THE NEW CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF
ISLAM

VOLUME 2
The Western Islamic World
Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries

Edited by
MARIBEL FIERRO
Volume 2 of *The New Cambridge History of Islam* is devoted to the history of the western Islamic lands from the political fragmentation of the eleventh century to the beginnings of European colonialism towards the end of the eighteenth century. This volume embraces a vast area from al Andalus and North Africa to Arabia and the lands of the Ottomans. In the first four sections, scholars all leaders in their particular fields chart the rise and fall, and explain the political and religious developments, of the various independent ruling dynasties across the region, including famously the Almohads, the Fatimids and Mamluks, and, of course, the Ottomans. The final section of this volume explores the commonalities and continuities that united these diverse and geographically disparate communities, through in depth analyses of state formation, conversion, taxation, scholarship and the military.

**Maribel Fierro** is a Research Professor at the Center of Human and Social Sciences (CCHS) of the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid. Her previous publications include *Al Andalus: Saberes e intercambios culturales* (2001), *Abd al Rahman III, the first Cordoban caliph* (2005), *Los Almohades: Problemas y perspectivas* (as co editor, 2005) and *El cuerpo derrotado: Cómo trataban musulmanes y cristianos a los enemigos vencidos* (*Peninsula Ibérica, ss. VIII XIII*) (as co editor, 2008).
The New Cambridge History of Islam offers a comprehensive history of Islamic civilisation, tracing its development from its beginnings in seventh century Arabia to its wide and varied presence in the globalised world of today. Under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad, the Muslim community coalesced from a scattered, desert population and, following his death, emerged from Arabia to conquer an empire which, by the early eighth century, stretched from India in the east to Spain in the west. By the eighteenth century, despite political fragmentation, the Muslim world extended from West Africa to South East Asia. Today, Muslims are also found in significant numbers in Europe and the Americas, and make up about one fifth of the world’s population.

To reflect this geographical distribution and the cultural, social and religious diversity of the peoples of the Muslim world, *The New Cambridge History of Islam* is divided into six volumes. Four cover historical developments, and two are devoted to themes that cut across geographical and chronological divisions – themes ranging from social, political and economic relations to the arts, literature and learning. Each volume begins with a panoramic introduction setting the scene for the ensuing chapters and examining relationships with adjacent civilisations. Two of the volumes – one historical, the other thematic – are dedicated to the developments of the last two centuries, and show how Muslims, united for so many years in their allegiance to an overarching and distinct tradition, have sought to come to terms with the emergence of Western hegemony and the transition to modernity.

The time is right for this new synthesis reflecting developments in scholarship over the last generation. *The New Cambridge History of Islam* is an ambitious enterprise directed and written by a team combining established authorities and innovative younger scholars. It will be the standard reference for students, scholars and all those with enquiring minds for years to come.
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A note on transliteration and pronunciation

Since many of the languages used by Muslims are written in the Arabic or other non Latin scripts, these languages appear in transliteration. The transliteration of Arabic, Turkish and Ottoman Turkish is based upon the conventions used by The encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, with the following modifications.

As regards Arabic, for the fifth letter of the Arabic alphabet (jīm), j is used (not dj), as in jumla. For the twenty first letter (qāf), q is used (not k), as in qādī. Digraphs such as th, dh, gh, kh and sh are not underlined. For terms and names in other languages, the individual chapter contributors employ systems of transliteration that are standard for those languages. Where there are well accepted Anglicised versions of proper nouns or terms (e.g. Baghdad, Mecca), these are used instead of strict transliterations.

For Ottoman Turkish, The encyclopaedia of Islam distinguishes between words of Arabic and Persian origin and words of Turkish origin. For the former, consonants and long vowels are transcribed as above, but short vowels as in modern Turkish orthography. For words of Turkish origin, the consonants are transcribed as above (but with v for w), and the vowels as in modern Turkish orthography.

As far as the pronunciation of Arabic is concerned, some letters can be represented by single English letters that are pronounced much as they are in English (b, j, f, etc.); one exception is q, which is a ‘k’ sound produced at the very back of the throat, and another is the ‘r’, which is the ‘flap’ of the Spanish ‘r’. Others are represented by more than one letter. Some of these are straightforward (th, sh), but others are not (kh is pronounced like ‘j’ in Spanish, gh is similar to the uvular ‘r’ of most French speakers, and dh is ‘th’ of ‘the’, rather than of ‘thing’). There are also pairs of letters that are distinguished by a dot placed underneath one of them: thus t, s, d, z and their ‘emphatic’ counterparts ṭ, ġ, ẓ, and which give the surrounding vowels a thicker, duller sound (thus s as in ‘sad’, but ẓ as in ‘sun’); ḏ and ṭ may also be pronounced as an emphatic dh.
A note on transliteration and pronunciation

The ‘ is the hamza, the glottal stop, as in the Cockney ‘bu’er’ (‘butter’); the ‘ is the ‘ayn, a voiced pharyngeal fricative that can be left unpronounced, which is what many non Arab speakers do when it occurs in Arabic loanwords; and the h is a voiceless pharyngeal fricative that can be pronounced as an ‘h’ in all positions, just as non Arabs do in Arabic loanwords. Doubled consonants are lengthened, as in the English ‘hot tub’.

The vowels are written as a, i and u, with ā, ī and ū signifying longer versions; thus bit and beat. W and y can function either as consonants or, when preceded by a short vowel, as part of a diphthong.
Chronology

336/948  Kalbid rule begins in Sicily.
359/970  The Fāṭimids establish their capital in Cairo.
         The Zirids rule in their name in Ifrīqiya.
361/972  The Fāṭimids leave for Egypt.
400/1009 Destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem during the reign of the Fāṭimid caliph al-Hākim.
401/1010  The ruling Sharīf in Mecca proclaims himself caliph.
         In Yemen al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Ḥāsim al-‘Iyānī claims to be the rightful imam and the mahdī.
405/1014  The Zirid Ḥammād recognises the ‘Abbāsid caliphate.
406/1015  Massacre of Shī‘is in Tunis and Qayrawān.
411/1021  Death of the Fāṭimid caliph al-Ḥākim.
414  15/1024 5  Famine in Egypt.
416/1025  Beginnings of the Mirdāsid dynasty (northern Syria and the middle Euphrates area). Byzantine landing at Messina.
422/1031  Abolishment of the Umayyad caliphate in Córdoba.
425/1034  Peace between the Kalbids of Sicily and the Byzantines.
426  40/1035 48  Beginnings of the Almoravid movement.
431/1040  The Saljuq Turks defeat the Ghaznavids at Dandānqān.
440/1048 9  The Zirids recognise the ‘Abbāsid caliphate and renounce allegiance to the Fāṭimids.
443/1051  The amīr of the Banū Quarra in Barqa (Cyrenaica) denounces the Fāṭimids and offers his allegiance to the Zirid al-Mu‘izz.
443/1052  The Arab Banū Hilāl after entering Ifrīqiya from Fāṭimid Egypt defeat the Zirids at Ḥaydarān.

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The Zīrid al Mu‘izz returns to Fātimid allegiance. 

Death of al Māwardī, author of an influential work on Islamic political thought (al Āhkām al sulṭāniyya).

Death of Ibn Yāsīn, founder of the Almoravid movement.

The Normans commanded by Roger cross into Sicily.

Death of the Zīrid al Mu‘izz.

Al Şulayhi rules over wide parts of Yemen in the name of the Fātimid caliph. A pro Fātimid reign is installed in Mecca.

Death of the Zāhirī jurist and theologian Ibn Ḥazm in al Andalus.

The Saljuq Alp Arslān invades Georgia and takes the Armenian towns of Ani and Kars.

Massacre of Jews in Zīrid Granada.

Founding of Marrakesh by the Almoravids.

The Saljuqs defeat the Byzantines at Manzikert.

Norman conquest of Palermo.

The Armenian Badr al Jamāl intervenes in Fātimid Egypt, beginning of military rule.

Sulaymān ibn Qutulmish seizes Nicaea and founds the Saljuq sultanate of Anatolia.

Norman conquest of Val di Mazara in Sicily.

Christian conquest of Toledo.

The Almoravids defeat the Christians at the battle of Zallāqa.

Completion of Norman conquest of Sicily (started in 453/1061).

Assassination of the Saljuq vizier Nizām al Mulk.

The Fātimid caliph al Mustāṣir dies. Disagreement over his succession brings about the emergence of the Nizāris, a branch of the Ismā‘īlīs. El Cid conquers Valencia.

Qilij Arslān annihilates the People’s Crusade of Peter the Hermit after it crossed the Bosphorus from Constantinople. The Hilalian Banū Jāmiʿ establish their rule in Gabes.

The Crusaders conquer Antioch.

The Crusaders conquer Jerusalem.
Baldwin of Edessa has himself crowned king of Jerusalem.

Acre conquered by the Crusaders.

Tripoli conquered by the Crusaders.

In Cordoba, burning of the works by al Ghazâlî, author of Ihya‘ ‘ulûm al din (‘The revival of religious sciences’).

Death of al Ghazâlî.

Ibn Tûmart, the founder of the Almohad movement, arrives at Bougie.

Christian armies reach the banks of the Ebro river in the Iberian Peninsula.

The Fâtimid caliph al Âmir puts an end to al Afḍal’s military rule. Ibn Tûmart is proclaimed mahdi.

The Fâtimids invade Palestine and are defeated by the Crusaders at the battle of Yabne (Ibelin).

Tyre conquered by the Franks. Ibn Tûmart and his followers move to Tinmal.


‘Abd al Mu’mîn is proclaimed Ibn Tûmart’s successor.

The Normans of Sicily, under Roger II, occupy the isle of Djerba. Norman presence in the Ifrīqiyan coast lasts until 555/1160, being brought to an end by the Almohads.

The Almohads complete the conquest of the Sûs. Andalusî revolts against the Almoravids.

Zangi takes Edessa from the Franks. The Sufi Ibn Qasî rules in the Algarve (southern Portugal).

Death of Reverter, the commander of the Almoravid Christian mercenaries.

Fez conquered by the Almohads. Friday sermon delivered in the name of the Almohads in Cadiz. Ibn Hûd defeated and killed by the Christians in al Andalus.

Death of Zangi.

Almohad conquest of Marrakesh, capital of the Almoravid empire. Lisbon conquered by Crusaders travelling to Jerusalem (542/1147). Almohad troops
cross the Straits and take possession of the Algarve and Seville.

542/1147
Almería conquered by the Christians with Genoese help.

542 5/1147 50
The rebellion of al Massī crushed by the Almohads.

543/1148
Second Crusade. Norman conquest of al Mahdiyya. The Ebro valley is completely lost to the Christians.

544/1149
Nūr al Dīn wins the battle of Inab where Raymond of Antioch is killed. Death of Qādī ‘Iyād, author of a popular book on the Prophet Muḥammad. Great ‘purge’ (i’tirāf) of the Almohads.

546/1151
The rulers of the western regions of al Andalus cross the Straits to pledge obedience to the Almohad caliph ‘Abd al Mu’mīn.

547/1152
Algiers, Bougie, the Qal’a of the Banū Ḥammād and Constantine conquered by the Almohads.

548/1153
‘Abd al Mu’min crushes the tribes of the Banū Hilāl at Setif. Ascalon conquered by Baldwin III.

549/1154
Nūr al Dīn conquers Damascus and makes it his capital.

552/1157
The pledge of obedience of the original Almohad tribes is renewed and the caliph visits Tinmal. Almería conquered by the Almohads.

554 5/1159 60
Almohad conquest of Ifrīqiya, including al Mahdiyya, Sfax and Tripoli.

556/1161
Defeat of the Arab tribes by the Almohads in al Qarn near Qayrawān.

560 2/1165 6
The Almohads fight and defeat Mazīz dag al Ghumārī and his son.

560 5/1164 9
Frankish invasions of Egypt.

560/1165
The Jewish thinker Maimonides, escaping Almohad persecution, arrives in Egypt.

561/1166
Death of the Sufi ‘Abd al Qādir al Jilānī.

563/1168
The Almohad Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf takes the caliphal title.

564/1169
Ibn Mardanish, ruler of the Levant in al Andalus, is abandoned by Ibn Hamushk.

567/1171
Saladin puts an end to the Fātimid caliphate. Acknowledgement of the ‘Abbāsid caliphate in Egypt.
The Almohad caliph crosses to al Andalus with an army including Arabs from Ifrīqiya and raids are made in the area of Toledo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>567/1172</td>
<td>Death of Ibn Mardanish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>571/1176</td>
<td>Death of Abū Ḥaṣṣ ‘Umar Ḫintī, the last of Ibn Tūmart’s companions and eponym of the Ḥafsids.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>572/1176</td>
<td>Qilij Arslân defeats Manuel Comnenus at Myriokephalon ending Byzantine hope of retaking Anatolia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>573/1178</td>
<td>The king of Portugal raids the areas of Beja and Seville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>575/1180</td>
<td>The Almohad caliph leads a successful expedition against Gafsa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>578/1182</td>
<td>Alfonso VIII of Castile camps in front of Cordoba and his raids reach Algeciras near the sea. Death of the Sufi Aḥmad al Rifā’ī.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>582/1186</td>
<td>The Almoravid ‘Alī ibn Ghāniya occupies the oasis of Tawzar and Gafṣa and joins forces with the governor of Tripoli, the Armenian Qaraqūsh. The Almohad caliph Abū Yūṣuf Ya’qūb launches an expedition against Ifrīqiya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>583/1187</td>
<td>Saladin’s victory over the Crusaders at Ḥittin is followed by the Muslim conquest of Acre and Jerusalem. Dinar issued by Saladin in Damascus to celebrate the victory over the Franks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>585/1189</td>
<td>Third Crusade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>586/1190</td>
<td>An ambassador sent by Saladin asks the Almohad caliph to help halt the Crusaders in the east with his fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>587/1191</td>
<td>Acre conquered by the Crusaders. The Sufi al Suhrawardi executed in Aleppo on Saladin’s orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>589/1193</td>
<td>Death of Saladin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>591/1195</td>
<td>The Almohad army defeats Alfonso VIII at Alarcos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>595/1198</td>
<td>Death of the philosopher Averroes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Famine in Egypt.

The Almohads take the Balearic Islands from the Almoravid Banū Ghāniya.

Capture of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade. Byzantine rule reduced to the region around Nicaea and the principality of Trebizond.

Kaykhusraw I captures Antalya on the Mediterranean.

The Almohad caliph al Nāṣir is defeated by the Christians at Las Navas de Tolosa (al ‘Iqāb).

Beginning of the rise of the Marinids.

Kaykā’ūs I captures Sinop on the Black Sea.

Fifth Crusade.

Crusaders’ conquest of Damietta.

The Crusaders leave Egypt.

Deportation of the Muslims of the Val di Mazara to Lucera in Apulia.

Ibn Hūd al Judhāmī rebels against the Almohads in al Andalus. The caliph al Ma’mūn crosses the Straits to depose Yaḥyā al Mu’tasīm in Marrakesh.

Sixth Crusade. The Crusaders recapture Jerusalem. End of Ayyūbīd rule and beginning of Rasūlid rule in Yemen.

Beginning of the Ḥāfṣid dynasty in Ifrīqiya.

Kaykubād I defeats the Khwāraz Shāh at Yassi Chimen.

Majorca conquered by the Aragonese.

Christian conquest of Cordoba. The Mongols invade Georgia.

Christian conquest of Valencia.

Death of the Sufi Muḥyi ’l Din ibn al ‘Arabī. Rebellion of Bābā Ishāq. The Ayyūbīd ruler of Egypt al Sāliḥ Ayyūb takes actions against the āmīrs of the Ashrafyya and deprives them of their iqṭā’s.

The Mongol Ilkhans annihilate the Saljuq army at Köse Dağ east of Sivas.

The Khwarizmians take back Jerusalem from the Franks.

Treaty of Jaén: the Naṣrīd sultan surrenders Granada to the king of Castile and León and agrees to become...

Chronology
his vassal. Nomination of a Franciscan friar as bishop in Marrakesh to cater for the needs of the Christian mercenaries.

645/1248 The Almohad caliph al Sa‘id attempts to regain control of the Maghrib and Ifrīqiya, but is defeated by the ‘Abd al Wādid ruler of Tlemcen.

646/1248 Seventh Crusade. Conquest of Seville and Jaén by Fernando III of Castile.

647/1249 The Crusaders take Damietta.

648/1250 Mamlūks‘ victory over the Franks at al Manṣūra. End of Ayyūbid dynasty. First official celebration of the birthday of the Prophet (mawlīd al nabi) in ‘Azaﬁd Ceuta.

648/1251 Beginning of the Turkish Mamlūk sultanate in Egypt.

650/1253 The Ḥāfṣīd ruler proclaims himself amīr al mu‘minīn with the caliphal title of al Mustansīr.

654/1256 The Mongols invade Anatolia again.

656/1258 The Mongols under Hülegü sack Baghdad. Death of the Maghribi Sufi al Shādhīlī.

657/1259 The Sharīfs of Mecca acknowledge the Ḥāfṣīd caliphate.

658/1260 Mamlūk victory over the Mongols at the battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt. The Ḥāfṣīd al Mustansīr orders the execution of his chancery chief, the Andalusi man of letters Ibn al Abba¯r.

659/1260 Alfonso X of Castile attacks the port of Salé.


660/1262 Marrakesh attacked by the Marīnids.

662/1263 Commercial agreement between Mamlūk Egypt and Aragón.

663/1264 Mudejar revolt in the Iberian Peninsula.

663/1264 Baybars receives a delegation from Charles of Anjou which signifies European recognition of the Mamlūk sultanate as a great power in the Middle East and
signals the weakening of European support of the Crusaders.

663/1265 The Mamlûk ruler Baybars grants representation to the four Sunnî schools of law.

668/1269 Marînid conquest of Marrakesh. End of the Almohad caliphate.

670/1271 Lord Edward, son of King Henry III of England, leads a Crusader force to Acre and gains limited cooperation with the Ilkhanid Mongols. Extirpation of the Assassins in their fortresses in northern Syria. Baybars conquers Antioch from Bohemond VI.

672/1273 Death of the Sufi Jalâl al-Dîn al-Rûmî.

673/1274 Marînid conquest of Sijilmasa. Firearms used for the first time in the Maghrib.


675/1276 First Marînid madrasa. Death of the Hâfîzîd caliph al-Mustansîr and beginning of a lengthy period (675 718/1277 1318) of upheaval in Ifrîqiya.

675/1277 Baybars invades eastern Anatolia and defeats an Ilkhanid army near Elbistan.

680/1281 The Ilkhanid army is routed by the Mamlûks near Hîms.

681/1282 Death of Ibn Khallikan, author of a biographical dictionary of persons who for some reason or other had gained fame.

684/1285 Qalâwûn’s truce with Leon II guarantees an annual tribute and secures the safe passage of slave imports from the Golden Horde to Egypt through Armenian land.

688/1289 Mamlûk conquest of Tripoli from the Crusaders.

689/1290 Mamlûk capture of Acre that brings the Crusader presence in the Levant to an end.

691/1292 Marînid institutionalisation of the mawlid al-nabî as an official festival.

700/1301 Unprecedented discriminatory policy against the Copts.

704/1304 First Marînid organised pilgrimage to Mecca.
Chronology

709/1309 Death of the Sufi Ibn ‘Atā’ Allāh, author of a breviary which acquired enormous popularity.

715/1315 Egypt’s land survey.

721/1321 Anti Christian riots in Egypt.

723/1323 Peace treaty between the Mamlūks and the Mongol Ilkhans.

c. 724/1324 Death of ‘Othmān (Osman), the eponym of the Ottomans.

725/1325 Failure of the Mamlūk attempt to expand sphere of influence to Yemen.

726/1326 The Ottomans take Brusa.

728/1328 Death of the jurist and theologian Ibn Taymiyya.

731/1331 The beglik of Menteshe concludes a treaty with Venice. Fall of İznik (Nicaea) into Ottoman hands.

741/1340 Marīnid defeat at Río Salado (Iberian Peninsula) by Christian troops.

748 50/1348 50 Black Death. Cairo loses approximately 40 per cent of its population. Marīnid occupation of Ḥafṣid Tunis. The Ottomans plunder the plains near Thessaloniki.

753/1352 The traveller and scholar Ibn Baṭṭūṭa visits Mali.

755/1354 Attacks against the Copts in Egypt leading to conversions to Islam. A great earthquake destroys the walls of Gallipoli and other towns in the area which are swiftly occupied by the Ottomans. The Genoese Filippo Doria takes possession of Tripoli and sells it to Aḥmad Makkī, who recognises the sovereignty of the Marīnid sultans until 766/1364f.

758/1357 Ḥafṣid Tunis occupied by the Marīnids (second time).

770/1368 Death of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa.

773/1369 The Ottoman sultan Murād I takes Edirne (Adrianople).

777/1375 The beglik of Germiyān passes to the Ottomans. Cilician Armenia becomes a vassalage of the Mamlūk sultanate.

784/1382 Restoration of the non dynastic Mamlūk sultanate, with a move from a Turkish to a Circassian sultanate.

788/1386 7 The Ottoman sultan Murād I defeats Qaramān near Konya. The Ottomans take Thessaloniki.

789/1387 Trade treaty between the Genoese and the Ottomans.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>791/1389</td>
<td>Battle of Kosovo. The Ottoman sultan Murād and the Serbian leader Lazar lose their lives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>795/1392</td>
<td>King Martino of Sicily (Aragonese) takes possession of Djerba (until 801/1398).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>796/1394</td>
<td>The Ottomans lay siege to the Byzantine capital Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>798/1396</td>
<td>Battle of Nikopolis, defeat of King Sigismund of Hungary at the hands of the Ottomans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>799/1397</td>
<td>Bāyezīd I attacks Qaramān.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>803/1400</td>
<td>Timur Leng invades Syria. Aleppo and Damascus are sacked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>804/1402</td>
<td>Timur Leng defeats the Ottoman sultan Bāyezīd I in Ankara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>807/1405</td>
<td>Death of Timur Leng.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>808/1406</td>
<td>Death of Ibn Khaldūn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>811/1408</td>
<td>The Mamlūks appoint the ruler of Mecca vice sultan of the Ḥijāz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>818/1415</td>
<td>Ceuta is conquered by the Portuguese. Grain riots in the Mamlūk sultanate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>819/1416</td>
<td>Revolt of Börkluje Muṣṭafā near Izmir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>820/1417</td>
<td>Ottoman forces invade Albania and gain access to the Adriatic Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>821/1418</td>
<td>Death of al Qalqashandī, author of a famous secretarial manual and encyclopaedia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>823/1420</td>
<td>Mehmed I takes the Genoese colony of Samsun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>824/1421</td>
<td>Grain riots in the Mamlūk sultanate. Death of the Ottoman sultan Mehmed I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>833 4/1430</td>
<td>Thessaloniki and Ioannina fall under direct Ottoman rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>840/1437</td>
<td>‘Discovery’ of the grave of Idrīs II in Fez that supported Sharīfism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>842 3/1438 9</td>
<td>Direct Ottoman rule over northern Serbia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>845/1442</td>
<td>Death of the Egyptian historian al Maqrīzī.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>848/1444</td>
<td>Treaty of Edirne concluded between the Ottomans and Vladislav, Branković and Hunyadi. Battle of Varna between the Ottomans and Hungary with Ottoman victory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>857/1453</td>
<td>Ottoman conquest of Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>858/1454</td>
<td>End of the Rasūlids and rise of the Tāhiriids in Yemen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>868/1464</td>
<td>Mehmed the Conqueror resumes Ottoman expansion in Anatolia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>869/1465</td>
<td>Revolution in Fez and execution of the last Marīnid sultan by the shariʿfs of Fez. The Portuguese take al Qasr al Ṣaghīr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>872/1468f.</td>
<td>Timbuktu taken by the Songhay king Sunni ‘Alī Beri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>874/1470</td>
<td>Qaramān is formally annexed by the Ottomans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>875/1471</td>
<td>The Portuguese take Tangier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>894/1489</td>
<td>Ottomans defeated by the Mamlūks at the battle of Agha Çayiri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>896/1491</td>
<td>Peace treaty between Ottomans and Mamlūks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>898/1493</td>
<td>Askiyā Muḥammad's coup d'état against Sunni ‘Alī in Songhay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>903/1497</td>
<td>Spanish conquest of Melilla. The Portuguese irrupt into the Indian Ocean world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>906 7/1501</td>
<td>Ismāʿīl Shāh, the Safavid ruler, makes Twelver Shiʿism the state religion. Muslim ships are sunk off Calicut in Kerala.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>909/1503</td>
<td>A Portuguese squadron cruises at the entrance to the Red Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>910/1504</td>
<td>The Barbarossa brothers (Oruj and Khayreddîn) make La Goulette a base port for their activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>911/1505</td>
<td>Death of the religious scholar and polygraph al Suyūṭī.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>911 17/1505 II</td>
<td>Spain occupies the major points on the Mediterranean coast in Iffīqiya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>914/1508</td>
<td>The Mamlūk sultan al Ghawrī begins establishing an artillery corps to face European (Portuguese) expansion. Oran is taken by Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>915/1510</td>
<td>The Moroccan sharīf Muḥammad al Qāʾim emerges as the makdī destined to revive the fortunes of Islam. Spain takes Tripoli.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>916/1510</td>
<td>The Hāfsīd sultan gives the Barbarossa brothers permission to establish a secondary base in Djerba. Tripoli and Bougie are occupied by the Spaniards. Algiers agrees to pay tribute to Spain.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Ottoman prince Qorqud faces a rebellion in south western Anatolia led by Šâh Qulu (‘Slave of the Šâh’). A corps of harquebusiers is recruited from outside the mamlûks’ cadres. The king of Tlemcen accepts Spanish sovereignty.

