Shi‘ī roots. Pan Islam, more importantly, was also adopted as a foreign policy by the Ottomans with the sultan brandishing the title of caliph.

Although the notion of a single ruler (caliph or imam) ruling over a single umma is a basic concept in Islamic thought and although the title had been used routinely by such imposing dynasties as the Umayyads and Abbasids the prevailing idea had been that the ‘true caliphate’ was only that of the four ‘rightly guided caliphs’ in succession after the Prophet Muhammad. Thereafter there was only kingship (mulk). By modern times, the title of caliph, seldom used, was hardly more than an honorific.

An interesting refurbishing of the idea came in the 1774 Ottoman Russian treaty at Küçük Kaynarca where as a sop to the defeated Ottomans it was stated that the Ottoman sultan, ‘in his capacity as caliph’, would continue to exercise religious authority over the Muslims living in the lands the Ottomans had lost in that war. Also buttressing the Ottoman claim to the caliphate was the apocryphal story maintaining that the last Abbasid caliph living in exile in Cairo had in 1517 (at the time of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt from the Mamluks) conveyed the caliphate to Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–20) in 1517.

The claim to intervene on behalf of Muslims beyond Ottoman borders might, it was hoped, offer the beleaguered Ottomans needed diplomatic
capital to use against those European imperial powers ruling over Muslims. It was as well a deft tit for tat response to the abusive European assertions of rights to intervene in support of the non Muslim Ottoman populations.

The fragility of pan Islam in the real world of international politics was demonstrated in 1914 when the Ottomans entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. Then the sultan ‘in his capacity as caliph’ declared a jihad against the Allies. Except for spurring the British to negotiations with Sharīf Ḥusayn of Mecca leading to the Arab revolt, the call to jihad had little impact. The many Muslim soldiers in the colonial armies of the Allied powers remained loyal to their alien flags, and scarcely any other pro Ottoman political activity took place.

Pan Islam did put back into political play the venerable idea of Muslim unity transcending state boundaries. The powerful mindset that pan Islam tapped into was illustrated by the Khilāfat movement that sprang up in India in 1919 with the aim of pressing Britain and the victorious Allies to preserve the caliphate and, for that matter, the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the widespread concern over the caliphate throughout the Muslim world was demonstrated by the consternation throughout the Muslim world, even among Shi‘ī Muslims, when Mustafā Kemal (Atatürk) abolished the caliphate in 1924. Congresses were held to restore the office and select a new caliph, but all to no avail. No agreement could be reached on who might be caliph and where the caliphate would be located.

The crisis over the abolition of the caliphate provoked in addition two futile congresses and two interesting political treatises dismissing the need for a caliphate. The first actually appeared at the time of the abolition of the Ottoman sultanate (November 1922).² Intended to prepare the public for the abolition of the caliphate fourteen months later, it was written under the aegis of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Blending classical Islamic references with modern Western political thought, the work argued that there was no Islamic requirement for the caliphate. It added that in accordance with the Islamic doctrine of consultation (shūrā) the Assembly was authorised to make decisions about public affairs including, if deemed proper, withdrawing political duties from the caliph.

The second work went even further in arguing that Islam did not mandate any specific form of government, and that the mission of the Prophet

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Muḥammad was confined to the spiritual sphere. This was the book appearing in 1925, *Al Islām waʿusūl al ḥukm* (Islam and the bases of political authority) by the Egyptian ʿalīm ʿAlīʿAbd al Rāziq (1888–1966). For his pains he was tried by a court of twenty five al Azhar ʿulamāʾ and stripped of both his Azharite degree and his judicial appointment.

Another detailed political treatise appearing two years earlier argued just the opposite. In his book, *Al Khilāfah, aw al ʿimāma al ʿuzmā* (The caliphate or the supreme imamate), Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935), the principal disciple of Muḥammad ʿAbduh and his successor as leader of the Salaḥyya, insisted that Islam required a single caliph ruling over a single Muslim community (*umma*). He presented an idealised picture of how the caliphate should work based on the familiar reformist image of the divinely inspired early Muslim government with the caliph as executive guided by the religiously learned *ahl al hāll waʾl aqḍ*, the use of ʾiḥtād and the guidance of ʾmašʿalā in resolving mundane issues not explicitly covered by Islamic law. Such would be the true caliphate, but Riḍā did make an effort to fit all this into the real world situation the Muslim community faced by accepting a transitional ‘caliphate of necessity’. This might even be the present Ottoman caliph (no longer sultan) if those ruling in Turkey would permit him to be more than a figurehead. A more promising choice, Riḍā suggested, might be the imam of Yemen or someone nominated by Egypt. As to where the caliphate might be placed, the Ḥijāz was ruled out (where the Hashemites had not yet been ejected by Ibn Saʿūd) as being indirectly under alien British control. Other places also offered difficulties. Riḍā suggested that perhaps Mosul might be best.

The Indian subcontinent

In 1857 the rebellion by Sepoy troops (both Muslim and Hindu) triggered scattered uprising and revolts throughout northern India. These revolts once put down the following year, the already anachronistic East India Company gave way to the British crown, and the equally anachronistic surviving symbol of Muslim rule, the last Mughal ruler, Bahadur Shah II, was deposed. Muslims, always a slight minority in overwhelmingly Hindu India, had now not only lost that last token of a once imposing Muslim imperial rule but also were losing out in that straitened political arena reserved for natives of India (Hindus were gaining at the expense of Muslims in the subaltern governmental positions). What were they to do?

This was the preeminent political question confronting Muslims of the subcontinent over the next ninety years from 1857 to 1947, when the partition
of British India producing the Muslim state of Pakistan alongside India
provided the answer. The political thought that reflected the debate on this
question and served to shape actions taken was as follows. There was, first,
what might be called the political quietist and communalist option. This
involved implicitly accepting that Muslims were fated for a time to live
under a non Muslim government and concentrating on educating Muslims
in the pure tradition of their religion, ensuring thereby the coherence of a
Muslim community living in accordance with God’s plan. The Deobandis
exemplified this approach. They were a group of ‘ulamā’ who had founded a
school in Deoband in 1867, and from that modest beginning blossomed a
network of schools existing to this day (Deobandi schools have recently
achieved notoriety for having taught many of the Afghan Taliban and similar
Islamic fundamentalists).

These schools, or better seminaries, taught essentially a conservative reli-
gious curriculum (with scant attention to secular studies) intended to turn out
‘ulamā’ and community leaders who would make the faith a living reality.
They were politically quietist but not in the sense that they accepted alien rule
or even less alien ways. Rather, guiding Muslims to know and live what they
held to be the divine plan for the individual and society took
first if not almost exclusive attention.

Most of the Deobandis thus opposed the movement for a separate Muslim
state, seeing this (not without some truth) as the work of Westernised
Muslims whose understanding of and fidelity to Islam was suspect. Better,
they believed, to support the independence movement led by the Congress
Party whose leader, Gandhi, had given assurances of Muslim autonomy and
had even openly supported the Khilāfat movement. Such was the thinking
of those Muslims who founded the Jam‘īyat ul ‘Ulamā’ yi Hind (JUH
Association of the ‘Ulamā’ of India) in 1919. This group even developed a
theory of muttaḥida qawmīyat (composite nationalism) according to which
a people can belong simultaneously to more than one nation (qawm). All
Indians, Muslim and non Muslim, belong to the Indian homeland which is
their nation even while the Muslims constitute their own nation. In such a
formulation an overarching state would be essentially secular.

Also opposing partition from a fervently Muslim position was Mawlānā
Sayyid Abū’l ‘A‘lā’ Mawdūdī (1903 79) who in time became the leading
ideologue of Sunnī fundamentalist Islam (and a major inspiration for the
equally influential Sayyid Qūṭb), but his intellectual odyssey was not lacking
in twists and turns. Hailing from a traditional Muslim family with a distant
past of service to the Mughal Empire and a more recent past of service to
the small princely dynasty of Hyderabad, Mawdūdī received a traditional education at first at the hands of his pious and Sufi father. It is perhaps not too much to see in his early formation an appreciation of and nostalgia for the classical norms of India’s imperial Islam. His formative years were not leavened by access to modern Western schooling that would be the route taken by most of India’s emerging elite. He taught himself English later. Obliged to leave school while still in his teens following the death of his father, Mawdūdī quickly proved to be adept in journalism. He started his political life supporting the Congress Party, even worked for a time for a Congress Party paper and wrote articles praising Gandhi. He was also involved in the Khilafat movement. From 1921 to 1924, he was editor of the official paper of the JUH, which, as seen, favoured ‘composite nationalism’ and co operated with the Congress Party.

Thereafter he soured on nationalism whether composite or Muslim separatist. It was as if to say that Muslim separatists were nationalising Islam rather than Islamising the Muslim nation, and the JUH and most of the Deobandīs were jeopardising the communalist task by co operating with the Congress. Yet, he was separatist in his own way, abandoning any notion of a shared political community of Hindus and Muslim as advocated by the JUH and most of the Deobandīs. In effect, Mawdūdī was saying that not until the Muslim community reformed in accordance with God’s plan would it be able to achieve the needed political community. It is almost as if contact with others was irrelevant. Such a position fitted well into the logically coherent fundamentalist ideology of the Islamic state, for which he is famous, but it evaded the immediate choice of working toward either some kind of shared polity with the Hindu majority or some kind of separation.

Those leading the movement that produced Pakistan had different ideas and a different background. The leaders were Muslims, of course, but not ‘ulamā’ with rare exceptions. Their Quaid i Azam (Great Leader) Muhammad ‘Alī Jinnāh (1876 1948) was a barrister trained in Britain. They were modernists. Many were trained in the school founded in 1877 by Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (1817 98) the Aligarh Muslim Anglo Oriental College (now Aligarh University) which, as the name suggests, was a college where Muslims could receive a modern, British style education. They were nationalists just in the sense that Mawdūdī deplored. The political goal of a state came first, and their image of an Islamic state looked very much like a Western parliamentary democracy. Stated differently, the All India Muslim League (founded 1906) that led the campaign to an independent Pakistan embraced all the Muslim secularists of India plus the many more who could respond to the sense of constituting a distinctive people.
The politics of that ninety year period from the Indian Mutiny to Partition is filled with might have beens right down to the final days. Many Muslims grew up politically in the Congress Party. Some eminent Muslims remained such as Abu’l Kalām Āzād (1888–1958). At several times agreements between Congress and the Muslim League or British action seemed to set a course against partition, and as always in politics things might have gone differently if different people (other than Jinnāh or Gandhi, for example) had been in leading roles.

Among the results of this cataclysmic move was an independent Muslim state, a homeland composed of two territories, East and West Pakistan, a thousand miles apart and a neighbouring India that with its roughly 12 per cent Muslim population was the third largest Muslim country following Pakistan and Indonesia. After the 1971 breakaway of East Pakistan to form Bangladesh the largest Muslim states in terms of their Muslim population are Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India.

Also, the man who had opposed the Muslim nationalist choice of a territorial state before creating a truly Muslim political community, Mawdūdī, settled in Pakistan to pursue a campaign for his type of Islamic state. Mawdūdī’s influence has transcended the Indian subcontinent. He, along with the Egyptians Ḥasan al Banna (1906–49) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–66) stand out as the three pre eminent ideologues of fundamentalist Sunnī political thought (matched by Khomeini for the Shī‘a). His political thought as set out in numerous writings (representative titles First principles of the Islamic state and Political theory of Islam, and his Qur’ānic commentary) may be epitomised as follows: God alone is sovereign. Every pious, practising Muslim is God’s vice regent (khalīfa = caliph). Muslims choose a leader to administer the state following the criterion set out in Qur’ān 49:13 (‘The noblest among you is the most God fearing’). That is, he (always ‘he’) must be pious as well as competent. The leader must consult (shūrā), but there is, strictly speaking, no legislative function. Nor is he required to accept their counsel. The ruler rules, the ahl al hāl wa’l ‘aqd advise and the qādis adjudicate, but all are limited to the task of finding and implementing God’s Law, the shari‘a, which covers all aspects of life, public and private. A government failing to so act does not merit obedience. Non Muslims are guaranteed their security and autonomy but have fewer rights, and fewer obligations (e.g. they pay a special tax (jīzya) but are freed of the jihad obligation) than Muslims. If they do not like that contractual arrangement they are free to convert but will not be forced to do so. Such a system, Mawdūdī maintains, is best described as ‘the kingdom of God’ or a ‘theodemocracy’.
A major theme in Indonesian political thought has revolved around the question of whether this state of Muslims should be a Muslim state. That might seem to suggest that one would find ideas similar to Mawdūdī’s call for a Muslim state in the Indian subcontinent and then in Pakistan or the Muslim Brethren’s programme in Egypt and beyond, but the situation in Indonesia is not quite like either of those two examples. There have been and continue to be two different ‘Muslim’ movements in this state represented by the reformist Muhammadiyah (founded 1912) and the traditionalist Nahdlatul ‘Ulama’ (founded 1926). The former was founded by ʿAhmad Dḥlān who had spent his formative years studying in Mecca and brought back to Java the Salafi reformist ideology of Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abduḥ. Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’, by contrast, represented the traditional ‘ulamāʾ who resisted such Salafi reformism almost as much as they opposed the threatening secularisation of society.

With adherents numbering in the millions, their own schools and other social services, both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul ‘Ulama’ are much more than political parties. When organised into political parties (sometimes together, usually in contentious separation and at times organised under different party labels) these deep rooted Muslim movements have never won an electoral majority in Indonesia even with an estimated 87 per cent Muslim population. They do, however, constitute a significant political bloc.

Alongside these different Islamist tendencies have been the forces of secular nationalism that led the independence movement against the Dutch and have dominated until recently political leadership since independence, first under Sukarno, thereafter Suharto and, until recently, in the post Suharto era as well. This secular nationalist orientation had its own diverse ideological strands being composed of descendants of the pre Dutch ruling class, those rising to positions in government or the professions via Dutch education and (until largely destroyed in the brutal abortive coup in the 1960s) those students, workers and peasants influenced by socialist and communist ideas.

Adding to the distinctiveness is that the creation of Indonesia out of over 14,000 islands (Java and Sumatra accounting for roughly 80 per cent of the population) that make up the state in its present boundaries is the achievement of Dutch imperial rule. Java or Sumatra had constituted the core of Buddhist or Hindu kingdoms in the past, but at the time Islam superseded those religions at roughly the end of the sixteenth century what is now Indonesia had split into diverse and contentious Muslim principalities. The fissiparous potential of regionalism offered another obstacle to state building, the Aceh.
wars against the Dutch from 1871 to 1908 prefiguring the present day disaffection in that province. This and similar regional resistance to the Dutch throughout the nineteenth century was often led by the ‘ulamā’.

These several different forces contended and co-operated in the nationalist struggle for independence. For example, both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’ joined Masyumi, the political party organised under the aegis of the Japanese soon after they had occupied Indonesia in 1942, but Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’ withdrew a decade later. Although independence was declared in 1945 it took a four year military confrontation with the Dutch before the latter recognised Indonesian independence in 1949. Many of those serving in the hastily assembled Indonesian army were drawn from those having received military training under Masyumi auspices, and participating ‘ulamā’ obliged as well with a 1945 fatwā calling for jihad against the Dutch. These Islamist forces were in a strong position to push for an Islamic state, but they reluctantly accepted in the August 1945 constitution the ‘Five Principles’ (Pancasila) formula that simply mandated belief in the one God. They were reconciled by the statement in the Jakarta Charter that would impose the ‘obligation of Muslims to observe the shari‘a’, but Sukarno who emerged as the leader of independent Indonesian managed to get that stipulation ignored.

In the stormy history of Indonesia marked by the long period of ‘guided democracy’ under Sukarno (1959–66) and Suharto’s even longer rule from 1966 until his overthrow in 1998, those aspiring to create a polity deemed Islamic were either suppressed or co-opted by the rulers. Emerging out of the battles of those decades was a modification of Islamist thinking personified in Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly dubbed Gus Dur, b. 1940) who advanced a more liberal, reformist interpretation of Islam and politics and induced the traditionalist Nahdlatul ‘Ulamā’ to accept Pancasila, withdraw from politics and concentrate on religious and educational matters. Although his inept tenure as president (1999–2001) led to his removal to be replaced by Megawati Sukarnoputri (the daughter of Sukarno) his rise to leadership does symbolise a certain accommodation between the several different Islamist and secularist orientations.

Islamic politics and the politics of Muslims

That Sukarno in overwhelmingly Muslim Indonesia could manipulate Islamist political aspirations and even back away from the Jakarta Charter’s ‘obligation of Muslims to observe the shari‘a’ suggests that one may well exaggerate the Islamic factor in the politics of Muslims. In fact, secular, non Muslim (even
occasionally ‘anti clerical’) leaders and ideologies throughout the Muslim world during much of the modern period have been significant, and at times clearly dominant. In twentieth century Egypt, for example, the ideas of al Bannā and Sayyid Qūṭb have surely been important but less so than those of Sa’d Zaghlūl and Nasser. For much of the twentieth century politics and political thought have been dominated by the likes of Atatürk, the Pahlavis father and son in Iran, Sukarno, Tunisia’s Bourguiba, Amanullah in Afghanistan and Ba‘thists throughout the Arab world. Yes, many of the above came to grief and their ideas were discredited, but in their time they kept Islamists and Islamist notions under control. The unpopularity of Islamist regimes in Sudan and Iran suggests that political Islam once in power may face a similarly limited tenure.

The Western domination of Muslim countries over roughly the last two centuries has provided a strong inducement for Muslims to think in terms of Muslims vs non Muslims. That they have certainly done and continue to do, but playing the Islamic card has not always been determining. Sultan Abdülhamid who embraced pan Islam was ultimately overthrown by the Young Turks championing the ideology of the secular state. Later, the pan Islamic impulse as a would be unifier transcending individual states has been rivalled by the notion of a unity embracing all peoples long dominated by Western imperialism. The idea of a ‘Third World’ unity was epitomised by the 1955 Bandung meeting of twenty nine Afro Asian countries, and for a time the speeches by Nasser and others linking in unity the peoples of ‘Africa, Asia and Latin America’ became almost a mantra.

Nor can the contributions of many different Western ideas in shaping the modern political thought of Muslims be overlooked. These would include in addition to that protean ideology, nationalism (if nationalism can rightly be labelled ‘Western’), but also such diverse ideologies as communism, fascism and socialism, the idea of state led ‘command economies’ as well as feminism.

Even so, the Islamic idiom in the political thought of Muslims is hardly ever completely absent, and it is usually the preferred mode of expression. This does not, however, mean that there exists a procrustean bed of political thought labelled ‘Islamic’ that ultimately shapes the ideas and actions of Muslims. Rather, new ideas are quite often fitted into existing tropes. Ideologues, for example, have used that Islamic golden age, the time of the Prophet Muḥammad, to argue for the separation of religion and state (e.g. ‘Alī ‘Abd al Rāziq) or, on the other extreme, the complete merger of religion and state.
The last several decades have witnessed an insistent use of traditional Islamic vocabulary by Islamists proclaiming revolutionary political messages.

**Radical Islamism**

Present day Islamist movements share the characteristic of being revolutionary. They seek not reform but a complete change in the existing political system. They accept (often enthusiastically embrace) the necessity of taking action (jihad) to right what is wrong. Existing governments are demonised. They are seen as having lost their status as Muslims. They have lapsed into jāhiliyya (the age of ignorance, in orthodox Islam being chronologically the period before the advent of Islam, now interpreted as a condition to which individuals and societies can revert). These movements depict an alien ‘other’ to be opposed. Such alien forces are seen as having caused, or at least contributed mightily to, this jāhiliyya, and they support those ostensibly Muslim rulers who must be overthrown. The goal to be attained in this struggle is the divinely mandated Islamic state the delineations of which have been clearly set out in the sacred texts and achieved in the time of Prophet Muhammad. These movements are scripturalists, embracing the idea of a moral and legal code (the šarī‘a) imposed by God and valid for all time and place.

It is tempting to see such radical ideologies as in the mould of the early Kharijites, and there is a chilling symmetry in Anwar al Sadat’s having pinned that pejorative label on Egypt’s Islamists only later to suffer at their hands the same fate of assassination (1981) meted out to the fourth caliph (and legitimate imam to the Shi‘a) ‘Ali fourteen centuries earlier.

It is equally tempting to classify these examples of radical Islam along with the many militant and puritanical Muslim revivalist movements such as Wahhābīm arising in eighteenth century Arabia and surviving to this day in Saudi Arabia. To reach even further back in time, one might evoke the historical explanation advanced by Ibn Khaldūn whereby a stern and uncompromising religio political message coming from the hinterland would overthrow the religiously lax dynasty in the city. Indeed, that Osama bin Laden left Saudi Arabia to organise resistance against the Saudi government and their American ‘patrons’ from faraway Afghanistan would appear to round out the Khaldūnian historical cycle wherein a state born in a challenge from the hinterland faces in its turn a challenge from afar.

Today’s radical Islamism exemplifies the extremist ideological stance that has from time to time risen to challenge mainstream Islamic political thought.
The latter in expressing a great fear of *fitna* (temptation, disorder) strictly limits any presumed right of revolution against constituted authority. The former starkly insists that such action is quite simply what God requires. ‘No deciding authority other than God’, the war cry of the Kharijites, finds its equivalent in the insistence by Islamists on God’s exclusive sovereignty (*ḥākimiyya*). Even more jarring is the notion that one should engage in jihad against professing Muslims.

Why did such movements come forward when they did? Perhaps the proximate cause can be linked to the cumulative disappointments raised by the yawning gap dividing expectations from achievements of Muslim governments, most of them only recently having emerged from Western colonialism. Specific turning points might include the crushing Israeli defeat of the Arabs in the June 1967 war, the break up of Pakistan to create Bangladesh (1971) or the earlier 1953 foreign intervention in Iran overthrowing the government of Musaddiq and restoring the shah to his throne. In a time of troubles when other ideologies (Arabism, other nationalisms, state socialism, the idea of a Pakistan) have not provided the hoped for panacea a radical Islamist ideology would seem the default option.

In any case, there can be no doubt about the Islamic lexical armature used in presenting these radical and fundamentalist political programmes. These are ideologies that build on Islamic notions in common currency over the past two centuries. The idea of the early Islamic *umma* as a golden age to be recovered already figured in the thinking, albeit for quite different purposes, of both Ottoman statesmen and the Islamic reformist (*Salafiyya*) movement led by Muḥammad ‘Abduh. The working out of a coherent fundamentalist political theory can be traced in the thought of al-Banna, Mawdūdī and Sayyid Qūṭb. Exemplifying the mining of the Islamic political tradition was Qūṭb’s evoking of Ibn Taimiyya’s (1268–1328) justification of jihad against the Mongols who had professed Islam but did not apply the *shari‘a*.

Radical Islamist thought has always transcended state borders. Nationalism and thus the nation state is either strictly opposed or at best seen as a transitional phase on the way to the single Islamic polity (*umma*). Certain Islamists have even advocated the restoration of the caliphate. The writings of such ideologues as Mawdūdī and Qūṭb have been read throughout the Muslim world and translated into the major Islamic languages. An added internation alisation of doctrine and practice was advanced throughout the 1980s with the influx of Muslims to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, creating in the process the radical terrorist al-Qā‘ida (*The Base*) whose members are now spread in secret cells world wide.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution

The ideology underlying the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and the creation of the Islamic Republic offers a Shi'i variant of radical Sunnī Islamism discussed above. The rhetoric of revolution can be expected to provide a political theory, and the revolution in Iran does not disappoint. Moreover, while one can find diverse roots of the ideological message that sparked and then sustained the revolution in Iran the message itself is overwhelmingly associated with one person, Khomeini (1902-89). His decisive influence in contributing to the theory and practice of revolution in Iran can be compared to that of Atatürk in creating a Turkish republic, surely the only way these polar opposites can be compared.

Unlike the principal ideologues of radical Sunnism (such as al Bannā, Quṭb or Osama bin Laden) who were not ‘ulamā’, Khomeini was an ayatollah, the highest rank in the Shi‘ī clergy. Both the radical Sunnī Islamists and Khomeini heaped their scorn on the establishment ‘ulamā’ seen as toadying to repressive governments, but Khomeini while scorning the establishment ‘ulamā’ championed rule by a religiously trained cleric. This was his famous concept of the wilāyat i fāqih (guardianship of the jurisconsult). The Sunnī Islamists, by contrast, give no such role to the ‘ulamā’ and tended to depict the shari‘a as an immutable and comprehensive guide to governance that is self-implementing.

A common theme linking the two is the emphasis on the religious imperative of this worldly activism and a rejection of political quietism. They both preach jihad and a very activist interpretation of the Qur‘ānic injunction to ‘command the good and forbid the evil’ (Qur‘ān 3:110 and passim). Khomeini’s call for political activism is especially important as a counter to the mainstream Shi‘ī proclivity for political quietism and the notion that all government in the absence of the imam is necessarily unjust. Khomeini argued explicitly that the religious leadership not only can but should act as agents of the imam in carrying out the this worldly mission of providing good governance.

Both radical Sunnī Islamism and Khomeini’s Shi‘ī political thought offer a starkly manichaean image of evil outside forces in league with despots at home bent on undermining the umma. That he referred to the United States as the ‘great Satan’ and the Soviet Union as the lesser Satan is not to be dismissed as hyperbole.

The revolution that Khomeini embodied not surprisingly abolished the monarchy and implemented a republican governmental structure with
a majlis, elections, cabinet ministers and a president. The juxtaposition of this essentially Western presidential/parliamentary system with parallel offices headed by the guardian jurisprudent who holds ultimate control illustrates the awkward presence of alien ideas and institutions even in a revolutionary ideology that would seek to restore a presumed Islamic authenticity.

Liberal Islam

The radical voices of both Sunnī and Shī‘ī Islamists have appeared dominant in recent decades (just as the varieties of secular nationalism dominated in the 1940s and 1950s), but a liberal and democratic Islamic discourse is not lacking, and it has been advanced by intellectuals from all over the Muslim world including Fazlur Rahman (1919-88) from Pakistan, the Indonesian Nurcholish Madjīd (b. 1939), the Iranians Mīhdi Bāzargān (1907-95) and Abdolkarim Sorouch (b. 1945), the Syrian Muḥammad Shahrūn (b. 1938), the Sudanese Abdullahi Ahmed An Na‘īm (1946), the Egyptians Muḥammad Khalafa‘llah (1916-97) and Muḥammad Sa‘īd al Ashmāwī (b. 1932), the Tunisian Muḥammad Talbi (b. 1921), the Algerians Mohammedi Arkoun (b. 1928) and even the grandson of al Bannā, Tariq Ramadan (b. 1962) in Switzerland. They offer quite different approaches and only one is, strictly speaking, an ‘ālim, but their ideas do affirm representative government, equal rights to non-Muslims and women, freedom of thought and, in one way or another, a liberal polity based on the concept of ‘no compulsion in matters of religion’ (Qur’ān 2:256).

All of which is to conclude that there is no single Islamic political thought. There is the political thought of Muslims. With attention to the changing historical circumstances (we have emphasised the Western impact on the entire Muslim world in modern times as a unifying theme) and a good grasp of the distinctive Islamic political language one can best follow this ongoing discussion of politics.
Women, family and the law: the Muslim personal status law debate in Arab states

LYNN WELCHMAN

Introduction

In the late twentieth century, a combination of geopolitical developments focused particular attention on 'the Islamic shari‘a' and specifically on its role as an identity and legitimacy signifier for opposition movements in and the governments of Muslim majority states. Positivist approaches to legislative power concentrated on the statutory expression of rules in different areas of state law. After varying periods of independent statehood, a number of post colonial states promulgated instruments of statutory law presented as reintroducing the rules and sanctions of Islamic criminal law into penal systems otherwise largely based on colonial legislation. Systems of Islamic banking and Islamic finance developed apace. Constitutional arguments focused on the various formulations through which 'the shari‘a' or 'the principles of the shari‘a' are or should be established as a source (or the source) of statutory legislation. In different Muslim majority states, courts became a site for contestation of different perceptions of the requirements of the shari‘a and the extent to which statutory laws and the state appointed judiciary would defend or concede to these different invocations of 'Islamic law'.'

Very much part of this context is the high degree of political attention currently given to Muslim family law developments in Arab states and elsewhere, both in Muslim majority states and in countries where Muslims are a minority. At the same time, the particular focus on statutory expressions of the shari‘a governing family relations has been a more consistent feature in recent history than that on certain other areas of state law. Differently positioned scholars in the Western academy have described family law variously as the 'last bastion' or 'last stronghold' of the shari‘a, evoking in

1 The distinctions between usage of shari‘a, fiqh and 'Islamic law' are the subject of many scholarly and activist interventions and are assumed rather than examined in this chapter.
such metaphors both an image of the forces ranged against (secularist reformers, European colonial powers, encroaching state authorities, among others) and of the defenders of the fort (variously, the establishment šarīʿi scholars and judiciary, and non establishment constituencies).\(^2\) Primarily however the metaphor relates to the processes of codification of laws and reorganisation of judicial systems which began in the Middle East in the nineteenth century under the Ottomans and the Egyptians and continued both under European colonial powers and in the independent states that emerged in the region in the twentieth century. The wide scale adoption (or imposition) of European based statutory codifications excluded the area of family law, and the claims of the state as the originator of authoritative norms were attenuated by a pro claimed subordination, in this area, to the norms of the šarīʿa as, mostly, extrapolated from the established and diverse jurisprudence (fiqh) of Muslim jurists. Although this was also the Ottoman approach to the civil law compilation of rules from the Ḥanafī school of law in the Mecelle (Ar. Majalla), subsequent developments in the rules on contract and civil torts around the region have attracted considerably less public and political interest than those governing family law for the majority Muslim population.

In the Western academy, commentary on this history has developed from the observation of the late J. N. D. Anderson that family law is regarded by Muslims ‘as partaking most closely of the very warp and woof of their religion’\(^3\) to critiques and reassessments of the interests of colonial powers and the impact of their rule (and of resistance to their rule) both on the attitude of different sectors of the subject populations to the nature and significance of šarīʿa rules, and on the substantive content of codifications of Muslim family law subsequently issued by independent Arab states.\(^4\) The discourses of reform, modernity and national unity employed by centralising and bureau cratrising state authorities in their promulgation of family law codifications are scrutinised in recognition of the centrality of the state as represented in and reinforced through the codification process, and of the place of ‘Islamic family law’ as a symbol of religious and national identity. A range of contemporary literature starting in the late twentieth century seeks inter alia to evaluate the

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impact of such codifications on the position and options of women subject to their jurisdiction.

Some of this literature looks at the interactions of law and society, the practice of law in the courts and its varying significance in out of court negotiations and individual strategies of protection and advancement by women in different socio economic sectors. As lucidly analysed by Annalies Moors, disciplinary shifts to legal anthropology, socio legal studies and women’s and gender studies, and the changing profile of researchers have variously expanded, challenged and nuanced academic understandings of ‘Islamic family law’ in its pre codification applications and social practice, its ‘translation’ by colonial powers and its current meanings and practices. Recognition of the political contingency not only of institutions such as family and law but of scholarship has led to ‘incentives to modesty’ on the part of some researchers in Islamic family law. Scholars critique the assumption that it is ‘Islam’ or ‘Islamic law’ that determines gender relations in specific contexts; they investigate more closely the meaning and nature of the ‘family’. Recognition of differences among women prompts both


8 Buskens, ‘Islamic commentaries’, p. 95.

scholarly and activist assessments of the priorities and impacts of family law reform. At the same time, on the level of public discourse, contemporary scholarship examines the texts of the laws promulgated by states for the choices they make and the story of gender relations that they describe or prescribe, the constituencies whose voices are heard in these choices, the economic and political circumstances of their debate and promulgation and the strategies, alliances and coalitions that develop around advocacy by different social actors, including broadly defined groups of feminists and Islamists. At the end of the twentieth century, where family law (or personal status law) had become the ‘preferential symbol of Muslim identity’, scholars also analysed the rallying of different and opposing constituencies to the cause of proposed changes in statutory law as a central element in civil society mobilisation and in the claiming and contestation of space in an ‘emerging public sphere’. These developments increasingly challenge governmental patterns of reliance on executive power or on other tactical strategies of avoidance to step or outflank opposition to key legislative decisions on family law.

Patterns of consultation, exchange and borrowings in the drafting of Muslim family laws in the Arab Middle East are well established, and were remarked upon in the literature that examined the texts and (in some cases) the application of the first national codes promulgated in the 1950s, which drew on various provisions and jurisprudential arguments from Egyptian laws issued earlier in the century on particular aspects of Muslim family law, as well on the first codification, the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917. National codes increasingly also borrowed from each other, often explicitly. Currently two intergovernmental ‘model texts’ are also available, one drawn up by the League of Arab States and one by the Gulf Co operation Council. Appeal to a (very broad) shared jurisprudential heritage is bolstered by the idea of the standardisation among states of approaches to particular areas of Muslim family law, including the assertion of state authority in imposing administrative and bureaucratic requirements in support of substantive elements of the statutory law. No two codes are the same, however, and official explanations of the laws assert the location of their particular formulations in the ‘national context’ of the particular state. Increasingly, external fora also press for a degree of conformity. In 1976, Anderson noted that international law stood to challenge ‘orthodox Muslim opinion … even though it has, at the present time, little or no relevance in practice’.\(^\text{14}\) Since then, most members of the League of Arab States have become parties to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and even more have signed the later Convention on the Rights of the Child. State reservations to the former, particularly to central undertakings with regard to women’s rights in the family, and their justifications thereof made on grounds of the normative precedence of their formulations of ‘\(\text{\textit{shari\text{'}a}}\)’ in this regard, have become the subject not only of scholarly examination but also of the reports, comments and questions posed by members of the oversight committee at the United Nations, informed by parallel reports from women’s and human rights groups in the particular state and from international organisations.\(^\text{15}\) Successive United Nations world conferences


\(^{15}\) Ann Elizabeth Mayer, ‘Internationalizing the conversation on Arab women’s rights: Arab countries face the CEDAW Committee’, in Haddad and Stowasser (eds.), \textit{Islamic law}, pp. 133-60.
on women have mobilised and facilitated regional and international networking, and impacted both state policy and public discourse.

State undertakings under international human rights law are one focus in advocacy addressing Muslim family law in the region, and here too major investments are made in regional and indeed international exchange, cooperation and strategising, particularly between different women’s rights groups.\(^{16}\) Discourses of equal citizenship rights and responsibilities, arguments on socio-economic change, the reality of women’s lives and the evocation of women’s role in the national struggle also variously feature. Alongside these appeals to women’s rights and state responsibilities are arguments insisting that proposed developments in family legislation, and in the position of women in general, are not antithetical to but rather in fulfilment of the principles of justice and egalitarianism underlying the shari‘a and, concomitantly, that current law and practice denies women the dignity accorded them in the shari‘a and denies the country the benefits of women’s effective participation in development. Particular mechanisms from within the body of fiqh may be proposed for statutory implementation as offering jurisprudentially endorsed strategies for more effective protection. Zakya Daoud describes this ‘double movement’ as simultaneously referring to international norms and to internal change within the normative framework of fiqh based family law.\(^{17}\) Paralleling such activism is what Ebrahim Moosa has called ‘a fury of interpretive activity’ around women’s rights and the source texts of Islamic law.\(^{18}\) Although some argue for a civil family law, whether as a replacement for the existing shari‘a postulate or as an optional regime, most present arguments for reform as within the broad normative framework of shari‘a.

Activist approaches within the broad textual formulation of gender specific rights and duties in the family may thus focus on specific areas of the law, such as child custody, access to divorce and the role of the guardian. In the overall legal script, the financial obligations of the husband (and the man in general) are set against his authority and control within the family. This includes, in most codes, the husband’s right to his wife’s obedience and the father’s duty of

\(^{16}\) For example the ‘One hundred measures and provisions for a Maghrebian egalitarian codification of personal status and family law’ produced by a collective of North African women’s organisations.


exercising guardianship over his children. Certain more recent codifications, as well as court practice, remove or constrain on the legislated duty of obedience, and guardianship prerogatives have in some countries and circumstances been extended to the mother. In theory and in practice, the husband’s financial obligations remain extremely significant, even when the impact of social change and economic exigencies undermine the functioning of the gendered roles as scripted in the laws. When women choose or are obliged to enter the waged labour market and to contribute financially to the household, the premises of the law in most countries mean that this contribution is not recognised as altering other elements of the equation. Nor is there recognition of women’s unwaged labour in the family as contributing to the development of the material wealth of the conjugal unit after marriage. The separate property regime legally protects a woman’s right to her own property, but most of the codes contemplate a husband having the right, depending on circumstance, to prohibit his wife from going out to work.

While codifications increasingly assign women ‘with means’ certain financial responsibilities towards their husband or, more commonly, towards their children and parents, there is no impact on the rules of succession assigning a female half the portion of a male in key degrees of relationship to the deceased, customarily justified on the grounds that the woman ‘is entitled to receive [her portion] without being required to undertake any obligations, unlike the man.’ The tenacity of the legal script of the marital relationship on these points, and ‘the reality of different women’s lives’, mean that activists do not necessarily call for the removal in law of the husband’s primary and normative financial responsibilities. Different studies have shown women’s


21 As explained by Libya in its report to CEDAW 1999, 48. See Hafidha Chekir, Le statut des femmes entre les texts et les résistances: Le cas de la Tunisie (Tunis 2000), p. 145; and Welchman, Beyond the code, p. 212.

reliance on these responsibilities not only for their own sake, but for the way they shape and support strategies of negotiation and protection. In terms of the ‘script’ itself, some argue that the law should not take away from women’s financial rights until it evens up inheritance entitlements and property during marriage. Lama Abu Odeh has suggested that the goal of women’s substantive equality might need the law to continue to require men to maintain while dropping women’s obligation (hitherto presented as reciprocal) to obey.

International networks of rights based women’s groups may afford women’s rights activists in the Arab Middle East solidarity, support mechanisms, funds, profile and a certain space, despite some tensions around a disproportionate Western influence over the priorities and strategies of the international women’s rights movement. Such international connections are however also a focus for opponents of the ‘women’s rights’ discourse. Opposition discourses display various features of the regional pattern of what Kandiyoti has called ‘the privileged place of women and family in discourses about cultural authenticity’. These include the conflation of ‘cultural’ or ‘national’ with a particular articulation of Islamic norms and religious principle. Invocations of biological determinism and appeals to what is presented as a monolithic and homogeneous Arab Muslim heritage may be accompanied by populist representations of class difference and the spectre of family breakdown, growing numbers of unmarried individuals and general moral decline. The fiqh based balance of ‘equivalent’ (rather than ‘equal’) rights in family law is presented as the ideal as well as the normative framework for the protection of women’s rights, with problems attributed to a failure of conscience and an absence of correct, faith based practice. Advocates of international women’s rights may be accused of alienation, of a lack of cultural authenticity and of seeking to undermine the unity and stability of the Muslim family and by extension Muslim society through the importation of Western ideas associated with moral laxity; in some cases charges of apostasy may be implied. References are frequently made to ‘international conferences on women’, and accusations that such activities are supported by ‘foreign funding’ evoke the same set of


images. Opponents of the general human rights discourse stress the empirically selective attitudes on the part of powerful Western states to the universality of the norms they promote. Opponents of the discourse of gender equality situate it, along with the discourses of ‘Western feminism’, within the larger context of colonial and neo colonial agendas, cultural imperialism and hostility to Islam and the Arabs. At the beginning of the twenty first century, this narrative of polarisation and resistance resonated with the use of vast Western military force against majority Muslim states and a declared interest on the part of the Bush administration, chief wielder of this force, in women’s rights in the Middle East.

The privileging of women and the family in this political discourse means that states’ political interests may be served by the invocation of Islam over contested areas of law and policy, while ‘Islamist’ groups may attack the discourse of women’s rights to undermine the credentials of existing regimes. In this context, Western scholarly literature on Muslim personal status law in the Arab world (and beyond) has expanded to include considerations of the dynamics and political implications of the debates around reform, and indeed to consider family law reform as an almost primarily political issue. Other recent publications are specifically aimed at supporting the research, activist and advocacy efforts of groups working internally in different Muslim countries and communities to change paradigms of authority and control within the family and society. 26 In the case of the international network Women Living under Muslim Laws, for example, this is done by evaluating existing provisions by the degree to which they are ‘option giving’ for the greatest number of women under their jurisdiction ‘at the current historical moment’. 27 Website resources abound. In different countries in the region, research and law focused advocacy on the substantive provisions of the code is complemented by outreach and ‘know your rights’ activities, the provision of legal advice and assistance and a focus on procedural issues such as integrated family courts, or particular documentary formats, such as the inclusion in the official marriage contract document of particular stipulations or agreements for the spouses to consider signing up to. 28 Demonstrations and mass petitions

27 Women Living under Muslim Laws, Knowing our rights, p. 21.
feature in campaigns, sometimes met in kind by opponents. In some contexts, criticisms from engaged feminist academics question a perceived concentration of activities in ‘project based’ and professionalised frameworks at the expense of broader social and political movements, reflecting broader areas of reflection on the roles of donor funding and civil society paradigms in the region.\(^\text{29}\)

In an age characterised *inter alia* by globalisation, new media and identity politics, Muslim family law in Arab states is thus a site of intense debate and contestation beyond national and regional borders and across disciplinary boundaries. Text focused compilations and overviews can scarcely keep pace with events.\(^\text{30}\) Legislative developments in Arab states at the turn of the century have included the promulgation in Oman of its first codification of family law in 1997, closely modelled on the GCC text; Yemen’s substantial and traditionalist amendments to its 1992 family law promulgated in 1998 and 1999; and Egypt’s 2000 legislation *inter alia* giving women the option of a no fault divorce. At the end of 2001 the Jordanian government enacted significant amendments to its existing legislation, which the subsequently convened House of Deputies declined to endorse in 2003. Women critical of uncodified family law in Bahrain became embroiled in court cases with members of the *shari‘i* judiciary. The year 2004 opened with the adoption of a new Moroccan code through parliamentary process for the first time, and there was an attempt by members of the Interim Governing Council in occupied Iraq to repeal Iraq’s codified family law in favour of a return to sect based regulation on the basis of traditional references. In 2005, a draft of long awaited amendments to the 1984 Algerian code was promulgated, and a first codification of family law was passed in the UAE, followed by a first Qatari codification in 2006. In 2009, Bahrain issued a first codification for its Sunni community, leaving a draft for the Shi‘i section on hold.


Sharīṭ postulates and statutory law

The official invocation of ‘shari‘a’ as the sole regulatory framework for Muslim personal status law has practical impact beyond the political and ideological debate. Codifications of Muslim family law nearly always direct the courts to the wider referential framework of fiqh in the event of a specific subject not being covered in the text. This comes in a variety of formulations, which themselves may indicate either legislative (and political) history or aspiration, ranging from the dominant opinion of a particular school, to a broader reference to ‘those principles of the Islamic shari‘a most appropriate to the provisions of the law’. These texts mandate the courts’ approach to the specific text as part of a broader rule and value system both in filling in the gaps in the codified law, and in interpreting specific provisions. The absence of any such provision in the 1956 Tunisian law did not prevent the courts drawing on sharī‘i postulates in their approach to the code’s silence on the validity or otherwise of, first, the marriage of a Muslim woman to a non Muslim man, and, secondly, of a polygynous marriage concluded in violation of the code’s innovative prohibition (and criminalisation) of polygyny. Accordingly, the courts held the first to be invalid, a position subsequently endorsed in 1973 by ministerial regulation but challenged by contemporary scholars arguing for the application of civil law principles and international law undertakings.31 On the second, the government used statutory amendments in 1964 to direct that polygynous marriages were not only unlawful but invalid. The previous year, Iraq had taken the opposite course, retreating from an unusual and for many controversial position in its original 1959 law which had held polygynous marriages concluded in contravention of the statutory constraints to be invalid. The normative system invoked as the basis and residual source for the statutory text thus poses its own challenges to and constraints upon a state legislature; jurisprudential disquiet (and political challenge) may be provoked by suggestions that a state may ‘prohibit what God has allowed’ and at the prospect of a state denying legal status and rights protection to those married in unions disallowed in statutory law but recognised in the sharī‘i consensus.

A central area where the bureaucratising and centralising tendencies of state authorities comes up against sharī‘i postulates is the matter of registration requirements and the status of acts of marriage and divorce undertaken in

accordance with traditional law but without complying with statutory rules in this regard. Official registration serves a number of purposes, including information on and a degree of control over the ‘private’ affairs of citizens, but also the potential for ensuring that other laws issued by the central authority are being upheld: the enforcement, for example, of rules on the minimum age of marriage, consent of the parties, judicial oversight of the conditions related to polygyny and a woman’s rights on divorce. Registration also serves protective purposes for parties to a marriage particularly women and court records in different countries show evidence of practices of registration at court among different sectors and at different times prior to the modern period. With codifications of family law by independent states came mandatory registration procedures, sometimes replacing those instituted by colonial era powers; and overviews of Islamic family law have included registration requirements as among key reform indicators. Nevertheless, the traditional jurisprudential consensus required no form of registration of marriage or divorce for these acts to be valid ‘according to the *shari‘a*. Holding a marriage or divorce invalid because registration procedures were not observed is, in this paradigm, asserting the laws of the state over those of the *shari‘a* in the regulation (and recognition) of ‘private affairs’ (including lawful sexual relations). Imposing administrative procedures as a state legal requirement may also challenge social perceptions of legitimacy, whether or not social practice would be found by the courts to be in accordance with *shari‘i* concepts of validity; but it is social practice that is the declared target of the reforms imposed by the law through the institution of administrative procedures.

Different approaches have thus been taken to encourage registration and to deal with the issue of unregistered marriages, including those that also violate other provisions of state law such as the rules on minimum age. These may include the imposition of penal sanctions for non compliance with the administrative regulations on marriage, the waiving of fees for the required court procedures and the establishment of the official document of marriage as the standard form of proof to establish marriage, with various formulations allowing for establishment of a marriage by a ruling of court in the event that the statutory administrative procedures have not been complied with but the marriage fulfils the *shari‘i* requirements of validity. A further step is taken when the state identifies the official marriage document as the only form of proof by which marriage may be established in court, whether in general (as in

32 White, ‘Legal reform’.
Tunisia) or in particular circumstances. Since a court can deal with claims arising from the marriage only when the marriage can be legally established, the effect is to deny access to judicial remedy sought by parties to a marriage that is not officially registered, regardless of whether its constituent elements comply with the *shar'i* requirements of validity. While those seeking stronger protection of women’s rights in marriage are generally supportive of registration requirements and the consequent judicial scrutiny, concerns arise at the potential lack of judicial remedy for the parties involved, particularly for the wife, who is most likely to need recourse to the court to claim her rights and, assuming she is aware of the law’s requirements, may not be in a position to insist upon their implementation, depending on the particular national context and social practice. In Egypt, the impact of this approach on women involved in ‘*urfî* (customary, unregistered) marriages prompted, in the law of 2000, an amendment to the previous position, which since 1931 had been that the courts would not hear any claims arising from a disputed marriage contract if it was not established by official document. The new law provided that the courts could, in such circumstances, hear petitions for judicial divorce or dissolution, to the exclusion of any other claim. Those objecting to the provision argued that it ‘legitimised’ ‘*urfî* marriage and risked encouraging the practice by providing a way out. Viewed by some observers as a concession by the official legal system to unofficial practice, it is presented by supporters and by the authorities as providing a remedy for women affected by the injury of this situation, enabling them at least to divorce and marry again if they choose.

Away from the statute, judges use the broader normative framework to reinstitute or preserve rules protective of women’s rights and choices as framed by *shar'i* postulates and as articulated in *fiqh*. Thus, when the 1992 Yemeni law invalidated a guardian’s marriage of his male or female wards before the age of fifteen it also removed the reference that had previously existed in the Yemen Arab Republic’s law to the right of a female married as a minor to choose to have the marriage dissolved on reaching puberty. Since the 1992 law provided no enforcement measures for the provision on the minimum age of marriage, Wurth notes that judges relied on the residual reference of ‘the strongest proofs in the Islamic *shari'a*’ to continue to allow the

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33 See Women Living under Muslim Laws, *Knowing our rights*, p. 140.
34 Essam Fawzi, ‘*Muslim personal status law in Egypt: The current situation and possibilities of reform through internal initiatives*’, in Lynn Welchman (ed.), *Women’s rights and Islamic family law: Perspectives on reform* (London, 2004), p. 72.
dissolution of marriages on the achievement of puberty. The rules of traditional law thus explicitly supplemented the statute law when the state failed to follow through on its own legislation against coercion and early marriage. As well as filling in the gaps, shari‘i postulates lie behind protective interpretations of particular statutory provisions, for example establishing procedural precedent that advances the principle codified in the law. Thus judges in Jordan established the principle that any unilateral ṭalāq was to be presumed arbitrary and hence to give rise to the ex wife’s right to compensation, with the burden of proof placed squarely upon the divorcing husband. This approach was clearly driven by the courts’ fiqh based disapproval of unilateral ṭalāq, even while upholding its validity.

On the other hand, judicial interpretation can frustrate the apparent intentions of the legislator. In particular, certain legislative provisions may provoke particular resistance to overt unsettling of the gender based rights balance of the shari‘i framework. Chamari for example notes the problems encountered by women in accessing their right to compensation on injurious divorce under the original terms of the Tunisian law. Judges applying the Jordanian rules on stipulations in marriage contracts, notably those where the wife seeks to secure for herself the unconditional option of divorce, took a rather narrowly literal approach to the phrasing of these stipulations that denied legal effect to those not sufficiently expertly drafted. In Egypt, Chemais found a majority of judges whom she interviewed to be explicitly opposed to the controversial provision in the 1979 law establishing a husband’s polygynous marriage without his wife’s consent as in and of itself an act of injury on the grounds of which she might obtain a judicial divorce, and reported that one judge claimed that he was deferring all such cases that reached him because of his refusal to implement this part of the law.

The latter case illustrates the tensions that can arise between the political authorities of a state taking upon themselves the task of legislating on the family, and the judges charged with applying it. The argument that certain reforms are illegitimate under the wider framework of ‘traditional’ shari‘a is also voiced by political opponents. In some cases, the state may consciously choose to leave certain matters to be decided by the courts rather than take a political risk through legislation; in others it may endorse or overturn judicial

36 Welchman, Beyond the code, pp. 340 1.
practice through subsequent statutory amendment. The more general approach to judicial discretion depends upon a variety of factors in the particular state, but among the features of campaigns by those seeking further protection of women’s rights in the family are proposals for increasingly detailed legislation; if rights are to be protected by the submission of various acts to judicial scrutiny, some argue that judicial discretion must be increasingly directed from the legislature in order to secure the intended impact of the desired legislative changes.

Illustrative of this latter approach is the intention of the Moroccan legislators, as announced by the king, to invest substantially in training and equipping the family judges to apply the new law, in which their role is increased, including the production of a detailed manual or handbook for their guidance in this task. By contrast, a draft Palestinian law prepared by the chief Islamic justice and head of the shari’a court system proposes considerable and specific space for the judge’s discretion in provisions that elsewhere are more centrally directed. Also in contrast, and more unusual, is the above mentioned attempt in Iraq to dispense with the existing framework of codified family law, in a debate that was revived in 2005 as the newly elected assembly engaged the process of constitution drafting. This debate, while directly produced by the current political situation, has its roots in historical criticism on the part particularly of Shi‘i scholars to the unified code of Muslim personal status law of 1959, criticism reviewed by Chibli Mallat in 1990 as ‘a blueprint of a world debate to come’.

The following pages illustrate some of the foregoing themes through a consideration of recent legislative developments in Jordan on the age of marriage, in Morocco on polygyny and in Egypt on divorce.

Jordan and the age of marriage

Limiting the practice of early marriage, particularly of girls, has long been a concern of social reformers, the feminist movement and women’s rights activists in the region as elsewhere, and is given weight in the international instruments and in its treatment as a developmental indicator. The setting of minimum ages of marriage has been a feature of family law codifications since the earliest legislative interventions, and the tendency since then has been for

an increase in the age of full capacity. Reformers focus on the physical and mental health risks of early marriage to very young women and girls and issues of their consent to the marriage, as well as the loss or at least substantial limitation of their opportunities for education and work outside family labour – a focus which for some indicated a class based prioritisation of this issue in the early days of advocacy for legislative reform, while finding more resonance now with the institution of compulsory terms of education. Reference is often made to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in advocacy that tends to argue for the setting of the age of legal majority as the minimum age for marriage, and for the informed scrutiny of the court for any exceptions to act to constrain abuse of power by the marriage guardian in marrying off an underage but sexually mature female ward. Concerns remain over the exercise of this authority by the guardian where the law permits the exercise of judicial discretion on applications for marriage below the statutory age of capacity; thus, while supporting the option for girls under eighteen to marry if they wish to do so, the network Women Living under Muslim Laws notes that ‘activists in systems with such provisions note that they can merely serve as loopholes for the continuation of early and forced marriage’.42

In Jordan, the political debate over the 2001 amendments to the 1976 law of personal status involved not only differing political and social agendas but also issues of procedure, with the appointed upper house of parliament approving the amendments and the elected lower house rejecting the law, which had been promulgated as ‘temporary legislation’ by royal decree based on cabinet decision following the dismissal of the elected legislature in advance of what turned out to be much delayed elections. Much of the opposition to the amendments focused on the introduction of a woman’s option for divorce by judicial *khulʿ* along the lines of the Egyptian model discussed below. However, changes were also made to the age of marriage, raising the statutory minimum age from fifteen for the female and sixteen for the male (by the lunar calendar) to the age of legal majority under the civil code, at eighteen solar years for both, a target set in the advocacy of various civil society groups in Jordan. The judge was empowered to permit exceptionally the marriage of males and females aged fifteen or above provided that such a marriage realised an ‘interest’ or a ‘benefit’ (*maṣlaḥa*) as to be defined by the *Qāḍī al Qudāh*. The chief Islamic justice subsequently issued the necessary directive setting out the

41 See on this and on the ‘limits of legal reform’ Badran, Feminists, pp. 126 8; and Shaham, *Family*, p. 58; Wurth, ‘Stalled reform’, p. 29.
bases on which a judge might permit such a marriage, which included attention to matters of choice and consent of the fiancée, and that the marriage ‘prevents an existing cause of corruption’ or ‘avoids the loss of an established benefit’.\textsuperscript{43} Besides establishing eighteen as the age of capacity, the amendment thus responded to interventions that had demanded the reinstitution of the role of the judge in scrutinising early marriages, a role that had been removed from Jordan’s first (1951) family law by the 1976 text.

The government appointed Royal Commission for Human Rights, which had been involved in the drafting process along with the Office of the Qādī al Quḍāh, released the text prior to promulgation to mixed reactions; some women’s activists and specialist lawyers were reported as complaining that there had been insufficient consultation with a wider section of the public.\textsuperscript{44} Complaints at perceived encroachment on the authority of the ‘ulamā’ on these matters came inter alia from constituencies opposed to the substance of the amendments. The print media gave substantial space to discussions on the rise in the age of capacity for marriage. In one feature, a sociologist and an educationalist (both men) supported the amendment on grounds inter alia of the negative impact of early marriage (particularly for females) on personal health and family relations, the opportunity for greater educational and productive capacities with a later age of marriage and the idea that changing times and socio economic circumstances fully justified this change in the law.\textsuperscript{45} In the same piece, two male lecturers in fiqh objected on the grounds inter alia that marriage is a right of females and males after puberty, that one of the aims of the amendment was to reduce the birth rate (‘especially in Arab states’) and that the current problems concerned delays in marriage rather than early marriage, given rising numbers of unmarried males and females in Jordan of all ages. One also warned against leaving such matters ‘in the hands of committees concerned only with human rights and child rights’ to the exclusion of adequate fiqh expertise. Elsewhere, another shāri‘a academic insisted that the incidence of early marriage was very low, that there was no need ‘for this big media fuss’ and that behind the ‘pressures on Islamic states’ to raise the age of marriage lay ‘the tendencies of world conferences on women to facilitate the prohibited (ḥarām) among adolescents’ in ‘suspect calls for the corruption of Islamic society’.\textsuperscript{46} One shārī‘ judge justified the amendment with fiqh arguments (including constraining the permitted in

\textsuperscript{44} Al Shahid, 21 November 2001.
\textsuperscript{45} Al Dastūr, 13 December 2001.
\textsuperscript{46} Al Dastūr, 23 December 2001.

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order to realise a benefit) and in light of social, cultural and economic changes including the longer period of compulsory education. Another was more circumspect, warning that ‘Jordan isn’t just Amman’, that outside the cities marriage tended to take place below the age of eighteen, that the measure might be ‘shutting in front of them the door of the permitted and opening the door of the prohibited’ and that he expected the exception (of permitting marriage below eighteen) to become the rule. Women’s rights and social activists were more supportive, some stressing the risks of early marriage particularly to girls, others the need for judges to be careful in their use of discretion to permit a marriage below eighteen.

After the elections, the legislature began to consider the large number of temporary laws issued by the government in the absence of a sitting parliament. In the first stage of the process in 2003, the House of Deputies declined to turn over to its legal committee the personal status law amendments and also amendments to the Penal Code that had been the subject of substantial interest by women’s groups. The pro government Jordanian press referred to an ‘undeclared alliance between deputies of the Islamist movement and the “conservative” tribal deputies’ and some three hundred women were reported to have fasted outside the parliament building in protest at the rejection of the two laws. The following summer, after the law had been approved by the House of Senators, the lower house rejected the law again, despite reports that women’s rights groups were expecting a positive vote and that deputies who had previously voted against the temporary law had ‘changed their minds after meeting with women’s groups and listening to their point of view’. The margin was just five votes, with those voting against described in the English language daily as ‘mostly Islamist, conservative and tribal deputies’. Although the substantive objections raised in the debate were similar to those presented for its rejection the summer before, there were also institutional issues at stake for some deputies who objected to opposition displayed to the decisions of the House of Deputies by the appointed House of Senators.

47 Al Ra’y, 13 October 2001.
49 Al Ra’y, 20 December 2001.
50 Al Ra’y, 4 August 2003.
54 Jordan Times, 29 June 2004; Al Ra’y, 6 September 2003.
Beyond and indeed preceding any tension between the lower and upper houses in their consideration of the temporary law, supporters of the aims of the laws had articulated a preference for the presentation of such amendments through ordinary legislative procedures in democratic process, evoking a certain resonance with the dilemma of women’s rights activists in Egypt when President Sadat promulgated the 1979 law by presidential decree.\textsuperscript{55} As for the substance, in 2006 a local human rights group launched a media campaign against early marriage, having found that the exception clause was being widely exploited.

Morocco and polygyny

The institution of polygyny is in many ways one of the ‘totems’ of the Islamic family law debate. Targeted by early reformists and modernists in the Arab world and elsewhere, including by the early feminist movement, as anachronistic and almost the antithesis of ‘modernity’, it was also pointed up by colonial and imperial powers in discourses of hostility and ‘othering’ of colonised nations. It now falls foul of the human rights norm of non-discrimination and continues to be a target for women’s rights activists in the region and beyond. On the ideological level, it is a prominent site of ‘difference’ between what are presented as the ‘values of the West’ and the text based principles of Islamic family law, and developments on the classical rules are vulnerable to attack as encroachments by the legislature on the morality and structure of the Muslim family and hence society, and on the shari‘a itself, at the behest of powerful Western players.

Tunisia is still pointed to by many women’s rights activists as the example of what a determined legislator can do, for its prohibition of polygyny in the 1956 law. In other Arab states, legislative approaches aimed at constraining and regulating polygyny have involved on the one hand a combination of judicial scrutiny and bureaucratic procedure prior to the conclusion of a polygynous union, an approach which revolves around the institution of registration procedures and requires the court’s consent under specified conditions to the conclusion of a polygynous marriage, with penalties prescribed for those marrying in violations of these regulations. On the other is the issue of remedy, the explicit acknowledgement in law that a woman may be injured by her husband’s taking another wife, and that she may have cause to seek dissolution of her marriage accordingly. Most states also allow a wife to retain

\textsuperscript{55} See Hatem, ‘Economic and political liberalisation’, pp. 231 51.
a remedy or a deterrent against polygyny by the insertion of a stipulation in her marriage contract entitling her to seek divorce if the husband takes another wife. While specific features of these approaches appear in different codes, certain of them remain less established and more vulnerable to challenge. This is the case for example with regard to the assumption of injury arising from a polygynous marriage.56

In Morocco, a combination of these constraining elements and the significant increase in bureaucratic procedures in the 2004 law is described by its drafters and supporters as rendering polygyny ‘almost impossible’. In an overview of his intent, King Muḥammad VI underlined the constraint of polygyny as in accordance with the intentions and justice of Islam, and the ‘distinctive wisdom of Islam’, in allowing a man to marry another wife ‘in a lawful manner by reason of urgent and pressing need, and with the consent of the judge, rather than resorting to unlawful de facto polygyny in the event of the total prohibition of polygyny’.57 In his examination of the political dynamics of the debate on family law reform from the early 1990s, Buskens describes the discourses of increasingly polarised constituencies ultimately necessitating and validating the hands on intervention of the monarch as Commander of the Faithful, amīr al mu’minīn.58

The Moroccan law introduces as preconditions for the court’s consent to a polygynous union two elements already included in the legislation of different states in the region: the husband’s financial ability to provide for a new wife in addition to his existing wife and family, and, less frequently, the existence of what is termed a ‘lawful benefit’ from the polygynous union, or in the Moroccan phrasing ‘an exceptional, objective justification’. The terms of a ‘lawful benefit’ are not generally defined in the laws, but those most generally regarded are the infertility of the existing wife or her incurable chronic or contagious illness particularly preventing her from maintaining sexual relations with her husband; in these cases commentators argue that polygyny may be a preferable course to the husband divorcing his wife in order to remarry.59

56 A provision in the subsequently abrogated 1979 Egyptian law establishing a polygynous marriage without the consent of the existing wife as per se constituting injury and therefore grounds for divorce (rather than such injury having to be established) was among the rules modified in the replacement 1985 legislation after particularly vigorous opposition. See Fawzi Najjar, ‘Egypt’s laws of personal status’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 10 (1988), pp. 328 31; and Amina Chemais, ‘Obstacles to divorce for Muslim women in Egypt’, in Hoodfar (ed.), Shifting boundaries, pp. 120 41.
57 Benyahya (ed.), Al Mudawwana, p. 38.
58 Buskens, ‘Recent debates’.
59 See for example Muhammad Abu Zahra, Al Aḥwāl al shakhsīya (Cairo, 1997), pp. 104 5.
A more general and permissive argument for polygyny presents as an ‘unfortunate fact’ the inability of many men to be satisfied with a single sexual partner, with the ensuing risk, were polygyny to be prohibited, of the proliferation of unlawful extra marital unions which would be not only in violation of the shari‘a, but would leave unprotected the rights of the female partner and ensuing offspring. Although the concern to contain sexual activity within the lawful framework of marriage underlies most defences of polygyny, the wider argument appears to be less readily acceptable in some contemporary official discourse; in the parliamentary debate in Morocco in 2004, an Islamist deputy was reported as arguing that ‘there are men who, for physical reasons, cannot satisfy themselves with only one wife’, and the religious affairs minister as responding that ‘in that case, they should seek treatment’. 60

In its original law of 1957, Morocco had provided that a woman could not be contracted in a polygynous union until she had been informed that the man was already married; in 1993 it added the requirement that the existing wife was to be informed that her husband was intending to marry again. The thrust of such notification requirements includes the constraints on a man’s action that may be mobilised beyond the court and the formal law through the expedient of administrative measures presented as protecting the rights of women against injury without encroaching substantively on the husband’s decision. Similar measures have been legislated in different countries of the region, and where there is opposition, it tends to focus on the requirement of informing the existing wife of her husband’s polygynous marriage or of greater potential of his intention to marry.

The issue of notification is connected to consent; the informed consent of a woman to enter a polygynous marriage, and, albeit informally, the consent of the existing wife to a subsequent marriage by her husband. In general, states have hesitated to condition statutorily the action of a husband upon the decision of his wife, preferring to focus on the wife’s options to leave her marriage in such circumstances. A common approach has been to allow the insertion of a stipulation in the marriage contract against the husband marrying polygynously, allowing the existing wife the option of petitioning for divorce in the event that he does. Morocco’s new law however takes this further, disallowing a subsequent marriage if there is a stipulation against polygyny, thus acting on an expressed lack of consent to prevent the conclusion in law of a polygynous marriage; in effect this would oblige the husband to choose

between remaining in his current marriage and concluding a new one, rather than obliging the wife to choose between leaving her current marriage or remaining in it with a co-wife. Women’s groups in Morocco as elsewhere had proposed that the possibility of this and other protective stipulations be included in the marriage contract form, but this was not taken up. On the other hand, in the event that there is no such stipulation, the 2004 law also focuses implicitly on the lack of consent; if the wife insists on a divorce during the hearing of the husband’s petition for permission to conclude a polygynous marriage, the court is to rule for divorce upon the husband’s deposit of a sum covering all her outstanding financial entitlements (including dower, maintenance and compensation) with failure by the husband to make such deposit within a tight deadline considered to constitute a withdrawal of his petition for permission. While protecting the right of the existing wife to opt for a divorce in these circumstances, the law clearly intends the procedural requirements and substantial financial burdens thus placed on the husband as deterrent measures. Practice will show whether this intended impact is realised, and whether it is accompanied by other, unintended effects.

Across the region, women’s right activists continue to seek either the absolute prohibition of polygyny, on the Tunisian model, or its significant constraint through judicial control. Rights based activist strategies towards polygyny may depend upon an assessment of feasible advocacy goals in the particular country, both in general and at different points in the legislative process, as well as on different ideological positions. While some approaches prompt a position on abolition, others argue for an incremental restrictive approach encouraging the social and economic decline of the institution. The summary of the discussion of the subject in Women Living under Muslim Laws indicates some of the complexities in the debate, while concluding that ‘even while it may be strategically option giving for women in particular circumstances, overall polygyny reflects gender inequalities in society and therefore ultimately cannot be considered option giving’.

Egypt and divorce

In legislating on the area of divorce, most codifications in the region have drawn heavily on Egyptian laws from the 1920s, as well as the preceding

62 Women Living under Muslim Laws, Knowing our rights, p. 24.
Ottoman Law of Family Rights. These early laws addressed divorce law by way of two main approaches: first, constraining the impact of the man’s pronouncement of unilateral ṭalāq (divorce by ‘repudiation’ as it is commonly translated in English) in certain physical and psychological circumstances, which mostly go to undermining the presumption of intention on the part of the husband; and secondly, specifying and expanding the grounds on which the wife could seek judicial divorce, largely through the specification of circumstances that would be considered to cause harm or injury under the existing description of the husband’s obligations. For the most part, only minor statutory adjustments were made to the regulation of the common practice of consensual divorce, where the ṭalāq is pronounced by the husband as part of an agreement which in standard form involves a renunciation of the wife’s remaining financial rights, but may also take the form of a khul involving repayment of received rights (notably dower) and possibly a further financial consideration in exchange for the divorce.

The overall script of the marital relationship thus places unilateral divorce in the hand of the husband, notwithstanding social and jurisprudential disapproval of his exercise of this power, while allowing the wife to access divorce either through securing her husband’s consent or through establishing to the court that he is at fault through falling short in some aspect of his obligations towards her. Women seeking divorce may submit their petition on the grounds most likely to achieve the aim of dissolution, and these may change accordingly to place, time and court practice. In other cases, women seek to persuade their husbands to agree to a divorce, negotiating away some if not all of their remaining rights in exchange for the divorce, without the intervention of the court. In Egypt, support for a new approach to divorce law reform drew, inter alia, on the stories of women being forced into giving up their financial rights in exchange for such a divorce, after spending years and money they could not afford in the courts petitioning for a judicial divorce on grounds contemplated in the law. The inability (or failure) of the judicial system to provide prompt and equitable resolution of women’s divorce applications was cited as a major factor when in 2000 the Egyptian legislature responded to lobbying by women’s rights activists by introducing the option

63 Tunisia’s law is unusual in the region in allowing either spouse to insist on a ‘no fault’ divorce.
of a judicial *khul* as part of a set of procedural measures aimed at integrating and speeding up the progress of claims through the courts.\(^{65}\)

Under the rules on judicial *khul*, where a woman’s husband refuses to consent to a divorce by mutual agreement, she may ask the court to rule for the divorce instead; she has to make certain formal statements as to the impossibility of the marriage continuing, and to return the dower that she has received as well as waiving remaining financial rights. This provision was hotly debated in public, press and parliament, and the law as a whole was dubbed ‘the law of *khul*’ as a result of the attention to and controversy over this one provision. Those in support of the law emphasised its provenance from within the Islamic tradition and the urgent need to speed up court procedures to reduce women’s suffering. Official discourse made textual arguments in support of the provision, and placed the provision as a whole within the jurisprudential framework of removing injury; thus a draft explanatory memorandum to the law argued that the husband has injury removed from him by the fact that ‘he may retrieve what he has paid and have raised from his shoulders the burden of paying any of the *shari’i* financial rights of the wife thereafter’. As for the wife, ‘this makes his holding on to the wife after she has decided to divorce him by *khul* an injury to her, and the *shari’i* rule is that there shall be no injury and no counter injury (*la ḏarar wa la ḏarar*). The argument here seeks to underpin the legitimacy of judicial *khul* with the accepted principle of judicial divorce for injury already established in Egyptian law.

The international press took an interest in the law; the *New York Times* greeted the entering into force of the new law with the headline ‘Egypt’s Women Win Equal Rights to Divorce’.\(^{66}\) Domestically, however, and despite the major contribution made by elements of the Egyptian women’s movement, Tadrus found official discourse keen to avoid association with those working within the international rights and equality framework; the dominant voices speaking in support appealed rather to concepts of the stability and security of the family. Similarly she found little use made of the discourses of citizenship or constitutional rights.\(^{67}\) Those who were opposed to the provision similarly argued from the *fiqh* texts and sources, to the effect that removing the need for the husband’s consent to a *khul* was a direct violation of the rules of the *shari’a*. It was argued that all the Sunni schools had required

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the husband’s agreement to a *khul* divorce; that giving the court the power to override his refusal to agree effectively removed the husband’s *qiwāma* (in this context, ‘authority’) over his wife; that it was ‘throwing a time bomb into the Muslim household for the wife to set off at any moment’; and that the provision might serve ‘daughters of the wealthy’ but would do nothing for ‘daughters of the poor’. In an analysis of the treatment of the *khul* provision in the press, Tadrus identifies a range of other arguments made by critics, including that this was an attempt to ‘make the Egyptian family a carbon copy of the Western family’; that it did not address the real problems in society, which were economic rather than related to personal status law; that women were governed by their emotions and were liable to make rash decisions on divorce; that the law would destroy the Egyptian family, lead to huge increases in the number of divorce cases and ‘compound the problem of spinsterhood’. She further notes references to ‘external forces imposing the bill’, links drawn with the programmes of, for example, the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women, and the idea of the law as ‘the fruit of the alliance between Western women’s movements and the Egyptian women’s movement’.

The title of an article by Oussama Arabi, one of several scholarly considerations of the law and what it represents, indicates some of the significance perceived by commentators from different disciplines and perspectives: ‘The dawning of the third millennium on *shari’a*: Egypt’s law no.1 of 2000, or Women may divorce at will.’ Domestically, the idea of ‘women divorcing at will’ provoked (or was used to provoke) substantial opposition to the new law: a major rewriting of the script of marital relations was perceived in the prospect that women could divorce their husbands without having to prove grounds, indeed with no ‘fault’ on the part of the husband, and against his will. Just as under the rules on *talāq* a man can unilaterally divorce his wife for no reason on her part and against her will, paying her deferred dower and financial compensation as required by Egyptian law, so the deal presented by the *khul* provision at its most basic requires the wife to pay ‘compensation’ to her husband in the event of her exercising this option. It is in this sense that the Egyptian National Council for Women later that year, responding to questions from the UN’s CEDAW Committee, presented judicial *khul* as ‘women’s equal right to

68 Fawzi, ‘*Muslim personal status law*’, pp. 58 73.
69 Tadrus, ‘*Qānūn al khul*’, pp. 89 95.
70 Oussama Arabi, ‘The dawning of the third millennium on *shari’a*: Egypt’s law no. 1 of 2000, or Women may divorce at will’, *Arab Law Quarterly*, 16, 1 (2001), pp. 2 21.
divorce for incompatibility without need to prove damage’. 

71 For supporters, the attraction of the idea of judicial *khul* \(^*\) lies not only in the anticipated brevity and non intrusiveness of the procedure, but in the prospect of women being able to insist unilaterally on a divorce where they cannot establish judicial grounds under the available law and practice. While the provision is regarded as a substantial gain by many elements in the women’s movement, critics sympathetic with the aims of the law remain nevertheless concerned that poor women have considerably less than ‘equal access’ to divorce under this rule, particularly given the requirement not only to waive remaining rights (which commentators pointed out is a common out of court divorce practice) but to pay back the cash sum of the received prompt dower; there was also criticism of the early stages of implementation of the new rules.

Domestic attention to the law has, as noted above, been matched by considerable regional and indeed international interest. The international angle is shown not only in presentations of the law abroad as equalising women’s access to divorce, but by the attention paid to it by the international media and human rights organisations. In Jordan, the government followed Egypt’s lead in substance, if not in process, including a similar provision for judicial *khul* \(^*\) in the 2001 amendments. The debates in the press showed similar lines being drawn as in Egypt and considerable take up of the option was reported in the period immediately following promulgation of the law. In Egypt itself, a legal challenge to the constitutionality of the provision on judicial *khul* \(^*\) was promptly instituted on the grounds, *inter alia*, that it was ‘in contradiction with the rulings of the Islamic *shari’a* which stipulate the husband’s consent to the *khul* \(^*\)’, and that therefore it was in violation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution which, as amended in 1980, provides that ‘the principles of the Islamic *shari’a* are the principal source of legislation’. At the end of 2002 the Supreme Constitutional Court dismissed the petition in line with jurisprudence established on previous challenges to the substance of personal status law amendments legislated in Egypt.

Concluding comment

In the courts as well as the legislatures, in the media and in meeting halls, Muslim personal status laws are variously debated and contested in different

Arab states. Differing and changing conceptions of ‘the family’ notwithstanding, the heterosexual conjugal unit addressed by the codifications generally remains the lawful framework for sexual relations, and most states (apart from Tunisia) continue to disallow affiliiative legal adoption, although some laws regulate the established institution of kafala to formalise and regulate co-operators of care. Proposals for a rescripting of the legal texts on the Muslim family on points such as these tend to be made on the bases of international norms rather than from within the dominant framework of shari’a postulates. More generally, however, the invocation of shari’a by state legislatures in relation to Muslim family law is contested within a political context by actors both opposing and proposing particular representations of shari’a in the codes, in a ‘relationship with the norm’ that may seem to fit Dupret’s description as ‘highly strategic in nature’.

In the Western academy, as among some fiqh scholars, there is criticism of a lack of jurisprudential coherence in the family codifications as compared with the uncodified fiqh heritage invoked as their basis; different criticisms address the rhetoric that purposefully obscures the political authority and choices central to the formulation of the codes and the regulation of the family and the position of women within it. These choices are highly significant in the options and remedies available to women within the family and at court, and despite reservations about the limits of state law as an instrument of social change, many women’s rights activists invest considerable effort in law focused advocacy and in the wider debate that looks set to continue.

Introduction

Iranian culture and society were profoundly affected by the mass revolution of 1978-9. The victory of the revolution in February 1979 was possible as the result of an ultimately incompatible coalition of forces, ranging from various leftist and communist parties, through the liberal democrats of the National Front, the Islamic democrats of the Iran Liberation Movement, to the clerical and non clerical followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In the demonstrations of 1978 and to a degree even before, non clerical forces increasingly allied with the charismatic Khomeini, who was the only person with mass popularity. Only the religious forces had had a venue in mosques and religious gatherings to voice anti regime language, often in the coded form of references to the oppressors and killers of the third Shi'i imam, Ḥusayn. The mythical elaboration and re enactment of Ḥusayn’s martyrdom at Karbalā’, Iraq, at the hands of the Umayyad caliph Yazid, which in peaceful times was used to assure Ḥusayn’s intercession for believers, became the cultural expression and rallying cry for revolutionary action against the shah’s tyranny.  

1 Recent works on contemporary Iran include Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and power in the Islamic Republic (New York, 2006); Barbara Slavin, Bitter friends, Bosom enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the twisted path to confrontation (New York, 2007); Trita Parsi, Treacherous alliance: The secret dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. (New Haven, 2007); Scott Ritter, Target Iran: The truth about the White House’s plans for regime change (New York, 2006); Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and results of revolution, new edn (New Haven, 2006), and Nikki R. Keddie, Women in the Middle East: Past and present (Princeton, 2007); William O. Beeman, The Great Satan vs. the mad mullahs: How the United States and Iran demonize each other (Chicago, 2008). There are also many other books, articles and websites with information, including the Gulf 2000 site on Iran, http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/iran.shtml.

Secularists' and democrats' acceptance of Khomeini's leadership was facilitated by the young leaders who spoke in his name in 1978 Abu’l Hasan Banī Ṣadr, Ṣādiq Quṭbzāda and Ibrāhīm Yazdī all of whom presented the cultural political synthesis elaborated in the 1970s of a modernised, anti-imperialist version of Islam. Khomeini’s own chief writing on government, published on the basis of his lectures in his Iraq exile Hukūmat i Islāmī, or Wilâyat i Faqīh, was not at all circulated during the revolution, but began to be presented as a blueprint soon after. In it Khomeini advocated rule by a leading cleric, but during the revolution he spoke in less absolutist and more constitutional terms. The grounds for accord among the different parties in the revolution were a widespread revulsion against dictatorship and a general belief that the shah was subservient to the United States, and perhaps Great Britain and Israel. All parties could agree on a desire for a less autocratic and far more internationally independent government. This agreement masked basic differences that appeared after the victory of the revolution.

Circumstances prior to the revolution favoured the rapid rise of religious politics in the later 1970s. Not only the repression of secular opposition, but also the takeover of nationalist and secular themes and policies by the shah and his entourage encouraged the expression of opposition in Shi‘ī religious terms. Politically oriented Shi‘īs were, however, divided, chiefly into followers of Khomeini’s reinterpretation of Shi‘ism as a doctrine of rule by a faqīh (leading Shi‘ī jurist), followers of a more democratic view of Shi‘ism proposed by men like Ayatollah Maḥmūd Ṭaliqānī and the engineer Mihdi Bāzargān, more leftist followers of the popular ideologue ‘Alī Shari‘atī, who died in 1978, and far leftist adherents of the Mujāhidīn i Khalq organisation.3

Many women joined the anti shah movement and the demonstrations that culminated in the shah’s overthrow. Some did this as activists in one of the revolutionary or reformist political groups, but during the 1978 9 demonstrations Khomeini and his lieutenants appealed to women to participate, and unorganised popular class women came out in large numbers. Some secularised middle class women even adopted chadurs to protest against the shah, and the Mujāhidīn i Khalq women wore a smock and distinctive headcover. The symbolism of women’s dress continues to be central, especially to the ruling Islamists.

Some see it as paradoxical that Iran, which had no longstanding Islamist organisation like the Muslim Brotherhood, active in several Arab countries, should have been the one country to have a successful ‘Islamic’ revolution. This paradox can largely be explained by the role of the Iranian Shi‘ī clergy, which was not paralleled elsewhere. Over several centuries the Shi‘ī clergy built up a kind of hierarchy independent of government unknown among the Sunnī ‘ulamā’. Twelver Shi‘īs believe in twelve imams, or infallible leaders, the last of whom is hidden and will reappear in the future as the Mahdī, or messiah. In his absence, Shi‘īs came to believe that the most educated clerics with the greatest following, called mujtahids or, recently, ayatollahs, are qualified to interpret his will. The followers of a particular mujtahid must follow his rulings. This power of interpretation, or ījtiḥād, came to be used for political purposes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Rulings by leading mujtahids were crucial in enlisting support for a successful movement against a British tobacco concession in 1891 and in the constitutional revolution of 1905. This independent political power of the Shi‘ī ‘ulamā’ meant that they could work without a formal organisation like the laymen led Muslim Brotherhood, and could organise around mosques and their social and charitable programmes as well as other traditional religious organisations.

The various groups opposed to the shah agreed on at least two points: first, opposition to autocracy, with its concomitant jailing, intimidation and torture of opponents, and second, opposition to the role of Western powers, especially the United States, seen as undermining Iran’s independence. During the revolution, secularists convinced themselves that the clerics would not really rule. The profound differences among the revolutionary forces on issues like the proper role for Islamic law and its clerical enforcers, freedom for different views and parties and women’s rights were all pushed into the background.

With the victory of the revolution in February 1979, Khomeini became the Guide or Leader, and appointed a provisional government led by the Islamic Liberal Mihdi Bāzargān and including other religious and secular liberals. At first, Khomeini continued to indicate that he and the clerics would not rule directly, and this idea seemed to be supported by the make up of the provisional government. The circumstances of the US hostage crisis 1979 and the Iran Iraq War 1980 8 facilitated the takeover of power by Khomeini’s clerical followers, which they may have expected all along. This takeover was not only political but involved a Cultural Revolution (that term was used) to impose uniformity around the Khomeinist ideology.

In the years 1979 83 Khomeini’s forces established a virtual monopoly of ideological and cultural power in place of what had been a multi party and
multi ideological revolution. Although Khomeini appointed a largely secular provisional government he simultaneously appointed loyalists as Friday prayer leaders in every city and built a kind of loyalist parallel government in the Council of Islamic Revolution. In early 1979 there were many political groups and parties. One reason the anti Khomeini liberals and left could never unite was that many in the Khomeinist left favoured land reform and other measures to help the poor that were opposed by the liberals and moderates. The Khomeinists also had control of much of the economy, including the huge former Pahlavi Foundation, which became the Foundation for the Dispossessed and continued to be able to hand out loyalty inducing benefits.

The populace voted overwhelmingly for an Islamic republic in 1979 and elected an assembly of experts in a campaign in which wilāyat i faqīh for the first time was promoted. Before the constitutional assembly met the government passed press laws that forbade collaborators of the old regime from publishing newspapers and set penalties for insulting the ’ulamā‘ or principles of the revolution. The newspaper Āyandāgan was falsely accused of being funded by SAVAK (the shah’s notorious security police) and Israel, and was ransacked by the Islamist thugs called Ḥizbulāh, who went on to force leftist parties out of their Tehran offices. Over forty newspapers were then shut, and by September the two largest remaining papers were turned over to the Foundation for the Dispossessed. The new constitution placed extraordinary powers in the hands of the faqīh and limited the rights and powers of elective institutions.

After President Jimmy Carter (pres. 1977–81) admitted the shah into the US for cancer treatment, on 4 November 1979, ‘students following the line of the Imām [Khomeini]’ seized the US embassy in Tehran, and when they refused Bāzargān’s order to leave, his government resigned. The long crisis, which ended only when Ronald Reagan (pres. 1981–9) became president in January 1981, was used by the clerical conservatives to consolidate their political, social and cultural power. Although the moderate Banī Ṣadr won election as president in 1980, Khomeini broke with him in the spring of 1981 and he had to flee to France.

In 1979 and early 1980 universities were a forum for ideological debates. Khomeini then supported a campaign to purge the universities of oppositionists. The Council of Islamic Revolution in April 1980 ordered leftists to leave the university, and some were forced out, with casualties. Banī Ṣadr announced a Cultural Revolution and Khomeini set up a Council of the Cultural Revolution. The universities were shut down for three years, and many students and professors could never return. The Cultural Revolution
was a great blow to cultural and intellectual life, interrupting the education and professional life of many and causing further emigration of students, teachers and professionals.

Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, beginning an eight year war that caused much devastation and loss of life. It also, however, united nearly all Iranians behind the government’s war efforts and lessened the possibility of oppositional activity or culture. The leftist Islamic Mujahidin-i Khalq, whose leader fled to Paris in 1981 with Bani Sadr, backed Iraq in the war and lost much support; the leadership was exiled from France in 1986 and went to Iraq and launched attacks on Iran. The clerical government, using violence, jailings, executions and divide and rule tactics, put down its opposition one by one, finally arresting the leaders of the pro Soviet Tudeh party in 1983. The execution of former Khomeinist Sadig Qutbza and the house arrest of the prominent and popular Ayatollah Shar’atmadari in 1982 were also part of the unification of power and of permitted ideology. Most of the senior grand ayatollahs continued to oppose clerical rule, or wilayat i faqih, but had no organisation or platform.

The universities, purged and given partially new curricula, were gradually reopened. As later student demonstrations showed, however, the regime did not succeed in uniting young people behind it. On the other hand, a ‘two cultures’ division between the poor and many in the traditional economy who favoured Islam and tradition and the better educated in the modern economy who were often secularist modernisers meant that the regime had the ideological support of many in the ‘traditional’ culture. This they retained in part by subsidies on basic goods, which continue today, and by measures to improve health, education and village and urban services.

The most contentious social questions concerned women. Those who had benefited from the Pahlavi reforms, and had often joined the wide revolutionary mobilisation of women, were alarmed in March 1980 by Khomeini’s ending of the reformist Family Protection Law (FPL) of 1967/75 and requiring ‘Islamic dress’. After mass women’s protests Khomeini retreated on dress, but in July government employees had to wear it and a year later the majlis ordered all women to do so. The return to a codified shari’a meant a revival of polygamy, temporary marriage, child marriage and an end to the FPL’s equalisation of women’s rights in divorce and child custody. Social trends like rapid urbanisation and the rapid rise in female education meant that de facto marriage ages continued to rise, now being near the mid twenties, and, as noted below, women’s protests brought legal reforms that eventually restored some of the FPL’s protections. Women still lost rights and status and, until the
war required their work, were largely discouraged from working, especially in
government offices. Several fields of university study and positions, including
judgeships, were closed to them, though most of these were gradually won
back later.

The state has made major efforts from the first to regulate behaviour. Liquor,
many forms of music and many cultural items from the West were outlawed.
Gender segregation and dress codes were enforced both by government autho-
rities and by young zealots, some of them well organised. Co education was
allowed only in universities, where the genders were segregated in class.
Teachers had to purvey the state ideology, pro government Islamic student
associations were formed, textbooks revised and commitment to the revolution
was demanded for university admission.

Although in the 1980s there were some culturally moderating and inter
nationalist trends, especially with the end of the Iraq War in July 1988, these
were overwhelmed in February 1989 when Khomeini made a brief statement,
soon referred to as a *fatwā* (binding religious judgement), that the author of
*The Satanic Verses*, Salman Rushdie, and all involved in the book’s publication
were sentenced to death. Subsequently a major Iranian foundation offered a
$2.6 million reward to Rushdie’s killer. Khomeini died in June 1989 and was
succeeded by Ali Khamenei. The government hierarchy claimed to be power-
less to withdraw Khomeini’s ruling, but it was gradually, and finally formally,
allowed to become a dead letter.

The main public cultural manifestations in the 1980s were Shi‘ī ones. There
was a revival of the mourning processions and plays commemorating the
deaths of Imam Ḥusayn and other Shi‘ī imams, and an increase in visits to the
great shrine in Mashhad, the shrine at Qum, and other shrines to Shi‘ī leaders
and martyrs. Iranian shrine going replaced visits to the shrines of ‘Ali and
Ḥusayn in Najaf and Karbalā‘. There were also visits to the graves of martyrrs
of the Iran Iraq War, and the funeral services of Khomeini brought out great
public mourning demonstrations. A great tomb and shrine to Khomeini were
subsequently built and attracted many visitors.

In private many people continued their contact with modern and Western
popular and high culture, often buying off local authorities in order to be free
in their own homes. Drinking, partying, listening to and creating both local
and Western music and listening to short wave radio continued, especially
among the modern middle class and the young. Despite censorship, many
books with different views continued to be published and translated. On the
other hand, authorities continued sporadically to disrupt and punish private
breaking of rules.
Transnational ties of the Iranian revolution

Although the Iranian revolution was unique as a mass revolution with significant clerical leadership, its impact was felt in other countries. The Iranian born cleric Mūsā Ṣadr was the chief leader who turned many Lebanese Shi’īs into an active political force from the 1950s until his disappearance in 1978. Iranian oppositionists and revolutionaries flocked to Lebanon in the 1970s. They included Muṣṭafā Chamrān, who worked with Mūsā Ṣadr and in revolutionary activities; some leading members of the ‘Islamic Marxist’ Mujāhidīn i Khalq; and ‘A’ll Akbar Muḥtashamī, a Khomeinist later high in the Islamic Republic. Revolutionists were also educated and trained in other foreign countries among them Abu’l Ḥasan Bānī Ṣadr and ‘A’ll Shari‘atī in Paris, where they were influenced by anti imperialist intellectuals, Ibrāhīm Yazdī in the US, and a number of clerical and secular leaders in Germany. Khomeini’s long stay in Iraqi exile, 1963–78, and his shorter one in France, surrounded by younger, more Westernised intellectuals, had an influence on his statements and perhaps his beliefs, which in the end included commitment to a constitution, parliament, modern education, women’s suffrage (which he had once opposed) and development activities for the poor.

When the revolution took power in February, 1979, many in the third world, as it was then called, and especially in the Muslim world saw it as a harbinger of what positive things might be accomplished by a united popular movement against a government seen as autocratic and oppressive and as tied to US and Israeli imperial policies. Iranian stress on the Islamic nature of the revolution reduced some of its impact in the non-Muslim world, but its influence in the Muslim world was more enduring. From the first, however, there were contradictions in the revolutionary ideology and practice that ultimately helped to undermine its influence. Among them were the contradictions, which exist still today, between the theocratic nature of the constitution, represented by the wilāyat i faqīh, or ‘guardianship of the jurisprudent’, with the faqīh able to rule on what he chooses, and elected bodies and individuals like parliament and the president. A less noted contradiction, which hurt the revolution’s foreign influence, was between the Iranian constitution’s insistence that Iran was a Shi’ī state with a Shi’ī faqīh and president, and its attempt to present itself as an all Islamic movement and leadership and appeal to the Sunnī majority in the Muslim world. Although Iran

ended such distinctly Shi‘i (and to Sunnīs offensive) practices as cursing the first three Sunnī caliphs, it continued other Shi‘i ways and statements and gradually lost much of its appeal among Sunnīs.\textsuperscript{5} Iranian influence became concentrated among significant parts of Shi‘i populations in the countries that had numerous Shi‘is—Iraq, where they were an oppressed majority, Lebanon, where they were the largest single confessional group, Pakistan, Afghanistan and also the smaller Gulf states where many Shi‘is were of Iranian origin.

For a few years, however, the revolution retained an appeal to third world nationalists, many leftists, other oppositionists and young people. In the early years the revolution’s leaders were vocal in their support for Yasser Arafat as representing the Palestinian cause, which gave them popularity throughout the Muslim world. Iran broke with Arafat when he accepted the Oslo two-state approach for Palestine, but Iran kept the support of non Iranian militants on this question. Revolutionaries and young activists in various countries did not know the history and political role of the Iranian clergy, and refused to believe that a revolution on the Iranian model, with a politicised clergy in the leadership, was not possible in Sunnī countries, where Islamist movements were headed by lay leaders without Khomeini’s mass power and following.\textsuperscript{6} Even many leftist oppositionists in Muslim areas moved towards ‘left Islamist’ positions partly influenced by the Iranian revolution and a belief that only an Islamist revolution could be successful in overthrowing tyrannies and imperialist power. The Iranian revolution played an important role in encouraging many formerly secular nationalists and leftists to become, or at least express themselves as, Islamists. Nationalism and even socialism were increasingly identified with often secular autocratic governments while Islamism was increasingly seen as the best route to overturning local governments and undermining Western power. Both inside and outside Iran, Islamists also gained popularity by providing services to the needy not given by secular governments. Governments that claimed to be Islamic, such as the Saudi Arabian monarchy or the government of Zia ul Haq (r. 1977–88) in Pakistan were also targets of some of the new Islamists.

There was, however, an opposite international trend, especially in the West, of supporting opponents of the Iranian revolution. Some of these


\textsuperscript{6} I was strongly attacked as a CIA agent or the like when I tried to make this point in talks to student groups in countries ranging from France to Nigeria from 1978 to 1983.
opponents were, broadly speaking, royalists, most of whom supported the reinstatement of the Pahlavi monarchy in the person of Prince Riḍā Pahlavi. On the other end politically were the Mujāhidīn i Khaḷq, whose leader Maṣūd Rajavī came to Paris with Baṅī Ṣadr in 1981, and who were joined by the National Democratic Front led by the grandson of Musaddiq (PM 1951 3), Hidāyat Allāh Maṭīn Daftarī in the National Council of Resistance (NCR). When Rajavī and his followers backed Iraq and attacked Iran during the Iran Iraq War, however, most Iranians saw them as traitors and their Iranian allies quit the NCR. They were expelled from Paris in 1986 and went to Iraq. They still have supporters among the powerful Western, and especially US, groups who want to work actively to overthrow the Islamic regime, though support for Pahlavi is greater. The major European powers, by contrast to the US before Obama’s presidency, have, since Leader Khamenei renounced Iranian efforts to kill Salman Rushdie, tried to improve relations with Iran and have generally encouraged both economic and cultural ties though recent relations have often been difficult.

Iranian involvement with the active Shi‘ī opposition in Iraq was one reason for the 1980 attack by Iraq on Iran. The Iraqi War helped turn many Arabs and Sunnis against Iran, and even Iraqi Shi‘īs mostly backed their government against Iran. A pro Iranian group of Iraqis, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, operated from Iran during and after the war, and returned to Iraq as a major player during the second US Iraq War. The most influential Shi‘ī leaders in Iraq, notably Ayatollah ‘Alī Sīstānī, are not, however, tools of Iran. Ironically, the Iranian born Ayatollah Sīstānī is a vocal opponent of theocratic rule, or wilāyat i faqīh, while many followers of the Iraqi born Ṣadr family, whose leaders were killed under the old regime, favour wilāyat i faqīh, while at the same time attacking Sīstānī for being an Iranian born foreigner. These Iraqis say, with some justice, that the idea of wilāyat i faqīh was first put forth by the Ṣādars.

Iran’s foreign influence has been especially strong in Lebanon, where the Israeli invasion in the summer of 1982 brought forth an effort to help radical Lebanese Shi‘īs remake their country on the Iranian model and make it a centre for the battle against Zionism. The Lebanese organization Ḥizbullāh,

7 Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, ch. 11. Many British MPs and US representatives supported the Mujāhidīn i Khaḷq, and some still do, even though they are listed by the US government as a terrorist organisation. Support by US governmental figures for Pahlavi is considerable.

8 Nicholas Blanford, ‘Iran, Iraq, and two Shi‘īte visions’, Christian Science Monitor (20 February 2004).
formed to resist Israeli occupation, engaged in the Lebanese civil war with Iranian support. With the end of that war in 1990 Ḥizbullah began to enter local politics as a political party. Iranian aid helped it set up a network of social, educational and welfare institutions, which increased its support. Ḥizbullah’s spiritual guide Sayyid Muhammad Ḥusayn Faḍl Allāh has endorsed the wilāyat i faqīḥ concept, while recognising in practice that the Shiʿī minority in Lebanon cannot hope to implement it. Iranian cultural influences are seen in increased women’s veiling and the spread of Iranian type mourning ceremonies. On the other hand, Ḥizbullah has become more and more a regular Lebanese political party, and some Lebanese Shiʿīs do not admire the Iranian revolution.9

While the Iranian revolution has been a force favouring the organisation and empowerment of Shiʿīs in several countries, it has also often intensified conflict between Shiʿīs and Sunnīs. This was the case in Pakistan, where the policies of President Zia ul Haq enshrined Sunnī law, and brought Shiʿī protest with a law to collect (Sunnī style) alms from bank accounts. Shiʿīs set up their own political organisations, some of which were revolutionary and most of which idealised Khomeini. Sunnī Shiʿī conflict has remained strong in Pakistan and India.10 Shiʿī Sunnī conflicts and identity movements have also increased in the Gulf countries and Afghanistan. Iran has had good relations with Syria, based not so much on the Syrian presidents’ adherence to a minority Shiʿī sect, the Alavis, as on perceived common interests regarding Lebanon, Israel/Palestine and some other questions.

In Sunnī countries early enthusiasm for the Iranian revolution declined with its Shiʿī identity and with the Iran Iraq War. Some moderation of international and domestic policies came after the end of that war and the death of Khomeini, first during the presidency of the pragmatic cleric ‘Ali Akbar Ḥāshimī Rafsanjānī (pres. 1989 97). There was some revival of foreign Sunnī enthusiasm for Iran in the first years after the 1997 election of the reformist President Muḥammad Khātamī (pres. 1997 2005) when there were hopes for the development of Islamic democracy,11 which by 2005 were mostly dashed. (With the subsequent pronouncements and policies of President

9 Chehabi et al., Distant relations, ch. 1.
Mahmūd Ahmadinejad (pres. 2005 ) Iran came to be seen as a threat by several Arab rulers, while increasing its support among those opposed to these rulers.)

Other aspects of Iranian transnational relations are cultural and scholarly contacts with foreign countries, which increased especially after 1989. Iran has held a series of international conferences, mostly regarding past cultural figures, to which foreign scholars are invited. They have even given prizes to foreign (mainly Western) scholarly books about Iran, many of which are translated into Persian. There are several co-operative research projects involving Iranian and European and Japanese scholars. Foreign, including American, organisations and universities welcome Iranian students and have invited visits by Iranian scholars and reformers, although travel to the US has become more difficult since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Iranian women living abroad pioneered the publication of feminist journals and other publications, many of which carried articles and information from Iran that then reached Iran, forming a basis for Iranian women’s periodicals that flourished in the late 1990s. Once they began, Iranian women’s organisations and publications encouraged contacts with, and published articles by, Iranian and other feminists living in the West, which have helped Iran’s women’s rights movement.12

Other international contacts coming into Iran include illicit but widespread pop music, videos, satellite television (illegal but widespread) and, recently, the internet. Urban young people are particularly attracted to Western pop culture. Most are alienated from the official ideology, which they see as restraining them without giving them anything in return.

Education and health

Despite the early purge of the universities, once they were reopened there was fairly steady expansion of education at all levels. Although there were required religious subjects, education remained largely secular and continued to emphasise science. The state has been on a trajectory to make education and literacy universal, and has nearly succeeded in that aim. The benefits of these programmes have been most strongly felt in rural and remote areas. Clerical endorsement of education for girls along with money and efforts devoted to universalising education helped. The building of new schools in distant areas made them more accessible, especially for girls. Textbooks were

rewritten to reflect the values of the new regime, with a clerical religious component, a continued emphasis on Iranian nationalism, especially after the outbreak of the Iran Iraq War, and stress on the different roles of males and females.¹³ Many students rejected their textbooks’ views.

After some years during which a few university subjects were barred to women, after women and others protested these were gradually opened up, so nearly all subjects became open. The proportion of females among entering university students has reached nearly two thirds. The trend for women to outnumber men at universities is seen also in other countries, including the United States, and may be largely due to males having more non academic interests and values and more freedom to pursue them. There are also effective adult literacy programmes, which affect women disproportionately, as they comprised most of the illiterates. By 2000 the adult female literacy rate was about 72 per cent,¹⁴ while rates for school age girls are far higher. Weaknesses in education include low salaries for teachers at all levels, which means many of them must take on additional jobs and university professors can do little research.

Higher education for women was championed by one of a group of influential women related to governmental figures Zahra Rahnavard, wife of ex prime minister Mir Husayn Musavi (PM 1981 9). She became head of the women’s al Zahra University. Regular universities also welcomed women, with men and women sitting on separate sides of the class, but with professors of both genders.

Partly because of the dearth of other cultural outlets, urban Iran has seen a flowering of special classes in art, music and other subjects, as well as organised after school activities like sports. On the other hand, some young people reject the whole system and spend their time defying it, whether via drugs, interaction with the opposite sex or partying with forbidden music.

Health care, a major weakness in pre revolutionary Iran, has been given impressive funding. The government created a grassroots primary rural and urban health care network which, among other things, has slashed maternal and child mortality rates.¹⁵ Drug abuse is a major problem and has given rise to some useful treatment programmes, although these are far from resolving

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¹⁵ Ibid., p. 102.
the problem. Drug abuse is the main cause of HIV/AIDS. Despite denial and other problems, government officials in a few parts of the country have developed the most effective education and treatment programme of any Middle Eastern country. 16 Regarding family planning, the government, which had encouraged childbearing in the 1980s, saw the economic problems it was causing and did an about face in 1988 after Khomeini authorised birth control programmes. Free family planning, theoretically compulsory classes for newly married persons, expansion of local and village health programmes to include contraception and a cut off of benefits for children after the first three were elements of a voluntary but highly effective programme. The enlistment of the clergy in the programme was one reason Iran accomplished more than other Muslim countries. Birth rates fell from very high to replacement levels both because of the birth control programmes and because of urbanisation, economic difficulties and the rise in women’s educational levels and in average marriage ages. The rural and urban neighbourhood health programmes were expanded and incorporated birth control. 17 Some grassroots health care and family planning workers used their training and organisation to campaign for other reforms. 18 For the next several years, when the baby boom children of the 1980s seek work, however, relative overpopulation and unemployment, especially of young people, will remain major problems.

Despite the regime’s achievements in fields like health, education and infrastructural development, which has brought roads, clean water and electricity to rural areas, there remained many social and cultural problems. Among the most important were the severe limitations on political activity, public behaviour and expression, which, combined with unemployment and economic problems, encouraged many Iranians to leave the country. A large number left in the early years after the revolution, and others continued to leave as opportunities presented themselves. Most students who went abroad stayed abroad.


17 See the statistics on the Population Reference Bureau site www.prb.org, which includes an article by Farzaneh Roudi Fahimi, ‘Iran’s family planning program: Responding to a nation’s needs’. See also several papers from Iran by Amir H. Mehryar, including Amir H. Mehryar (ed.), Integrated approach to reproductive health and family planning in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran, 2001).

While public schools had more religion in their curricula than formerly, a programme to unite the theological schools of Qum with the universities, making secular teachers go for a time to Qum, had the unexpected result of having many students at Qum learn something of Western thought. Secular students and graduates remain highly dissatisfied, however, frequently protesting government acts and unable in large numbers to find suitable employment.\textsuperscript{19} In a kind of unacknowledged compromise, young people and women in cities have for some years been allowed more freedom of dress and contact than formerly while there has been a definitive crackdown on political activity. With the recent recrudescence of unalloyed conservative religious power, even non political behaviour has been increasingly under attack.

**Women and young people**

The position of women was central to the revolution’s early rulers, who attacked modernised women as ‘Western dolls’ or worse, while Khomeini abrogated the Family Protection Law before any other law. Though great limits on women’s rights were imposed in the first years after 1979, some women effectively defended their public roles by going to work in the private sphere and participating in the war effort. Women protested having war widows’ children go to their husbands’ families and brought about reforms in this law and some others. Many middle class women, when dismissed from government jobs, found employment as entrepreneurs, teachers, doctors and nurses, and in the arts.\textsuperscript{20}

Over the years, there was increasing vocal and press opposition from women to policies that, when the Family Protection Law was ended and shari‘a reinstated, sanctioned polygyny, temporary marriage, free divorce for men, child custody to husbands and their families. Several women began to contest the official interpretation of Islam on these and other points, and to develop more gender egalitarian interpretations of Islam. For a time there was conflict between these women, sometimes called ‘Islamic feminists’ and those secular feminists who saw Islam as unalterably gender inegalitarian, but over the years the two groups increasingly co operated to achieve their practical demands.

\textsuperscript{19} On education see Bernard Hourcade, *Iran: Nouvelles identités d’une république* (Paris, 2002); Farhad Khosrokhavar and Olivier Roy, *Iran: Comment sortir d’une révolution religieuse* (Paris, 1999); and several articles by Golnar Mehran.

\textsuperscript{20} Haleh Esfandiari, *Reconstructed lives: Women and Iran’s Islamic revolution* (Washington, DC, 1997).
Already in the 1980s press publicity and women’s activism brought some legal remedies, including limits on a husband’s rights to stop a wife from taking a job. Very important was a new marriage contract that spelled out women’s rights and husbands’ behaviour that would give the wife the right to divorce. These provisions were very similar to those in the Family Protection Law, but now they were valid only if both parties signed them. A limited divorce reform was passed in 1989, saying divorces had to have court permission, though studies suggest that men’s requests are almost never denied. Courts became more sympathetic to women, and women judges, at first not allowed to practise, became first associate judges and, more recently full judges.

An important new post revolution trend was for women to interpret Islam in more gender egalitarian ways. After the government opened religious higher education to women some women mastered accepted forms of Islamic argument. Also, there soon developed a group of reformist Islamist women, several of them related to high governmental figures, who pressed women’s causes effectively. A new women’s press included the only women’s daily, Zan (Woman), edited by Fā’īza Hāshimī, a daughter of leading politician Hāshimī Rafsanjānī. More aggressively presenting women’s demands were Zan i Rūz and Zanān, edited by Shahlā Shirkat, with the latter presenting both secular and Islamic authors, some from abroad. Secular and Islamic women co operated in pressing for reforms, and reformist views on gender and other matters even influenced several clergy, a few of whom wrote reformist articles on the subject.

Women continued to work both in traditional rural and urban occupations and in the modern economy. Iranian and Arab women have low labour force participation, although, as in many countries, women workers are under counted in official censuses. Many women set themselves up as private entrepreneurs when, for a time, many were dismissed from government employment. Women have struggled to broaden their participation in sports, and they now are active in unprecedented numbers. Although not all women agree on priorities, there has been unprecedented co operation between religious and secular women in pressing demands. Women’s non governmental organisations, some of which are not wholly ‘non governmental’, have both

23 See Tohidi, ‘International connections’.
helped poor women and given women an additional place to exercise leadership.25

Women and young people voted in especially high majorities for reformist president Khātamī in 1997 and 2001 and for the reformists who won parliament in 2000. The parliament passed several pro woman reforms, but the Guardian Council rejected them, with only a few provisions (such as raising the minimum age for female marriage from nine to thirteen) partially reinstated by the Expediency Council. The conservative counter attack on reformists that began in 2000 hurt women’s rights, although most of the gains that had been achieved remained even after reformist candidates were eliminated from parliamentary elections in 2004. Many discriminatory laws remain in force, but women’s advances in education, where they are almost two thirds of university admissions, and in work, continue. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the courageous human rights attorney Shirin Ebadi in 2003 was a boost for women’s, children’s and human rights in Iran. The prize gives her some protection in her continued struggles and legal cases in Iran. On the other hand, there have been a few cases of sentences of stoning to death, after this practice had been abandoned.

Young people have been another force for protest and reform, with major university protests in 1999 and 2002. Urban young people are constantly pushing the boundaries on socialising between genders, dress codes, permissible music and other activities. A major source of young people’s discontent is the high rate of unemployment, including for the educated. Most of those who go abroad for education remain abroad and constitute part of a major brain drain that has affected Iran since 1979. Young people tend to be friendly to the West and its ways, and are especially involved in the internet. There are now a huge number of young people, resulting from the high birth rates of the 1980s and, at least in urban areas, they are largely disaffected and many seek out ways to get forbidden cultural products from abroad, to mix the sexes on hikes or in homes of liberal minded parents, to party and even to use drugs. Some young people, especially from the poorer classes, resent this behaviour, and some join groups that attempt to punish it.

The arts and intellectual trends

The 1980s were a period of heavy censorship in the arts, and a style that might be called ‘clerical realism’ was favoured, and several forms of music were

25 Elaheeh Rostami Povey, ‘Trade unions and women’s NGOs: Diverse civil society organisations in Iran’, Development in Practice, 14, 1 2 (February 2004), pp. 254 66.
banned. This gradually changed, so that by the late 1990s several different types of fine art were produced, and various forms of popular, Western classical and local classical and folk music and dance were performed, though some censorship remained. Literature also developed with greater freedom, and women writers gained new prominence.

The best known Iranian art abroad is film, which has produced internationally known and honoured directors like ‘Abbās Kiyārūstamī and Muḥṣīn Mākhmālbāf. Many Iranian films show slices of everyday life in an apparently simple but ultimately profound manner. A number of films, both by male and female directors, highlight the position and problems of women. Iran has an unusually large number of female directors, among them Samīrā Mākhmālbāf, Tāhmāna Milanī and Rakhshān Banī ‘timād. Films had to follow certain rules regarding dress and behaviour, particularly for women, but censorship decreased until recently, and films were partly protected by their receipt of numerous international prizes and earning foreign currency. A few films shown abroad could not be seen in Iran.26 On the other hand, a number of interesting films popular in Iran were not seen abroad, many of them having more action than the ‘slice of life’ films popular abroad and some of these had equal political and economic significance.

Intellectual trends regarding theology and politics were dynamic in the period since 1979, and especially since the mid 1990s. The original dominant trend of Khomeinism was itself an intellectual innovation in Shi‘ism, which had not previously called for direct rule by a leading jurisprudent. Ayatollah Muṭahharī gave a more liberal interpretation of Khomeinism. Some, who made up the so called ‘Islamic left’, combined Khomeinism with an emphasis on just treatment for the poor, and worked for this in the early parliaments. Many of the top clergy never accepted this wilāyat i faqīh, and though most of them were politically quietist, Ayatollahs Sharī‘atmadārī and later Muntazīrī openly opposed clerical rule, for which both were punished.

In the 1990s and after, many thinkers broke with the one dimensional ideological views that had dominated contemporary Iranian thought, whether Marxist, nationalist or Islamist. All these earlier ideological trends, for all their differences, tended to see Iran’s problems as the outcome of the power of foreign imperialism in alliance with local despotism. Yet the essential break that the revolution brought with what were seen as imperialist powers did not bring economic, political or cultural improvements or lessen despotism.

Hence even those who had been part of the Islamic left began to look for more internal causes of, and solutions to, Iran’s problems, without abandoning the widespread view that foreign imperialism contributed to these problems.

Before and especially during the first years of Khātami’s presidency, newspapers and journals became the most important expressions of reformist and oppositional thought. An independent press centring in Tehran promoted democracy and the rule of law. Among the most prominent editors were former hostage takers, who had now rethought their youthful simple positions and become reformists. Hujjat al Islām Musāwī Khūniḥā, known as the spiritual mentor of the hostage takers, founded the pioneering reformist daily *Salām* in the early 1990s; its editor in chief was ‘Abbās ‘Abdī, one of the four original planners of the embassy seizure. Another leader, Sa‘īd Ḥājjariān, a chief adviser to President Khātami, edited the crusading reformist daily *Ṣubh i Imrūz*, and another edited the reformist daily *Hambastīgī*. Nearly all of these men, and many others, have experienced jail and violence from the regime they helped install, and their newspapers, like most others, were eventually shut down.\(^{27}\) The prominent female attorney Mehrangīz Kar has written, both in Iran and in exile, important works on the history and status of Iran’s women.

A leading oppositional journalist is Akbar Gānji, who called Islamic political conservatives ‘fascists’ and explained that term in a 1997 lecture. He was then arrested, but published several articles in a book titled *The fascist interpretation of religion and government*. Gānji alleged that high ranking clerics were involved in the murders of a hundred dissidents in the years 1989–97. In a 2002 book, written in prison, he criticised even Khomeini and reformers and called for the separation of religion and state and for liberal democracy.\(^{28}\) He was jailed and conducted an internationally publicised hunger strike, but was released in 2006 and has continued to write and agitate from exile in the US.

A growing group of reformist thinkers came to be called ‘religious intellectuals’. The first important reformer to put forth an alternative, open interpretation of Islam was Abdolkarīm Soroush. In the first post revolution years he was a pro regime ideologist and member of the High Council of the Cultural Revolution. Soon after Khomeini’s death new periodicals began to

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debate public issues, and the bimonthly Kiya¯n from 1991 featured lead articles by Soroush. He came to stress rational, scientific and critical philosophy, thus contributing to the secularisation of Islamic thought.29 His central point is that the true essential Islam cannot be known, and that different interpretations of Islam are inevitable expressions of different periods and to be welcomed. He spoke of Islamic democracy, which as he explained it sounds parallel to European Christian Democracy. He was increasingly attacked by governmental and pro regime forces, and has spent recent years abroad, chiefly in the United States.

A growing number of clerics have presented reformist ideas. The best known is Ayatollah Ḥusayn ‘Ali Muntazirî, who was Khomeini’s first designated successor as faqīh, but was then deposed and became increasingly critical of clerical rule and autocracy. Released from house arrest after public pressure in January 2003, he resumed his strong attacks on the ruling elite.

A more philosophical clerical voice is that of Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistârî, professor of theology at Tehran University. He allows considerable human, rather than divine, regulation of human affairs; says there must be guarantees of freedom; and insists that Islam has no single form of polity. Unlike a number of other clerical writers, he criticizes wilāyat i faqīh only implicitly, and not directly.30

A strong critic of the regime and of wilāyat i faqīh is Muhsin Kadivâr. His early imprisonment for his writings made him famous. He interprets Islam as being in accord with democracy and human rights, and in two books dissect the weak Islamic basis for wilāyat i faqīh. He says God has delegated political control to the people and democracy is useful in all cultures.31 In January 2003 Kadivâr left the United States in the middle of a Harvard fellowship to return to the struggle in Iran. As of 2009 he is a visiting professor in the USA.

Beginning in 2000 and increasing since 2003 there has been a governmental crackdown on cultural freedom and criticism, with nearly all the oppositional newspapers closed and recent crackdowns on some who post critical work on

30 Farzin Vahdat, 'Post revolutionary discourses of Mohammad Mojtabeh Shabestari and Mohsen Kadivâr: Reconciling the terms of mediated subjectivity. Part I: Mojtabeh Shabestari', Critique, 16 (Spring 2000), pp. 51 54, and 'Part II: Mohsen Kadivâr’, Critique, 17 (Fall 2000), pp. 135 57.
the internet. The Guardian Council rejected most reform measures passed by the 2000 reformist parliament, and then rejected reformist candidates in the 2004 parliamentary elections, so a conservative parliament was elected. Reformists became increasingly disillusioned with President Khātamī, whom they came to see as at best ineffectual and at worst a friendly appearing front for clerical policies. He has been criticised for failing to stop repression against journalists and student and other protesters. Nearly one hundred newspapers and journals have been shut down and many journalists and reformers jailed by the right wing judiciary. This contributed to an abandonment of politics by many, especially young people, until the June 2009 elections.

In 2004 over twenty journalists and internet technicians, mostly young men and women, were arrested in late summer and released in December. Like many arrestees under the shah and the early Islamic Republic, most of them were forced to go on state run television and confess to crimes. They were then released and said they had spent three months in solitary confinement and had been tortured. One woman who had not confessed ended up hospitalised. This followed an earlier killing in prison of a Canadian Iranian woman journalist. A statement from the European Union protesting the arrests helped to win their release, some of those released said.32

These events, and general frustration about the economy and the political system, contributed to widespread frustration among young people, which only increased the country’s brain drain. Young people who remain are increasingly disillusioned and many seek outlet in personal solutions.

At the same time, the controlling right wing clerics have some cultural followers, chiefly among popular class people who resent the privileges and behaviour of the upper classes and benefit from some social services, and among some conservative merchants, many of whom have ties to the economic foundations that profit from the clerics’ economic set up.

Iran since Ahmadinejad 2005–33

Since the parliamentary elections of February 2004 and especially the presidential election of Mahmūd Ahmadinejad in June 2005 the trend in Iranian governmental politics has been toward increasingly restrictive and religiously coloured conservatism. Ahmadinejad has also made provocative foreign


33 This section is largely based on the books and sources listed in n. 1, including much use of internet sources and a variety of articles and on items in n. 34.
policy statements. Among the populace there was for a time less open opposition to government policies regarding women, students, the economy, freedoms and minority and foreign policies, as many Iranians found direct political activity impossible. Economic and foreign policy difficulties, however, led to various protests and to opposition to Ahmadinejad’s policies even among prominent conservatives and leading clerics. The nuclear issue became prominent under Ahmadinejad.

President Khâtami had several achievements in foreign policy, having ended Iran’s virtual isolation and set up friendly relations with several countries, including Russia, China, India and major European countries. On the other hand, he lost much support among reformists for his failure to support student demonstrators and other reformists and for his inability to stop the crackdown on a free press. He did not have the power, and perhaps not the will, to move effectively against the conservatives on domestic policy. He was not eligible for re election, due to a two term limit.

Ahmadinejad’s victory in the two round June 2005 presidential elections was unexpected. Most people expected the centrist and pragmatic ex president, ‘Ali Akbar Rafsanjâni to win. Reformists were divided and many boycotted the elections. Ahmadinejad, mayor of Tehran, barely made it to the second round, but then got 62 per cent of the vote. Among the factors behind his victory were his non clerical status, his promises to help the poor, the intervention of his group, the Revolutionary Guard, and possibly popular class resentment against the free ways of the urban elite and worries about US threats, which made candidates who favoured detente less popular. His chief opponent, ex president Rafsanjâni, was also widely seen as a corrupt rich cleric.

Understanding Ahmadinejad’s presidency requires a closer look at some questions not stressed in the previous pages. This presidency brought to the fore certain issues that had existed at least since the 1979 revolution. One of these was the economy and how the government should approach economic development. After 1979 even more of the economy came under government control than had been true under the shah; not only did the state continue to control the oil industry and its profits, but other areas were transferred to the new government, and many businesses and lands were confiscated from their former owners, some of whom had been arrested or had fled. In addition, bonyads (literally ‘foundations’) were increased in number; the former Pahlavi Foundation became the Foundation for the Dispossessed, and other foundations were created, nearly all initially under the control of pro regime clerics. Some of their work involved helping the poor, but much of it was controlling and managing enterprises in the manufacturing, agricultural and service
economies. The ‘ulamā had a privileged role in foundations, which became subject only to the leader and did not have to adhere to most of the regulatory, tax or reporting laws that applied to other enterprises. The great majority of the Iranian economy is either government or foundation owned, with foundations covering over 20 per cent of GDP, and vested interests want to keep this control, while those who want a freer economic system or rational planning have tried to lessen it. The Revolutionary Guard had a growing role in the economy and foundations after 1989.

Broadly speaking, there have been two major approaches to the economy. Many of the early revolutionaries, especially those in the parliamentary ‘Islamic Left’, who were predominant in parliaments until 2004, favoured a policy of active government intervention to bring about greater equality of income and a reduction of poverty, and to provide needed services to the poor. Khomeini and those around him shared many such ideas, and their proponents succeeded in raising living standards in the countryside by providing electricity, roads, piped water and basic education and health services to most villages and in changing laws affecting labour, pensions and social security to help the poor. Improvements in living standards were in part negated by the huge expenditure in lives and property brought by the eight year Iran Iraq War, and also by the corruption and profiteering of the new privileged classes especially many in the clergy, the commercial bourgeoisie and government officials. Major subsidies for some foodstuffs and for petrol are extremely expensive for the state and distort economic development. The richest decile of households benefits twelve times more from gasoline subsidies than the poorest decile, and energy subsidies cost the state $84 billion in 2008.

A different tendency involved those who wanted to expand free market policies. This trend, first represented by liberal Islamists like Mihdi Bâzargân, who had to resign in November 1979, returned during the presidencies of Rafsanjâni (1989–97) and Khâtamî (1997–2005), but it encountered many obstacles. There have been several, only partly successful, attempts to soften laws limiting foreign investments. Some success came with nearly equalising official and real currency exchange rates. Much popular opposition has greeted attempts to reduce subsidies, especially on petrol. A conservative trend, involving many clerics and Revolutionary Guards, speaks of returning to Khomeini’s ideals but stresses government controls on both economic and political life.

The overall economic picture today is mixed. Iran still suffers from US and UN sanctions. Iran’s population has almost doubled since 1979, to c. 70 million,
and GDP has slightly more than doubled, which means per capita income today is slightly higher than in 1979. Income distribution has not dramatically changed, but it seems to be more equal at both the high and the low ends. The population is much healthier and better educated than before, and is now overwhelmingly young and urban, with many new smaller cities. Many aspects of life have been modernised, from the Tehran subway system through the education and health systems to the ubiquity of new means of communication. Iran has the world’s fourth largest number of bloggers and access to the web and to illegal satellite TV is widespread. There are many problems, including continued rapid inflation, corruption, favouritism, high unemployment, difficulties in starting productive enterprises outside the state and foundation system, and continued regional inequities that fuel ethnic discontent. The oil industry is in dire need of technological modernisation for which foreign expertise and investment are required. US and UN sanctions and Iranian limits on foreign investment make such investment difficult, though economic relations with the Gulf emirates and with Russia and China mitigate these problems somewhat.

A major change has been the rise since the end of the Iran Iraq War in economic and political power of the c. 125,000 member Revolutionary Guard and the associated Basij, or militia, who originated among men and boys who volunteered to go to the front. Though the Revolutionary Guards are not monolithic in their views or composition, many of them, and especially the associated Basij, appeal to popular class men who resent the wealthy, dislike the cultural and economic liberalisation under presidents Rafsanjānī and Khātamī and want a return to egalitarian and strict Islamic policies of the early revolutionary years. This tendency, sometimes called the New Right, is also supported by some clerics and bazaars, though these groups are not homogeneous, and other clerics have opposed the policies of Ahmadinejad, the main representative of this group. The New Right appeals to the urban and rural poor, and shows that the ‘two cultures’ divisions in Iran are still alive and important. The New Right is rhetorically against steps toward lessening tensions with the West, especially the US and Israel, which they see as implacably hostile to Iran’s revolution. In practice, however, its leaders are sometimes more conciliatory in international affairs. Khamenei generally supports the right.

Within Iran’s right wing or conservative groups, there are different trends, in particular between those who take a hard line against the US and Israel and those who take a more ‘Realist’ or pragmatic position and see some accommodation with the West as necessary. Pragmatism is mainly associated with
centrists like Rafsanjāni. Some of Ahmadinejad’s opponents on the left also appeal to Khomeini’s heritage in their case stressing economic justice and incorruptibility rather than Islamic strictness. And, to add to the complexity of the picture, Ahmadinejad and some of those around him at times display a Realist willingness to deal with the US in order to mitigate Iran’s major economic problems. Continued factional politics, popular reactions to subsidy reduction and to middle and upper class mores and counter reactions by those being attacked make for an unstable and unpredictable situation. As of November 2009 both internal and international affairs were in flux.

Since his election Ahmadinejad has not attempted the major reforms that are needed to fight corruption and the vested interests clerical, commercial and foundation that block economic development. High oil prices keep the economy going but unemployment and poverty continue and inflation has dramatically worsened, producing widespread economic discontent and unrest. Crucial investment money continues to flee to Dubai and elsewhere and the brain drain continues. Ahmadinejad’s appointments to governorships and other posts have been overwhelmingly reactionary, including men involved in major past human rights violations and killings.

In October 2005 Ahmadinejad spoke about Israel in a way that was highly confrontational and provocative but did not, as often claimed, include a military threat. He quoted Khomeini, saying ‘This regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time’, and spoke of an election among all Palestinians as leading to a new (non Zionist) state in Palestine. In

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34 Among the many English language books and articles used for this chapter not cited above, I have found useful several written since 2000 by persons with recent experience in Iran: Haleh Esfandiari, My prison, my home: One woman’s story of captivity in Iran (New York, 2009); Hooman Majd, The Ayatollah begs to differ: The paradox of modern Iran (New York, 2008); Azadeh Moaveni, Lipstick jihad: A memoir of growing up Iranian in America and American in Iran (New York, 2005); and idem, Honeymoon in Tehran: Two years of love and danger in Iran (New York, 2009); Pardis Mahdavi, Passionate uprisings: Iran’s sexual revolution (Stanford, 2009); Elaine Sciolino, Persian mirrors: The elusive face of Iran (New York, 2000). Also very informative are Ervand Abrahamian, Tortured confessions: Prisons and public recantations in modern Iran (Berkeley, 1999); Janet Afary, Sexual politics in modern Iran (Cambridge, 2009), Reza Altabari, Human rights in Iran: The abuse of cultural relativism (Philadelphia, 2001); Mehdi Moslemi, Factional politics in post Khomeini Iran (Syracuse, 2002); Nasrin Alavi, We are Iran: The Persian blogs (Brooklyn, NY, 2005); John W. Limbert, Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the ghosts of history (Washington, DC, 2009); and Frederic Wehrey, The rise of the Basij: Assessing the domestic roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica, 2009). Still useful are many older works, including Gary Sick, All fall down: America’s tragic encounter with Iran (New York, 1985); Shaul Bakhash, The reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic revolution (rev. edn, New York, 1990); Robin Wright, The last great revolution: Turmoil and transformation in Iran (New York, 2000). For topical summaries and very recent events websites including Wikipedia are indispensable.
subsequent statements and deeds, however, Ahmadinejad was increasingly hostile to the Jewish state and continued to predict its imminent end. Like many in the Muslim world, Iran’s rulers have opposed a Jewish state in which non-Jews have lesser rights, but in recent years they had played down this issue and some had indicated that they would accept a two state solution if Palestinians did. Several Iranian leaders who continue to have more say in foreign policy than Ahmadinejad, including leader Khamenei, made statements repudiating any Iranian attempt to interfere militarily in Palestine, and Ahmadinejad in interviews not publicised in the US said that he was speaking of a regime disappearing from within, like the Soviet regime. Leader Khamenei has specifically renounced war and aggression. Nonetheless Israel and many in the US remain apprehensive about his predictions of the end of the Jewish state and about Ahmadinejad’s questioning the Holocaust and sponsoring a December 2006 conference and exhibit of Holocaust deniers. Many Muslims in the Middle East (like many in Israel and the US on the other side) have only been exposed to one side of the Palestine/Israeli question, and Ahmadinejad is likely among them and trying to appeal to them. He touched a popular theme when he asked why Palestinians should be made to pay for the past actions of Nazis. He has not threatened Iranian military, much less nuclear, attacks on Israel, but his provocative words predicting Israel’s demise, and Iran’s support for militant anti-Israel groups including HAMAS in Palestine and Ḥizbullah in Lebanon are cause for great Israeli concern. Most Iranians have little interest in Israel, but many are concerned by threats of war from either side, having so recently experienced a devastating war.

Iran’s foreign policy is decided by a group of leaders, with Leader Khamenei the most important, and Ahmadinejad less important than several others who are seen as more pragmatic and realistic. The extent of Iranian aid to Shi’i groups abroad and to the Sunni HAMAS are subjects of major controversy. Some US announcements of material proof of Iranians arming Iraqi Shi’i and Sunni oppositionists have been followed by embarrassing cancellations of sessions to present this proof. Several outside countries, notably the US, are involved militarily in the struggles in Iraq and elsewhere, and Iranian aid to their allies is far from unique. Iran is friendly with Iraq’s Shi’i rulers and does not want a highly unstable Iraq on its borders, so claims of official Iranian aid to militant Sunni oppositionists in Iraq do not appear credible. At most Iran does not want Iraq to become so peaceful because of US policies, including aid to Sunni forces, that it might encourage US attacks on Iran.