The Ottoman sultan Selîm I routs the Safavid Šâh Ismâ’îl at Chaldiran. Oruj Barbarossa attempts to retake Bougie from the Spaniards.

Before this year Leo Africanus visited Timbuktu.

Selim I defeats the Mamlûk sultan at Marj Dâbiq. Ottoman conquest of Aleppo and Damascus. The Barbarossa brothers occupy Algiers.

Ottoman conquest of Cairo and end of Mamlûk sultanate. End of the Tâhirid sultanate in Yemen.

Oruj Barbarossa is killed.

Charles V is elected Holy Roman Emperor.

Khayreddîn Barbarossa presents the Ottoman sultan Selim I with the newly acquired territories in North Africa.


First siege of Vienna.

Khayreddîn Barbarossa forces the king of Tlemcen to pay tribute.

Süleymân appoints Khayreddîn Barbarossa commander in chief of the Ottoman fleet.

Ottoman conquest of Baghdad. Khayreddîn Barbarossa seizes Tunis and expels the Ḥafṣîd sultan.

Charles V leads an expedition against Tunis and restores the Ḥafṣîd sultan. The corsairs call in Ottoman help.
Süleyman and the king of France Francis I form an alliance.

Ottoman invasion of Yemen. The Ottoman fleet besieges unsuccessfully the Portuguese fort of Diu in Gujarat.

Ottoman conquests in Hungary. Charles V leads an unsuccessful naval expedition against Algiers.

Ferdinand besieges Buda unsuccessfully.

The corsair Turguhd briefly occupies al Mahdiyya, being dislodged by the Spaniards.

Truce between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. The Zayyânid king of Tlemcen asks for the protection of Spain, but it is eventually incorporated into the Ottoman 'regency of Algiers'.

Ottoman campaign against the Safavids.

The Sa'di Muhammad al Mahdi takes Fez.

Tripoli and Tlemcen fall to the Ottomans.

Failed Ottoman attempt to conquer Hormuz.

Muhammad al Shaykh al Sa'di conquers Fez a second time and eliminates the Wattasid dynasty.

Treaty establishing the borders between the Safavid and Ottoman empires. The Ottomans establish the province of Ethiopia, on the African Red Sea littoral (capital, Massawa).

Bougie is taken from Spain. Turguhd obtains the governorship of Tripolitania.

Qayrawân submits to Turguhd.

Failure of Ottoman siege of Malta.

Death of Süleyman the Magnificent.

Spanish attempt to conquer Algiers. The Ottomans lose Yemen.

Ottoman failed plan for the construction of a canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Great Morisco rebellion in Granada. Ottoman reconquest of Yemen.

The kingdom of Tunis incorporated into the Ottoman empire. Failed Ottoman attack against Astrakhan.

The allied fleet of Venice, Spain, the Knights of St John and the Pope destroy much of the Ottoman fleet off Naupaktos (Lepanto) in the Gulf of Corinth.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>980</td>
<td>Great epidemic at Algiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>981/1573</td>
<td>Tunis is retaken by the Spaniards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>982/1574</td>
<td>The Ottomans took definitive control of Tunis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>986/1578</td>
<td>Defeat of the Portuguese at Wādī al Makhāzin and death of Don Sebastian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>986/1578</td>
<td>Ottoman Safavid war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>989/1581</td>
<td>The British Levant Company is granted the monopoly to trade in the Ottoman empire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>993/1585</td>
<td>The corsair Murād Raʾīs ventures into the Atlantic and plunders the Canary Islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>996/1587</td>
<td>The beglerbegis of Algiers are replaced by pashas appointed for a term of three years. This system lasts until 1070/1659.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>996/1588</td>
<td>Death of the Ottoman architect Sinān. Defeat of the Spanish Armada by Elizabethan England.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>999/1591</td>
<td>Moroccan conquest of Timbuktu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001 15/1593 1606</td>
<td>Ottoman ‘Long War’ with the Habsburgs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1002/1593</td>
<td>The scholar Aḥmad Bābā al Timbuktī, who resisted the Saʿdī conquest of his land, is arrested by the Moroccans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1004 7/1595 8</td>
<td>One of the deys (Ottoman officers), ʿOthmān, sets up a kind of principality in Tunisia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1005/1596</td>
<td>Rebellion of Qara Yazījī in Anatolia. Ottoman victory of Mezōkeretes/Haçova against the Habsburgs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1017 23/1609 14</td>
<td>Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1018/1610</td>
<td>Larache passes to Christian hands. The French destroy the major part of the Tunisian fleet in La Goulette.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1032/1622</td>
<td>Treaty between England and Algiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1034/1624</td>
<td>The Dutch threaten Algiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1035/1626</td>
<td>Treaty between the Dutch and Algiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1036/1627</td>
<td>Death of Aḥmad Bābā al Timbuktī.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1037/1627</td>
<td>Pirates from Algiers sack the coast of Iceland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1038/1628</td>
<td>Treaty between France and Algiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1041/1631</td>
<td>Corsairs from Algiers reach England.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1049/1639</td>
<td>Treaty of Qaṣr Shīrīn.</td>
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Abbreviations

AA  Al Andalus
AI  Annales Islamologiques
Annales ESC  Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations
AQ  Al Qanṭara
BEO  Bulletin d’Études Orientales
BRIJMES  British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
BSOAS  Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
CSHB  Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae
El2  Encyclopaedia of Islam
IC  Islamic Culture
IJAHS  International Journal of African Historical Studies
IJMES  International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
IJTS  International Journal of Turkish Studies
ILS  Islamic Law and Society
IOS  Israel Oriental Studies
JAH  Journal of African History
JAOS  Journal of the American Oriental Society
JESHO  Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient
JNES  Journal of Near Eastern Studies
JRAS  Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
JSAI  Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam
JSS  Journal of Semitic Studies
JTS  Journal of Turkish Studies
MEAH  Miscelánea de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos
MSR  Mamluk Studies Review
MUSJ  Mélanges de l’Université Saint Joseph
MW  Muslim World
RA  Revue Africaine

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List of abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>REI</td>
<td>Revue des Études Islamiques</td>
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<tr>
<td>REMMM</td>
<td>Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROMM</td>
<td>Revue de l’Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée</td>
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<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Studia Islamica</td>
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<td>ZDMG</td>
<td>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft</td>
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Map 1 The Taifa kingdoms
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Introduction

MARIBEL FIERRO

What do the geographical areas included in this volume have in common over a period reaching from the fifth/eleventh to the twelfth/eighteenth century that would give meaning to both the periodisation and the geographical subdivisions used here? As noted in their introduction by the editors of volume 3 of the *New Cambridge history of Islam (The eastern Islamic world, fifth/eleventh to twelfth/eighteenth centuries)*, a certain degree of arbitrariness always accompanies the need to make temporal and territorial divisions. The obvious Mediterranean articulation of the political and commercial trends dealt with in this volume should not obscure the deep connections that linked the western and eastern Islamic worlds their populations, their religious and political concepts and practices, and their economies. It is also obvious that the encounter, not to say clash, with the two great civilisations of India and China mostly affected the eastern regions of the Islamic world, while the encounter and clash with Christendom had a deeper impact on the western Islamic regions. But here again things were not as simple as may appear. The westward diffusion of tea from China can be used to exemplify the often convoluted paths through which links between different areas were established. Having been used in the Chinese empire for centuries, tea was not introduced into Iran until the eleventh/seventeenth century; yet it was not from there that it crossed into the Ottoman lands. Instead, Russia was the channel through which tea made its way to Turkey in the nineteenth century, and from there it moved to the Fertile Crescent, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, Algeria and Tunis lands where coffee had been introduced, starting in Arabia, from the ninth/fifteenth century onwards. But tea had reached the ‘far Maghrib’ much earlier. Dutch sea traders brought it to western Europe in the early seventeenth century, and from there it became known in England. Enterprising British trade then led Moroccan and Saharan populations to become habituated to its consumption in the eighteenth century. This panoramic view of the diffusion of tea reflects the complex interplay between
political, economic, cultural and religious factors. Complexity reveals itself even when commonalities and continuities are sought after and stressed, while it also forces us to consider the extent of the differences and disruptions that geographical and temporal diversity seem to imply. What follows is intended to serve as a roadmap to guide the reader through this volume, which is devoted to the history of the western Islamic world from the disintegration of the (real or apparent) political unity brought about by the early caliphates to the moment at which the regions in question started to be overtaken by European colonialism and modernity.

A geo-political framework

The Fāṭimid caliphate at its peak between 365/975 and 415/1025 extended from Tunisia and Sicily in the west to Ḥimṣ and Tripoli in the east. By the middle of the fifth/eleventh century, the western possessions were lost to Berber rulers, the Zirids, while Palestine was threatened by Turkish incursions and, later on, lost to the Crusaders, with the exception of a few coastal towns. Mecca and Medina acknowledged Fāṭimid rule until the reign of the caliph al Mustansir (427 87/1036 94). Cairo became the resting place of the Fāṭimid caliphs, including those who had died in Ifrīqiya, thus stressing the genealogical legitimacy of their imamate.3

The Almohad caliphate at its height extended from the Sūs (southern Morocco) to the Iberian Peninsula and from the Atlantic to the central Maghrib.4 Its collapse gave rise to different political entities in al Andalus and in what are now Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The Berber Almohads presented themselves as inheritors of the Mahdī Ibn Tūmar’s legacy of religious and political reform, while at the same time claiming a Qaysī (referring to the northern Arab tribe of Qays ‘Aylan that includes Quraysh) genealogy. For all their propaganda of universal rule, the Almohads were never able to capture the Holy Cities, control over which was an important basis for Ayyūbid, Mamlūk and Ottoman claims to legitimacy. Tinmal in southern Morocco, where Ibn Tūmar’s grave was located, was the destination of caliphal visits, but its appeal remained regional and was short lived.

Saladin’s (r. 569 89/1174 93) direct or indirect rule comprised not only Egypt and Syria, including most of the territories recently held by the Franks, but also a portion of Mesopotamia, the Ḥijāz, Yemen and Cyrenaica. Saladin’s forces also penetrated deep but only temporarily into Nubia. As ‘Reviver of the empire of the Commander of the faithful’, the Ayyūbid ruler put an end to the Fāṭimid caliphate and supported ‘Abbāsid legitimacy. Mostly noted for his jihad against
the Crusaders, his reign witnessed the official strengthening of Sunnism in Egypt after the Fātimid/Ismāʿīlī experience.5

The Mamlūk sultanate was centred in Egypt and Syria. As successors of the Ayyūbids, the Mamlūks made jihad against the Crusaders a crucial element of the legitimacy of their rule. At the beginning, they visited the tomb of the last Ayyūbid sultan (al Śāliḥ Ayyūb) as the site of the ceremony in which new Mamlūk officers were commissioned, but with Khalīl (r. 689 93/1290 3) it was replaced by the tomb of Qalāwūn (r. 678 89/1279 90). Mongol advance and the fall of Baghdad provided a new basis for Mamlūk legitimacy with the transfer of the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate to Cairo (656/1258) and the victory of ‘Ayn Jālūt (658/1260) against the Mongols.6

The Ottoman empire extended from Anatolia to the Safavid empire in the east with the barrier formed by the mountains of eastern Anatolia, Azerbaijan and the Caucasus and included Syria (922/1516) and Egypt (922/1517), while in North Africa the so called Corsair states were under Ottoman control. The conquest of south eastern Europe, which gave the Ottomans access to substantial material resources, had lasting consequences in the area. The last ‘Abbāsīd caliph, al Mutawakkil III, was with the Mamlūk army when the latter was defeated by the Ottomans at the battle of Marj Dābiq (922/1516) and was deported to Constantinople. The ‘Abbāsīd caliphate ended with him. The Ottoman sultans used the caliphal title, even claiming in the tenth/sixteenth century that al Mutawakkil had named Sultan Selīm I as his heir. The Ottoman caliphate was abolished in 1924.7 The Moroccan Sa’dis also made caliphal claims, using their Sharīfī descent, their Sufi connections (they moved al Jazūlī’s tomb to Marrakesh), their jihad against the Christians and the conquest of the Sūdān to strengthen their legitimacy. Ottoman expansion stopped at Morocco.8

For the purpose of this volume, the geopolitical area in which these and lesser dynasties ruled has been divided into three sections. The first includes al Andalus and North and West Africa. The second embraces Egypt, Syria, western Arabia and Yemen. The last section concentrates on Anatolia and the Balkans. The first four parts into which this volume is divided correspond to each of those areas in combination with a chronological and political framework. Thus, Part I deals with al Andalus and North and West Africa, and Part II with Egypt, Syria, western Arabia and Yemen from the fifth/eleventh until the ninth/fifteenth centuries, before Ottoman rule. Part III concentrates on the Ottoman empire, from pre Ottoman Anatolia to the extension of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, Syria, Egypt, western Arabia and Yemen. Part IV focuses again on North and West Africa from the tenth/sixteenth to the twelfth/eighteenth centuries, both from the perspective of
those lands that remained outside the sphere of Ottoman power (Morocco and
sub Saharan West Africa) and of those that fell under the control of the Sublime
Porte.

Part V of this volume is intended to bring together some of the threads that
have sustained the narrative in the preceding parts, with an analytical and
comparative perspective. Focusing on rulers, soldiers, peasants, traders and
scholars, it comprises five chapters, dealing with state formation and organ-
isation, conversion to Islam, taxation and the raising and payment of armies,
trade and scholarship.

Within the first four parts, the chapters chiefly concentrate on ruling
dynasties and the narrative of their political history. Volume 4 of the New
Cambridge history of Islam deals with religion, culture and society during the
period covered in volumes 1–3, but it is obvious that any treatment of political
history necessarily involves society, economy, culture and religion. What
follows is an overview of some of the issues that have informed the treatment
of political history by the various contributors, issues that are treated in more
detail in Part V of this volume.

**Old and new Muslims**

Most of the lands covered here (Syria, Egypt, North Africa, al Andalus, Sicily,
with Anatolia as one of the exceptions) had already been under Muslim rule
for three or four centuries. By the fifth/eleventh century, Muslims had just
become or were becoming the majority of the population across these
regions. From this time onwards the different regions in various ways expe-
rienced shifts from ‘new’ to ‘old’ Muslim societies. Arabisation was helped in
areas such as Egypt and North Africa by large scale immigration of Arab
tribes. Berber survived as a daily language, and there were some attempts at
using it as an Islamic literary language. Latin and Romance in al Andalus and
Coptic in Egypt died out, the latter surviving after the seventh/thirteenth
century only for liturgical use. The sixth/twelfth century also saw the dis
appearance of the indigenous Christian community in al Andalus through
expulsion and conversion, a process that went hand in hand with the con-
fiscation of the Church lands. A similar development took place in Egypt in the
eighty/fourteenth century, when the endowed properties (waqfs) of the local
churches were confiscated by the Mamlûk government, leading the Copts
to mass conversion. If the Sunnî identity of Egypt had taken shape under
the Ayyûbids, its Islamisation was achieved under the Mamlûks. The slow
process of Islamisation in North Africa saw the reduction of ancient Khâriji
settlements, the disappearance of local variants of Islam such as the religion of the Barghawatā and also of imported Shi‘īsm, and the emergence of a distinct and innovative local interpretation of Islam, that of Almohadism. Its blend of Mahdism and rationalism made possible the appearance of unique intellectual figures such as the Sufi Muḥyī al Dīn Ibni ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) who had a lasting influence in the East where he settled and the philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) whose influence was mostly limited to Latin Christendom.

By the eighth/fourteenth century, the penetration of Turkish tribes into the remains of the Byzantine empire opened up new lands to Muslim rule, and to the spread of the Islamic religion and the Turkish language. The second half of the ninth/fifteenth century witnessed the loss of al Andalus (with the fall of Granada in 897/1492) on the western shore of the Mediterranean Sea, while on the eastern shore the Ottomans conquered Byzantium (857/1453) and started their expansion into the Balkans. Muslim penetration mostly peaceful through traders, scholars and Sufis in West and East Africa continued at an uninterrupted pace. Arabic had a place in these new Muslim societies as the language of the new religion. Turkish, the language of conquerors and rulers, not only survived for daily communication, but gained new vitality as an Islamic language. The possibility that the Romance language of the Christian conquerors of al Andalus could become an Islamic language for the communities of Mudejars (Muslims living under Christian rule) came to nothing, as those communities eventually disappeared through emigration, forced conversion and final expulsion.

During his famous travels, the North African Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (d. 770/1368 or 779/1377) saw much among his fellow Muslims in West Africa, Egypt, Syria, Anatolia and further east that looked alien to him, but in every place he met other religious scholars and Sufis with whom he often shared a common language Arabic and a common religious and legal culture. There were local contexts for the expression of a universal faith. The production, transmission and assimilation of what has been called an ‘international Sunnī culture’ were the main features of the intellectual and social endeavour of the scholars living in those societies. One crucial impulse in that endeavour had been the effort to check the attraction of Isma‘īlī and, more generally, Shi‘ī doctrines and political thought, with al Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) as its main representative. Later on, the dangers represented by the attraction of certain Sufi doctrines (God’s love, the unity of existence), and the threat posed by the Mongol rulers and their infidel legal code, as well as the need to check the fragmentation of Revelation propelled by the legal schools, motivated the
innovative religious and political doctrines of another influential scholar, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328).

Caliphs and sultans

An Ismaʿili dynasty, the Fāṭimids, had managed to rule an extensive area of the former ‘Abbāsid caliphate for almost three centuries (297/567/909-1171). They ruled as caliphs, thereby challenging ‘Abbāsid legitimacy, while their existence and success provoked the proclamation of yet another caliphate, that of the Umayyads in the Iberian Peninsula. The latter was to have an ephemeral existence, leading to the disintegration of the political unity of al Andalus, with new rulers of different ethnic backgrounds coming to power (they were Arabs, Berbers and slaves, usually of Slav origin; note the absence of rulers of Hispano Roman or Hispano Gothic origins). All those Taifa (Party) kings proved unable to solve the problem of their military weakness when confronted with Christian expansion.

Of the three caliphates that coexisted in the fourth/tenth century, only the ‘Abbāsid survived after the sixth/twelth century, even if mostly in a symbolic way. It served to legitimise the Saljuq sultanates and Berber Almoravid rule, and also helped the Andalusi opponents of the Almohad caliphate in their struggle for legitimacy. In 567/1171, Saladin had the name of the ‘Abbāsid caliph pronounced in the mosques of Cairo for the first time in over two hundred years. The seat of the caliphate was to move to Cairo when in 656/1258 the Mongols sacked Baghdad, and in the tenth/sixteenth century the last ‘Abbāsid caliph lived under Ottoman control. By then, the ‘Abbāsid caliphate existed in form only, while Sunnī legal scholars had already adjusted the theory of the caliphate accordingly, with al Māwardī (d. 450/1058) a crucial figure in that endeavour. ‘Abbāsid survival as an effective caliphate might have worked out otherwise had an attempt by the caliph al Naṣir (r. 575/1180-1225) to give the caliphate a new social and political basis of power not failed. The Almohad political and religious system, that needs to be analysed taking into account the Fāṭimid precedent, and some Sufi orders responded among other factors to similar tendencies for centralised and hierarchical socio-political organisations.

The Ottomans’ rise to power greatly helped at the beginning by avoiding the faction fighting that characterised other Turcoman polities and later the Ottoman sultans’ claim to be entitled to the inheritance of the ‘Abbāsid caliphs were consolidated by the control of Medina and Mecca. When in 925/1519 the Habsburg Charles V was elected Holy Roman
Emperor, the road was open for Süleymân I claiming the title of caliph. The interplay between Christian and Islamic political and religious titles, and the corresponding doctrines sustaining them, underline the intertwining at various levels of what could be understood as an ‘Islamo Christian civilisation’, with its most open manifestations in those regions where contact was closer, such as the Iberian Peninsula, Norman Sicily, the Balkans and the southern regions of the Russian empire.\(^{12}\)

The Ottoman sultan’s right to universal Islamic sovereignty was reinforced by declaring the Safavid shahs to be heretic. Accusations of heterodoxy and infidelity were often instrumental in the acquisition of political power and in the process of state formation, as shown by the Almohad declaration of Almoravid unbelief because of their anthropomorphism, and by various examples in sub-Saharan Africa. Genealogies of power in the Sunni world were another instrument to reinforce and legitimise the exercise of political and religious authority. Sharīʿism (descent from the Prophet’s family) developed alongside Sufism as well as the increasing veneration for the Prophet Muhammad, of which the spread of his Nativity (mawlid) after the seventh/thirteenth century is a clear sign.