The greatest boon to Iran’s international influence has probably been US foreign policy under George W. Bush, which continued largely to benefit Iran.
In Iraq, Iran has been able to maintain good relations with various Shīʿī factions, including both the government of Nūrī al Mālikī (PM 2006) and the forces represented by Muqtada’ al Ṣadr. The US toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government and dissolution of the Sunnī Baathist led army and civil service left Shīʿīs, in partial alliance with the Kurds, in control of the Iraqi government and military. Restrictive interpretations of Shiʿism are dominant in Basra and much of the south, Iranian pilgrims and others contribute to the Iraqi economy, and Iranian influences are significant.

In Afghanistan, Iran co operated with the US in overthrowing the militantly Sunnī Taliban, and is now on friendly terms with the Hamid Karzai (pres. 2002) government, and also with the governments of Pakistan and India. Iran also benefits from its relations with HAMAS in Palestine and with Ḥizbullāh in Lebanon, which in May 2008 achieved a significant role in Lebanon’s government. Iran, with its lack of major internal strife, its benefits from the US overthrow of hostile neighbours, its over 70 million people and its profits from high oil prices, is now stronger in its region than ever before. Iranian rulers have not been militarily adventurous or aggressive; they know that both the US and Israel have arsenals of varied atomic and conventional weapons that could cause terrible destruction and that there is no way they could militarily challenge either country that would not visit unacceptable damage on Iran. While Ahmadinejad has some bizarre religious and other ideas, he has not threatened military action against anyone, nor is his position in Iran such that he could carry out such action even if he wanted. Iranians want international respect and guarantees against attacks and military aid to their opponents, and any major international negotiation on other issues would have to grant these to be effective. Before 2009, US leaders several times made statements in favour of US action for ‘regime change’, implying US action to topple the current regime. To be successful, any US negotiations with Iran would have to result in US disavowal of acts favouring regime change. Leading Iranian reformers, including Akbar Ganjī and Shirin Ebadi, favour such negotiations rather than military or subversive acts. They and others say that threats by the United States weaken reform by uniting Iranians and allowing the government to discredit reformers by associating them with a US enemy.

Under Ahmadinejad the nuclear issue came to the fore as Iran became capable of enriching uranium to a degree useful for its planned and Russian aided nuclear energy plants. All Iranian officials have consistently stated that Iran has no nuclear weapons programme and repudiates nuclear weapons in its future. However, in 2005 6 Iran resumed uranium enrichment after
a temporary suspension, saying it was for necessary peaceful purposes. Iran’s nuclear acts have mostly, but not 100 per cent, been in accord with the International Atomic Energy Association and the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, but Iran has refused to halt enrichment as most governments in the West are demanding. In 2005 the US National Intelligence Estimate, reflecting the judgement of all sixteen US intelligence agencies, judged that Iran had an active nuclear weapons programme. This, however, was repudiated in the November 2007 Iran National Intelligence Estimate, which stated with ‘high confidence’ that Iran had halted a nuclear weapons programme in 2003, and with ‘moderate confidence’ that the programme remains frozen. It says that the enrichment programme could give Iran enough material to produce a nuclear weapon by the middle of next decade but that intelligence agencies ‘do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons’ at some future date. The Russians said there was no evidence that Iran had ever pursued a nuclear weapons programme, but others dispute this.

Iran, under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty to which it adheres, has the right to continue enriching uranium for peaceful use, subject to International Atomic Energy Association inspections. Many people think Iran wants to enrich to a point that it could develop weapons within, say, six months, a policy followed by several other countries already. The non-proliferation treaty requires nuclear powers to move toward nuclear disarmament much faster than they have, and prominent Americans of varied political views have spoken in favour of policies leading to world wide nuclear disarmament as the only way to avoid further proliferation and the danger of war, whether accidental or deliberate. US policy under Bush was one of a partially successful UN Security Council tightening of sanctions on Iran, and continuing assertions that US military action against Iran was still possible if Iran did not radically change its policies. A variety of voices, including that of a major government appointed committee report led by Democrat Lee Hamilton and Republican James Baker, have spoken out in favour of high level negotiations with Iran without programmatic preconditions. Robert Gates signed this report before becoming secretary of defence and continues to stress negotiations, while ex vice president Richard Cheney has spoken more aggressively.

Israel’s leaders have been the most concerned about Iran. They probably know that Iran would not launch a suicidal attack against them, but a nuclear Iran would be more difficult to attack or to pressure into concessions — witness US negotiations with North Korea as against its attack on non nuclear Iraq. Some Israeli (and fewer US) leaders have threatened attacks to set back
Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Such attacks could risk killing many civilians, would allow Iran to retaliate in Iraq or elsewhere, or force oil prices to go sky high, and might well not achieve their nuclear goal. There is evidence of US and Israeli interference in favour of disaffected groups among Iranian ethnic minorities. US and Israeli threats strengthen Iranians’ support for their government, despite discontent over its socio economic and cultural policies.

In March April 2008 there were elections for a new majlis. Thousands of candidates, including many reformists, were disqualified before the elections, which discouraged some people from participating. Conservative supporters of Ahmadinejad won a big victory, though there is still a bloc of reformist delegates and many conservatives who are dissatisfied with Ahmadinejad. Inflation, unemployment and corruption remain big issues, and there have been some strikes, protests and anti government acts, but regarding foreign policy and nuclear independence for the construction of reactors most people support the government. The overwhelming election of ‘Ali Larijani, formerly National Security Adviser and nuclear negotiator, to be speaker of the parliament indicated some conservative disaffection from Ahmadinejad’s domestic and foreign policies and a major challenge to him for the presidency in the 2009 elections.

**Minorities in Iran**

About half of Iran’s people are native Persian speakers, mostly Shi‘i. Iran’s minorities are all distinct, but they may be ranged in several categories. There are religious minorities, some of which have distinctive ethnicities. These include Zoroastrians, who were formerly predominantly poor and discriminated against, but got much educational and other help from India’s Parsis and were also raised in status by twentieth century Iranian nationalists, who glorify pre Islamic Iran. There are also Jews, once c. 75,000, now down to c. 25,000, whose formerly low status was also raised in modern times partly due to foreign pressure. Under the Islamic Republic many have emigrated but the community retains recognised rights and, like the Zoroastrians and Christians, a representative in the majlis. The head of the Iranian Jewish community in 2005 wrote to Ahmadinejad objecting strongly to his statements on the Holocaust, and posted the letter on the Web. Christians are divided into Armenians of different denominations and Assyrians. The largest religious minority are the Bahá‘ís, who, being the dominant branch of the nineteenth century Bábí offshoot of Shi‘ism, are treated as an unrecognised and apostate group and have been subject to the worst forms of discrimination under the Islamic Republic. This had lessened under Khátamí, but has recently
increased. Sunnī Muslims have had no official recognition of their form of Islam, and are not allowed to build mosques in some cities.

Ethno linguistic minorities may also be divided into different categories. Internal tribal federations like the Qashqai and Bakhtiari are now mostly settled and not rebellious. The largest ethnic minority, the Azerbaijani Turks, are now found in many of Iran’s cities and are generally integrated into Iran’s economic, religious and political power elites, though Azerbaijanis have grievances, especially regarding more respect for ethnic Turks and more use of their language. There has also been some separatist agitation tied to the Azerbaijan Republic to the north and possibly to other outside powers.

More problematic are other ethno linguistic minorities with related groups over the border. The north eastern Kurds have a history of autonomist agitation and struggle. Their Shīʿī minority are more tied to Iran, but many in their Sunnī and other non Shīʿī majority have fought for autonomy and for some relations with Kurds in Iraq and elsewhere. The south eastern Arabs are overwhelmingly Shīʿī and remained loyal in the Iran Iraq war, but have socio economic grievances and have some separatists, including militants, among them. The northern Turkomans are Sunnī and were the scene of socio economic revolt after the 1979 revolution. The Sunnī Baluchis have linguistic ties to Baluch in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and have been involved in local revolts. Both presidents Khāṭamī and Ahmadinejad took some steps to meet the economic and linguistic grievances of the border minorities, but they were far from sufficient to overcome the economic favouring of the centre and its predominantly Persian and Azerbaijani elites. There is evidence that Americans and Israelis have tried to take advantage of minority resentments against the Iranian government, and they have been accused of complicity in some of the violent incidents involving border ethnic minorities.

Women under Ahmadinejad
Ahmadinejad seems to have been personally open to letting women have some further freedoms, as when he ruled that they could attend soccer games, but was forced by conservative clerics to rescind this. His supporters in the clergy, the Revolutionary Guard and the street enforcers Basīj and Ḥizbollāhs are very restrictive regarding women. There have been increasing crackdowns on women’s dress and behaviour. In August 2006, following a peaceful protest favouring an end to laws discriminating against women, women leaders launched a campaign for ‘One Million Signatures Demanding Changes to Discriminatory Laws’. Modelled on a similar campaign in Morocco, which had succeeded in achieving major legal reforms thanks largely to a
favourable king, the Iranian women similarly argued that legal equality was compatible with Islam. They used their petitions to speak with ordinary women in their homes and identify their needs and grievances. In Iran, however, the government has arrested and for a time jailed several leaders of the campaign on trumped up charges and continues to block the free collection of signatures.

In mid 2007 authorities arrested three visiting Iranian Americans, including Haleh Esfandiari, head of the Middle East programme at the Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington, DC, and a long time scholar and activist regarding Iranian women, on false espionage charges. Esfandiari had opened the centre to a wide variety of speakers and opinions about Iran and the Middle East. She was kept in solitary confinement in Evin prison and interrogated repeatedly. Esfandiari was released after several months of international protest.

In 2008 the government shut down the important women’s journal Zanân. On the Web and in private spheres, however, many women continue to push the envelope regarding free expression and action, and some gains in education and public health continue. There is an ongoing ‘two cultures’ division regarding attitudes toward women’s rights, with some seeing feminism and women’s rights, like human rights, as a Western imposition, and many popular class men not wanting to give up the one sphere in which they have power over others. There are also differences of opinion regarding homosexuality, with a few legally dubious death sentences for homosexual rape of minors. Even if rare, death sentences and whipping for sexual ‘crimes’ arouse horror among many within and outside Iran and are one aspect of an attempted revival of Khomeini type interpretations of Islamic law and practice. Major punishments for various sexual behaviours were formerly common in the Christian West and elsewhere, and it may be hoped that the world wide trend toward tolerant attitudes and practices, which is already very strong among educated Iranians, will be resumed in the future.

Discontent is widespread in Iran, mainly due to inflation, corruption and economic difficulties, but the strong reaction and jailings that greeted women’s, labour, and student protests for a time discouraged open activity. Nor does discontent mean that any large group expects a rapid end to the regime. Ahmadinejad retains popularity among the marginalised. There continued to be far more public statement of opposition, including by leading figures, and more influence on the government by public opinion than in most Middle Eastern countries, however.
Repression and electoral protests, spring autumn 2009

In April 2009, Iranian American journalist Roxana Saberi was sentenced to eight years in prison as a US spy, but she was released in May after spending four months in prison, and court dropped the spying charge. However, Kian Tajbakhsh, an Iranian American scholar imprisoned and later released for spying at about the same time as Haleh Esfandiari in 2007, was re arrested in September 2009 and tried and sentenced to twelve years in prison. As with Esfandiari, one group in Iran’s government with power in the judiciary showed itself paranoid about US and Israeli plans to overthrow Iran’s govern ment, citing various congressional and CIA actions. Three American hikers were arrested on 31 July in Iran after they crossed into Iranian territory and were imprisoned for spying.

Iran’s 12 June presidential elections created an unexpected crisis within Iran. There were two reform candidates, Mir Husayn Musavi and Mehdi Karubi, and two conservatives, Ahmadinejad and Muhsin Rezai. Urban populations were heavily involved in a unexpectedly lively campaign. Several women’s groups made the candidates answer questions on their policies toward women. Musavi’s wife, Zahra Rahnevard, was active in his campaign in a first for Iran. Musavi also challenged Ahmadinejad in an unprecedented TV debate.

Several sources indicated that Ahmadinejad’s forces were prepared to falsify election results in order to ensure his victory. Mobile phone communications were interrupted in Tehran on election day and BBC broadcasts were jammed. Many voters reported being turned away and other electoral irregularities. An Iranian news website later identified at least thirty polling sites with turnout over 100 per cent and 200 sites with turnout over 95 per cent. On 21 June 2009, a spokesman from the Guardian Council argued this was normal, as people are not obliged to vote where registered, but opponents denied this. It seems clear that many irregularities occurred, including an impossibly early statement of Ahmadinejad’s receipt of 63 per cent of the vote.

Clashes broke out between police and groups protesting the election results from 13 June onward. At first they were peaceful, but they became increasingly violent, as angry crowds in Tehran broke into shops, tore down signs and smashed windows, and police, Revolutionary Guards and Basij increasingly used lethal violence. Demonstrations grew bigger every day. Cell phones with cameras kept both Iranians and the world informed in an unprecedented global use of new communications media.

On 15 June, Musavi showed up, with anywhere from hundreds of thousands to three million of his supporters in Tehran, despite being warned that
any such rally would be illegal. This demonstration, the largest in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s thirty year history, was Musavi’s first post election appearance, and he continued to speak out thereafter. Protests focused around Azadi Tower, around which lines of people stretching for more than nine kilometres met. All three opposition candidates appeared.

Further demonstrations and rallies continued, despite increasing government crackdowns. On the weekend of 13 14 June, in raids across Tehran, the government arrested over 170 people. An estimated 200 people were detained after clashes with students at Tehran university, although some were later released. Government forces continually tied protestors to foreign plots against the government. Prominent Iranians continued to be arrested and not always released. The Revolutionary Guard, the Basij and the police often used lethal force, killing many demonstrators. The young Neda Agha Sultan’s killing on 20 June was caught on camera and quickly sent around the world, where she became a symbol of protest, repression and martyrdom. Many other women were prominent in leading and encouraging the protests.

From August the regime held show trials with some forced confessions but others remaining defiant, and several demonstrators were sentenced to death and more to prison terms. Many protestors died both during the protests and in prison, where Musavi disclosed sexual and other atrocities. In October protestors took to the streets during the annual Jerusalem Day anti Israel rallies. In November police in Tehran used batons and tear gas to disperse protest rallies on the thirtieth anniversary of the seizure of the US embassy. By November the government had made no concessions, and continually tied protests to alleged US, British, and Israeli plots to overthrow the regime.

2009 negotiations on nuclear and other issues

Barack Obama in his 2008 campaign favoured changing US policies toward Iran, including unconditional opening of negotiations with Iran on nuclear and other issues. When Obama won in November, Ahmadinejad congratulated him in the first such congratulation to a newly elected US president by an Iranian president since the 1979 hostage crisis. On 19 March 2009, the beginning of the Nowruz festival, Obama spoke directly to the Iranian people in a video saying ‘The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations. You have that right but it comes with real responsibilities.’

After the Iranian election protests the US administration decided not to abandon nuclear negotiations nor intervene beyond objecting verbally to violations of human rights, which Obama did. After Obama’s election the
US joined international efforts to solve the nuclear issue. Until then the Bush administration had rejected or ignored several Iranian proposals. France, Germany and the UK (the EU3) had offered Iran several proposals to resolve the nuclear issue in 2003. China, Russia and the United States joined these three in 2006 to form the ‘P5+1’ meaning the permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. Iran proposed different approaches than those of the P5+1.

Under Obama the P5+1 sought to renew negotiations with Iran. In April 2009 the other five countries welcomed ‘the new direction of US policy towards Iran’, formally inviting Iran to talks once again. Iran responded in September, when Tehran issued a revised proposal. It repeated several provisions of a proposal Iran issued in 2008, and did not discuss the nuclear issue. Instead, the proposal covered other issues of importance to Iran: co operation to address terrorism, drug trafficking, crime and piracy; UN and Security Council reform; codification of rights for the use of space; promoting a ‘rule based’ and ‘equitable’ IAEA oversight function; promoting universal adherence to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and WMD non proliferation. At negotiations in Geneva the Iranian representative agreed to renewed IAEA inspections of Iranian sites and, apparently, to a proposal to send a significant quantity of nuclear fuel to Russia for further enrichment for medical purposes. However, the latter idea was then rejected by Tehran authorities, under pressure from both the right and Musavi, who wanted to use it against Ahmadinejad. Iranian electoral protestors have not embraced Western nuclear demands. No important Iranians have advocated nuclear weapons, but none wants to accept foreign control of peaceful nuclear activities that are not imposed on other states.

Inspections continued and various alternative compromises were being discussed in late 2009, but thus far without resolution. It seems clear that negotiation will require much patience and diplomacy, but most specialists do not see any useful outcome from the alternatives of increased sanctions or force, and it is unclear if Russia or especially China will agree to significantly stronger sanctions. The nuclear issue may not be separable from the other issues that many Iranians find important to give their country the international standing it deserves, including security against attacks. Many Iranians do not accept being subject to terms that are not imposed on India, Pakistan or Israel.

Conclusion

Many persons and groups originally supported the Iranian revolution thinking it would mean freedom from the autocratic shah and from foreign control.
Except for those who supported theocracy, Iranians were rather quickly disillusioned as clerical rule was established, oppositional parties and media were suppressed, strict Islamic law and censorship were enforced, universities were closed for three years as part of a so called Cultural Revolution and strict limits were put on pre-existing women’s rights. In fields like education, health, rural development and some features of women’s lives, post-revolutionary Iran has made some impressive advances more than most outsiders realise. A loosening of cultural restrictions and censorship from their early extremes took place after 1989, beginning under President Rafsanjānī and particularly in the first few years of the reformist presidency of Khātāmī. Conservative forces, however, remained stronger than the president. They controlled the judiciary, the Guardian Council, much of the economy and top government bureaucracy; the military remains under the orders of the fāqīh, who is commander in chief. When conservatives saw reformist cultural and political trends as endangering their power, they began to crack down, especially on newspapers and media in 2000, although some advances in cultural and behavioural freedom continued as long as they did not pose a direct political threat. Many reformers turned against President Khātāmī, whose term ended in 2005. He was seen as either unwilling or unable to fight basically to implement the reforms demanded by the huge opposition and by the reformist parliament elected in 2000 reforms that were vetoed by the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council disqualified so many reformist parliamentary candidates in 2004 that many boycotted the elections and conservatives won. The electoral victory of President Ahmadinejad in 2005 and his subsequent rule reinforced the conservative trend.

Current trends are towards cultural and behavioural severity and sporadic crackdowns, although much behaviour that would have been strictly punished in the 1980s continues, while problems of the economy and unemployment add to a continuing brain drain and widespread disillusionment. Young people, who were in the forefront of demonstrations, now mostly think demonstrations achieve only jail and injury. As a result, most prefer to push for their personal space in inter-sex relations, finding and consuming foreign cultural items and also forbidden items like drugs and alcohol. On the other hand, many young people take extra classes in the arts, sports, electronics and other fields and become high achievers in school, but double digit unemployment after they graduate adds to the pessimism caused by the political and cultural situation. Current disillusionment and feelings of political impotence are not universal or permanent, but for the moment they remain the dominant trend. The popular classes often support cultural conservatism but are
increasingly concerned with inflation, food shortages, corruption and the growing gap between the rich and the poor.

The government gets wide support on nuclear independence not only for energy needs, but national pride, as well as for what is seen as its international defence of Iran’s interests. Aggressive US statements regarding Iran mainly strengthen the government’s support, while detente could give freer rein to the opposition. Many on both sides in the Iran US struggle have distorted views of the other and of their own government’s role, and any resolution of disputes might require both to open themselves to a more complete picture of the other.
Introduction

Since the nineteenth century, when it became abundantly clear that the Islamic world had become economically underdeveloped with respect to Western Europe and its cultural offshoots on other continents, diverse thinkers have explored whether this slippage has had anything to do with Islam. One answer is that Islam has always been irrelevant to the economic development of Muslim dominated societies. The underlying logic is that from the rise of Islam to the present Muslims circumvented Islamic prescriptions with ease.¹ A competing answer, increasingly common in both popular and scholarly discourses, is that Islam has impaired economic development by discouraging inquisitiveness, change and adaptation. The exponents of this viewpoint invoke factors such as Islam’s alleged ban on interest and its traditionalist bias.²

Yet another competing viewpoint is that the Islamic world slipped into a state of economic underdevelopment not because Islam inhibited growth but, on the contrary, because Muslims stopped abiding by its time tested economic prescriptions. By this account, Islam has always promoted and supported economic development, and what became a problem is not its set of economic prescriptions. Rather, for selfish material gain politically powerful Muslims upset the just social order that prevailed during Islam’s canonical ‘age of felicity’, the period from 622 to 661, spanning the last decade of Prophet Muhammad’s life and the tenure of the first four caliphs. Thereafter, the governance of the community got corrupted and the moral fibre of its

¹ This view is developed most fully by Maxime Rodinson, Islam and capitalism, trans. Brian Pearce (New York, 1973).
members weakened, initiating a long descent that culminated in the colonisation of vast Muslim territories and economic injustice on an unprecedented scale. An obvious implication is that today’s Muslims can overcome under development through a ‘return to Islam’.³

Islamic economics

The last of these three theses lies at the core of ‘Islamic economics’, a contemporary school of thought whose stated goal is to restructure economic relations on the basis of fundamental Islamic teachings. Not all living Muslim economists subscribe to it, or even take it seriously. At least implicitly most of today’s Muslim economists treat economics as a secular domain. However, a vocal minority wants to ground economics in religion. This minority forms a component of the global movement known as Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism. The broader movement seeks to rebuild the entire social order according to presumed Islamic principles.

The basic argument of Islamic economics is simple: many verses of the Qur’an encourage effort and enrichment, and the economic prescriptions developed during Islam’s earliest period are ideally suited to economic development. Specifically, Islam’s contract law, financial regulations, distributional instruments and behavioural norms provide an institutional framework conducive to enrichment in a socially just way. For proof, say Islamic economists, one needs to look only at the impressive economic record of the first Islamic society in seventh century Arabia.⁴

Although little is known about the economic record of the earliest Muslims, it is abundantly clear that during the first few centuries of Islam regions under Muslim rule flourished economically. Also beyond doubt is that economic institutions assimilated or incorporated into Islamic law contributed to the observed economic growth. However, these indisputable facts leave open the

³ For one variant of this argument, see Muhammad Hussain, Development planning in an Islamic state (Karachi, 1987), p. 14.
possibility of growth inhibiting influences, at one time or another. In principle, the early Muslims might have been economically successful in spite of obstacles to development grounded in Islam. The primary source of economic advancement might have been the mixing of cultures generated by conquests, conversions and political reorganisation. In any case, even if Islam promoted growth for a while, it obviously failed to ensure quick adaptations to later opportunities. Perhaps, then, Islam has been less conducive to economic development under certain conditions than under others.

Islamic economics rejects this interpretation out of hand. Indeed, it attributes all Muslim economic successes to institutional and moral changes instigated by Islam from scratch, without building on pre-Islamic structures or drawing on the experiences of non-Muslims. By the same token, it ascribes all subsequent failures to forces that made Muslims become, after the brief age of felicity, progressively readier to depart from Islamic norms. If the Islamic world is currently poor, it says, the reason lies in aspirations, events and personalities that made Muslims stop practising their religion faithfully. The foregoing historical interpretation makes all accomplishments of Islamic civilisation after the early period—even the splendours of Baghdad under Harun al-Rashid (r. 786-809) and of Istanbul under Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520-66)—appear as degeneration. It leaves unaddressed why Muslims fell victim to corrupting influences. At least implicitly, moreover, it treats the ideal economy as static. The key to economic success, it holds, lies in identifying and preserving the institutions spelled out in the fundamental sources of Islam, rather than in optimising institutional responsiveness and flexibility.

Some Islamic economists go beyond denying the existence of links between Islam and the reality of the Islamic world’s present economic shortcomings. In addition, they downplay the West’s economic achievements. As they see it, the West’s economic expansion has induced vast economic inequalities as well as massive unhappiness, as evidenced by millions of Westerners dependent on psychotherapy. As such, the economies of the West offer little worth emulating, and their evolution should not even be characterised as development. The key to development worthy of the name lies in restoring Islamic economic patterns and returning to the pristine simplicity of the age of felicity.5

What such a revival would mean in practice is a matter of heated contention. Nevertheless, there are basic assumptions and perceptions shared by

5 For the full blown argument, see Ahmad R. Haffar, ‘Economic development in Islam in Western scholarship’, Islam and the Modern Age, 6, 2 (1975), pp. 5-22 and 6, 3, pp. 5-29.
almost all contributors to Islamic economics. In a properly Islamic economy, they say, the individual leads a distinctly Islamic way of life; his entire existence is governed by Islamic rules and regulations—family, marriage, dress, entertainment, education, politics and, of course, economics. In each of these domains, they believe, there is a clear demarcation between Islamic and unIslamic behaviours. Still another perception is that the ongoing march of history favours the spread of Islamism. Earlier generations of Islamists had predicted that capitalism and communism, the two major economic systems of the modern era, were both doomed to fail, because in different ways each bred injustice, inequity and inefficiency. Capitalism offers broad freedoms but is rife with exploitation. Socialism provides relatively more equality but limits personal freedoms and denies the individual respect. One part of this prediction has already been borne out with the collapse of communism in 1991. Capitalism is next, say Islamic economists; it will collapse like a pack of cards as soon as someone exposes its vulnerability. The global economy is all interconnected, and if one of its components gets destroyed, panic will set in, bringing down the rest.

The economic system that Islamic economics proposes as an improvement has three distinguishing features, each ostensibly based on fundamental Islamic teachings and early Islamic practices. The first is an Islamic banking system that avoids interest, considered to be prohibited explicitly and unequivocally by the Qur’ān. The establishment of Islamic banking would eliminate, it is believed, a huge source of exploitation in the contemporary global economy; it would also unleash hidden reservoirs of economic creativity. Second, there would be an Islamic redistribution system, zakāt, based on principles of charity and sharing found in the Qur’ān. This system would dampen inequalities and guarantee everyone a dignified existence. Finally, the norms of economic behaviour thought to have prevailed in early Islam would be reinstituted, to promote fairness and honesty in the marketplace. In so far as these norms were followed, confidence in the economic system would improve, stimulating investment and growth.

Islamic banking

In the vast literature that develops, defines and promotes Islamic economics, by far the most popular topic is Islamic banking. Unsurprisingly, Islamic banking is also the most visible practical initiative undertaken in the name of Islamisation. As of 2005, twenty three countries have Islamic banks founded to borrow, lend, collect deposits and invest on an interest free basis; their
deposits exceed $200 billion. Subsidiaries of these banks or conventional banks offering Islamic services are in operation in more than forty other countries. Unlike a conventional bank, an Islamic bank is supposed to avoid fixed, risk free returns. To profit from a loan legitimately, the bank must share in the borrower’s possible losses in return for a share of any gains. Likewise, an account holder must share in the bank’s possible losses in return for a share of any capital gains achieved through the account.

The Islamic bank must operate, in effect, like the venture financiers that have bankrolled, among other young sectors, the world’s high technology sectors. A venture financier lends to promising entrepreneurs in return for shares of their potential gains. Many of these entrepreneurs will fail, but even a single major success may suffice to make the venture financier profitable in the aggregate. The contract between a venture financier and an upstart firm is formally identical to a form of partnership widely used throughout the pre modern Islamic world: the muḍāraba. Under Islamic contract law, muḍāraba is typically formed between one investor and one merchant. The former provides capital to the latter in return for a share of any returns of the financed commercial venture. On the downside, if the merchant goes down in a shipwreck with his wares, the investor loses his entire investment.

Islamic banks around the world claim to have formed partnerships modelled after muḍāraba with each of their thousands of account holders. Accordingly, as compensation these account holders receive not interest but variable ‘profit shares’. However, the fluctuations in these ‘profit shares’ closely follow the movements of ordinary interest rates. Indeed, in countries that allow both conventional banks, which deal in interest openly, and ‘interest free’ Islamic banks, the returns of account holders are more or less identical. In fact, their clerks are known to promise account holders that their returns are almost certain to match the prevailing interest rate. This suggests that the Islamic banks themselves earn returns tied to interest rates. They could not pay returns tied to the interest rate if their investment incomes were genuinely variable.


Kuran, Islam and mammon, pp. 7 13, 43 9.
By the 1990s even many Islamic economists were acknowledging that the world’s Islamic banks were avoiding the risky investments required by their charters. No commercial Islamic bank has ever put more than 30 per cent of its assets into risky investments, and typically the figure is about 1 or 2 per cent. Moreover, the trend has been downward, which calls for an explanation.

The Islamic banks have been using a substantial share of their assets to finance resale contracting (mura‘abaha). Typically such contracting involves buying commodities on behalf of a client, who then pays, along with a predetermined mark up, at a future date. Islamic economics by and large treats this mark up as legitimate on the ground that the bank exposes itself to risk by taking ownership of commodities for some period. Were the commodities to suffer damage during that time the loss would fall wholly on the bank. However, as a matter of practice, the bank’s risk is negligible, because its ownership lasts barely a few seconds and, in any case, the buyer is required to insure the goods bought on his behalf. In effect, the bank charges the client a fee for the time value of money; this fee is precisely what any economist will recognise as interest. Like resale contracting, the Islamic banks’ other forms of investment yield essentially fixed returns.

The reason why the Islamic banks give and take interest as a matter of course is not that their executives lack religious commitment. Rather, almost everywhere they are in competition with conventional banks, so that those lending on the basis of genuine profit and loss sharing receive a disproportionately large share of the bad investment risks. The underlying economic logic is elementary: whereas entrepreneurs with relatively very risky projects prefer to borrow on the basis of profit and loss sharing (in order to minimise their losses in the likely event of failure), those with unusually safe and promising projects prefer to borrow from conventional banks at interest (to maximise their gains in the likely event of success). The Islamic bank thus faces an adverse selection problem, in that its loan applications come primarily from the types of entrepreneurs that it would rather avoid.

All venture financiers face adverse selection. Through training and experience the successful ones learn to identify the worst risks. In principle, therefore, Islamic banking could train its loan officers to filter out bad proposals. However, even Islamic banks that have hired graduates of leading business schools are highly reluctant to engage in profit and loss sharing. The reasons for avoidance of profit and loss sharing must go beyond, then, adverse selection and the inability to screen projects effectively.

A common practice in many of the countries where Islamic banks operate is double bookkeeping: one set of accounts for top management, another for the tax collector. Under the circumstances, an Islamic bank is reluctant to lend to a firm on the basis of profit and loss sharing unless it can sit on the latter’s board. However, for fear that information about its true profitability will leak to the government, the typical firm will let no banker monitor its operations. The fundamental explanation for the rarity of genuine profit and loss sharing lies, then, in an informational asymmetry: clients know more about their business prospects than banks possibly can. This asymmetry creates mistrust between banks and their potential clients, making resale contracting, a compensation mechanism that requires no monitoring, mutually preferable to profit and loss sharing.\(^10\)

Throughout the Islamic world the supply of venture capital has been limited precisely because of inadequate transparency in business. Consequently, vast numbers of talented and potentially successful entrepreneurs have lacked credit in the absence of connections. Thus, if Islamic banks had been abiding by their charters, they would have done a great economic service to the countries of the Middle East, South Asia and Far East, where most are located. It does not follow, however, that in giving and taking interest they have brought economic harm. On the contrary, they have stimulated domestic and international trade, and enabled a wide range of companies to buy equipment on credit. The very fact that these banks have maintained profitability for so long and attracted vast deposits proves that they fill a need.

**Islamic redistribution**

If the leading practical initiative of Islamic economics has been Islamic banking, the second has been the establishment of Islamic redistribution systems modelled after the zakat system practised in seventh century Arabia. Like every other major religion, Islam stands opposed to great inequalities in the distribution of resources. It advocates compassion towards the poor and the disadvantaged. The extent of charity is left to the individual’s conscience, although it is clear that full equality is not an objective, only the alleviation of the worst imbalances. The Qur’ān provides two instruments for lessening inequality. One is an inheritance law that limits testamentary freedoms, most

importantly, in requiring equal treatment of all children of the same sex. The
other, which Islamic economics considers more fundamental, is zakāt.

In the earliest Muslim community people of means paid zakāt to the
treasury on specific forms of income and wealth, including livestock and
precious metals. In accordance with the Qur‘ān, the proceeds were used for
assistance to specific categories of expenditure, such as the spread of Islam,
travellers in difficulty, dependants of prisoners, the poor and the handicapped.
Significantly, expenditures were not limited to inequality or poverty reduc-
tion. However, it is the distributional objective that has caught the attention
of modern Islamists. Literature produced especially in the 1970s and 1980s
argued that fourteen centuries ago zakāt was a very effective instrument of
inequality reduction and that today’s vast inequalities may be reduced by
reviving zakāt throughout the Islamic world.

Actually, no hard evidence exists on how zakāt affected the distribution of
income among early Muslims. In any case, the effects would doubtless differ
substantially in a modern economy, where most wealth is held in forms not
covered by zakāt—housing, industrial capital, transportation vehicles, stocks,
bonds and most income is earned outside of agriculture. Moreover, the
traditional rates are generally lower than those of the prevailing secular
taxation systems. It follows that reviving zakāt in its ancient form could
produce perverse results. Nevertheless, in certain countries, including
Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen, governments of the
mid and late twentieth century put in place obligatory zakāt systems, each
resembling the original zakāt system in important respects, but exhibiting also
major differences. In each of these countries, a major justification for
reviving zakāt, as opposed to making the existing tax code more progressive,
is that it would be easy to collect. People would willingly pay zakāt, it was said,
even as they evaded tax obligations, for the typical Muslim considers it an
expression of piety. Muslims widely believed, it was also claimed, that zakāt
pays for itself, in that payers became financially more successful through
Divine Grace. Finally, because of its religious nature, the system would
essentially be free of corruption.

None of these high expectations have materialised. Inequality has not fallen
in any country with an official zakāt system. By the early 1990s even leading

11 Timur Kuran, ‘Islamic redistribution through zakāt: Historical record and modern
realities’, in Michael Bonner, Mine Ener and Amy Singer (eds.), Poverty and charity in
Islamists were conceding this point. In the late 1980s roughly one tenth of the Pakistanis below the government’s official poverty line were receiving some support under the rubric of zakāt, usually about a quarter of what was considered necessary for basic subsistence. The remaining nine tenths were not benefiting in the least. Most recipients belonged to the lower middle class of a major city, and those funds came not from the wealthy but from city dwellers of similar means. In 1988, when Pakistan’s official poverty line stood at 241 Rupees per year, the average annual income of recipients was 410 Rupees, only slightly under the average of 447 Rupees for donors. The effect of Pakistan’s zakāt system was hardly, then, to transfer resources from rich to poor. Rather, it shuffled resources within the lower middle class. The wealthy managed to shelter their assets in forms of wealth exempt from zakāt, such as stocks and overseas bank accounts. Meanwhile, in Malaysia redistribution was mostly upward, from poor farmers to two generally wealthier groups: students at religious schools and administrators of the zakāt system. Zakāt revenue was coming from small scale rice producers; coconut and rubber growers were exempt, as were most urban residents, on the ground that the fundamental sources of Islam do not specify applicable rates.

These and other applications of zakāt have furnished tests of various earlier mentioned claims. For example, it has become clear that willingness to pay zakāt is not necessarily greater than the willingness to pay secular taxes. In both Pakistan and Malaysia groups not explicitly covered by the system have been invited to make voluntary contributions, but the responses have been negligible. At the same time, there have been many attempts, some of them successful, to insert loopholes into the collection system evidence that, like paying taxes, paying zakāt to a government agency is widely considered a burden. As for the claim that a zakāt system, because of its religious basis, would be immune to corruption, applications to date have proved disappointing. Both

13 This is evident from every contribution to a conference volume edited by Ahmed Abdel Fattah el Ashker and Muhammad Sirajul Haq, Institutional framework of zakah: Dimensions and implications (Jeddah, 1995).
the Pakistani and Malaysian zakāt systems have suffered from petty corruption, and there have also been reports of more serious systemic problems.

Innovations and reforms

These experiences have generated much soul searching and rethinking among Islamic economists and within the broader Islamist movement as well. In fact, the 1990s saw growing support for reforms considered heretical just a few decades earlier, when modernists objected to the zakāt systems on the drawing board. The most prominent dissenter was Fazlur Rahman (1919–88), a Pakistani scholar who, starting in the 1960s, argued that to become an effective economic instrument a modern zakāt system should be based on universal economic principles and accommodate prevailing economic realities. Accordingly, he wanted the sources of revenue to include commodities and occupations unknown in early Islam and rates and expenditure categories to be adjusted in the light of changing social needs. These proposals drew vociferous objections from Islamists committed, at least in principle, to the immutability of the Islamic social order. In 1969 Rahman was forced to flee Pakistan under death threats, and he became a professor at the University of Chicago, where he served until the end of his life. Ironically, even though each of the subsequently instituted zakāt systems was presented as a replica of the seventh century system, all involved unacknowledged, and often also unique, innovations. For example, bank deposits were made ‘zakātable’ once a year in Pakistan, but not in Malaysia; and in Pakistan officials of the zakāt administration were paid out of government funds, in Malaysia out of zakāt receipts, in accordance with early Islamic practice.

By the dawn of the twenty first century, it had become commonplace to encounter proposals for collecting zakāt from a broader class of people than mentioned in traditional sources, for updating rates and for monitoring zakāt officials. In fact, a sizeable minority was proposing that from the standpoint of poverty alleviation zakāt funds were better used for education and training than for financing immediate consumption. Each of these proposals departs from the specifics of what is considered the zakāt system implemented in Arabia, during the first few decades of Islam.

However, potentially the most significant reform proposal is one embraced by only a small minority. Going beyond what Fazlur Rahman contemplated, it

concerns the definition of the community within which income and wealth transfers are to take place. Under Muhammad’s helmsmanship there was a single, and in principle undivided, Muslim community. Leaders of the poorest predominantly Muslim countries, such as Yemen, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia and Tanzania, are beginning to ask, usually privately, why zakāt transfers should now be constrained by political boundaries. The early Islamic pattern should require, they are arguing, oil wealth to be shared not only with the poor of prosperous oil producers but, more broadly, with those of the entire Islamic world. Why, one might ask, did it take so long for an international zakāt system to become a subject of discussion? After all, the poorer Muslim countries have always had strong incentives to demand large cross country transfers. The most widely disseminated publications on zakāt, and all major zakāt conferences, have been financed largely, if not wholly, by Saudi Arabia, which has been averse to automatic annual transfers based on need. Like other aid donors, Saudi Arabia prefers to have a say in the selection of its aid recipients.

For all the talk about reviving an ancient system, modern Islamic redistribution appears responsive, then, to social pressures and changing conditions. Islamic banking, too, is a recent creation. Pre modern Islam featured no banks in the modern sense, let alone ‘Islamic’ banks. There were elaborate rules to regulate financial transactions among individuals, including a law of partnerships, an inheritance law and a law of sale. However, no laws emerged to govern organisations capable of pooling the resources of thousands of people and designed to live indefinitely, like today’s Islamic banks. Legally an Islamic bank is a corporation, which is a concept that entered legal systems of the Islamic world only in the late nineteenth century, through Western influences.

Given the commitment of Islamic economics to early Islamic precedents, it may come as a surprise that the corporate character of an Islamic bank is not an issue in Islamist discourse. Evidently the corporate form has become such an integral part of Muslim life that its foreign origins are hardly recognised, let alone questioned and debated. The same can be said about a huge array of other modern concepts, institutions and practices that Islamic economics accepts by default. Looking at Islamic economics as a whole, it is striking how it focuses on a few issues, most prominently Islamic banking and Islamic redistribution, leaving vast domains essentially untouched. Although publications presenting an ostensibly Islamic viewpoint exist in most fields of economics, little else has been written that stands out, symbolism aside, as recognisably Islamic.
Why ‘Islamic’ economics?

This narrowness of Islamic economics contrasts sharply with the richness of Islam’s economic heritage. During the first few centuries of Islam, Muslim officials, including the jurists who developed and refined Islamic law, addressed various economic issues. In addition to developing partnerships to govern the pooling of labour and capital, they developed, for example, intricate rules to reduce transaction costs in diverse markets (law of sale), a form of organisation conducive to sheltering wealth and supplying public goods (waqf) and a method for facilitating the transfer of resources over long distances (ḥawāla). Not every legal choice turned out to be efficient in a static or dynamic sense. One is struck, however, by the breadth of the issues covered. Evidently the generations of Muslims who developed Islamic law aimed at solving a wide range of practical economic problems, as they presented themselves.

If the narrowness of Islamic economics presents one puzzle, another lies in the shortness of its history. The term ‘Islamic economics’ itself was coined in the 1940s. Before that time Muslim reformers who talked about defending, reforming or revitalising Islam showed no interest in economic thought per se. Those concerned with economic issues did not promote reforms grounded in Islamic scripture or even develop a discourse that was explicitly Islamic. India’s greatest Muslim writer of the early twentieth century, Muhammad Iqbal (1878–1938), wrote about economic development and also about the future of Islam, but he did not relate these two big issues. Likewise, one finds no trace of a concept such as Islamic economics in the works of others who made major contributions to Islamic thought in the decades before Mawdūdī came on stage. The writings of Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), Jamāl al Dīn al Afghānī (1838–97) and Sayyid Ahmad Khān (1817–98) betray no preoccupation with the Islamisation of economics.

Still another puzzle involves the timing of this emergence. By the 1940s the Islamic world was patently underdeveloped; its days of glory were long gone. Why, then, would someone worried about Muslim economic performance seek a solution through a ‘return to Islam’? To anyone interested in removing obstacles to economic growth and modernisation, a more promising path, it might have seemed, was to study the institutions of the West. To be sure,

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17 For a representative work, see Mohammad Iqbal, Thoughts and reflections of Iqbal, ed. Syed Abdul Vahid (Lahore, 1964).
18 On the writings of these and lesser known Islamic thinkers who preceded Mawdūdī, see Albert Hourani, Arabic thought in the liberal age, 1789–1939 (Cambridge, 1983).

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Islamic economic history is itself replete with valuable lessons for economic development. However, if it is such lessons that induced the emergence of Islamic economics, why was this revival so delayed? One might have expected the school to be initiated in the nineteenth century, if not before, as soon as it became clear that the Islamic world was underdeveloped. In any case, alleged links between the rise of Islamic economics and perceived advantages of Islamic economic institutions are suspect, for the richness of Islamic economic history is not found in Islamic economics.

The reason why the 1940s saw the rise of Islamic economics is not that creative individuals suddenly turned to Islam’s heritage for ways to improve economic performance. The school emerged in late colonial India as part of a campaign to help India’s sizeable Muslim minority adapt to modern economic conditions without compromising its religious identity or cultural integrity. Over the previous decade it became clear that India would soon gain independence and that its rulers would be selected primarily from among Hindus. Many Indian Muslims feared, partly because of the biases of Hindu dominated local governments, that a Hindu governed India would expose them to danger. Responding to this anxiety, certain Muslim leaders began arguing that their Indian co-religionists formed a distinct nation entitled to self rule. Before long the idea of Pakistan was born, and the new state became a reality in 1947.19

A minority of Muslim notables resisted the idea of a separate state controlling less than half of India. They argued that Muslims needed not political independence but cultural revival. The leader of the rejectionists was Mawdūdī (1903–79), the founder of Jami‘at i Islāmī (Party of Islam) in India and then in Pakistan. Mawdūdī’s favoured solution to the perceived danger of Hindu dominance was visible cultural reassertion. Specifically, he wanted his community to revive in daily life the diverse traditions that once brought it power and prosperity. As part of this transformation, he promoted the concept of Islamic economics, along with diverse other concepts linking Islam to matters of policy and lifestyle, such as ‘Islamic politics’, ‘Islamic constitution’, ‘Islamic redistribution’ and ‘Islamic way of life’.20

In his writings of the late 1930s and early 1940s, Mawdūdī argued that to survive as a community India’s Muslims would have to treat Islam not merely

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as a system of faith and worship but as their ‘way of life’. Yet, he observed, most Muslims were segregating Islam from vast realms of their lives. They were ‘partial Muslims’ who kept their religion invisible, causing communal disintegration. It is they, according to Mawdūdī, who bore responsibility for Muslim economic backwardness and political powerlessness, and they now posed a greater danger to Indian Islam than the looming transfer of political power to the Hindus. To reverse the trend, a campaign of cultural reassertion had to be launched. Sustained efforts had to be made to supplement private faith by acts that would keep religion in public view, making Muslims easily distinguishable as Muslims.

Economics had to be an integral part of this campaign, because economic activity is carried out mostly outside the home, implying that it may serve the cause of keeping Islam visible. In so far as buyers and sellers follow Islamic contracting procedures, consumers abide by Islamic consumption norms, savers hold accounts at Islamic banks and wealth transfers are made through Islamic procedures, Islam will gain salience. New generations of Muslims will grow up in an environment where Islam appears relevant to ordinary decisions.

The significance of these observations, Mawdūdī also believed, would only grow over time. In a technologically primitive and static world, careers are determined by family background, farmers plant crops as their grandparents did, most people have little time to spend on non subsistence goods and markets offer little variety anyway. In such a setting, where individual choice sets are severely constrained, economics may be vital to survival, but economic decision making hardly absorbs attention. By contrast, in a technologically advancing world, where individuals choose their own careers, savers must decide where to place their savings and markets offer abundant choice, economic decision making absorbs much time. Therefore, reasoned Mawdūdī, if Muslims continued to treat economic decision making as a secular activity, ongoing economic transformations would make Muslim life appear increasingly secular. However, if economic decision making were considered a religious activity, Muslim life would retain a religious character even in the face of rising prosperity.21

Every society contains people who preserve or rebuild group solidarity by promoting visible markers of group identity. So the originality of Mawdūdī’s programme did not consist of his insistence on making Muslims distinguish themselves from non-Muslims. His critical contribution was to update the meaning of Islamic orthopraxy, or behavioural correctness, to meet a new historical challenge. Although his rhetoric stressed the revival of decaying customs, in fact he did not limit his scope to domains that Islam had traditionally regulated. Conscious that the shockwaves of the Industrial Revolution were permanently altering the workings of every society, he added visible economic elements to Islamic orthopraxy.

Protectionism and culture clash

Two other factors played key roles in the emergence of Islamic economics. Mawdūdī and most of his associates had received a traditional education. As such, they expected to be at a disadvantage in a society dominated by the Western educated ‘partial Muslims’ who were spearheading the movement for Pakistan. They and their constituents had a vested interest in preserving traditional patterns of authority. Efforts to give economics a religious cast stemmed also, then, from a protectionist impulse.

The other complementary factor was rooted in the perception, shared widely both within and outside India, that Indian Muslims, especially those exposed directly to the West, were suffering from a clash of cultures. The emerging Western lifestyle, spreading among Indians of all faiths, required believers to pursue a compartmentalised existence. One had to relegate religion to the weekend and a few holidays, separate religion from science and cultivate social relations without reference to religion, among sundry other forms of self-denying accommodation. Yet Islam claimed authority over the totality of life.

There had already been responses to this perceived clash. One response, secular modernism, was to accept the advantages of Western civilisation and privatise Islam in the image of unobtrusive Protestant Christianity. This response became the official policy of Turkey under its first president, Atatürk (1881–1938). Turkey’s modernisation drive aimed to push Islam to the periphery of social life and to shift the primary loyalty of Turks from religion to nation. In Iran, Reza Shāh Pahlavi (1878–1944) had pursued a milder version of the same modernisation strategy. A second response was the

22 Bernard Lewis, The emergence of modern Turkey, 2nd edn (London, 1968), chs. 10 12; Amin Banani, The modernization of Iran, 1921 1941 (Stanford, 1961), chs. 2 3.
Muslim modernism of India’s Muslim League, led by people Mawdūdī characterised as ‘partial Muslims’. The Muslim League paid lip service to the comprehensiveness of Islamic wisdom, making it seem that it draws authority from Islam. In essence, however, it pursued secularism, assigning at best a symbolic role to religion. Banking law would be Western banking law; society’s safety net would resemble a Western social security system; and taxation would be based on economic and political expediency, with no inspiration drawn from religion.

Mawdūdi’s favoured response was in spirit closer to secular modernism than to Muslim modernism. Like Atatürk and Reza Shāh, he sensed that many Muslims felt torn between tradition and adaptation. He believed, moreover, that a choice had to be made between Islam and the West, and that this had to be done openly and without apology. If the West’s cultural influences were controlled, he reasoned, Muslims would feel better adjusted and less resentful. The desired control required providing distinctly Islamic alternatives to behaviours generally associated with Westernisation. Banking was a pillar of modern life, so it had to be Islamicised by defining distinctly Islamic ways of borrowing, lending, saving and investing. A rising share of consumption depended on market transactions, so buying and selling had to be given an Islamic veneer. There was a growing demand for poverty alleviation, so identifiably Islamic redistribution instruments had to be found.

At the time that Mawdūdi took to proposing economic remedies for culture clash, the concept had not entered popular discourse, as it would after Samuel Huntington published a much celebrated and vilified article on the ‘clash of civilizations’. Huntington underestimates the homogenising effects of economic development, the diversity of civilisations, the fuzziness of their boundaries, people’s receptivity to cross cultural influences and the flexibility of religions. But whatever the validity of Huntington’s general argument, his reasoning matches the thinking prevalent in the 1940s among Indian proponents of deliberate and self conscious Islamisation. As far as Mawdūdi and his companions were concerned, Islam and the West could not co exist, and they were in a fierce struggle for the identity and allegiance of Muslims. These claims shared all the limitations of Huntington’s argument today. Mawdūdi wrote, for example, as though Islamic civilisation is a well defined entity and as though it specifies exactly what Islam requires in every sphere of life. Despite these exaggerations, however, his writings set the tone for Islamism and indeed for Islamic economics, down to the present.

Islamic economics after Mawdūdī

For about three decades, Islamic economics remained essentially an intellectual exercise. Books and pamphlets were published for audiences of varying sophistication, mainly by religious scholars and political activists. Only gradually did the school begin to draw in scholars trained in modern economics. It received a major boost, however, from the Arab oil boom of the 1970s. This is when Islamic economics metamorphosed into a global movement aimed at giving economic life an Islamic character.

Saudi Arabia and other Arab beneficiaries of the boom decided to share their new wealth with oil poor Arabs, essentially to buy peace. Front line states and organisations in the war with Israel, all capable of destabilising the Arabian Peninsula, were among the major beneficiaries of the consequent transfers. Oil rich countries felt obliged also to deliver more aid to non Arab Muslims and to step up their financial support to pan Islamic causes, in order to impress the wider Islamic world, parts of which were suffering from the high price of oil. The primary motive was again to pacify countries capable of sowing trouble. As their revenues mushroomed, the oil kingdoms needed also to invest their growing savings. In so far as their investments were given an Islamic appearance, so they thought, they would gain legitimacy in the eyes of the world’s Muslims. Their regimes would thus become more secure and gain political clout.24

For all of these reasons, funds started pouring into the development, dissemination and practice of Islamic economics. The 1970s saw the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank, modelled after the World Bank but meant to operate in an interest free manner and primarily for the benefit of Muslims. The world’s first commercial Islamic banks, too, were established at this time, making Mawdūdī’s blueprint at last a reality. Meanwhile, well funded institutes and departments of Islamic economics began springing up, academic journals of Islamic economics were established and Islamic economics conferences began attracting huge numbers of participants from all across the Islamic world and beyond.

Once Islamic economics secured steady funding and a formal infrastructure, it took on a life of its own. As with any academic discipline or school of thought, its practitioners started refining and expanding its mission. Nascent Islamic banks developed problems, which stimulated new ideas and

24 Ayman al Yassini, Religion and state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Boulder, 1985), esp. ch. 6.
accommodations with economic realities. People trained in Islamic economics filled positions at universities, and they started looking for new problems to address. By the late 1980s, economists with modern training, including ones educated in Europe and North America, began contributing to Islamic economics. Through their works, Islamic economics began absorbing the tools and methods of modern economics.\textsuperscript{25} Contributors with a theoretical bent developed Islamic ‘general equilibrium’ models that hold the price of money fixed. Those familiar with the theory of social choice tried to develop axiomatic foundations for Islamic economics.\textsuperscript{26} For yet another example, specialists in the history of economic thought turned to the thinkers of classical Islam in search of Muslim precedents for ideas widely thought to have originated with the European Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{27}

In the early twenty-first century, certain Islamic economists are struggling with thorny practical problems, like that of structuring aid to the poor in ways to maximise the chances of making them self-sufficient. Others are trying to develop interest-free mortgage contracts and hedge fund instruments.\textsuperscript{28} Islamic economics has changed, then, from the days when Mawdūdī picked a few Islamic symbols in a bid to establish cultural markers. Still, in terms of scope and substance, both the doctrine and the practices of Islamic economics retain the influence of Mawdūdī’s initial agenda. Interest-free banking remains by far the most popular topic of research, with zakāt a distant second; and major areas of economics still lack distinctly Islamic contributions.

As the foregoing history of the rise and subsequent evolution of Islamic economics has pointed out, neither Islamic banking nor the government operated modern zakāt systems emerged in response to economic problems. Under Mawdūdī’s guidance, the initial goal was Islamisation, and economic consequences constituted a secondary matter. The charters of Islamic banks, which required them to specialise in profit and loss sharing, were developed largely by activists eager to make a cultural statement, who knew little economics. They plunged into profit and loss sharing and learned only


\textsuperscript{26} Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, \textit{Perspectives on morality and human well-being: A contribution to Islamic economics} (Leicester, 2003), chs. 4-6.


\textsuperscript{28} El Gamal, \textit{Islamic finance}, evaluates many of the recent developments.
through experience that the preconditions for genuinely interest free banking, in the sense of the global venture capital industry, were lacking. The same pattern applies to the establishment of modern obligatory zakāt systems. At first the primary goal was to institute a redistribution system identified with Islam, and economic details were secondary. That is why critics preoccupied with the economic effects of various initiatives were ignored or silenced.

Modern economics and the Qur’ān

To qualify as ‘Islamic’, Islamic economics must somehow be linked to economic elements of the Islamic heritage. That much has always been taken for granted. But what is that heritage, and in what ways, if at all, might it constrain the drive to build an Islamic economy?

The most basic Islamic resource is the Qur’ān, for a believer the ultimate authority on all matters. Many of its 114 sūras, or chapters, contain exhortations and prohibitions of an economic nature. The basis for these injunctions is that individuals are prone to moral weakness and, hence, need moral guidance (for example, 4:28). Accordingly, various sūras define one or another dimension of economic virtue, in order to educate believers intent on living morally about what economic behaviours to avoid and where to use their own judgement (94:1 3). Along with moral guidelines, the Qur’ān provides a disincentive for straying from the path of righteousness: divine retribution (33:72 3).

If Qur’ānic economic prescriptions serve any one substantive principle, it is moderation. Discouraging asceticism, they urge believers to ‘disperse in the land and seek of Allah’s bounty’ (62:10) through both personal and collective initiatives (43:32). They also invite believers to become knowledgeable (55:33) and attain material comforts (7:32). Significantly, no ban is brought against private ownership, and diverse worldly inequalities between men and women, master and slave, one nation and another are allowed, if not also endorsed (2:251, 43:32, 11:117 18). By the same token, economic standing is considered irrelevant to status in afterlife. All believers are equal before God and enjoy the same capacity for attaining salvation. A requirement for entering heaven is to consume, invest, exchange, produce and save responsibly. Avoiding consumption ‘in vanity’ (2:188), believers must ‘lower their gaze and be modest’ (24:30). They should appropriate only what is rightly theirs, not seek enrichment through begging and never advance at the expense of others.

29 All references to the Qur’ān are to the 1909 translation of Marmaduke Pickthall, reissued as The glorious Koran (New York, 1992). Spellings have been modernised.
(2:273, 26:183). Nor should they pursue material gain through lewdness (2:268), oppression (7:33), ‘drink and games of chance’ (5:90), deceit (3:161) or mismeasurement (55:7 9).

The Qurʾān encourages trade, but even the earliest recorded sūras show a concern about related evils (83:1 3). The ancient Arabian lending practice of ribā, whereby the principal doubled if the debtor defaulted and redoubled if he defaulted again, is denounced as a source of illegitimate gain: ‘O you who believe! Devour not ribā, doubling and quadrupling. Observe your duty to Allah, that you may be successful’ (3:130). Lest ribā be confused with trade itself, a distinction is drawn between their moral standing: ‘Allāh permits trading and forbids ribā.’ Whereas trade will be rewarded with profit, those who practise ribā will reap only fire (2:275). Still another requirement is to keep resources in circulation: ‘They who hoard up gold and silver and spend it not in the way of Allāh, unto them give tidings (O Muḥammad) of a painful doom’ (9:34).

Although the Qurʾān does not call for equality of income or wealth, it instructs the wealthy to be charitable toward the economically deprived. In fact, it identifies charity as an instrument for attaining salvation. One sūra enjoins Muslims to ‘pay zakāt’ (2:43) and others specify that ‘Allāh and His messenger’ will collect zakāt to support orphans, the poor and wayfarers (59:7) as well as freedom for slaves, relief for debtors, assistance to new converts and wages for zakāt collectors (9:60). Several sūras lay down rules of inheritance. One of them specifies minimum shares for husbands, wives, children and other near relatives, with lesser shares for females than for their male counterparts (4:7, 12). Another urges Muslims to heed the interests of ‘those who come after them’ (59:10).

Considered God’s will, all Qurʾānic prescriptions are supposed to be self-justifying. As such, they are unaccompanied by detailed reasoning. But some of them stand for general principles common to all viable societies. For instance, the call to respect the needs of descendants reflects a concern for intergenerational equity; and the ban on mismeasurement aims at promoting trust, a key ingredient of economic exchange. As for the specific norms, such as inheritance shares and the prohibition of ribā, their logic can be inferred from characteristics of the society within which Islam arose. In seventh century Arabia, ribā concentrated wealth in the hands of major merchants, while pushing large numbers of debtors into a perpetually dependent status, if not into enslavement.30 Ribā was thus a potent source of social conflict, which

was to be removed by banning the practice. Another source of instability was that widows were commonly denied a share of their husband’s estate; hence, the need for entitling them to a prespecified share. However, on certain economic matters of great relevance to any modern economy, the Qur’ān offers nothing as specific as inheritance shares or a ban on ribā. For instance, no sūra deals specifically with the price of information, the most important traded commodity of any post industrial economy. Nor does any sūra deal directly with oil, now the principal source of wealth in Islam’s heartland.

From such silences, one might infer that it is futile to seek a complete economic blueprint within the Qur’ān, to say nothing of finding one applicable today. Alternatively, one might conclude that the Qur’ān lays down only general principles of economic productivity and justice, sometimes explicitly but usually through examples of direct relevance only to seventh century Arabia; and, hence, that it allows broad freedoms in regard to the specifics of any modern economy. The latter interpretation is supported, it has been said, by the fact that the Qur’ān appoints people as God’s ‘viceroys of the earth’ (6:166). On that basis Fazlur Rahman considered governance of worldly affairs a human task. Anyone who reflects on Islam’s contribution to civilising seventh century Arabia, he wrote, will realise that basic objectives of the Qur’ān carry universal and permanent relevance. At the same time, present generations need not feel constrained by any particular rule or policy outlined in the Qur’ān.31

By Rahman’s logic disagreements over interpreting the Qur’ān are inevitable. Try as one might to identify its spirit, one cannot possibly reach a conclusive settlement on every possible controversy. Just as there exists no unambiguous economic doctrine within the Torah or the Book of Mormon, so there is none in the Qur’ān. After all, the Qur’ān is not an economic treatise. It outlines the basic requirements of a faith without specifying every detail of daily life, to say nothing of identifying all economic particulars. This is evident from its vocabulary. Among words of relevance to economics, akala (consumption) appears 101 times, māl (property) 86 times, anfaqa (spending) 70 times, waritha, mirāṭh, awratha, or wasiyya (inheritance, to bequeath) 43 times, zakāt (poor due, alms) 32 times, thaman (price, cost) 32 times, tijāra (trade) 9 times, ribā (usury) 8 times, aqrada (lend) or iqtabasa (borrow) 7 times, and rabiha (profit commercially) just once. Absent from the vocabulary of the Qur’ān are numerous basic terms of modern economic discourse, including debates within Islamic economics. These include designations for such

concepts as bank, equilibrium, credible commitment, adverse selection and economic stability. By contrast, words related to faith appear very frequently. *Rabb* (God) appears 970 times, *āmana* (believe) 812 times, *kafara* (disbelief) 488 times, *āya* (sign, revelation) 382 times and *samā’* (heavens) 310 times.\(^3^2\)

The narrowness of the Qur’ānic economic vocabulary helps to explain why efforts to create a distinctly Islamic school of economics have produced a literature focused on a few pet issues, to the exclusion of vast domains of great relevance to contemporary wealth creation or distribution. Two other characteristics of the economically pertinent verses of the Qur’ān have contributed to the limitations of Islamic economics. Nowhere in the Qur’ān does one find what a contemporary social scientist would call economic analysis, or causal models of economic interaction. Likewise, no explicit attention is given to what we now call economic development. The prohibition of *ribā* and the specification of inheritance shares appear without an indication that changing technologies, institutions and lifestyles may necessitate readjustments. Leading promoters of Islamic economics have inferred, therefore, that wherever the Qur’ān legislates, reforms would be un-Islamic. For their part, Muslim reformists point out that the Qur’ān itself was an agent of economic change, an instrument for improving Arabian economic relationships. If the very essence of Islam’s economic message is the possibility of progress, they have reasoned, it can be used to justify change and to resist traditionalism, indifference and inertia.

PART IV

CULTURES, ARTS AND LEARNING
The transmission of religious knowledge (‘ilm) has always been at the heart of Islamic tradition. The Qur’ān and Hadith abound with general references to the importance of learning, as well as the specific injunction that believers study and follow the ethical path God has provided. Since earliest times, the transmission of knowledge from teacher to student has also had a vital social function, creating scholarly networks which, in the absence of a clerical hierarchy or an established church, came to exercise authority in the religious community. Muslim notables also regarded religious education as critical to the formation of the shared ethical sensibilities that underlay the public good. In these and other ways, religious learning lay at the heart of Muslim societies, and its promotion was incumbent on all who aspired to social or political prominence.

Because of the centrality of religious knowledge in Muslim societies, constructing institutions for its transmission has also been considered socially imperative. During the Muslim world’s Middle Ages (1000–1500 CE), the madrasa emerged as the dominant institution for the transmission of intermediate and advanced religious knowledge. A residential college for the study of the religious sciences, the madrasa played a key role in the great recentring of religious knowledge and authority that took place in the Middle Ages, bringing popular religious culture into closer alignment with scholarly knowledge. When, in the early modern era, Islam pressed deeper into sub Saharan Africa and South and South East Asia, the madrasa, or a like minded institution of a different name, played a role in the new Muslim lands similar to that seen centuries earlier in the medieval Middle East. The institution created cadres of religious scholars committed to the ideals of revealed knowledge; provided

a mooring for popular worship, piety and law; and became the object of largesse by leaders intent on demonstrating their piety and social distinction. Notwithstanding their great variety, Islamic schools continue to play these roles today.

Contrary to recent stereotypes, from the late medieval period to the nineteenth century, Islamic education was not unchanging. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, movements of educational reform arose in Central Asia, Sumatra and, most significantly, northern India. The reforms implemented in this period were still modest by comparison with those Islamic education was to experience in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In all eras reformists emphasised the importance of returning to the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth and a more vigorous exercise of ijtiḥād (independent religious reasoning, as opposed to taqlīd, ‘imitation’ or conformity to the achievements of established Islamic scholarship). But in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries educational reformists went beyond these tried and true methods in an effort to respond to four new challenges: the political ascendance of the West; the emergence of a centralised and developmental state; the expansion of global economic markets, including labour markets that placed a greater premium on educational skills; and the appearance of new instruments for storing and disseminating information. These challenges were to leave a deep imprint on modern Islamic education.