Soldiers and peasants

The Fāṭimids had established their caliphate by using the military power of a Berber tribe, the Kutâma. The combination of tribe and charismatic religious leadership was a recipe for the success of new dynasties arising in the Maghrib.\(^{13}\) Berber charismatic leadership was channelled within Mālikī Sunnism in the case of the Almoravids (Ṣanhâja), while the Almohads (Maṣmūda and Zanāta) attempted what might be described as a political and doctrinal ‘Sunnitisation’ of Shiʿīsm. The dynasty that succeeded the Almohads in the western Maghrib (Morocco), the Marinids (Zanâta), would, for their part, resort to the jihad spirit and to the return to traditional Mālikī Sunnism.\(^{14}\)

The armies of these new dynasties did not preserve their original Berber tribal character, as succeeding rulers had to face internal disaffection and growing external threat. The new sources of recruitment (Christian mercenaries, black slaves, Arab tribesmen, alien Berber groups) provided temporary solutions, but would prove to be inadequate to face ‘societies organized for war’ such as those that had arisen in the Christian part of the Iberian Peninsula.\(^{15}\) Christian advance did not stop at the Straits of Gibraltar. Portuguese and Spanish expansion on the southern shore of the Mediterranean had profound effects in the internal politics of the Maghrib. From the seventh/thirteenth century
onwards, Muslim military power in the western Mediterranean was forced to face an expanding Christendom that was putting to use new technologies in war both by land and by sea.\textsuperscript{16}

The Fāṭimid army used their Berber troops to conquer Egypt in 358/969. Also with Berber troops, they tried to extend their rule to Syrian lands (Damascus was ruled briefly by a Berber governor). It might then have appeared that Berber armies were going to play a crucial role in the political and military fortunes of Egypt and the Near East. But it was the Turkish ethnic element that eventually rose to prominence in those areas (Turkish troops were even to be found in Morocco), thus overcoming the previous preference for ethnically diverse armies whose factional struggles could serve the interests of the rulers. Turks could be enslaved, while Berbers (even if only nominally Muslim) were not. The Fāṭimid caliph al ‘Azīz (r. 365 86/975 96) had already brought Turkish slave troops into his army. Berbers did not excel in archery, and when they began to expand into Syria they suffered defeat at the hands of Turkish troops who were skilled horsemen and archers the Zangid Nūr al Dīn (r. 541 70/1146 74) was reported to say that only the arrows of the Turks were effective against the Crusader army.\textsuperscript{17} It was also the Turks who brought about the fall of the Byzantine empire, whereas the military capabilities of the Berbers were restricted to North Africa and Egypt. The use of Turkish cavalry accelerated during the Ayyūbid period, as horsemanship was crucial in the cavalry based army, although, in contrast with the Fāṭimid period, the institution of military slavery played a minor role under the Ayyūbids. By the seventh/thirteenth century, Turkish slave recruits were in especially abundant supply as a result of the Mongol invasions, creating large pools of captives who found themselves on the slave market. Several theories have been put forward regarding why the mamlūk system became so prominent: manpower shortages; technological advances such as the introduction of the stirrup, which transformed the role of the cavalry; Muslim withdrawal from political life because of its failure to approximate an Islamic ideal; the preservation of nomad vitality; the evolution of an elite more interested in commercial life than in military affairs.\textsuperscript{18}

There were varying degrees of organisation and hierarchisation in the armies, from the Ayyūbid army, strongly dependent on the amīrs, to the control and centralisation attempted by the Almohad caliphs. The military slave institution as embodied in the Mamlūk sultanate was one of the most successful and lasting of its versions. Mamlūk armies defeated both the Crusaders and the Mongols, and the Mamlūk sultans were thus perceived as the saviours of Islam. The Almohads who like the Almoravids had to resort
to Christian militias in their armies did not manage to stop Castilian and Aragonese military advance, and the Naṣrids survived by becoming vassals of the Christians or by taking advantage of their internal quarrels. The Marinids in Morocco and the Ḥaṣids in Tunis remained minor powers. There were attempts to seek Mamlūk intervention in the Iberian Peninsula, but to no avail. Battlefield losses were avoided, because of the expenses involved in the purchase and training of mamluks, and thus after Sultan Qalāwūn’s death in 689/1290 there were few campaigns abroad by mamlūk armies. By the ninth/fifteenth century, the mamlūk institution was showing signs of indiscipline and decaying effectiveness. The power and identity of the nomadic tribes grew at the expense of the Mamlūk state, probably owing to the influence of plague the Black Death raged from 748/1347 to 750/1349. Plague affected the Bedouin less, and the Bedouin emerged as the effective arbiters of political power in a number of regions in the south. (Bedouin tribes remained a source of instability and danger to the state, for example the Berber Hawwāra in Upper Egypt during Mamlūk times.)

Horsemanship was as crucial for the mamlūk army as it had been for that of the Ayyūbids. Adoption of gunpowder based weapons such as the harquebus, which could not be operated from horseback, would have profoundly transformed the structure of the army and therefore of the ruling elite. Rejection of the new guns has been considered to have led to mamlūk technological inferiority and to the defeat of Marj Dābiq in 922/1516, when the Ottomans seized the advantage after they opened fire on the mamlūk cavalry with artillery and muskets. Although the Ottoman armies continued to make use of a well trained infantry and gunpowder technology, the mamlūk institution survived under the Ottomans, thus showing a remarkable degree of adaptability. The Ottomans created ‘an institution of artificial kinship, the janissary standing army, which functioned as an extension of the royal household’. By the eleventh/seventeenth century, Ottoman military superiority was showing signs of decay, as only limited attempts were made to catch up with the increased firepower of European and especially of the Russian armies.

It has been said that ‘the most important function of a pre modern Islamic state was the raising and paying of the military forces. This determined the composition of the elite, the system of taxation and revenue raising and ultimately the success or failure of the regime.’ In the eastern part of the Mediterranean, there was a general growth of the iqtā system, consisting broadly of allocating the revenues from designated lands to military personnel, which replaced cash payments from the central government. The iqtā
system implied the notion of the divisibility of power and the impossibility of maintaining territorial unification. While there is no lack of studies devoted to the iqtâ‘ system in the Near East and Egypt, developments in the western Mediterranean are less well known. In the early Ottoman period, taxes were collected by the holders of tîmârs (military fiiefs). From the tenth/sixteenth century onwards, the prevalent system was that of tax farming. The sources at our disposal do not always yield much information about how peasants (on whom the burden of taxation mostly fell) accepted or resisted tax collection. We would like to have for other periods and cases data as detailed as those that have been recorded for the peasants (fellahs) of Tunis showing their waves of protest at the imposition of new and unjust taxes during the twelfth thirteenth/eighteenth nineteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{24} Islamic taxation was confessional as well, and was therefore much affected by changes involving the dhimmî communities (religious groups such as Jews and Christians granted a Covenant of protection). The minting of coins reflected the needs of taxation also of trade and how the extraction of wealth was legitimised by those carrying it out. The Almohads brought their revolution into the minting of coins, producing what a recent study has called the ‘first truly Islamic coin’, i.e., the square dirham.\textsuperscript{25} The Venetian ducat, which circulated widely in Muslim marketplaces, influenced the reforms in Mamlûk money (ninth/fifteenth century). Almoravid coins, for their part, had a profound impact on the Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula.

Local and state elites

The Fâtimids, the Almohads and the Ottomans, with their ideologies of universal rule, developed highly centralised bureaucratic organisations for the fiscal, political and legal administration of the territories under their rule. The Mamlûks also had a sophisticated bureaucratic and financial apparatus by which the military elite controlled the country and its sources of wealth. By contrast, Ayyûbîd rule was not imperial, and the Ayyûbîd ‘Muslim military patronage state’ was not predominantly bureaucratic or institutional. By giving members of the ruling family confederacy wide powers over certain areas, the Ayyûbîd system gave rise to rivalries and constant divisions that led to fragmentation and counteracted its positive side, namely family solidarity.\textsuperscript{26} The Ottomans carried centralisation further than previous governments, as shown by their army, their policy of legal codification, the creation of impersonal bureaucratic procedures, and the development of administratively subordinate religious elites. We have access to archival material for the
Ottoman period that is largely absent for other periods and areas. \(^{27}\) Thanks to it, the maintenance or loss of Ottoman rule in near and distant provinces can be analysed in detail, while allowing for the reconstruction of the different patterns of imperial and local elites formation according to time and space.

The means of recruiting the learned elites needed to maintain rule in towns varied through the period under study. They could be supported out of household revenues or were paid directly out of revenue collected by the state. A third method, which was to have enduring consequences, was the assignment of the revenues of charitable endowments (\textit{waqfs}). \(^{28}\) The flourishing of \textit{madrasas} (colleges) from the Saljuq period onwards many of them built at the initiative and expense of the ruling military and political elites represented an effort to give formal structure to and exert control over the social channels by which Islamic religious and legal knowledge was transmitted. At the same time the \textit{madrasas} offered more guarantees of a steady income to the ‘\textit{ulamā’} (religious scholars), thereby contributing to their professionalisation, and they sometimes also helped social mobility and integration, although family networking was almost inescapable. While in the Maghrib starting in the Marānid period the \textit{madrasas} were all official foundations, al-Andalus was the only area of the Muslim Mediterranean where the \textit{madrasa} was largely absent (only one foundation is recorded in the Naṣrid period) and played no role in the recruitment of scholars.

The emergence of \textit{madrasas} preceded the formation of the Sufi brotherhoods as organised groups holding properties and regulating the transmission of leadership. These brotherhoods soon became crucial institutions for both the individual and the societies in which they were active. They provided the initiates whatever their degree of involvement with a framework for socialisation and an ethical code, as well as doctrinal and ritual instruction. At the same time, they became involved in the management of considerable economic assets both in towns and in rural areas. Their leaders were sought as arbiters in tribal disputes and sometimes aspired to political rule, an aspiration that became a peculiar feature in certain regions such as the Maghrib, responding to the crisis of patronage in certain periods. Political agendas on the part of influential Sufis together with accusations of religious deviations were often adduced as rationales to suppress them and their followers, as happened with Ibn Barjān and Ibn al-‘Arīf (both died in 536/1141) in Almoravid times, and with al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) in Aleppo on Saladin’s orders.

Scholars filled the ranks of the urban notables, together with those who held influence and authority by virtue of the sword, and those whose
influence derived from the wealth acquired through trading and tax farming. These loosely defined groups which did not become corporate bodies were often linked through intermarriage or had overlapping interests based on religious, ethnic, political, social and economic identities, loyalties and affiliations. The ‘ulamā’’s role was not limited to interpreting and applying the Islamic law, but also covered the areas of mediation, intercession, arbitration or representation of ‘public’ opinion. The legality of any political system was dependent to a higher or lesser degree on the cooperation of the ‘ulamā’. The religious scholars’ withdrawal of consent or open confrontation with the political authorities was feared by the latter, who might try either to appease or to eliminate them. Sometimes the ‘ulamā’ themselves could become rulers, as happened in al Andalus. There were several cases there in which the local qādī (judge) seized political power in moments of military weakness or disintegration of centralised governments. The Andalusi qādīs who took power in Toledo, Seville and other towns during the fifth/eleventh century are paralleled by similar cases in the Near East (Tyre, Tripoli, Amīd). The same pattern was repeated later on when Almoravid rule collapsed in the Iberian Peninsula, and was then connected with other alternative ways of ‘creating’ rulers, such as military men or charismatic leaders (ghāzīs, Sufi shaykhs, mahdīs). Mahdīs were often successful in Yemen and the Maghrib. In Anatolia, Turkish ghāzīs (a much debated term)39 were responsible for the advance of Islam in territories that had been until then ‘the abode of war’ (dār al ḥarb). In al Andalus, the other main frontier area with Christendom, a ghāzī like figure is more clearly found among Christians, as shown by the case of the Cid,30 but also the Portuguese Giraldo Sem Pavor.

A sea for war and peace

To be a ghāzī was not exactly equivalent to performing jihad. It implied irregular raiding activity whose ultimate goal was (or at least the warriors and their supporters could imagine that it was) the expansion of the power of Islam. Being a ghāzī was never understood to involve indiscriminate warfare against infidels, and it could involve warfare against co religionists. At the time of the Crusades, the practical behaviour of both Muslim and Crusader rulers followed a similar pattern.31 Strategic and commercial interests often super seded political or religious differences between states, for example the way in which the Mamlūk regime secured the vital slave trade by taking advantage of Byzantium’s fear of the Mongols and the Norman Anjou dynasty.
The Crusades, in both the east and the west, posed a formidable challenge to the Muslims, one that had a profound impact on their armies, states and societies, resulting in the centralisation of Muslim power, the creation of jihad states, suppression of internal opposition, popular participation in warfare, promotion of trade, and varying degrees of pressure against and persecution of Christian and Jewish communities.32

All the territories under the control of the various dynasties during the fifth/eleventh to the twelfth/eighteenth centuries, despite their shifting frontiers, had one common border: the Mediterranean Sea. The Fāṭimids who established strong links with the Byzantines, the Normans and the Italian cities promoted the integration of Egypt both in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean trade. West Africa, where the Songhay empire was established, had close economic, political and religious relationships with the Mediterranean area. The Red Sea was a crucial link between Asia and Europe. The Muslims of al Andalus had a tradition according to which a bridge would appear to allow them to cross the Straits of Gibraltar and thus help them escape from an unfortunate fate at the hands of the Christians. This tradition its circulation can be traced back to earlier times gained special importance at the end of the Muslim presence in the Iberian Peninsula (ninth/fifteenth century), when frontiers were moving along the Mediterranean, though with different characteristics in each area. Those frontiers were military, economic, technological, ethnic and religious, though not always all at the same time. Fluidity and pragmatism were among their main features.

Sharing a common sea through which and along which traders, soldiers, pilgrims, scholars and ‘renegades’ of various sorts (such as the ‘Christians of Allāh’)33 moved and interacted made possible the circulation of ideas, artefacts, styles, techniques and plagues, among other things. Continuities, interruptions and changes in routes, commodities and patterns of trade in the Mediterranean world have been the object of general and specific studies, some of which such as those by Henri Pirenne and Ferdinand Braudel have proposed interpretative frameworks that are still being discussed.34

Egypt may serve as a focal point for an overview of developments taking place in the Mediterranean basin, while Yemen was a crucial link in the trade between Egypt and India, which explains the efforts of the dynasties from Cairo in securing their rule over it. Egypt thus appears to be a ‘natural’ point of intersection for the material and intellectual exchange between the eastern and western Islamic lands and between the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean commerce, but this does not mean that it always worked that way (‘geography alone does not create trade networks’).35 Egypt’s position in international
trade was enhanced by the policies of the Fāṭimid caliphs. Fāṭimid prosperity has been ascribed to the absence of interference by the state in the commerce of its subjects, coupled with the general growth of trade associated with the rise of western Europe. At the same time, there was the economic collapse of Iraq and the diversion of trade from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. After the establishment of the Crusader states, pilgrims no longer had access to the overland routes to the Ḥijāz through Palestine, and the Egyptian town of Qūṣ became the favourite stopping place of Muslim pilgrim caravans. North African slave and gold trade through the Sahara with the Bilād al Sūdān and to the south was largely in Ibāḍī Berber hands, but fell under Fāṭimid control. The revival of a market economy in Latin Europe went together with the near monopoly on the part of Italian seaports of commerce with Fāṭimid Egypt. In general, the Muslim world had difficulty keeping up with the pace of innovation in European shipbuilding and, later on, in stopping European penetration into local markets. Many examples could be given. Tunisia was dependent on raw materials coming from Europe in an important local industry, the fabrication of chechias (a kind of hat), and was also dependent on Jewish merchants for trade. Egypt’s industry did not undergo the necessary changes in technology and mechanisation that allowed Europe to produce plain and low priced goods for domestic and foreign markets.

The seventh/thirteenth century witnessed the growth of commerce between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, with Mamlūk Egypt greatly benefiting from it, especially the transit trade in luxury goods. While Italians and Catalans controlled trade in the Mediterranean, Egyptian and Yemeni merchants controlled the routes to the Indian Ocean. Competition arose with the northern route in the hands of the Genoese Ilkhanid alliance, following the Mongol conquests. By the late eighth/fourteenth century international trade was clearly depressed compared to earlier levels, owing to the break up of the Mongol empires, the closure of the overland routes to China which brought to an end the presence of large foreign merchant communities there, the extraordinary political turmoil in fifteenth century western Europe, and the depopulation associated with plague. Mamlūk institutionalisation from the times of Sultan Barsbāy (r. 825 42/1422 38) of the state monopoly on the transit trade and also local industry was not beneficial in the long run, and it entailed the disappearance of the enterprising Kārimī merchants.

The extent and pace of the impact of the ‘Discoveries’ in Mediterranean commerce is subject to debate. An attempt on the part of Aḥmad al Manṣūr
(r. 986 1012/1578 1603) to join England in the acquisition of American territory came to nothing, in spite of the sultan’s conviction that Morocco fulfilled what was required for such an enterprise: the expansion achieved south of the Sahara had given him personal experience as a conqueror and his men had proved their capacity for fighting and living in hot climates. If the Atlantic was lost to Muslim ships, the Indian Ocean had problems of its own. Ottoman trade has been described as being mostly internal, as the Ottomans failed in controlling the Indian Ocean trade after the Portuguese disrupted the old routes through the Gulf and the Red Sea. Attempts in the tenth/sixteenth century at building a canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and another canal between the Don, which flows into the Black Sea, and the Volga, which flows into the Caspian, did not materialise, in spite of their potential in counteracting European and Russian competition and advance. Piracy and privateering emerged as a general phenomenon on both sides of the Mediterranean, and it was only in the eleventh/seventeenth century that they became more specifically Muslim, with human beings as perhaps the most important of the commodities that sustained such activities. It would still be a long time before the abolition of slavery would become an issue as a result of the impact of Western colonialism. Some of the threads followed in this volume and most especially the understanding of the nature of political power, the sources and limitations of religious knowledge and authority, and the role of its bearers would then be stretched to a point not experienced before in the history of Islamic societies. The interested reader will find the reactions to such unprecedented pressure in volumes 5 and 6 of the *New Cambridge history of Islam*. Notes


27. With some exceptions, such as the Arabic documents from Norman Sicily: see Jeremy Johns, Arabic administration in Norman Sicily: The royal diwân, Cambridge, 2002.


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38. The relationship of Muslims with the sea has been analysed by Xavier de Planhol, *L’Islam et la mer: La mosquée et le matelot (VIIe XXe siècle)*, Paris, 2000.


41. Humphreys, ‘Egypt in the world system of the later Middle Ages’, 459.


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PART I

AL-ANDALUS AND NORTH AND WEST AFRICA (ELEVENTH TO FIFTEENTH CENTURIES)
Al-Andalus and the Maghrib (from the fifth/eleventh century to the fall of the Almoravids)

MARÍA JESÚS VIGUERA-MOLINS

Sources of information

Our understanding of al Andalus and the Maghrib in the fifth/eleventh century is largely based on textual sources, primarily historical narratives but occasionally documents of a different nature, such as those of the Cairo Geniza (a chamber of the synagogue in Fustat that served as the burial room for the various kinds of writing that originated within the Jewish community). This documentary evidence is increasingly being complemented by the fruits of archaeological excavation, numismatics and epigraphy. Here only the main documentary sources dating from the period in question will be dealt with.

The writings of Ibn Ḥayyān (d. 469/1076) and Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) represent the spectacular double finale to the chronicles of the Umayyad period. They both show a keen critical insight into the changes brought about by the fall of the Umayyad regime in the first years of the fifth/eleventh century, and give us valuable information about the Taifa kingdoms that followed. The Matīn, Ibn Ḥayyān’s great compendium, unfortunately only survives in the form of quotations by later authors.

Al ‘Udhrī (d. 478/1085) devoted particular attention to his patrons, the Banū Ṣumādih of Almeria. Though al ‘Udhrī’s text has not been preserved in its entirety, the historical and geographical details provided by the surviving parts stand out for a certain originality of analysis. Al Bakrī (d. 487/1094), son of the deposed Taifa king of Huelva, is acknowledged to be the best Andalusi geographer. Ibn Abī l Fayyāḏ (d. 459/1066), from Almería, compiled information about both the Umayyads and the Taifas in his book ‘On history lessons’ (al ‘Ibar), of which there remain only posterior quotations.

Apart from al ‘Udhrī, individual Taifas do not seem to have had their own particular chroniclers, with perhaps a few exceptions that are now lost, such as al Shilbi’s account of the Taifa of Seville. The book by Ibn ‘Alqama (d. 509/1115) may have either confined itself simply to the conquest of Valencia by the ‘Cid’
(the Christian nobleman Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar), which is the section preserved in the Primera crónica general de España, or also covered Valencia’s complex history during the Taifa period.

The great and largely lost encyclopaedia by al Muzā’ar, Taifa king of Badajoz (d. 460/1067), also included historical information. The last Taifa king of Granada, Abū ‘Abd Allāh, was the author of a unique political autobiography. Deposed by the Almoravids and exiled to the Maghrib, this Berber ruler penned a first person chronicle as a meditation on his destiny and the inexorable demise of the Taifas. Very short is the chronicle entitled Anonymous chronicle of the Taifa kings.

Some poets wrote compositions in verse on historical themes. One such work is the Kitāb al ṭibyān fī khułāfā’ Bānī Umayya fī ʿl Andalus by the Cordoban Ibn Zaydūn (d. 463/1070). Ibn Khāqān (d. 529/1134 or 535/1140) and Ibn Bassām of Santarem (d. 543/1148) each compiled anthologies containing as much as they could of the splendid literary output of fifth/eleventh century al Andalus, both poetry and prose, placing it within its political framework. Of particular interest from a historical perspective, the latter’s Treasury of the charms of the Andalusīs (al Dhakhīra fī māḥāsin ahl al Jazīra) included long passages from the work of the great historian Ibn Ḥawwān.

The Granadine Ibn al Sayraḥī, secretary to Abū Muhammad ibn Tāshfin, Almoravid governor of al Andalus, wrote two books: The bright lights, on the reports of the Almoravid dynasty (al Anwa‘r al jāhya fī ʿakhbār al dawla al murābītiyya) and Narrative of the news and government of the rulers (Taqaṣṣūl anbā‘ wa siyāsāt al ru‘āṣa‘). Both these and other lost works are quoted by later authors when writing about the Almoravids.

Contacts across the Mediterranean in the sixth/twelfth century facilitated the work of the great geographer al Idrīsī, grandson of one of the Ḥammūdid kings of the Taifa of Malaga. Under the patronage of Roger II, the Norman king of Sicily, he wrote his classic work Amusement of one who misses traversing distant lands (Nuzhat al mushtāq fī ikhtirāq al āfāq), as well as a compendium on roads and routes called Uns al mühaj.

Historical information can be gathered both from the biographical dictionaries and from legal works, such as al Wanshārīsī’s compilation of legal rulings (fatwā, pl. fatawā), as well as the Kitāb al ʿaḥkām al kubrā by Ibn Sahl of Jaén (d. 485/1093), the Aḥkām by the Malagan judge al Sha‘bī (d. 497/1103) and the Masā’il and tawwā by the great judge of Cordoba Ibn Rushd (d. 520/1126). Ibn al Ḥajj’s Nawāżīl is also an essential source for the Almoravid period. This rich output of fatwā compilations reveals the ascendance of the Mālikī legal school under the Almoravids. The compilation of legal rulings by the judge of Ceuta ‘Iyāḍ (d. 543/1149) was collected by one of his sons as Madhāhib al ḥukkām...
Finally, for the information it affords on the ‘censure of customs’ and the ‘marketplace police’ (hisba) in Seville under the Almohads, the ‘Treatise’ by Ibn ‘Abdûn is also of great value.

Territorial and urban developments

During the fifth/eleventh century, the Islamic West saw enormous shifts in territorial frontiers and variations in the patterns of population. In al Andalus, the Umayyad order, with its capital in Cordoba, splintered into the small competing power centres of the Taifas. In the process of division, the former territorial divisions that had existed under the Umayyad caliphate were largely rendered obsolete, the most common new unit becoming the iqlim or district, although in some cases the areas occupied by Taifas coincided with former Umayyad administrative units. The Taifas of Cordoba and Seville, for example, occupied what had been the corresponding Umayyad provinces (kürs), while what had previously constituted the three frontier Marches were now the Taifas of Saragossa, Toledo and Badajoz respectively. The single towns or castles that made up the smallest Taifas likewise overlay earlier territorial subdivisions. But under the Taifas, these early spatial units acquired a new meaning.

The Arabic sources speak of ‘kings of the Taifas’ but never of ‘kingdoms’, for in these petty states the sovereign embodied political rule rather than a particular geographic area. Modern historiography tends to call them ‘kingdoms’ because we are accustomed nowadays to thinking that political and territorial units are necessarily one and the same thing. But while a Taifa naturally did need to have its own political and administrative structure in order to exist, the permanence of its territorial shape was by no means so essential. How much land a Taifa occupied was ultimately less important than who ruled it. And in most cases the area occupied by a Taifa was highly variable, sometimes shrinking, sometimes expanding, sometimes even disappearing altogether as it was swallowed up by a stronger neighbour.

In both al Andalus and the Maghrib, the cities experienced substantial growth. In al Andalus, nearly thirty different cities found themselves the capitals of Taifas during this period and reaped the benefits that this new status and function entailed. In emulation of Umayyad Cordoba in its heyday, each of the new capitals tried to make its royal court a centre of culture to attract the experts in administration and letters who had dispersed during the period of civil unrest. Once settled in the Taifa capitals, these men formed new political and cultural elites, which in turn stimulated further urban growth. As for Cordoba itself, the loss of the city’s central role was accompanied by
considerable physical destruction, but it quickly assumed a new role as just one more Taifa capital.

In the Maghrib, the great urban event was the founding of Marrakesh in 463/1070 by the new Almoravid dynasty. Though it was Marrakesh that served as the capital for the centralised state, the Almoravids maintained local centres of power in several cities, with a view to maintaining control over the main trading routes between western Africa and the Mediterranean. With the conquest of Sijilmāsa in 446/1055, the Almoravids took control of the routes' gateway to the desert in the south. From there, they occupied Marrakesh, Fez and Tlemcen, key cities in between the desert and the Mediterranean, and finally the route's Mediterranean outlet itself at Ceuta. The Almoravids had an impact on urban centres in al Andalus too, bringing special prosperity to Cordoba, Granada, Seville, Jaén and Malaga in the south, Almería, Murcia and Valencia in the east and Lisbon, Silves and Niebla in the west.

In the first half of the fifth/eleventh century, both al Andalus and the Maghrib underwent internal fragmentation and, in addition, the relative political isolation of each intensified. By their conquests in the latter part of the century, the Almoravids managed for a while to repair internal divisions in both regions, and even managed to join al Andalus and the Maghrib together into a new political unit. This unification was seen as a step towards reconstructing the umma (community of the faithful) of Islam, which had been violated by the earlier territorial division, and consequently earned the Almoravids the praise of the Muslim sources, which often contrast the chaotic factionalism that existed before the Almoravid conquest with the unity that came after.

Another feature of Andalusi territory is its gradual erosion. The seesawing fortunes of Christianity and Islam in the Iberian Peninsula saw first the fall of Toledo to the Christians in 478/1085, the conquest of Valencia by the Cid and its subsequent recovery by the Almoravids, and the inexorable expansion of the Christian strongholds in the Pyrenees into the plains, with Christian armies taking Huesca in 489/1096 and reaching the banks of the Ebro river in 512/1118. The military defeats and political crises of the fifth/eleventh century favoured this southern advance of the Christians, while simultaneously the Christian ideology of the 'Reconquista' presented an analogous threat on the conceptual plane to the Muslims.

The fall of the Umayyad caliphate and the civil war
In 399/1009, in spite of the apparent strength of the Ummayad caliphate, civil war (fitna) broke out and the centralised caliphal state was torn into the
various Taifas, which would last for the rest of that century and into the next. The structure of the Umayyad state collapsed when al Ḥakam II died in 366/976, leaving the reins of power in the hands of his son Hishām II, still a young boy. This power vacuum was quickly filled by Ibn Abī ʿĀmir, known as al Manṣūr, who used Hishām as a figurehead to legitimize his own rule. When al Manṣūr died in 392/1002, his two sons succeeded him in power, still acting ostensibly in the name of the powerless Hishām II, a situation which caused irreparable damage to the caliphal institution.

Al Manṣūr’s second son, nicknamed ‘Sanchuelo’, finally brought the matter to a head by forcing Hishām II to declare him next in line for the caliphate, thus provoking an uproar from the Umayyad family, which overthrew and killed Sanchuelo, deposed Hishām II and proclaimed caliph a great grandson of the first caliph al Nāṣir named Muḥammad. Muḥammad adopted the name ‘al Mahdī’, meaning ‘the saviour’, a move with clear eschatological connotations that signalled his intention to save al Andalus (in other words, the Umayyad dynasty) from al Manṣūr’s family, the ‘ʿĀmirid usurpers.

Thus erupted the struggle for power between Umayyad and ʿĀmirid factions, the first of several simultaneous conflicts that made up the civil war. When al Mahdī dethroned Hishām II in what was in effect a coup d’etat, it represented the first time in two and a half centuries that a legitimate sovereign had been removed by force in al Andalus. He immediately faced threats from the supporters of the previous regime. Chief among them were the ‘Slavs’ (ṣaqqāliba), slaves of European origin who occupied important posts in the palace guard and provincial troops under al Manṣūr and his sons, and the Berber mercenaries that had been recruited in the Maghrib by the ʿĀmirids and brought over in large numbers to fight in the Peninsula. (As the latest wave of Berber arrivals in al Andalus, they were thought of as the ‘new’ Berbers.) Perceiving that the loyalty of these two groups lay primarily with the ʿĀmirids, al Mahdī discharged many of their members when he assumed power, and they moved out of Cordoba in search of new means of support. In many cases Slavs and ‘new’ Berbers set up their own self-governing entities where they settled. This is one pattern in the creation of the Taifas: a particular group endowed with civil or military power but regarded as outsiders or upstarts by the local population first imposed its rule over the area and then declared its independence from the central seat of power.

As if this was not enough, al Mahdī alienated many in his own faction by his scandalous treatment of Hishām II, whose death and burial he feigned. Al Mahdī’s actions obviously sank the authority of the caliphate to new depths, and as a result other members of the Umayyad family rose up against
al Mahdi. Years later, Ibn Hazm recalled his consternation: ‘I was invited to
go to the mountains near Cordoba to attend the burial of the caliph [Hisham II]. I and many others around me saw a bier on which lay a body in shrouds . . .
thousands of people recited the funeral prayers for his soul. But not many
months later, Hisham [II] reappeared . . . and was once again proclaimed
caliph . . . and his caliphate continued for [nearly] three more years.’

So the civil war raged with varying intensity throughout al Andalus, with
the focal issue of the conflict the caliphal succession. As we have seen, Hisham II was restored to the throne in 400/1010, but he died three years later in 403/1013, and between his death and the abolition of the caliphate in 422/1031 a
large number of pretenders to the caliphate competed among themselves. Six of them were members of the Umayyad family: al Musta’in, al Mu‘ayti, al Murtadā, al Mustazhir, al Mustakfi and al Mu‘tadd. Three supposed descend
ants of the Idrisid dynasty of the Maghrib also joined in the fray. Amid the
general turmoil, these ‘Berberised’ princes of the Hammūdi family (al Nāṣir, al Ma‘mūn and al Mu‘talī) managed briefly and intermittently to assume the
increasingly tarnished title of caliph, before withdrawing to establish their
own petty dominions in Malaga and Algeciras, with nominal control over Ceuta in North Africa as well. At the beginning, the Hammūdid supported
their legitimacy to rule as successors and defenders of the Umayyad caliphs,
but when they left Cordoba they started new ways of asserting their political
claims, as shown in their choice of honorific surnames and their fine gold
coinage."

Civil war, aiming at control of the caliphal throne, thus revolved around
three main power groups: the Andalusis, the ‘new’ Berbers and the Slavs.
Individuals from each group began to declare autonomous political entities in
various regions, either to fill a local power vacuum and thus prevent inter
vention from outside, as in the case of the Andalusis, or simply to guarantee
their own survival, as in the case of the Slavs and ‘new’ Berbers. The result was
a changing map of several dozen ‘states’ of varying importance, size and
longevity.

In the fifth/eleventh century, ‘Andalusi’ centres were those in which the
majority of the inhabitants were not recent arrivals (like the ‘new’ Berbers and
Slavs) but rather the descendants of, on the one hand, the diverse pre Islamic
indigenous population of the Iberian Peninsula and, on the other, the Arabs
and Berbers who had arrived starting in the second/eighth century. These two
component groups had become largely homogenised, especially during the
Umayyad caliphate of the fourth/tenth century. By the fifth/eleventh cen-
tury, a sense of being Andalusi was increasingly contrasted with the Berber
character of the latest and still unassimilated wave of immigrant mercenaries from the Maghrib.

The ‘Slavs’ were originally slaves of European descent, many of whom rose up in the state administration. They were generally eunuchs, though there were some exceptions, such as Mujāhid, who founded a dynasty in Denia. The first Umayyad caliph, ‘Abd al-Rahmān III, began to use the Slavs in large numbers, and they were entrusted with progressively more responsibility because of their personal loyalty to the sovereign and detachment from internal Andalusi affairs. This was equally true of the ‘new’ Berbers, which explains the heavy dependence of al-Manṣūr and his sons on both these groups. By the time the caliphate collapsed, they constituted blocs of tremendous power with a potential for mischief after al-Mahdī’s assumption of power had forced them into opposition and ultimately self rule.

Political fission and fusion in al-Andalus

The alternation of centrifugal and centripetal forces is a constant theme throughout the history of al-Andalus. Not once was a strong central authority smoothly replaced by another. Instead there were transitional interregnums of petty states, created as a response to a power vacuum at the centre, or as a breaking away from that centre.

Such an interregnum occurred in the turbulent period between 400/1009 and 406/1016, when Andalusī unity gave way to the establishment of Taifas by all three of the major power groups. Slavs set up Taifas at Almería, Murcia, Denia (including the Balearic Islands), Tortosa and Valencia (Badajoz too, for a time). The ‘new’ Berbers established Taifas at Arcos, Carmona, Granada, Morón and Ronda. To this list we might add the enclaves of the ‘Berberised’ Arab Ťammūdīds at Algeciras and Malaga. Finally, at Albaracín, Alpuente, Huelva, Santa María del Algarve, Silves, Toledo and Saragossa, and somewhat later at Mértola, Niebla and Seville, Andalusī assumed control, usually led by families of long standing regional importance. The last Taifa to be established was Córdoba, after the caliphate was reluctantly abolished in 422/1031 and the last caliph expelled from the city.

The three great frontier Taifas, with their respective capitals at Saragossa, Toledo and Badajoz, had started independent existences early, beginning in 400/1009, for these territories had a long tradition of local government. The areas controlled by ‘new’ Berbers and Slavs soon became Taifas, both parvenu groups having played a catalytic role in the break up of the caliphate. On the other hand, these groups lacked roots and hence support in the local
community, and as a result few of these Taifas remained under their control for long. Over the course of the century, the ‘new’ Berber and Slav Taifas fell, one by one, to neighbouring Taifas ruled by Andalusis. There were two exceptions: the powerful Zirid family of ‘new’ Berbers ruled at Granada until 483/1090, and Slavs maintained control of the Balearics until 508/1116.

Political ‘fission’ took place when the petty states that resulted from the fragmentation of the caliphate attempted to reproduce the Umayyad state’s political and administrative framework. These entities were indeed fragments, and that concept is clearly reflected in the word ‘Taifa’, for in Arabic ‘tā’ifa’ means ‘division’ or ‘faction’, which in the political language of Islam is negatively contrasted with the ideal of the unity of the ‘community of the faithful’ (umma). Furthermore, the fragmentation and discord of the Taifas weakened them and left them open to the extortion of tribute, called parias in Spanish, by the more powerful Christian kingdoms in their vicinity. The parias were paid as a guarantee against attack or in return for military assistance, and constituted a relationship of dependence that cost the Taifa rulers dearly not just in economic but also in political terms. Moreover, the payment of parias forced the Taifas to increase the tax burden on their subjects beyond the legal limits. This was one more factor, along with the splintering of the Muslim community and their lack of legitimacy, which led to the Taifas’ downfall. It came about in three different ways. Some were conquered by stronger Taifas. Seville absorbed a dozen of its smaller neighbours. Saragossa and Granada grew in similar fashion, with Saragossa taking first Tortosa, then Denia, and Granada the Taifa of Malaga. Other Taifas fell to Christian armies: Toledo in 478/1085 and Valencia in 487/1094 (though it was later recovered by the Almoravids). Finally, all those Taifas that remained in 483/1090 were one by one absorbed into the Almoravid empire. With the Almoravids, political fusion was once again accomplished, and al Andalus was furthermore unified with the Maghrib. This situation would persist until the end of Almoravid rule in the sixth/twelfth century brought about another period of political fission.

Legitimising strategies of the Taifa kings and criticism of their rule

By referring to the rulers of the Taifas as ‘kings’ (mulūk), the Arabic sources implied that though these men exercised real power, they did not do so with any kind of rightful authority, as the caliphs, for example, had. Not all the Taifa rulers called themselves ‘king’. Many dodged the question of sover eignty by simply adopting the title of ‘chamberlain’ (ḥājib), the title under
which al Manṣūr had ruled, drawing legitimacy as he had from their professed subordination to a caliph. No Taifa ruler dared to adopt a title that had any religious connotation such as imam, caliph, ‘Prince of the Believers’ (amīr al mu’minīn), nor even ‘Prince of the Muslims’ (amīr al muslimīn), but they did permit themselves more mundane titles like ‘chamberlain’, ‘king’, ‘leader’ (ra’īs), sometimes just ‘prince’ (amīr) and very occasionally ‘sultan’. The first ruler of the Taifa of Cordoba simply governed under his previous rank of ‘vizier’.

The Taifa rulers tried to compensate for this diminished status by adopting honorific surnames, with al Manṣūr (‘the Victorious’) and his sons again serving as models. As the century progressed, there was a tendency in some Taifas to adopt ever more superlative names, a habit which drew criticism, a famous example of which is a verse accusing the rulers of being ‘cats inflated so as to appear lions’. They were also attacked for their crippling fiscal policies. Ibn Ḥazm criticised the entire financial system, ‘All those who govern [Taifas] in any region of this our country of al Andalus are highwaymen . . . making constant attacks against the possessions of Muslims.’ The existence of this extra legal taxation was constantly pointed to as a sign of the Taifas’ illegitimacy, and after he assumed control over the region, the Almoravid amīr Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn was praised by the jurists of both al Andalus and the Muslim east for, in al Ghazālī’s words, ‘suppressing the unjust taxes’, as well as correcting other unorthodox practices.

The strict qualifications required of anyone who claimed to be caliph largely prevented the Taifa rulers from doing so, and this meant that they constantly had to seek a largely theoretical but nevertheless essential legitimacy by recognising at least symbolically the ultimate authority of either one of the rival Umayyad caliphs in Cordoba or, after the Cordoba caliphate was abolished, one of the Ḥammūsid caliphs. The only other alternative was to come up with your own pretender to the caliphal throne, as a few Taifa rulers did, with varying degrees of success. One attempt along these lines was an outright hoax: in order to legitimise his policy of territorial expansion at the expense of neighbouring Berber ruled Taifas in 427/1035, the ruler of Seville needed someone to rival the Berber’s favourite, the Ḥammūsid caliph; his solution was to find a look alike of Hishām II and have him proclaimed caliph.

When they had no other recourse, the Taifa kings sought legitimacy by acknowledging an ‘imām ‘Abd Allāh’, thus alluding in generic fashion to the caliphal institution from which they claimed support, and which they continued to defer to on their coinage. Nevertheless, this gesture did not prevent their subjects from questioning their legitimacy, spurred on first by the Mālikī
jurists and later by the Almoravids, who, upon assuming power, were quick to acknowledge the ‘Abbāsid caliphs, and preferred for themselves the title ‘Prince of the Muslims’. The output of the Taifa mints is another sign of their political fragility. Their coins are of low quality gold (except for some minted in Saragossa and Seville, and the Ḥammūdid dinars), and some Taifas either were unable to issue coinage on a regular basis or did not mint money at all.

The main Taifas

In the fifth/eleventh century Taifas, as in those of the mid sixth/twelfth century and the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth, regional fragmentation did not cease after a certain number of divisions, but rather existing fragments were in turn split up into smaller units, generally because of conflicts within members of a single dynasty. It was for this reason that at one time or another the sub regions dominated by the cities of Calatayud, Tudela, Huesca and Lerida broke away from Saragossa, and Lisbon detached itself from Badajoz. In other cases, the break did not involve members of the same family, as when Murcia became independent of Seville. By contrast, other Taifas grew by union or conquest. Let us examine briefly sixteen of the most important Taifas.

1. Albarracín. This small Taifa was ruled by the Banū Razīn, an ‘old’ Berber family that had lived in the region of Teruel since the early second/eighth century. Small in area but strategically located, this Taifa lasted from 413/1013 till its conquest by the Almoravids in 497/1104.

2. Almería. The Slav Khayrān founded this Taifa in about 403/1012, and was succeeded on his death in 419/1028 by another Slav, Zuhayr. Ten years later, Almería submitted to the authority of ‘Abd al ‘Azīz, ruler of Valencia and grandson of al Manṣūr. ‘Abd al ‘Azīz sent the Tujibī Maʾn to govern the city, but Maʾn quickly set himself up as independent ruler. He was succeeded by first his son and then his grandson, whose rule was interrupted by the Almoravid conquest of Almería in 484/1091.

3. Badajoz. An officer of the palace guard named Sābūr, undoubtedly a Slav, declared the independence of this region at the outset of the fitna. When he died in 413/1022, his vizier ‘Abd Allāh, a descendant of one of the ‘old’ Berber families, the Banū ‘l Aftas, inaugurated his own ruling dynasty, which governed until the Almoravids occupied the area in 487/1094.

4. The Balearic Islands. From his base at Denia on the mainland, the Slav Mujāhid occupied the islands in 404/1014 but he left them in the hands of various governors, who declared their independence after Denia fell to
Saragossa. Later, facing attacks by Catalan and Pisan forces, these rulers requested assistance from the Almoravids, who ended up occupying the Taifa in 509/1116.

5. Cordoba waited until the abolition of the caliphate before declaring itself a Taifa. It was governed by three generations of the Banû Jahwar, a powerful Arab family that had lived in al-Andalus since the second/eighth century. They dominated the city until it was taken by Seville in 462/1070. In 467/1075 Cordoba came under the nominal rule of Toledo, but Seville managed to recover it in 471/1078. In 484/1091 it fell to the Almoravids.

6. Denia. The Slav Mujâhid seized power here in 400/1009. Mujâhid’s original home had apparently been Sardinia, and after conquering the Balearics he partly occupied that island in 406/1015, his interest clearly the creation of a commercial empire based at Denia. When Mujâhid died in 436/1044, he was succeeded by his son, who was deposed by his brother in law al Muqtadir, ruler of Saragossa.

7. Granada. About 404/1013, the people of Elvira (Granada) requested military assistance from the Zârî Berbers, who came to their aid. These Kabyle Berbers, who had arrived in al-Andalus a short time previously, ruled this Taifa until the Almoravids occupied the territory in 483/1090.

8. Malaga. Like Algeciras, this great port was occupied by the Ḥammûdids after they renounced their claim to the caliphate in 417/1026. The union between the two Taifas was dissolved in either 427/1035 or 431/1039 because of family disputes, with the result that nine different members of the family held power at different times before the Taifa’s conquest in 448/1056 by Granada.

9. Morón. It was ruled by the Dammarîs, Zaâna Berbers recruited in the Maghrib by al Mansûr, until it was annexed by Seville in 458/1065.

10. Murcia. First governed by the Slav rulers of Almería from 406/1016 to 429/1038, Murcia came under the independent rule of the Banû Tâhir sometime before 455/1063, but was taken by Seville in 470/1078. The Almoravids occupied it in 484/1093.

11. Niebla. The Andalusi Arab family of the Yaḥṣubîs provided three rulers in succession before this territory fell to Seville in 445/1053.

12. Saragossa. The Tujîbî family had already governed the area before the civil war, and ruled it as a Taifa thereafter. Four members of the family ruled between 400/1009 and 430/1039, at which time Sulaymân ibn Hûd seized the Taifa. Five more of the Banû Hûd succeeded him, and other members of the family split off parts of the territory to form sub Taifas.
based around Tudela, Huesca, Calatayud and Lerida. Saragossa fell to the Almoravids in 503/1110.

13. Seville, ruled by a powerful local family, embarked on a policy of expansion that was only checked by first Toledo, then Badajoz and Granada. The first to be absorbed, between 436/1044 and 456/1063, were the small Andalusi Taifas of the south west, Mértola, Niebla, Huelva, Santa María del Algarve and Silves. Next to fall were the five Taifas in the strip of territory south east of Seville ruled by ‘new’ Berbers: Algeciras, Ronda, Morón, Carmona and Arcos, conquered between 446/1054 and 461/1069. Before Seville was occupied by the Almoravids in 484/1091, the Taifa had also managed to annex Cordoba and Murcia.

14. Toledo. Various local notables ruled this territory jointly from about 400/1010 until 410/1020, when they invited members of a Berber tribe that had lived in the region of Cuenca since the second/eighth century, the Banū Dhi ‘l Nūn, to assume the leadership of the Taifa. The last of this dynasty to rule Toledo, the incompetent al Qādir, was overthrown in 472/1080 by his subjects, angry at having to finance the tribute paid to Alfonso VI of Castile. Al Qādir appealed to Alfonso VI for help in reclaiming his throne and was reinstated the following year. However, the king of Castile decided to conquer Toledo himself in 478/1085, giving al Qādir as a consolation prize rule over the Taifa of Valencia.

15. Tortosa. A succession of four Slavs ruled Tortosa, beginning in 400/1009. Al Muqtadir of Saragossa conquered it in 452/1060 and turned it into a sub Taifa, together with Lerida and Denia, which was ruled autonomously by a branch of the Tujibī family. Tortosa was taken by the Almoravids in the early sixth/twelfth century.

16. Valencia. Power in this Taifa was seized by Slavs in 400/1009, and they governed until 412/1021 or 413/1022, when they decided to proclaim one of al Maṣūr’s grandsons the ruler. This man was followed by a second ‘Āmirid, but Valencia fell to Toledo in 457/1065. Two years later, a third ‘Āmirid recovered control of the Taifa, and was followed by yet a fourth, who ruled until 479/1086, when the king of Castile installed al Qādir, ex king of Toledo. His assassination in 485/1092 led to the reign of the judge Ibn Jaḥḥāf, during which time the Taifa came under increasing pressure from forces under the Christian knight known as the ‘Cid’ on the one hand, and the Almoravids on the other. The Cid finally took Valencia in 487/1094 but lost it to the Almoravids in 495/1102.
The shifting balance of power with the Christian kingdoms and its impact on the dhimmī communities

Christians and Jews had continued to practise their respective religions as ‘people of the covenant (of protection)’ which allowed them to keep their property and organise their communities under their own religious hierarchies. However, they were always subject to Muslim authority at the political level, and they also had the obligation to pay a head tax (jizya). In some cases, church buildings remained untouched throughout the long period of Muslim rule: Huesca, for example, was reported to have three churches when captured by Christian armies in 489/1096.

Regarding the continuing if gradually declining presence of Christians in al Andalus we have several contemporary reports. The Zirid Taifa ruler ‘Abd Allāh in his ‘Memoirs’ states: ‘And so I evacuated Riana and Jotrón for him [his brother Tamīm of Malaga] as their inhabitants were Christians who lived between our two territories [the Taifas of Granada and Malaga] and were incapable of intriguing with anyone’, indirectly alluding to the ‘trouble making’ character often ascribed by the Arabic sources to the Andalusi Christians.