This chapter examines the impact of modern developments on the transmission of Islamic knowledge and the forms of Islamic education. To assess the scale of modern changes, the chapter looks first at the varieties of Islamic education in earlier times. It then examines the changes that took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and their implications for modern Muslim culture and politics. Two conclusions stand out from this survey. First, in the modern period Islamic education has been neither institutionally monolithic nor pedagogically conservative, but characterised by a dizzying plurality of actors engaged in continuous educational experimentation. Second, and more generally, the central issue with which Muslim educational reformists have been preoccupied has been the question of just what is required for an authentic profession of Islam in the modern world. What distinguishes educators’ answers today from those of earlier generations is that modern religious schooling is no longer primarily dedicated to training scholarly elites, but to creating a self aware and pious public. In the face of political, economic and cultural forces of un-Islamic provenance, Muslim educators have come to see a fellowship of the pious as the most essential condition for the promotion of the faith. Whether this fellowship
also requires an Islamic state is a matter on which educators have had less agreement.

Early institutions of Islamic learning

Although the transmission of knowledge has always been central to Islam, the institutions through which this transmission takes place have changed over time. Since the eleventh century, the institution most directly identified with religious learning has been the madrasa, a residential college for the study of the Islamic sciences. In today’s Arab Middle East, the term madrasa can refer to a general as well as a religious school. In earlier times and in many non Arabic countries still today, however, the term typically referred to an institution offering intermediate and advanced instruction in the Islamic sciences. The madrasa was thus distinguished from institutions of elementary religious learning, like those involved in teaching youths to read and recite the Qur’ān. Although its name and social form vary, in the Arab world the institution most commonly dedicated to the latter task was (and is still today) the kuttāb (pl. katātīb). Katātīb train students to read, memorise and recite the Qur’ān, skills regarded as the first steps toward learned piety. A kuttāb like institution emerged in the first century of the Islamic era, not long after scholars had completed the first recensions of the Qur’ān. Although in modern times a few governments have tried to burden the institution with additional educational duties, including secular instruction, most katātīb today remain true to their founding mission, teaching youths to read and recite the Qur’ān.

The madrasa developed a full three centuries after the appearance of these simple institutions for Qur’ānic study. The first was established in the tenth century in the province of Khurasan in eastern Iran, but the institution soon spread to other Muslim lands. By the first decades of the thirteenth century, madrasas had been introduced to Spain and northern India. By this time, too, the madrasa had become ‘perhaps the most characteristic religious institution of the medieval Near Eastern urban landscape’.

2 On Qur’ānic study, see Anna M. Gade, Perfection makes practice: Learning, emotion, and the recited Qur’ān in Indonesia (Honolulu, 2004); on kuttāb, see Gregory Starrett, Putting Islam to work: Education, politics, and religious transformation in Egypt (Berkeley and London, 1998), pp. 27, 36 8.
4 See for example, Starrett, Putting Islam to work, p. 29.
The madrasa’s rise to social prominence reflected a broader reorganisation in Islamic traditions of knowledge. By the third century of the Muslim era, the Islamic sciences had become more intellectually diverse than in early generations, as the hadith were gathered into great compilations, and the commentaries that were to become the foundation for Islam’s legal schools (madhhab) were composed. Inevitably the expansion in the forms of knowledge meant that advanced study required a longer period of time.7 Prior to these developments, most higher religious education took place in informal learning circles (Ar., ḥalaq, sing. ḥalqa) in homes, bazaar stalls and, above all, mosques, under the direction of a master scholar. By the end of the ninth century, however, mosques offering advanced religious study began to erect hostels for resident students. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, several Muslim communities went further and built the first madrasas.8

The medieval institution gradually assumed a form similar to that of traditionalist madrasas still today. A typical complex consisted of a mosque, dormitories and classrooms, as well as a residence for the founder director and a washing area for ritual ablutions. Many madrasas also came to include mausoleums for the institution’s founder, on the assumption that in death as in life he could intercede with God and serve as a channel for divine grace (baraka). Muslim reformists have long taken exception to saint veneration of this sort, and in modern times they have staged campaigns to demolish tomb complexes or turn them into secular archaeological monuments.9

In addition to assuming a conventional architectural layout, medieval madrasas also developed a basic curriculum, large portions of which are still used today in traditionalist schools. Although small institutions specialised in the study of just one or several texts, the larger madrasas provided instruction in Qur’ān recitation (qira’a), Qur’ān exegesis (‘ilm al tafsīr), the sciences of tradition (‘ilm al hadīth), legal theory and methodology (‘ilm usūl al fiqh), jurisprudence (fiqh) and the principles and sources of religion (usūl al dīn). Instruction was also provided in sciences ancillary to the transmitted


9 EI2, art. ‘Madrasa architecture’ (R. Hillenbrand). On shaykhs and baraka see Christopher S. Taylor, In the vicinity of the righteous: Ziyāra and the veneration of Muslim saints in late medieval Egypt (Leiden, 1999), pp. 127 67.
traditions, including Arabic grammar, lexicology, morphology, metrics, rhyme, prosody and history.\textsuperscript{10} Actual curricula varied across schools, however, in a manner that reflected the fact that the \textit{madrasa} was not an administratively corporate entity with the faculties and departments found in its Western counterpart, the late medieval university. Up until the modern period, \textit{madrasas} did without boards of directors, admissions examinations, standardised curricula and departments. Religious learning remained ‘fundamentally and persistently an informal affair’,\textsuperscript{11} in the sense that it was organised around the student’s personal relation to an individual teacher, not his admission to a formally incorporated faculty. Colleges did not determine curricula; individual teachers did. A student did not enroll in an academic department; he (all were male) became a disciple of a master teacher. Under Western influence, the person alised and initiatic quality of Islamic learning was to change in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Islamic schools developed more bureaucratised forms of finance, administration and instruction.

In their first centuries, some \textit{madrasas} provided instruction in subjects other than the religious sciences. From the eleventh to the fourteenth century, Middle Eastern scholarship in mathematics, astronomy and medicine was the most advanced in the world, and some larger \textit{madrasas} excelled in the teaching of these, as they were known, foreign sciences. However, the use of phrases like ‘foreign sciences’ and the ‘sciences of the ancients’ to refer to these disciplines illustrated their ambiguous standing in the \textit{madrasa} curriculum. Well before the end of the medieval period, \textit{madrasas} in the Arab lands of the Middle East had made jurisprudence (\textit{fiqh}) and its ancillary disciplines the focus of study, and they provided little if any instruction in non religious sciences.\textsuperscript{12} At the large libraries for which the Muslim Middle East at this time was renowned, books in philosophy and the natural sciences were still easily available, and lawyers, philosophers and doctors continued to consult them. With only rare exceptions, however, formal instruction in these subjects was now confined to hospitals and private homes. The narrowing of the \textit{madrasa} curriculum may well have contributed to the general decline of the non religious sciences.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} Makdisi, \textit{The rise of colleges}, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{11} Berkey, \textit{The transmission of knowledge}, p. 17; cf. Makdisi, \textit{The rise of colleges}, p. 128.
In the eastern lands stretching from Anatolia and Persia to Central Asia and northern India, madrasas showed a less exclusive attitude toward the foreign sciences. Thirteenth century Iran developed ‘educational charitable complexes’, each of which included a hospital, Sufi convent, public baths and even astronomical observatories. Across the eastern territories, medicine was also a regular part of madrasa curricula. In sixteenth century India, madrasas were drawn into the service of training Mughal state officials, and these schools made regular use of books on logic, mathematics, literature and philosophy. The scholars Mīr Fāṭīḥ Allāh Shīrāzī (d. 1588) and Mullā Muhammad Niẓām al Dīn (d. 1748) played a pivotal role in institutionalising the study of the rational sciences in northern India’s famed centres of learning, notwithstanding opposition from conservative ‘ulama’ who saw the disciplines as a threat to Islam. Established in the eighteenth century to train qādīs (judges, muftis (a jurist consulta qualified to issue legal opinions), and government bureaucrats, the famous Farangi Maḩall school in Lucknow, India, also developed a curriculum dedicated to the rational as well as religious sciences.

With the arrival of European colonialism, however, even northern India experienced pressures to narrow the madrasa curriculum. As earlier in the Middle East, the trend was the result of several influences, including the reassertion of jurisprudence (fiqh) as the queen of madrasa sciences. ‘As long as the study of the “rational” sciences continued to be a principal means for securing employment in the Muslim courts’, these efforts garnered little support. During the first centuries of contact with Europeans, Indian Muslim scholars showed a keen interest in Western philosophy and science. However, in the eighteenth century, with the growing European threat, calls for a return to ‘true’ Islam as distinct from the rational sciences began to resonate more broadly. Emphasising the Islamic sciences to the exclusion of those deemed foreign proved useful for drawing lines between Muslims and non-Muslims, and rallying believers against institutions and modes of thought deemed un-Islamic.

16 Yoginder Sikand, Bastions of the believers: Madrasa and Islamic education in India (New Delhi, 2005), p. 42.
17 Francis Robinson, The ‘ulama’ of Farangi Mahall and Islamic culture in South Asia (London, 2001), p. 2; and Sikand, Bastions of the believers, p. 46.
18 Sikand, Bastions of the believers, p. 48.
The decline of non religious study in institutions of Islamic learning was doubly ironic in the light of the fact that, during Western Europe’s Middle Ages, libraries and madrasas in the Middle East and northern India had preserved ancient Greek treatises in philosophy and natural science otherwise lost to Europeans. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Muslim, Christian and Jewish scholars in Muslim Spain and Sicily translated many of these books into Latin. The dissemination of these works in Christian Europe subsequently sparked a revival of the natural sciences and philosophy; soon these subjects were given pride of place in the region’s newly established universities. Although studied by generations of Arabs, Persians, Turks and Indians, works in philosophy and natural science were eventually marginalised from the madrasa curriculum. Although the issue still causes controversy in a few circles, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were to see efforts to bring history, natural science and philosophical empiricism back into Islamic education.

State-based modernisation

There was no single moment at which Islamic schooling became ‘modern’ in the educational sense of the term. Many of the rationalising ambitions of educational reformists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had precursors in earlier eras. So, too, did some of the educators’ proposed organisational reforms. Mughal history shows clearly that prior to the modern period Islamic education could be harnessed to projects of state training and administration, and the linkage was often accompanied by a heightened emphasis on the rational sciences.

In addition to the Mughals, one of the more striking examples of educational rationalisation prior to the modern period was that undertaken in the Ottoman Empire. From the late fifteenth century on, Ottoman authorities launched reforms aimed at centralising and coordinating Islamic schooling. The Ottomans ranked madrasas in their territories according to a strict hierarchy and established educational criteria whereby scholars passed from lower to higher ranks in the religious hierarchy. Süleyman the Magnificent

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designated the muftı (şeyülislam) of Istanbul the first among ‘ulamā’; his government also regularised the procedures whereby ‘ulamā’ were recruited to government service. By the eighteenth century, the process of bureaucratic rationalisation had created eleven levels in the madrasa hierarchy, each differentiated from the others by prestige, staffing and salaries.\(^\text{22}\)

By this late period, however, Ottoman power had also begun to wane relative to the empire’s fast rising European rivals. In reflecting on the reasons for the European advance, Ottoman officials concluded that one key was the European emphasis on technical and non-religious education. In a pattern of defensive educational reform seen a few years later in Egypt and Iran, Ottoman officials responded with initiatives intended to narrow the gap with the West.\(^\text{23}\) The state established naval (1773) and military engineering (1793) academies, recruiting Western Europeans as instructors. Over the next decades, Ottoman officials opened a school of medicine (1827), a military academy (1834) and schools of civil administration (1859) and law (1878). All of these institutions used Western rather than Islamic schools as their model, at times even importing the European brand directly. The Ottoman Education Regulation of 1869, which provided guidelines for programmes of mass education, was based on a report drafted a few years earlier for Ottoman authorities by the French Ministry of Education. State officials concluded that it was neither efficient nor politically prudent to launch the educational reforms by taking on the empire’s madrasas; instead, they decided to create a separate educational stream based on what they deemed positive science. The state’s dualist disposition on school reform was reinforced by the fact that, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, ‘ulamā’ had rebuffed proposals for reform made by the Ministry of Education.

The relationship between the new Ottoman schools and state regulated madrasas, however, did not remain entirely dualistic. Tensions between the Ottomans and Western powers rose in the final decades of the nineteenth century, and Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) responded to the development by launching educational programmes that combined European pedagogy with heightened instruction on Islam and Ottoman history. These programmes proved popular with Ottoman ‘ulamā’.\(^\text{24}\) In the waning years

\(^\text{22}\) Ibid., pp. 24–6.


of the empire, state officials overcame their earlier hesitation and also intervened in the religious school sector. In 1900, the authorities opened a western style Faculty of Theology (Ulûm i Âliye yi Diniye Şubesi) in Istanbul. In 1908, they created a teachers’ college for training madrasa instructors. In 1910, state officials introduced mathematics, history and literature into madrasa curricula.  

By this time, however, the empire’s academies had also brought a generation of young Ottomans into existence who were impatient with the pace of madrasa reform. The Ottoman defeat in the First World War, and the subsequent occupation of large parts of Anatolia by Allied forces, strengthened the political elite’s resolve to reform the entire school system, including its Islamic branch. Not long after the declaration of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923, Mustafa Kemal, the Republic’s founder and first president (1923-38), who was later given the surname Atatürk by the Grand National Assembly, abolished all but eight of Turkey’s madrasas, replacing them with a School of Theology (İlahiyat Fakültesi) and thirty three schools for training religious officials. Over the next few years, his administration eliminated religious instruction entirely from public education, reversing most of Abdülhamid’s reforms. After Atatürk’s death in 1938, the state reintroduced religious education into its schools, and higher religious education under state supervision was also allowed. Aside from elementary instruction in Qur’anic recitation, private religious education remained tightly controlled. Since the 1980s, however, the strict laïcism of the early Kemalist period has given way to state sponsored religious education, premised on a distinctive ‘Turkish Islamic synthesis’.  

Although unique in some respects, the experience of the Ottoman Empire and Republican Turkey illustrates the breadth of the challenge faced by Islamic educators in other lands from the late nineteenth to mid twentieth century. No country undertook étatizing reforms as radical as those of Republican Turkey, and none was as secularising in its ambitions. Nonetheless, in countries not yet fully colonised, state officials faced a growing Western threat, and many concluded that one way to contain it was by launching programmes of technical and professional education. Government officials had greater difficulty deciding just what they should do with the existing system of Islamic schools.

In Qājār Iran, the state responded to the disasters of the Russo Persian War of 1803-15 by inviting French officers to Iran to train troops in European military arts. In the 1810s, the state dispatched small bands of students to France and Britain to study military affairs. In 1851, the Academy of Applied Sciences (Dār al Funūn) was established, the first state sponsored European style school; its curriculum was again ‘predominantly military in nature’. Only a small number of youth were involved in the new academies and study abroad programmes, however, so the ‘ulamā’’s monopoly on education remained largely intact. Notwithstanding Qājār caution with regard to Islamic schooling, conservative ‘ulamā’ continued to criticise the European inspired schools, taking exception, for example, to their teaching of the heliocentric nature of the solar system. Sensing ‘ulamā’ opposition, Qājār officials resolved not to intervene in the religious school sector and deferred the implementation of programmes of mass education. Impatient with state dithering, private citizens responded by establishing European style schools of their own. These only increased the ire of conservative ‘ulamā’, several of whom led attacks on the new schools in the 1880s. Slowly, however, the new school movement found its way, and, by the end of the nineteenth century, Iran’s ‘ulamā’ had lost their monopoly in the educational field. Although efforts to organise a programme of mass education soon picked up, the madrasa system itself remained unreformed.

Developments in Egypt showed a similar push and pull between a state desperate to contain the growing Western threat and ‘ulamā’ determined to resist state interference in their schools. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Albanian born Muḥammad ‘Alī did like his Istanbul counterparts and established schools for military training (1816), engineering (1820), medicine (1827) and civil administration (1829). In the 1820s, Egyptian officials tried to recruit boys from katātib to special preparatory and technical schools. However, when it became clear that graduates of these schools were obliged to enter military service, enrolments plummeted. State officials then resolved to establish their own school system, but this effort foundered after a series of disastrous military setbacks in 1863. In the 1870s an effort was made to restart the programme, but it too came to naught.

30 Ibid., p. 104.
The British took control of Egypt in 1882 and quickly realised that they needed educated natives to assume lower level administrative roles. They also concluded that the only institution capable of providing such training quickly and inexpensively was the existing system of Qur'anic schools (katātib). Their experience in India, however, had taught the British to be wary of educating large numbers of natives, since learning could cause unrest. Egyptian youths who studied in katātib that eventually came to double as elementary schools, then, were not encouraged to go further in their studies. In 1895, the British resolved to promote general education in only 46 of the country’s 5,000 katātib.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 31, 47.} Similarly, notwithstanding colonialist arguments that the education of women was the key to Muslims’ progress, British policies restricted girls’ opportunities for elementary education and discouraged the training of women doctors.\footnote{Leila Ahmed, Women and gender in Islam: Historical roots of a modern debate (New Haven, 1992), p. 153.} Although British rule was justified on the grounds of bringing enlightenment and progress to less advanced peoples, the civilising mission, it seemed, had clear political limits.

Schooling against the colonial state

As in Egypt after 1882, European rule subordinated the development of general education to the interests of the colonial state. The precise impact of colonial rule varied by country, however, in a manner that sometimes worked to the benefit of Muslim educational reformists. In particular, in some countries colonial rule stimulated new, mass based movements for Islamic learning and piety. In the absence of a Muslim controlled state, Muslim educators in these countries concluded that the best way to defend and promote Islam was by going public with religious education, rather than concentrating school resources on the training of a small scholarly elite. Muslims remained divided, however, on the question of what curriculum was most appropriate for the new religious education. The key point of disagreement pitted educators intent on bringing science, mathematics and history into the curriculum against those who wished to maintain an exclusive focus on the religious sciences.

The examples of Morocco and India illustrate how varied these interactions could be. Beginning in the 1830s, the French intervened directly in Moroccan affairs. At first, the Morrocan encounter with European schooling brought
about a small renaissance in Islamic learning. Mathematics, engineering and astronomy were reintroduced into Islamic curricula, and youths from religious families were dispatched to Europe for study. Until the 1930s, the country’s two prestigious mosque universities continued to attract children from elite families. Shortly thereafter, however, the system began to decline. New French restrictions on the charitable endowments which financed school operations contributed to the sector’s slide, as did the colonial government’s assumption of control over the heretofore independent mosque universities. However, the populace’s turn from Islamic schooling also reflected a growing perception among elite Moroccans that European style education offered better prospects for status and economic mobility than did Islamic schooling. Mosque universities eventually became the preferred educational path only for the rural poor and traditionalist families.

In British India, the Muslim elite and middle classes were more divided as to the benefits of European style education. Some educators called for the incorporation of mathematics, science and history into the madrasa curriculum, but others insisted that, in the absence of Muslim rule, madrasas should become the frontline of struggle against all manner of European influence. After the anti colonial rebellion of 1857, the rivalry among different school movements intensified. Although no group ever succeeded at winning all of the public to its side, the varied school networks created the largest movement for mass Islamic education the world had ever seen.

All of India’s school movements emphasised the importance of implementing the shari‘a (divine law) in personal life. All, too, agreed on the need to develop new forms of instruction and school administration. However, the main school groups differed on their target constituencies, patterns of religious authority and attitudes toward Western learning. Some educators, like the famous modernist Sayyid Ahmād Khān (1817–98), directed their appeals to high born Muslims, emphasising the need to cooperate with the British and incorporate European arts, sciences and even etiquette into Muslim education. Others, like the Ahl i Ḥadīth, denounced Sufism and medieval commentaries on the law, insisting that the only way forward was through study.

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34 The account that follows draws from Dale F. Eickelman, Knowledge and power in Morocco: The education of a twentieth century notable (Princeton, 1985), pp. 3 10, 80 2.
35 Ibid., p. 163.
37 Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India, pp. 317 35.
and enactment of God’s law. Still other scholar educators, like those at the celebrated Farangi Mahall, developed a specialised educational curriculum to train jurists for service in the Mughal state or, later, the British founded ‘Anglo Mohammadan’ courts.  

It was the famed madrasa at Deoband in the Saharanpur district of the then United Provinces, founded in 1867, that eventually became the most influential of the subcontinent’s Islamic school movements. From the mother madrasa in Deoband, the number of affiliated schools grew to 36 by 1900; by 1970, the total number in what had once been British India was 9,000. Although, in the 1990s, Deobandī schools came to be identified in the Western media with the Afghan Taliban (the leadership of which had graduated from Deobandī schools along the Afghan Pakistan border), mainstream Deobandism has long been politically moderate even if intellectually conservative. In the run up to Indian independence most Deobandī leaders supported the establishment of a multi-confessional state rather than a separate Muslim homeland. Although their curricula did not emphasise subjects other than the Islamic sciences, Deobandī leaders never condemned the study of modern sciences outright. Indeed, even though they did not offer advanced instruction in subjects like science or history, the Deobandī schools combined elements of Western education with India’s classical madrasa tradition.

The Western innovations about which the Deobandīs were most enthusiastic were not curricular but administrative. The first Deobandī school had a library, classrooms, a paid professional staff and a fixed curriculum with regular examinations. Rather than relying on charitable trusts (waqfs), the school depended for its finances on contributions from the general public, all of which were carefully recorded and published to allow public scrutiny.

Deobandī innovations in matters of administration were not matched, however, by an equal openness on curricular matters. During the colonial period, the Deobandīs did not encourage their students to go on for study in government schools. Still today in independent India, the mother school at Deoband restricts instruction in geography, science, history and English to the first five grades.

Success in the emerging Muslim public sphere also required a formula for transcending the fractious divisions of ethnicity, language and social standing

38 On the Farangi Mahall, see Robinson, The ‘ulamā’ of Farangi Mahall; and Sikand, Bastions of the believers, p. 46.
39 See Sikand, Bastions of the believers, p. 75.
40 Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India, pp. 93 7.
41 See Sikand, Bastions of the believers, pp. 104 6.
that continued to divide Indian Muslims. The Deobandīs responded to the challenge by placing Islamic law at the centre of their social and educational programmes and offering an ingeniously modern formula for Islamic identity. The Deobandīs popularised markers of high religious standing, by making habits of dress, learning and social bearing previously restricted to high born Muslims (ashrāf) available to all those who embraced Deobandī reform. The ‘democracy’ of once elite religious styles proved enormously popular, and it would have its counterpart in educational movements in other parts of the modern Muslim world.

Indonesia offers a final example of the diverse ways in which Western colonialism impacted religious education. Although Islamic traditions had made their way across coastal portions of the Indonesian Archipelago from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century, the area was never united under a single Muslim ruler. As a result, although all were Sunnīs of the Shāfī’ī school of law, each of the archipelago’s territories had its own political elite and distinctive social styles. There was no counterpart, then, to India’s high status ashrāf, whose social habits might become the model for a new national Muslim identity. Rather than popularising the status markers of high born elites, then, Indonesian reformists promoted a more generic, populist and labile Muslim identity. One of the more striking features of this modern Indonesian Muslim identity was the ease with which it assimilated cultural forms of diverse provenance, including elements of Western dress, administration and education. Literally and figuratively, in Indonesia Islamic modernism (in its masculine variant) wore Western trousers and a tie.

In the final years of the nineteenth century, the Dutch completed their campaign to bring the archipelago under their control. Dutch rule put an end to independent Muslim polities. But the colonial peace also facilitated an expansion of Qur’ānic schools and residential madrasas (known locally as pesantren or pondok pesantren) into interior regions. The schools led the way in a new wave of Islamisation that spread across the archipelago in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The largest and most influential of boarding schools, like the famous Tebu Ireng school in Jombang, East Java, also pioneered reformed variants of Sufism, as well as advanced study of the hadīth, Qur’ānic interpretation and jurisprudence. Unlike India, with its long history of higher education, prior to the nineteenth century Indonesia was

42 Metcalf, Islamic revival in British India, p. 256.
43 Zamakhşyarı Dhoñfüjer, The pesantren tradition: The role of the kyai in the maintenance of traditional Islam in Java (Tempe, 1999).
largely lacking in institutions of higher Islamic learning. Advanced study was possible only intermittently, typically at royal courts and under the patronage of Muslim rulers. Scholars desiring more advanced instruction were obliged to travel to Arabia. The dearth of higher religious education ended in the late nineteenth century, with the growth of large and well staffed boarding schools and the incorporation of advanced religious study into their curriculum.44

As in India, the new emphasis on mass religious education did not produce a consensus on how to be a modern Muslim. The first decades of the twentieth century witnessed growing competition among two rival Muslim elites, known locally as the ‘old group’ (kaum tua) traditionalists and the ‘new group’ (kaum muda) modernists. The two groups disagreed on questions of law, independent religious reasoning (ijtiḥād) and pilgrimage to saint shrines, among other things. But the two leaderships were in broad agreement on the importance of mass piety and educational reform. Although a few strongholds of traditionalist learning resisted the trend, both the old group and new group scholars began to incorporate general education into their school programmes. By the 1930s, the best among the traditionalist and modernist Muslim schools included mathematics, science, history and European languages in their school programmes. This early precedent paved the way for even bolder developments in Islamic education in the decades following Indonesian independence. By the 1980s, Indonesia’s boarding schools and system of state Islamic universities (UIN, IAIN) were among the most forward looking in the Muslim world.45

The ascent of European colonialism over Muslim lands, then, did not bring educational reforms where previously there were none. The Ottoman and Mughal Empires had harnessed the institutions of Islamic education to state programmes well before the European arrival. In both empires, Muslim educators’ ties to the state led to an emphasis on the rational as well as religious sciences. Even in territories remote from the historic Muslim heartland like West Africa and Indonesia, the pre colonial period witnessed the spread of movements that campaigned against customs deemed unIslamic and in favour of advanced study of the Islamic sciences.

In the colonial period, the boldest attempts to reform Islamic education took place in countries where Muslim leaders concluded that the way to protect and promote Islam was by taking religious learning to the masses. In the absence of a Muslim state, a pious people with a clear sense of themselves as Muslims seemed to offer the best prospect for upholding the faith. The late colonial period also witnessed the emergence of institutional hybrids blending instruction in the Islamic sciences with Western influenced study of science, history and mathematics. National independence would greatly accelerate these reformist trends. Rather than diffusing the crisis in Muslim education, however, nationalism introduced challenges of its own.

Mass education in the post-colonial age

For Muslim rulers in newly independent countries, the first order of business was not the reform of Islamic education, but the building of a modern and independent nation through, among other things, the creation of what was hoped would be a shared national culture. In forging this identity, the political leadership had to grapple with the question of just what role Muslim symbols, scholars and schools should play in the nation building process. Political elites in different countries formulated different answers to this question, but all saw mass education as essential. Educational programmes thus became a key focus of government investment during the first years of national independence, and the resulting public school system had a powerful effect on Islamic learning. Even where they had little religious content, state schools challenged religious styles of learning, created a new class of Muslim intellectuals apart from the ‘ulama’, and changed the ways in which ordinary Muslims thought about religion and identity.

As Findley has noted,\(^46\) in 1800 literacy rates in the Middle East hovered around 12 per cent of the population. Literacy rates were comparable or perhaps even lower in most of the Asian and sub Saharan peripheries of the Muslim world. Although comprehensive data are lacking, literacy rates almost certainly edged up in the period from the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, with the early growth of mass oriented Islamic schooling. Nonetheless, three decades later, at the beginning of the independence era, rates of participation in religious and general education averaged 10 per cent or less of the school age population in most majority Muslim countries.

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By 1960, still only a few years into the independence period, state sponsored schooling had already wrought vast changes in the educational landscape. The percentage of primary age youths enrolled in school (for both sexes) had soared, to 47 per cent of the population in Bangladesh, 66 per cent in Egypt, 71 per cent in Indonesia, 65 per cent in Iran, 30 per cent in Pakistan, 12 per cent in Saudi Arabia and 75 per cent in Turkey. By 1990, the proportion of the school age population in elementary school had risen further, to 70 per cent or higher in all countries, with the notable exception of Pakistan (37 per cent).\(^47\)

In many countries, the education of young girls still lagged behind that of boys. In 1960, the percentage of girls enrolled in primary school was 26 per cent in Bangladesh, 52 per cent in Egypt, 58 per cent in Indonesia, 27 per cent in Iran, 13 per cent in Pakistan, 2 per cent in Saudi Arabia and 58 per cent in Turkey. Again, however, the next three decades ushered in remarkable progress. By 1990, the rates of female participation in primary school education were 68 per cent in Bangladesh, 90 per cent in Egypt, near 100 per cent in Indonesia, Iran and Turkey and 72 per cent in Saudi Arabia. Pakistan was again the outlier, with just 26 per cent of its school age girls enrolled in primary school. Whatever its economic and vocational benefits, and whatever its success at instilling nationalist ideals, the new schooling was creating a generation of Muslim youth with educational aptitudes vastly different from their elders.

The new nations’ progress in secondary education was statistically less striking than in primary education, but it was still sociologically important. It is from the ranks of youths who have attended secondary school (and, today, university) that most members of the middle class, the professions and the political elite originate. In 1960, rates of participation in secondary education for both sexes were 16 per cent for Egypt, 6 per cent for Indonesia, 12 per cent for Iran, 11 per cent for Pakistan, 2 per cent for Saudi Arabia and 14 per cent for Turkey (no statistics were available for Bangladesh). By 1990, the figure had soared to 17 per cent for Bangladesh, 82 per cent for Egypt, 45 per cent for Indonesia, 56 per cent for Iran, 22 per cent for Pakistan, 48 per cent for Saudi Arabia and 54 per cent for Turkey. Although the secondary education of young women continued to lag behind that of young men, by 1990 the gap had narrowed to just a few percentage points in all of these countries, with the notable exception of Egypt.\(^48\)

\(^48\) Ibid., p. 128.
There are as yet no comparable statistics on the numbers of youth in post colonial countries who made their way through some type of Islamic schooling. However, what field studies we have indicate that, in the 1950s and 1960s, the popularity of state sponsored education resulted in declining enrolments in the private Islamic school sector, as parents concluded that state schools offered their children a better path to employment and prosperity.\(^{49}\) However, the situation changed noticeably in the 1970s and 1980s, as Muslim countries were swept by a powerful resurgence in Islamic observance and piety. A key feature of the resurgence was an increase in enrolments in institutions of Islamic learning, both full time and part time, formal and informal. A second and no less notable concomitant of the resurgence was that full time Islamic schools incorporated more instruction in general subjects (maths, science, etc.) into their curricula. The dualism of Islamic and general education was at long last decreasing.

The combination of mass education and Islamic resurgence had other consequences for public culture and religion. First, as pietist movements gained momentum, governments in many countries— including countries like Egypt, Turkey and Indonesia, whose rulers had once promoted a more or less secularist nationalism— put religious instruction back into the state school curriculum. Although many governments did so in an effort to preempt the rise of an Islamist opposition, the policy represented a significant departure from the deconfessionalised nationalism of the early independence period. The state’s growing involvement in religious education also presented troubling challenges to non Muslim minorities, the members of dissident Muslim sects and proponents of women’s rights. Representatives from these groups found that their views were often not well represented in official religious curricula.

Mass education and Islamic resurgence also contributed to important changes in popular understandings of Islamic knowledge. Decades earlier, during the first wave of mass religious education in the colonial period, many schools had maintained the classic educational pattern of initiatic training, whereby education proceeds through the nurturing of a personalised and hierarchical relationship with a religious master. Educational discipleship of this sort has deep roots in Islamic tradition, reaching back to the first generations of Muslims.\(^{50}\) However, with the massification of religious education

\(^{49}\) On changing parental perceptions of Islamic education in the early independence period, see the studies in Hefner and Zaman (eds.), *Schooling Islam*, and Louis Brenner, *Controlling knowledge: Religion, power and schooling in a West African Muslim society* (Bloomington, 2001), pp. 85 130.

in the 1970s and 1980s, the initiatic mode gave way to impersonal learning styles. Students attended schools with standardised curricula disseminated by, not to put the matter too bluntly, teacher bureaucrats. In these settings, Islamic knowledge came to be viewed, not as part of an all encompassing social relationship, but as ‘a subject which must be “explained” and “understood” as “objective” knowledge’.  

From the perspective of the government officials responsible for religious education, there were advantages to packaging Islamic knowledge in this way. The state’s religion lessons could be poured into neat curricular modules for mass consumption. In so doing, it was hoped, Islam’s social and political message could also be made more uniform and state friendly. However, the repackaging of religious knowledge, and its removal from the personalised hierarchies of traditional learning, led non state actors to conclude that they too had the right to determine the tenets of their faith without seeking authorisation from established religious scholars. Inevitably, some reached conclusions different from those of state officials. Through these and other developments, and in contrast to what government officials had intended, mass religious education created a more pluralised and competitive religious marketplace.

The political consequences of the new religious learning were varied. In some countries, the resurgence turned political, as the networks linking mosques, madrasas and informal learning circles were harnessed to the task of building a religiously based political opposition. Indeed, some Islamic schools came to display qualities similar to those identified with ‘social movements’ in recent writing by political scientists. Like those movements, the schools provided cultural frames for diagnosing societal problems, recommended strategies for the problem’s solution and tried to motivate actors to support the proposed remedial action. Most social movement literature identifies the state as the primary target of movement fervour. However, Islamic movements, especially of an educational sort, tend to be as much concerned with changing believers and society as they are with challenging the state.

However, a small minority among the activist educators sought, not only to promote social change, but to effect a veritable Islamic revolution.

52 For an Egyptian example, see Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, activism, and political change in Egypt (New York, 2002), esp. pp. 119–32.
In Iran, school based movements played an important role in the 1979 revolution. In Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s, youths with ties to madrasas in Pakistan bordering Afghanistan played an important role in the anti Soviet resistance and the Taliban movement that came to power in 1996. Although studies consistently indicate that today’s radicals are more likely to have been educated in secular rather than Islamic schools, these developments raised concerns among Western policy analysts, most of whom had little prior experience with Islamic education.

More than any other event, it was the collaboration of the Taliban with al Qā‘ida militants that pushed these concerns to new heights. Looking for a root cause for religious extremism, some Western commentators were quick to lay the blame on madrasas. The Taliban leadership did emerge from madrasas located along the Afghan Pakistan border. However, their militancy owed little to Deobandī traditions of education, which, although conservative, have consistently eschewed extremism. Rather than Deobandism, the roots of Taliban militancy lay in a twenty year conflict that pulverised the Afghan economy, created millions of desperate refugees and marginalised or killed off the country’s traditionalist leadership. Billions of dollars in military assistance, including that from the United States, also contributed to the tragic mix.54 This is not to say that the Taliban did not play the central role in forging the cultural frames used for movement mobilisation. Rather, it is to say that the Taliban’s extreme politics only attracted a mass following as a result of the collapse of the central institutions of Afghan Islam and society.

The situation in Indonesia in the early 2000s offers a similarly instructive lesson on the relationship of Islamic schooling to political extremism. In the months following the resignation of President Suharto’s ‘New Order’ government (1966–98) in May 1998, hundreds of radical Islamist paramilitaries sprang up in cities and towns across the country. Several boasted of their ties to Islamic schools. In late 2002, a handful of Islamic boarding schools were discovered to have had ties to militants responsible for the October 2002 bombings in Bali, in which 202 people died, most of them Western tourists. For some Western analysts, these facts proved that Islamic education contributes directly to extremist violence. But this generalisation overlooks that fact that Indonesia has some 47,000 Islamic schools. Research conducted in the aftermath of the Bali bombings

indicated that the number of schools promoting extremist violence numbered fewer than one hundred.\textsuperscript{55}

A survey of 1,000 Indonesian Muslim educators conducted in 2006 offers additional insights into the political views of Indonesia’s Muslim educators.\textsuperscript{56} Rather than being radical or ‘medieval’, most educators appear to have rather nuanced views, characterised by a desire to balance the ideals of Islamic law with those of modern democracy. The survey showed, for example, that some 85.9 per cent of Muslim educators agree that democracy is the best form of government for Indonesia. A full 94.2 per cent support the idea of citizen equality before the law; 82.5 per cent support the rights of citizens to join political organisations; 92.8 per cent support legislation that would protect the media from arbitrary government action; and 80 per cent endorse the idea that party competition improves government performance. These figures are as high or higher than comparable data from Western countries.

Indonesian educators differ from their Western counterparts, however, in their support for Islamic law. Some 72.2 per cent of the educators believe the state should be based on the Qur’an and Sunna and advised by religious experts; 82.8 per cent think the state should work to implement the shari’ā. Support for the shari’ā drops to 59.1 per cent when the regulation in question concerns the amputation of thieves’ hands, or government efforts to require performance of the Ramadān fast (49.9 per cent agree). Educators’ views on gender and pluralism also tend to be more conservative than those typical for post 1970 Western publics. Some 93.5 per cent of the educators believe that a non Muslim should not be allowed to serve as president. A full 55.8 per cent feel that women should not be allowed to run for the land’s highest office, although a solid majority were comfortable with the idea of women serving in the National Assembly. Some 20 per cent would bar non Muslims from teaching in public schools; a similar number would restrict non Muslims’ religious services in nearby areas.

Although we lack comparable data on educators in other Muslim majority countries, surveys of general public opinion indicate that, although in a few countries people see democracy as antithetical to Islam, most do not.\textsuperscript{57} Indeed,

\textsuperscript{55} International Crisis Group, ‘Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but still dangerous’ (Jakarta and Brussels, 26 August 2003).
\textsuperscript{57} See John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who speaks for Islam? What a billion Muslims really think (New York, 2007); Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 133 55; and Moataz A. Fattah, Democratic values in the Muslim world (Boulder, 2006).
however difficult its practical realisation, the idea of democracy is today popular among Muslim publics in many countries. As with Indonesian educators, however, enthusiasm for democracy often coexists with an equally strong commitment to the ideals of Islamic law. Inasmuch as many theorists of Islam and democracy regard some aspects of the historical شريعة as incompatible with democracy, this tension may well generate complex or contradictory outcomes. At the very least, however, research like that from Indonesia and other majority Muslim countries illustrates once again that Muslim educators are by no means aloof from the central issues of our age. Most are preoccupied with matters similar to those of other moderns, including the question of how to maintain an ethical compass in a world of bountiful opportunities and great moral peril.

Conclusion

The changes wrought in Islamic education over the past two centuries show the clear imprint of global forces that have affected all modern peoples: Western colonialism, developmentalist states, modern science and capitalism and the worldwide institutionalisation of mass education. The reforms made to Islamic education over this period, of course, also show the imprint of distinctly Muslim concerns. Central among these has been the question of how to be a Muslim in a world still subject to non-Islamic powers.

From early on in the modern era, the response Muslim educators devised to this last challenge involved directing education toward, not just the training of scholarly elites, but the creation of a fellowship of believers capable of implementing God’s law in their personal lives. Whether this implementation requires the creation of an Islamic state is a question on which Muslim educators and their publics have long disagreed. They will likely continue to disagree for many years to come.

There was no master plan for rebuilding Islamic education in the modern age, and different school systems adopted different approaches and curricula. Nonetheless, a general trend has been apparent. A few ultra-traditionalists aside, modern Muslim education has struggled to revive the traditions of empirical and rational inquiry for which Islamic civilisation was earlier renowned. This does not mean that the religious sciences are being marginalised; on the contrary, scholarship and debate on their varied forms remain vigorous. Instead, the revival of a Muslim rationalism involves efforts to build intellectual disciplines and scholarly networks that will provide Muslims with
a seat among equals in the global ecumene of learning, research and publication that so uniquely defines the late modern period.

From the perspective of the *longue durée* of Muslim civilisation, the effort to build new traditions of learning recalls the remarkable engagement of Muslim scholars with Greek philosophy and natural science a thousand years ago. Science and philosophy in Muslim lands were once the most brilliant in all of Europe and Asia. By the fifteenth century, however, their lustre in the Arab heartland had begun to fade. Although the eastern lands from Anatolia to India maintained their brilliance longer, eventually they too dimmed. An aggressively ungenerous Western colonialism contributed to the fading. However, the earlier decline of science and philosophy in the Arab Muslim world shows that the West cannot be assigned full blame for this unhappy evolution. In Arab lands, the falsafa tradition of philosophy and natural science had been marginalised in Islamic learning from the late medieval period on, as jurisprudence became the centrepiece of madrasa study. The falsafa style of empirical inquiry and dialectical debate had come to be seen as immodest by comparison with the faithful study of God’s law.58 Equally important, in times of crisis, Muslim politicians used the shari‘a as a symbol with which to mobilise believers against their rivals, drawing stark boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims. For politicians and militants unfamiliar with the delicate interdependencies required for knowledge to flourish, the shari‘a appeared more truly Islamic than did Muslim philosophy and science. The long term effect of the marginalisation, however, was that Muslim scholars were deprived of the tools with which they had earlier engaged the social and natural worlds, and which they needed all the more to engage the modern.

As many Muslim commentators have emphasised, today Muslim countries lag behind many other areas of the world in general education, women’s schooling, scientific research and book publishing.59 In an age in which the intensive cultivation of knowledge has become essential for public well being, the lag is serious. Its gravity is complicated by the fact that, in a few majority Muslim countries, political interest groups have come to see the repressive control of inquiry and knowledge as necessary for their social position and their understanding of the good. This is, of course, a challenge with which the modern West is painfully familiar from its own history.

Nonetheless, looking back over the past two centuries, a long term trend seems clear. Muslim knowledge and learning are in the midst of a transformation as momentous as that they experienced a thousand years ago, during Islam’s brilliant encounter with Greek philosophy and natural science. No one can say for certain what the long term outcome of today’s encounter will be. As continental Europe during the 1930s illustrated by tragic example, modern learning depends upon fragile civilities and strong checks and balances, all of which are easily exhausted where politics becomes an exclusionary fray. At the same time, however, modern societies are so thoroughly dependent on science and learning that to compromise their cultivation causes immediate and visible harm. No less significant, such developments also damage the efforts of pious believers who aspire to an intellectually expansive profession of the faith.

There is no single modernity. Muslim societies will strike their own balance between open inquiry, religious community and social control. The balance struck will likely differ as much among individual Muslim societies as between these and the West. As with other modern peoples, however, Muslims will make their choices in a world in which the accelerated movement of people and ideas has blurred once clear social borders. In these circumstances, some on all sides will see both an opportunity and imperative for mutual respect and learning. ‘O mankind, We have created you male and female, and appointed you races and tribes, that you may know one another.’60 This most beautiful of Qur’anic messages has special relevance for knowledge and learning in our age.

History, heritage and modernity: cities in the Muslim world between destruction and reconstruction

JENS HANSSSEN

Introduction

In recent years, Islam’s two holiest cities have been purged of the ancient architectural vestiges of a more tolerant past. In the name of Wahhabí conceptions of religious purity, the Saudi leadership stripped Mecca and Medina’s historic sites of ‘heretical effigies’ fearing that heritage preservation ‘could lead to polytheism and idolatry’. The historic urban fabric around sacred sites was destroyed; Dār al Ṭaḥkām—the first school in Islamic history where the Prophet taught—was demolished; the Mosque of Bilāl, the Baqī’ cemetery of the Prophet’s companions, Shāfi‘ī, Sufi and, of course, Shi‘a shrines were bulldozed down to bedrock by the Saudi Ministry of Awqāf to expunge the haunting spirits of Islam’s history of diversity.¹ Since the oil boom of the 1970s Mecca’s delicate ecological system that had facilitated the sublime experience of the ḥajj around the holy precinct for a millennium and a half, has been turned into ‘a nightmare obstacle course generating hazards in which the very survival of the pilgrims was at stake’. Pilgrims had moved through it ‘like water flowing in a gentle stream’ for centuries. Now, the Qur’ānic Barren Valley was turned into a concrete jungle whose multistorey banks, malls and hotels have laid siege to the Grand Mosque.² The developer charged with the reconstruction of Mecca and Medina—the Saudi Bin Ladin Group—celebrated the project as a ‘Story of the Great Expansion’.³ To Saudi heritage activists,

³ Hamid Abbas, Story of the great expansion (Jeddah, 1996).
however, it marked ‘the end of history in Mecca and Medina and the end of their future’.4

Cities in the modern Muslim world look back on a rich and diverse past. The oldest cities among them, Damascus, Aleppo, Jerusalem and Jaffa had inherited Roman, Byzantine, Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid and Mamluk architecture long before the Ottoman state marshalled them into the modern age. Coastal towns, such as Tartus, Tripoli and Sidon are still dotted with buildings that date back to the crusaders. North African port cities share with their eastern Mediterranean counterparts Phoenician, Greek and Roman urban heritage while Cairo and Baghdad were founded in the seventh and eighth centuries and subsequently became imperial capitals and seats of Muslim caliphs. Although many others possess urban traces of ancient times, like Beirut or Amman, by the general definition of a city by the Chicago School of urban research ‘a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals’ many towns became fully urbanised only through large scale immigration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.5

And these are just the towns of the Ottoman Empire. Bukhara and Samarqand have been architectural gems, intellectual hubs and capital cities of Muslim empires for centuries. Early modern Indonesian port cities were nodes in a thriving intellectual and commercial network across the Indian Ocean and into the Arabian and Chinese Seas. Persianate cities were interconnected as nodes and rivals in Iran’s political economy long before Tehran came to dominate the modern Qājār and Pahlavi state. Populist claims to religious essentialism notwithstanding, Muslim cities need to be understood as material manifestations of social change and political power in their particular settings. They are also historically defined by the presence of minorities, Muslims and non Muslim alike, and relations between them and with Muslim authorities. Istanbul, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Isfahan and even Medina have had sizeable Christian, Jewish and non Sunnī Muslim populations ever since the Muslim conquest.

The question this chapter puts into relief is how to account for the cultural and religious reference system of Islam that has been common to all these cities and towns on the one hand and their apparent religious, social and architectural diversity on the other. For the longest time, scholarship has

stressed the commonality of Muslim cities. However, the assumption in the ‘Islamic city’ paradigm that cities in the Muslim world are physical manifestations of sacred laws and governed by a single religious reference system has been refuted by a host of historians who related residential patterns, urban morphologies and spatial organisation of cities to political and socio-economic factors rather than verses in the Qurʾān or Mālikī jurisprudence.⁶ These latter historians have accounted convincingly for the differences between cities, mosque styles, bazaar layouts and domestic architecture around the Muslim world.⁷

Arguably, however, as social anthropologist Clifford Geertz points out, ‘whatever the status of the idea of an Islamic City is in scholarly discourse, Orientalist or otherwise, it is very much alive in the minds, and in the discourse of workaday Muslims … and, in fact, is made even more alive by the enormous transformations cities are currently undergoing in the Islamic world’.⁸ It is the hypothesis of this chapter that the notion of an ahistorical, essential Islamic city was never pace Geertz just an innocent concept of Muslim identity, it has to do with assertion of power; nor has it been irreversibly supplanted in a scientific paradigm shift.⁹

The academic study of the Muslim urban environment has been a key element in the European justification of colonial rule in the Middle East. Based on the assertion that Islam is an urban religion, historians provided the Western public and imperial policy makers with an authoritative account of the decline of the contemporary Muslim world qua their studies of cities. The survival of the old walled cities of Aleppo, Damascus, Algiers or Fez into the twentieth century reassured colonial publics of the success of their governments’ civilising missions.¹⁰ At the same time, as Timothy Mitchell has argued in his landmark study Colonising Egypt, the meticulous preservation of urban nuclei froze Muslim cities in time and affirmed the adjacent new and ‘clean’ European city’s modernity.¹¹

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⁶ As argued by Besim Hakim, Arabic Islamic cities: Building and planning principles (London, 1986).
⁷ Most notably the ground breaking works by André Raymond.
⁹ Note that Geertz’s case study is Fez, a city with a large, prosperous and historically rooted Jewish population.
What, then, is the relationship between writing the history of the Islamic world and the historical processes themselves? Can we escape colonialism’s epistemological grip on historical knowledge and move beyond post colonialism’s identititarian strategies? Can Istanbullus, Cairenes, Beirutis and Baghdadis reclaim their urban pasts? Finally, what are the consequences of colonialism’s physical and rhetorical in(ter)ventions for the possibility and desirability of urban heritage preservation?

Urban studies, Orientalism and the historiography of modern Islam

The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were times of great physical, political and socio economic change for Muslim cities. One of the most ethnically and religiously diverse Ottoman provincial capitals, Aleppo’s built up area expanded from approximately two square miles at the end of the eighteenth century to ten square miles at the end of the nineteenth century. The populations of its trading partners, Mosul and Hama, almost doubled between 1820 and 1920 to 90,000 and 60,000 respectively. In Palestine, Nablus metamorphosed from a small town at the beginning of Ottoman rule to a thriving regional trade centre with hundreds of tightly packed towering stone buildings by the mid nineteenth century. In the old city of Damascus, almost three quarters of private houses were rebuilt or redesigned in the second half of the nineteenth century.

In short, historic Muslim cities were living organisms that witnessed profound transformations before the impetus of colonialism and authoritanism. Heritage activism today needs to acknowledge these eighteenth and nineteenth century dynamics and abandon the tendency to museumise ancient individual buildings as the religious essence of a nation’s particular

15 Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and peasants in Jabal Nablus (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1996), p. 27.
culture or as an epoch’s singular style in favour of an approach that historicises and contextualises Islamic architecture and artifacts. In the twenty first century, urban immigration, unemployment, pollution and lack of public services cause widespread alienation among city residents. Technical or humanitarian solutions to these urban problems alone are insufficient to sustain the educational, intellectual and aesthetic dimensions that distinguish human life.17 Good urban design ought to account for how the city is perceived by its users and to prioritise legibility, participation and a sense of home.18

Muslim urban history and Western historiography of modernity have been inseparably interwoven since the inception of urban studies as a sub discipline of Orientalism in the early twentieth century. Janet Abu Lughod’s critical assessment may serve as a starting point: ‘the idea of the Islamic city was constructed by a series of Western authorities who drew upon a small and eccentric sample of pre modern Arab cities on the eve of Westernization (domination), but more than that, drew upon one another in an isnād [chain of scholarly transmission] of authority’.19

Within the discipline of Orientalism, interest in cities was a manifestation of the growing respectability of studying ‘living Islam’ (‘sich in den Islam einleben’) at the end of the nineteenth century.20 In a veritable paradigm shift, away from reclusive pursuits of classical manuscripts, theological scriptures and Islamic high culture more generally, the Hungarian Ignaz Goldziher (1850 1921), the Dutch Snouk Hurgronje (1857 1936) and other European Orientalists followed the example of British Arabist and long term Cairo resident Edward W. Lane (1801 76), and began to travel to the Muslim world, live in its cities, meet clerics and scholars and generally learn in Goldziher’s words ‘how effective Islam is in society and history’.21

This new urban approach brought scholars directly into the orbit of colonial politics, but it also signalled the first crisis of modern Orientalism.22 Two new methodological revisions emerged at this time of colonial expansion that sustained the study of Muslim cities for generations to come: the sociological

and the archaeological, or geographical, approaches. Max Weber’s work on ‘The City’ has been the foundational sociological text in the ‘isnād’ of Middle East urban studies ever since it appeared in 1921.\textsuperscript{23} Weber asserted the particularity of the Western city ‘a place of the ascent from bondage into freedom’ in contradistinction to the Oriental city ‘the abode of illegitimate authority’.\textsuperscript{24} The implications of this claim are profound: the ancient, Oriental, Asiatic, Arabian and Islamic city type Weber moved freely between them served to endow the Occidental city with essential typological qualities. By doing so he based his homage to the exclusive modernity of the West on putative lacks and absences in the post medieval non West. The apparent absence of a regular street grid, civic institutions, citizenship and a literary urban spirit are epiphenomena of larger cultural deficiencies and developmental problems of Islamic history.\textsuperscript{25}

Weber based his Islamic city typology on Mecca, perhaps in the assumption that the holiest place of Islam represented the urban archetype which other Muslim cities aspired to emulate.\textsuperscript{26} His only quoted source and authority on the Muslim world in his work was Snouck Hurgronje and his monumental \textit{Mekka} of 1888.\textsuperscript{27} Hurgronje’s comprehensive urban analysis in \textit{Mekka} is perhaps the ‘ur text’ of the Islamic city paradigm. Significantly, his ‘fieldwork’ in and around Mecca was paid for by the Dutch East Indian authorities who asked him to spy on Javanese clerics who, it was suspected, were fuelling and organising anti Dutch struggles in the archipelagoes.

Like his mentor Goldziher before him, Hurgronje wanted to ‘fully immerse himself in the Muslim world … to observe with the ear as much as the eye’.\textsuperscript{28} In modern times, Hurgronje argues, the lack of a hierarchical structure of urban authority in Mecca led to symptomatic factionalism: apparently, the idea of an association which could unite the city into a corporate unit was missing in Mecca.\textsuperscript{29}

Instead of recognising the unique history of Mecca and Hurgronje’s counter insurgent taint, Weber asserts that ‘this Arabic condition’ meant that the Islamic city had not emancipated itself from the feudal stage of history. From Weber onwards, then, the discourse on cities was set as a question of development:

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 742.
\textsuperscript{26} As we shall see presently, imperial, not religious, capitals served as urban models.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., XIX. Goldziher did not compromise his scholarship by counter insurgent motives.
\textsuperscript{29} Hurgronje paraphrased in Weber, \textit{The city}, pp. 87 8.
cities were the material manifestations of singular and/or epochal civilisational essences; they were windows and stakes of progress.\(^\text{30}\)

In the early twentieth century, there emerged a second methodological path out of Orientalism’s ivory towers, one that studied material culture and spatial formations through ‘fieldwork’ on urban morphology. Hurgronje/Weber’s archaeological and geographical counterparts focused on commonality and underlying, permanent physical features of the Islamic city. This ‘\(\text{\textit{isnād}}\)’, whose foundational text was Fustel de Coulanges’s \textit{La cité antique} rather than Weber’s \textit{Stadt}, was developed by French scholars who resided in colonial cities of North Africa in the 1910s and 1920s. The Arabist William Marçais argued in his foundational 1928 article ‘L’islamisme et la vie urbaine’, that, compared to European urbanists, Muslims have not formulated theories of urban planning.\(^\text{31}\) Marçais’s inferiorising paradox that Islam was an urban religion in cities without conceptual foundations remained unchallenged. But subsequent generations of urban historians walked the cities in North Africa and Syria under French occupation, dissected their morphology and mapped out their physical characteristics. By the end of the colonial period, scholars had produced a remarkable inventory of detailed building plans for grand mosques, elaborate markets, famous schools, public baths and ornate fountains, residential and commercial quarters and ancient city walls. These were complemented by studies of Islamic legal rulings on urban infrastructure, walls, ruins, water and neighbourly relations.

These separate sociological and material culture lineages of the Islamic City \(\text{\textit{isnād}}\) were synthesised for the first time in the work of Gustave E. von Grunebaum.\(^\text{32}\) In a 1954 lecture on ‘\textit{Die Islamische Stadt}’, Grunebaum combined the research on urban morphology by among others the Marçais brothers, Jean Sauvaget and Jacques Weulersse with Weberian sociology of modernity and civilisational development.\(^\text{33}\) The medieval Muslim city failed to produce the cultural attributes that Weber had argued led to modernity and freedom in the West. Instead, ‘the Muslim perceived the city [only] as

\(^{30}\) The sense that urbanity was a progress and civilisation endowing attribute was also a central trope of intellectual reform movements in the late Ottoman Empire. See Jens Hanssen, *Fin de siècle Beirut: The making of an Ottoman provincial capital* (Oxford, 2005), ch. 8.


\(^{32}\) André Raymond admitted that he was ‘unable to trace the direct influence of Max Weber on the theories of J. Sauvaget and J. Weulersse’. In ‘Islamic city, Arab city: Orientalist myths and recent views’, *British Journal of Middle East Studies*, 21, 1 (1994), p. 4.


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a settlement in which he could fulfill his religious duties and attain his social ideals fully.\textsuperscript{34} Politically undifferentiated, yet administratively fragmented, the medieval cities of Islam anticipated and facilitated ‘the great decline of the Muslim world’.\textsuperscript{35}

In the 1950s, this Viennese Orientalist at Chicago came to collaborate with the university’s anthropologists Robert Redfield and Milton Singer on a research project entitled ‘Islam and the West’. Knowledge transmission between the Chicago School and Grunebaum was reciprocal: Grunebaum was to the Chicago School what Snouck Hurgronje was to Weber, as the Orientalist turned developmentalist and the developmentalists adopted Orientalist causation. Grunebaum borrowed cultural analysis from his colleagues Louis Wirth, Redfield and Singer who themselves had co-founded urban studies as an academic discipline based on a revival of classical works of German civilisational and urban thinkers like Oswald Spengler, Max Weber and Georg Simmel.\textsuperscript{36} The Chicago School evolved around comparative studies of how the ‘moral order’ of cities around the world was shaped by their physical environment. What they lacked was knowledge of Islam. Fortunately for Redfield and Milton, Mr von Grunebaum … clears up some apparently contradictory and paradoxical features of Muslim civilization. For despite the high value this civilization puts on poetry, learning, the political community and the town, it has not developed imaginative literature, scientific knowledge, political and urban institutions to the level known in the West.\textsuperscript{37}

Algiers: historicising a colonial city

Orientalist scholarship on the Islamic city worked hand in glove with heritage preservation and colonial aesthetics in North African cities. Hubert Lyautey, resident general of Morocco from 1912 to 1925 and a seasoned officer on the French imperial circuit, developed the dual city or, with Abu Lughod, urban apartheid approach.\textsuperscript{38} Lyautey used urban planning as a means to

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} For a trenchant methodological critique of von Grunebaum’s Weberian Orientalism, see Abdallah Laroui, \textit{The crisis of the Arab intellectual: Traditionalism or historicism?} (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984), ch. 3.
\textsuperscript{37} Von Grunebaum, \textit{Islam: Essays in the nature and growth of a cultural tradition}, p. ix.
square European health and security concerns with the aesthetic appeal of Muslim architecture:

Touch the indigenous city as little as possible. Instead, improve their surroundings where, on the vast terrain that is still free, the European city rises, following a plan which realized the most modern conceptions of large boulevards, water and electrical supplies, squares and gardens, buses and trams, and also foresee future expansion.39

Decolonisation in particular the Algerian War of Independence has turned back the colonial gaze and exposed the ways in which colonial knowledge and power reinforced each other to perpetuate European domination. Studies on the nature of the Islamic city were replaced by studies on the colonial production of this category. The works of Frantz Fanon in Algeria, in particular, have highlighted how socio economic and racial difference acquired physical form in a bifurcated dual city:

The settlers’ town is strongly built, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt … [It] is not the prolongation of the native city. The colonizers have not settled in the midst of the natives. They have surrounded the native city; they have laid siege to it … The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in the mire.40

Since Fanon’s ‘cri du casbah’ a host of scholars have deconstructed the epistemological foundations of colonial violence in North Africa and the scholars’ and architects’ complicity in it. Urban underdevelopment in Algiers and elsewhere is not due to the pathology of a religion or civilisation as von Grunebaum asserted, but a consequence of colonialism. Even though Abdallah Laroui rightly cautions against the romantic understanding of Algiers’s history in Fanon’s anti colonial polemic,41 The wretched of the earth and A dying colonialism have opened a space for charting an analytical shift in urban studies more generally. On the one hand, Muslim cities are conceived as sites of larger political, economic and cultural transformations colonialism, capitalism, nation building, modernity in the Middle East; and on the other hand, the lived experience of urban dwellers are taken to hold the key to measuring the effects of these transformations.

39 Lyautey quoted in Gwendolyn Wright, The politics of design in French colonial urbanism (Chicago, 1991), p. 79.
Pre colonial Algiers was a heavily fortified Ottoman outpost governed by a military elite of Anatolian origins. In contrast to Ottoman Cairo, Tunis or Tripoli, this imperial elite perpetuated its ethnic distinctness into the early nineteenth century through nuptial strategies of exclusion and residential separation from local elites.\textsuperscript{42} The French invasion of Algeria in 1830 in part a strategy of national unification during political crisis in Paris quickly swept away the Ottoman government in the provincial capital. Algiers was subjected to comprehensive urban destruction and was redesigned as the capital of a French Mediterranean empire and the launching pad to colonise Africa.\textsuperscript{43}

The seaward quarters of the walled city where the Ottomans had erected public and religious buildings were demolished for much the same military purposes as Baron de Haussmann ‘modernised’ Paris twenty years later. Algiers’s three main traffic arteries leading from the central parading ground Place du Gouvernement were straightened and widened into colonnaded boulevards. New ramps aligned an arched harbour front on top of which a sumptuous corniche Le Boulevard de l’Impératrice cut through expropriated properties.\textsuperscript{44} As Algiers outgrew the old city walls, and Europeans settled around large military installations in the northern and southern outskirts, colonial planning severed the upper casbah from Marine Quarter and the sea, and by preserving it ‘in all its original barbarity’ isolated it from French Algeria’s evolving present.\textsuperscript{45}

The Marine Quarter came to enjoy the amenities of modern life running water, electric street lighting and a tramway but as a mixed, cosmopolitan quarter ‘neither Moorish, nor entirely European’ it also destabilised French colonialism’s segregated order of things. Designs by René Danger, Henri Prost and LeCorbusier attempted to eradicate this uncomfortable urban ambiguity in the 1930s. While parts of the lower casbah were identified and exhibited as tourist attractions, parts of the Marine Quarter were demolished and its population displaced to social housing projects on the outskirts or to the already overcrowded casbah.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44} J. L. Cohen, N. Oulebsir and Y. Kanoun (eds.), \textit{Alger: Paysage urbain et architectures, 1800 2000} (Besançon, 2003).
\textsuperscript{46} Cohen, Oulebsir and Kanoun (eds.), \textit{Alger: Paysage urbain et architectures,} pp. 140 85.
All urban plans for Algiers of the colonial period shared a pedagogy of difference in which the cultural otherness of the colonised was set in stone as absolute and irreducible. By the 1930s the regionalist movement of the École d’Alger challenged the settler movement’s fascist quest to exhumé ‘Latin Africa underneath the trompe l’œil of modern Islamic stage effects’. However, neither Le Corbusier’s Mediterranean modernism (cubic forms, white walls) nor Albert Camus’s Mediterranean romanticism (sun, sand and sea) was willing to overcome the colonial contradictions inherent in the dual city approach, or to recognise the epistemic violence that their Mediterraneanism perpetuated. The preservation of isolated religious buildings or compact residential neighbourhoods as ‘vernacular architecture’ then, were not magnanimous concessions to ‘Muslim culture’. Rather, it worked to consolidate the inherently unstable French colonial presence in North Africa. Colonial cities in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia were simultaneously retreats for Europeans disenchanted by industrial capitalism, as well as architectural and administrative laboratories of European modernity.

Tel Aviv and Jaffa: a colonial relationship

‘Mediterraneanism was, I believe, deeply embedded in the whole Modern Movement from 1905 onwards.’ Colquhoun’s provocative linkage between European modernism and Mediterranean architecture flies in the face of modernist architects’ self identification with universalist, rationalist and functionalist approaches to building that transcended regional particularities. Indeed, early twentieth century cities in the eastern Mediterranean were magnets for modernist architects. Tel Aviv in particular provided the opportunity for an entire generation of Jewish German builders who had been uprooted by anti-Semitism to put into place Neues Bauen  the progenitor of Bauhaus and the International Style. Over 800 residences, schools and housing blocks bore those distinct signatures of 1920s modernism that were believed to be most suitable to Palestinian climate: cubic units of exposed reinforced concrete walls brushed white; balconies elegantly swung around curved corners, all

neatly inserted into Patrick Geddes’s 1925 Master Plan for Tel Aviv.\textsuperscript{51} It is this city of Tel Aviv the ‘largest open air Bauhaus Museum in the world’\textsuperscript{52} that UNESCO declared a World Heritage Site in 2003.\textsuperscript{53}

*Neues Bauen* and its architects were by no means dominant in mandate Palestine; nor was their work restricted to and uncontested within the Zionist movement. British colonial urbanism celebrated ‘the Oriental spirit’ of the place eclectically. Architectural markers of late Ottoman modernity such as Sultan Abdülhamid II’s iconic clocktower were deemed inauthentic and destroyed (only to be recast, after Palestinian protest, as an abstract ‘symbol of the persistence of a native, Oriental culture’).\textsuperscript{54} At the same time imperial nostalgia expressed itself in a paternalistic preservationism that drew on a long Victorian fascination with Islamic architecture, it blended scholarly engagement with utilitarian appropriation of Islamic architecture and the French Beaux Arts traditions.\textsuperscript{55}

The founding of Tel Aviv in 1909 ‘gave the landscape something colonial’,\textsuperscript{56} even as it was shrouded in pioneer myths of human adversity and natural barrenness a ‘dream city washed ashore right near Jaffa’.\textsuperscript{57} Soon Tel Aviv’s ‘need to grow to live’ threatened to encroach on Jaffa’s northern perimeter. In the 1910s, the Young Turk governor anticipated Tel Aviv authorities’ designs for southward expansion by establishing a *waqf* compound or real estate endowment between Tel Aviv and Jaffa.\textsuperscript{58} When Geddes devised his Master Plan in 1925, he acknowledged the planning limits set by the Hasan Bey Mosque and forced Tel Aviv to expand northward. The city of Jaffa avoided physical erasure but it came to be stripped of its economic base and political autonomy, as the mandate authorities expropriated more and more orchards, fields and villages deemed ‘unproductive’ or ‘unsettled’. With the expansion of Tel Aviv’s municipal borders in the 1930s and 40s, this crown land was tendered for urban development.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{51} Julius Posener, *Fast so alt wie das Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1990), p. 248.
\textsuperscript{55} As Mark Crinson argues in *Empire building: Orientalism and Victorian architecture* (London, 1996), British and French colonial architecture presented a rare but powerful instance of Orientalist discourse that actually addressed ‘the Oriental’ it constructs.
\textsuperscript{56} Posener, *Fast so alt*, p. 246.
\textsuperscript{57} Emmanuel Hertz, quoted in Schlör, *Tel Aviv*, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{58} LeVine, *Overthrowing geography*, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., pp. 182–202.
Tel Aviv became a city that lay permanent siege to Jaffa. Tel Aviv’s *raison d’être* as a modern, exclusively Jewish city was premised on its negation of and physical separation from Jaffa’s extant ‘Levantine’, Ottoman modernity. In fact, Zionist writing exhibited unease and fear about the confessional and ethnic mixing implied in the term ‘Levantine’.60 The existence of Jaffa’s ten original Jewish neighbourhoods and their inhabitants’ participation in Jaffa’s municipal life was generally denied and droned out by the Orientalist trope of urban decay and Ottoman tyranny. The few Zionist attempts at appropriating Jaffa’s building culture into their visions most notably Erich Mendelsohn’s idea for an Atelier Méditerranéen were best encapsulated by the emblem of Tel Aviv’s Levant Fairs in the 1930s: flying camels. During the 1948 war, Jaffa was ethnically cleansed of most of its Arab population, its bazaars bulldozed and its surrounding villages erased by Zionist militias. More recently, however, Tel Avivians rediscovered ‘old’ Jaffa as a quaint fishing village for tourists and artists.61 Whether through war, administrative conquest Jaffa was annexed in the early 1950s or the tourists’ gaze, Tel Aviv Jaffa was a colonial ‘contact zone’ comparable to North African cities and the wider urban world of European colonialism.

Izmir and Alexandria: port-capitals of the eastern Mediterranean

Ottoman Jaffa was a small but prosperous port city of c. 50,000 inhabitants, surrounded by orange groves. It was strategically located on regional trade and pilgrimage routes. Under the Young Turks, Jaffa became the cultural centre of Arab Palestine hosting a multi confessional municipal council, clubs, seaside cafés, theatres, a cinema and widely circulated Arabic newspapers. Merchants from Beirut and Alexandria invested in *suq* s and hotels, and the Ottoman government constructed new buildings, most notably the Hamidian clocktower in 1900.62 In the British mandate period, sectarian violence between Jewish immigrants and Arab inhabitants flared up chronically as Jaffa emerged as the capital of Palestinian nationalist mobilisation.

In late Ottoman times, Jaffa was part of a network of port cities in the Mediterranean that attracted Jewish, Christian and Muslim refugees from

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60 Schlör, *Tel Aviv*, p. 176.


colonial North Africa and their respective rural hinterlands. The great chain of Ottoman port cities extended from Istanbul to Salonica, Izmir, Mersin, Alexandretta, Lattakia, Tripoli al Shām, Sidon, Haifa, Gaza, Damietta, Tripoli al Gharb and Tunis. Modern Ottoman port cities emerged at a time when the eastern Mediterranean was incorporated into the world economy. Not all cities by the sea were naturally port cities. Acre was a garrison town enforcing regional trade monopolies before it was eclipsed by Beirut in the 1820s. Likewise Alexandria replaced Damietta as soon as it metamorphosed into a catalyst of Mediterranean free trade after Egypt’s withdrawal from Palestine in 1840. While the importance of some port cities declined in the late Ottoman period, others’ prosperity long outlasted the demise of the empire.

Port cities were the first to sacrifice the ideas of urban entrenchment and fortification for the benefit of economic expansion and circulation. In the nineteenth century, they became market driven urban contact zones of human and cultural encounter, of exchange of goods and ideas whose engine of development and urban reconfiguration were port enlargements. In the absence of a coercive state, a complex social and legal system of exceptions, exemptions and exclusions known as the Capitulations provided minority merchants and local dragomans with diplomatic immunity. These developments were facilitated by the rise of steamship lines in the Mediterranean and the expansion of trade after the Euro Ottoman free trade agreements of the late 1830s and early 1840s. Port cities avoided on the one hand the museumisation of colonial cities, and on the other hand the total destruction of the old urban core that occurred in industrialising port cities in southern Europe. However, as in the two case studies below they also paid heavily for rising ethnic and social tensions. Two events in Izmir and Alexandria capture and frame the particularities of this city type that was so dominant in the Mediterranean from 1840 to 1920.

In 1842, a festive Corpus Christi procession paraded on Frank Street, the main thoroughfare of Izmir along richly decorated shop fronts and building façades. In the larger diplomatic context, the celebration was a manifestation of the imperial government’s fateful commitment to religious tolerance and uniform citizenship expressed in the Gülhane Edict three years earlier. In the urban context of Izmir, such public ceremonies were at times provocative rituals that inscribed one’s community into city life, to stage sectarian

difference or newly acquired financial privileges. In times of prosperity, the public places where they were staged facilitated friendly encounter and civic intimacy; in times of economic hardship they could become the sharp edges of suspicion and anxiety. 65

In the last decades of Ottoman rule, Izmir’s urban centre metamorphosed into a business district where modern boutiques coexisted with traditional wholesalers, Protestant churches with Muslim waqf complexes and new government buildings. By the time this first Christian procession took place, Frank Street had become home to a diverse Levantine population of Greeks, Catholics, Armenians, Jews and Muslims. 66 Creole languages—Karamanli, Romaic or Ladino—not necessarily Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, French or Yiddish were the paroles d’affairs in Izmir’s market streets. The complex web of financial, political, cultural and linguistic circuits ensured that British free trade in western Anatolia would not by pass Izmir’s intermediaries. 67

Izmir suffered several earthquakes, fires and outbreaks of epidemics over the centuries. But the rise of sectarian nationalism and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans marked the end of Izmir’s era as an open port city. From 1913 onwards, large numbers of Muslim refugees arrived in and around Izmir before facing Greece’s invading armies between 1919 and 1922. On 14 September 1922—the eve of Turkish reconquest of Izmir—the great fire destroyed large parts of the city, the idea of its urban experiment and with it the qadi records to prove it. 68 The subsequent population exchange between Greece and Turkey all but terminated the possibility of hybrid identities and multiple belongings in south western Anatolia.

Like Izmir, Alexandria was a culture capital for expatriate Greeks. They constituted the largest number of non Egyptian residents which constituted over 15 per cent of Alexandria’s total population of approximately 200,000 to 400,000 between 1880 and 1910. 69 When Georges Averoff, a leading benefactor of Alexandria’s Greek Orthodox community, died in 1899, a huge funeral procession filed eastwards from his villa in the high class suburb of Ramleh past Alexandria’s Greek confessional and cultural institutions to the Greek

65 Ibid.
66 In 1880, non Muslim Ottomans made up approximately a third of Izmir’s approximately 210,000 inhabitants; ‘Foreigners’ a quarter.
68 Ibid., p. 133.
69 Non Muslim population of Alexandria’s population grew from approximately 17 to 27 per cent between 1897 and 1917. See Ilbert, Alexandrie, vol. II, p. 759.
Orthodox cemetery in leafy Chatby. Like public parades in Izmir, this ritual of mourning was also a celebration of the social capital of the wealthy minority notables in Alexandria’s municipal politics. The Salgados, Zizinias, Tossizza and Avero's much more so than foreign consuls or even the ruling Turko Circassian elites were the driving force behind Alexandria’s emerging commercial and architectural profile.

From the 1830s to the 1850s, Francesco Mancini, the chief engineer of Alexandria’s new Planning Commission (the ‘Ornato’), turned the Place d’Armes a military parading ground into the elegant Place des Consuls (‘Midān Muḥammad ‘Alī’ from the 1860s). Aligned, regular blocks of two storey high okelles, or arcaded business cum residential complexes, skirted this 420m by 65m square which became not only the aesthetic and social centre of Alexandria where the ‘Frank Quarter’ to the east, the Turkish Town to the north and Egyptian working class districts to the south converged but also a model for public squares elsewhere in the Ottoman world.

Attracted by the cotton boom and the khedive’s expansive drive to Europeanise Egypt, architects from all over Europe received commissions to build signature palaces and villas for the merchant and ruling elites. Italian trained architects were dominant. They were the first to build neo classical palaces in Alexandria that would showcase the modernising pretensions of Egypt’s new ruler Muḥammad ‘Ali (r. 1805 49). For Alexandria’s wealthy Levantines, too, neo classicism was the style of choice. Unlike in French North Africa, neither ancient Rome nor classical Islamic architecture were points of reference. The Hellenistic civic temples of Bavarian Athens inspired private commissions in Alexandria just as the Greek diaspora of Egypt subsidised the construction of the capital of modern Greece.

Following the fateful interconfessional riots around Midān Muḥammad ‘Alī in June 1882, the British fleet bombarded a city evacuated by its European inhabitants. Between the withdrawal of Egyptian troops and the delayed landing of British troops, angry crowds of disinherit Egypt looted

71 For example, Beirut’s Sahat al Burj renovations in the 1880s appears to have been modelled on Alexandria’s Midan.
and set fire to abandoned buildings across town. The mob’s gutting of al Manshiyya’s golden square mile triggered Alexandria’s shift from crucible of Mediterranean capitalism to the colonial domination of Britain in Egypt and globally. While the events of 1882 exposed the social tensions generated by the unequal distribution of Alexandria’s economic boom, the new colonial regime had at its disposal more efficient means to regulate this ‘permanent provocation’ without ever diffusing it. Ever more secure of architectural investments, Alexandria’s cultural centre of gravity shifted eastward around Ramleh Station, the head of the tramway that ran along the shoreline, where the Grand Hotels the Cecil, the Windsor and the Metropolitan ostentatiously serviced an international haut volée. It took another major urban conflagration, the Great Fire of Cairo in June 1952, to seal Egypt’s age of colonial liberalism and with it Alexandria’s fate. It is to Cairo and its imperial rival we now turn.

Imperial constructions and regional rivalry

Urban typologies such as the colonial city, the Mediterranean city and the port city elaborated on above have shown that many nineteenth century Muslim cities were so deeply affected by European expansion that they ceased to be definable by absolute cultural alterity well before Orientalists developed the idea of a unitary, unchanging Islamic city model. But typological approaches to cities are at best approximations. Cities are complex, historical as well as conjunctural creatures whose forms and functions defy rigid categorisation and elude representative similarity.

For example, Alexandria, the Mediterranean port city par excellence, became a colonial bridgehead; all the while its finance sector and urban administration remained in the hands of Levantine, Greek and Egyptian elites before and after the British invasion. Conversely, Cairo acquired a quasi colonial dual city structure through Khedive Ismā‘īl’s Haussmann inspired urban transformation. Yet to reduce nineteenth century Cairo to this fateful master plan would fail to capture the regional context of Cairo’s urban developments. Rather, Cairo was first and foremost an imperial capital vying with its rival cum inspiration Istanbul over political and cultural leadership of the region.

Istanbul and Cairo have been by far the largest cities in the Middle East for centuries. The two metropoles dominated the Ottoman Empire politically

and culturally since the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1516. In 1800 the Ottoman capital may have counted as many as 300,000 inhabitants inside the city walls and the same number in the growing extramural quarters across the Golden Horn, Galata and Pera and in the villages along and across the Bosporus. Cairo’s population on the eve of Napoleon’s invasion in 1798 was also estimated at 300,000 inhabitants. But both cities came out of the eighteenth century bruised and battered, suffering unprecedented European encroachment and occupation, political and refugee crises and growing urban unrest.

Despite varying degrees of dynastic provincial autonomy throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Cairo’s position had generally been subordinate to Istanbul. This relationship began to change in the early nineteenth century. The ambitious Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha developed Cairo into the centre of a rival dynastic empire which extended deep into Sudan and the Arabian peninsula even though the rulers of Cairo continued to pay tribute to the imperial authority in Istanbul. Egypt’s ruler also began to pose a serious challenge to Ottoman sovereignty over the Arab territories between Istanbul and Cairo, Bilād al-Shām. The most acute expression of this rivalry was the Egyptian occupation of Palestine, Syria and Mount Lebanon from 1831 to 1841. Much of the subsequent Ottoman policies of provincial and urban reforms in the empire’s Arab lands, in particular Midhat Pasha’s governorates of Baghdad (1869-71) and Damascus (1878-80), were carried out against the background of Egypt’s modernising drive.

The urban rivalry between Cairo and Istanbul was expressed most visibly in the hype for urban renewal projects that dominated urban life in both cities after 1840. Both ruling dynasties outdid each other in imperial ostentation as new boulevards perforated historical neighbourhoods and as international architects were given a free hand to experiment with building styles and materials. Finally and crucially, Cairo and Istanbul also shared the effects of growing economic peripheralisation and financial dependence on European creditors and on the states that protected them. This trend ultimately led to a ‘synchronised’ path of Ottoman and Egyptian state bankruptcies in the late 1870s.

In Istanbul, the Ottoman reform project, or Tanzimat, was tied from the outset to the idea of urban renewal. The very year Sultan Mahmūd
famously proclaimed in the Gülhane Edict that all tax paying Ottoman sub-
jects, regardless of ethnicity or religion, were guaranteed legal recourse to
security for life, honour and property, the German officer Helmuth von
Moltke proposed four east west arteries in ‘Old Stamboul’. This scheme
may not have been carried out but, like subsequent unexecuted grand
schemes, it provided a blue print for the expanding Ottoman capital that
focused on circulation and mobility, traffic and transportation.  

Long standing Ottoman practices of urban regulation by decree or ‘qâdi’
urbanism’ as the urban historian André Raymond called it were no longer
sufficient to deal with the challenges of urban growth, insecurity, social
tensions and frequent outbreaks of fires. In 1836 the leading reformist intellec-
tual, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, urged the Ottoman government from Paris to
widen Istanbul’s streets into geometrically arranged arteries, to break up
overcrowded neighbourhoods and to recruit European trained architects
and engineers.  

Reşid Pasha’s recommendations gradually became codified in the Building Regulation of 1848 and the Regulation of Streets of 1858, whose
fine tuning culminated in the imperial Municipal Law of 1877.  

Massive Ottoman government loans and the sale of imperial real estate
provided the means to carry out large scale reconstructions after fires wiped
out large areas of old Istanbul and the Grand Rue de Pera in 1865 and 1870. The
Hocapaşa fire allowed Ottoman planners to widen and align north south and
east west axes between the Aya Sofya and Beyazit Square. Similar plans for
the reconstruction in Pera faltered at the resistance of residents as plot density
returned to pre fire levels. At the northern tip of Pera, the military parading
ground in Taksı̇m was turned into a large Beaux Arts leisure park. In southern
Galata, new and enlarged streets replaced historic ramparts parallel to the
shoreline and the much improved waterfront.  

As Istanbul’s centre of gravity began to shift to Pera, the Tanzimat sultan,
‘Abdü laziz, decided to move his entourage out of the labyrinthine Topkapi
Palace, perched as it had been for centuries on the tip of the Golden Horn. For
the new imperial palace, his planners designated a site on the northern shore
of the Bosporus within eye shot of Pera a move to Istanbul’s Asiatic side has

79 Zeynep Çelik, The remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman city in the nineteenth century
80 Stéphane Yerasimos, ‘A propos des réformes urbaines des Tanzimat’, in F. Géorgeon
and P. Dumont (eds.), Vivre dans l’Empire Ottoman: Sociabilités et relations intercommuni-
82 Ibid., pp. 55 81.

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not been seriously considered since the early seventeenth century. Designed by the prolific Armenian architect Karbet Balyan, the Dolmabahçe Palace combined a symmetric, axial Beaux Arts composition of space with traditional central hall interiors behind a neo classical waterfront façade. As such it constituted in Zeynep Çelik’s words ‘the ultimate declaration of imperial preference for an architectural style imported from Europe’.  

Istanbul’s fin de siècle intellectuals pathologised the growing cultural divide in the imperial capital between a ‘Westernized’ city in Pera and a ‘traditional’ one in old Istanbul. But physical and cultural transformation took place on both sides of the Golden Horn. In Old Istanbul almost half the irregular street layouts assumed checked patterns by the early twentieth century as wooden structures ceded to aligned row houses made of brick and stone. The calendar kept by a young Ottoman bureaucrat between 1902 and 1907 offers insight to the time geography of thousands of Muslim middle class city dwellers who inhabited both worlds of Istanbul without any deep sense of alienation.

Cairo leapt out of its Mamluk shell under Khedive Ismā‘īl Pasha (r. 1863–79). Three adjacent urban grid systems cut across the flood basin between the west bank of the Nile and the old city. The Ismā‘īliyya 80 hectare business district, Bāb el Lūq and Nāṣriyya two 72 hectare residential neighbourhoods for Egypt’s emerging efendiyya and upper classes grew into this new network of streets. The showpiece of Cairo’s urban renewal, however, and the ideal site for the grand ceremony of the Suez Canal inauguration in 1869 was Azbakiyya. On 26 hectares diplomatic representations, grand hotels, the Cairo Opera, the Mixed Tribunal and the Orosdi Bak Department Store (later Omar Efendi) flanked a lush park, an artificial punting lake, a Chinese pavilion and European cafés. In Azbakiyya major arteries converged from the Citadel, the renovated al Azhar Mosque, Bāb al Ḥadid, the barracks and the Egyptian Antiquities Museum, the ‘Abdīn Palace and the industrial sites at the port of Būlāq. European investors were offered large plots to build residences and fill the grid while the Cairo Water Company supplied running water and provided an exclusive sewage system on demand for Azbakiyya residents.

83 Ibid., p. 130.
87 Doris Abouseif, Azbakiyya and its environs, from Azbak to Isma‘īl, 1476–1979 (Cairo, 1985).
The growing number of European speculators, bankers and architects felt secure and very much at home in Lord Cromer’s Cairo. The Mixed Tribunals ensured they were above Egyptian law. As the new Cairo sparkled in European grandeur, the old city appeared static and disorganised. And yet, the obdurate facts of Cairo’s political and religious sites contradicted a conceptual bifurcation into a colonial and a native city by British legislators, Egyptian nationalists and scholars of colonialism.

In 1868 ‘Alî Mubârak, the Paris educated polymath, engineer and educator, had devised a law which treated the city as a whole, gave technicians control over the process of urban renovation and facilitated a coherent urban policy towards Cairo’s anticipated expansion. Mubârak advocated the piercing of a number of aligned arteries through the old city, most notably Muḥammad ‘Alî Street. But even as densification of the old city increased toward the end of the nineteenth century, a number of high ranking Egyptian officials including Khedive ‘Abbâs Hîlîmî (r. 1892–1914) and ‘Alî Mubârak himself, chose to reside in renovated old city palaces.

Cairo’s and Istanbul’s construction booms were aesthetically nurtured by the wave of trend setting world exhibitions which were sometimes attended by Ottoman and Egyptian rulers themselves. Spectacular visual affairs, they also offered European architects and planners the opportunity to land lucrative commissions for their design projects. A mixture of clients’ tastes, the growing attractions of historicist architecture and the emergence of national cultures in Cairo and Istanbul determined architectural developments in residential, commercial, public and religious buildings: a Paris inspired neo classical horizontal monumentality; the Levantine Baroque villa of merchant elites and the Orientalist imagination; and the vertical orientation of religious and educational buildings.

Cairo’s Muḥammad ‘Alî Mosque built between 1828 and 1849 was a monumental undertaking which went through a number of building stages and stylistic directions. The final architectural style of the mosque represented

91 On the centrality of Orientalism underlying world exhibitions, see Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, ch. 1; and Zeynep Celik, Displaying the Orient: Architecture of Islam at nineteenth century world’s fairs (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1992).
a symbolic break from Egypt’s Mamluk architectural tradition although it stood on the neo Mamluk foundations of its first building stage.\footnote{Nasser Rabbat, ‘The formation of a neo Mamluk style in modern Egypt’, in M. Pollak (ed.), \textit{The education of the architect} (Cambridge, MA, 1997), p. 371.} At the same time, it evinced semiotic ambiguity towards the Ottoman Empire: while the outer shell was a faithful adaptation of earlier great Ottoman mosque architecture, the two pencil minarets reserved for sultanic architecture only constituted an unmistakable act of insubordination.\footnote{Mohammad al Asad, ‘The Mosque of Muhammad qAli in Cairo’, \textit{Muqarnas}, 9 (1992), pp. 39–55.} In contrast, the al Rifā’ī Mosque at the foot of Cairo’s citadel was conceived by the native Egyptian architect Ḥusayn Faḥmī (1827–91) as a break from the dominant Istanbul referential style. Its design mirrored the early Mamluk architecture of the magnificent Sultan Ḥasan Mosque (1357–63) next to which it was placed.\footnote{Mohammad al Asad, ‘The Mosque of al Rifā’ī in Cairo’, \textit{Muqarnas}, 10 (1993), pp. 108–24.}

The first struggles over Egyptian architectural heritage took place in the Comité de Conservations de l’Art Arabe. It was founded during the ‘Urābī revolt in 1881 and evolved around three major ideas: the search for a historical style that would cast national identity in stone, the pavilion art of world exhibitions and architectural conservationism.\footnote{Donald Malcolm Reid, \textit{Whose Pharaohs? Archaeology, museums, and Egyptian national identity from Napoleon to World War I} (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2002).} While all members, foreigners and Egyptians alike, were deeply concerned about the excesses of Ismā‘īl’s Haussmannisation, and most agreed on the nexus between Egypt’s modernity and heritage conservation, disagreement soon erupted about which buildings to preserve and how to preserve them. Of the committee members, ‘Alī Mubārak had the least compunctions about demolition of old mosques. He saw it as a necessary sacrifice to implement his urban schemes and the greater good of catapulting Egypt into the modern age. Those buildings he did deem preservable, he peeled out of its environs to become visible and free standing objects. Most of his colleagues rejected Mubārak’s approach and he soon resigned from the committee. Controversy subsequently erupted over the finer ideological points of the restoration work: should historical buildings regain their original patina as Sābir Sabrī (1840–1915) argued, or should pastiche techniques retain the sense of the passage of time as the Hungarian chief architect of the committee, Max Herz (1856–1919) advocated?\footnote{Alaa El Habashi, ‘The preservation of Egyptian cultural heritage through Egyptian eyes’, in J. Nasr and M. Volait (eds.), \textit{Urbanism: Imported or exported. Native aspirations and foreign plans} (Chichester, 2003), pp. 161–3.}
After the death of ハウスین فهمی, both Herz and Sabri became the most active proponents of Mamluk revivalism as the design of choice for new buildings and the renovation of old ones. Arguably, Sabri’s neo Mamluk architecture blended nationalist aspirations with Orientalist sensibility. But Mamluk revival was popular for its historico geographic continuity, its rootedness in Egypt. At that, its distinction from the styles of the concomitant Ottoman architectural revival was defining. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, Pharaonic monumentalism quickly replaced Mamluk revivalism as the dominant architectural form of Egyptian nationalism. But a string of buildings, in particular the Art Deco apartment blocks in Heliopolis contained residues of neo Mamluk design well into the 1930s.

Fin de siècle Istanbul was an Art Nouveau paradise. Throngs of European architects came to the Bosporus. Some, like Le Corbusier who sought cultural alterity in Istanbul in 1911, were appalled by the modernising experiments of Ottoman architectural revivalism. Others before him were lured by the prospects of lucrative business and stylistic freedom. Ottoman revivalism’s chief architectural representatives in Istanbul were the French professor Antoine Vallaury at Istanbul’s new School of Fine Arts, and the German architect Jasmund at the new School of Civil Engineering. Ottoman revivalism itself was very much an amalgam of different styles, vernacular Beaux Arts, neo classicism, Ottoman baroque, Islamic modern, all of which employed an Orientalising Ornamentalism in pursuit of an Ottoman imperial, and later Turkish national architectural character.

The definition of Ottoman architectural heritage preceded Vallaury and Jasmund. Ibrahim Edhem Pasha’s celebrated Principles of Ottoman architecture published for Vienna’s World Exposition of 1873 announced that ‘progress in the exalted realm of Fine Arts is possible only by recourse to the resplendid works of the past’. In other words, Ottoman architects strove to develop a middle ground between full equivalence of Ottoman with European architectural developments on the one hand and the appropriation of contemporary European building techniques, methods and concepts. The shift of the...
Turkish capital from Istanbul to Ankara after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire also marked the transference of Ottoman Revivalism to the Turkish National Architecture Renaissance. From the 1930s onwards, this subtle and ambiguous shift was droned out by the arrival of German modernist architects who, like their colleagues in Tel Aviv, had fled Nazi repression. Yeni mimari or Neues Bauen served as a means for Kemalism to imagine the Turkish nation into being modern.\(^\text{103}\)

A time and a place for urban democracy

The Tanzimat politicians in Istanbul heralded municipal reform as a civilizational leap forward.\(^\text{104}\) In 1858 they created the municipal authority of the Sixth District of Galata and Pera as a model not only for other districts but for the cities and towns of the entire empire. Imperial capitals and colonial cities generally tended to have a poorer record of municipal governance than provincial cities.\(^\text{105}\) In Istanbul and Cairo municipal experiments were discredited by the colonial attitudes of the European diplomats and councillors were not elected members but appointed state officials.\(^\text{106}\) Ottoman provincial capitals, on the other hand, enjoyed a more democratic municipal experience than Istanbul’s prototype.\(^\text{107}\)

The Ottoman provincial law of 1867 put provincial capitals on a different political footing: ‘Her köy bir belediye dairesi sayılır.’\(^\text{108}\) It introduced free council elections to recently created municipalities such as Beirut and Jerusalem, and to those formed the following year such as Damascus and Baghdad, for example. Other cities, like Jaffa, voted for its first municipal council in 1872.\(^\text{109}\) Elections were held every two years for half the council.

103 Ibid.
107 For an elaboration of the provincial capital as an analytical alternative to Islamic and colonial city paradigms, see introductions to Hanssen, Fin de siècle Beirut; and Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber, The empire in the city: Arab provincial capitals in the late Ottoman Empire (Beirut, 2002).
They were organised by an electoral college of reputable elders and rotated from district to district for up to two weeks. In the case of Beirut, whose vibrant municipal politics were closely monitored by a critical local press, elected councillors were often Arab merchants and intellectuals from long established families, but unlike on provincial councils, for example, Muslim and Christian clergy were conspicuously absent. Moreover, in a confessionally divided city like Beirut, sectarian block voting was nipped in the bud by the vigilant press.\footnote{Hanssen, \textit{Fin de siècle Beirut}, ch. 5.}

These new democratic practices hardly constituted universal suffrage. They were severely circumscribed by class, gender and urban residence biases. Voters had to be male Ottoman citizens over twenty five and affluent enough to file taxes in excess of (unspecified) fifty piastres a year. Candidates were required to be above thirty years of age and own urban property taxed at a minimum of 50,000 piastres.\footnote{Belediye Kanunu, see Başkanlık Arşivi, \textit{Yıldız Esas Evrakı}, 37/302/47 112 (İstanbul, 1877).} Moreover, budgetary autonomy was often threatened by deficits, and interference from provincial governors could not always be prevented by the local media.

From the local perspective municipal councils were sites of governmental accountability and sources of citizenship. From the imperial perspective, the implementation of municipal reforms by elected members contributed a great deal to Ottoman pacification and considerable prosperity in Arab provincial capitals; especially after the Ottoman reassertion of power over the Arab provinces had generated so much urban sectarian violence in Aleppo (1850), Nablus (1856), Jidda (1858) and finally in Dayr al Qamar, Zahleh, Hasbayya and Damascus in the summer of 1860.

After the First World War the age of urban democracy came to an end with the imposition of the mandate state system over the fluid provincial borders around the Syrian Desert. Fearing that, like in European cities, municipalities become dens of socialists, colonial regimes did not lift property and gender discrimination, and municipal elitism was consolidated and confessionised. While Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Jerusalem and Amman were favoured as colonial capitals, the rest of the Ottoman family of provincial capitals – Hama, Nablus, Aleppo and Mosul, for example – suffered marginalisation in the new national economies, as they were cut off from their historical trade routes by national borders and state centralisation. In the 1960s, 70s and 80s, decolonisation’s new authoritarian regimes applied the \textit{tabula rasa} principles of high modernism to the capitals of new independent nation states.
In the name of modernisation, urban planning destroyed much of the historical urban tissue colonialism had left to wilful decay.

Conclusion: challenges to architectural heritage today

Architectural heritage preservation is not a new concern in the Middle East. It appeared during the first wave of globalisation in the nineteenth century when colonialism and capitalism sparked urban growth and Oriental tourism as well as discourses of cultural authenticity and modernity. Since then, the historical urban tissue in many cities of the Muslim world has been destroyed by greedy developers. Often, the state’s search for archeological proof of authentic national roots and origins has also removed the many layers of history in Middle Eastern cities. Preservation activists have recently begun to question the assumed irreconcilability between Western modernity and Middle Eastern architectural heritage and called for more public acknowledgement of the architectural vestiges of modern urban history, in particular the great post independence architects of the Muslim world.112

This chapter supports this critique: first, modernism owes much of its creativity precisely to the contacts between the West and the non West, since the Muslim Mediterranean invariably served as its inspiration and laboratory. Second, the nineteenth century produced modern cultural and architectural sensibilities that were affected by colonialism but not controlled by it. Third, alternative dynamics in architectural aesthetics emerged out of regional cultural politics quite apart from Western impositions. Most importantly, though, architectural heritage preservation ought actively to reflect on cities as living organisms. These acknowledgements keep open the possibility to reclaim both modernity and the past by historicising, not ossifying, the built environment.

Today’s renewed sense of urgency occurs amidst a new wave of globalisation of markets, tourism, new patterns of consumption following neo liberal policies of deregulation and structural adjustment, and architectural practices that reflect these patterns. Privatisation of urban space and post modern kitsch go hand in glove with turning in Pierre Nora’s apt phrase *milieux de mémoire* into *lieux de mémoire*.113 The lack of independent municipal councils today

leaves urban populations in the Middle East exposed to the logic of international investment as in post war Beirut, or to crony capitalism as in internationally isolated Damascus.

Post war Beirut’s building boom was premised on the logic that rapid physical redevelopment of the downtown area would foster economic revitalisation. Heritage activists argued that social recovery and civic identity should take priority in order to overcome the conditions that had led to the war of 1975–90. In the early 1990s they began to mobilise for the preservation of the battered extant architectural heritage. The idea was to preserve clusters of residential and public buildings from different historical epochs beyond the downtown area without changing their urban functions. The reality of a soaring real estate market prevented government support. Instead, Solidere, the company charged with the reconstruction of the city centre, manufactured a gentrified ‘Mediterranean atmosphere’ against the silhouettes of largely mandate period colonial architecture around the Place d’Étoile.

After the assassination of the mastermind of Beirut’s physical reconstruction, Prime Minister Rafiq al Hariri, in 2005, Lebanon is pushed once again to the brink of civil war, economic collapse and an Israeli reinvasion. The chronic political instability may keep Western tourism from bringing in much needed revenue, but the industry had already shifted its focus after 9/11 and was gearing up for the rapidly increasing number of tourists from the Gulf. To these visitors and investors, Beirut offers European architectural culture without the harassment at European and American borders. In an interesting twist to urban heritage commodification at the end of the nineteenth century, nostalgia producers and consumers of Beirut’s pastel colours and pastiche architecture are not primarily Europeans, but wealthy Saudis who build hotels, mosques and theme parks, largely for their clients from the Gulf.

Urban heritage preservation in today’s Middle East is caught between the hammer of erasure and the anvil of reconstruction, or both as in the case of Mecca’s ‘great expansion’. Residents of Damascus’s vibrant old city brace themselves for the imminent implementation of a thirty year old highway project that will cut through their historic neighbourhoods. Many other cities in the Muslim world are divided and suffer military occupation. Once mixed Jerusalem has been violently partitioned after 1948 into an Israeli western sector and Palestinian eastern sector marking the end of Levantine pluralism and contiguity.114 Since Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967, and more

forcefully since the Oslo Accords, its Palestinian residents have been encircled by a Zionist settler siege.\textsuperscript{115}

Finally, Baghdad, too, is currently in the grips of colonial rule. Its urban destruction is on the scale of 1980s Beirut. As the American dream of an oil based reconstruction \textit{eldorado} unravels in the lawlessness of the Iraqi streets, historic buildings are bombèd, looted, or in some cases razed by their owners.\textsuperscript{116} While the headquarters of the US occupation of Iraq are entrenched behind near impregnable fortifications in the so called Green Zone in the heart of Baghdad, Mutanabbi Street, Rashid Street and Abu Nuwwas Street embattled symbols of Baghdadi bibliophilia and sociability even under the ruthless rule of Saddam Hussein have today become bomb sites and border lines in a bifurcated phantom city.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{115} Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman, \textit{A civilian occupation: The politics of Israeli architecture} (London and Tel Aviv, 2003).

\textsuperscript{116} Keith Watenpaugh, Edouard Mètenier, Jens Hanssen and Hala Fattah, \textit{Opening the doors: Intellectual life and academic conditions in post war Baghdad} (www.h.net.org/about/press/opening doors/), pp. 23 5.

\textsuperscript{117} See Jabra Ibrahim Jabra, \textit{Princesses' Street: Baghdad memories} (Fayetteville, 2005).
Many speak of the ‘impact of the West’ not of technicalism on Islamdom, as if it were two societies, not two ages that met; as if it were that Western progress had finally reached the point where Muslims could no longer escape it, rather than that something new had happened to Western culture which thereby was happening to Islamdom and the whole world as well.¹

At the present juncture of our standard scholarship, and given our high pitched cultural and methodological attitudes that still radiate resiliently from Enlightenment constructs, it is only with a good deal of nervousness that one attempts to present an overview of Islamic philosophy and science in the modern period, especially since 1800. As a matter of scholarly integrity, then, one ought to declare at the very outset that any such overview, written as it is within a hundred years from the First World War, has to be rather precarious and must be considered tentative, far from offering a complete picture; an overview that is perhaps lopsided, one that is open to all kinds of revisions, adjustments and even reversals.

To begin with, there exist very few substantive studies of the general intellectual history of Islam in the late modern period. Indeed, scholars will overwhelmingly agree that present day grand anthologies on Islam, historical narratives plying on wide canvases and encyclopaedias these are typically at their weakest precisely when it comes to a history of philosophy and science in precisely the period which interests us here. By and large, what the authors have given us are catalogues, lists of names, statistical figures, chronologies, pie charts and highly superficial and often misleading accounts betraying a complacent lack of familiarity with primary sources, sources that happen to be

largely in Arabic and Persian and less frequently in Turkish and Urdu and other languages.\footnote{An example of this are the writings of Pervez Hoodbhoy. See for example his \textit{Islam and Science} (London, 1991).}

But all of this can be explained. As a matter of fact, it ought to be explained necessarily since it is this explanation wherein lies the fundamental framework of the discourse embodying this chapter. And the task becomes surprisingly easy once we discover that hidden underneath the current state of affairs in contemporary scholarship and in the cognitive and intellectual worlds of today’s Islam is a methodological clamp and a body of government and state educational and administrative policies engendered by the very elements that make up that clamp. What are these elements? The central and most glaring one is the Enlightenment story of the ancestry and particularism of European civilisation: The ‘West’, so the familiar story goes, is an unambiguously defined cultural universe composed of two worlds that are biologically related and sequentially ordered: classical Greece and the Latin Occident. These two worlds led in time to the rise of the grand principles of Truth, Liberty and Justice; and this, in turn, produced a Progress that ultimately created modernity, created it as a matter of ontological and filial necessity. Residing at the core of this story are notions of the unity, uniqueness, selfhood, superiority and, above all, essential continuity of Western civilisation.

Here was a civilisational continuity running from the Greeks through the Italian Renaissance to the rest of Europe, surviving or rather skipping in a protracted but steady flight the yawning intervening centuries called for so long the ‘Dark Ages’. It has been observed that this notion of history was ‘formulated as much to deny [Europe’s] medieval past as to establish a new and more worthy ancestry’.\footnote{Maria Rosa Menocal, ‘The myth of Westernness in medieval literary historiography’, in E. Qureshi and M. Sells (eds.), \textit{The new crusades} (New York, 2003), p. 253.} A little reflection will show the implausibility of the story, and yet it did stick and the very fact that it did is a fascinating phenomenon of our human history. Indeed, far reaching have been the methodological consequences of the image of a pure parenthood of modern Europe, uncontaminated by any alien cultures, certainly not the Arabo Islamic culture even in its European manifestations. In our contemporary conceptions of Islam’s relationship to modernity hardly anything intervenes more fateful than this image.\footnote{This observation was made a while ago by Hodgson in his \textit{Venture}, vol. III, p. 205.}

Around this neat story revolve several corollaries which constitute additional elements of the methodological clamp whose grip has hardly relaxed.
even after the end of European colonial rule over the Islamic world. Thus, science and philosophy as we know these enterprises in the modern world were ‘Western’ creations, directly grounded in the Greek genius and essentially independent of what the Islamic world was doing in the Middle Ages. One could tell the tale of philosophy without reference to Islam, or teach the history of science in which Islamic culture need not figure. What was to be canonised was Descartes but not the tenth century Arabic philosopher Abū Bakr al Rāzī, William Harvey but not the thirteenth century Muslim legist physician Ibn Nafis, Copernicus but not the fourteenth century Damascene mosque astronomer time keeper Ibn Shāṭir and this despite the substantive or even direct textual relationship of the pairs. Almost obliterated from our historical consciousness is the monumental humanistic fact that the Latin West was an integral part of the whole Afro Eurasian ecumene, and that the phenomenon we call the Rise of the West is an embodiment of a convergence and confluence of so many cumulatively efficacious cultural, intellectual, technological and market forces whose roots lay as much inside Europe as in other regions, most particularly in the regions of Islam. We have forgotten that when the West rose, thereby rose with it certain creations of the Islamic world too, even though they rose certainly on European terms, supervened over by Europe.

But proceeding in the methodological vein, we observe another corollary: namely the presumption of a rupture in the intellectual history of Islam. Since modern science and philosophy or simply science and philosophy without qualification had a uniquely Western life, a fundamentally different career of these disciplines began in the Islamic world in modern times. So when one studies, say the cultivation of logic or mathematics among Muslims over the past two centuries, one would not look for any thematic, substantive or institutional continuity between what happens in these later times and what happened indigenously in Islam’s classical or even pre colonial days. Problems of philosophy and analytical methods, for example, could no longer arise from within, and the history of philosophy in the latter day Islamic world was therefore the history in this world of philosophy as it is carried out in the modern Western academy. Why would one need to know classical Arabic or Persian to write this history? Given this, it is small wonder that the contribution of modern day Muslims in the two fields of philosophy and science turns out to be abysmally low, practically nil in fact! It should be noted, however, that the case of science is distinct from philosophy and should be treated in terms of its own peculiarities; indeed, the mutual independence of the two is a hallmark of our era.
Held in this methodological clamp, typical survey works in the modern intellectual history of Islam have suffered serious repressions. For example, with the exception of Iran, surveyors have ignored without an uneasy conscience the rather massive body of literature produced, commented upon or studied in madrasas over the past two hundred years or so, overlooking at the same time the philosophical and natural scientific attitudes cultivated by the ‘ulamā’, those who remained by their own design or having ‘fallen through the cracks’ outside the fold of modern universities and colleges. This situation unfolds a multiplicity of ironies too. For example, an effective agreement now exists between those extremist Muslim groups of recent times who totally reject the West in all its real or perceived manifestations, and those in the West who see with equal conviction a clash of civilisations between the two traditional adversaries\(^5\) a firm agreement on the notions of rupture and Islam-West dichotomy.

But against what we expect to hear, still living as we are in the twilight of the nineteenth century, the ‘ulamā’ did not espouse the Enlightenment story to begin with; in fact it did not even reach them for quite some time. While it was much before the colonial incursions of Europe that they had begun the process of Islamic reform, a process that largely arose out of internal developments in Muslim societies,\(^6\) there exists overwhelming evidence that the ‘ulamā’ of the Ottoman Empire which represented the largest cross section of Muslim peoples in fact participated, and decisively participated, in the introduction of modern scientific education in their urban communities.\(^7\) In Iran, they even claimed modernisation for the Islamic religion, equating it with a return to pure Islamic principles of shari‘a.\(^8\) True, many of the traditionally educated savants remained indifferent to modern science and philosophy since they knew very little about it and did not care, but they did continue to teach and cultivate these disciplines, these ma‘ṣūli‘at (rational sciences) as they were quite often called, and they did so quite actively in their classical curricular manner.

So, until about the middle of the nineteenth century when modernisation in education and in the society at large became a chief concern for Muslim


governments, state policy makers, modernist reformers and colonial rulers, with all its attending politics and a plethora of strategies for its enforcement through stringent legislation, we see no aversion to modern science on the part of the ‘ulamā‘. In fact, with some exceptions of course in the case of the Darwinian theory of evolution, we have no evidence to show that there is any Western scientific theory or concept that was opposed by the madrasa person ages throughout the period under consideration in this chapter. What they did begin to oppose and did resist after around the mid century were European technology and the cultural and social dislocations it brings with it. But technology is not science: and here is a fundamental distinction well understood in the West but obfuscated by what is described as scientism — a pragmatic, technicalistic attitude to science that has reigned in the official Muslim world from the nineteenth century until this day, tenaciously espoused by governments and executed by law. Scientism sees science as a product not as a process.\(^9\)

As a result of state educational and administrative policies effected by decrees and legal enactments — a move towards the emulation of European ways of governance and thinking which was resisted by many traditional quarters — the latter part of the modern period saw a rapid growth of a new crop of intelligentsia having little or no grounding in its own intellectual tradition. This ascendant intelligentsia did not grow out of its own cultural soil and its ability to read classical Arabic or Persian sources gradually dwindled and soon virtually disappeared; now European languages, mainly French and English, became the medium of intellectual and formal commerce, and a widening gulf began to appear between those who attended modern educational institutions, and those who studied in madrasas and consciously started to forge an exclusivist Islamic outlook.

Typically, we see in the later period a general espousal on the part of the new intellectuals of a positivistic view of science, including biological materialism, and practically a disdain for the ‘ulamā‘. On the part of the state policy makers the attitude that now developed is indeed best described as scientism, an attitude that confused science with technology and promoted the belief that science holds the answer to all our questions and is the panacea for all our ills. Thus, the irony we just talked about is messy: for here is another Muslim group which is party to the agreement on the notions of the intellectual isolation of modern Western science from Islamic traditions and of the

essential incommensurability of the two civilisations. This party happens to be
the new Western educated and pro Western secular elite whose powerful
members loudly dismiss those extremist brethren of theirs who reject the
West in blanket terms, but dismissing at the same time the Western upholders
of the clash of civilisations thesis.

This latter day elite of Muslim societies, a product as it was of state policies,
found itself both ideologically and intellectually severed from its own legacies;
it was thus unable to recognise what Hodgson described as Islam’s ‘incalculable
impulse to science and philosophy’\textsuperscript{10} that happened to be a formative
element in the very process that led to the Scientific Revolution. It is a
profound historical irony that this modern Muslim elite group turned out to
be the largest consumers of the Enlightenment story: for them, Islam’s
intellectual history is sweet, but it is just that; it is of antiquarian interest
only and does not have any relevance for modernity.

The case of science: transition and the politics of rejection

It makes good historical sense to resist the tendency of projecting to the past
the ideological polarisation in contemporary Muslim nation states with
madrasa educated ‘Islamists’ standing on one side of the fence, and Western
or Western style educated ‘liberals’ on the other. What we have today is a
relatively recent historical contingency which cannot be considered inherent
in Islam’s doctrinal or ideological ethos, an ethos deemed to be an expression
of some kind of an ontologically stable essence; to do so is to fly in the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Indeed, the polarisation found in
today’s Islamic societies cannot be explained on the plane of thought and ideas
alone; the thesis is stronger in fact: the body of historical records we possess
supports the observation that the power of exclusivist ideas gripping large
numbers of Muslim peoples of our times lies beyond the realm of ideas.

It is well known that the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the
times of massive European penetration into Muslim societies. Entering first as
traders, advisers, bankers, money lenders, diplomats, observers, teachers and
missionaries, Europeans eventually took full control of all aspects of practi-
cally the entire Muslim world, completing their vast colonial conquest by the
beginning of the twentieth century and transforming all human civilisations.
We are talking about that period of history when Muslims no longer formed a

\textsuperscript{10} Hodgson, \textit{Venture}, vol. III, p. 197.
single society, and in so far as we can speak of various Muslim societies as constituting an active cultural grouping, it is on the grounds that they shared the Islamic heritage, a heritage which remained and remains until this day a potent determining force in shaping these societies. Muslims must now share in a complex world system in the construction of which non Muslim peoples had taken the lead. The impact of European powers’ intervention was different in each case, and present day Muslim societies are manifestations of the vicissitudes of this very impact, the unfolding of the interaction of regional Islamic societies with Europe.

The ‘science versus religion’ issue

Despite local diversities, it is still possible to see certain general patterns of this interaction, this process of integrating into a regional Muslim matrix Europe’s cultural, intellectual and even imaginative ways. As far as attitudes to science and modern science education are concerned, a few things are very clear. One is that there existed practically no ‘science religion clash’ in these societies. The uninformed mockery made of Charles Darwin in some quarters does not represent a sustained or systematic attitude, but only isolated idiosyncrasies displayed often by those who were otherwise the strongest advocates of modern science, such as the modernists Jamāl al Dīn al Afghānī (d. 1897) or the pro crown Sir Sayyid ʿAlīkhān (d. 1898).

There was, one must note, no equivalent of the institution of the church in Muslim societies, no ecclesiastical authority, no intricate church state power dynamics, and no stable ‘orthodoxy’ formally hammered out by an official theology. Religious leaders were either private individuals or groups whose madrasas were funded by pious endowments (waqfs), or they were, as is the case with the Ottomans, appointed and controlled by the state having no independent institutional support base of their own. In the case of Iran, the religious classes the ‘ulamā’, including faqīhs, mujtahids, ayatollahs and the like have remained very strong in parallel with the state and we can legitimately talk about a formidable quasi clerical force there, and yet these Iranian religious groups constitute a rather unstructured and diverse elite with no robust linear institutional continuity. The same can be said of certain politically active Sufi groups in some Muslim regions.

11 This observation is clearly stated in ibid., p. 167.
Concerning Iran, it should be kept in mind that Imāmī Shi‘ī legists considered all governments during the historical phase of the occultation of the Imam, a period they were going through, to be unjust; therefore, they have not traditionally been in competition for power against the state and in so far as they did participate in governments they did so only with theological apology, reluctance and ambivalence. The developments leading to the Iranian revolution of 1979 were complex and highly unusual, and fall outside the scope of this chapter, so we shall let that pass. But what has been said here, simplistic though it may be, does explain adequately one fundamental fact: that there is no analogue in Islam of the threat that science and scientific developments posed in Latin Christendom to a legally and doctrinally powerful religious institution which had a stake in a particular cosmology which it had canonised.

As far as the ‘ulamā’ of the Ottoman Empire are concerned, we see no science religion anxiety on their part; for example, Ottoman books written in the nineteenth century do not speak about any conflict between the two entities. What happened later in the modern period ought to be described more accurately as a dualism between the old system of knowledge and the new, rather than as a conflict or an active clash. Here is a leading historian of Ottoman science speaking: ‘It is difficult to suppose the existence of anyone [in the Ottoman empire] who defended the old sciences against physics, chemistry, astronomy, and other branches of modern science.’13

The ‘ulamā’ sometimes fought against certain modern medical procedures and their operating institutional structures introduced by European colonisers and Christian missionaries, especially in the field of public health. But again this was not an opposition to modern medical sciences as such, and its historical and ideological context very clearly shows that it was what should be called ‘associationist’ opposition. Evidence also shows two more things: one, that the religious classes and the public at large did not quite understand those specific innovations of European medical practice which they happened to reject, and this owing largely to the unfamiliar complexity of the institutional colonial networks and bureaucracies involved in the execution of these practices; and two, that they were hostile to these practices since they clashed directly with some deep seated social and religio cultural norms which could not be easily compromised. The main context here is that of a climate of a blind resistance

13 E. Ihsanoglu, ‘Some critical notes on the introduction of modern sciences to the Ottoman state and the relation between science and religion up to the end of the nineteenth century’, in Ihsanoglu, Science, technology and learning, pp. 235 51.
to all aspects of European lifestyle, manners, customs, social service practices and administrative interventions, since these were associated with foreign intruders whose intentions were considered highly suspect the opposition was clearly associationist.

Thus in spite of several cholera outbreaks and heavy loss of human lives in nineteenth century Iran, little understood preventive measures offered by Europeans were vehemently dismissed by the ‘ulamā’ and declared to be a ploy for the overthrow of Islam. When in 1896 on the Persian Gulf ports British doctors took charge of the administration of quarantine required by international travel regulations, it met with serious hostility. Indeed, not only did these regulations affect the livelihood of local merchants adversely, it also gave rise to a profound religio cultural issue the dead bodies of Shi‘ī Muslims could not be sent to the sacred site of Karbalā’ for burial without sanitary certification from the British, since these bodies had to pass through Basra where quarantine was imposed. This was perceived as yet another instance of the much resisted alien interference.

Much later, we see a case of an even deeper Iranian clerical resentment against quarantine measures which were enforced along the Ottoman Persian border to control the cholera outbreak of 1904. It was this border over which Shi‘ī pilgrims passed on their way to and from the holy places of Karbalā’ and Najaf. The control of immigration and customs happened to be in the hands of Belgians against whom much bitter feelings were aroused, and we find reports that at least one senior leading Shi‘ī religious leader, a mujtahid, and his followers openly flouted and defied the quarantine regulations, declaring it to be an obstruction to the performance of obligatory religious duties. Similarly, European sanitary control of water supply and regulating the washing of dead bodies in Iran were also declared to be subversions and suppression of Islam! All of this, however, evidently belongs to political history and not to intellectual history: the two must not be confused.

Three types of responses

The Ottoman response

The modern Europe Islam interaction process shows another defining, taxonomic feature: namely that the responses of Muslim societies to European science and the introduction of modern science education can be classified under three broad characteristic types. In terms of numerical and imperial magnitude, the Ottomans represented the largest segment of Muslim peoples,

14 For a lucid account see Lambton, ‘Social change’.
and here practically the entire body of newly emerging elites supported the cultivation of modern science. Members of these elites included the new military, civil bureaucracy, modernist reformers, urban intelligentsia, upwardly mobile lower and middle class intellectuals, rulers and, of course, traditionally educated ‘ulama’. It has already been noted that in the process of introducing modern science in the Ottoman regions, ‘ulama’ have played a crucial role; what is glaringly evident here is the fact that in the foundational phase of this process they were utterly unaffected by, and in all likelihood unaware of, our Enlightenment story that gave birth to the notions of Muslim intellectual rupture and an unadulterated Greek Latin ancestry of the West. Indeed, this is the best studied area in the social history of science in modern day Islamic societies and it pays to look at it more closely.\footnote{See the numerous writings of E. Ihsanoglu, particularly the ones referred to above.}

The relationship of the Ottomans to European science had traditionally been a very comfortable and sometimes even collaborative one. Already in the sixteenth and more extensively in the seventeenth century we see the beginnings of translations, paraphrases and adaptations of Western sources, and this created a textual and academic environment for the spread of the new scientific knowledge to the rest of the Islamic world. The curricular system of madrasas was reorganised as early as the fifteenth century by Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1444; 1451–81) who added by means of a royal decree the teaching of rational sciences in the main offerings. Thus mathematics, logic, astronomy and physical sciences formally entered the madrasa curricula along with all the conventional religious sciences. Later on, the status of the rational sciences was further consolidated by Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–56).

Indeed, there did exist a comprehensive scientific culture in the Ottoman Empire since science was cultivated also in professional institutions, such as hospitals, and the Offices of the Muwakkit (Time Keeper, astronomer legist who determined the times of ritual prayers in mosques), of the Chief Physician and of the Chief Astronomer. In addition to all this, there did exist some degree of sustained European Ottoman technological exchange, too.\footnote{Sonja Brentjes, ‘The Ottoman Empire: Storehouse, client, and testing ground for the Scientific Revolution’, paper read at the conference on ‘The Scientific Revolution in multicultural perspective’, University of Oklahoma, 7–8 April 2003.}

Let us here note very briefly the historically tedious question of the place in traditional madrasas of what were called ‘the sciences of the ancients’ – an appellation coined for rational disciplines transmitted into the Arabic intellectual world through a massive activity of translations of ‘foreign’ texts, pre dominantly Greek, but also some Syriac, Pahlavi and Sanskrit which were all...
one way or another Hellenised in time. Were these disciplines, which of course included the natural sciences, mathematics and philosophy, taught in madrasas, the well known traditional educational institutions fully consoli
dated by Nizām al Mulk, the leading vizier of the early Saljuq period (eleventh century)? The question is answered almost categorically by an earlier genera
tion of scholars, namely that rational sciences found hardly any place in the most prestigious madrasas, and that this divorce goes a long way in explaining the decline of science in Islam.17 In light of most recent research, however, this comforting answer has become highly problematic. Much work is yet to be done for us to be able to settle the question, but one thing is clear: the matter is highly messy and generalisations made earlier are premature.18 For example, if only one looks at the curricula of the madrasas in the thirteenth century, one notices unfamiliar classi
cifications of disciplines, a changing classification that makes it more and more difficult over time to tell what discipline includes what subject so the Elements of Euclid is to be found in kalām, and arithmetic in ‘Principles of Religion’!19

But back to the Ottoman Empire. Here the trend set by Sultan Mehmed II continued. Technological novelties such as the printing press and pumping equipment for firemen became cherished imports from Europe in the early part of the eighteenth century and interest in European lifestyle kept intensi
fying. During the second half of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, a number of engineering and medical schools were established under European advice and on European models; the basic aim of these schools was to train the military in modern warfare and in pragmatically chosen applied sciences. It seems quite remarkable that in all cases madrasa graduates of the ‘ulamāʾ class taught in these institutions along with European teachers, and these ‘ulamāʾ not only offered lessons in traditional fields but also in science, especially mathematics and astronomy.

Two more things in this regard will ring quite contrary to what we expect to hear. One is that in the earlier phase of these science education schools, both Ottoman and European books were used concurrently, the former belonging to Islamic scientific tradition and the latter being post-Scientific Revolution modern scientific texts; so, for example, students would study pre-Copernican Arabic astronomy along with modern heliocentric astronomy as part of a single curriculum. Second, equally striking is the fact that the madrasa graduates in the Ottoman Empire played a participatory role in writing and compiling books on modern science in Arabic, Persian and, above all, in Turkish. As a result a new scientific vocabulary developed in Ottoman Turkish and by the beginning of the twentieth century it was a language fully capable of scientific discourse, with an elaborate body of modern terminology. This ought to be recognised as a fundamental contribution in the dissemination process of modern science in Islamic societies. Already in the eighteenth century when French teachers left the ‘House of Engineers’, a technological school which was part of the Imperial Maritime Arsenal and where both classical Ottoman and modern European science texts were taught, madrasa graduates belonging to the ‘ulamā’ cadres took over all the courses there. The first director of the famous Dār al Funtūn in Istanbul, conceived as a modern university for training civil servants, was one Tahsin Efendi when the classes began in 1869; Tahsin Efendi was himself madrasa trained. In 1773 the Imperial Naval Engineering School was opened; the War College for training in modern military technology was inaugurated in 1834; the Imperial Medical School began teaching in 1838 – in all these cases ‘ulamā’ belonging to the highest ranks were present at the opening ceremonies. At these new modern institutions, madrasa trained faculty taught religion, languages and culture; but then the first teachers of mathematics and medicine too were madrasa graduates. It was the traditional legist, madrasa educated Gelenbevi İsmail Efendi (1730–91) who taught mathematics at the Imperial Naval Engineering School and later became a qādi (Tur. kadi). He wrote at once on modern arithmetic, geometry, logarithms and trigonometry on the one hand, and literature, fiqh, kalām, logic and philosophy on the other. Then we have the case of Kâtip Çelebi (1609–57), again from among the ‘ulamā’, who argued that the earth is round and declared, citing the famous thinker al-Ghazālī in support, that this does not conflict with the Islamic religion. A very broad minded madrasa educated figure and a Sufi was İbrahim Hakkı (1703–80) who wrote openly about Copernican heliocentric astronomy, effectively supporting it. But what is most outstanding in this instance is Hakkı’s admonition that science must not be judged by religion.
This kind of attitude is stronger in educationist Ishak Efendi, who was appointed principal of the Naval Engineering School in 1830: he moves a little ahead of Hakkı, bringing science fully into the embrace of Islam and making the historical observation that Islamic religion has been a motivating factor in the development of science. A member of the ‘ulama’ class and Principal Ishak Efendi’s namesake and contemporary, Ishaq Efendi of Harput represents a typical example of the attitude of the nineteenth century Ottoman religious figures to European science and technological innovations. In a work, Es’ile i Hikemiye (Philosophical Investigations), recording his replies to a number of questions asked by Europeans travelling with him in a voyage to Izmir from Damascus, the Harput Ishaq Efendi recalls his response to the question whether there exists a conflict between modern astronomy and religion: ‘these subjects have no connection with the basic principles of religion!’

Here is a man fully soaked in the madrasa culture, knowing little modern science.

The response of Iranians and others

The second characteristic type of response is to be seen largely in Iran. This is the Muslim region where ‘ulama’ though not institutionalised like the clergy of Catholic Church for example, have always remained politically conscious, frequently engaging in powerful and, most recently, decisive activism in matters of state and governance, something that even the ruthless administration of the shah until his exit in 1979 could not effectively render pliant. Here the state and all imperially controlled agencies and imperial authorities including Qājār rulers and princes, ‘the men of the sword’ to which these princes (shāhzādahs) belonged along with tribal leaders (khāns and beggs) and the great landlords, and later on the self identified Pahlavis pushed for modernisation in education and for European style scientific teaching institutions. But the ‘ulama’ had deep resentment for anything European and while they did not ever oppose science as an intellectually legitimate mode of enquiry and rational methodology, they did resist the institutional structure of a modern, that is European, educational system. The ‘ulama’ would do anything to resist foreign influence: one recalls that Reza Shāh, an officer of the Russian groomed Cossack Brigade who made himself the founder of his Pahlavi dynasty in 1925, had came to power with the support of many ‘ulama’ who had hoped that he would keep the outsiders in check effectively. To

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20 Ishanoglu, ‘Some critical notes’, p. 250. My account draws very heavily upon this work.
reiterate, Iranian ‘ulamā’ s resentment to modern science education was not substantive but cultural and associationist.

Modern education in Iran was introduced almost exclusively by foreign missionaries, European commissions and advisers, with practically no participation on the part of the ‘ulamā’; the Iranian case in this regard being unlike the Ottoman. But what is interesting, however, is that the two cases are similar in that it is the state’s desperate preoccupation with the reform and modernisation of the military that led to a sustained move towards science education in general, bringing about an overall fundamental social change. Thus it was at the behest of the foreign military missions that Abbās Mirzā started the policy of sending young Persian men to England for training; to begin with, two men were sent in 1811 and then five in 1815 but none of them, one ought to note very carefully, to study theoretical science; they were sent rather for training in technology, with one of them learning medicine which is again of pragmatic value. As a general continuing trend, it was such mostly technologically trained men who upon their return played a central role in modern science education; the case was similar in the Ottoman Empire.

Notwithstanding their blinding blanket resentment against what was fast becoming an all pervading foreign involvement in Iran’s internal affairs, the Iranian ‘ulamā’ remained unfazed and uninfluenced by modern science education schools. Until Reza Shāh’s massive Westernisation measures between 1925 and 1941 when he was deposed by British and Russian troops, education was still largely in the hands of the traditional madrasas and maktabs. Elementary education was offered in maktabs Persian, some Arabic, Qurʾān reading and some arithmetic. Madrasas offered more advanced education; and while these waqf run institutions overlooked modern sciences, they did teach philosophy in its fullness, including logic. More important, these madrasas also cultivated philosophy, and it is here that we find interesting developments in ontological and epistemological problems as these profoundly interesting problems emerged in Arabic philosophy since Avicenna. This links these madrasas, ironically, to Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. So here there is no rupture, rather this local historical contingency opens up new vistas for Arabic Latin comparative studies; but we shall take up these developments in some detail in an appropriate section.

In this particular sense, the political and intellectual developments in the Muslim society in India constitute a similar case. Here too, the ‘ulamā’ fought

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21 Again, a comprehensive picture is given by Lambton in ‘Social change’ to which my account is directly indebted.
hard against foreign colonial interference, that is, the non Muslim British Raj, and played a leading but still embarrassingly understudied role in the 1857 rebellion, paying harsh penalties for their multifaceted struggle. And again here too we see no opposition to modern science on philosophical and conceptual grounds. Any resentment that there was, it always turns out upon a closer examination to be institutional, associationist or directed against new technological applications of science that had clear cultural or political implications. Untouched by modern science and philosophy, the ‘ulamā’ went their own way, studying philosophy and logic, the ma’qūlāt, in their characteristic time tested traditional manner.

But it is most striking that at least one school of Indian ‘ulamā’ that has fortunately been subjected to some scholarly study in recent years, the Khayrābādī school,22 known for its rigorous philosophical learning and robust rationalist posture, continued to teach and cultivate not only philosophy but also pre Copernican mathematics and the natural sciences, including physics and astronomy. This eminent phenomenon lasted well into the contemporary period. While it is certainly fair to say that the natural sciences this school taught must have been outdated having little modern scientific value, but it behooves us to note with intellectual responsibility that the rationalistic critical attitudes the Khayrābādīs promoted and the analytical enquiring minds they groomed serve as a corrective to our standard image of the madrasa community as universally anti reason and obscurantist.23

One final observation concerning India and Egypt is in order. The movement known as Islamic modernism saw some of its strongest expressions in these two regions. This movement views the modern Western civilisation not as alien to Islam but in fact as incorporating many Islamic elements. There are strands in this movement where a community of ideas and intellectual traditions is recognised between Islam and the West, effectively rejecting the rupture thesis and attempting to rehabilitate science within the Islamic cultural horizons. Science was not antithetical to the formative spirit of Muslim societies, it was argued; on the contrary, it was Islamic civilisation that had ushered in modern scientific methodology. But science as it had developed in the modern West needed to be ‘Islamised’. Blended with a


pan Islamic sentiment, this modernist movement received several powerful spokesmen in India and Egypt.