The fifth/eleventh century marked the great turning point in the respective fortunes of Islam and Christianity in the Iberian Peninsula, and beginning in the latter half of this century Christian advances from the north began to encroach upon the Andalusī heartland itself. The density and homogeneity of the Muslim community increased as Jews and Christians either underwent conversion real or feigned or emigrated to the Christian north or the Maghrib, either voluntarily or under duress. During its first four centuries, al Andalus had been a land of three religions; after this century, the only remaining indigenous non Muslims would be a minority of Jews.

The final crisis for the Christians began with the first great territorial conquests by Christian armies at the end of the fifth/eleventh century and the subsequent arrival of the Almoravids. The first sign of fading tolerance came in 492/1099, when the Almoravid amīr Yūsuf ibn Tāshfin ordered the destruction of a church near Granada in accordance with a fatwā. Then, in 519/1125, Alfonso I, king of Aragon, undertook an expedition through al Andalus. Over the course of fifteen months, he traversed the eastern regions of al Andalus, besieged Granada, reached the Mediterranean coast at Vélez Malaga, returned to Granada, and then withdrew northward to his kingdom, gathering with him as he went a large number of Andalusi Christians, whom he then settled in Aragon. The connivance of the local Christian communities
with the invaders outraged the Muslims. In autumn of 520/1126, a fatwā issued by Ibn Rushd ordered the expulsion of the Christians from Granada, Cordoba and Seville. They were deported to Meknes and Salé in the Maghrib, where they were allowed to maintain their dhimmī status. There would be further deportations of Christians to the Maghrib in the sixth/twelfth century.

The Jewish community fared somewhat differently. In certain Taifas, such as those of Granada, Seville and Saragossa, Jewish notables served as viziers and secretaries. In general they earned praise from the Arabic sources, but occasionally the Muslim rulers of the Taifas were criticised for having entrusted these men with such important posts. Foremost among these Jewish notables was Samuel ibn Naghrīla, who wielded great power as a vizier in the Taifa of Granada between 429/1037f. and 447/1056. The privileged position of his son and successor Yūsuf sparked violent disturbances in 459/1066, which led to the slaughter of many Jews, among them Yūsuf himself. This violent reaction, though rather local in nature, was another sign of the various changes that swept through Andalusi society in the fifth/eleventh century. The religious orthodoxy of the Almoravids (and the Almohads after them) would also have an impact on the size of the Jewish community of al Andalus.

The Maghrib during the fifth/eleventh century

During the fourth/tenth century, the decay and disappearance of the Idrīsid rulers in the Maghrib, harassed by the Umayyads and Fāṭimids, had allowed various Berber Zanāta clans to form an alliance extending across the central Maghrib, from the Atlantic coast to the territory between Algiers and Ifrīqiya dominated by the Banū Ḥammād. On the other hand, the departure of the Fāṭimid caliphs to Egypt at the end of the century left the westernmost territories of the Maghrib under the control of the Ṣanḥāja Berbers.

The first Zīrid (Ṣanḥāja) ruler, Buluggīn ibn Zīrī, acting in the name of the Fāṭimids, kept up a policy of intervention in both the western and the central Maghrib. The second Zīrid amīr, al Manṣūr (r. 374 86/984 96), abandoned all pretensions to rule these areas, where the Zanāta were now supported by the Cordoban ḥājib al Manṣūr and his sons, who continued to intervene in North Africa until the fall of the ʿĀmirid regime in 399/1009. Once the Maghrib was relieved of foreign interference, a certain balance between Zanātas and Ṣanḥājas was achieved. The third Zīrid amīr, Bāḍīs (r. 386 406/996 1016), enhanced ties with the Fāṭimids in Cairo, though they failed to back him in his
conflict with his uncle Ḥammād ibn Buluggīn. This latter eventually set up his own independent rule in 405/1014 west of Ifrīqiya.

The political map of the Maghrib was therefore a complex patchwork of tribal territories. The Ṣanḥāja dominated in the eastern and central Maghrib, while other Ṣanḥāja groups, Berbers originally from the southern Maghrib, were concentrated in the areas around Tangier, Wargha and Azemmour. The Zanāta had started in the east, but drifted westwards into the central Maghrib, where they were allied with the Umayyads. In the west, the Zanāta formed not one unitary territorial entity but rather several ‘taifas’, and they were obliged to share the extreme Maghrib (al magrib al aqṣā) with other powerful tribal groups. The various clans of one of these groups, the Maṣmūda, inhabited the area stretching from the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts in the north to the Anti Atlas mountains in the south west. Among these Maṣmūda clans were the Barghawāṭ, who were heterodox Muslims (but by no means alone in this respect) and the Ghumāra, who inhabited the Ceuta area.

Further components of the political patchwork were the Maghrabi ‘taifas’ that began to take shape in about 403/1013 when the Umayyad caliph Sulaymān al Mustaʿīn appointed the Idrīsid ʿAlī ibn Hammūd governor of Ceuta and his brother al Qāsim governor of Algeciras, Tangier and Arcila. When shortly thereafter the Ḥammūdids held the caliphate in al Andalus, they delegated rule over their North African enclaves to two clients, Rizq Allāh and Suqūṭ al Barghawāṭī. In 453/1061, the latter proclaimed his independence, and he managed to maintain it until the Almoravids overran Tangier in 471/1079 and Ceuta in 475/1082.

An additional element was added to the mix in the mid fifth/eleventh century. When the Zīrids of Ifrīqiya withdrew their allegiance from the Fātimids, the Fātimid caliph hit back by unleashing upon Ifrīqiya the Arab tribes of the Banū Hilāl, hoping simultaneously to rid himself of these unruly tribesmen and to punish the Zīrids. However, the invading Banū Hilāl and Banū Sulaym soon pushed westward beyond Ifrīqiya and had a serious impact on all of North Africa, not just politically but also economically, socially and culturally.

While from the east the Maghrib was assailed by the Hilālī invasion, from the south west a second force began to form, this time involving Berber rather than Arab tribesmen. These were the Ṣanḥāja Almoravids, whose expansion eastward only ceased when they reached the territories dominated by their fellow Ṣanḥājas, the Banū Ḥammād, and who imposed political unity on all these multifarious groups in a vast empire that spanned all of western north Africa.
The teachings of Ibn Yāsīn and the rise of the Almoravids

In the early fifth/eleventh century, the nomadic Ṣanhāja tribes which wandered the desert between the Dra‘ valley and the Niger river lost control of the caravan routes to black tribes of the southern Sahara. These troubles in the south, combined with the ongoing hostility they faced from the Zanāta in the north, drove the Ṣanhāja to react by forming a sort of confederation, in which the Judāla and Lamtūna tribes—both of them ‘people of the veil’ (mulaththa mīn, i.e. the men habitually covered their faces)—played leading roles.\(^{19}\)

Several sources\(^{20}\) record the territories inhabited by each of the various Ṣanhāja groups of lithām: the Judāla between the Dra‘ and Sijilmāsa, the Massūfa between Sijilmāsa and Ghāna, the Lamta in the region of the Sūs river and the Banī and Nūn oases, where they founded the caravan way station of Nūl Lamta, and the Jazūla in the lands between the Sūs and the Nūn. The Lamtūna wandered south of the Dra‘ to the Niger river, and according to al Bakrī,\(^{21}\) writing in 460/1068,

the terrain in which they roam, which is of two months’ march in all directions, is situated between the land of the Blacks and the lands of Islam . . . Their wealth is their flocks; their food consists of meat and milk. Many would live their lives without ever knowing what bread is, and without ever having tried it, if some merchant coming from the lands of Islam or the lands of the Blacks did not bring them some or give them flour. They are Sunnīs. They make war with the Blacks. Their chief was Muhammad, called Tārasnā, a man of virtue and faith, who made the Pilgrimage and devoted himself to the Holy War . . . Beyond the Lamtūna there is another Ṣanhājī tribe, which is the Judāla, near the sea, with no other tribe separating the two. These tribes, beginning in 440/1048, summoned to the Truth for the redressing of injustices and the abolition of unlawful taxes. They are Sunnīs, who follow the school of Mālik ibn Anas. The man who showed them the way, calling them to the ḥibāt and urging them to act in the defence of orthodoxy, was ‘Abd Allāh ibn Yāsīn.

Islam had first begun to penetrate these remote regions of the western Sahara at the end of the first/seventh century, but the local populations had never been fully Islamised and over the centuries their form of Islam continued to include heterodox practices. Nevertheless, many of the local shaykhhs fulfilled the pilgrimage to Mecca, and one such shaykh was Yahyā ibn Ibrāhīm, ruler of the Judāla, who made the ḥajj in approximately 427/1035f. On his return, he brought with him a Mālikī jurist, ‘Abd Allāh ibn Yāsīn, whom he wished to instruct his people in the proper practice of their religion.
Ibn Yāsīn (d. 451/1059) acted as a kind of missionary of orthodox Islam as it was interpreted by the Mālikī legal school. A series of Şanhāja rulers used the spiritual basis that he generated by his teachings both to justify their territorial expansion and to bind their subjects together politically. First the Judāla forced the Lamtūna to adopt Ibn Yāsīn’s orthodoxy, then the two tribes together imposed it on others. However, upon Yahyā ibn Ibrāhīm’s death, the Judāla expelled Ibn Yāsīn, and he was taken in by the amīr of the Lamtūna, Yahyā ibn ‘Umar. Whether because he had held out in a ‘monastery fortress’ (ribāt) with his loyal followers (murābiṭūn) or because they made up a tightly ‘bound’ group, Ibn Yāsīn bestowed this name on the people of his movement (al murābiṭūn), hence ‘Almoravid’), as a sign of his firm intention to spread Islamic orthodoxy through Holy War.22 First overcoming the heterodox or non Islamised tribes in the immediate vicinity, he then pursued his campaign to the Dra‘ valley and Sijilmāsa, recapturing Awdaghust in the process.

When the Lamtūnī Yahyā ibn ‘Umar died, most probably in 447/1055, Ibn Yāsīn chose Yahyā’s brother Abū Bakr ibn ‘Umar to take his place as amīr, proclaiming him in Sijilmāsa in 450/1058. By that time the Almoravids had consolidated their military position, and command of their armies was given to one of Abū Bakr’s cousins, Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn. Ibn Tāshfīn’s military and political genius led the Almoravids to total domination over the disunited tribal groups around them, for he knew how to harness his men’s appetite for conquest to a total conviction that they were bearers of a new religious orthodoxy. Thus the Almoravids occupied Āghmāt in 450/1058 and moved north against the Barghawāṭa in 451/1059. During the battle that followed, Ibn Yāsīn was killed.

The Almoravid expansion continued under the leadership of Abū Bakr, who laid the foundations of the future Almoravid capital at Marrakesh in 463/1070. In the same year, the amīr again turned his attention southwards to the Sahara and brought Ghāna under Almoravid rule. Before leaving on this expedition, Abū Bakr named Ibn Tāshfīn his successor, and during the amīr’s absence Ibn Tāshfīn consolidated his authority over the Almoravid administrative and military structures centred in Marrakesh. Abū Bakr returned two years later and, recognising the depth of his cousin’s power base, ceded leadership of the movement to him. Almoravid expansion proceeded under Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn’s command, first towards the central Maghrib, then towards the north. Fez was conquered in 462/1070. The campaign then split in two. One objective was Tangier and Ceuta, which fell respectively in 471/1078f. and 477/1084 (though the sources do not all agree on this date). The second objective was the eastern Maghrib. The Almoravids took Tlemcen in 468/1075, then conquered the
regions of Oran and Chélif, then the city of Algiers in 465/1082. They halted their eastward push at the frontiers of the Banū Ḥammād territory.

Almoravid rule was facilitated by the general enthusiasm with which the Mālikī reforms of the Almoravids were greeted, as was their concern for political and religious legitimacy. This concern can be seen in the way that Yūṣuf ibn Tāshfin was careful to limit himself to the title of 'Prince of the Muslims' (amīr al muslimīn), which made clear his subordination to the ‘Abbāsid caliph in Baghdad and which served to contrast the unity he offered with the chaotic situation that had existed previously in both al Andalus and the Maghrib. Thus, the Almoravids, like the Saljuq Turks, who also emerged in the middle of the fifth/eleventh century, were careful to use new titles of power that deferred to the ‘Abbāsid caliphate in their campaign to unify and strengthen Muslim territories. The two movements had two significant differences, however differences that may explain the shorter duration of the Almoravid empire relative to the Saljuqs. First, they differed in the socio political structures that each created. Secondly, they evolved spiritually in quite separate ways. Thus, the dominant Mālikism of the Almoravids caused them first to welcome the teachings of the Iranian theologian al Ghazālī, but then later to condemn them. By contrast, the Saljuq acceptance of this man as a spiritual leader never wavered.

The Almoravids’ Saharan Berberism was profoundly different from the culture of the more Arabised areas of the northern Maghrib and contrasted even more sharply with the Muslim society of al Andalus. Both the Berbers and Mālikism had been present in the Muslim west before the Almoravids, of course, but this movement brought these two elements together into a new dynamic force which earned a place in history as the first of the so called ‘Berber empires’.

The Almoravids come to the aid of al-Andalus: the victory at Zallāqa (Sagrajas)

In al Andalus, the idea that the many Taifas should be reunified was gathering strength, because such fragmentation was incompatible with Islamic law, and because unity would bolster the Andalusis’ ability to repel the Christian advances. While the Taifa kings had been incapable of keeping the Christian armies at bay on their own, let alone imposing the desired unity, the Almoravids had not only fully defended the frontiers of Islam in North Africa but also brought it into a both territorial and spiritual union.

The first Taifa king to request Almoravid help was that of Badajoz, subject to constant attacks by Alfonso VI of Castile. When Toledo was conquered by
Alfonso VI in 478/1085, the Taifa rulers decided to overcome their individual differences and ask the Almoravids to mount an expedition to al-Andalus. In the summer of 479/1086, Yūsuf ibn Tashfīn crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and landed in Algeciras. The kings of Seville and Badajoz gave him an enthusiastic welcome, though the Almoravids did not trust their new Andalusi allies, for they immediately went about fortifying Algeciras, their bridgehead to the Maghrib, whose walls had fallen into disuse. From there, they summoned to the holy war, and moved against the Christian forces in the northern regions of Badajoz. The Almoravid troops were joined by the armies of the southern Taifas. Alfonso VI, then besieging Saragossa, made haste to meet his enemy, and the ensuing battle on 12 Rajab 479/23 October 1086 took place at Zallāqa. The military confrontation was also ideological, as reflected in the contemporary official documents of both sides. One such text is the letter sent by Yūsuf ibn Tashfīn to the Zīrīd amīr in Tunis, the only other great power in the Maghrib at the time, to tell him of his victory, which justified his intervention in al-Andalus, by which he had considerably altered the regional balance of power.

When the Christian kingdoms recovered from their defeat and returned to the offensive, Ibn Tashfīn crossed to al-Andalus again (year 480/1088) and forced the Castilians to withdraw from the area around the stronghold of Aledo, in the region of Murcia; then he again returned to the Maghrib. However, it was only a matter of time before Alfonso’s constant encroachments on Muslim territory prompted further pleas from the Taifa rulers, and for a third time Ibn Tashfīn entered al-Andalus, this time determined to bring a definitive solution to the region by simply conquering it. Though this invasion was essentially his own initiative, Ibn Tashfīn had moral support in the form of fatwās issued by several Andalusi jurists that reproached the Taifa rulers for their transgressions of Islamic law, as well as petitions from many Andalusis eager to put their safety in his hands and return to political and fiscal legitimacy. Ibn Tashfīn’s first move was to depose the king of Granada, an action for which the shortsighted rulers of Seville and Badajoz congratulated him. When Ibn Tashfīn returned to North Africa, he named his cousin Sīr governor of his Andalusi territories, entrusting him with the offensive that would ultimately overrun all the Taifas, the last area to fall under Almoravid control being the Balearic Islands, in 509/1116.

The Almoravid conquest of al-Andalus

The deposed king of Granada, ‘Abd Allāh, described in his ‘Memoirs’ how the populace of Granada had eagerly awaited the arrival of the Almoravid amīr in
A month later, the Almoravids occupied the Taifa of Malaga in similar circumstances. After Tarifa was taken, the main Almoravid army marched north towards Seville while one smaller force commanded by Ibn al Ḥājj approached Cordoba, another attacked Ronda, and a third moved east along the coast towards Almería. Cordoba and Ronda belonged to the Taifa of Seville, and all three fell during 484/1091. As had previously happened with the king of Granada, al Mu'tamid, king of Seville, was exiled to the Maghrib.

Before the end of the same year, the king of Almería had fled to the territory of the Banū Ḥamād in the central Maghrib, leaving his Taifa in the hands of the Almoravid army, which then undertook the conquest of eastern al Andalus, facing serious resistance only from the Cid in the area of Valencia. Though not the formal ruler of this region, the Cid had achieved effective control over it at this point and received tribute from the northernmost Taifas as far west as Saragossa. The Almoravid troops had been in action against him since 480/1088, but the shifting fortunes of battle finally saw the Cid enter Valencia in triumph as its lord and master in 487/1094. After his death there in 1099, the Castilians managed to hold the city for another three years before surrendering it to the Almoravids in 496/1102. From Valencia, the Almoravid army marched north and conquered the remaining northerly Taifas of the Ebro valley.

In the centre of al Andalus, the Almoravids had already taken Jaén. In the west the Banū 'l Aftās were allowed to continue their rule in Badajoz as a reward for their assistance to the Almoravid campaign. However, the king of Badajoz, desiring further to guarantee his security, resumed negotiations with Alfonso VI of Castile in which he offered the Christian monarch rule over Santarem, Lisbon and Cintra. The Almoravids reacted by promptly overrunning the Taifa, reaching Lisbon in 487/1094.

Further actions taken by Yūsuf, the first Almoravid amīr

Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn crossed the Straits for the fourth time in 490/1097. His intention was to pursue the holy war by harassing the Christian territories around Toledo. He defeated a Christian army at Consuegra but never managed to take the city of Toledo itself. Having already named his son ʿAlī as his successor in Marrakesh, Yūsuf made yet one more visit to al Andalus, in 496/1102, and repeated the proclamation of his successor in Cordoba, symbol of the former Umayyad glories. ʿAlī’s name, with the title amīr, appears on coins minted in Cordoba after the year 497/1103f.
In naming his successor, Yūsuf stipulated the condition that his son should give priority to al Andalus, creating an army whose mission would be both the defence of the territory from outside forces and the maintenance of Almoravid control over the interior. The Almoravids, after all, had imposed their control on the Andalusis by force, and while armed resistance to them had at first come largely from those whose interests were linked to the independent power groups of the Taifas, it soon became generalised, as the Almoravids’ early commitment to religious and especially fiscal orthodoxy gradually weakened.

When Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn fell ill in 499/1105f., ‘Alī assumed power in Marrakesh. Among his first moves were the replacement of the Almoravid governor of Granada and the dismissal of the chief judge of Seville. Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn died in 500/1106, and ‘Alī formally became the new amīr of the empire.

‘Alī, second amīr of the Almoravids

‘Alī ibn Tāshfīn’s reign (r. 500 37/1106 43) may be divided into two: the first half, marked by a string of successes, and the second, which saw a series of major reverses. During this time, ‘Alī came to the Peninsula four times. The initial period of success began with victory at Uclés in 501/1108, which allowed the Almoravids to retake Cuenca, Huete, Ocaña and Uclés itself. He attacked Toledo the following year, and managed to occupy Talavera. He rounded out these conquests by taking the Taifa of Saragossa in 503/1110, though he managed to hold onto it for only eight years before it fell again to the Christians. In 504/1111 the general Sīr, governor of Seville, recovered Santarem from Castile, but he died in Seville three years later, to be succeeded by ‘Abd Allāh ibn Fāṭima. This kind of turnover among the high functionaries of the Almoravid empire was apparently typical, and the Arabic sources tell us that although Andalusis might be given lesser positions as judges or secretaries, the important offices tended at first to be given to North Africans. The names and exploits of Andalusis in positions of military or political power only begin to figure in accounts of the latter part of the Almoravid period.

In 508/1114, Ibn al Ḥājj, now governor of Saragossa, was killed and his army defeated at El Congost de Martorell, thus frustrating his attempt to raid Barcelona. This failure marked the beginning of the second part of ‘Alī ibn Tāshfīn’s reign. He was unable to return to al Andalus until 511/1117, when he managed to capture Coimbra, but he was forced to withdraw a few weeks
later. The fall of Saragossa and shortly thereafter the rest of the valley of the Ebro to Alfonso I of Aragon indicates how much the constant military activity had taken its toll on the Almoravid army, though in 513/1119, taking advantage of internal disturbances in Castile, it did manage to wrest Coria from the Christians. However, in the following year, a heavy defeat at Cutanda near Teruel left Calatayud and Daroca in Christian hands. The fact that Almoravid forces were no longer capable of mounting a rapid response to attack was vividly demonstrated by the fifteen month foray which Alfonso I of Aragon embarked on in Sha'bân 519/September 1125. As we have noted previously, he was able to penetrate deep into eastern and southern al Andalus, plundering and destroying with impunity.

‘Alî proclaimed his son Sîr heir in 522/1128. This provoked a revolt by Sîr’s brother Ibrâhîm, and though the rebellion was put down and Ibrâhîm exiled to the Sahara, this added yet one more conflict to sap Almoravid energies. The depth of the Almoravid army’s weakness was revealed most sharply by its crushing defeat at Cullera in 523/1129, and thereafter the rupture between Almoravids and their Andaluþi subjects became increasingly more patent. The depth of Andaluþi disillusionment can be seen in the letter by Abû Marwân Ibn Abi Khîsâl, an Andaluþi secretary enrolled in the Almoravid chancery:²⁶ ‘O sons of ignoble mothers, flee like wild asses! . . . The moment has arrived when we are about to give you a long punishment, in which no veil will be left covering anyone’s face [a reference to the traditional garb of the Berber tribesmen], in which we will throw you back into your Sahara and cleanse al Andalus of your filth.’ Needless to say, the letter earned the man his dismissal, but the astonishing fact is that he dared to speak in such terms of the ruling group.

As their power faded, the Almoravids were unable to cope with the three challenges that confronted them: the Christian conquests, the growing discontent and enmity of the Andaluþi population and the apparently unstoppable revolt in North Africa of the Almohads, a rival reformist movement. In the midst of the ensuing chaos, ‘Alî took a step that somewhat allayed the crisis in al Andalus. He designated his son Tâshfîn who later became his successor governor of Granada and Almería in 523/1129, and soon put him in charge of Cordoba as well. Tâshfîn remained in al Andalus until 532/1137, when he was summoned back to the Maghrib because of the jealousy his skilful rule had aroused in his brother Sîr, ‘Alî’s declared heir. Tâshfîn’s successes as governor had been both political and military, particularly in the region of Extremadura, though his campaigns had resulted in no permanent territorial conquests. Yet his skills and effectiveness were ultimately
rewarded when his father, the amīr ‘Alī, designated him heir to the throne in 532/1138. Once back in North Africa, Tāshfīn had to wait until the untimely death of his brother Sir before he could take charge of the Almoravid response to the increasing military success of the Almohads and the spread of their religious doctrine across the Maghrib.

Tāshfīn, third amīr of the Almoravids

Tāshfīn (r. 537 9/1143 5) was the third Almoravid sovereign, succeeding his father ‘Alī at the head of the Almoravid empire, which still stretched across western North Africa and much of the Iberian Peninsula but was now entering its final years. He had been well prepared for the role of amīr by his nine years as governor of Granada, Almería and later Cordoba, from where he directed campaigns against the Christians. Even Arabic sources that are not favourably inclined to the Almoravids recognise Tāshfīn’s gifts as both governor and military leader. Yet he was withdrawn from al Andalus at a moment when he was probably the only man capable of frustrating the respective territorial ambitions of Alfonso VII of Castile and Alfonso I of Aragon. Alongside their own military efforts, these kings provided interested support to local Andalusi chieftains in their rebellions against the Almoravids, rebellions whose success initiated a new period of ‘Taifas’ in al Andalus. This second Taifa period was on a considerably smaller scale than its predecessor in the fifth/eleventh century, but like its predecessor it was brought to a close by the invasion of a vigorous new Berber empire from North Africa, the Almohads.

In 539/1145 Tāshfīn died in battle against the Almohad army. Two more amīrs occupied the Almoravid throne, but their rule was now limited to part of the Maghrib only, the Andalusis having ceased to accept their authority. Tāshfīn’s son Ibrāhīm succeeded his father on his death, but, being still very young, he was immediately ousted by his uncle Ishāq ibn ‘Alī (r. 539 41/1145 7), who was no more successful than Tāshfīn had been at keeping the Almohads at bay. In 541/1147 they captured the Almoravid capital at Marrakesh and slaughtered the remaining members of the dynasty.

The end of the Almoravids

Since the beginning of the sixth/twelfth century, various political, social and economic factors had combined to erode Almoravid prestige among the Muslim population of al Andalus. Andalusī disappointment is vividly
reflected in the hostility of the religious community. Opposition to the Almoravids was particularly bitter among the Sufis in Almeria and the Algarve, where critics found a common cause in their defence of mysticism, symbolised by al Ghazâlî. His writings, especially his famous ‘Revival of the religious sciences’ (Ihya’ ’ulûm al din), had been burned in Cordoba in 503/1109 by the Almoravid authorities, because, among the various notions abhorrent to them, al Ghazâlî’s works suggested that each individual should make his own personal interpretation of doctrinal texts. Some Mâlikî scholars could not tolerate such freedom. The opposition to the Almoravids turned into a general uprising in the last years of the dynasty, when local authorities began to fill the power vacuum left by the increasingly weak central government. As Almoravid troops were increasingly withdrawn to the Maghrib to deal with the several insurrections that had broken out there, the Andalusîs took up arms against the Almoravid authorities and military units that still remained, killing them or driving them from the Peninsula. While finally able to drive out the empire that had imposed unity on al Andalus from abroad, the Andalusîs were incapable of unifying themselves politically, despite several attempts to do so, such as the efforts of the amîr Ibn Hûd (significantly, with support from Castile).

The ‘second Taifas’ that sprang up in the Algarve, Almería, the Balearic Islands, Badajoz, Cadiz, Cordoba, Granada, Guadix, Jaén, Malaga, Murcia, Seville and Valencia never had time to achieve the importance that their precursors had. Within a few years, beginning in the Algarve in 537/1142, the new Taifas fell one by one to Almohad forces, with Murcia the last to be occupied, in 567/1172, and the Balearic Islands much later in 599/1203. By the middle of the sixth/twelfth century, the bulk of al Andalus had passed within the orbit of a new empire.

In its decline, with its initially strict religious orthodoxy weakening, the Almoravid empire began to lose territory to Christian armies. One of the reasons for its decline is related to the relatively demilitarised character of Andalusî society, which had to resort to assistance from the more bellicose Maghrib, while by contrast the Christian societies of the northern Peninsula were ‘organised for war’. Nevertheless, the approximately fifty years of Almoravid domination in al Andalus demonstrated that even territorial unification imposed from outside could not stem the steady loss of Andalusî territory. Meanwhile, North Africa was overrun by the Almohads, who had mounted the most effective and long lasting of the several uprisings against the Almoravids in North Africa.
The Almoravids


6. See Chapter 22B, ‘Overland trade in the western Islamic world’ (John Meloy).
13. M. Barceló, ‘“Rodes que giren dins el foc de l’infern” o per a què servia la moneda dels taifes?’, Gaceta Numismática, 105 6 (1992), 15 24.
15. Wasserstein, The caliphate in the west.
The central lands of North Africa and Sicily, until the beginning of the Almohad period

MICHAEL BRETT

Introduction

The crisis of the Islamic world in the fifth/eleventh century, when the lands of the former Arab empire were overrun by barbarians from beyond its borders—Turks in the east, Berbers in the west—was brought about in the central Mediterranean by the invasion of Ifrīqiya by the Arab tribes of the Banū Hilāl and the invasion of Sicily by the Normans. Ifrīqiya was the old Byzantine province of Africa, from eastern Algeria to Tripolitania; Sicily had been conquered and annexed to Ifrīqiya in the third/ninth century, but had become independent when the Fāṭimids left for Egypt in 361/972. The Arab invasion put an end to central government in Ifrīqiya, while that of the Normans imposed a Christian monarchy upon Sicily. In the middle of the sixth/twelfth century the Normans briefly took possession of the Ifrīqiyan littoral, but the adventure ended with the Almohad conquest in 5545/1159–60. In the interval, Ifrīqiya had become a land of city states and tribal lordships, while Norman rule in Sicily had prepared the way for the disappearance of its Muslim population in the course of the next century.

In the secondary literature both episodes have become legendary. The invasion of the Banū Hilāl has been charged with the ruin of the agricultural economy of Classical North Africa, and the consequent backwardness of the country that laid it open to French conquest in the nineteenth century.1 Sicily under the Normans, on the other hand, with its Latin, Greek and Arab populations and trilingual administration, has been considered a model of social harmony, cultural synthesis and consequent prosperity.2 Underlying these contrasting paradigms is a difference in the sources: on the one hand, the literary tradition summed up in the Kitāb al-ʻībar of Ibn Khaldūn, the eighth/fourteenth century historian of the Banū Hilāl;3 on the other, the Arabic, Greek and Latin documents of the Norman administration in Sicily.4 The documents are for the most part charters of a kind and a value familiar to
European medievalists. The Kitāb al ‘ibar, on the other hand, derives from the controversy surrounding the Zirids, the dynasty at the centre of the Ifrīqiyan affair, whose polemical character is familiar to historians of medieval Islam. Together with the paradigms of the secondary literature, both have called for re-evaluation.

Zirids and Kalbids

The difference between the two histories apparent in the difference between the sources goes back to the departure of the Fāṭimid caliph al Muʿizz for Egypt in 361/972, leaving his central Mediterranean empire divided into two provinces under two viceroys of very different provenance. The viceroy of Ifrīqiya, Buluggin ibn Zirī, was a Ṣāhāja Berber chieftain who held the western frontier of Ifrīqiya for the Fāṭimids against the Zanāta Berber allies of the Umayyads of Cordoba. In Sicily, ‘Ali ibn al Ḥasan al Kalbī was an Arab aristocrat whose kinsmen had ruled the island since 336/948, completing its conquest from the Byzantines. Both were warriors who carried the war into Morocco and Calabria, where both of them died on campaign, ‘Ali in 372/982, Buluggin in 373/984. In Sicily, the hold of the Kalbids on the island ensured that the succession remained in the family. The family in question, however, belonged to the Fāṭimid aristocracy in Egypt; and following ‘Ali’s death his son Jābir was recalled to Cairo in 372/982 and a cousin, Ja‘far, sent out in his place. The Egyptian connection remained strong even after the accession in 379/989 of Yūsuf, son of Ja‘far’s brother and successor ‘Abd Allāh. When Yūsuf was incapacitated by a stroke in 388/998, Cairo approved the lieutenancy of his son Ja‘far; and when Ja‘far was overthrown by revolt in 410/1019 he and his father retired to Egypt, leaving Sicily to his brother Ahmad al Ahkal. At least down to Yūsuf, therefore, the Kalbids in Sicily served as provincial governors, with official rather than regal titles; they never minted a coinage; nor did they produce a dynastic chronicler. Their low profile means that the history of Muslim Sicily, as recounted by Michele Amari on the basis of the sources collected in his Biblioteca Arabo Sicula, is not written on the strength of a native Sicilian tradition.

For this period its history is consequently problematic. Following the death of ‘Ali, the momentum of the conquest and advance onto the Italian mainland, which over the past 150 years had alternated with a turbulent history of revolt by the settler population against government from Ifrīqiya, continued for the next fifty years in periodic raids and expeditions across the Straits of Messina against the Byzantines, who still maintained their claim to the island.
Advancing through Calabria and Apulia in the direction of the Byzantine capital Bari, Kalbid forces periodically occupied Gerace, Cosenza, Cassano and Matera. The climax came in ten years of warfare following a Byzantine landing at Messina in 416/1025, ending in peace in 425/1034. Internally, the turbulence continued. The Kalbids ruled over a mixture of Muslim Arab and Christian Greek peasants, grouped in fortified hill towns and villages under their own military chiefs (qā'īds) and shaykhs; at his accession, al Ahkal had in effect to reconquer the island. The capital Palermo and other cities on the coast were commercially as well as piratically important, trading with Ifrīqiya and Egypt. The initiative, however, was increasingly with the Italian city states, Pisa, Genoa and Amalfi. In a tradition going back to the Romans, Sicily was more of a supplier than a carrier: timber for the Kalbid and the Zirid fleets, but above all wheat.

In Ifrīqiya, on the other hand, Buluggīn’s son al Mansūr overthrew al Mu‘izz’s settlement, under which a secretary, ‘Abd Allāh al Kātib, had been left in charge of the administration at the capital Qayrawān. In defiance of al Mu‘izz’s successor al ‘Azīz, al Mansūr slew not only ‘Abd Allāh but the envoy sent from Egypt to marshal the Kutāma Berbers of Kabylia who had brought the Fātimids to power in 297/910, and moved down from the western frontier to take up residence at Qayrawān in full control of the patrimonial state bequeathed by the Fātimids. Recognised by al ‘Azīz as the hereditary monarch of his North African dominions, he continued to mint coins in the Fātimid name, but a Yemenite genealogy was invented for his dynasty, which found its own chronicler in the head of the chancery, al Raqīq (d. after 418/1027f.).

Ifrīqiya, however, was not so easily unified by the head of a Berber clan to which the principle of patrilineal succession was alien. The old administrative division between the settled lowlands to the east and the tribal highlands to the west reasserted itself at the accession of al Mansūr’s son Bādīs in 386/996. Over the next twenty years, what began as a rebellion of the senior members of the family ended with the establishment of his uncle Ḥammād as the ruler of the western highlands from a new capital in the mountains, the Qal‘a of the Banū Ḥammād. The attempt of Bādīs to force him into submission failed when the sultan died on campaign against him in 406/1016. At Qayrawān the succession of Bādīs’ infant son al Mu‘izz was ensured by the army, which defeated Ḥammād in 407/1017; but the division of the state and the dynasty was made permanent by the subsequent peace agreement. The internal conflict had meanwhile thrown the Ṣanhāja onto the defensive in the long running battle with the Zanāta to the west, a band of whom, the Banū Khazrūn, had migrated eastwards to establish themselves in the region of
Tripoli. They occupied the city from 391/1001 to 400/1010 and again from 413/1022, to form a petty dynasty. With their dominion thus reduced to the Ifrīqiyan heartland, the region of modern Tunisia, the Zīrīds continued to live off the rents and taxes of the countryside, and the income from the commercial economy centred upon Qayrawān. The city was the hub of a network of trade routes, from Egypt to al Andalus; over to Sicily; and across the Sahara to the central and western Sudān, a source of slaves and gold. Its focal position had been strengthened by Fāṭimid expenditure but weakened by their departure, which had drawn trade away to Egypt. Economic grievances generated by a decline in prosperity may have underlain the problems of al Mu‘izz’s long reign, which culminated in a breach with the Fāṭimids and the downfall of his state.7

The breach with the Fāṭimids

Those problems began and ended with religion: the Fāṭimid Shi‘ī allegiance of the dynasty in opposition to the Mālikī Sunnī affiliation of the schoolmen at Qayrawān. Under the Zīrīds these had resumed the dominant position denied them under the Fāṭimids, who had incorporated their Ḥanafī rivals into their own body of jurists. Sectarian conflict was contained at the level of government by the division of the judicature between a hereditary Mālikī judge (qādī) of Qayrawān and a hereditary Fāṭimid judge of al Šabra al Mansūriyya, the neighbouring palace city. But in the context of the so called Sunnī revival it was exacerbated by the contest between Fāṭimids and ‘Abbāsid for the allegiance of Islam, and turned to violence by the preaching of extremists. Massacres of the Fāṭimid Shi‘ī minority may have been prompted by a proclamation of the ‘Abbāsid by Hāmmād in 405/1014f., at the outset of his defiance of Bādis, and taken place at Tunis in 406/1015f. at the instigation of the jurist Muḥriz ibn Khalaf. They certainly took place at Qayrawān in 407 8/1016 17, following the accession of the child al Mu‘izz. Before order was restored, the mob invaded the palace city and sacked the market (ṣūq). Massacres at Tripoli were preached by the jurist Ibn al Munammar; at Qayrawān the jurist Ibn Khaldūn al Balawi, killed by the authorities in the course of the rioting, may have been responsible. The disorders anticipated the riots in Fustāṭ against the preaching of the divinity of the Fāṭimid imam caliph al Ḥākim a year or two later. Their seriousness and significance, however, is disguised by the retrospective attribution of the affair to the invocation of Abū Bakr and ‘Umar by the boy sultan, a sign of his future Sunnism. Followed by extensive reprisals, the outbreak in fact left relations
with Cairo unchanged. Like his predecessors, al Mu’izz was showered with titles and insignia by al Ḥākim and his successor al Zāhir. As Sharaf al Dawla wa ‘Aḍuduhā, he remained central to the empire of the imam caliph.

His personal regime took shape around the age of fourteen to sixteen with the execution of his chief minister Muḥammad ibn al Ḥasan in 413/1022; the appointment of Abū ’l Bahār ibn Khalūf as head of government in 414/1023; the death at the end of the year of his aunt Umm Mallāl; and the marriage of his sister to ‘Abd Allāh, son of Ḥammād, in 415/1024. Muḥammad ibn al Ḥasan was the general who had ensured his accession in 407/1016, Ibn Khalūf the man responsible for the repression of the violence in 407 8/1016 17. Viziers in all but name, they were the successors of ‘Abd Allāh al Kātib at the head of the administration. Umm Mallāl had acted as regent, while the sister, Umm al ‘Ulū, was the instrument of a dynastic reconciliation and alliance. Having failed to prevent the return of the Banū Khazrūn to Tripoli in 413/1022, in 417/1026f. al Mu’izz followed Cairo in recognising their occupation, safeguarding the flow of trade through this important entrepôt. Meanwhile the Byzantine invasion of Sicily in 416/1025, aborted by the death of the emperor Basil II, was followed by raids into Byzantine territory as far away as the Aegean by the Zirīd and Kalbid fleets. Only the south, the oasis region of the Djerid and the hill country of the Jabal Nafūṣa, remained disturbed by the Zanāṭa, who are confused in the sources with the region’s rebellious Ḥārījīt population. From 427/1036 onwards, their militancy brought to an end a relatively untroubled decade. Over the next ten years, insurgency in the south was accompanied by a Zirīd invasion of Sicily, while a quarrel with Ḥammād’s son and successor al Qā’id led to war.

The chronology is unclear, but from 428/1037 to 443/1042 annual expeditions seem to have been required to defeat the incursions of these Zanāṭa almost as far north as Qayrawān and across to the island of Djerba, and regain control of the south. Meanwhile in 427/1036 an army under al Mu’izz’s son ‘Abd Allāh had been sent to Sicily at the invitation of ‘the Sicilians’, angry that al Akḥal had exempted the lands of ‘the Ifrīqiyyans’ from tax (kharāj). The identity of these two parties is conjectural, as is al Akḥal’s purpose; but the Sicilians who threatened to turn the island over to the Byzantines are likely to have included the indigenous Greek component of the population, extensively but by no means entirely Islamised and Arabised. Al Akḥal was besieged and finally murdered at Palermo in 429/1038, but in 431/1040 ‘Abd Allāh was defeated by the Byzantines, who had seized the opportunity to return. Rejected by the islanders, he returned to Ifrīqiya, where al Mu’izz himself was committed to a two year siege of the Qal’a of the Banū Ḥammād
from 432/1041 to 434/1043. The Byzantines likewise withdrew after the recall of their commander Maniakes in 433 4/1042, leaving Sicily divided between Ḥasan al Ṣamsām, al Akhāl’s brother, and some four other regional lords. With Kalbīd rule fatally compromised, the Zīrid fleet continued to operate against Byzantium, sailing into the Aegean in 439/1047f., the year the Fāṭimids and Byzantines made peace. In response to Byzantine complaints about the aggression of this viceroy of the imam caliph, Cairo disclaimed responsibility for his actions. The answer signalled a revolution in Zīrid policy at home and abroad.

Over the past ten years, al Mu‘īzz had moved towards a formal repudiation of his Fāṭimid allegiance. He had done so as something of a scholar, tutored by the learned Ibn Abī ‘l Rijāl, secretary of the chancery, and known in the Latin West as Abenragel for his treatise on astronomy. In debate with the Mālikī scholars (‘ulama‘), he had presided over their disputes on the side of moderation.9 From the remarks of Ibn Sharaf, poet and continuator of the chronicle of al Raqīq, it is clear that Mu‘īzz’s highly cultivated court was Sunnī in outlook, and apparent that the price to be paid for the backing of public opinion against the threat of religious extremism was the breaking of ties with Cairo. More positively, it was the key to an ambitious attempt to transform the wider fortunes of the dynasty by turning the sultan into a champion of the true faith. In 440/1048f., the ‘Abbāsids were proclaimed, the Fāṭimids denounced and their insignia burnt. In 441/1049f., the Zīrid dinar was no longer struck in the name of the imam caliph, but carried the minatory Qur’ānic legend: ‘Whoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it shall not be accepted from him, and in the Hereafter he shall be among the lost.’ A new open air oratory (musallā) was constructed for the old Fāṭimid palace city, henceforth known simply as al Ṣabra, ‘Endurance’. The following year, 442/1050f., al Mu‘īzz’s son Tamīm was proclaimed heir to the throne with a specifically anti Fāṭimid invocation, and ‘Abbāsid black was provided in place of Fāṭimid white for all religious functionaries.

The change was not without difficulty. The prohibition of the Fāṭimid dinar raised prices. At the same time the administration was purged. In 439/1047f., the governor of Nefta in the Djerid was removed; a Şanhāja, and thus a member of the Zīrid clan, he must have been responsible for the peace of this sensitive area. Two years later, in 441/1049f., the great Qā‘īd ‘Abbād ibn Marwān and all his nominees were dismissed from central government, as a token, it may be, of an end to corruption and illegal taxation. But from this new position of strength, al Mu‘īzz could send the radical preacher Ibn ‘Abd al Ṣamad away on pilgrimage, to be murdered en route. Meanwhile, abroad,
an alliance with al Qāʿid at the Qalʿa and al Muntaṣir ibn Khazrūn at Tripoli was extended to Barqa in Cyrenaica, where in 443/1051 the amīr of the Banū Qurra, Jabbaʿa ibn Mukhtār, denounced the Fāṭimids and offered his allegiance to al Muʿizz. A coalition was building under al Muʿizz’s leadership which gave promise of a new Sunnī empire to the west of Egypt. Any such grand design, however, came to grief at the battle of Ḥaydarān in the following year, when the Zirīd army was routed by the Riyāḥ and Zughba, tribes of the Banū Hilāl.

The battle of Ḥaydarān

Almost all sources repeat the story that the response of the Fāṭimid vizier al Yāzuʿī to al Muʿizz’s repudiation of his allegiance was to send the Bedouin Arab tribes of the Banū Hilāl across the Nile to wreak vengeance on the traitor.10 This cannot be true, since the presence of the Banū Hilāl to the west of the river, beyond the oasis of Farafra, was noted by Ibn Ḥawqal in the second half of the fourth/tenth century.11 Moreover, in 429/1038 Saʿīd ibn Khazrūn was killed by the Zughba at Tripoli, while the first reference to the Riyāḥ is to their employment by al Muʿizz as warriors some ten years later.12 The migration of these tribes across the northern Sahara had evidently taken place in the first half of the fifth/eleventh century, not as an isolated phenomenon, but as the latest phase in the population of the great desert by camel herding nomads over the past thousand years. For their horses, however, the Hilalians needed the pastures of the desert margin, and as cavalrymen they were equipped to take possession of them in competition with their Berber occupants, not least the Zanāṭa of the Banū Khazrūn. In that capacity, the Riyāḥ and Zughba presented al Muʿizz with an opportunity to gain control of the troublesome south, in particular the route to Tripoli across the Jaffāra plain between the Jabal Nafūsa and the sea. But their employment ended when, like the Zanāṭa before them, the two tribes advanced beyond Gabes, the gateway to the north, to enter central Tunisia. In the spring of 443/1052, al Muʿizz responded with a major expedition, which as it straggled through hill country to the south of Qayrawān was ambushed by the Arabs. The Zirīd cavalry fled, leaving the sultan to retreat to al Šabra escorted by his ʿabīd or black infantry. The baggage train, with all his wealth, was plundered.13 The Arabs advanced to Qayrawān, where al Muʿizz himself supervised the erection of barricades around the unwalled city. Meanwhile they laid claim to the countryside.
For a year after the battle, al Mu‘izz was engaged in bargaining with the tribes over their demand for iqtā’s, concessions of land and revenue, while the rest of the country waited. But the Riyāḥ and Zughba quarrelled over the booty of the battle, and appealed to the Fāṭimid vizier al Yāzūrī, who seized the opportunity to intervene. In 445/1053f. he sent a commander, Amin al Dawla ibn Mulhim, to Gabes to adjudicate the dispute; to urge the tribes to resume the siege of Qayrawān; and to invite a return to Fāṭimid suzerainty. Ibn Walmiya, the Śanḥāja governor of Gabes, submitted and was reappointed to the post; ‘Abd Allāh, the Ḥammādīd husband of al Mu‘izz’s sister, and another brother of al Qā‘id at the Qal‘a, came to offer their allegiance. Amin al Dawla returned to Egypt with the imam caliph’s share of the booty of Ḥaydarān, and a delegation of Ifrīqiyyans anxious to submit. The episode was celebrated by the announcement sent by the caliph al Mustansır to Yemen. His sijill or letter is the crucial proof of the extent of Fāṭimid intervention in the affairs of Ifrīqiya, and of its limitation to the period after Ḥaydarān.14 It was nevertheless sufficient to precipitate the collapse of the regime. Although Qayrawān had been hastily provided with an enceinte, al Mu‘izz had lost control of the surrounding countryside, and prepared to retire to al Mahdiyya on the coast. In 446/1054f., while he himself returned to Fāṭimid allegiance, the exodus began; in 449/1057 he left the city. Al Šabra was sacked by the Arabs, and Qayrawān deserted by its inhabitants. In 449/1057f., the dinar struck at al Mahdiyya reverted to Fāṭimid type, and in 454/1062 al Mu‘izz died, to be succeeded by his son Tamīm.