The point to note is that many early Islamic modernist leaders were *madrasa* educated. The redoubtable Jamāl al Dīn al Afghānī is one of them, even though his early life is hidden in obscurity; then, we have the case of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, again a traditionally educated figure who founded his famous Aligarh College in 1875 and vigorously tried to inculcate an inclination for modern science among the Muslims of India, though himself innocent of modern science. We have met both of them already. But then we have a very strong case of al Afghānī’s Egyptian disciple, the rather well known Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905) who was an uncompromising advocate of modern science education and of rational reasoning as opposed to blind imitation of tradition in matters of Islamic law. He was basically *madrasa* trained.

Attempts were also made in India for a synthesis of traditional healing systems with modern science. Thus we have the example of Hakīm Ajmal Khān, a physician of the Yūnānī Tibb (‘Greek Medicine’), that strand of Galenic Arabic medical practice which evolved in Islam’s Persianate regions, in particular in India; this Tibb is still practised today all over South Asian regions and to some extent elsewhere too. Inspired by the idea that Islamic medical tradition needed to be revitalised by modern advancements in knowledge, Ajmal Khān founded the Delhi Tibbiya College in 1916. His stress on indigenous medicine with an openness to European medical sciences and his focus on preventive measures rather than hospital multiplication had very happy political implications too since it became a cause common to both Hindus and Muslims whose unity was one of Ajmal Khān’s chief concerns.

The Tibbiya College soon included a very active Research Division, headed by a celebrated, European educated scientist Salimuzzaman Siddiqui, who later received the honour of the Fellowship of the Royal Society and spent his final years developing pharmaceutical chemistry at the Karachi University in Pakistan. The work done by him at the Tibbiya College proved to be of much scientific value. What stands out is the research he did on *Raufolfsia Serpentina*, a popular folk medicine used for treating hypertension. Salimuzzaman Siddiqui managed to isolate a physiologically active agent and its related chemical components it was called Ajmaline after Ajmal Khān and patented. Indeed, it is thanks to the modern traditional synthesis efforts of the Delhi Tibbiya College that South Asian folk and Yūnānī medicines are now available in the form of pills, capsules and in other industrially produced modern...
shapes, forms and packages. Note that Ajmal Khān himself had no training in modern medicine.  

Developments in philosophy

In the modern period, madrasas certainly lost their relevance for science. But the philosophical activity that continued in these institutions is not without significance for the history of rational speculative thought; indeed, it is in this institutional framework and context that we can talk about the latter day indigenous Islamic intellectual tradition ramifying from the grand legacy of Arabic philosophy and growing out of its own internal developments. One recalls that even though Arabic philosophy, falsafā as it has been called by Muslims, cannot be explained fully in terms of Greek philosophy alone, it did receive its fundamental inspiration from the Greeks, largely carried out by Hellenised individuals of the Islamic world, and naturalised by integration into it of Arabism and Islamism.  

Given this, ironic as it may seem, the madrasa culture has kept alive Islam’s historical relationship with the Greek genius, that genius which is considered the fountainhead of the modern West. This is an unrecognised humanistic posture of the madrasa culture’s rationalistic trends.

Unfortunately, very few scholarly studies of Arabic philosophy in modern times exist. But what little does exist brings into focus three of its compelling characteristics. First, that for later developments in the philosophical enterprise of Muslim societies, the monumental Avicenna (d. 1037) called the Al Shaykh al Raʾis (the Grand Shaykh) in the Arabic tradition indeed marks a decisive watershed. Experts tell us that Avicenna is the reference point for all subsequent Arabic philosophical writings which are measured now against the structure, techniques and language of two of his major works: the comprehensive Kītāb al Shīfāʾ (Book of Healing), and the equally ambitious Kītāb al Tanbīh wa al Ishārāt (Book of Admonition and Remarks); both these works construct an all embracing holistic philosophical system, setting the tone it seems for the entire later intellectual history of Islam.

But two other figures also appear to be characteristically important for the later period: Ābu Ḥāmid al Ghazālī (d. 1111), and the father of Illuminationist philosophy Shihāb al Dīn Suhrawardī (d. 1191). The former is somewhat of a paradox in the history of philosophy while he ruthlessly dismissed Hellenised Arabic philosophers, and did so on their own terms; he also managed at the same time to make the study of philosophy much more widespread, especially among the practitioners of kalām, those non-Aristotelian self consciously Muslim thinkers somewhat misleadingly called rationalistic theologians, so much so that it becomes difficult to distinguish a kalām discourse from a falsafa discourse in subsequent periods. Suhrawardī, for his part, made room for mystical insights in rational knowledge and put a philosophical premium upon the knowing subject both in epistemology and ontology, and this found much favour among Sufis, especially the Andalusian Ibn al ‘Arabī (d. 1240).

Let us note the background: Ghazālī had dealt a powerful and efficacious blow to pure scholasticism which in his view dulled the vitality of religion and religious life; what we received from him is a rigorous offensive against the doctrines of the philosophers point by point, aimed at demonstrating and exposing what the attacker saw as their self contradictions and hence absurdities. After Ghazālī, speculative philosophy could live only under the metaphysical protection and in the embrace of indigenous traditional systems of Sufism and particularly of the intellectually vigorous and confident kalām. For a reinvigorated articulation of its ideas, the new kalām that now developed engaged itself in the study, elaboration, adjustment and integration of all relevant philosophical disciplines, making a systematic restatement of its doctrines, and refuting or dismissing those ideas of the philosophers which did not serve well what was seen to be implicit in the religious data. We note that included among these intellectual disciplines were Greek logic and epistemology, as well as natural philosophy. It is interesting that the towering figure of this neo kalām, Fakhr al Dīn Rāzī (d. 1209), had begun his career as a thoroughgoing rationalist indistinguishable from the philosophers.

This post Ghazālī rapprochement between kalām and philosophy is an important element in the background of later philosophical developments in Muslim societies. In fact it is this very mutual espousing of the two which became utterly unbearable in the traditionist Ahl i Ḥadīth circles from where

28 Of particular relevance here is Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī, *Muḥaṣṣal afkār al mutaqdīmīn wa al mutā’akhkhirīn* (Cairo, 1978).
fierce attacks on speculative intellectualism have kept erupting throughout the period. The most sustained and merciless of these eruptions came in the fourteenth century from the philosophically sharp Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), resulting eventually in the removal of the whole discipline of philosophy from the famous al Azhar University in Cairo. Philosophy was not readmitted here until the late nineteenth century through the protracted efforts of Jamâl al Dîn al Afghâni and his follower Muḥammad ʿAbduh.

The centrality of Avicenna, and the formative role first of Ghazâlî’s offensive and then of the Illuminationist synthesis of Suhrawardi, these constitute one main characteristic of Islamic philosophy in the modern period. But the small body of scholarly research done in this area throws into perspective a second characteristic: namely, the existence of a formidable mass of texts on logic in the post thirteenth century period formal texts that represent an independent logical development. It is independent in the sense that while it is, like the Latin tradition, ultimately grounded in Greek logic with Aristotle looming large, it took its precise form from Avicenna’s writings. So for the later period, the central place accorded by Arabic logicians traditionally to Aristotle is now taken by the grand shaykh. Again, then, Avicenna marks a turning point here. But this is not the case with what happened in the Latin world: here attention continued to be centred on Aristotle and therefore those Arabic texts of minor importance which moved closely around Aristotle were translated, while more influential ones dealing with Avicenna’s system were kept out of selection. Arabic and Latin traditions thereby moved in different directions addressing their own logical concerns; interesting to note here is the fact that Averroës (d. 1198) and al Fârâbî (d. 950 1) are far more important in this regard for the Latin tradition than they are for the history of later Islamic philosophy.

Finally, if we take the structured philosophical activities in modern day Iran to be representative of the Islamic world activities that have received more scholarly attention that any other in this world, then one more distinguishing characteristic of later Islamic philosophy can be identified: that Ṣâdr al Dîn Shîrâzî (d. 1640) of the famous ‘School of Isfahan’, a sage known as Mullâ Ṣadrâ, reigns supreme. All subsequent philosophers in Iran had to attend to the philosophical pronouncements of Mullâ Ṣadrâ; a huge body of commentaries, super commentaries and glosses were written on his works; and it is

29 See Ibn Taymiyya, Muwafaqat ṣâḥîh al manqûl li ṣârîh al maʿqûl (Beirut, 1997).
Al Ḥikma al muta‘āliya fi al asfār al arba‘a al ‘aqliyya (Metaphysical philosophy of the four intellectual journeys) that still defines intellectual Shi‘īsm of our own times. Mullā Ṣadrā embodies the high point of a new philosophical departure that began with Suhrawardī’s synthesis and received a profound influence from the spiritual empiricism of Ibn al ‘Arabī. The fundamental preoccupation of this new tradition is ontological: it is built upon the doctrine of ‘grades of Being’ reality was one, homogeneous continuum punctuated by ‘more or less’. The pantheistic possibilities of this doctrine are obvious: one could cry, ‘the whole of God is Being and the whole of Being is God’.

Ṣadrīan trends

Mullā Ṣadrā is indeed the most important representative of the School of Isfahan which remained the centre of intense philosophical activity between the mid sixteenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. It is this School that played a determining role in providing the framework for the scholastic activities of Shi‘ī centres, and the intellectual system it constructed continues to govern Iranian philosophical thought until today. The fundamental defining feature of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, particularly as it is presented in the Asfār, is its emphasis on being, as we have noted. Speaking philosophically not historically, one may say that the Ṣadrīan trend in modern Islamic philosophy has fully reversed Karl Popper’s ‘Epistemology without a knowing subject’.

For Mullā Ṣadrā, in the end subject was all; all epistemology and ontology ultimately reduced to the knowing subject; indeed, subject was the object, for there existed a unity (ittihād) between the intellect (‘aql) and the intellected (ma‘qūl), between the knower and the known. Powers of the subject were constitutive of reality.

The Asfār rejects Aristotelian definition (al ḥadd al tām m in Avicenna) as the foundation of science and syllogistic reasoning and replaces it by ‘primary intuition’. Time and space were known through this primary intuition, and visions and personal revelations were epistemologically valid. It was not sensory input and abstraction of universals upon which knowledge was primarily founded. Rather, knowledge was founded upon al mawdū‘ al mudrik, literally the knowing subject. It is by means of knowledge by presence (‘ilm hudūrī),

which is prior to predicative knowledge (‘ilm ḥuṣulī), that the knowing subject ‘sees’ the object, and obtains knowledge of this object in a durationless instant. There is, then, a transcendental relation of knowledge between the subject and the object; indeed, no barrier exists between them; the knowing subject and the known object were ontologically indistinguishable.

Hossein Ziai points out that if we ponder the impact of Şadrā’s system on Shī’ite political doctrine, we may fathom how intellectual Shī’ism, as the dominant recent trend in philosophy, has embraced the primacy of practical reason over theoretical science, especially in the last century . ‘Living’ sages in every era are thought to determine what ‘scientific’ attitude the society must have, upholding and renewing the foundations using their own individual, experiential, subjective knowledge.33

Accepted by the vast majority of Shī‘ī clergy is this Şadrān expression of philosophy, an expression whose structural model is provided by Avicenna, which attempts to fortify itself against Ghazālian attacks, and on which the influence of the Illuminationist School and of Ibn al ‘Arabī is fundamental. We have practically no studies available of the fālsafā activity in other present day Muslim societies, but in Iran the nucleus of speculative philosophy is still occupied by Mullā Şadrā and we find Tehran becoming in the nineteenth century the gathering place for philosophers. Here we see works being written on Şadrā, especially as his ideas were interpreted by Mullā Hādi Subziwārī, as well as on Avicenna and on the Illuminationist School. One may recognise here three important philosophers of the past sixty years: Sayyid Muḥammad Kāzim ‘Aṣṣār, the teacher of the well known contemporary scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Sayyid Abu al Ḥāṣan Qazwīnī and Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabaṭabā’ī. All of these personages received traditional education; they were all in their own ways Şadrān; and they were all fundamentally interested in Avicenna. ‘Aṣṣār was a jurist who taught both at the modern Tehran University as well as the traditional Sipahsālār Madrasa; Qazwīnī, who knew modern astronomy and mathematics, happened to be an ayatollah; and Ṭabaṭabā’ī, who lived in the great Shī‘ī learning centre of Qom, enjoys a legendary scholarly status in Iran and is named with the honorific title ‘Allama (the Most Learned).34

Between 1958 and 1978, ‘Allama Ṭabaṭabā’ī held annual discussions in Qom with the famous French scholar Henry Corbin who began as an avid reader of

33 Ziai, ‘Recent trends’, p. 409. I acknowledge that much of my exposition is based upon Ziai’s works.
Heidegger and subsequently soaked himself in Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist Wisdom (Hikmat al Ishrāq), spending a major part of his productive life in Iran and writing much to construct philosophical connections between pre Islamic gnosis on the one hand, and Sufism, Islamic spirituality and philosophy, on the other.35 The Ṭabaṭabā’ī Corbin conversations and colloquia became a rich source of inspiration for many among the younger generation, including Nasr who also studied under the ‘Allama.36 In fact Nasr was the main rapporteur of the sessions; also in attendance was Daryush Shayegan who later became a Corbin scholar.

A brief note on logic: Shamsiyya and the Khayrabādī School

The ‘lovely little textbook’, Al Risāla al Shamsiyya (Logic for Shams al Dīn), is that resilient work which has remained the first substantial text on logic taught in Sunnī madrasas well into our own times. It is ‘perhaps the most studied logic textbook of all time’.37 Written by Najm al Dīn al Kātibī in the thirteenth century, it concentrates on narrowly focused formal questions whose precise articulation was accomplished in the works of Avicenna it is these works that serve as the point of departure and reference for the Shamsiyya. One notes a characteristic trend in Arabic logic in its golden age when the textbook was written: the discipline no longer moves all across the subjects covered in Aristotle’s Organon, but pays a more pointed attention to a fully developed specific problematic of a formal nature.

There exists a vast body of unedited Arabic logical texts written throughout the subsequent centuries which develop, criticise, adjust, paraphrase and comment on the logical insights of Avicenna that he had developed through his ‘conversation’ with Aristotle;38 and this is most often done by using the Shamsiyya as the proximate source. Still awaiting critical examination, a bulk of these texts was produced in the Indian subcontinent as even a rough glance at the India Office collection of the British Library shows. The pride of place

38 The expression comes from Street, ‘Logic’, p. 262.
here belongs to the Khayrābādī School whose most illustrious representative Faḍl i Ḥaqq, exiled by the British following the 1857 rebellion, himself wrote logical treatises.\textsuperscript{39} Two commentaries on the \textit{Shamsiyya}, one written by Qūṭb al Dīn Rāzī (known as the Qūṭbī) in the fourteenth century and another by Mīr Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī (known as Mīr Qūṭbī) in the following century, have remained integral parts of the standard Khayrābādī curriculum.\textsuperscript{40}

One prominent scholar of the School, Muʿīn al Dīn of Ajmer (d. 1940) also wrote logical treatises and one of them is available in a rather poor edition published in 1967. This is his \textit{Muʿīn al Mantīq} (Companion to logic) which he wrote during his imprisonment imposed by British rulers as a penalty for his campaign against them and for the independence of India from foreign occupation.\textsuperscript{41} This profoundly interesting, but still unstudied, work is a critical discourse on the three canonised logical texts \textit{Shamsiyya}, Qūṭbī and Mīr Qūṭbī. The cultivation of logic in this School was one of its hallmarks and ceased only after the death of Muntakhab al Ḥaqq Qādirī, an eminent rationalist scholar and logician who was the founder dean of the Faculty of Islamic Learning at Karachi University. We see no rupture here.

\textsuperscript{39} See n. 22 above.
\textsuperscript{40} Hakim Mahmud Ahmad Barakati, ‘\textit{Taqdīm},’ in \textit{Muʿīn al Dīn Ajmerī, Muʿīn al Mantīq} (Karachi, 1967), pp. 17–42.
\textsuperscript{41} Al Dīn Ajmerī, \textit{Muʿīn al Mantīq}. 

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One of the most intriguing changes affecting Muslim societies in modern times has been that in modes of communication. Once relying on oral means for all interpersonal activities, these societies have come to employ writing as a standard implement of social exchange and individual expression. By the mid twentieth century, mass produced written and printed messages had come to permeate public communication, supplementing, if not quite supplanting, the age old oral modes. As ever, the changes evolved differentially in different parts of the Islamic world. But eventually they came to affect most people, relegating those unaffected to the margins of communal activity. The present chapter explores these developments, focusing largely on a medium whose history epitomised the process: the periodical press and its assimilation in Muslim countries, with emphasis on the Middle East.

A late debut

Back in 1800, communication throughout the Islamic world was for the most part spoken, not written. As in most non European societies of the time and in Europe itself earlier on people had little use for written texts in conducting their daily affairs. Official announcements were delivered by mosque preach ers and town criers, and news was told by those who brought it from afar, then circulated orally in the community. Pious masters imparted spiritual guidance orally to small or big gatherings of listeners. Education, on its lower level, relied on the spoken word and memorisation more often than on reading and writing. Entertainment was likewise obtained by listening to storytellers and other verbal performers. Manuscript books, representing a splendid scholarly legacy and the society’s deep reverence for the written word, existed in institutional and individual collections, a source of pride to their possessors. They were used by a thin layer of educated men for executing legal or official duties and for scholarly pursuit. To others written texts were not independently
accessible, nor was reading ability regarded as a useful skill. These conventions were mirrored in the physical environment, urban as well as rural: a visitor to any Islamic city before the late nineteenth century would have found little trace of written messages in the public domain — neither street names nor shop signs, nor yet banners or graffiti (mosque calligraphy, tombstones and the casual inscription on a monument were obvious exceptions). This situation entailed mass illiteracy, which at once reflected and perpetuated the redundancy of writing. On the whole, such traditional modes of communication served society’s needs satisfactorily and allowed it to function smoothly throughout the generations.

Printing was invented in Europe in the mid-fifteenth century (if we overlook some remote antecedents) and quickly spread through much of the continent. It took another three centuries for Muslim societies to open up to the idea. Muslims were aware of the potent device almost from the start, but it failed to appeal to them; if anything, it generated suspicion. By some accounts, the authorities explicitly prohibited it: the Ottoman Sultan Beyazid II is said to have issued a *ferman* (edict) in 1485 banning printing in Islamic languages (i.e., Arabic and Turkish), and his successor reiterated the ban in 1515. Non-Muslim Ottoman subjects were presumably exempt and could print in their respective idioms.¹ Thus, Jews opened a Hebrew press in Istanbul already in the early 1490s, and members of other communities followed suit: Armenians (in the sixteenth century), Greeks (seventeenth century) and Christian Arabs (from the seventeenth century onward). The empire’s subjects using the languages of Islam, by contrast, waited until the eighteenth century to avail themselves of the new technology.

As we shall see, Muslims were wary of printing even after its sanctioning by the state in the eighteenth century, and another century elapsed before they began using it extensively. Why were they so slow to adopt printing? With no direct testimony from Muslim sources, scholars hitherto could only speculate on the question. Sensible explanations have been offered which, however, still leave something to be desired, or searched. The official reason for the assumed initial ban is said to have been concern lest the uncontrolled production of written texts result in mass dissemination of corrupt knowledge and multiple errors in the holy books, thereby desecrating them, and the

¹ The ban story, however, is in some doubt; see John Paul Ghobrial, ‘Diglossia and the “methodology” of Arabic print’, a paper presented at the international symposium on ‘The history of printing and publishing in the languages and countries of the Middle East’, Paris, 24 November 2005. The paper is being revised and will be incorporated in a more comprehensive study.

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language. This attitude, it has been suggested, reflected a traditional reverence for oral transmission of texts, primarily sacred ones, the only method that lent them validity. It required that books be produced carefully and deliberately, not through mass practice. Other possible considerations have been mentioned: fear by the community’s powerful religious leaders, the ‘ulamā’, of losing their monopoly on public knowledge (that is, a pragmatic as well as spiritual rationale); care for the numerous scribes and copyists, a highly regarded calling, who might thus lose their livelihood; the gulf between the spoken and written idioms (diglossia), which would render senseless the production of written texts in mass quantities; and, more generally, the traditional dislike for innovation per se, especially if alien in origin. Such explanations make sense. But why this remained so long after Europe had done away with similar justifications seems to remain an open question. The aversion to printing or inadequate attraction to it was shared by diverse groups with equally diverse motivations until the later part of the nineteenth century.

In Muslim countries farther from Europe, foreigners introduced printing at an earlier time. Portuguese Jesuits brought the technology to India in the mid-sixteenth century and used it there to produce their religious texts. German and Dutch missionaries and the British East India Company followed suit in the eighteenth century. The Carmelites brought printing to Iran in the early seventeenth century, and around the same time the Dutch East Indies Company and Dutch Calvinist missionaries introduced it in Indonesia. In all of these places, the use of the new machinery remained exclusively in foreign hands and local printing did not start until the nineteenth century. By that time, the Ottoman reservations about the practice had also subsided. Under changed international circumstances, Sultan Ahmed III agreed to consider printing more favourably, and in a 1727 ferman he authorised the printing of works on useful matters such as medicine, geography and philosophy, though still expressly excluding religious subjects such as the Qur’ān, Hadith (traditions of


3 Nazir Ahmad, Oriental presses in the world (Lahore, 1985), pp. 55 87.


the Prophet) and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). The man who managed to persuade him, the Islamised Transylvanian official İbrahim Müteferrika, immediately set up a press and began production.6

Government ventures

A central mark of the activities in this field from now on was government involvement and control. Such was the case in the Ottoman capital, where printing remained a state monopoly for over a century, which was not seriously challenged until 1860.7 Such was also the case with the autonomous enterprise in Egypt and similar initiatives in Iran. In these last two places, far sighted potentates Muḥammad (Mehmed) ‘Alī (r. 1805–48) and ‘Abbās Mīrzā (r. 1797–1833), respectively bought printing equipment and sent people to learn the craft in Europe during the 1810s. By the following decade dynamic book printing was already under way in both countries. In Muḥammad ‘Alī’s Egypt, the famous Būlāq press, opened in 1821, one of many government-run projects now turned out scores of titles annually, authored or translated by state functionaries in many fields from military manuals to poetry.8 The Ottoman state press in Istanbul, and presses in Tehran and Tabrīz mostly owned by royal house members and affiliates, printed books in similar quantity and variety during the same period.9

Turkish and Arabic speaking parts of the Ottoman empire had been exposed to newspapers in foreign languages before their rulers launched their own organs. Foreigners printed papers in Istanbul during the French Revolution and, again, there and in İzmir in the 1820s. In Egypt the French army circulated journals during the occupation of 1798–1801. European newspapers had also been brought into both countries and read by the small cosmopolitan communities. As it happened, it was the astute and ambitious governor of Egypt who first moved to adopt the idea, issuing the earliest indigenous periodical in the region. Muḥammad ‘Alī experimented with a

rudimentary product (Jūrnāl al Khidīw) in the early 1820s, and then started his proud Turkish Arabic mouthpiece, Al Waqā‘ī al Miṣrīyya, in 1828. The paper carried mostly administrative news and occasional foreign items, and was of little attraction in form and contents. But with state resources behind it, Al Waqā‘ī persisted to the end of the century and beyond. Three years after its foundation, it was replicated in the Ottoman capital by a venture of Sultan Mahmūd II (who also borrowed so much else from his Egyptian subordinate). In 1831 the sultan ordered the publication of Takvim i Vekayi, a Turkish bulletin designed to enlighten the Ottoman officialdom on ‘the true nature of events... the real purport of the acts and commands of the government’.¹⁰ Similar to its Egyptian counterpart in substance and format, it like wise continued into the twentieth century, and died only with the empire. Muḥammad ‘Alī, a Muslim ruler, had no misgivings about using printing to practical ends. The sultan may have felt the same, though as head of an Islamic empire he found it expedient to justify the new project as a sequel to traditional practice rather than an innovation: the paper, its first issue stated, merely assumed the task of the imperial historiographer, by different means better suited to the needs of the time.¹¹

During the second half of the nineteenth century, official bulletins of similar nature were set up in major cities of the Arabic speaking Ottoman provinces, from Aleppo to Šan‘ā’. In Istanbul and Cairo, as well as in Lebanon,¹² the official bulletins would soon be overshadowed by private newspapers. In all the other Arab provinces, however, state publications would dominate the press arena all but exclusively into the twentieth century.¹³ In Qājār Iran, a government functionary, Mīrzā Šāliḥ Shīrāzī, published the first paper in Tehran in 1837, loosely known as Akhbār i Waqāyi’. As in Egypt and Turkey, it was later followed by several similar products issued by state officials, the only newspapers to circulate in that country until close to the end of the century.¹⁴

The early press ventures of Muslim rulers were important in blazing the trail, but in themselves had limited overall effect. Muḥammad ‘Alī’s Al Waqā‘ī’

¹⁰ Takvim i Vekayi (Istanbul), first issue, 25 Cumadelûlā 1247/1 November 1831, p. 1.
¹¹ Takvim i Vekayi, first issue, 25 Cumadelûlā 1247/1 November 1831, p. 1.
¹² The name ‘Lebanon’ is conveniently used here instead of more cumbersome appellations, to indicate the area where a state by that name was established in 1926.
The press and publishing

defined its main objective as ‘improving the performance of the honourable governors and other distinguished officials in charge of [public] affairs and interests’. According to it circulated among senior executives, army officers and others who were involved in modernisation projects, in 600 copies per issue. It was not sold on the street nor was it meant for the public at large. Sultan Mahmūd’s Takvim, with more officials, dignitaries and foreigners to impress, was printed in 5,000 copies that likewise were not designed for the man on the street. In Egypt, Turkey and Iran the government forced the officialdom to subscribe for its papers, for even in those limited circles there was scarce passion for them. None of these official organs seems to have had a public impact of much import. By the mid nineteenth century, nothing in this humble journalistic enterprise hinted to the lively public role the medium was soon to assume.

Early private journalism

The first Muslim community to produce local private journalism was apparently that of India, where Muslims were publishing newsletters and journals in Persian and Urdu already in the 1820s and 1830s. In the Ottoman Empire, private individuals turned to newspaper publishing after the middle of that century, pioneered by non Muslim Arabs. The birthplace of this activity was in the Christian parts of Lebanon, where Maronite and Greek Orthodox intellectuals devoted themselves to literary and linguistic exploration that came to be known as the nahda, or awakening. Inspired by Protestant and Jesuit missionaries, they sought to redress their unfavourable religious minority status by reviving the rich Arab cultural legacy binding them with their Muslim compatriots. Around mid century, they were opening printing shops, bookstores and reading rooms, publishing old manuscripts, writing tracts on history and language, running a scientific society and responding to the challenge of missionary education by opening quality schools of their own. They also launched the earliest private Arabic journals, starting with Khālīl al Khūrī’s Ḥadiqat al Aḥbara (1858). Their aim was ‘spreading universal knowledge scientific, cultural, historical, industrial,

15 al Waqā’ti al Miṣriyya (Cairo), first issue, 3 December 1828, quoted in Ramzi Mikhā’il Jayyid, Tatāwwar al khabar fi al siḥāfa al miṣriyya (Cairo, 1985), p. 31.
16 Jayyid, Tatāwwar al khabar, p. 35.
18 Ahmad, Oriental presses, pp. 119 26.
commercial...and the like, as in the foreign countries, where their benefits have become evident.20 Muslims were slower to join this activity: about a dozen Christian owned periodicals were published before the first Muslim newspaper, Thamarät al Funün, appeared in Beirut, in 1875. By then, Lebanon had become a locus of vivid journalism, its products circulating among the local educated class and across provincial lines.

Shortly after the birth of the Lebanese press, a similar activity began in Istanbul following several decades of state initiated reforms. Critical of their government, educated Turks in the 1860s and 1870s turned to the medium for airing libertarian views, daringly lashing at the empire’s rulers for their incapacity and tyranny. Prominent among them were İbrahim Şinasi’s Tasvir i Efkâr (1861), Ali Șuavi’s Muhbir (1866) and Namık Kemal’s İbret (1871). The government forced many of its castigators to flee with their papers to London, Paris and Geneva, whence they continued their offensive. Other journals of various interests also began to appear in Istanbul during these years, among them notably Fâris al Shidyâq’s Arabic language Al Jawa‘ib (1861), often described as the most popular Arabic paper of its time.21

Political developments after the mid 1870s, however, interfered with the smooth growth of the Middle Eastern press. The mistrustful Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) prescribed tough control regulations, including tight supervision of newspapers, printing presses and booksellers. Bold papers were purged, or reduced to political quietism. The stiff policy also applied to the Arab provinces, with the result that most of them were unable to produce any press at all until after the turn of the century. In Lebanon, where Arabic publishing had previously thrived, the rigid Hamidian censorship combined with socio political upheaval to induce many Christian Lebanese to emigrate. Looming opportunities in neighbouring Egypt, then in a swing of rapid development under Khedive Ismâ‘îl (r. 1863–79), attracted many of them, including journalists who brought with them skills, experience and sometimes their papers. Egypt’s political realities were then more conducive to free publication, and were about to become even more so under the British. The stormy events on the eve of the 1882 British conquest stimulated the emergence of spirited local journalism and of a local readership. These circumstances ushered in a much livelier chapter in the history

20 Buṭrus al Bustānī in Al Jinān (Beirut), January 1870, p. 1.
of the Arabic press, which from now on would have its centre of gravity on the banks of the Nile.

Between 1876 and 1914, Egypt produced a striking 8,499 newspapers and journals in Arabic, mostly in Cairo and Alexandria, and many more in other languages. Newspapers were coupled with literary, scientific, satirical, professional and cultural periodicals of every stripe, including a few women’s journals. While most were of brief duration the market was just awakening there were also solid publications, which appeared regularly and attracted a growing audience. Christians, mostly of Lebanese provenance, continued to lead the trade with some of the more popular papers, notably the dailies Al Ahram (1876, by the Taqla brothers) and Al Muqatam (1889, Ya’qub Sarruf and Faris Nimr) and the cultural journals Al Muqattaf (Beirut 1876, Cairo 1884, Sarruf and Nimr) and Al Hilal (1892, Jurji Zaydan). In time the number of Muslim Egyptians in the business grew and papers venting local sentiments gained popularity notably Al Mu’ayyad (1889, ‘Ali Yusuf) and Al Liwâ’ (1900, Mustafa Kamil), both exponents of a nascent Egyptian nationalism which gradually eroded Christian prominence on the journalistic stage. It was also during this period that a new branch of journalism was born in Egypt, religious organs a development of special significance that will be considered separately below. By the turn of the century, Egypt was the uncontested capital of Arab press activity. Its products, like those of Lebanon before, reached the educated classes in the towns of other Arab provinces. Egyptian based papers by Turkish and Persian expatriates had a loyal readership in Turkey and Iran. Elsewhere in the region, the press was either strictly censored or non existent. A proud Cairo journalist in 1902 aptly noted that the Egyptian press was ‘the envy of other papers in the East those wretched sheets whose hands are shackled by the chains of tyranny, whose tongues are bound by the fetters of slavery, whose pens are smashed by the axes of despotism’. The situation changed following the historic shifts in Tehran and Istanbul after the turn of the century. The 1906 11 Iranian Constitutional Revolution prompted a vigorous eruption of mostly political private papers. Reportedly as many as ninety of them had appeared by 1907, assuming the role hitherto played by the expatriate journals that had clandestinely sown revolutionary

seeds in the country.\textsuperscript{25} The 1908 Young Turk Revolution had a similar effect. The abolition of censorship resulted in a dramatic surge of publication in the capital and Arab provinces, from Jerusalem to Baghdad. Between then and the First World War, more than 350 new papers appeared in Istanbul and a comparable number in Arab towns, addressing public issues with remarkable freedom and airing much suppressed zeal. Many of the new papers were inevitably short lived, impaired by limited experience and a poor market and overcast by the better Egyptian products that reached these provinces. But here and there, solid papers emerged, improving gradually.

By the eve of the First World War, the countries of the Middle East had become a scene of effervescent printing. Newspapers were the busiest part of this endeavour everywhere, not least because launching them was so easy and the reward of personal fame so tempting. They carried news and comments, pronounced views and waged passionate verbal battles. The proliferation of journals was a major factor in encouraging the spread of printing shops, the more successful of which came to act as publishing houses, turning out literary works, classic and modern books, and a host of pamphlets and chapbooks designed for the awakening market. They also introduced the public to other items of a novel kind, from poster and handbills through commercial envelopes to wedding invitations. At that stage, printing and publication were still beset by childhood diseases of every kind—technological, infrastructural, even linguistic and ethical. Their major challenge, however, was creating a sizeable readership that would adopt their products as a new form of public sphere, as we shall see below.

Printing in the service of the faith

Religious printing had a rich record in Europe, with an early peak during the Reformation and many achievements thereafter. European propagators were also responsible for first disseminating mass produced religious texts in Islamic languages. The spiritual leaders of the societies that spoke these languages, however, were initially wary of the idea of printing. Their fear, we will recall, reflected a sincere concern about the proper making of books as well as concern about their own status as overseers of written guidance. The ‘ulamā’\textsuperscript{\textdagger}’s stance was reminiscent of that of their Catholic counterparts, who for several centuries had led a battle against the uncontrolled spread of ideas in

print Protestant and otherwise employing bans and punishments. In the Islamic experience, however, the guardians of tradition responded to uncontrolled printing in a milder way and their opposition was of shorter duration. It seems that the historical circumstances under which Muslim societies adopted printing engrossed as they were in confronting a foreign onslaught were largely responsible for this, alongside cultural factors whose precise nature requires more exploration. Before too long, people seeking to defend Islam against external threats began using the hitherto disputable tool as a legitimate weapon.

Again, we have no cutting proof, but only learned speculations, concerning the ‘ulamā‘’s role in delaying the adoption of printing and checking its progress once it had been authorised by the sultan. Some of them must have been worried about the possible abuse and excesses of printing. If they were, during the early decades after its introduction there was little to justify their concern, since printing proceeded slowly and was under their close control. Carefully edited Islamic texts, including the Qurʾān, were printed in several places Tehran, Istanbul, Cairo, northern India after the onset of the nineteenth century under ‘ulamā’ supervision and the endeavour expanded thereafter. 26 But when private printing began to spread more rapidly, especially after the emergence of journalism, their suspicion was again aroused. The often foreign substance of many of the early papers and their poor form abhorred the ‘ulamā’. Some of them openly articulated their unease in writing, explicitly criticising the press for spreading ‘lies and vain arguments’, and ‘spiritual deception’. 27 ‘Our ignorance is better than such corrupt knowledge, which distorts our views and those of our ancestors’, a prominent Baghdadi ‘ālim (religious leader) stated in 1876, after examining a copy of the innovative Al Muqtataf. 28 Lay people likewise expressed aversion to modern printing, instilled in them by their mentors. ‘God rendered the buying of journals and subscribing to them reprehensible’, explained an Ottoman state functionary at the end of the nineteenth century, quoting the wisdom of his guides; ‘for, as the holy Ḥadith of Bukhārī says, “you should avoid gossip, wasting money and asking too many questions”. Journals combine all three evils’. 29 During the early years of the press, newspaper owners repeatedly...

27 E.g., Ḥusayn al Marsafì, Risālat al kalim al thamān (Cairo, 1881), pp. 30 2.
28 Al Kitāb al dhahab li yūbīl al muqtataf al khamsīnī 1876 1926 (Cairo, 1927), p. 131.
29 Al Manār (Cairo), 1 (1897 98), p. 660.
complained of the ‘ulamā’’s mistrustful attitude, whose popularity was under
mining their livelihood. Unlike their Catholic counterparts, Muslim spiritual
leaders did not mount an open and co-ordinated campaign against popular
publishing. Still, many of them felt ill at ease with the medium that could be
so lightly abused, and conveyed their apprehension to their followers.

‘Ulama’ reluctance, such as existed, began to wither away when individuals
outside of religious institutions started using printing in defending Islam
against its foes. Perhaps the earliest certainly the most famous man to
employ the press to such ends was Jamāl al Din al Afghānī, the religious
political activist who in the late 1870s encouraged his followers in Egypt to
borrow ‘the enemy’s weapon’ and turn it against that enemy unreservedly.
Sometime later in Paris, Afghānī published his own journal, Al ‘Urwā al
Wuthqā (1884), with his colleague Muḥammad ‘Abduh. Though lasting for
several months only, it was an arch model of an Islamic campaign in print.
Discussing the roots of Muslim weakness and urging religious revival, it
reached readers throughout the Middle East and far beyond, striking their
minds ‘like an electric current’.

The next major publication of this kind was started in Egypt in the following decade by Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s celebrated pupil, Muhammad Rashid Riḍā. For thirty seven years, Riḍā’s monthly Al Manār (1897) was an arena of lively discourse on questions of Islam and modernity, engaging believers from Marrakesh to Singapore. It presented serialised tafsīr (exegesis) of the Qurān, discussed chapters in Islamic history and offered tradition based comments on current events. Remarkably, it also provided fatwās (religious legal opinion) on every matter of daily life in response to readers’ queries the pious equivalent of the readers’ questions sections in the more secular publications. Al Manār was hardly alone in this. Beginning in the 1880s, Islamic newspapers and journals were popping up as spontaneous ventures wherever printing existed. Papers in Arabic, in particular, had a wider circulation for Arabic was read by the educated elite everywhere. Islamic publication represented a rainbow: some papers were devoted to religious preaching, advocating Islamic purism or reformist ideas; others, more interested in anti-imperialist struggle and nationalism, used the notion of Islamic unity as a battle cry. An example of this last kind was Al Mu’ayyad (Cairo, 1889) of Shaykh ‘Alī Yusuf, the devout al Azhar graduate who propagated an Islamic oriented Egyptian nationalism.

30 E.g., Al Muqtabas (Cairo), Ṣafar 1324 (March 1906), pp. 62 3; Al ‘Irfān (Sidon), 12 January 1910, pp. 28 9.
Periodical publications were accompanied by other printed religious products. These included mass editions of the Qur’an or individual Qur’anic suras (chapters), circulated by official institutions and various popular groups. One vigorous enterprise of this kind was initiated after mid century by ‘ulamā’ in northern India. Another, more politically oriented, was undertaken by Sultan Abdülhamid II as part of his pan Islamic campaign, from the early 1890s onward. The sultan ordered wide distribution of Qur’ans and enlisted ‘ulamā’, the famous Shaykh Abū al Hudā and others to write booklets and pamphlets in popular language supporting his caliphate. A curious instance was the use of printing by forces of the pietistic Sudanese Mahdist state in the late 1880s: having seized printing equipment, they prepared multiple copies of the Mahdī’s proclamations (manshi‘rāt). These may have been intended for assuring retention of the texts rather than for distribution, but the very resort to such modern means by a puritan conservative movement was in itself remarkable.

Some religious scholars continued to criticize printing, or rather its abuses, into the twentieth century. As late as 1931, al-Azhar ‘ulamā’ still labelled journalism ‘one of the most dangerous means’ at the disposal of ‘the enemies of the true faith’, allowing them to pronounce ‘their false call and extol wrongdoing…in every valley [and] spread their wicked ideas on every hill’. But while repeating the old censure, the ‘ulamā’ also moved to apply the sensible lesson, inaugurating their own periodical mouthpiece in that year. Having previously used printing for carefully produced books, the bastion of Islamic orthodoxy now adopted the most efficient arsenal and put it to work in ‘calling for good…and illuminating the right path’. The authoritative opposition to mass publishing was thus relegated to history and printing assumed full swing in the service of the faith.

Press and readers – the emergence of a new public sphere

Before adopting printing, we shall recall, Muslim societies had used written texts sparingly. When the contents of written messages had circulated publicly, it had been mostly through oral means. When printing became available,

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34 Sean O’Fahey, ‘”His master’s voice”: The Sufis, the Mahdists and printing’, Culture and History, 16 (1997), pp. 136 44.
35 Nūr al Islām (Cairo), first issue (1931), opening statement.
it was a small number of intellectuals who proceeded to use it, believing in its
power to advance their society. But in order for the new device to have this
kind of effect, a profound socio cultural change had to take place. To access
printed items independently, people had to acquire reading skills and abandon
old beliefs in favour of a new outlook. The change occurred slowly at first, but
it was enhanced at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the
twentieth, to no small extent thanks to the advent of newspapers.

Until the birth of the periodical press, the market for printed texts in Muslim
countries was infinitesimal. We are told, for example, that the translated works
produced in Muh.ammad ‘Ali’s Egypt, whose intent was educating the public,
‘were accumulating in piles in the warehouses’ for lack of demand. Nor did the
early state sponsored journals evoke much curiosity even among the reform
teams, as we have seen. It was the accelerated change in the region’s political
scene that generated public interest in the printed word. More specifically, it was
the rising demand for information, always an essential commodity when the
kaleidoscope of events begins to rotate faster. Administrative reforms, urban
development, improved transportation, a growing presence of foreigners,
Western encroachment and invasion, all underscored the modified environment.

For the first time now these changes came accompanied by an influx of intelligence
and analysis, accessible to anyone with a reading ability. The pressing demand for
news and its ample availability in print combined to connect the public with the
medium, a bond later to be extended to other kinds of printed items. It was also
these new possibilities that drew more people to pronounce their views, which
printing amplified with unprecedented efficacy.

Newspaper circulation figures, ever problematic on many counts, nonethe
less cast some light on this last evolution. Before 1870, newspapers in Islamic
languages rarely sold more than a few hundred copies each anywhere. The
overall readership in any country of the region was scarcely any bigger than
that. Thereafter matters began to move ahead more dynamically. With the
pace of political events in the region intensifying in the 1870s and 1880s, leading
newspapers in Egypt and the Turkish speaking parts of the empire managed
to establish loyal audiences, moving from hundreds of copies per issue to
thousands and reaching tens of thousands towards the end of the century. It
was more than the political scene that was changing, of course, and people
were also seeking enlightenment on scientific, cultural and spiritual issues,
now addressed by the many non-political journals. The most popular

periodicals, such as the Cairo based *Al Muqtaṭaf* and *Al Hila¯l*, acquired a region wide market of several thousands copies each towards the end of the century. By the eve of the First World War, overall newspaper and journal circulation had reached some 80,000 copies in Egypt, over 30,000 in Lebanon and a few thousand copies in each of several other Arab provinces. In the post revolutionary Ottoman Empire and Iran, papers were likewise sold by tens of thousands.\(^{37}\)

More than a one way vehicle of news and ideas, the press was becoming a platform for public exchanges. Newspapers not only informed their readers but also allowed them to voice their preferences, political and otherwise. In the cultural periodicals, especially, a dialogue was evolving between writers and readers, with the latter sending queries and essays and responding to those of others, which often ran across provincial boundaries. For example, between 1876 and 1908 the literary scientific quarterly *Al Muqtaṭaf* handled questions by no fewer than 2,612 people identified by place of residence and mostly also by name, from Fez to Delhi, and a still bigger number by unidentified inquirers. They asked about every matter, from pre Islamic poetry to photography, with answers often coming from other readers.\(^{38}\)

Slow at first, the pace of these dialogues was becoming livelier as the nineteenth century turned into the twentieth.

The growing passion for intelligence had other expressions. There was an increasing demand for expatriate newspapers, always freer than their counter parts at home in reporting and commenting, and hence deemed more reliable. Papers by exiled Egyptian activists circulated in Egypt prior to the British occupation, as did the European based papers of Ottoman oppositionists in pre 1908 Ottoman lands. Similarly, Persian papers arriving from Calcutta, Istanbul, Cairo and London enjoyed popularity in pre 1906 Iran despite harsh censorship. Equally telling was the appearance of clandestine printed handbills and placards on city streets in the region in Syria and Lebanon in the early 1880s, in Iran before and during the 1906 revolution a medium whose choice by opposition groups attested to its assumed effectiveness.\(^{39}\)

The increase in newspaper consumption led to a greater demand for books, if we are to judge from the continuous growth in their printing. By the end of the century, the book industry was several fold bigger than during its first half,

38 *Al Muqtaṭaf* (Beirut and Cairo), issues of 1876 1908, section entitled bāb al masāʿīl.
now involving not only official but also numerous private printers. Egypt, having produced c. thirty-five book titles on an annual average in the 1830s, was turning out over 300 annually in the decade before 1900, many of which were exported to neighbouring countries. The Ottoman capital, with a reported average annual production of fewer than 100 titles back in the 1850s, reached a level of 1,500 after 1908. While we know less about the popular ways of book consumption than we do about newspaper reading, there can be no mistaking the meaning of these figures, which increased much faster than the population. The indifference of Muḥammad ‘Alī’s time was giving way to passionate curiosity.

The change was more profound than that indicated by sales figures. The thirst for news and views, especially in the energised urban areas, grew faster than people’s ability freely to access the information available in print. To meet the mounting demand, a considerable rise in literacy had to occur, a process that was already under way in the late nineteenth century but was too slow for the immediate needs. Muslim societies therefore instinctively fell back on old customary practice: the oral circulation of written texts, now coming in modern format and through modern technology. In cafés and the marketplace, in street corners and rural gathering places, one literate man armed with a single newspaper copy could enlighten a crowd. The society could not wait for education to prepare it for obtaining information; it moved to reach it by the good old methods. The phenomenon was reported throughout the Middle East and beyond, a familiar mark of the entry into the era of written discourse. It continued until the spread of broadcast media and literacy made it redundant, in many places after the mid twentieth century. We shall never know how many people were thus exposed to printed knowledge. But they surely made up social segments considerably bigger than the educated classes in each community, quite likely several fold bigger. Obviously, listeners to the read texts seldom participated directly in the written discourse. Yet they did have an indirect input into it, by forming an audience that could be addressed, listened to and sometimes provoked into public action. By the eve of the First World War, active written exchanges were limited to small, mostly urban sections of Middle Eastern society. But with far bigger crowds engaged as listeners, a shift in the nature of the public sphere was clearly in progress.

The public sphere expanded – and controlled

Printing became a routine feature of public life in the Middle East after the First World War. Experience and technological advancement continuously improved the quality of printed products. As important for their development was the emergence of state sponsored education and the concomitant rise in literacy, which increased the pool of customers. The new schooling systems, in constant need of textbooks, were in themselves major consumers of print, as were the mushrooming bureaucracies of the new states. Both boosted the industry. The public, mostly its urban segments but slowly also the rural parts, came to rely on newspapers for multiple services: announcements of social and cultural events, legal notices, ads for goods and services, entertainment and, of course, the vital reporting of news. The press addressed new constituencies: women, youth, people with specialised professional interests, sports lovers and more. The growing social role of the written press was reflected, again, in rising sales figures: at mid century newspapers and journals circulated in tens of thousands of copies in almost every Islamic state, hundreds of thousands in bigger communities such as Egypt and Turkey (where dailies alone circulated in 510,000 and 693,000 copies respectively, in 1952). Two or three decades later, even smaller countries would be consuming newspapers by tens of thousands, while in the bigger ones circulation would reach millions.41 Journalism became a recognised, even prestigious calling, which led to the emergence of professional unions in several countries towards mid century and the opening of university training programmes (starting at the American University in Cairo, in 1936).

For several decades after the First World War, this vibrant activity was marked by strong political overtones. Middle Eastern societies were preoccupied with the quandaries spurred by the post war earthquake. Foreign domination, the formation of new states, restructured politics with constitutions, parliaments and parties, the appearance of new enemies in the region all represented urgent political dilemmas. Printing became a weapon in battles: between the country and its alien occupiers, governments and their critics, parties and their rivals, and among various groups advocating multiple agendas. Alongside the political encounters, an intellectual discourse evolved around the broader cultural implications of the grand issues. Egypt, with its robust printing industry, remained the publishing capital of the Arab world

and its high quality publications continued to serve as platforms for animated regional exchanges, their bold presence still impeding the rise of local products. New cultural literary journals, prominently the weekly *Al Risāla* (Cairo, 1933), now assumed the role which *Al Muqtaṣaf* and *Al Hilał* had played in the previous century in setting the tone of regional intellectual discourse. The debates in print were dominated by a secular tenor for the better part of the twentieth century. Exploring modern recipes for a better future, the region’s leaders endorsed nationalism, liberalism, socialism and revolution, adopted temporal laws, emasculated the ‘*ulamā’* and advocated regional unification plans unrelated to the Islamic *umma* (community of believers). These were all secular ideas, notwithstanding ingenious efforts to relate them to tradition. Informing public discussion, they lent it a worldly taint, so much so as to form the impression of complete break with tradition—a misleading impression, as later developments will show.

From the perspective of the individual, especially in the urban centres of change, the long familiar public sphere was gradually replaced by another, organised along different lines. In the old order, the usual gathering locations and periodic assemblies fully met the needs of social intercourse. In them there was a special role for wisdom imparted from above, by the political and religious authorities, whose social status largely emanated from popular dependence on the intelligence they divulged. Usually it was familiar persons who conveyed information, which was then circulated through the intimate social networks of the family, village and tribe. The modern routine of communication was different. Information now arrived from anonymous sources—the nameless reporter, the unidentified broadcaster, the faceless author of handbills—and accessing it required none of the old social networks. Moreover, the individual could actively partake in public exchanges regardless of social standing; the only requisites for that were reading and writing skills. In its modified formula, the public sphere was less congenial and more atomised, but also more participative. An inevitable result of all this was a decline in the status of old authorities: both the state and the ‘*ulamā’* were losing their dominant say in shaping the community’s discourse—precisely the change they had abhorred at the onset of printing. Equally predictable was the decline in the role of communal networks, now less vital for social survival.

The freer exchanges in print became, the less likely they were to escape state interference. Rulers in the region had kept their eye on publication already in the nineteenth century and regulated it with stick and carrot. In the twentieth century, alarmed by the ongoing erosion in their public authority, governments groped for more effective controls. New military regimes set
up after mid century in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Sudan, Libya, northern and southern Yemen turned to control public voices as soon as they seized power. Those airing views in print were now obliged to pledge loyalty to the state and keep within known (if not always told) boundaries or face harsh sanctions. Claiming legitimacy based on collectivist revolutionary ideologies, these governments established their monopoly on the truth by seizing the tools for promoting their version of it. They issued their own organs, hired pens to pronounce their views, muzzled all other voices, and turned the print industry, especially the press, into mobilised tools in their service. Their leaders utilised it to indoctrinate the public at home and promote the regime’s line abroad. Consequently, the press assumed the familiar contents, format and jargon of mobilisation tools. The champions of revolution pitted themselves against the region’s ‘conservative’ states and, as often, against each other. In the resultant inter Arab friction of the 1950s and 1960s, once aptly dubbed ‘the Arab Cold War’, the press and other media served as a central battleground.

Twentieth century Middle Eastern states thus appeared to have devised a formula for checking the decline in their authority previously caused by free popular debate. In the more rigid systems they even seemed to have reversed it. Completely free writing became rare and possible only under unusual conditions, mostly outside of one’s country (Turkey, and for a while Lebanon, were conspicuous exceptions). Accordingly, the standard typology of twentieth century Middle Eastern media systems has focused on the state control level as a prime yardstick: it has become customary to classify their communication systems, comprising both print publications and broadcasting along a scale ranging from tight control to near complete freedom.42

During the last quarter of the twentieth century, as revolutionary zeal was subsiding, media realities in some places began to change once more. Egypt again offered an illuminating model of the shift. Responding to mounting socio economic pressures and government legitimacy problems, president Anwar al Sadat (pres. 1970–81) moved to liberalise the country’s publication scene starting in the mid 1970s. He permitted his critics to organise openly and voice their complaints in print, which promptly generated a spirited debate. Licensed pluralism was further enhanced under his successor, Hosni Mubarak (pres. 1981–), and the Egyptian scene recovered its colour. Liberalization in varying degrees also occurred in several other places, while in some states Saddam Hussein’s Iraq

was a distinct example the rigid modes persisted to the end of the twentieth century. In countries where no revolutions had occurred, notably in the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan and Morocco, writers continued to demonstrate their loyalty to the ruling authorities, retaining a soft tone in political matters but enjoying more freedom in pursuing their own journalistic agendas.

Within the newly prescribed confines, Middle Eastern printing continued to evolve. Journals, books and pamphlets remained major fora for discussing social, cultural and, with caution, political issues, reaching bigger audiences. Gaps in verbal freedom and material conditions between countries often prompted writers to move across the region, a comfortable option for Arab authors wishing to air views more freely without leaving their cultural element. Until the mid-1970s, Lebanon, enjoying a temporary political stability, was a haven for those seeking free expression and its press offered an outlet for conflicting Arab positions, official and otherwise. Certain Gulf states would assume the role later on. Equally important was the exodus of writers who would not be muzzled, mostly to Europe, where an expatriate publishing endeavour had existed since the previous century. Prior to the 1980s, such activity abroad formed a marginal trickle beside the mainstream of printed discourse within the region. Thereafter it gained in importance. Improvements in production and distribution technologies, along with Saudi finance and the influx of seasoned Lebanese writers who fled their beleaguered country, combined to turn the European publishing enterprise into a major artery of Middle Eastern publication. Fine products such as the London based dailies *Al Sharq al Awsat* (1977), *Al Hayāt* (1988) and *Al Quds al ‘Arabi* (1989) and the weeklies *Al Hawādith* (1975) and *Al Majalla* (1980) set new professional standards. They also underscored the region’s political and material difficulties that still impeded publication at home.

**Islam reasserted in print**

Disenchantment was one mark of the Middle Eastern public debate in the later part of the twentieth century, following decades of volatile secular oriented order with often unsatisfying results. In many places civil society groups were emerging, motivated by the state’s inadequate handling of public needs. They confronted the authorities with more than an implicit defiance. The challenge had many faces, the most significant being the religious one. Protesting government failures, sprouting Islamic groups purported to offer an alternative solution to the material and spiritual problems. Religious oppositionists seized power in Iran, assassinated an Egyptian president, attained power
democratically in Turkey, came close to doing so in Algeria and clashed with the government in many other places, verbally or violently. In all of this the media, both written and otherwise, played a key role.

Religious publications had been continuously present in many parts of the region since the late nineteenth century, issued by official Islamic institutions and by popular groups. The latter sometimes preached a cautious spiritual or social gospel; at other times they openly advanced a religious political agenda, as did, for example, the Muslim Brothers, who put out several journals and numerous other publications in Egypt and Syria from the early 1930s onward.\(^{43}\) Having thrived under foreign occupation, such groups came to confront tougher realities at independence when faced with their own secular minded rulers, who suppressed the more vociferous pious organs. Yet even when pushed to the margins the religious trend did not disappear. During the heyday of secular ideological debate the second and third quarters of the twentieth century the religious call continued to be enunciated, if humbly, by the pietistic press of official institutions such as al Azhar, whose course ran parallel to, and never clashed with, that of the state. It was also voiced by printed organs of the conservative Saudi state, the bearer of Islamic banners, and by a few popular religious groups in various places that projected a politically harmless image.

The public role of religious publications changed during the last quarter of the century. With no adequate government remedies for many of society’s ills, proponents of the ‘Islamic solution’ became more vocal. In the mid 1970s in Egypt and Iran and in the following decade in other, mostly poor countries, advocates of Islamist ideas were boldly spreading their creed. The call could be conveyed by many means: spoken, printed, recorded, videotaped; any qualms regarding their ‘novel’ nature had long been abandoned. Media other than printing were indeed used by these movements with impressive creativity, but written organs remained essential. They included lengthy studies on questions of Islam and modernity, small pamphlets tackling narrower issues, fascicules with Qur’ān passages, newspapers and journals, handbills and posters, as well as endless written but unprinted items such as street banners and graffiti that permeated the public domain.

We may look more closely at Egypt as a prime instance of this activity. After the mid 1970s, the Muslim Brothers’ monthly Al Da’wa suspended in

the early 1950s and now re licensed was vigorously circulating alongside several other Islamist journals. Docile at first, Al Da‘wa gradually mounted an offensive on Anwar al Sadat’s regime, for its fallacious socio cultural policies and foreign strategy, especially the dialogue with Israel. Still more blatant criticism was spread in print by more radical groups: Sadat’s assassins in 1981 were reportedly inspired by Al Farîda al Gha’iba (‘The Missing Duty’, i.e., jihād), a pamphlet authored by one of their number that had clandestinely circulated among them.⁴⁴ Al Da‘wa, which the government again suspended just before the murder, was not permitted to resume publication and a new edition was published among exiles in Europe. But as free speech at home was upgraded under Sadat’s successor, the Brothers easily found alternative outlets. Forming alliances with political parties, they began to use those parties’ newspapers most efficiently Al Ahlār and Al Sha‘b for postulating their own views. They also continued to circulate a host of educational pamphlets, which they sold or gave away around mosques and on street corners throughout the country. Such activity had to be conducted cautiously despite the relative liberalism under Mubarak. Direct attacks on the regime were avoided, though the emphatic insistence on the ‘right’ Islamic path did imply unmistakable censure of the official leadership. The government itself periodically redraw the red lines and sometimes punished its religious critics, meeting the more violent radicals with an iron fist. Islamist groups elsewhere in the region challenged the existing order in similar ways, though normally enjoying less freedom than their Egyptian counterparts. Where castigation was audacious and the regime rigid, such publications were firmly suppressed; Syria of the early 1980s is a prominent case in point. Typically, the barred organs in both Egypt and Syria soon popped up in Europe and resumed their call from there.

For the governments, the spreading of pious messages out of their control presented an intricate problem. Unlike the circulation of alien ideas, communism for example, the religious call invoked deep rooted popular emotions and bashing those voicing it could weaken the government’s legitimacy. Suppression was thus a problematic option that had to be backed by a publicity campaign. Governments seeking to curb religious antagonists therefore entered the same arena and resorted to similar tools. They enlisted leading ‘ulama’ to engage Islamists in open debates that were publicised in state controlled media;⁴⁵ produced their own religious periodicals (thus in Egypt, the official Al Liwa‘ al Islāmī

⁴⁴ Johannes J. G. Jansen, The neglected duty: The creed of Sadat’s assassins and Islamic resurgence in the Middle East (New York, 1986), and see e.g. Umar F. Abd Allah, The Islamic struggle in Syria (Berkeley 1983), especially pp. 128 32.
⁴⁵ E.g., Akhbâr al Yawm (Cairo), 10 April 1982, 1 May 1982.
was launched in early 1982, shortly after the elimination of Al Da’wa); upgraded religious sections in daily newspapers, and encouraged moderate writers to counter the radical call in books, pamphlets and broadcasts. Like the Islamist publications, state sponsored religious products circulated widely, in the expanding clusters of religious bookstores near central mosques and elsewhere.

In countries where the government itself professed a pious outlook, most publications carried a strong traditional tone with little opposition. Saudi Arabia was an obvious instance, as was the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, the new authorities employed an elaborate set of written means to pronounce their views and spread revolutionary ideas at home and abroad, from books and journals to highly artistic posters, money bills and postage stamps. They also circulated Arabic, Turkish and Urdu journals addressed to the relevant audiences. The Sunni Saudi Arabia, feeling harassed by this activity, countered the Iranian call through its more experienced and better financed media. Like the bitter inter Arab quarrels of the 1950s and 1960s, the more recent religious disputes across international lines was a routine facet of printing activity in the region.

In encounters between states and their religious opponents towards the end of the twentieth century, both sides employed printing on a scale unknown in the past. This reflected the upgraded state of the medium in the region, the result of rapid educational development and the entrenchment of reading habits. It is important, however, to consider the scene in its proper proportions. While the circulation of printed items was accelerating, oral channels were used at least as intensively both in spreading Islamist ideas and in countering them. The old mosque and bazaar based channels proved as effective as ever. The vocal religious message reverberating in a place of worship, besides bypassing the still widespread illiteracy, was infinitely mightier than the flat written text. Mosque sessions and bazaar talk were also more difficult for the state to check. Popular religious movements had a clear edge over the government wherever they managed to take control of a mosque, or, better, to improvise one, something they did on a massive scale. There were other modes of oral communication, utilising an assortment of new technologies, which were available to governments and their religious challengers alike. As the highly effective broadcast media were in the state’s grip, such means as audio and video cassettes simple to make, easy to distribute and hard to block became prime weapons in the Islamist arsenal. Ayatollah

Ruhollah Khomeini’s famous recorded sermons, circulating in pre-1979 Iran and preparing the ground for the revolution, offered an illuminating example of their tremendous utility.47

These and other technological innovations portended broad social, political and cultural changes. Their long-term impact on the fate of printing is yet to unfold, but one lesson is already clear with regard to the end of the twentieth century. As elsewhere, oral means and printed products in the Islamic Middle East complemented each other; neither of them precluded the other. But here, perhaps more than elsewhere, the spoken word still carried immense social and political power, especially in a religious setting. As the clashes between governments and their Islamist opponents have shown, at least in appealing to popular religious sentiments written items offered a dubious match to the time-honoured oral dialogue.

Conclusion

The wheels set rolling by governments in the early nineteenth century, having shifted to a higher gear with the beginning of private printing during its second half, assumed dramatic momentum in the twentieth century. Printing and publishing became inseparable features of social and cultural life for most Islamic communities in the Middle East and beyond. Statistical data, seldom accurate but often useful as a measure of scale, again seem to mirror these trends. By 1995, according to one account, the Arab states produced a total of 140 daily newspapers that circulated in 9.2 million copies; Turkey’s 57 dailies sold 6.8 million and Iran’s 27 circulated in 1.4 million copies. The number of non-daily periodicals was markedly bigger, with many millions of other readers. Even relative latecomers to this activity turned out remarkable quantities: Jordan (250,000 copies of dailies in 1995), Yemen (230,000) and Sudan (650,000). The output of printed books was equally impressive, according to the same account: in the year 1995 Egypt produced 2,250 titles, Turkey 6,546, Iran a striking 15,073.48 With a readership far bigger than the number of printed copies, it was clear that society’s habits of consuming and transmitting knowledge had been transformed. Traditional reservations were all but forgotten. Government suspicion remained an obstacle, sometimes seriously obstructing publishing, but nowhere did it prevent its progress.

Technological developments from the early 1990s onward had a far reaching impact on the modes and pace of communication in Islamic countries, as elsewhere. The impact might well prove to be as revolutionary as that prompted by printing. Fax (which came somewhat earlier), satellites, desktop publication, electronic mail and, most dramatically, the internet rewrote the rules of access, application and consumption of information. In Islamic countries, where the public sphere was monitored by governments and free expression was determined by political oscillations, the significance of such new devices was perhaps greater than in other places.49

One notable change was the upgrading of printed items, felt most prominently in the press. Digital transmission and printing, facilitated by the development of software in Arabic and other Islamic languages, allowed the making of better looking papers and their immediate distribution everywhere, obviating the need for cumbersome transportation. With the spread of the internet came newspaper websites, scores of which were set up with bases in most countries of the region.50 By rendering the locus of production immaterial for distribution, the new means also encouraged the rapid emergence of Arabic publishing projects in Europe, whose products circulated throughout the Middle East and beyond. Similarly, desktop publication simplified the making of books and every other kind of printed item. The scene of printed products thus became infinitely richer and more dynamic than previously. As the twentieth century turned into the twenty first, these changes were modifying not only the scope of text consumption but also its modes.