It was the end of an era. Ifrīqiya, the Byzantine province which the Arabs had inherited, had finally broken up. Qayrawān, its metropolis, shrank to a fraction of its former size. The major cities of Tunis, Sfax, Gabes and Gafsa were all independent, the Zīrids confined to al Mahdiyya and Sousse. It only remained to offer an explanation. On the Ifrīqiyan side, the theme of Zīrid descent from the pre Islamic kings of Ḥimyar in Yemen supplied the metaphor. Just as the kings of Ḥimyar had been obliged to emigrate by the breaking of the great dam of Ma‘rib and the flooding of their city, so Qayrawān had been swamped and its monarch driven into exile by a flood, not of water but of men, the Banū Hilāl, who as north Arabsians were the inveterate enemies of the Yemenites. The explanation of this inundation was supplied by the Egyptians. In 450/1058 the vizier al Yāzūrī, who had despatched Amin al Dawla to Gabes, who was no doubt responsible for the triumphant claim of the sijill to have wrought the destruction of the traitor al Mu‘izz, and whose poet Ibn Ḥayyūs had boasted of his personal responsibility for the downfall of the sultan, was executed for treason. As the Zīrids were reconciled with the
Fāṭimids, it was possible to say that he had been the reprehensible cause of the disaster, breaking the barrier of the Nile to loose the Arabs on Ifrīqiya. When the metaphor was combined with the explanation, the Banū Hilāl passed into history as the great destroyers Ibn Khaldūn’s swarm of locusts which had devastated the land and laid it permanently waste.

Arabs and Normans

Underwritten a century ago by Georges Marçais, the myth of the catastrophe has been convincingly discredited in a celebrated article by Jean Poncet. It is certainly the case, however, that the battle of Ḥaydarān was comparable to that of Dandānqān, which opened the way into the Middle East for the Saljuqs, and for the population of its northern highlands by the Turcomans. The Banū Hilāl were unlike the Saljuqs, who created an empire on the strength of their championship of Islam; their various tribes served the Zīrids and Ḥammādids as allies in their struggle to revive the Ifrīqiyan state. But like the Turcomans, they overran the countryside as warriors, as nomads, and as speakers of a different language, vernacular Arabic as distinct from Berber dialect. In all three ways, they permanently altered the balance of economy, society and state. By the time of Ibn Khaldūn in the eighth/fourteenth century, when the Ḥafsids at Tunis and Bijaṭa (Bougie, Bejaïa) had reconstituted the central government of Ifrīqiya, their warrior tribes had become an estate of the realm. Below this privileged elite, however, the poorer nomads were mingling with the peasantry in a subject population whose formation was marked by the spread of Hilalian Arabic as the vernacular of the countryside. Berber had retreated into the hills and mountains where its speakers were comparatively secluded in hilltop villages. Between the mountains, the oases and the cities pastoralism had spread northwards towards the Mediterranean, while agriculture had turned to shifting cultivation. The separation of this reality from the legend, however, does not begin to emerge in the Kitāb alʿibar of Ibn Khaldūn until the Almohad conquest of Ifrīqiya in the mid sixth/twelfth century. The previous hundred years are poorly documented, a time of troubles when the villagers of southern Tunisia hedged their paths with slabs of stone too close for horsemen to pass, and the Ḥammādids were obliged to abandon their Qalʿa in the mountains for Bijāṭa on the coast.

The contemporaneous invasion, conquest and government of Sicily by the Normans was different from but still more radical than the revolution in Ifrīqiya in its consequences for the population of the island. In the twenty
years after the end of the Byzantine invasion of Sicily in 433f./1042, southern Italy had fallen into the hands of the Norman mercenary Robert Guiscard. Al Hasan al Şamsâm had been driven from Palermo by the citizens, while the qaḍ‘îls Ibn al Maklâtî and Ibn Mankût at Catania in the east and Mazara in the west had been eliminated from the competition between Ibn al Thumna at Syracuse in the south east and Ibn al Ḥâwwâs at Enna and Agrigento in the centre. In 453/1061 Robert’s younger brother Roger crossed into Sicily at the invitation of Ibn al Thumna, again as a mercenary but again as a conqueror. Over the next thirty years he gradually extended his control over its three regions: the Val Demone along the north coast from Messina to Palermo by 464/1072; the Val di Mazara in the west by 469f./1077; and finally the Val di Noto in the south east between 479/1086 and 484/1091. In the 450s/1060s he was held up by the arrival of a Zârid army under Tamîm’s two sons, Ayyûb and ‘Alî, who like ‘abd Allâh before them took control of the island only to quarrel with the Sicilians and retire to Ifrîqiya following their defeat by Roger at Misilmeri near Palermo in 460/1068. The critical event was the capture of Palermo in 464/1072, which secured the Norman presence on the island. The capture of Trapani in 469f./1077 and Taormina in 471f./1079 rounded off their occupation of the north and west, but the south and east remained hostile under the amîr of Syracuse, Ibn ‘Abbâd (Benavert), until his defeat and death in 479/1086. The conquest was finally completed in 484/1091 with the fall of Noto.

Roger’s handful of knights could not have taken the island without the aid of Muslim Sicilian allies and troops. The conquest completed, the terms of surrender left the Muslim population under the authority of its qaḍîs and shaykhs, who administered the Islamic law on behalf of the Christian state. The disadvantage was its definition as a subject community on the strength of its religion. Its rents and taxes were compounded by a tribute imposed as the price of peace; called a jizya, this placed the Muslims of Sicily in the position of Christians and Jews under Islam. Politically and administratively, the Muslim population was then decapitated by the progressive allocation of the land, its inhabitants and its revenues to Roger himself and his treasury, and to his knights, the ministers of his household, and the bishoprics and monasteries of the Latin Church which he introduced alongside the Greek. There is no record of a Muslim recipient of such grants before Abu’l Qâsim ibn Ḥâmmûd in the second half of the sixth/twelfth century, a minister of state who may have belonged to the old Muslim nobility. If any of its members were left for a time in possession of their lands and people, they were eventually ousted.
by this systematic redistribution. Starting most probably from registers compiled under the Kalbids, the allocation of the new demesnes proceeded through local enquiry to determine their boundaries, to identify their occupants and to establish their dues. The task fell to a rudimentary central administration staffed by bilingual Greeks, who compiled the new registers of lands and people as charters for the holders of these estates. The procedure was all the more alien since Roger was latterly based in Calabria, and the seat of government only returned to Palermo via Messina in 505/1112, when his son Roger II came of age. When it did so, the administration not only turned to the literate Muslim community of the city for an Arabic secretariat, but from 524/1130 onwards, when Roger was crowned king, systematically remodelled its procedures on those of the Fāṭimid caliphate in Egypt. The architect was the great minister George of Antioch, the staff a group of converted Muslim eunuchs who presided over the issue of a second generation of charters, magnificently written in Arabic, Greek and occasionally Latin.16 The creation of this administration was an aspect of an imperial design that culminated in the 540s/1140s in the conquest of the Ifrīqiyan coast, and the extension into North Africa of a more indirect form of rule over a Muslim population.

The Muslims of Sicily, by comparison, were increasingly oppressed. The weight of taxation may have been offset initially by a return to peace and prosperity: Palermo itself was particularly large and wealthy, and wheat was a major export. But taxation became more onerous as land was expropriated to make way for Latin colonists from the mainland, and the Muslim population itself dwindled. The arrival of economic refugees from Ifrīqiya in the 530s/1030s was more than offset by emigration on the one hand, conversion on the other, an eventual passage into Latin Christianity through the ambiguous identity of native Arabic speaking Greek Christians. Emigration was justified by the necessity to escape from infidel territory; any lapse from the faith was evidently abhorrent. Between the two extremes, the quandary of remaining generated a legal controversy as to whether the judgments of a qāḍī appointed by an infidel ruler were valid. In the special case of the royal eunuchs and other high officials of Muslim origin, their obligatory conversion to Christianity might be excused as nominal, a case of taqiyya or legitimate pretence. Not until the end of the sixth/twelfth century did the Muslims of the Val di Mazara resort to the fourth option of rebellion, which led finally to their deportation to Lucera in Apulia between 621/1224 and 644/1246. In Ifrīqiya on the other hand, emigration, acceptance, rebellion and possibly even conversion were compressed into
the twenty five years of the Norman occupation of the coast between 529/1135 and 555/1160.17

Al-Mahdiyya

The Norman occupation of the coast of Ifriqiya, which centred on the capture of al Mahdiyya in 543/1148 and ended with the fall of the city to the Almohads in 555/1160, terminated the efforts of the Zirids to regain a measure of power and authority after their flight from Qayrawân. More generally, the two events brought to an end the era of the city states which had formed alongside that of the Zirids at al Mahdiyya in the aftermath of Ḥaydarân. In 456/1064, at the beginning of his long reign from 454/1062 to 1108, al Mu‘izz’s son Tamīm recovered Sousse after an initial rebellion. In 493/1100 he recovered Sfax from Ḥammū ibn Mallīl, the cousin of its former Zirid governor, who had seized power in 451/1059. At his death, therefore, he left to his son Yahyā a dominion over the Tunisian Sahel, the bulge of the east coast, some 200 kilometres from north to south and perhaps 50 kilometres deep. To the north, however, a family of citizens had established the dynasty of the Banū Khurāsān at Tunis, while at Gabes to the south the dynasty of Ibn Walmiya, the governor appointed by the Fatimid Amīn al Dawla in 445/1053f., was replaced around 489/1096 by the Banū Jāmī, the only such dynasty to be founded by Arabs of the Banū Hilāl. The inland city of Gafsa was ruled throughout the period by the Banū ‘l Rand, a dynasty of local Berber origin founded by the governor appointed by the Zirids. The Banū Khazrūn may have survived for a while at Tripoli, but by the middle of the sixth/twelfth century the city was governed by the Banū Matruh, a family from the town. The oasis cities of the Djerid, such as Tozeur and Nafzawa, appear to have been controlled by local notables, such as the Banū Sind at Biskra.18

The conflict between these petty dynasties, dominated by the ambition of the Zirids to reconstitute their former dominion, was complicated by the occupation of central Tunisia by the warrior tribes of Riyāḥ and Zughba. Indispensable allies of the various rulers, forming the bulk of their armies on campaign, they continued to dominate the city of Qayrawān, and block any Zirid expansion inland. Their alliance nevertheless enabled Tamīm to rout the Ḥammādīd al Nāṣir at the battle of Sabība in 457/1065, defeating his attempt to conquer Ifriqiya for himself. The depredations of al Nāṣir’s own Hilālī allies, the Athbaj, in the region of the Zāb to the south of his Qal’a made the city, like Qayrawān, untenable as a capital, and obliged him in the aftermath of Sabība to move down to Bijāya on the coast. There and at Bone (Būna, ‘Annāba) he
profited from the growing trade with Pisa and Genoa, while retaining control of the strategic city of Constantine in the interior. Although peace with Tamīm was eventually sealed with a marriage alliance in 470/1077f., his reach extended along the whole of the northern coast as far as Tunis under the Banū Khuråsān. As rulers of a city growing into the largest in the country, these turned to the Ḥammādids against the Zirids, whose attempts at conquest were successfully resisted.

For Tamīm and his successors at al Mahdiyya, the sea was all the more important. In the 450s/1060s, Tamīm’s attempt to conquer Sicily failed after the defeat of his son Ayyūb by the Normans in 461/1069; in 463/1071 an attempt to relieve the siege of Palermo was unsuccessful, as was a final expedition to Mazara in 467f./1075. Zīrid piracy nevertheless continued, and contributed to the sudden, dramatic, but largely inconsequential capture and sack of al Mahdiyya apart from the citadel by the Pisans and Genoese in 480/1087, an expedition in which the motives of plunder, commercial advantage, and war upon Islam in the years before the First Crusade were all combined. In spite of this disaster, under Tamīm’s son Yahyā, 501/1108, the Zīrid fleet scoured the coasts of the western Mediterranean. Meanwhile piracy had brought into Tamīm’s service George of Antioch, an Arabic speaking Greek who became a senior minister before fleeing to Sicily on Tamīm’s death. There, in the service of Roger II, he extended the Norman conquest of the island to Ifrīqiya.

Trade was a major factor in the enterprise. The Zīrids not only profited from the growing commerce of the Mediterranean, but with their slender resources were increasingly dependent upon it, and especially upon the supply of Sicilian grain. Trade led to war in 511/1117, when the Zīrid sultan ‘Alī blockaded Gabes to prevent the Banū Jāmī from trading with Sicily, and drove off a Sicilian fleet that came to their aid. In 517/1123, in the reign of ‘Alī’s young son al Ḥasan, this was followed by Roger’s first attempt at conquest, an expedition that notably failed to capture al Mahdiyya. Over the next twenty years, however, Zīrid resistance was undermined by dependence upon Sicilian grain, which had to be paid for with gold. In 529/1135 the Normans came as allies to relieve the siege of al Mahdiyya by the Ḥammādids, who had taken Tunis from the Khurāsānids in 522/1128 and harboured their own imperial design; but in the same year their fleet conquered the island of Djerba. In 536/1141f. it destroyed shipping in the harbour of al Mahdiyya, the occasion for a treaty that reduced al Ḥasan almost to the status of a vassal, and in 540/1145f. went on to capture Tripoli and the Kerkenna islands. The following year the ruler of Gabes offered his allegiance to Roger; when he was
killed by the outraged citizens with the help of a Zîrid army, Roger seized the opportunity to mount a final invasion in 543/1148. Unwilling to obey the summons of George of Antioch to join his march upon Gabes in accordance with his treaty obligations, al Hasan fled to the Almohads at Marrakesh, while the Normans took possession of al Mahdiyya along with Sousse, Sfax and Gabes.21

The capture of Bone in the autumn of 548/1153 by the royal eunuch Philip of Mahdiyya was a different matter. In 547/1152 the last Ḥammādīd sultan Yahyā had surrendered to a more formidable conqueror, the Almohad caliph ‘Abd al Mu’min, who had proceeded to crush the tribes of the Banū Hilāl at Setīf in the spring of 548/1153, and appointed his son ‘Abd Allāh as ruler of this new province of his new empire. Governed for the Normans by a brother of Yahyā, Bone had little future as an enclave in an aggressive Almohad dominion which threatened the whole of the Norman position in Ifrīqiya. Internally this was undermined by the death of George of Antioch in 546/1151, the execution of his protégé Philip of Mahdiyya on his return from the capture of Bone, and the death of Roger himself in 549/1154. With a Norman garrison in the citadel, the government of each city had been left to its notables under an ‘āhd, a formal agreement with the conquerors; their collaboration with the infidel was justified not only legally, by the need to preserve the community, but also economically, by the prosperity that resulted from an increase in trade with Sicily. When the Normans were thought to have broken the terms of the ‘āhd, however, rebellion was in order. After the death of Roger, the most probable reason was the arrival of a wave of Sicilian immigrants, and the beginning of the kind of discrimination experienced by the Muslim population of Sicily. Sfax, Gabes and Tripoli all revolted in 551/1156f., evicting their garrisons and massacring their Christian inhabitants; Zawīla, the large suburban city outside the walls of al Mahdiyya, did so unsuccessfully in the following year. The suppression of its revolt provoked an appeal to ‘Abd al Mu’min, who came in 554/1159 to complete his conquest of the Ḥammādīd sphere with the capture of Tunis, before driving the Normans from al Mahdiyya in 555/1160. Taking possession of all the cities as far as Tripoli, he defeated the Arabs yet again near Qayrawān. The resistance of Tunis shows that the Almohads were not in fact welcome; but the city became the new capital of a new central government of Ifrīqiya, under which the tribes of the Banū Hilāl, followed by those of the Banū Sūlaym, were incorporated into the state, to continue their evolution within the political framework of ‘Abd al Mu’min’s empire and its successors.22
## Central Mediterranean lands

### Ifrīqiya

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<td>Transfer from Qal'a to Bijaya</td>
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<td>Badis ibn al Manṣur</td>
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<td>al 'Aziz ibn al Manṣur</td>
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<td>Yahya ibn al 'Aziz</td>
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The central lands of North Africa and Sicily

547/1152 Almohad conquest
548/1153 Sack of Qal’a

CITIES

Tunis
Banu Khurasan

Sfax
Hammu ibn Mallīl

Gabes
Banu Walmiya
Banu Jamī’

Tripoli
Banu Khazrun

Rule of qaṭīs
443 77/1052(?) 84: Zirid restoration?
Banu Mātrūh

Gafsa
Banu ’l Rand

Biskra
Banu Rumman/Banu Sindi

4th/10th century to 693/1294

Sicily

KALBIDS
‘Alī ibn al Hasan 359/970
Jabir ibn ‘Alī 372/982
Ja’far ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī

‘Abd Allah ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī
Yusuf ibn ‘Abd Allah 379/989
Ja’far ibn Yusuf 388/998
Ahmad al Akhal ibn Yusuf

Byzantine landing at Messina 410/1019
Peace with Byzantium 425/1034
Zirid invasion of ‘Abd Allah ibn al Mu’izz 427/1036
Notes


The Almohads (524 668/1130 1269) and the Ḥāfṣids (627 932/1229 1526)

MARIBEL FIERRO

The Almohad caliphate

The mahdi Ibn Tumart and the Almohad movement

Ibn Yāsīn, the founder of the Almoravid movement, is depicted as a Mālikī jurist engaged in transforming the Lamtūna Berbers into good Mālikī Muslims, a mission he accomplished by resorting often to physical punishments. His teachings were transmitted for some time, but eventually forgotten. Despite both his relevance and the prominence of the Mālikī school under the Almoravids, Ibn Yāsīn did not come to play a central role either in western Mālikism or in Almoravid political legitimisation.

Ibn Tūmart, the founder of the Almohad movement, also aimed at a moral and religious reform. Accounts of Ibn Tūmart’s life more detailed than those of Ibn Yāsīn, as well as the ‘Book’ (Kitāb) attributed to him, are extant. The Almohad numismatic formula Allāhu rabbūna wa Mūḥammad rasūla wāʾl mahdi īmāmūnā (God is our Lord, Mūḥammad is our Prophet, the mahdi īmām) bears witness to the central role he was accorded in the new polity. However, our understanding of how and when those accounts of his life were written down is still faulty, apart from the obvious fact that they moulded Ibn Tūmart’s life according to the Prophet’s biography. Much of the portrayal of Ibn Tūmart comes from the ‘Memoirs’ of al-Baydhaq, whose aim is nevertheless chiefly to establish ‘Abd al Mu’min’s right to lead the Almohads as caliph.

The picture those accounts convey is as follows. Ibn Tūmart was born in Īgillīz, a village in the Sūs, the great valley which separates the western range of the High Atlas from the Anti Atlas to the south, and an area where the spread of Mālikism, Mu’tazilism and Shi‘ism is documented. He came from the Harga tribe, Maṣmūda Berbers, although he was properly a member of the Prophet’s family. He travelled to al-Andalus around the year 500/1106f. and then to the East to pursue his education. In Baghdad, he met al-Ghazālī
Ibn Tūmart (d. 505/1111), the great religious reformer, who prophesied that Ibn Tūmart would put an end to the Almoravid dynasty, responsible for the burning of al Ghazālī’s work Ihyā’ ʿulūm al din (The revival of the religious sciences) under the pressure of the conservative and fanatic Mālikīs. After a stay in Fāṭimid Alexandria where Ibn Tūmart practised ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’, he started his return to the Maghrib by sea. He disembarked in Tripoli and after stopping at al Mahdiyya, Monastir, Tunis and Constantine, he arrived in Bougie in 511/1119. Everywhere he went he preached against deviations from proper Islamic norms and customs, censoring the consumption of wine and the use of musical instruments. In Mallāla, near Bougie, Ibn Tūmart met ‘Abd al Mu’min, a Zanāta Berber from the area of Tlemcen, whose intention was to travel to the East to study. This meeting had been foretold in advance by Ibn Tūmart, who made his new pupil realise that the science he was expecting to acquire in the East was there in the Maghrib itself and secretly informed him of his great destiny. From Mallāla, Ibn Tūmart and the small group of his close followers travelled to Marrakesh, stopping at different places such as Tlemcen, Fez, Meknes and Salé. In the Almoravid capital, he censored the use of veils by males and the fact that women did not cover themselves. His debates with the local scholars provoked the amīr to expel him from the town. After a stay in Aghmat, Ibn Tūmart moved to the Atlas, where local leaders such as Abū Ḥaṣṣ ʿUmar Īntī (Hintātī), from whom the Hāšids dynasty descended became his followers. Ibn Tūmart eventually settled in his native town in the Sūs, and there he was acknowledged as the Mahdī, i.e. ‘the rightly guided one’ expected to appear in the Maghrib in the sixth/twelfth century, the one responsible for the suppression of error and the maintenance of truth whose orders had to be obeyed because they coincided with God’s will and order, and the one who would fill the earth with justice. The Almoravids had to be fought because of their departure from truth, clearly manifested in their anthropomorphic beliefs (tashbīḥ). As they were in fact unbelievers, jihad could be waged against them as against Jews and Christians. For nine years from his proclamation as Mahdī in 515/1121 until his death in 524/1130, Ibn Tūmart fought the Almoravids and those tribes such as the Haskūra who refused to acknowledge his leadership. In 518/1124, he and his followers moved to a settlement in the Great Atlas Tinmal that was to become the ‘Medina’ of the movement. The original population was massacred and only loyal Almohads were allowed to live there. Ibn Tūmart consolidated his hold over the mountains to the south and west of Marrakesh. Having realised that Tinmal was an impregnable site and having to deal also with the Christian advance in al Andalus, the Almoravids
concentrated on building a belt of fortresses to stop the Almohads descending into the plains of Marrakesh.

One of Ibn Tūmart’s first followers, al Bashīr al Wanshariṣī, had the power to predict the future and also to distinguish between sincere believers and hypocrites, which he did during the great ‘purge’ (tamyīz) of the Almohad tribes, a bloodletting much criticised by Ibn Taymiyya. Shortly after, in 524/1130, an attack against Marrakesh was organised, but the Almohads were defeated in the battle of al Buḥayra. Al Bashīr mysteriously disappeared and Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar Īntī was seriously injured. Seventeen years of continuous fighting passed before the Almohads attacked Marrakesh again, and this only after having conquered the north of Morocco and part of Algeria. Three months after the Buḥayra defeat, Ibn Tūmart died, but his death was hidden for some three years. Tinmal, as well as Īgīlīz, became places of pilgrimage, and the Almohad caliphs who were buried at Tinmal, near Ibn Tūmart’s grave often visited them.

Ibn Tūmart’s movement can only be understood within its Berber context, in which a charismatic figure with a religious message provided the ‘glue’ by which tribes were united in a common enterprise leading to state formation. The use of the Berber language is well documented, although it was precisely during the Almohad period that the Arabisation of the Maghrib was made possible thanks to the incorporation of Arab tribes (the Banū Hilāl and Banū Sulaym) into the army and their eventual settlement in certain areas of the Maghrib. Accounts of Berber merits and genealogies such as the Ṭafākhir al barbar were recorded, although Ibn Tūmart was presented as a member of the Prophet’s family and ‘Abd al Mu’min eventually adopted an Arab (Qaysī) genealogy. The original Almohad organisation was a combination of a religio-political hierarchy with Berber tribal structures. Together with the close circle of the Mahdi’s relatives and ‘servants’ (ahl al dār), the Council of Ten (al jamā‘a) consisted of Ibn Tūmart’s first followers, such as al Bashīr, Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar Īntī and ‘Abd al Mu’min. The shaykhs of the tribes incorporated into the movement (Ḥarga, Hintāta, Gadmīwa and Ganfīsa) constituted the Council of Fifty. As the latter most probably included the Ten, what we have here is the Berber institution of the Ait al Arba‘īn. The tribe to which Ibn Tūmart belonged, the Maṣmūḍa, had a long record of producing prophet like leaders during the process of acculturation to Islam. The Barghawāṭa branch, settled along the Atlantic coast, had their prophet Sāliḥ and a Berber ‘Qur‘ān’. They managed to establish a polity of their own lasting from the second/eighth century until the Almoravids. The Ghumāra branch in the north responded in 315/927 to the prophet Ḥāmīm and his own Berber ‘Qur‘ān’. In Ibn Tūmart’s case, Islamic acculturation had reached a point that did not
allow for the appearance of a new Berber ‘Qur‘ān’, only for a Kitāb that contained legal discussions integrated into Islamic normativity.