While lending serious advantages to big publishing firms, the chief importance of new technologies was in their becoming available to groups and individuals unaffiliated with any establishment. In this, the internet had a special significance, creating yet another layer of public sphere. Requiring simple operational skills and modest resources, and elusive enough to evade control, the internet gave unprecedented power to private elements with different agendas. The fact that in employing the new media states had little comparative advantage over non state actors represented another challenge to the states' effective hegemony. This was particularly problematic in cases of opposition groups, which could use the new technologies to build an organisational

network quietly under the government’s nose and then act against it as well as challenge a superpower.

All of these mighty innovations seem to diminish the importance of the older media, including printing. But if the course of development during the last two centuries is any indication, new modes do not necessarily preclude the old, certainly not in the short run. Rather, they complement each other for a considerable time. The recent changes are thus perhaps best seen as the newest layer of a cumulative process. They would have been impossible without the advent of mass printing spearheaded by the press, the gradual rise in literacy and the emergence of popular reading habits from the late nineteenth century onward.
Introduction

This chapter aims to give an overview of some of the major modern art movements in the Islamic Middle East and does not attempt to treat the Islamic world more broadly. It begins with a discussion of the births of some of these movements in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Egypt, and goes on to examine a number of themes: changing attitudes towards figural representation; the role of the Arabic script; the response by artists to regional issues and questions of identity and gender; and, in an era where globalisation affects art, the range of new media that artists are employing today.

The term modern in the present context defines art produced in materials and styles associated principally with Western art traditions such as oils, canvas, sculpture and printed images. The story of what Middle Eastern artists do with these new materials, which began to be introduced into this region in the last decades of the nineteenth century, and the very different subject matter associated with these new forms now confronting them, is a major feature of the art of this period. Also to be considered is how they react to what is effectively a total break with the past traditions of so called ‘Islamic’ art and their search for distinct regional and cultural identities. This also parallels the broader effects of modernisation in different spheres of the cultural life of the region at this time, notably in literature.

A distinct pattern emerges from the study of the birth of art movements in countries as diverse and far apart as Iran and Egypt, although the impetus for each of these movements depended on different sets of circumstances within each and at various times. The pattern begins with some form of interaction between the Middle East and the West, whether it was the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon in 1798, or the desire for technical innovation in Iran and the Ottoman Empire, or direct colonial encounters. Ultimately this led to Western artists working in the region and to periods of study by Middle
Eastern artists in the art schools of Europe and elsewhere. Here they were exposed to and influenced by different schools of Western art from Renaissance painting to the work of the Impressionists or the Cubists. Back in their own countries, many of these pioneering artists began creating their own artistic identities and creating distinctive schools. However, in some places, the price of state patronage was conformity.

Although written within the context of a history of Islam, the term 'Islamic' in relation to the modern art of this region is problematic and one that is increasingly subject to debate. A confusing and misleading enough term when dealing with the art of the pre modern era, it has been traditionally used to describe the material and artistic output of the vast region from Spain to the Malay world where Islam has been the dominant religion and has influenced political culture. The modern art scene, however, is hugely diverse and displays a multiplicity of themes, only some of which can be clearly linked to aspects of Islam. In this writer's view, to talk of 'Islamic' art now implies art that is, in the eyes of its creators and its public, tied unequivocally to the religion of Islam in its content and expression.

National movements

Ottoman Empire and Turkey

The modern art of Turkey went through a number of phases each strongly influenced by different Western art movements. In the Ottoman Empire, while there had been visits as early as the fifteenth century by Italian artists such as Gentile Bellini (d. 1507) to the Ottoman court, these were isolated events, however, without long term effect. The true beginnings of the modern movement can be observed within the framework of the Westernising reforms, known as the Tanzimat, introduced during the nineteenth century. With their focus on innovation, they were intended to bring the Ottoman

Empire more consciously in contact with Europe, especially France. Relevant in the context of art, lithography had been introduced during the 1830s; photography the following decades. Some of the earliest photographs dating to the 1850s are landscapes, individual historic buildings and images of the Crimean War 1853. Also in a military context was the teaching of topographical drawing and oil painting. Although presented in a different medium, the oil paintings can be seen as an extension of the paintings of landscapes which appear in architectural contexts in the eighteenth century with themes which echo floral tilework and by the end of the nineteenth century, feature garden pavilions and seaside palaces. Only by the end of the nineteenth century do they include figural representations. Painting and drawing were offered as part of the curriculum of the Imperial Land Engineering School (Mühendishane yi Berri yi Hümayun), founded in 1793, and later at the School of Military Sciences (Mekteb i Ulum i Harbiye yi Şahane) which opened in 1834. A number of 'soldier painters' and naval officers from these academies were sent to train abroad and there are notable and talented figures among them. The visit of Sultan 'Abdülabit (r. 1861-76) to Europe in 1867 was also influential in terms of art: his acquisition of Orientalist paintings which he exhibited in Dolmabahçe Palace in 1874 was an important moment and introduced the Ottoman public to this genre of painting. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, key painters studied in Paris within the Orientalist tradition. It is striking, however, that this interest in Western painting was not limited to the elite but secondary schools, too, began teaching Western style drawing. An influential figure at this point was Osman Hamdi (1842-1910), archaeologist and founder of the Istanbul Fine Arts Academy (Sanayi yi Nefise Mektebi) in 1883 which was modelled on the École des Beaux Arts in Paris. It taught both painting and sculpture, with many of the teachers being Europeans. Hamdi was a remarkable painter
within the Orientalist school of painting. His representations of the detail of Ottoman mosques and home interiors as well as his portraits he was the first Turkish artist to represent the human form easily rival the works of his teacher Jean Leon Gérôme (d. 1904) or Frederick Lewis (d. 1876). Where he differed from them, however, was that he was strongly rooted in the Ottoman cultural tradition, and ‘unlike European Orientalists he avoided creating an imaginary and mysterious eastern world’.11 Women were not excluded from the art movement: a Fine Arts School for Girls (İnas Sanayi Yi Neşesi) was opened in 1914 under a dynamic director and the first prominent female artist, Mihri Müşfik Hanım (d. 1954).

A key and influential Turkish artist of the first decades of the twentieth century was İbrahim Čallı (d. 1960). His career is interesting as it spans the Ottoman involvement in the First World War, the subsequent wars of independence and the creation of the modern state. In 1910 he won a prize from the Fine Arts Academy and was sent to Paris to study under Fernand Cormon (d. 1924). On his return to Istanbul in 1914, he re entered the Academy as a teacher the first Turkish artist to be appointed to the Academy, and where he taught for thirty years introducing French painting styles of the early twentieth century Impressionism particularly.

During the First World War, art was turned to the service of the state. The Ministry of War created a workshop filled with military equipment in order that artists in staging their scenes could accurately depict the Ottoman war effort. Čallı was one of these artists and particularly evocative is his Night ambush painted in about 1916 and now in the Istanbul Military Museum (Askeri Müzesi).12 In terms of Čallı’s subject matter, many of his non war pictures are strongly French in character, but by the 1930s some unequivocally Turkish themes such as Mevlevi dervishes had started to appear in his work.13

One of the most significant art movements of the early decades of the twentieth century was the association of artists known as ‘Group D’ which was formed in 1923. The mission of these artists was to continue to bring to the Republic of Turkey knowledge of the European art movements of the 1920s and 1930s, such as Cubism or Constructivism, and to apply these new artistic principles to their own work. However, by the 1930s, criticism that the themes espoused by Turkish artists were inappropriate to the new ideologies of the Turkish state had begun to appear: ‘The people are not interested in

13 Ibid., p. 155.
Montmartre or the Moulin Rouge, landscape painters should show us how they view our own country’s beauty through the artist’s eye’ wrote the Turkish Aksam newspaper in 1931. This was associated with the attempts of the Turkish president Kemal Atatürk (pres. 1923–38) to awaken the Turks to their own cultural heritage and the appreciation of art more generally.

In 1938, ten painters were sent to different Turkish provinces in order to change their repertoire so that they would be ‘enriched with more honest, natural and realistic subject matter’. The search for an ‘identity’ for the depiction of ‘Turkishness’ had begun. As Çalli had started to focus on traditional Turkish themes such as Mevlevi dervishes, so too did other ‘Group D’ artists, notably their principal ideologue and founding member Nurallah Berk (1906–82). Berk was a painter, writer and critic and had studied in Paris in the 1920s. He was strongly influenced by Cubism and skilfully applied the style to Turkish subjects such as water sellers, potters and traditional family scenes.

In the 1950s he began to take an interest in Turco Islamic design and with that Arabic calligraphy. This interest in the Islamic heritage is a theme that emerges in the artistic movements of other countries and will be discussed further below. It should be noted at this point that the inclusion of traditional ‘Islamic’ elements such as Arabic calligraphy or the focus on traditional ‘Islamic’ themes in the art of modern Turkey is relatively rare when compared to contemporary Iranian or Egyptian art that will be considered below. This is a direct reflection of both the secular status of Turkey as well as abandonment of the Arabic script for general use in 1928 by Kemal Atatürk. One of the few modernist abstract artists to return to ‘Islamic’ themes was Erol Akyavas (d. 1999). Having studied during the 1950s in France with Fernand Léger and André Lhote in Paris and in America with Mies van der Rohe, in 1987, he created his series Mi’rajname, a set of eight prints inspired by the mythical night journey of the Prophet Muḥammad (Illustration 24.1).

Iran

As with Turkey, the beginnings of the modern art movement of Iran in the nineteenth century is strongly rooted within the context of the interest in Western technologies such as photography which was introduced to Iran during the 1840s. The first Iranian photographer was the Qajar ruler of Iran, Nāṣir al Dīn Shāh (r. 1848–96), who was trained by the Frenchman Jules

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14 Ibid., p. 181.
15 Ibid., p. 204.
16 Ibid., pp. 199–204.
In terms of art, there were two significant figures: Abu'l-Ḥasan Ghaffārī (d. 1866) and his nephew Kamāl al-Mulk Ghaffārī (d. 1940).

Abu'l-Ḥasan Ghaffārī was court artist to Muḥammad Shāh (r. 1834-48). In 1845 he went to Italy where he studied intensively for five years the styles and

techniques of the Italian masters and also learnt about lithography. He is known for his remarkable and realistic portraits of the Qajar elite and for his involvement with the Dār al Funūn (Technical College) which opened in 1851. Initially established to train civil servants, it soon began to teach painting, lithography and photography. Painting classes were taught according to the precepts of European academies such as the École des Beaux Arts in Paris. Significantly, painting was now conceived of as an ‘academic discipline rather than handicraft’ and, as suggested by Maryam Ekhtiyar, ‘By replicating European paintings, Iranian artists of this period were not only experimenting with styles, methods and approaches, but were in essence striving to come to terms with their ambiguous relationship with Europe and to redefine themselves within that global context.’ The once glorious arts of miniature painting with their traditional methods of production were now consigned to the status of quaint revivalism. The new emphasis on the study of Italian and Dutch masters such as Raphael, Titian and Rembrandt was continued by Abu’l Hasan’s nephew Kamāl al Mulk. In 1911 he opened in Tehran the Academy of Fine Arts (Dānesh kada honar haye zibā) which was dedicated to the teaching of Western style painting and where the students could show their work to the general public.

Kamāl al Mulk’s rigid style of academic realism continued to pervade until the 1940s. A highly influential figure emerged at this point, Jalil Ziapour (d. 1999), a staunch adherent of Cubism which he had studied with André Lhote in Paris. Promoting European modernist ideas Ziapour set up the Fighting Rooster Society (Khurūs i jangī) in 1949, and another member of this group, Mahmoud Javadipour, opened the first art gallery in Tehran, the Apadana. It has been convincingly argued that the espousal by Iranian artists of a style such as Cubism should not be seen as mere emulation. Cubism began to be developed in 1908 by artists Georges Braque (d. 1963) and Pablo Picasso (d. 1973). Although by about 1920 it had run its course as a movement, the principles that governed it were to be extremely influential on twentieth century art more broadly. In the late 1940s Cubism was undergoing a revival which has been regarded as part of an effort to counter the humiliations of the

Second World War by attempting to reconnect French culture with the high period of the pre-war years. Ziapour, who was in Paris between 1946 and 1948, was attracted to this phase of Cubism because it was ‘tinged with nationalism, and to appropriate it and make it Iranian was a logical proposition’.\(^{23}\) His own Iranian version of Cubism in which his subject matter was inspired by his research into tribal practices and costumes became therefore ‘local in content, Western in form’.\(^{24}\)

Marcos Gregorian (b. 1925) was another influential figure: trained in Rome at the Accademia di Belle Arti he opened the Gallerie Esthétique in 1954 and in 1958 organised the first Tehran Bienniale. It was also Gregorian who first took an interest in ‘coffee house’ painting. This type of folk art had as its theme the battle of Karbalā` in 680 and the martyrdom of Imām Ḥusayn. The tragic events commemorated annually in the month of Muḥarram in the form of plays often used paintings to recount the stages of the story. Large portable paintings known as *shamayel* or *pardeh* were particular popular for this as they could be rolled up and transported and gave their name to this genre.\(^{25}\) After the fall of the shah in 1979, they became the model for showing Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the story of the Iranian revolution.\(^{26}\)

During the 1960s debates about the meaning of modernism as it affected Iranian art began to take place. They can be seen against the backdrop of the tensions created in Iran by the wish to modernise without denying or destroying tradition, a process begun by Reza Shāh Pahlavi (r. 1926–41) and continued with greater force by Muḥammad Reza Shāh (r. 1941–79). In 1962, the influential writer Jalāl Alī Ahmad (d. 1965) compared the obsession with the West to a disease, a condition he called ‘gharbzadegi’.\(^{27}\) The increasingly abstract tendency, one of the main features of the contemporary art of this era, was to irritate critics such as Cyrus Zoka most profoundly. Writing in the journal *Sokhan* about the third Tehran Bienniale in 1962, he ‘called for a visual language that would speak specifically to Iranians’,\(^{28}\) echoing the sentiments expressed about modern Turkish art thirty years earlier (referred to above). The result

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24 Ibid., p. 47.
28 Ibid., p. 67.
was ‘Saqqakhaneh’ (Saqqākhāneh), a movement which sought to integrate popular symbols of Shi’a culture in art, a ‘spiritual Pop Art’ as it was also described.29 One of its prime exponents was Hossein Zenderoudi (b. 1937), a student of Gregorian. Strongly influenced by the Shi‘i themes present in the coffee house paintings that Gregorian had collected and by the talismanic shirts he saw in the National Museum, Tehran (Muze yī Irān Bāstān, now known as Muze yī Melli i Iran), his characteristic work of the 1960s, while very ‘modern’, included symbols like the hand (Illustration 24.2) which in popular Iranian culture symbolises the hand of ‘Abbās, the half-brother of Imām Ḥusayn slain at Karbalā’, protective magic squares which for centuries had been featured on amulets, medicinal bowls, the talismanic shirts worn in battle and Arabic calligraphy in the typically Persian scripts of nastālīq and shikasteh. In other works he draws on Iran’s pre-Islamic past for example the lion as it appears in the Achaemenid palace of Persepolis. This work and that of other artists such as Parviz Tanavoli (b. 1937), well known for his remarkable bronzes and the now iconic Heech—a series of sculptures based on the Persian word for nothing (heech),30 Siyah Armajani (b. 1939) for his calligraphic abstractions on paper or Faramarz Pilaram (d. 1983) with his abstract representations of the mosques of Isfahan, all found great favour. An important patron was Farah Diba, the empress of Iran at this time, who was equally instrumental in building up a collection of the works of contemporary European artists.31 A highly significant exhibition held in America in 1962 opened up the debate about the nature of Iranian contemporary art and prompted Abby Grey to begin forming one of the earliest collections of Middle Eastern art to be assembled in the West. Now containing about two hundred works, it is housed in the Grey Art Gallery in New York. These works in essence were, as Ziapour had described his own work during the 1940s, ‘local in content, Western in form’.32

Egypt

In Egypt, the artistic interaction with the West began with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798; for the expedition included painters along with scientists and

archaeologists and a number of these ‘Orientalist’ painters remained in Egypt and undoubtedly played a role in the beginnings of the Egyptian modern art movement. It was under British occupation that the first art school, the School of Fine Arts (Madrasat al Funūn al Jamīla), sponsored by Prince Yūṣuf Kamal (Yūṣuf Kamāl), was opened in Cairo in 1908 in the context of a move by a group of intellectuals, foremost among whom was Mustafa Kamil Basha (Muṣṭafā Kāmil Bāshā), ‘unanimously dedicated to the peaceful achievement of Egyptian independence through education’.33 Opposition to the idea came from traditionalists who were eventually won over by the pronouncement in favour of art and in particular the permissibility of representing the human image by Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), religious reformer and grand muftī of Egypt. As a result of this important pronouncement (the implications of which are discussed further below), Prince Kamal’s art school, which took in students free of charge, was responsible for the training of what have become known as the ‘First generation’ of Egyptian artists. These included the brilliant sculptor Maḥmūd Mukhtar (d. 1934).34

Beginning his training at the School of Fine Arts, Mukhtar was sent on a scholarship to the École des Beaux Arts in Paris. There he achieved considerable renown exhibiting regularly at the Salon des Artistes, while in Egypt he acquired the status of nationalist hero. One of his most important works was the monumental Egyptian awakening (Nahdat Maṣr) (Illustration 24.3) in which a sphinx is rising, and a woman, her hand on its head, lifts her veil, and which stands at the gate to the University of Cairo. Deliberately evoking the glories of the Pharaonic past (he also included hieroglyphs in his sculptures) and touching the burgeoning sentiments of national awareness that were gathering momentum in the early 1920s it was received with great acclaim. Mukhtar’s work belongs to a phase of Egyptian art described as neo Pharaonism which was nationalist in aspiration. He was also part of an interesting society known as ‘La Chimère’ founded 1927. Another important artist in this group was Muḥammad Naji (d. 1956) whose studies of Egyptian tomb art and Coptic painting were greatly to influence his work.35

Another significant artist at this time was Habib Gorgi (d. 1965). Founder in 1928 of the Society of Artistic Propaganda which aimed to purify Egyptian art of ‘foreign’ influences, he also believed strongly in spreading the appreciation of art more widely. One of his lasting achievements was the establishment of a

33 L. Karnouk, Modern Egyptian art: The emergence of a national style (Cairo, 1988), p. 4.
34 Ibid., pp. 11 18.
school for the children of fellahin (peasant) families which was later to be expanded by his son in law Ramses Wissa Wasef (d. 1974) and which now produces the remarkable Harania woven tapestries in the ancient Egyptian tradition.  

A group of artists, active from the mid 1930s and independent of the School of Fine Arts which they considered reactionary and too academic, reflected or reacted to ideologies prevailing in Egypt at this time. These ideologies included the nationalist ‘Young Egypt’ movement, fascist in inspiration; the

36 Egyptian landscapes: Fifty years of tapestry weaving at the Ramses Wissa Wasef Art Centre (Oxford, 1985).
growing communist tendency and the Muslim Brotherhood. An important group, the ‘Art and Freedom’ movement led by Georges Hinayn, produced a manifesto ‘Long live low art’ which, in reaction to fascism, ‘stressed the individual imagination as the greatest revolutionary force, the artist’s political asset which he ought to express freely and creatively’. A number of the artists of this generation who included the painter and writer Ramsis Yunan (d. 1966) and Fuad Kamil (d. 1973) deliberately abandoned figural representation and moved instead towards Surrealism and then Abstraction. Yunan argued ‘we should not fear innovation, no matter how extreme it may be, for those who fight innovation under the pretext of protecting our national identity reveal the weakness of their faith in its potential for growth’.

As with the rejection in the 1960s of abstraction in Iran, the Egyptian abstract style was also disliked by the establishment and never caught on. The group finally dispersed in 1947.

Another group of artists active in the period immediately preceding the revolution of 1952 have been described as ‘folk realists’. They deliberately drew their inspiration from the folk traditions of rural Egypt. In much the same way that Saqqakhaneh in Iran in the 1960s turned to the Karbalá’ paradigm and its associated popular imagery, the Egyptian ‘folk realists’ used the prophylactic symbols of the hand of Fátima and the Prophet’s winged horse Burāq combined with Pharaonic and Coptic symbolism. One of the most innovative artists in this group was Abd al Hadi al Jazzar (d. 1965). He was particularly fascinated by the popular side of Islam as expressed through the festivals taking place in the quarter of Cairo known as Sayyida Zaynab (named after Imám ‘Ali’s daughter), a part of Cairo where magicians still wrote out spells. Reflecting this influence, his paintings are full of powerful imagery where spirits and strange creatures abound.

A new era of Egyptian art came into being after the revolution in 1952 led by Gamal Abd al Nasser (pres. 1956-70). Culture became centralised with artists directed as never before. The Higher Council for the Arts was created in 1956, and through this body came commissions, grants, competitions, the growth of community cultural centres and the general encouragement of arts and crafts. However, this greater support for the arts also had negative effects for it was not only the organisation of the arts but the subject matter itself that was affected. One of the principal tenets of Nasser’s Philosophy of the revolution was the ethnicity of the Egyptians, their place and role as Muslims, as Arabs and the

37 Karnouk, Modern Egyptian art, p. 30.
38 Ibid., p. 33.
39 Ibid., p. 47.
40 Ibid., pp. 6ff.
place of Egypt within Africa. ‘Can we ignore that there is a continent of Africa in which fate has placed us...can we ignore that there is a Moslem world to which we are tied not only by religious faith but also by the facts of history?’

Pronouncements of this kind were ultimately to lead to a revival of Islamic art. However there were other discussions taking place about national identity which were to become particularly pronounced after the cataclysmic defeat in 1967 by Israel and which was to cause major reevaluation of the direction the Arab world should take. Artists were inevitably affected by this. Buland al Haidari writing on the theme of ‘Arabness’ described artists after 1967 ‘vying with each other in trying to blaze a new trail which would give concrete expression of the longing for Arab unity, and end by giving the Arab world an art of its own’.

However, the question of ‘how can we make our art more Islamic’ was not just being discussed in Cairo but in Baghdad at the first Biennale of Arab contemporary art in 1971 and in Rabat in 1975. The question of using art to define ‘identity’, a theme that has recurred a number of times in this chapter emerges again. It is significant that by the 1970s, the art schools in Egypt were no longer teaching life drawing and paintings of nudes could no longer be exhibited. There was now a great emphasis on geometry and on Arabic calligraphy. Sami Rafei’s Monument to the unknown soldier in Nasr City in Cairo constructed in 1974 is decorated with square Kufic script in a style that had reached its height in Central Asia in the early fifteenth century and that had nothing much to do with Egypt but was undeniably ‘Islamic’.

**Iraq**

If we turn now to Iraq and examine the period from about 1950 to 1970, questions of ‘Arabness’, the search for identity and the deliberate use of the Arabic script are highly significant here. As with the other schools of art that have been discussed so far, the pioneers of the Iraqi school are those who studied abroad on government scholarships during the 1920s and 1930s and absorbed Western painting styles and techniques. The most prominent was Faik Hasan (d. 1987), a graduate of the Académie Nationale des Beaux Arts in Paris in 1938 and founder of the painting department at the Institute of Fine

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Arts (Ma‘had al Funūn al Jamīla) what was to become the centre of a vibrant artistic movement. In 1941 the Jam‘iyat ash-diqā‘ al fann was founded by a group of artists and held its first exhibition. (This active art society was to continue presenting the work of Iraqi artists and others until 1974.) The burgeoning movement was unexpectedly given further impetus as a result of the Allied invasion of Iraq in 1941 because the Allied army included Polish soldiers, among whom were artists, two of whom had trained with Pierre Bonnard in Paris.\(^{43}\) Faik Hassan’s work was strongly influenced by these artists for it was only after meeting them ‘that he noticed that the light in Baghdad was not transluscent as he used to think, but full of dust’.\(^{44}\) He strived particularly to use the Pariscian style to paint Iraqi themes.

Art and intellectual life more broadly were actively supported by the state in Iraq. Artists were sent on scholarships abroad and were invited to contribute to international exhibitions. New artistic groupings emerged: in 1950 the Société Primitive (later called al Ruwwād, ‘The Pioneers’) around Faik Hassan; in 1951 the ‘Baghdad group of modern art’ around Jewad Selim; in 1953 ‘The Impressionists’ around Hafidh al Drobi.\(^{45}\) In 1956 the officially sponsored Iraqi Artists Society (Jam‘iyat al fannānīn al tashkīlīyīn) was formed with the architect Muhammad Makiya at its head and with its own exhibition centre. In 1962 (after the revolution of ‘Abd al Karīm Qāsim in 1958) the National Museum of Modern Art (al Mathāf al Fann al Ḥādīth) was founded in Baghdad.

Sculptor and painter Jewad Selim (d. 1961) emerges as one of the remarkable figures of his generation. Not only was he an outstanding artist but his approach to his Iraqi heritage, his blend of abstract forms with local symbols, made him hugely influential. As with Saqqakhaneh (Saqqākhāneh) and the Karbalā’ paradigm in Iran, the espousal of icons of the past Pharaonic or local in Egypt Iraqi artists sought out the themes of their ‘Mesopotamian’ pre-Islamic past and incorporated them into their own artistic vocabulary. A particular and highly coherent ‘collective vision’ was created, ‘modern [and] peculiarly Iraqi’, with artists working ‘in the name of modernity as


In other words modern art was seen to form a direct continuum with the glories of the past, whether it was the sculptures of the Assyrians or the paintings of the medieval Iraqi painter Yahyā al Wāṣītī. Selim’s philosophy is exemplified in the Baghdad group’s manifesto written by Shakir Hassan al Said in 1952. ‘Today we will announce the birth of a new school of painting that will take its origins from the civilisation of the current epoch, with the styles and tendencies it has produced in plastic arts, and from the exceptional character of Oriental civilisation.’ ‘The modern art group of Baghdad consists of painters and sculptors each of whom have their own distinctive style but they have all determined to be inspired by their Iraqi heritage in order to develop these styles.’

What these artists wanted was ‘to represent peoples’ lives in a new way, defined by their understanding and observation of this country in which so many civilisations have flourished and disappeared and then flowered again’. Selim, before going to the Slade School of Art in the 1940s, spent time in the Baghdad Museum studying ancient Mesopotamian sculptures — this he continued in London where he was a frequent visitor to the British Museum. For Dia al Azzawi as well, study in the Baghdad Museum was an integral element of his formation. But for him ‘the Assyrian, Islamic, Arab and modern elements in a canvas should be indistinguishable or simply felt and appreciated as a single entity’.

After his return from the Slade, Selim founded the Department of Sculpture (Qism al Nahít) at the Institute of Fine Arts (Akādimiyat al Funún). In 1952 his sculpture The unknown political prisoner was selected in an international competition, exhibited at the Tate Gallery and won an award.

He is best remembered, however, for the monument Naṣb al ḥuriyya (Illustration 24.4) commissioned in 1959: fourteen reliefs cast in bronze, each averaging eight metres in height, and still standing in Baghdad today. The revolution of 1958 brought in ‘Abd al Karim Qāsim and this monument was created as a symbol and visual narrative of the new republic. Intended to be ‘read’, it consists of a series of scenes, the first of which, starting on the right with a horse which, ‘unlike its placid bronze counterparts of pre 1958 Iraq, is teeming with vitality’ and it ends with a mother weeping over a martyred

48 Jabra, La peinture contemporaine, p. 6.
50 Al Khalil, The monument, p. 84.
an image regarded as a deliberate echo of the Karbalā’ paradigm. A political prisoner breaking out of an iron cage in the centre symbolises the role of the army in the revolution. The reliefs owe much on the one hand to ancient Assyrian and Babylonian reliefs, and on the other, to the techniques of Henry Moore and for the subject matter to Picasso in particular to his 1937 painting *Guernica* which was commissioned by the Spanish republican government after the bombing of the city by the Germans and which has become the embodiment of the inhumanity of war.

**Themes in contemporary art**

We turn now to a number of themes current in contemporary art which include the role of Arabic calligraphy; changing attitudes towards figural representation; how artists reflect issues of gender, religion and politics across the region and finally returning to questions of definition and the term ‘Islamic’ in this regard.

51 This was the only section shown to the government in advance, ibid., p. 84.
Writing and calligraphy

Writing in 1981, the poet and critic Buland al Haidari posed a fascinating question: ‘How well have our modern Arab artists been able to use the rich provisions of the past in meeting the needs of the present?’

One of these ‘rich provisions of the past’ was the weighty inheritance of Arabic calligraphy. Its importance stemmed from the powerful association of the Arabic language with the religion of Islam as the language in which the Qur’an was revealed and the script in which it was subsequently written down. This gave it a significance way beyond the status of a tool of communication. The script styles developed in the early centuries of Islam and the strict sets of rules employed to write them, as well as the high status of the calligrapher, had rendered calligraphy pre eminent among the ‘Islamic’ arts. Bound up also with the ambivalent attitudes towards figural representation explored more fully below, it is something that historically provided and continues to provide a common link across what can be broadly called the ‘Islamic lands’ from Spain in the west as far as the Malay world in the east. In the modern era, there are two clearly identifiable directions in the use of Arabic script: the continuity of the calligraphic tradition on the one hand, and the use of script, calligraphic or simply writing, by artists for a number of different purposes and in a wide variety of styles.

Traditional calligraphy continues to be taught today by master calligraphers (khattāṭūn) such as Üstad Hasan Çelebi. Based in Istanbul and heir to the great schools of Ottoman Turkish calligraphy, he grants diplomas (sing. ijàza) to those who have mastered the complexities of the scripts and has taught a number of calligraphers now prominent in their own right: Muhammad Zakariyya, Nassar Mansour and Fou’ad Kouichi Honda amongst others. There are practising calligraphers who represent other schools, for example, Sudanese calligrapher Osman Waqialla (d. 2007) who was taught by the Egyptian master Sayyid Muhammad Ibrahim and Ghani Alani, a student of the Iraqi calligrapher Hashim al Khattat al Baghdadi (d. 1973).

53 S. Blair, Islamic calligraphy (Edinburgh, 2006).
55 Mohamed Zakariya, Islamic calligrapher (Bellevue, WA, 2006); published in conjunction with the exhibition at Bellevue Arts Museum, 21 September 2006 18 February 2007.
56 The cosmos of Arabic calligraphy: The works of Fu’ad Kouichi Honda (Tokyo, 2006).
57 V. Porter, Word into art: Artists of the modern Middle East (London, 2006); published in conjunction with the exhibition ‘Word into art: Artists of the modern Middle East 18 May to 3 September 2006’ at the British Museum, London; Blair, Islamic calligraphy, p. 597.
During the mid twentieth century, however, an important new phenomenon emerged: the proliferation of Arabic script written non calligraphically and often combined with modern abstract art. Why artists from across the region began using script in this way is intimately linked to questions of regional or religious identities which depend on their country of origin and on the political circumstances within each. In Iraq there were a number of key figures who began using script, each with clearly articulated reasons for doing so. Madiha Omar is generally regarded as the first. Living in Washington she encountered the work of Nabia Abbott, *The rise of the north Arabic script*, and fell
in love with the shapes of the Arabic letters.\textsuperscript{58} Jamil Hammoudi (b. 1924) defined his use of script in terms of his rediscovery of Arab heritage within the context and in contradistinction to European abstract art. He wrote about how it was the fear of getting lost in traditions outside his own experience that led him to cling onto the values which rooted him to his own culture and that there was nothing more sacred to him than the Arabic alphabet.\textsuperscript{59} Both these artists were part of the movement known as ‘One dimension’ (al Bu’d al Wāḥid) founded by Shakir Hassan al Said (Illustration 24.6), a major player in the Iraqi art movement from the 1960s, who, like Jewad Selim, was anxious to create a fusion with his heritage or turaṭh, but specifically by using script. Deeply influenced by the Sufi writings of Ḥusayn ibn Mansūr al Ḥallāj (d. 922), Shakir Hassan described his artistic journey in Sufi terms of the stages that bring one closer to God.\textsuperscript{60} The use of script gave this art a ‘local’ character and, as argued by Sylvia Naef, made it more accessible and familiar in the way that figurative art is familiar in a Western art context. It was also intended as a

\textsuperscript{58} M. Omar, \textit{Arabic calligraphy in art} (Washington, DC, 1946).
rebuttal of accusations that this art represented bourgeois decadence. Members of the group believed that the form provided a direction for Arab abstract art more widely.\textsuperscript{61} It also went deeper the script did not need to be specifically legible, or tied to the rules of Arabic calligraphy. ‘I prefer to write the letter in my paintings in the manner of children and semi intellectuals’, wrote Shakir Hassan.\textsuperscript{62}

The use of Arabic script proliferated across the region. It has come to symbolise, as Karnouk put it ‘the common aspects of existence in the Arab world from marketing design to computer programming extending beyond ancestry or present religions’.\textsuperscript{63} Artists drawing on the enduring literary traditions of the Middle East were creating word pictures out of poetry or delighting in the shape of the Arabic letter. The term \textit{hurufiyya} was coined for it. Referring to the letter (\textit{harf}) as well as to the medieval study of the scientific properties of the letters, the clearest definition for it was given by Charbel Daghir: these are works which ‘deal with the Arabic language, letter or text, as a visual element of composing’.\textsuperscript{64} Particularly important is Lebanese artist and poet Etel Adnan who began working with folding Japanese paper in the 1960s, but it was only after the June war of 1967 that she began to combine her interests as writer and artist by creating ‘livres d’artiste’ in which she wrote out poems in Arabic in her own hand and decorated them. ‘She introduces Arabic writing her handwriting not only as text to be read, visually along “a canvas”.’\textsuperscript{65} Her use of Arabic (because of her upbringing it was not a script she could write fluently) was deliberate and enabled her to express her identity as an Arab, which she particularly sought to do after the 1967 war.

The phenomenon of this use of Arabic script by artists of the Arab Middle East has been considered by a number of scholars, most recently Sheila Blair who, in addition to linking it to the canons of the traditions of Arabic calligraphy, explores new developments not only in ‘art’ calligraphy but in typography and graphic design.\textsuperscript{66} A key question is whether this focus on script can be regarded as a widespread movement or rather, as Afif Bahnas suggested, ‘What unifies the artists is the conviction that Arabic letters whether isolated or

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{61} S. Naef, \textit{A la recherche d’une modernité Arabe} (Geneva, 1996), pp. 272-3.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} L. Karnouk, \textit{Contemporary Egyptian art} (Cairo, 1995), p. 80.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Shabout, \textit{Modern Arab art}, p. 164.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Mechter Atassi, ‘Re inscribing oneself’, p. 93.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} For example, Naef, \textit{L’écriture}; Ali, \textit{Modern Islamic art}, pp. 137ff; Blair, \textit{Islamic calligraphy}, pp. 589-621.
\end{itemize}
forming words constitute a powerful source of inspiration." Word pictures have not only been the domain of Middle Eastern artists but of Western artists Georges Braque, Piet Mondrian and others, including Antoni Tàpies, who was to have a profound effect on Shakir Hassan al Said, and Paul Klee, whose work clearly demonstrates the influence that the Arabic script had on him during his time in Tunisia. However, what is striking in the works of the Middle Eastern artists who use text is not only the varied and imaginative manner in which they use it but also the way in which they employ it to demonstrate their love of literature and their preoccupation with current political events. In addition, a new genre is emerging, books echoing the French tradition of the 'livres d’artiste', pioneered among the Middle Eastern artists by Etel Adnan, which can also be seen as a resurgence of the arts of the book that were once so strong a feature of Islamic art in Iraq, Iran and Central Asia.

Figural representation

While there are increasing numbers of artists from across the Middle East representing the human image, the continued popularity of script in some of the more conservative parts of the region can in certain cases be attributed to the unease that continues to prevail around the issue of figural representation in Islam. It is worth briefly considering how the strictures against representation were handled in such specific cases as, for example, the foundation of the School of Fine Arts in Egypt by Prince Yūsuf Kamal in 1908, and discussions around the permissibility of photography.

As mentioned above, Prince Kamāl needed to secure the approval of a leading cleric in order to be able to open the School of Art and to allow figural painting to take place there. In an article entitled 'Pictures and sculptures and their benefits and justification', the reformist Shaykh Muhammad ‘Abdūh (d. 1905), writing in 1903, went to the heart of the vexed issue about whether it was lawful to have figural representation in Islam.

As for the Prophet’s saying: 'Those who will be most tormented on Judgment Day are the image makers', it seems to be that since it was spoken in the age of idolatry, when images were used for distraction or were attributed with magical powers, the artist was rightfully considered responsible for causing

67 Naef, L’écriture, p. 41.
68 This was the theme of the 2006 exhibition, ‘Word into art’, curated by V. Porter. A revised version with a new catalogue Word into Art: Artists of the Modern Middle East Dubai was shown in Dubai in 2008.
distraction away from or interference preventing the unity of God. Once these obstacles were removed, pictures of human beings become as harmless as those of trees and plants.

He went on to affirm that there was no danger to the religion in the depiction of images and that in fact it was an excellent method of education. His student Muhammad Rashíd Rida (d. 1935) gave specific examples for the permissibility of images from drawings of animals for use in dictionaries to matters of security. He was virulently opposed, however, to sculpture, regarding it, particularly the erection of commemorative sculptures, as ‘servile imitations of Europe’ and thinking that it could lead to idolatry. Yusuf al Qaradawi (b. 1926) while accepting two dimensional figurative art also condemned modern sculpture. The condemnation of sculpture by traditionalists inevitably led to divergent opinions on the display of ancient sculptures in museums whether in Egypt or Saudi Arabia, a debate which still continues today. As regards photography, this was generally considered lawful on the grounds that the process of creating the photographic image is a mechanical process only which, as expressed by Yusuf al Qaradawi, can be likened to an image reflected in a mirror. However, there are divergent views on this as well amongst other clerics in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.

The continued discussions about the lawfulness of figurative representation have inevitably had an effect on whether artists use the image or not, and on the continued popularity of the Arabic letter as art. In terms of the market for art, it is clear, for example, that local collectors in the region, particularly in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, still feel more comfortable with non figurative art. The artists who use the figure, particularly where the images are erotic, such as the Egyptian Ghada Amer whose work was exhibited in the Without boundary show at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, find much greater favour in the West than in their native countries (Illustration 24.7).

The way the choice becomes inextricably linked to politics is exemplified by Wijdan Ali who states that she deliberately abandoned figurative representation and focused on the letter in her Karbalâ’ series as a result of the Gulf War of 1991. Blair wrote of this series: ‘Word and image work together to invoke calamity and destruction, but the word is subservient to the artistic message.’

72 Daftari, Without boundary, plate 26.
73 Ali, Modern Islamic art, p. 163; Blair, Islamic calligraphy, p. 590.
Art, politics and new media

The clear engagement with the troubled modern history of the Middle East is another defining feature of much of the work produced today which is in an increasingly diverse range of media including conceptual art. The exhibition, *Out of Beirut*, at Modern Art Oxford focused on a group of avant garde artists outside the mainstream art establishments and responding to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90) largely through installations, photography and film. Notable among these artists is Walid Raad, whose ‘Atlas group’ through an array of fictional characters dramatically evokes the Civil War (Illustration 24.8).

While Lamia Joreige, in her powerful film, *Here and perhaps elsewhere*, triggers

74 The Atlas Group and Walid Raad, *The truth will be known when the last witness is dead: Documents from the Fakhouri File*, 2 vols. (Cologne, 2004).
24.8 Walid Raad, *Already been in a lake of fire*, 1999–2002, plates 63–4 © The Trustees of the British Museum (digital print 1/3, H: 118.8 W: 203.2 cm)
the process of memory by interviewing the present day inhabitants of the Green Line that divided East and West Beirut and which saw the disappearance of many thousands of its citizens.\footnote{S. Cotter (ed.), \textit{Out of Beirut} (Oxford, 2006); published in conjunction with the exhibition ‘Out of Beirut’ at Modern Art Oxford, 13 May – 16 July 2006, p. 18.}

An interesting paradox emerges here that was highlighted in \textit{Out of Beirut}: ‘Starting in the late 1990s, many of these artists have come to be feted by the international art world to the extent that their work is better known abroad than at home, where local audiences remain largely indifferent, and at times oblivious to or even disdainful of their output.’\footnote{K. Wilson Goldie, ‘Contemporary art practices in post war Lebanon: An introduction’, in S. Cotter (ed.) \textit{Out of Beirut} (Oxford, 2006); published in conjunction with the exhibition ‘Out of Beirut’ at Modern Art Oxford, 13 May – 16 July 2006, p. 85.} The reasons for this still need to be fully explained but some of the reasons for this indifference may be attributed to the fact that conceptual art is now within the mainstream artistic vocabulary of Western art while in the region it is still poorly understood.

The wars of Iraq during the last decades have also resulted in extraordinarily powerful works. Iraqi artist Kareem Risan, using the form of the ‘livre d’artiste’ for example shows his distress at the burning of the libraries following the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003, or the use of depleted uranium in the anti tank shells.\footnote{Porter, \textit{Word into art}, pp. 112 and 115. See also Shabout (ed.), \textit{Dafatir}.} Middle Eastern artists, whether in diaspora or still living in the countries of their birth, offer extraordinary and powerful commentaries on a range of subjects. Part Iraqi, part Irish artist Jannane Al Ani reacts to ‘the orientalist vision of the idle lascivious odalisque exemplified in Ingres’s \textit{Turkish Bath}’.\footnote{Shirin Neshat (London, 2000); published in conjunction with the exhibition at the Kunsthalle, Vienna, 31 March – 4 June 2000, and the Serpentine Gallery, London, 28 July – 3 September 2000.} Iranian artist Shirin Neshat’s remarkable photographic images speak of her reactions to Iran’s revolution and in particular to the changing attitudes to women.\footnote{Daftary, \textit{Without boundary}, plates 25 (Hatoum), 36 7 (Jacir).} A number of Palestinian artists offer commentaries on the problem of Palestine and Palestinian identities. Mona Hatoum with her now iconic \textit{keffiyah} woven using strands of women’s hair; Emily Jacir in her video \textit{Ramallah/New York}; Khalil Rabah with his \textit{Dictionary work} in which the definition of the word Philistine is left blank, the dictionary page otherwise covered with twisted nails (Illustration 24.9).\footnote{G. Ankori, \textit{Palestinian art} (London, 2006), p. 81.} Other stories are told by Israeli
Arab artists, ‘green line Arabs’ as they are sometimes described, a non homogeneous group of artists whose work reflect the complexities of being an Arab in Israel.  

Conclusion

The art of the modern Middle East speaks in a range of distinctive voices; this chapter has touched on only a small selection of these. In the countries discussed above, and through some of the themes that have been highlighted, we have hoped to show that what seemed to have begun initially as a series of movements strongly influenced by Western traditions, now exists in extremely diverse and individualised forms. It would be misleading to regard this material as a single entity or indeed to describe it as ‘modern Islamic’ because the works exhibit a multiplicity of themes, Islam being only one of

82 Ibid., p. 176.
many. Some artists continue to espouse traditions such as calligraphy but seek ever more inventive ways to create it. Many artists through the media of installation or film create art that increasingly comments on or reflects the current turmoil in which the Middle East finds itself. There are also many artists of Middle Eastern origin now in diaspora, and they too offer different but no less powerful perspectives.
Markets for cinema and television in the Muslim world are fragmented linguistically, historically and geographically, hence a meaningful treatment of the entire Muslim world is impossible here. The scale of production is vast. Film industries in several Muslim countries have produced thousands of titles since the 1920s. Television production takes place on a larger and equally disconnected scale. The Arabic speaking world itself has not been a market or unit of content production for audiovisual materials during most of the past century. It is really only since the 1990s that a semi coherent market for Arabic language audiovisual content has taken shape through the medium of satellite television broadcasting, which increasingly converges with the internet.

Cinema

Arabic language films are of three types: co productions financed by European film and television companies, films financed and produced by states and commercial films. The categories are not mutually exclusive. ‘Arab cinema’ is a category of film festivals in Europe and the United States, and of publishing. But there has never been a common market or consistent cultural forum in which films from all Arab nations circulate. Co productions are linked by common European sources of funding, but Arab ‘national cinemas’ have no more to do with each other than do the national cinemas of the United States, Australia and Britain.

1 Alia Arasoughly, Screens of life: Critical film writing from the Arab world (Quebec, 1996); Ibrâhîm ‘Arîs, Rîhla fî al-sînîmâ al’Arabiyya wa dirâsât ukhrah (Beirut, 1979); Khémaïs Khayati, Cinémas arabes: Topographie d’une image éclatée (Paris, 1996); Lizbeth Malkmus and Roy Armes, Arab and African film making (London, 1991); Georges Sadoul (ed.), The cinema in the Arab countries (Beirut, 1966); Viola Shafik, Arab cinema: History and cultural identity (Cairo, 1998).
As of 2001 Egypt had produced roughly 3,071 long fiction films compared to 698 films in the rest of the Arab world. Raw numbers understate the dominance of Egyptian films. Only Egypt developed a widely accessible film industry over the long term. Most Arabs have never seen a non Egyptian Arabic language film, whereas in the urban Arab Middle East many people are familiar enough with Egyptian cinema to name at least a few actors and films.

Co-production films

The majority of non Egyptian Arabic language films have been transnational co productions involving European film or television production companies outside the circuits of major media producers. This mode of production has been described as ‘interstitial’. The major source of funding, particularly for Francophone directors, has been the French cultural programmes Fonds Sud and l’Agence de la Coopération culturelle et technique. Tunisia and Morocco have been the largest players in Arab co production cinema. Other sources of funding include Channel Four in the United Kingdom, Canal Plus Horizons in France and ARTE in France and Germany. Some films from the Maghreb also receive public sector and private (domestic) funding. Algerian, Egyptian, Lebanese and Palestinian directors have also made co productions. European funding guarantees circulation in Western film festivals. Co productions also feature in Arab world film festivals, but access to such events is limited. Major Arab film festivals are few, and their duration short. Ticket prices are often high. The best established Arab film festivals are the Cairo International Film Festival, which began in 1976, and the Carthage Film Festival, which occurs every other year and began in 1966. Since 2004 the Dubai Film Festival has also become a major presence in Arab film festivals. None of these events are specifically for Arab films. Audiences are often more interested in attending non Arab films, which are shown uncensored only in festivals. A number of smaller and more

2 Numbers are extrapolated from Mahmūd Qāsim, Dalīḏ al aqlām fi al qarn al ‘ishrīn fi Mīṣr wa al ‘ālīm al ‘Arabī (Cairo, 2002). Non Egyptian films include those from Algeria (128), Bahrain (1), Iraq (99), Jordan (1), Kuwait (2), Lebanon (219), Libya (8), Mauritania (1), Morocco (93), Palestine (8), Sudan (2), Syria (60) and Tunisia (72). Qāsim’s estimates are incomplete and sometimes faulty, but at least give a rough idea of basic numbers.
specialised film, video and television festivals take place in various locations within the Arab world. Aside from film festivals, there are only a few institutions that occasionally show non Egyptian Arab films, such as the Jam‘iyyat al Nuqqād (Critics’ Association) in Cairo, and similar institutions elsewhere in the Arab world. Censorship limits the role of such specialist venues in many Arab countries. For example, Wedeen notes that film clubs existed in every Syria city during the 1970s, and had become a gathering place for critical intellectuals, but were suppressed in the 1980s during a regime crackdown on opposition.  

Outside the film festival circuit, co productions are screened commercially primarily in the country of their directors. Tunisian and Moroccan co productions are said to have had success in their home markets. Dwyer describes Muḥammad Tāzī’s Looking for my wife’s husband as a major hit in Morocco, and mentions that the Moroccan public consistently supports Moroccan films. One hears similar claims made about Tunisian cinema in its home market. Egyptian co productions a small sub set of total Egyptian production usually do poorly at the box office. Most co productions, as well as many foreign films shot on location in Egypt, work through the Misr International Films company, which is co owned and closely associated with the director Youssef Chahine. Many Egyptian co productions avoid casting stars, and hence forfeit a key element of commercial success. Furthermore, critics and local audiences tend to view co productions with suspicion, arguing that to secure foreign funding such films must pander to Western stereotypes of Arabs. Co production filmmakers counter that the economic importance of Gulf Arab audiences makes Egyptian commercial cinema as dependent on foreign funding as co productions. From the 1970s to mid 1990s, any Egyptian film that was not a mega hit at home could only turn a profit by selling video distribution rights to the Gulf. Distributors who catered to such markets financed commercial film production, hence Gulf Arab preferences for stars, censorship of content and taste for genres decisively shaped Egyptian cinema. However, there is no evidence that Gulf consumers favour the harsh restrictions on content imposed by some governments (particularly Saudi Arabia). Arab tourists in Cairo and Beirut easily bypass their nations’ censorship laws,
and are an important segment of the market. Films broadcast on satellite television further erode government control over what citizens watch.

Co productions sit astride complex social, economic and artistic faultlines. Western film festivals and art house theatres are indispensable venues for co productions. Consequently co productions implicitly represent national or Arab identity to Western audiences. Expatriate Arab audiences at Western film festivals also demand that Arab filmmakers present their cultures in ‘the best possible light’ often a construct viewed through a double lens of nostalgia and concern for the distorted image of Arabs in Western media.10 Consequently, works intended as criticism of filmmakers’ own societies are often denounced by expatriate audiences for ‘airing dirty laundry’.

However, the social position of co production filmmakers mirrors the interstitial nature of their funding; they do not necessarily want to be the representatives of any nation. Liminality is a crucial component of co production filmmaking. Many Arab filmmakers involved in co productions can be described as ‘accented’: ‘“situated but universal” figures who work in the interstices of social formations and cinematic practices … [who] exist in a state of tension and dissonance with both their original and their current homes’.11 ‘Accented’ filmmakers are often ‘exiles’ who have relocated to Western metropolitan locations and do not intend to return (in some cases cannot return) to their countries of origin.12 Many Arab co production filmmakers are rather cosmopolitans who regularly move back and forth between their countries of origin and Western cities. Nonetheless they work through the same institutional channels as ‘accented filmmakers’, and share particularly the characteristic of liminality with respect to the Arab world and Western societies.

Co productions address diverse themes, including gender issues, nationalism, conflict, religion and politics among others.13 All are topics dealt with in

11 Naficy, Accented cinema, p. 11.
12 Ibid., p. 12.
commercial and state produced films, hence it can be said that co production films are distinguished from commercial and state produced films more by style and intended audience than by theme. Style and audience considerations are in turn inseparable from a transnational mode of production. Co productions tend to be *auteur* productions; they are less likely to be straightforward linear narratives, and more likely to use experimental techniques; they are less likely to adopt political positions considered normative within both Arab and Western societies. They reflect a largely secular world view, though it should be said that they share this characteristic with all feature length fiction film directors in the Arabic speaking world.

State-produced films

Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco

Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia have all engaged in public sector filmmaking. In the Maghreb countries public sector production often combines with foreign (mainly French) financing. In Algeria the government controlled production, distribution and exhibition, mainly through the Office National du Commerce et de l’Industrie Cinématographique (ONCIC). Co productions involving French partners were produced in small numbers during the 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s Algeria made around thirty films per decade, focusing initially on the national liberation struggle, and later on revolutionary themes such as land reform. Most Algerian films were consciously didactic and characterised by an overbearing social realism. Films made on the margins of the system were sometimes more subtle. In particular, Merzak Allouache’s *Umar Gatlato* challenged normative views of masculinity and the hegemony of the national liberation narrative. The title means literally ‘Umar he killed him/her’ the protagonist’s nickname. The film explains (tongue in cheek) that it is his masculinity that has such strength as to kill anyone who comes near. *Bāb al Wād al Hūm* (Bab al Oued City), by the same director, examined the emerging social and political strife between the state and Islamists that would plague Algeria in the 1990s. Armes notes several other Algerian public sector films that transcended

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14 Naïcy (*Accented cinema*, pp. 289–92) provides an extensive list of stylistic features of ‘accented cinema’, most of which are relevant to Arabic language co production films.
the didactic and state centred tenor of typical productions.18 Algerian public sector filmmaking did not outlive the political troubles of the 1990s, and was privatised in 1993. The shift to private production coupled with an inexorable rise in political violence reduced Algerian production to a trickle. Since the mid 1990s only a handful of co production films have been made by Algerian directors.

The Moroccan public sector was a continuation of a colonial office called the Centre Cinématographique Marocain (CCM) that was established in the 1940s. After independence the CCM was part of the Ministry of Information and Interior rather than the Ministry of Culture (as had been the case in Algeria). The state left film importation, distribution and exhibition in the hands of the private sector, leading, according to Armes, to an ‘inevitable’ bias toward foreign films.19 There is, however, no obvious reason why this should be so. The local market tends to support Moroccan films.20 Possibly organisational flaws in the Moroccan film industry were the main factor holding back film production. If Dwyer is correct that the local market patronises Moroccan films, then possibly not enough films are being produced. A similar situation pertained in Egypt during the 1930s to the 1950s.21 In more recent times protectionist policies of Arab states may hinder the competitiveness of their own industries. Muhammad Tazi’s experiences with chaotic and poorly policed distribution systems are instructive.22 The CCM funded three films in the late 1960s, and was then inactive through most of the 1970s. In the 1980s a new funding system led to a relatively high level of production, which lasted through the 1990s.23 Many Moroccan films made since the late 1980s have received both state subsidies and foreign support. Morocco now has the strongest public sector in the Maghreb, and is least dependent on co production financing.

In Tunisia the Société Anonyme Tunisienne de Production et d’Expansion Cinématographique (SATPEC) was responsible for importation, distribution and exhibition. SATPEC established a film production facility at Gammarth, but its policies were inconsistent and sometimes overly ambitious, resulting in bankruptcy and eventual sale to Canal Horizon in 1994. Since the mid 1980s

19 Ibid., p. 439.
20 Dwyer, Beyond Casablanca, p. 364.
22 Dwyer, Beyond Casablanca, pp. 26, 211 42.
Tunisia subsidised film through a tax on box office receipts.\textsuperscript{24} The subsidy, together with co-production partners, enabled Tunisia to produce thirty-four films between 1986 and 1998.\textsuperscript{25} Tunisian cinema of the past few years has been notable for its feminist orientation.\textsuperscript{26} Undoubtedly the best received Tunisian film of recent years, perhaps of all time, is \textit{Šamt al Qusīr} (Silences of the Palace).\textsuperscript{27} Not all feminist Tunisian films have been made by women. \textit{Bent Familia} (Girls from a good family) by Nouri Bouzid, and Ferid Boughedir’s \textit{Šayf Ḥalq al Wādī} (Summer in La Goulette) and \textit{‘Uṣfūr al Sath} (Halfaouine) can be seen in the same light.\textsuperscript{28} Feminist cinema is a productive niche for Tunisian films, as it appeals both to the national market and to international audiences.

\section*{Syria}

The forte of Syrian cinema is politics, surprisingly given the stern censorship to which Syrian films are subjected. Of some sixty films made between 1928 and 1999, over fifty have been produced by Al Mu’assasa al ‘Āmma lil Sinimā (The Public Organization for Cinema), founded in 1963.\textsuperscript{29} In recent decades Syria has produced no more than one or two films per year, some of which are screened only abroad. Syrian cinema in its current configuration seems sure to achieve critical success, but never a critical mass that could increase its presence in the local or pan Arab market.

Syrian films are greatly respected at international film festivals and, among the limited audiences that have access to them, within the Arab world. The best received Syrian films have been \textit{auteur} productions well received by critics.\textsuperscript{30} This is perhaps a function of the productivity of censorship, in which the necessity to express politics indirectly fortuitously coincides with an artistic imperative to express meaning artfully rather than straightforwardly.\textsuperscript{31}

\begin{itemize}
\item[27] Moufida Tlatli, \textit{Šamt al Qusīr} (Tunis, 1994).
\item[28] Nouri Bouzid, \textit{Bent Familia} (Tunis, 1997); Ferid Boughedir, \textit{Šayf Ḥalq al Wādī} (Tunis, 1995); Ferid Boughedir, \textit{‘Uṣfūr al Sath} (Tunis, 1990).
\item[29] The figure of sixty is extrapolated from Qāsīm (\textit{Dalīl al aflām}, pp. 1067-95). Jān Aliksān (\textit{Al Sinimā fī al waṭan al ‘Arabī} (Kuwait, 1982), p. 118) claims one hundred before 1982, of which he says only seven were private sector productions made before 1963.
\item[31] See Naficy, ‘Cinema in Iran’, p. 170. He and others who imply that censorship can be ‘productive’ by no means favour it.
\end{itemize}
In some cases political criticisms of the authoritarian Syrian regime are fairly clear. *Nujum al Nahar* (Stars of the day),\(^{32}\) for example, is nominally an indirect fictional narrative, but nonetheless a thinly disguised metaphor for political power and for Asad’s cult\(^ {33}\). Other films have dealt with political subjects unrelated to regime criticism, such as the literary adaptation of Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani’s *Men in the sun*, titled in its film version as *Al Makhda‘iun* (The duped),\(^ {34}\) or *Kafr Qasim*,\(^ {35}\) which dramatised a massacre of Palestinians in the village of Kafr Qasim by Israeli soldiers. The regime tolerated some comedies, particularly by Durid Lahham, whose films were among the small number of Syrian productions counted as private sector.\(^ {36}\) Lahham’s *Al Hudud* (The borders)\(^ {37}\) was successful, and even got a fair amount of exposure in commercial theatres outside Syria. The film criticises inter Arab politics through a story about a man caught between passport control points when he loses his papers, ending up stateless.\(^ {38}\)

### Iraq

Iraq produced thirty seven feature films before 1968, when the state initiated public sector filmmaking. Iraqi cinema has been undistinguished. The Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, followed by the first Gulf War in 1991 and a decade of international sanctions suppressed film production. Unsurprisingly many films of the Saddam Hussein era (1979–2003) tended to be propagandistic.\(^ {39}\) *Al Ayyam al tawila* (The long days)\(^ {40}\) made by the Egyptian director Taufiq Shalih at the invitation of the Iraqi regime, is a representative artifact of Saddamist propaganda. It tells the story of a young man (a thinly disguised Saddam) who is wounded while committing the assassination of ‘Abd al Karim Qasim. The film focuses on the toughness of the protagonist as he makes his way through the countryside to the Syrian border.\(^ {41}\) Shalih was an able director. The film struggles to rise a bit above the limitations of his narrative material. *The long days*, however, was no *Triumph of the will* not quite good enough even to generate

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33 Wedeen, *Ambiguities*, p. 112.
controversy as beautiful propaganda in an ugly cause. It effectively ended Šālih’s career.

Egypt
Egypt had a large and important public sector during the 1960s. Its history, however, is best told as part of the larger history of Egyptian cinema (see below).

Training
Aside from a few private initiatives to establish film training schools, the creation of training facilities has been largely in the hands of states. There have been abortive initiatives to establish training facilities in the Maghreb, Syria and Iraq. Lebanon offers some training at the private Université Saint Joseph in Beirut. Aside from Egypt, which did establish a viable film school, most Arab filmmakers were educated in European or (less commonly) American institutions. During the Cold War Arab countries allied with the East Bloc sent substantial numbers of filmmaking students to Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany. Egypt’s film school, Al Maḥḍad al Ālā lil Sinimā (The Supreme Institute of Cinema), was founded in 1959. Since its establishment most Egyptian filmmakers have graduated from it, though it was really from the 1970s on that substantial numbers of graduates began to make their presence felt at the directorial level.

Commercial cinema
Egyptian commercial films have long been a de facto ‘Arab cinema’ in the sense that its films circulate widely. Before the 1960s or 1970s (depending on the country) efforts were made to produce films privately in a number of countries. The expansion of public sectors after independence largely supplanted these halting initiatives. Egypt was not immune to this trend, particularly during the 1960s. Aside from Egypt, only Lebanon had modest success in creating a commercial film industry. The efflorescence of Lebanese commercial production occurred when the Egyptian public sector was at its peak. Of 219 Lebanese films made before 2000, 81 were made between 1963 and 1971, when the Egyptian state took control of studios, finance, exhibition and distribution. It was still possible to produce privately financed films in

42 Viola Shafik, *Egyptian cinema: Gender, class, and nation* (Cairo, 2007), pp. 37 8.
44 Numbers extrapolated from Qāsim, *Dalīl al aflām*, p. 81.
Egypt, but much of the capital that had previously financed Egyptian cinema nonetheless went to Beirut. So did many filmmakers and actors. Historically there was a great deal of Lebanese and Syrian input into Egyptian media (including publishing as well as audiovisual media) and entertainment industries. Furthermore, Lebanese owned distribution companies had always provided finance for Egyptian films. Once the Egyptian state nationalised distribution it was easy for the distributors/financiers to shift their investment to Lebanon. After reprivatisation of Egyptian cinema in 1971, Lebanese production fell back to its previous level—four to five films per year. The Lebanese Civil War from the mid 1970s to 1990 prevented expansion of the industry. Currently most Lebanese films are co-productions.

**Egyptian cinema**

In the formative years of Egyptian cinema (the early 1930s to mid 1940s) the most important development was the creation by industrialist Ṭaḥāt Ḥarb of Stūdyū Miṣr, a comprehensive studio on Egyptian soil. Ḥarb’s enterprises flourished from roughly 1920, when he founded the Bank of Egypt, to 1939, when he was forced by political rivals to resign as head of the bank. He is remembered for developing the Egyptian economy in the teeth of foreign occupation.45 His companies were seen as proto national institutions.

Stūdyū Miṣr is credited with creating a solid foundation for the Egyptian film industry, because it put the means of production in Egyptian hands.46 The early years of Stūdyū Miṣr are remembered as a kind of golden age. Its first production was the singer Umm Kulthūm’s vehicle Wīdād in 1936 (directed by the German Fritz Kramp, though sometimes attributed to the Egyptian Aḥmad Ḍabakḥan). Stūdyū Miṣr films are thought to have reflected nationalist values. This is particularly true of the film Al ‘Azīma (Determination),47 made in 1939, which tells the story of a young capitalist who wants to make his mark as an independent businessman in the import export business. The protagonist’s


47 Kamāl Šalīm, Al ‘Azīma (Cairo, 1939). For more on Al ‘Azīma, see Walter Armbrust, Mass culture and modernism in Egypt (Cambridge, 1996), in which the film is referred to as Resolution.
aspiration to found productive industries in Egypt mirrored the mythical status of Ṭa’lāt Ḥarb himself. Al ‘Azīma is remembered as the founding text of Egyptian cinematic realism, which, in formal criticism, is credited as a genre, and accorded immense importance. In a referendum by critics and filmmakers of the best one hundred Egyptian films of all time Al ‘Azīma was ranked first.48

Stūdyū Miṣr monopolised the crucial processes of developing and printing film. Consequently Stūdyū Miṣr was able to rent its facilities to other film makers, and even to the British during the Second World War. Once the studio made its facilities available for rent, dependence on European technical expertise lessened. However, Stūdyū Miṣr also reveals much about the chronic difficulties the Egyptian film industry has faced throughout its history. The fundamental problem is that the Egyptian film industry was always undercapitalised. This did not mean that films were unprofitable, but that profits always tended to be fragmented. An apocryphal story claims that by roughly the early 1950s the Egyptian cinema was the second most profitable industry in the country, after cotton. In reality the film industry was chronically cash poor. From the beginning filmmakers sought government inter vention to regulate markets, protect local products from foreign competition and subsidise production.49 Furthermore, Egypt has always been underserved in terms of its exhibition capacity. In the 1990s screen density (the number of movie screens per 1 million of population) in the United States was the highest in the world, at 100 screens per 1 million people. In France and Britain it was 80 and 34 respectively.50 Egypt had 162 theatres in 1992.51 If one assumes a slightly higher 170 screens to account for multiplexes (of which there were few in 1992), then the screen density for Egypt, with a population of 59 million, would be 2.74 screens per million people. This comes as no surprise in comparison to the United States, which was the best screened nation in the world. But in fact Egypt fared poorly even in comparison to ‘less developed’ countries. Egypt reached its peak number of theatres in the 1950s, at 450.52 Its screen density at that time was 19.6 screens per million. For comparison, in the

48 On the politics of memory and nostalgia of Egyptian cinema, see Armbrust, ‘Egyptian cinema on stage’. Details of the referendum appear in Bahjat (ed.), Miṣr.
49 Flibbert, ‘Commerce’; Naṣir Ḥasanayn, Al Abūd al iqtiṣādiyya li azmat sinā‘at al sinimā al Miṣrīyya (Cairo, 1995).
51 Ḥasanayn, Al Abūd, p. 246.
52 Ibid.
1950s, India, with a population of 395 million, had a screen density of 8.1. But screen density in Egypt declined from 19.6 in the 1950s to 2.74 in the 1990s. In India screen density rose from 8.1 in the 1950s to 12 in the 1990s. As under served as Egypt may have been, its screen density nonetheless exceeded most of the Arab world. As a result, not only was the domestic film market relatively anaemic, but exports to other Arab countries had only limited potential for covering costs. Nonetheless, as the costs of filmmaking rose, exporting became a vital part of the business. Hence lack of exhibition capacity was indicative of a general problem in industrial organisation.

Egyptian film industry has been called ‘Hollywood on the Nile’, but it was never organised like Hollywood as a vertically integrated monopoly. Stūdyū Miṣr, the business best positioned to build a monopoly, cut back production in the 1940s and rented its facilities to other filmmakers. The Misr Company for the Theatre and Cinema (the parent company of Stūdyū Miṣr) tried in vain to create a monopoly in post war years through mergers and acquisition of producers and exhibitors. But there was little co ordination between producers and insufficient governmental regulation of the competition. Labour costs were a far higher percentage of production expenses in Egypt than in Hollywood because studios never put actors under fixed, long term contracts. By the mid 1940s demand for Egyptian films was high, and was met by a mélange of investors rather than by vertically integrated studios. Allegedly the money invested in films at this time came from war profiteers. But the main point is that at a time of expanding film markets the major studio of the day competed with minor entrepreneurs on an oddly equal footing. Stūdyū Miṣr, in control of developing and printing facilities, paradoxically fed the competition by allowing its facilities to be rented. Many films were financed by an ever shifting pool of investors, filmed at the smaller studios, but developed and printed by Stūdyū Miṣr. By one count there were 120 production companies active between 1945 and 1952, up from 24 in the previous period. The owners of Stūdyū Miṣr made profit without risk, but also contributed to a fragmentation of capital by accommodating new competitors rather than expanding their own business.

58 Al Sharqāwī, Risāla, pp. 101 2.
One famous Stūdyū Miṣr production from the Second World War, Al Sūq al saudā’ (Black market),59 illustrated the studio’s predicament. As one might guess from the title, the subject of Al Sūq al saudā’ is war profiteering. Spurred by the British war effort, thousands of men came to Cairo from the countryside to work for good wages, even as others were suffering from economic dislocations. The migration of men to the cities, and their relative prosperity, created an opportunity for filmmakers. Competition was muted because of the relative absence of foreign (particularly European) films. Film production leaped from around twelve films per year in 1942 to fifty three per year in 1946, and stayed at about that level until the mid 1990s.

In 1946 Al Sūq al saudā’ depicted war profiteers as social parasites. However, money from war profiteering is alleged to have fuelled the film industry. Scorn heaped on war profiteers in Al Sūq al saudā’ resembles critics’ descriptions of film production from the mid to late 1940s: tasteless and exploitative. Late 1940s cinema was ‘the cinema of war profiteers’. Stūdyū Miṣr saw the writing on the wall. Its chance to dominate the film industry was slipping away as new competitors entered the market. Just as these vulgar (according to the standard narrative) films were entering the theatres, Stūdyū Miṣr produced al Sūq al saudā’, which angrily condemned vulgar war profiteers—the same characters who, it seems, were laundering ill gotten gains by investing in film production that competed directly with Stūdyū Miṣr’s own products. While five new studios were built during the 1940s, Stūdyū Miṣr rented out the parts of the filmmaking process it still monopolised, particularly developing and printing film.

Numbers tell the story. In 1939, when Al ‘Azīma was made, Stūdyū Miṣr produced four films. Total production for 1939 was fifteen films. In 1946, when Al Sūq al saudā’ was released, Stūdyū Miṣr’s production was three films out of fifty two. Thus from 1939 to 1946, Stūdyū Miṣr’s share of the market dropped from 26 per cent to about 6 per cent. But the market wanted more Egyptian films—total production had tripled. New producers entered the business for profit. It is said that Egyptian film production was crippled by the inability of Egyptian producers to wrest screen time from foreign films.60 However, in the mid 1940s, when Egyptian cinema was expanding, the real problem may have been the inability of Egyptian filmmakers to satisfy local demand. If Stūdyū Miṣr had operated in the 1940s like a Hollywood studio, it would have expanded production, built theatres and created its own distribution network.

59 Kasmil al Tilmisanî, Al Sūq al saudā’ (Cairo, 1946).
60 Vitalis, ‘American ambassador’.
Egyptian cinema was best off economically when the local market tilted toward monopoly. But monopoly was not associated with the rise of Stūdyū Mīṣr (when its most highly praised films were produced). Wartime expansion took place when foreign competition was relatively absent and production was still ‘disorganised’ and ‘almost speculative’. Production might have collapsed soon after the war if the Egyptian government had not provided protection for local producers.  

From the late 1950s to the 1960s a more monopolistic market was established, but by nationalising the film industry rather than through less intrusive methods of structuring the market, such as imposing tariffs, instituting cultural policies favouring filmmakers or regulating foreign competition. Crucially the state undermined its own film industry by building a television infrastructure starting in the 1960s without enabling the owners of film archives to rent their product to television stations at market value. By 1969 Egypt had half a million television sets in operation. Rental of films to content hungry television stations allowed Hollywood to profit from the new medium of television. In Egypt television just as hungry for content was state owned and paid low rents. 

During its ascendance, Stūdyū Mīṣr operated in a competitive market in which all facets of the trade were unsynchronised. The studio might have lived up to its later reputation as a foundation for Egyptian film production if it had created a monopoly. Instead, Stūdyū Mīṣr kept production flat, rented its facilities to competitors and left the foreign distribution system in the hands of businessmen who made no films but took most of the profits. In the 1930s and 1940s the economic patterns of Egyptian film production were established. Except for the 1960s, when the cinema was nationalised, variations on these patterns persist. The financial scale of film production in Egypt resembles ‘independent’ production in the United States, except that in Egypt most of the budget goes to the star actors.

The importance accorded to Al Azīma in historiography of Egyptian cinema points to a hierarchy of genres that privileges realism. This is so because realism, in the literary form of the novel, puts diverse elements of a national

63 Putnam, Undeclared, pp. 235 40.
64 Flibbert, ‘Commerce’, 110.
community in temporal synchronicity. Consequently, historical narratives of Egyptian cinema tend to be about the rise and fall of a realist aesthetic. Historical narratives stipulate that the cinema was founded in the early 1930s by entrepreneurs, but that these pioneers worked strictly as individuals and failed to establish an industry controlled by Egyptians. In the 1930s Stūdyū Miṣr created a filmmaking establishment, and a brief golden age prevailed because Stūdyū Miṣr had the resources and aesthetic vision to produce a ‘national’ cinema. Then in the late 1940s Stūdyū Miṣr fell victim to hard times caused by the Second World War, even as its competitors flourished. The success of other studios is attributed to their willingness to pander to vulgarity. Ostensibly, cheap musical and dance films occupied the place once held by more elevated Stūdyū Miṣr productions. By the end of the 1940s the Egyptian cinema had gone through its first rise and fall cycle.

The cinema recovered in the 1950s really from 1952, when the Free Officers come to power. This second ‘golden age’ of Egyptian cinema is closely associated with Gamal ‘Abd al Nasser (pres. 1956–70). Films improved qualitatively, though the quantity remained roughly the same, at about fifty per year. The public narrative of Egyptian cinema emphasises the role of directors such as Salāḥ Abū Sayf and Youssef Chahine in establishing foundations for the realism of later periods, particularly the nationalised cinema of the 1960s. Some 1950s films were inspired by the Free Officer coup. For example, Al Mufattish al ‘āmm (The inspector general), an adaptation of the Gogol story by the same name. In the last ten minutes of the film all problems are neatly resolved when a military coup takes place. Other films indulged in flattery of the new regime. Nasser’s shining moment in the 1956 Suez War initiated a flurry of nationalistic epics, most notably Būr Sa‘īd (Port Said), and Rudd qalbī (Return my heart). By the end of the decade a government office was established to grant film subsidies on a competitive basis. Comedies, musical and dance films and indeed most Hollywood genres were produced in great numbers. The less realist genres particularly musical and dance films tend to maintain the greatest emotional attraction to audiences over the long run.

67 Hilmī Rafla, Al Mufattish al ‘āmm (Cairo, 1956).
68 ‘Izz al Din Dhī al Faqqār, Būr Sa‘īd (Cairo, 1957); ‘Izz al Din Dhī al Faqqār, Rudd qalbī (Cairo, 1957).
69 Amybrust, ‘Egyptian cinema on stage’.
gender archetypes emerged. Film adaptations from literature became a larger part of the script writers’ repertory, most prominently through works of Najib Mahfūẓ. Aside from the well known Mahfūẓ, the adaptation movement was broad, and fed strongly into the critical preference for social realism.

Extensive nationalisation came in 1963, though some earlier films had enjoyed subsidies. Nominally private productions had already received state subsidies: a historical epic set in the court of Khedive Ismā‘īl called Almaz wa ‘Abdūh al Ḥāmūlī, a medieval epic pitting Crusaders against Arabs titled Al Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al Dīn (The victorious Ṣalāḥ al Dīn) which was a political allegory of Nasser’s conflict against Israel, and the film version of Mahfūẓ’s Bayn al qaṣrārayn (Palace walk). Nationalisation of the film industry was part of a broad campaign dating from the late 1950s. Filmmakers themselves had long called for government intervention due to their chronic shortage of capital, which became more acute as Egyptian films competed with foreign (particularly American) films that used new technologies unavailable in Egypt. Private production continued throughout the period the private sector produced 289 films, to the public sector’s 141 but private filmmakers were obliged to use state owned facilities.

The character of public sector production differed considerably under different ministers of culture. ‘Abd al Qādir Hātim (1962 6) is criticised for emphasising quantity at the expense of quality. Tharwat ‘Ukāsha (Hātim’s successor) is credited with having presided over the production of some of the greatest films in Egyptian cinema. Relaxation of censorship after Nasser was discredited in 1967 fed the production of quality films. After the 1967 war the regime relaxed censorship, perhaps to let the traumatised public catch its breath. This period has been dubbed the ‘green light cinema’. Some films from the post 1967 public sector period had been made earlier but not released

71 Samīr Farīd, Najib Mahfūẓ wa al sīnīmā (Cairo, 1990).
72 Mahmūd Qāsim, Al ʿAdab fī al sīnīmā (Cairo, 1998) provides an extensive list of literary works made into Egyptian films.
74 Youssef Chahine, Al Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al Dīn (Cairo, 1965).
75 Hasan al Imām, Bayn al qaṣrārayn (Cairo, 1964).
76 Gordon, Revolutionary melodrama, p. 208.
because of censorship. For example, *Al Mutamarridūn* (The rebels),⁷⁸ was made in 1965, but released in 1968. It was a political allegory in which the inmates of an insane asylum (standing for the Free Officers) take over the institution with disastrous results. Others were completely new productions, such as the highly regarded *Al Mūmiyā‘* (The mummy, made in 1969 but not shown in Egypt until 1975).⁷⁹ Notwithstanding fierce disagreement over the legacy of public sector cinema, it can be said that many see the period as the qualitative pinnacle of Egyptian cinema. Economically, everyone acknowledges that the public sector lost money, but the amount is disputed, as is the question of whether losses were caused by corruption and inefficiency, or by one time expenses incurred by the transition from private to state controlled production.⁸⁰

After Nasser died in 1970 Anwar al Sadat (pres. 1970 ⁸¹) began to re position Egypt vis à vis the West. Although full *infitāḥ* (economic open door policy) came after the October War of 1973, re privatisation of the cinema was an early harbinger of it. As an instance of proto *infitāḥ* the re privatisation of the cinema was instructive in that the rhetoric of free market reform fell short of the reality. Direct government funding of films ended, but the state retained control of the means of production for decades afterward. This mixed system yielded poor results. Many films of the 1970s have a shoddy look and sound. The economic chaos of the industry, a production and exhibition infrastructure worn out by underinvestment during the public sector period and the tremendous impact of the War of Attrition and subsequent October War all plagued the cinema. The peace treaty with Israel in 1978 also resulted in a temporary boycott of Egyptian films by Arab states. By the mid 1970s the situation gave impetus to a new style of filmmaking known as ‘New Realism’. New Realists, several of whom were graduates of the film school established in 1959, used location shooting to dramatically different effect than most previous Egyptian films. The grittiness of their depictions of urban space had few predecessors in Egyptian cinema, and made few concessions to polite

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⁷⁹ Shādī ‘Ābd al Salām, *Al Mūmiyā‘* (Cairo, 1975). *Al Mūmiyā‘* has generated perhaps more academic writing in Egypt than any other single film. See, for example, the journal *Al Qāhira*, 159 (Feb. 1996), which is a special issue on Shādī ‘Ābd al Salām, the director of *Al Mūmiyā‘*. The issue includes the Arabic script for the film. The English language journal *Discourse* (21, 1 (1999), subtitled ‘Middle Eastern films before thy gaze returns to thee’) contains a translation of the script.
sensibilities. One exception is Tharthara fawqa al Nil (Chatter on the Nile), which featured location shots in city streets reminiscent of later New Realist films. It should also be mentioned that the ‘camera in the streets’ aesthetic of Egyptian New Realists was consistent with international cinema trends of the 1970s. New Realists conveyed a sense of positioning the camera literally ‘in the streets’. Dialogue became less theatrical and more naturalistic. Thematically New Realist films reacted both against the infitâh, and against a metanarrative of vibrant middle class national identity that had been prominent in earlier films. New Realism is associated with a group of directors whose work was well received internationally, though often less well at home. The major figures of the new style were Āţif al Tāyyib, Muhammad Khân, Khayrî Bishâra, Bashîr al Dîk and Dâûd ‘Abd al Sayyid. Sa‘îd Marzâq’s 1970s films, such as Al Mudhnibuţ (The guilty) can be considered pioneers in the visual style of New Realism. But their uncom- promising visual style was adopted in commercial films by less acclaimed direc- tors, which did well at the box office. Examples are comedies starring Âdil Imâm from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Imâm was the box office king during this period. His films were rarely considered ‘serious cinema’, but their stylistic debt to New Realism is obvious.

The precarious economics of filmmaking began to catch up with the industry. Since the 1980s video sales had been crucial to film profits, but video cassettes were also extremely vulnerable to piracy. In the 1980s and 1990s selling video rights to the Arab Gulf countries was an imperative for most films, but Gulf audiences, saturated with satellite television by the mid 1990s, began to lose interest in realist Egyptian films. As profits fell so too did production standards. Serious filmmakers complained about ‘contractor films’ cheap productions financed purely for quick (though mostly small) profit. New Realism became an exhausted paradigm. Its commitment to grounding narratives in an urban environment recognisable to mainstream audiences, as well as its capacity to put a spotlight on infitâh driven class contradictions, had begun to feel tawdry. New commercial formulas were developed, some of which were deeply at odds with

81 Husayn Kamāl, Tharthara fawqa al Nil (Cairo, 1971).
82 Armbrust, Mass culture.
83 Sa‘îd Marzâq, Al Mudhnibuţ (Cairo, 1976). For extensive analyses and filmographies of New Realism see Shafîk, Arab cinema; Samîr Fârîd, Al Wâqi‘iya al jadîda fi al šînîma al Miṣrîya (Cairo, 1992).
the style and themes of New Realism. Arguably the most influential visual and thematic archetype of the past decade was *Sahar al layali* (Sleepless nights) from 2003. *Sahar al layali* is a film about marital relations that visually turns New Realism on its head, constructing a de-localised, materially sumptuous fantasy world conjured by liberal economics as normative. There were a number of commercial successes in the cinema of the late 1990s and early 2000s, but by the end of the decade film production dropped precipitously. Many observers of the Egyptian film industry lamented that the scale of production may never recover to the average of fifty or so per year that had been the norm for decades. Qualitatively there is no question that interesting films continue to appear, and it may also be said that feature length fiction films are still the most prestigious form of audiovisual production. But there is little doubt that the most vital audiovisual medium had become television.

**Television**

The next edition of the *Cambridge history of Islam* will undoubtedly have a separate article for Arab television. Both the scale of production and the social embeddedness of television far exceed those of cinema. Indeed, there is no doubt that since the 1960s far more Arab *films* have been viewed on television than in theatres. One implicit rationale for assimilating television to a chapter on cinema is undoubtedly that much academic literature on Arab television focuses on a somewhat analogous narrative form, namely the *musalsal*, or dramatic serial, usually of between fifteen and thirty episodes. But even if *musalsals* have been the most watched programmes over a long period, obviously television cannot be reduced to one type of programme. People watch sports, religious programming, news, musical performances, music videos, documentaries, animated features, game and quiz shows and an enormous variety of other programmes that do not revolve around *fictional* narratives comparable to films. More importantly, the practice of viewing television differs

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85 See Armbrust, ‘Terrorism and kabab’, for an analysis of transition to post New Realism in Egyptian cinema.


vastly from that of viewing films in theatres. Television watching is less event-centred, more discontinuous, often less formal and more equitable in gender terms (in access, if not necessarily always in terms of who controls the programme at a given moment), to name just a few of the differences between film and television as social practices.

Boyd provides a serviceable historical survey of Arab television and radio. He indicates that the most populous Arab states began to acquire production capacity as early as the mid-1950s. Television has therefore been a feature of the Arab world long enough to be treated historically, though little academic literature has done so. Egypt was the dominant content provider for the entire Arabic speaking world during the first three decades of Arab television. Early on Egypt produced a much higher proportion of its own programming than other Arab states and quickly became an exporter to other Arab countries. Early programmes were crudely made and broadcast live, but once the sale of television programmes became a source of national income (by the late 1960s) production standards rose. Programmes were produced without wires and microphones visible (as had been the case in early productions), and many were filmed without live audiences and then edited. Although the cinema is sometimes credited with making Egyptian colloquial Arabic a de facto lingua franca throughout the region, television and radio were undoubtedly far more important in this regard.

Until recently most television broadcasting in the Arab world was controlled by states. Lebanon was the exception. Two private commercial stations were established in the late 1950s in partnership with Western companies, broadcasting almost exclusively Western content and struggling financially until 1970, when a market for televisual material opened up in the Gulf. Civil war, beginning in 1975, interrupted the momentum of private Lebanese television, but the companies managed at least to stay alive. From the mid-1980s unofficial sectarian stations were established. By the end of the war in 1990 forty such stations representing virtually every sectarian group in the country were operating. Most were put out of business after the war, but in 1994 a number were granted licences, including Télé Liban (broadcasting in French),

In 2007 TBS changed its name to *Arab Media and Society*.
89 Boyd, Broadcasting, p. 39.
90 Ibid., pp. 71 2.
LBC International (Maronite Christian), MTV (owned by a Greek Orthodox businessman named Gabrial Murr, cousin of former minister of interior Michel Murr), Future Television (owned by the late prime minister Rafik al Hariri) and NBN (owned by former speaker of the Lebanese House and leader of the Shi‘ī Amal movement Nabih Berri). In 1996 the Lebanese parliament was pressured into granting a sixth licence for Al Manār, the Shi‘ī Ḥizbullāh organisation’s channel.

By contrast, before the onset of satellite broadcasting Egypt operated three main stations. Channel One broadcast locally made Arabic language content; Channel Two broadcast the main foreign language programme (primarily from the United States), and Channel Three broadcast educational content. Variations on the Egyptian pattern were the norm during the pre satellite era.

Satellite television broadcasts began in the early 1990s from a number of different satellites, including Arab owned equipment (Arabsat and Nilesat), as well as European owned satellites. Most content available in the Arab world is broadcast on the Arab owned satellites. As of 2006 Arabsat broadcast 234 channels; Nilesat had 292. On both systems the free to air package (requiring only installation of a dish, with no need to pay fees for access) included an impressive array of channels. Nilesat, for example, carried roughly 150 free channels, including something from almost every Arab country. Regulation of satellite access differs from country to country, but for the most part complete prohibition of satellite access is all but impossible. Saudi Arabia, for example, exercises strict control of terrestrial television broadcast. But Saudi Arabia is also the majority owner of Arabsat and a major market for Arabsat broadcasts.

In other Arab Gulf countries access to satellite broadcasts was merely a matter of contacting a local installer by the mid 1990s. Even in much poorer countries satellite equipment became affordable. By the mid 2000s in Egypt entry level satellite equipment (a dish, a receiver and installation) cost just over $100. The cost of a television was higher, but the country was already awash in televisions; there were some 10 million television sets in Egypt by 1997 about one per every seven Egyptians. In the mid 2000s satellite installation was a massive business in Egypt, supporting thousands of shops and tens of thou-
Academic literature on satellite television was rudimentary by the mid 2000s. *Musalsals* are no longer the primary analytical focus. The twenty four hour news station Al Jazeera, initially modelled on the American station CNN, spawned a cottage industry of academic commentary. The Al Jazeera Effect became a stock phrase in mainstream Western media. Initially analysis of Al Jazeera construed the new station as a pioneer of civil society in the Arab world. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States Al Jazeera became identified with radical Islamists. Al Jazeera bashing reached even to mainstream American journalism. The vilification of Al Jazeera began in an article by Fouad Ajami in the New York Times. Clones of Ajami’s article appeared immediately. Eventually vilification of Al Jazeera became normative in the US press. The academic obsession with Al Jazeera will no doubt subside, but the effect of news reporting on democratic ideals in the Arab world will be a staple feature of analysis for some time.

Satellite broadcasting has also generated interest in its effect on religious discourse by such figures as the popular *dāʿīya* (‘missionary’ often glossed slightly misleadingly as ‘preacher’) ‘Amr Khālid, or the Azharite trained Shaykh Yūsuf al Qaraḍāwī. Other topics such as music videos,


reality television and Ramadan programmes are entering academic writing.100

Starting in the mid 1990s, the advent of satellite broadcasting decisively ended Egyptian dominance in producing television content. At present there are three major centres of production: Egypt, Lebanon and the Arab Gulf countries (Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia). All have invested heavily in television production infrastructure. All other Arab countries have at least some capacity to produce television content, and all are represented on free to air satellite broadcasts to the entire region. However, despite diversification in production centres and a massive proliferation in the number of channels available to consumers, Arab satellite broadcasting is financially unsound. Sakr demonstrates that as of the early 2000s all Arab satellite companies were losing money.101 Channels stay in business through the patronage of states, wealthy individuals (such as the Saudi businessman al Walid ibn Ṭālāl) or political organisations (such as Hizbullah). Hence, as Sakr convincingly argues, an apparently ‘global’ Arab satellite industry essentially reproduces the politics of the region. It is, however, Arab politics on a much grander scale than had ever been possible in the past. At no previous time have Arab publics had access to political discourse from the entire region. Furthermore, Arab elites, who are often bilingual or multilingual, have access not only to Arabic language media broadcast on satellite television, but to American and European media as well. In this regard satellite broadcasting should be put in the same context as the ‘narrowcasting’ medium of the internet. Internet cafés proliferate even in poor neighbourhoods throughout the Arab world.102 Consequently mass mediated ‘public diplomacy’ initiatives103 predicated on the notion that the Arab world is starved of information, and hence radicalised through ignorance of the Western (particularly American) political ‘message’ must be seen as fundamentally impotent. The most influential Arab political elites in fact have access to a much greater range of media than American elites.


Islam’s publics and public sphere have expanded and been significantly transformed in the modern period, taking on new ‘forms of life’ through media that are defining features of modernity and its global transformations. The printing of religious texts, which became commonplace in the nineteenth century, put them into mass circulation and contributed to a renewed textualism as both repository and symbol of fixity, complementing oral transmission and thereby associating the latter’s adepts with ‘traditionalism’. Key texts of religion, which may previously have existed only in scattered manuscript copies, not only became broadly accessible via print, by definition mass circulation; print reinforced the symbolic register of Islam as a ‘religion of the book’ in broader mass publics. Broadcasting exposed mass audiences to particular forms of piety and their purveyors, including not least the states that monopolised broadcasting from the 1930s until satellite television in the 1990s. The advent of the internet by the latter decade brought something like the full global diversity of Islam from grassroots expression to programmatic responses into view and just a click away for new, global publics. The new publics included diasporas and religious seekers, Muslims and non Muslims, and believers in non Muslim majority countries as well as in long standing Muslim societies. Already by this period, sermons and other religious discourse circulated via cassette tapes in nearly every Muslim society. Through such media, the public face of Muslim culture has been altered from the ancient formulary of ‘a whole way of life’ to the very modern registers of ideology, on the one hand, and ‘privatised’ religion for individual consumption, on the other.

Precursors, print and new creoles

Electronic media such as satellite television and the internet extend a process that began in the nineteenth century with print and expansions of education.
Both were attendant upon Western imperialism that replaced Islam’s own global lineaments with new ones of capitalist exploitation. Imperialists did not so much bring printing as stimulate its uptake as part of Muslims’ responses to them. Imperialists did bring new forms of education, primarily to train local cadres to staff the echelons of empire and form a new creole population between traditionally non literate masses and super literate religious intellectuals. Among this new population, a new religious intelligentsia ‘lumpen intellectuals’ from the perspective of the traditionally learned of Islam’ used media to address, first, traditional ‘ulamā’ with calls to reform their practice and then wider publics with calls to mobilisation that became institutionalised in the form of religious political parties, with these intelligentsia as their vanguards. Vast expansion of mass education, particularly mass higher education, as Muslim countries gained independence following the Second World War not only helped spread their messages. More importantly, mass higher education spread skills, from the analytical and data minded approaches of modern education that challenged the hermeneutic and text minded approaches of traditional Islamic learning of ‘ulamā’ to the newfound textualism, whose strong forms register as ‘fundamentalism’, and easy recourse to media as representation of as well as channel to what is public about Islam today.

Electronic media thus have a context in which they arrive, and which they expand and transform, that is far larger than fundamentalist or activist usage. Indeed, those uses are far outweighed by the broader range of efforts to figure out how to be Muslim in the modern world which frames media as representation and as site of that exploration. This context has two intertwined and co evolving institutional bases. In response to the debacle of Western imperialism, Muslim self examination focused on educational reforms ranging from attempts to revivify traditional learning broadly and madrasas in particular as an alternative arena to the state arena Muslims had lost, to more co optive responses for taking advantage of Western forms and techniques of education. These efforts run roughly from Deobandī revivalism to Aligarh’s educational reforms in India, with variations in between that had counter parts from South East Asia to the Middle East. Coeval and sometimes connected, sometimes not, Islamic reformers arose, of whom the apodictic figure might be Jamāl al Din al Afgānī (c. 1838-97), a peripatetic scholar who travelled, studied, taught and preached awakening and reform from Iran to

1 The characterisation is from Olivier Roy, The failure of political Islam (Cambridge, 1994).
the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, India and in Europe and Russia. These two streams—expanding education and reform, first of the ‘ulamā’ and then of the umma—came together in another archetypal figure, Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935), a Syrian born journalist whose initial religious education was complemented with training in modern science. Settling in Cairo, then a media hot house of journals and growing book publication, Riḍā proceeded to use the self-contained forms of journalism in preference to the deep contextualisation of ‘ulamā’id discourse to address the ‘ulamā’ and their publics, to argue for and to exemplify a public interest (maslaha) of the community in addition to the ījtihād of the scholars.³ Spanning these identities, he created his own journal, Al Manār (The lighthouse) and collected his essays into books (in the fashion of ‘ulamā’ publication). A thoroughly intermediate figure in every sense, Riḍā exemplified a new type of Islamic intellectual, some of whom, although not Riḍā himself, founded and led religious political movements, starting with the Ikhwān al Muslimīn (Muslim Brotherhood). A South Asian counterpart but more of a revivalist, Mawlānā Sayyid Abū’l A‘lā’ Mawdūdī (1903–79), likewise worked as a journalist, but became recognised as mawlānā (teacher) and founded the Jama’at i Islāmī party.

The significance of such intermediate figures is partly their link not just to new media industries but also to new media formats that together amount to an alternative intellectual technology to the viva voce transmission of the traditional ‘ulamā’ and their hermeneutic methods of textual interpretation. These intermediaries created a discourse about Islam, alternative to the ‘ulamā’, often critical of their alleged disengagement from the world, and intently focused on interpreting the world. These new Muslim leaders drew on ‘ulamā’id discourse, on the one hand, and more political nationalist ones, on the other. More importantly, these leaders are harbingers on a small scale of what happened with the expansion of mass education in the independence period following the Second World War. Mass education that was part of state building efforts vastly expanded not only literacy but, as Dale Eickelman put it,⁴ access to the texts of religion, skills that could be applied to interpreting them quite independent of religious scholars or tutors, and thus to self-directed interpretation primarily of texts viewed as bodies of

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³ I am indebted for this observation to Dyala Hamza’s careful elucidation of his technique in the Alexander von Humboldt Summer Institute on ‘Public spheres and Muslim identities’ at Dartmouth College, in conjunction with the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin in August 2002.

information. That is to say, reading ‘objectively’ for meaning, rather than liturgically in the recitative fashion that religious education traditionally began with, or in the interpretive fashions it proceeded to under scholarly tutelage, moved discussion into modern vernaculars and into more immediately worldly terms of how to lead a Muslim life in the modern world.

This change was not sudden. The expansion of mass education in general and mass higher education, in particular, which spread a new kind of intellectual techniques more associated with the analytics of modern science than with the hermeneutics of religious scholarship, unfolded over two generations following the Second World War. Additionally, the rise in education’s most basic global measure, adult literacy, to majorities in the largest Muslim countries, near majorities in the poorest and to almost all today in Turkey, Iran and the Levant may not be from low bases previously imagined. This can be significant for what kind of Muslim public there has been. Carl Ernst has provocatively argued that ‘the main patrons of publishing in Muslim countries in the nineteenth century [to take up mass printing], aside from governments, were Sufi orders’. Their publications were characterised by devotional literature as well as religious debate (often apologetics) addressed to the mass and dispersed audiences of Sufi networks (in effect pulling together a consuming public) and rendered an esoteric system of teaching public, fixing or stabilising meanings through modern communications. At the very least, and in more ways than one, the religious field was open to the sorts of pressures and potentials that come with publication. Those include, as Francis Robinson observed in India, a scripturalist revivalism resembling the sola scriptura of Christian Protestantism, erosion of ‘ulamā’ authority and re thinking Muslim ‘community’ in more international terms. All of these features – reintellectualisation, an ‘objective’ treatment of texts, authorisation by alternative skills, analytics over hermeneutics, intermediate communities of discourse that do not centre on or sometimes even include ‘ulamā’, vernacularisation, an intense focus on the immediate modern world and how to construct a Muslim life in it are catalysed by electronic media, and some are magnified through them.

The difference electronic media make

Electronic media are lodged in the same demographics, some of the same educational developments and in their own cultural ones. New media are means for new people and new thinking to form new publics, both in the sense of audiences and in the sense of public opinions. As forums and means, however, newer electronic media differ structurally from mass media from print to broadcasting. Structurally, they replace the mass media model of one to many communication with any to any, or passive reception with active selection, and markedly reduce the social distance between sending and receiving, producing and consuming messages. Unlike broadcasting, they are not monopolised by governments and often are practically deployed to circumvent those monopolies. By comparison to print, their capital costs and required skills are barely higher for producers than for consumers, in part because core capital costs are shifted to infrastructure that neither producers nor consumers own. This last is particularly the case, and particularly the attraction, with tape cassettes (more recently, CD ROMs and DVD diskettes) and the internet, while asymmetries between sender and receiver are still marked in satellite television. Although barriers to entry have fallen in broadcasting, they become vanishingly small for tape cassettes, other small media such as desktop publishing and for the internet. The result is that electronic media can take on characteristics of ‘virtual community’ that is more truly community like than an audience in that it is interactive and potentially highly so, and also less hegemonic than aggregate ‘public opinion’.

Interactivity and community were manifest in the arguably first significant electronic medium with democratic characteristics, the tape cassette. Already in widespread use for popular culture, including for circulating amateur recordings of folk music and poetry, tape cassettes became associated with Muslim publics in the run up to the Iranian revolution of 1979. Then, famously, sermons of the Āyat Allāh Ruhollah Khomeini (1900–89) and others forbidden to make public addresses, circulated on tape cassettes. Today, sermons, recitations, lessons and religious discourse of all sorts circulate on tape, to be consumed at will and, much like newspapers, across a range of public and private settings where, particularly in quasi public settings from


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coffee houses to taxis, they become not just marks of personal piety but orientation to a virtual Islamic ‘counterpublic’.\textsuperscript{9} Faxes have likewise been identified as media with other, more fundamental uses, in this case for business communication, also deployable for religious activism across borders.\textsuperscript{10} But tying such new media so strongly to resistance risks overlooking their wider context and mobilisation of individuals’ agency that is also a hallmark of modernity, and one not absent in electronically mediated Muslim publics. This is particularly the case with the internet, which subsumes the interactive, participatory characteristics of other electronic media and makes them central.

The internet is something of a paradox in this regard. It draws on the highest of ‘high’ technologies and was conceived as a tool for engineers and scientists. They built their values and work habits into it and oscillated between expecting new users to become socialised to those practices, on the one hand, and presenting them as inherently democratic, on the other. The technologies composing the internet were developed in and deployed from high tech precincts, initially as a public sector asset that extended first to other scientists, then to other academics, then to the professionals they trained and finally through the corporate sector to general publics, including those in other countries, although it had been ‘international’ from shortly after its inception.\textsuperscript{11} After more than twenty years of gestation in scientific laboratories, the internet fairly burst into public as the \textit{sine qua non} of new media in the early 1990s, when widely promulgated views of the internet as a new democratic medium, open to all and potentially placing all the world’s information available to all, largely effaced its scientific technical origins.

\textit{Technological adepts bring Islam on-line}

The first appearance of Islam on the internet is probably lost but also surely dates to its scientific prehistory. Then, Muslims who went or were sent overseas for training in the high tech institutions that spawned the internet and used it routinely for work followed counterparts already there in placing avocational interests on the internet, which included religion and in their case Islam. What they placed on line included core religious texts of the Holy Qur’an and collections of \textit{hadith} in translations that could be found in university libraries, scanned and archived in digital formats the very texts whose status as ‘foundations’ of Islamic guidance in the form of the \textit{shari’a} had

\textsuperscript{10} Mamoun Fandy, \textit{Saudi Arabia and the politics of dissent} (New York, 1999).
become ever more reified over the past century. In a sense, they did what scientists and engineers do reflexively—go to foundations, treat those objectively and map them into applications—but as pious acts of witness that brought their religion into cyberspace. In addition to utilising the internet technology of file archives, they also utilised its ‘newsgroup’ facilities to create forums for discussing issues concerning Muslims, the diaspora contexts of their lives and how to judge Muslim issues. They also used the internet to reflect on problems related to leading a Muslim life in the modern world and in largely non-Muslim environments, from where to find mosques, ḥalāl butchers, and cheap flights home on to Muslim judgements on issues of the day. Tracked from early schooling into science, maths and technical subjects, they drew on the intellectual technology of that training and applied it to reasoning with religious texts. Such discussions proceeded largely innocent of hermeneutic techniques guided by specialists, instead utilising analytical ones, self-guided, and often devolving into hot arguments unmoderated by higher religious authorities. In this, theirs were little different from newsgroups and listservs on the growing range of other topics that found their way to online communities, which grew as more came on line from the professional and wider public worlds.12

With such growth came more institutional voices such as Muslim students’ associations and national Muslim organisations in Western countries that sought to aggregate information for Muslims and about Islam for both Muslims and others, as well as individual efforts to explain the faith. Some created sites to explain Islam and to provide its texts, including didactic material; a few tried their hands at ijtihād and even offered fatwās based on their experiences to others like themselves.13 As internet technology expanded, so did the range of Islam offered on line. Development was both technological and social, as well as demographic as more Muslims came on line or became aware of this new ‘cyberspace’.

Officialising strategies

A turning point came in the early 1990s with the World Wide Web, a much more ‘user friendly’, less ‘techie’ interface that by 1992 adopted the ‘hyper media’ model of linked texts and became multimedia with graphics. To the Web came a wider public, ushered by access through commercial providers.

13 See Gary Bunt, Virtually Islamic: Computer mediated communication and cyber Islamic environments (Cardiff, 2000).
The wider Islamic public included established authorities, beginning with Muslim governments and already existing outreach (da’wa) organisations speaking for and committed to providing a ‘correct’ Islam. Some were drawn by the presence of Muslims, others to counter free lancing in the name of Islam with more institutional voices. Those also early included some Islamist political movements such as the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) of Algeria or Hizbullah in Lebanon and MIRA (Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia) by a Saudi exile in London. Most were based in the Muslim world’s ‘overseas’ in Europe or North America, as were the more orthodox sites with whom they joined in ‘officialising strategies’ targeting the on line spaces opened by the technologically adept amateurs in matters of Islam.

The officialising strategies that marked a new phase took many forms but essentially reduce to two. One brought the challenge to established religious figures and politics that had been the hallmark of Islamist political movements starting with the Ikhwan al Muslimeen and the Jama’aat i Islami, although both of those organisations were slower in coming on line than newer ones. The other asserted the apologetics of conventional da’wa organisations and of states that assumed special responsibility for Islam, such as the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, whose embassy in Washington, DC, posted on line copies of its printed brochures about Islam. Their targets were partly each other and partly asserting more formal, both official and oppositional, presences in the new cyberspace. In short, they brought degrees of religious professionalism, ranging from that of conventional da’wa to confrontational jihad and many shadings in between. In time, schools including individual madrasas and organisations primarily of scholars, like the Tablighi Jama’at Islami also came on line. So too did modern form Islamic universities sponsored by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Islamist parties from Indonesia to North Africa, even representatives of Afghanistan’s otherwise anti modernist Taliban, and in time Egypt’s Ikhwan and Pakistan’s Jama’at, as well as traditional seminary universities from Qom to al Azhar and representatives of major Sufi orders.

What this mélange of organised Islam and officialising strategies brought on line was a largely modern idiom of Islam as a system in a world of systems, ideological, practical and liturgical, offered up for personal examination and ready to give an account of itself. Little of this material was not recycled from other media, and in the early stages much of it looked more like books than like web pages. Basically, it was aimed at a new demographic of professionals working and pursuing leisure on line, or at religious seekers. At other times the material was intended to serve as a pious act of witness, but it was for the
most part presentationally static. This quality changed in the later 1990s as more and more Islamic websites upgraded their graphics, organisation and presentation of material to fit the medium and to take advantage of newer technologies. Chief among these were newly developed search and retrieval technologies and software for on the fly formatting that could aggregate material not according to designers’ selections in the ‘portal’ model that dominated the second phase, but according to user queries and with a constantly updated base of information including ‘meta’ information yielded by searchers’ queries and even contributions.

**New intermediations**

Much as the second, officialising phase shifted with the World Wide Web to a publishing model, albeit based on hypertext and multimedia, from the more interactive one of the early internet, further development of that technology shifted the Web back toward more interactivity and to capturing ‘feedback’ from users. Its devices were many. Polls became regular features for direct feedback in addition to the indirect measures of recording which pages or sequence of pages the users consulted in a website. Parts of sites were turned into databases that could be searched, from religious lessons for children to sermons and *fatwās*. *Fatwās*, which traditionally had been specific responses to religious questions put by individuals and of no force beyond those individuals, became textually fixed, searchable and available for perusal by others. The *fatwās* were presented alongside social/psychological advice columns dealing with practical questions such as how to get along with in laws or to live among non Muslims or to manage other interpersonal relations or one’s personal feelings. On some sites, users could submit queries to shaykhs, either for formal *fatwās* or for more informal advice; they could also search the accumulating results either for direct answers or to find a sympathetic shaykh whom they might query later. There was no technical limit to how ‘full service’ a site could become, with constantly changing news from Muslim countries or about Muslim issues, sermons, *fatwās*, advice, lessons for children, guides to mosques, organisations, religious goods stores, sanctioned vendors of travel and other services. The Web became dynamic again with technologies for user configurability and more systematic feedback from which information, and even contributions, could be gleaned from users.

For Islamic websites, the audience for this new Web was Muslims in the diaspora and those ‘at home’ in Muslim majority countries who already had recourse to the internet for work and leisure or who increasingly sought work and leisure on line. Where high tech adepts dominated the first phase and
organisations dominated the second, nearly every major shaykh now has some
on line presence and profile, as do other religious figures such as the Islamic
teleevangelist Amr Khalîd as well as the major Sufi orders and modernist
intellectuals. Through these sites, they distribute their message and trawl for
supporters, inquirers, seekers. That is, the audience is a thoroughly modern,
even post modern, one of mobile professionals, increasingly centering on what
might be called ‘post modern nomads’. These include internet developers
with marketable skills who build and maintain these new sites and who form
part of the internal diaspora of high tech specialists in Muslim countries, com-
parable to the earlier high tech adepts that first brought Islam on line from
overseas. This time, it is not only their own but a joint production with religious
specialists who are also intermediate in their own way, whom Malika Zeghal
has called ‘new Azhari’ in the Middle Eastern Sunnî world. Orthodox in
theology but able to express it in the vernacular, some are also at home in the
world of new electronic media from satellite television to the internet. Many of
them move in some of the same regional circuits as growing numbers of
internet technologists. Sometimes they form alliances, as shaykhs prefer dealing
with Muslims and technologists find religious organisations to be steadier
sources of support for their business than commercial clients.

The current exemplar of this newly configured public sphere of Islam might
be Shaykh Yûsuf al Qaradawi, who is featured on the website Islamonline.net
and on satellite television, both from Qatar. An Azhar trained ‘alim who
nevertheless speaks in an easy modern idiom, al Qaradawi registers as too
modern to some traditionalists and too traditional to some modernists in his
opinions as well as his style; and Western observers have accused him of being
chameleon like, tailoring opinions to audiences, to language. In other words,
he is a thoroughly intermediate figure, akin to the creoles that Benedict
Anderson identified with the reimagination of community in early modern
ity. Creoles are not mixed languages but intermediate speech communities
and discourses that array on a continuum along which their speakers move.

15 Malika Zeghal, ‘Religion and politics in Egypt: The ulema of al Azhar, radical Islam, and
16 Jon W. Anderson, ‘New media, new publics: Reconfiguring the public sphere of Islam’,
Social Research, 70 (2003), pp. 887 906; see also Peter Mandaville, Transnational Muslim
17 Benedict Anderson, The imagined community: Reflections on the origin and spread of
18 Lee Drummond, ‘The cultural continuum: A theory of intersystems’, Man, n.s. 15
which is the condition of contemporary Islam that ranges from activist to pietist and, beyond those, to jihadist in one direction and moderate reformers in the other.

The internet is a natural medium for a creole continuum: it is a new space, populated by specialists who often have more in common with each other than with communities of origin, who are mobile within it by reason of skills particular to its situations, forming a kind of diasporic public that is neither an audience nor an opinion profile but something of an imagined community of linked fate. Much as mass media first of print and then of broadcasting were implicated in the emergence of modern mass society and culture, so the more interactive media of the internet are implicated in these successor publics and the modes of communication that define them as speech communities. The modes realised in internet technologies are more interactive, even participatory, and not just for their any to any structure but increasingly because they structure feedback and enable mutual recognition. In this sense, they have come full circle, but to a new point where something close to the full diversity of the Muslim world is on display, or a very wide sample of it.

Islamic forms of life in electronic publics

Now well into the first decade of the twenty first century, that diversity includes most flavours of Islamic activism, including the jihadi and even terrorists, who use the internet for gathering information, recruitment, fund raising and communication within their communities as well as for publication to others. This diversity includes older line madrasa and da'wa organisations, new form Islamic universities and modernised presentations of old ones, now including al Azhar. It includes most major shaykhs, reformists to arch traditionalists and representations of major Sufi orders as well as minor branches of them. It includes ranges of opinion from fully engaged to accommodationist and traditionalist to modernist. It also includes material produced by scholars of Islam as well as others and scholarship about them. This array is not the Islamic public in any dialogic sense but an array of publics, islands or overlapping communities of discourse that form a continuum and along which individuals move, while the extremes may not be in communication at all.

Interactive media of networked communications that are exemplified in the internet and more partially represented in cassette tapes and satellite

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television organise this plurality on a global scale and make it available on that scale. Not only Muslims in the diaspora find their ways to the internet, or articulate diasporic concerns there, but also those in Muslim majority countries who can use it find their way to an Islam that is not available locally. This aspect of internal diaspora contributes to the continued piety of the professional bourgeoisie, potentially defusing radicalism on the one hand or secularisation on the other that arise from too few choices, although potentially also ‘privatising’ religion. The availability of an Islamonline.net, or the mufti of Damascus, or a Hanbali shaykh from Saudi Arabia on the internet presents a contemporary opportunity comparable to what peripatetic seekers of the pre modern era sought through travel to visit books, other scholars, Sufi masters. The contemporary version extends to nearly the entire bourgeoisie through the form of life composed by electronic media, expansions of education and the creolised discourses that emerge with those.

Grasping these ‘forms of life’ that emerge in Islam’s publics with electronic media requires more than correlating these media with religious politics. Viewed as thinkers, figures such as Mawdūdī or Riḍā are typically fitted to the intellectual genealogies of ‘political’ Islam at the cost of fitting them to more widely shared genealogies of contemporary Islam that are demographic, educational, discursive, specifically social and broadly cultural. Shifting attention to modes of mediated communication helps bring this wider ecology of media into better view than focusing primarily on their content. Much as Riḍā, with his creole education, essayed an intermediate discourse on Islam in the more self contained and self enclosing format of journalism than the ‘endless conversation’ of ulamā’i hermeneutics, or even Sufi devotional literature, his contemporary counterparts include ‘post modern nomads’ who likewise extend that intermediate space between a folk Islam associated with non literacy and high Islam of the super literate. This middle ground is the realm of a pious, and growing, bourgeoisie with a core of modern professionals whose vocations and avocations bring them on line; it includes similarly disposed new ‘ulamā’ whose patronage by this bourgeoisie begins with the technological adepts who bring them, as their predecessors brought their own Islam, on line. This is a much expanded demographic over the one Riḍā exemplified, thanks to the subsequent expansion of higher education in Muslim countries and the subjective empowerment of new interpreters who are equipped and made confident by its techniques. Riḍā would likely approve of tech adepts bringing texts and discussion of Islam into the new media of the internet, where they were followed by officialising strategies of both established institutions and their opponents and then by today’s various post modern nomads.
taking advantage of the mobilities of electronic media to cast messages into this intermediate space and their social relations across borders. Whether he would approve of the content is another matter — many commentators do not, or at least find it problematic, and not only conservatives — but that does not detract from the significance of the modalities.

These modalities are demographic: they include new people, most with modern educations and many with significant career mobility. They are discursive: they include intellectual techniques that cast Islam as a system in a world of systems, as an explorable ‘database’ of propositions about belief and practice, and a broadly analytic approach to applying those to interpreting the world and guiding experience that mixes text and talk. They are social: they include new ways of accessing, and selecting, Islam that at least nominally can forge long distance relationships, that update them and extend to more people the long tradition of Muslim travel to seek knowledge. They are also cultural in fostering communities of discourse and other modes of cooperation involving, among others, ‘new’ ulamā’, technological enablers and publics who share their perspectives, orientations and concerns that together compose this form of life electronically mediated in new Muslim publics.
Glossary

adat (Ar. ‘āda) custom, customary law
adatrecht customary law as interpreted by colonial authorities in the Dutch East Indies
ahl al dhimma non Muslim minorities deemed ‘protected’ and accorded religious and communal rights, including the right to profess religion among themselves, in exchange for submission to Muslim sovereignty and the payment of the jizya tax
Ahl i Ḥadīth ‘followers of the Prophetic tradition’, especially in South Asia, who reject taqlīd and insist on literalist adherence to the Qur’an and Ḥadīth to restore what is seen as the original purity of Islamic faith and practice
ahl al kitāb lit., ‘people of the book’, non Muslims accepted by Muslims as having a revealed scripture, mainly Christians and Jews, and accorded a distinctive status under Islamic law; during some periods, the category was extended to Sabeans, Zoroastrians and even Hindus
Aḥmādis a group founded in India who see themselves as Muslims but believe that the sect’s founder, Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad (d. 1908), was a prophet
‘ālim see ‘ulamā’
amīr prince, chief, commander
amīr al mu'minīn caliphal title, ‘commander of the faithful’; a title often assumed by Muslim rulers
‘aqīda creed; also (according to modern understandings) articles of the Islamic faith
Glossary

\texttt{'aql} \hspace{1cm} \text{intellect, intelligence}
\texttt{ashraf} \hspace{1cm} \text{see sharif}
\texttt{awliya} \hspace{1cm} \text{see wali}
\texttt{Ayatollah, Ayat Allah} \hspace{1cm} \text{‘sign of God’; title awarded to the highest rank of Ithna ‘Ashari or Twelver Shii mujtahids}
\texttt{baraka} \hspace{1cm} \text{divine blessing, sometimes thought embodied in Muslim saints; a beneficent force of divine origin}
\texttt{bay'a} \hspace{1cm} \text{contractual allegiance offered by a follower to a sovereign or to a Sufi shaykh}
\texttt{bida} (pl. bida‘) \hspace{1cm} \text{blameworthy innovation; an innovation for which there is no precedent in the Qur'an or from the time of the Prophet; the opposite of Sunna}
\texttt{caliph (Ar. sing. khilaf, pl. khulaf’a)} \hspace{1cm} \text{‘successor’ to the Prophet Muhammed as leader of the Sunni community; title assumed by the Ottoman sultan after 1774; title also adopted by some Muslim rulers}
\texttt{caliphate system} \hspace{1cm} \text{government based on the rule of the caliph (Ar. khilaf)}
\texttt{dai’ya} \hspace{1cm} \text{one who ‘calls’ or ‘summons’ believers to the true faith of Islam through da’wa outreach; a ‘missionary’}
\texttt{dar al harb} \hspace{1cm} \text{‘the abode of war’; non Muslim lands not acknowledging Muslim sovereignty or paying tribute to a Muslim ruler}
\texttt{dar al Islam} \hspace{1cm} \text{‘abode of Islam’; land administered by a Muslim ruler and in which shari‘a was supposed to be implemented}
\texttt{da’wa} \hspace{1cm} \text{a ‘call’ or ‘invitation’ to the true faith of Islam}
\texttt{dhikr} \hspace{1cm} \text{remembrance of God; a Sufi litany designed to bring disciples closer to God through the remembering of His names}
\texttt{dhimma, dhimmihood} \hspace{1cm} \text{see ahl al dhimma}
\texttt{din} \hspace{1cm} \text{religion, understood not as personal belief but as the obligations God imposes on believers}
\texttt{falsafa} \hspace{1cm} \text{Arabic philosophy}
\texttt{faqih (pl. fuqahā’)} \hspace{1cm} \text{jurisconsult, a scholar of Islamic law}
### Glossary

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<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Farā’idī</strong></td>
<td>followers of the movement of Islamic reform in Bengal founded by Ḥājjī Sharī’at Allāh (d. 1840) who preached that Muslims must follow the farā’id or obligatory duties enjoined by the Qur’ān and the Prophet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>fatwā</strong></td>
<td>a judgement on some detail of the law furnished by a qualified scholar known as a muftī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>fiqh</strong></td>
<td>lit., ‘understanding’, jurisprudence; works of jurisprudence, as elaborated by a faqīh (sing. ‘jurisconsult’, ‘jurist’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>fuqahā’</strong></td>
<td>see faqīh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ḥadd</strong> (pl. ḥudūd)</td>
<td>fixed punishments in Islamic law, often stipulated in the Qur’ān, for acts identified as crimes against religion, including theft, unlawful intercourse and highway robbery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ḥadīth</strong></td>
<td>body of traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad and his companions, one of the sources of Islamic law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ḥadīth</strong></td>
<td>an individual tradition of the Prophet Muḥammad or of his companions; a prophetic tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ḥajj</strong></td>
<td>the pilgrimage to Mecca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ḥājjī</strong></td>
<td>one who has completed the pilgrimage to Mecca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ḥākimiyya</strong></td>
<td>God’s government; God’s exclusive sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ḥākimiyyat allāh</strong></td>
<td>the sovereignty of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ḥalāl</strong></td>
<td>sanctioned by religion; food that is lawful to eat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ḥanafī</strong></td>
<td>one of the four ‘schools’ of Sunnī jurisprudence, and the official school of Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ḥanbali</strong></td>
<td>one of the four ‘schools’ of Sunnī jurisprudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ḥarām</strong></td>
<td>prohibited according to divine law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ḥaram al Sharīf</strong></td>
<td>the Muslim religious site in Jerusalem containing the Dome of the Rock and the al Aqṣā Mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ḥijāb</strong></td>
<td>stylised Islamic head cover for women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
hiāra  | ‘withdrawal’, emigration; often referring to the emigration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 1/622, a date which marks the beginning of the Islamic era

ḥikāyā  | Malay historical chronicles

ḥudūd  | see ḥadd

ḥukūmat i ilāhiya  | government under the authority of religious scholars, based in theory on the sovereignty of God

ḥukūmat i islāmī  | Islamic government

‘ibādāt  | devotional worship incumbent upon believers

ijāza  | in classical Islamic schooling, an utterance or certificate issued by a teacher authorising a disciple to teach a particular religious text or subject

ijmā‘  | consensus, as among scholars on matters of jurisprudence

ijtihād  | the exercise of independent judgement on matters of legal interpretation; renewal in legal thinking; as opposed to taqlīd

‘īlm  | knowledge, typically of a religious nature

‘īlm al ḥadīth  | the sciences of the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad

‘īlm al tafsīr  | the science of Qur’anic exegesis

‘īlm usūl al fiqh  | the sources, principles and methodologies of Islamic jurisprudence

imām  | religious (and Shi‘ite political) leader; thus imāmāt (imāma, the office of religious leadership) and Imāmī (a Shī‘a of the Twelver persuasion)

imān  | a prayer leader

imān  | faith; belief in the truth of God

Ja‘farī  | the main system of religious jurisprudence recognised in Shī‘ī Islam

jāhilī  | heathen, referring to the pre Islamic ‘age of ignorance’; term used by Sayyid Qūṭb to justify the waging of jihad against modern states not based on Islamic law
jāhiliyya ignorance (of the message of God), a charge often made against governments in the Muslim world that do not enforce Islamic law
jamā‘a community
jamā‘īt Islāmiyya associations rooted in a revitalised Islamist student movement on Egyptian university campuses
jam‘iyya (pl. jam‘iyyāt) group or society; more specifically, an Islamic charitable organisation
Jāwī Arabic script adapted to the transcription of Malayo Indonesian languages
jihad striving in the cause of God, the struggle against the base self, fighting for the sake of Islam; holy war
jizya a poll tax paid by non Muslims accorded the status of ‘protected non Muslims’ or ahl al dhimma
kāfīr unbeliever
kalām Islamic theology
katātib see kuttāb
kaum muda ‘young group’; Islamic reformists in Malayo Indonesian lands
Kaum Tua ‘old group’; Islamic traditionalists in the Malayo Indonesian world
khalīfā (pl. khulāfā) God’s vice regent; ‘successor to the Prophet’; deputy head of the community; a successor to a Sufi shaykh; see caliph
khilāfā the Arabic term for caliphate
kufr the condition of unbelief
kuttāb a school providing instruction in the reading and recitation of the Qur’ān
madhhab school of Islamic jurisprudence
madrasa institution of intermediate or higher learning in the Islamic sciences
majlis an advisory council
maktāb elementary Qur’ānic school
Mālikī one of the four ‘schools’ of Sunnī Islamic law
maqāṣid goals, intentions, reasons, as in maqāṣid al shari‘a, the intentions of the shari‘a
marja‘ model; source of emulation, a Shi‘i mujtahid acknowledged to be a pre eminent interpreter of law and to whose teachings believers are enjoined to align their actions and beliefs

masjid mosque

mašlaḥa in jurisprudence and politics, the principle of public interest or benefit

mu‘āmalāt social transactions regulated by God’s law

muḍāraba a form of partnership in which the investor shares with the merchant the rewards or losses of the venture; equity financing seen as consistent with Islamic law

muftī a specialist in Islamic jurisprudence deemed qualified to issue legal opinions

mujaddid ‘renewer’; honorific title given to prominent religious reformers

mujāḥidīn combatants, warriors for the faith

mujtahid one capable of ijtihād; a religious scholar seen as especially qualified to deliver independent opinions on the sharī‘a

mullā Muslim functionary, member of the ‘ulamā‘; title of respect for a Muslim scholar

murābaḥa in modern Islamic finance, resale contracting; a contract whereby a bank purchases a good for the client and sells it back on a deferred payment basis at cost plus profit

murīd follower, disciple, as of a religious teacher

murshid religious teacher; master of mystical science

mu‘tazila Muslim scholars from the Middle Period and later who emphasise the importance of using reason to understand divine revelation

pesantren, or pondok in Java and Malay portions of South East Asia, residential madrasas dedicated to the study of the classical Islamic sciences

pir spiritual teacher, head of a Sufi convent, a hereditary Sufi leader associated with a shrine and popular piety
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Glossary</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>pondok</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>qāḍī</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>qiyyās</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Qur’ān</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ribā</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salafi (Ar. Salafiyya)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ṣalāt</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>sayyid</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Shāfi’ī</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>shahāda</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>sharī’a</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>sharīf (pl. ashraf)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>shaykh</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Shi‘a

the Shi‘i community; the second and smaller of the two principal branches of Islam, the other being Sunnī Islam; divided into several branches, including Zaydīs, Imāmīs (also known as Twelvers or Ithnā ‘Asharīs), and Ismā‘īlīs

Shi‘ī

an adjective referring to the Shi‘a; a noun referring to one or more members of the Shi‘a

shirk

‘association’ of that which is not God with God; polytheism; idolatry

shūrā

consultation; Islamic doctrine enjoining consultation between rulers and subjects

Sufi

traveller on the Islamic mystical path

Sufism

the illuminationist tradition in Islam; Islamic mysticism; taṣawwuf

Sunna

lit., ‘path’; exemplary normative conduct as derived from the Prophetic Ḥadīth; one of the sources of the faith with the Qur‘ān

Sunnī

the larger of the two principal branches of Islam, the other being Shi‘ī Islam

sūra

Qur‘ānic verse

tafsīr

exegesis; the formal discipline of Qur‘ānic exegesis

tajdīd

renewal, as in the revitalisation of principles of faith

takfīr

the ‘declaring infidel’ of people who think themselves Muslims

Taliban

lit., madrasa students; the ultra conservative and tribal based reform movement that ruled Afghanistan from 1994 to 2001

Tanzimat

‘Reorganisation’, term used to describe the period 1839–76 in Ottoman history and its reforms which climaxed with the issuing of the First Ottoman Constitution in 1876

taqlīd

in Islamic jurisprudence, ‘imitation’ of established Islamic traditions; acceptance of and strict conformity to the settled opinions of Islamic scholarship as handed down; the opposite of ijtihād
Glossary

țiɾiqa  Sufi brotherhood or mystical order
taʃawwuf  see Sufism
tawhîd  the unicity or oneness of God
‘ulamâ’  (sing. ‘âłîm) lit. ‘those who possess knowledge’ (‘îlm); people of learning; Islamic scholars
umma  the community of believers; the term can also refer to a non Muslim community
uʃûl  sources
uʃûl al dîn  the sources or principles of religion
uʃûl al fiqh  the sources, principles and methods of Islamic jurisprudence
wahdât al wujûd  the doctrine of the unity of being developed by the Spanish Sufi Ibn ‘Arabî (1165–1240)
Wahhâbî  a movement of religious reform founded by Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhâb originally centred on the Najd plateau in the interior of the Arabian Peninsula, and today regarded as the doctrinal foundation for the practice of Islam in Saudi Arabia
Wahhâbiyya  Muslims regarded as following Wahhâbî tenets
wâli  (pl. awliya)  an Islamic saint
waqf  a pious endowment or charitable trust established to support institutions concerned with religious welfare and the public good
wilâyat  guardianship, authority
wilâyat al faqîh  authority of the jurist, as in the right of jurists to intervene in social and political affairs
zakât  religious taxation; alms charged on certain categories of wealth and goods
zâwiya  centre for religious activity, often of a Sufi nature
Zaydî  a branch of Shî‘î Islam, prominent in the highlands of Yemen
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Chapter 25: Cinema and television in the Arab world

Practical suggestions for further reading


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Primary sources

1. A condensed survey of cinema in the Arab world unfortunately must minimise citations of the main primary source, namely the films themselves. Leaman and Shafik (see ‘Suggestions for further reading’ above) provide select filmographies for various national cinemas. Mahmúd Qásím’s Dá’il provides the most comprehensive filmography of all national cinemas in the Arab world. The work contains many mistakes, and is poorly organised. However, despite its shortcomings, Qásím’s book contains by far the most extensive and detailed source of information on Arab cinemas. Another casualty of brevity is discussion of actors. Film stars are the primary organising principle for audiences. In other words, any sociological or historical study of Arab cinemas must account for the fact that the filmography of a given director means little to audiences and consumers, whereas the filmography of an actor is both the main selling point for producers, and the main point of identification for consumers. Hence Qásím’s Mawsí’at al mumaththil provides a valuable alternative organisation of primary sources. The films themselves are available on an irregular basis from commercial distributors in the Arab world and in the West. Piracy is a massive problem. Many Egyptian classics have been purchased by satellite broadcasters, particularly Saudi businessman al Walíd ibn Talál’s Rotana media company. Rotana owns some 2,000 titles, and broadcasts a mix of old and
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new films. The company is currently in the process of digitising its entire library. Many other satellite channels broadcast films on a less systematic basis. Non Egyptian films are sometimes relatively accessible in Europe and the US through companies that cater to art film and educational markets, though many films that show in film festivals are not obtained by distributors at all (sometimes by the choice of the filmmakers, some of whom lack trust in the distributors).

Aside from films, popular cinema magazines should also be considered a primary source for the study of Arab cinemas. Magazines elaborate the personae of stars as much as film narratives. They also provide an effective zone of exchange between film producers and consumers. And perhaps most crucially, magazines (particularly illustrated weeklies) put films in a context that is accessible to researchers - a context that markets products and lifestyles, but also one that juxtaposes cinema with wider issues, including politics and religion. Because Egypt is by far the dominant producer of commercial films accessible to large numbers of viewers, Egyptian film magazines are the most important in this regard.

The magazines listed here are a selection of prominent illustrated weeklies, and only titles with fairly long runs. They include specialist film magazines and variety magazines with a consistent interest in films and stars, including occasional special issues on cinema.

Aside from fieldwork derived research focusing on end users and producers, the main source for the study of television is broadcast content. Little television content is sold in recorded media. A few popular serials in VHS cassette and DVD can sometimes be found where films are sold, including in Arab communities in the West. However, the advent of transnational satellite broadcast has made sale of recorded television media essentially superfluous even within diaspora communities. Hence satellite broadcasts are the most practical means to gain access to broadcast content. Arabsat and Nilesat broadcasts can be accessed throughout the Middle East, and in much of Europe. The websites listed here give some basic information on channels and satellite coverage.
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Chapter 26: Electronic media and new Muslim publics

Practical suggestions for further reading


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