Ibn Tūmart’s Kitāb, also known by the title of its opening words A‘azz ma ṣuṭlab (‘The most precious one can ask for’, i.e., ‘ilm or religious knowledge), is a composite book including different tracts collected after Ibn Tūmart’s death, to which a book on jihad was added by the second Almohad caliph. Although much work is still to be done to study its sources and redaction, the Kitāb if it is the work of Ibn Tūmart situates him within the circles of contemporary legal scholars who, like al Ghazālī, were interested in legal methodology (uṣūl) and aimed at a religious renewal, although Ibn Tūmart seems to have developed a specially radical doctrine that seriously challenged prevailing understandings of Islamic religious law.¹¹

Much has been written about Ibn Tūmart’s links with al Ghazālī. While the idea of an encounter between the two is to be discarded, the use of al Ghazālī’s figure and doctrine was then a powerful legitimising tool. Al Ghazālī had undertaken an ambitious project of religious and political reform. Two aspects are of relevance here. First, al Ghazālī had written extensively against the Bāṭiniyya (those who believed in an esoteric truth) at a time when the Fāṭimid caliphate was progressively losing political and religious power, but more radical Ismaʿili groups, such as the Nizāris, still insisted verbally and often with the sword that following their impeccable imām provided religious certainty in this life and salvation in the next. Although al Ghazālī opposed such doctrine, in some of his works he himself asserted that after the Prophet’s death the Muslim community was still in need of divine inspiration, to be found among God’s friends (awliyā’ Allāh), not necessarily to be identified with the Sufis. The role of the friend of God (walī Allāh) thus came close to that of the Ismaʿili imām (al Ghazālī’s Andalusi pupil Abū Bakr ibn al ‘Arabī said that his teacher had digested so much of the thought of the philosophers and of the Bāṭiniyya that he could not extricate himself from it). Secondly, al Ghazālī directed a severe criticism against those jurists who limited themselves to the letter of the law without paying attention to its principles and inner meaning. This criticism of traditional religious scholars paralleled the search for alternative authority figures, such as the ‘friend of God’ (walī Allāh), be it a Sufi or a mahdī.¹² While it is difficult to imagine how Ibn Tūmart could have attracted his Berber followers with the dry discussion of fine points of legal methodology contained in his Kitāb, his proclamation as mahdī greatly contributed to his success. As such, he was in possession of the Truth (he was ‘the well known rightly guided one and the impeccable imām’, al mahdī al ma‘lūm al imām al ma‘ṣīm), and believers in his message had only to follow

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his teachings to achieve salvation. The Truth consisted in the strict monotheistic belief (tawhīd) linked by some sources either to Muʿtazilism or Ashʿarism that gave its name to the movement (al muwaḥhidūn, i.e. the believers in One God) and that implicitly charged its opponents with anthropomorphism, an accusation that was also made explicitly. True belief was acquired by learning Ibn Tūmart’s creed (ʿaqīda), of which different versions circulated. Simpler versions of such a creed (the murshidas) were directed to the common folk, reflecting the concern of the age to ensure that they could not be charged with infidelity because of their ignorance (takfīr alʿawāmm). The obligatory character of learning such professions of faith led to their being taught in both Berber and Arabic, and their wide diffusion explains the fact that a Latin translation was produced in 1213.

Ibn Tūmart’s doctrine has also been linked to Zāhirism because of its insistence on a strict adherence to God’s message as preserved in the Qurʾān and the Prophetic Tradition, and its rejection of both speculative analogy (qiyyās) and imitation of human interpretation of the Law (taqlīd). Zāhirī trends in the general meaning of the word, i.e. literalist are present especially in the first period, when the Cordoban Zāhirī Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) was revered and when the Almohad caliphs favoured the study of both Qurʾān and hadīth (Tradition of the Prophet), promoting the writing of exegesis and of works in which Prophetic Traditions found in more than one canonical collection were collected. At the same time, these trends could also be connected with reformed Mālikism, which is what Almohadism eventually looked like. Even if parallelisms with certain legal and theological schools can be discerned, Almohad doctrines should be understood as a local interpretation of the ‘Sunnī revival’ of the times, an interpretation that under went changes and reorientations in tune with the political development of the Almohad caliphate.

‘Abd al-Muʿmin (r. 527 58/1133 63) and the foundation of the Almohad caliphate

‘Abd al Muʿmin’s rise to power seems to have started after al Bashīr’s and the mahdi’s death. Three years later, in 527/1133, he was proclaimed Ibn Tūmart’s successor, a nomination that did not go uncontested. Ibn Malwiyya, a member of the Council of Ten, rebelled and was defeated. ‘Abd al Muʿmin’s political and military skills contributed to the formation of a powerful army out of the tribes mobilised by Ibn Tūmart’s message, while the Almoravid amīr ‘Ali ibn Yūsuf (r. 500 37/1106 43) increasingly relied on a Catalan mercenary, Reverter, and his men in the Maghrib. Avoiding open
confrontation, by 535/1140 the Almohads had completely taken over the Sūs. Incursions towards the north had already started in 532/1137, but it was three years later that ‘Abd al Mu’min launched a campaign that was to culminate with the conquest of Marrakesh in 541/1147. Keeping to the mountains, the Almohads won over the regions rich in mines of Tādlā, Fāzāz and the Jebala, reaching the Mediterranean coast at Bādis, and then moving towards Oran and Tlemcen. The village near Nedroma where ‘Abd al Mu’min was born was conquered and his Kūmya tribe joined the Almohad movement. Other tribes, such as the northern Mašmūda (Ghumara) and Şanḥāja, as well as various Zanāta groups, defected to the Almohads. Divisions within the Almoravid army erupted and the new amīr Tāshfīn (r. 537 9/1143 5), a Lamtūnī who was contested by the Massūfa, was not even able to establish himself in Marrakesh. Reverter’s death in 539/1145 further weakened the Almoravid cause. After defeating the Almoravids in the central Maghrib and conquering Oran and Tlemcen, the Almohads, now feeling strong enough, moved into the plains of western Morocco. Fez was taken after a siege in 540/1146, followed by Meknes and Salé. In March 541/1147, after some resistance, Marrakesh fell. The ensuing massacre was stopped by ‘Abd al Mu’min, who only entered the city once the erroneous orientation of its mosques was corrected. Marrakesh became the capital of the Almohads instead of Tinmal. The first Kutubiyya mosque was then built, to be followed a few years after by the second Kutubiyya, with its massive minaret and different orientation, and extensive gardens and basins were also constructed.16

‘Abd al Mu’min took the caliphal title after having firmly established his rule in the area. This happened once the rebellion of al Massī along the Atlantic coast was crushed (542 5/1147 50). Al Massī from Salé, claimed to be the Mahdī and was followed by the Gazūla (Jazūla), Ḥāhā, Ragraqa, Ḥazmūra, Haskanūra of the plains and other tribal groups. Rebellion erupted also in Sijilmāsa and the Dra‘ valley. During the same period, the Almoravid Ibn al Şahrāwiyya, who had taken refuge in al Andalus, disembarked in Ceuta, hoping to restore Almoravid fortunes.

Shortly after the capture of Marrakesh, delegations from the independent rulers of al Andalus (the second Taifa) arrived to pay allegiance. The Almoravid admiral Ibn Maymūn was the first to deliver the Friday sermon in the name of the Almohads in Cadiz in 540/1146, while the first Andalusī ruler to approach ‘Abd al Mu’min was the Sufi Ibn Qasī, who had proclaimed himself imam and by the year 539/1144 was ruling in the Algarve (southern Portugal). Almohad troops crossed the Straits in 541/1147 and took possession of the Algarve and then of Seville. When Ibn Qasī realised that Almohad rule
was under serious threat because of al Massū and Ibn al-Ṣahrāwiyya, he and other Andalusi rulers who had joined the Almohad cause defected. ‘Abd al Mu‘min, using both the original Almohad troops and the Christian soldiers who had served the Almoravids in Marrakesh, defeated al Massū. Ibn al-Ṣahrāwiyya was also eventually defeated and joined the Almohads. Thus, control over the Maghrib was regained, and soon reinforced by fear. In 544/1149f., a great ‘purge’ (i‘tirāf) was carried out by the Almohad tribal leaders (the shaykhs), to whom ‘Abd al Mu‘min had given lists with the names of those who had to be eliminated in the rebel tribes. The ensuing bloodshed ensured that peace was imposed, truth reigned and difference of opinion was suppressed. In al Andalus, Cordoba was taken.

‘Abd al Mu‘min then started building opposite Salé Ribāt al fath (Rabat). It was also called al Mahdiyya given its similarity to the Mahdiyya built by the Fāṭimids in Ifrīqiya (Tunisia), a town then in the hands of the Normans of Sicily, who had taken advantage of the upheavals caused by the invasion of nomadic Arab tribes to seize control of the coastal regions.17 ‘Abd al Mu‘min concentrated a large army in Rabat Salé to undertake the conquest of al Andalus, the rest of central Maghrib and Ifrīqiya.

In 546/1151, the rulers of the western regions of al Andalus crossed the Straits to pledge obedience to ‘Abd al Mu‘min, except Ibn Qasī, who having established an alliance with the king of Portugal was killed by some of his followers that same year. Troops under the command of Abū Ḵafṣ ‘Umar Īnī were sent to al Andalus, while ‘Abd al Mu‘min led the campaign towards the central Maghrib. Algiers, Bougie, the Qal’a of the Banū Ḥammād and Constantine were conquered in 547/1152. The defeat of the Arab tribes at Setif in 548/1153 opened the road to Ifrīqiya. But first ‘Abd al Mu‘min put an end to internal dissent caused by Ibn Tūmart’s brothers and members of his tribe, the Harga,18 as well as to the unrest in the Sūs coming from former Almoravid tribes. In 552/1157, the pledge of obedience of the original Almohad tribes was renewed and the caliph paid his traditional visit to Tinmal. In 553/1158, the campaign against Ifrīqiya was finally launched. Tunis was conquered in 554/1159 and in the same year Mahdiyya (in Christian hands since 1148), Sfax and Tripoli were seized from the Normans. The itinerary that Ibn Tūmart is alleged to have followed in his return from the East had now been completed in reverse order by ‘Abd al Mu‘min. For the first time in the history of North Africa, a single state was created, ruled by Berbers.

As for al Andalus, Almoravid rule had been seriously weakened as a result of Christian expansion and of the concentration on fighting the Almohads in the Maghrib. Although Tāshfin did react to the Christian threat, after 535/1140
Andalusís openly revolted against those foreign Berbers who had failed in delivering the military help that was the rationale for accepting their rule. Santarem and Lisbon were captured in 542/1147 by the king of Portugal, who availed himself of Crusader help. The Ebro valley was completely lost by 543/1148. During this period, central rule collapsed in the rest of al Andalus. Judges, as representatives of the urban elites, came to power in towns such as Cordoba, Jaén, Malaga, Murcia and Valencia. Local soldiers trained in the frontier areas, such as Sayf al Dawla Ibn Hūd, also made their bid for power. Ibn Hūd, who established his rule in the Levante, the eastern part of the Iberian Peninsula (Sharq al Andalus), even adopted the caliphal titles of Commander of the Believers (amīr al muʾminīn) and al Mustansir, but was eventually defeated and killed by the Christians in 540/1146. The main opposition the Almohads found in al Andalus came from Ibn Mardanīsh, another ‘man of the sword’ who also took power in the Levante. His territory was separated for a decade from that of the Almohads by the last Almoravids who resisted in Granada, and by the Christians, who with the help of Genoese naval power ruled over Almería from 542/1147 until 552/1157. Ibn Mardanīsh came to depend on Castilian military help, an alliance strongly attacked by Almohad propaganda. His father in law, Ibn Hamushk, who ruled the fortress of Segura, caused great damage on the Almohad frontier, for example taking Granada for a brief period in 557/1162, but he eventually defected to the Almohads.

By then, the Almohad army had incorporated Arab troops, especially after the Arab tribes were again defeated in al Qarn near Qayrawān in 556/1161. ‘Abd al Muʾmin started the transfer of those Arab tribes to the extreme Maghrib as a way both to control them and to increase his own power. The Arabs were mobilised for jihad in the Iberian Peninsula by his successors after his death in 558/1163. ‘Abd al Muʾmin had spent the previous year preparing an attack by land and sea to put an end both to local rebellions and to the Christian threat in al Andalus. Great numbers of troops were recruited, many ships built, and large quantities of food and armaments stored. Before starting the campaign, during the winter of 557/1162, ‘Abd al Muʾmin paid a visit to Ibn Tūmart’s grave in Tinmal, suffering great discomfort because of cold and rain. In February 558/1163, the troops were concentrated in Rabat, but shortly after this ‘Abd al Muʾmin fell ill and died.

The Muʾminid dynasty till the end of the Almohad caliphate

‘Abd al Muʾmin’s son Muḥammad, named heir in 549/1154, reigned for a few months, but was soon replaced by his half brother Yūsuf. The intervention of
the sayyid (the title given to the Mu’minid princes) Abū Ḥaḍṣ ‘Umar, Yūsuf’s full brother, was decisive. ‘Abd al Mu’min was said to have abrogated Muḥammad’s nomination shortly before his death, but this was an attempt to cover up what was in fact a coup within the Mu’minid family.

The new ruler, Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf (r. 558 80/1163 84), had long experience, having served for seven years as governor in Seville. He could count on the loyalty and capabilities of his equally experienced brother Abū Ḥaḍṣ ‘Umar. However, Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf had some trouble in obtaining the recognition of Abū Ḥaḍṣ ‘Umar Īntı, the powerful member of the Council of Ten, as well as that of some of his own brothers, the governors of Bougie and Cordoba. This opposition seems to have been the reason for cancelling the great military campaign in al Andalus organised by ‘Abd al Mu’min and for not yet taking the title Commander of the Believers (amīr al mu’minīn). Also, Mazīzdag al Ghumārī and his son rebelled. They were defeated only after a long campaign in 560 2/1165 6 in the Ghumāra mountains near Ceuta. In 561/1165, Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf sent a letter to the Almohad governors forbidding them to impose any death sentence without his approval, and in 563/1168 he felt strong enough to adopt the title of Commander of the Believers.

By then, he had obtained important successes in al Andalus. In 560/1165, his half brother, the governor of Cordoba, recognised his rule, while great damage was inflicted on Ibn Mardanīsh. Defeated near his capital Murcia, Ibn Mardanīsh was also abandoned by Ibn Hamushk in 564/1169. The following year, the planned expedition against Ibn Mardanīsh had to be postponed because the caliph fell ill after plague erupted in Marrakesh. But the sayyid Abū Ḥaḍṣ ‘Umar left for al Andalus and, with Ibn Hamushk’s help, Lorca, Elche and Baza submitted to the Almohads. The caliph arrived in 567/1171 with an army including Arabs from Ifrīqiya and raids were made in the area of Toledo. After Ibn Mardanīsh’s death in 567/1172, his sons surrendered Murcia and were incorporated into the Almohad hierarchy. They advised the caliph to attack the Castilians in the area of Huete. The Almohads took some fortresses, but failed to conquer Huete. The Castilians from Avila were able shortly after to cross the Guadalquivir, laying waste the area of Ecija and Cordoba in 569/1173.

The king of Portugal was also pursuing an aggressive policy in the River Guadiana region with the help of a frontier man, Giraldo sem Pavor the ‘Portuguese Cid’ who managed to occupy the town of Badajoz. Conflicts between Portugal, León, Castile and Navarra, as well as within the Castilian nobility, led to an alliance between Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf and Fernando II of León, and in 564/1168 the Leonese reconquered Badajoz and handed it over to the Almohads. Only Evora remained in Portuguese hands. However, the
Almohad hold in the area was tenuous. In 564/1170, a convoy with food and armaments had to be sent from Seville to Badajoz, but was captured by Giraldo. During the campaign of 565/1170, Giraldo could again be stopped thanks to the renewed alliance with the king of León. When the caliph arrived in al Andalus in 567/1171, another convoy with food and armaments sent to Badajoz this time reached its destination without problems, but while the Almohads were busy with the campaign against Huete, Giraldo took Beja, only to see it abandoned by the king of Portugal after some months. When the Almohads raided the area of Toledo, the Castilian king asked for a truce, which allowed him to fight the king of Navarra. The Portuguese king also asked for a truce in 569/1173, which led Giraldo Sem Pavor to defect to the Almohads, serving them in the Maghrib where he died. Beja was repopulated by the Almohads, but peace did not last for long. The king of León now launched an attack against al Andalus, while a member of the Castilian nobility, Fernando Rodríguez, defected to the Almohads. Shifting alliances and counter alliances became a common feature of this period.22

During the almost four years of his stay in al Andalus, Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf started building the impressive new mosque of Seville.23 He returned to Marrakesh in 571/1176, the year when Abū Ḥāfṣ ʿUmar Īnṭī, the last of Ibn Tūmart’s companions, died. The Castilians besieged Cuenca and, although the governors of Cordoba and Seville attacked the areas of Toledo and Talavera as a distraction, the town fell after nine months. In 578/1182, Alfonso VIII of Castile camped in front of Cordoba and his raids reached Algeciras near the sea. The Almohads reacted by raiding again the area of Talavera. The king of Portugal, on his part, raided the areas of Beja and Seville in 573/1178, while one of Ibn Mardanîsh’s sons, leading the Almohad navy, attacked Lisbon. Naval encounters between the Almohads and the Portuguese ensued with varied fortunes. In 1183, Castile and León established an alliance to fight the Almohads. The caliph again crossed the Straits, to meet his death while his army was besieging Santarem in 580/1184. Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf had also to pay attention to his eastern North African frontier. In 575 6/1180 1, he led a successful expedition against rebel Gafsa and the defeated Arabs were sent to al Andalus to wage jihad against the Christians. But some of them remained in the area to join other rebels against the Almohads, such as the Banū Ghāniya, descendants of the Almoravid ruling house.24 Having resisted for some time in Seville and in Granada, keeping their allegiance to the ‘Abbāsids, the Banū Ghāniya managed to rule an Almoravid outpost in the Balearic Islands that lasted until 599/1203. In November 580/1184, ʿAlī ibn Ghāniya (d. 584/1188) sailed to North Africa and occupied Bougie, Algiers and Milyāna.
Abū Yaʿqūb Yusuf was succeeded by his son Abū Yusuf Yaʿqūb (r. 580/95/1184 99), who later took the title al Manṣūr. A reformer, he administered justice personally for some time, while prohibiting the use of wine, silk clothes and musical instruments. In Marrakesh, the citadel (qaṣba) with its mosque, new gardens and a hospital were built.

One of his first concerns was to fight the Banū Ghāniya. Bougie was reconquered and ʿAlī ibn Ghāniya fled towards Ifrīqiya, where he found support among the Arabs. He occupied the oasis of Tawzar and Gafsa in 582/1186 and joined forces with the governor of Tripoli, Qarāqūš. This Armenian had entered Ifrīqiya from Ayyūbid Egypt with an army of Turcomans (the ghuzz) in 568/1172. The coalition of Arabs, ghuzz and Almoravids took control of the Djerid. Only Tunis and Mahdiyya remained in Almohad hands. After visiting Tinmal, Abū Yusuf Yaʿqūb launched an expedition against Ifrīqiya in 582/1186. An initial defeat of the Almohads at al Ṭūmra was followed by the victory of al Ḥamma near Qayrawān. Gafsa surrendered to the Almohads. In 583/1187, the caliph returned triumphant to Tunis after having pacified the Djerid. But his defeat at al Ṭūmra had led his brother Abū Ḥafs ‘Umar al Rashīd, governor of Murcia, to sign an alliance with Alfonso VIII to foster his own cause, while his uncle Abū ʿl Rabī’ Sulaymān attempted the same in Tāḍlā. Both were taken prisoner and sent to Salé where they were executed in 584/1188.

The Portuguese, in the meanwhile, had conquered Silves with the help of Crusaders travelling to Palestine after Saladin’s conquest of Jerusalem in 1187, and Alfonso VIII of Castile had raided the region of Seville. The caliph arrived in al Andalus in 586/1191 and signed a truce with the king of Castile. While part of his army besieged Silves, he attacked the king of Portugal in the area north of Santarem. Lack of provisions and illness made him return to Seville, where he punished corrupt Almohad officials, administered justice personally and forbade music. In the meantime, ʿAlī al Jazārī, a member of the Almohad religious and administrative elites (ṭalaba) established under ‘Abd al Muʾmin, rebelled in Marrakesh and gained a wide following. Persecuted, he fled to Fez and then to al Andalus, his native land, where his teachings attracted the populace of the Malaga markets, until he and his followers were executed. Another rebel in the Zab was also defeated when the Arabs abandoned him.

In 586/1190, an ambassador sent by Saladin arrived asking the Almohad caliph to help to halt the Crusaders in the east by sea, but without success. The fleet was needed for the second attempt to reconquer Silves, accomplished in 587/1191. Unrest continued in the area of Ifrīqiya, where Yahyā ibn Ghāniya, the new Almoravid leader, would fight for some fifty years to prevent the
Almohads regaining control of the Djerid. The Almohad caliph could do little against him, as his intervention in al Andalus was needed given the constant Christian pressure. In June 591/1195, the Almohad army defeated Alfonso VIII at Alarcos, a battle in which the Arabs’ way of fighting (karr wa farr) and the strength of Almohad archery seem to have been decisive. Several castles were occupied and, in the next two years, raids were carried out in the area. Alfonso VIII did not dare to have another encounter with the Almohads for seventeen years. The king of León Alfonso IX, condemned by the pope for his alliance with the Almohads, travelled to Seville to obtain their help against a Castilian Aragonese coalition, but to no avail. A period of ten years’ truce followed, during which Alfonso VIII of Castile recovered his strength.

Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad, who took the title al Naṣir (r. 595 610/1199 1213), was named heir by his father al Mansūr before the latter’s death in 588/1192. He had to fight in the Sūs the rebellion of Abū Qasaba, who, like al Jazīri, was a member of the Almohad ṭalaba and who persuaded himself of being destined to rule; his severed head hung for many years in one of the gates of Marrakesh. Another Almohad rebel was active in Ifrīqiya, where he collided with the Banū Ghāniya. They managed to expand and occupy Tunis and other towns, but at the same time they were cut off from their original power base in the Balearic Islands with the Almohad conquest of Majorca in 599/1202f. In 602 3/1206 7, Mahdiyya, Tunis and Tripolitania were reconquered in an expedition commanded by the caliph.

Al Naṣir tried to reduce the power of the Almohad shaykhs and the Mu‘minid sayyids, but the ensuing tensions within the ruling elite affected the performance of the Almohad troops, whose payment stopped being regular. In 608/1211, al Naṣir led a campaign in al Andalus. Initial success was followed by defeat in the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (al ‘Iqāb) in July 609/1212 at the hands of a coalition of the Christian kingdoms which also included Crusader help.25 The Christians, for all the symbolic value of this victory, could not benefit greatly from it. Pedro II of Aragon and Alfonso VIII of Castile died shortly after and their successors were minors. Only when Fernando III (r. 1217 52) under whom Castile and León were united and James I of Aragon (r. 1239 76) reached maturity did Christian advance continue.

Al Naṣir died shortly after the battle of al ‘Iqāb, to be followed by five caliphs in a short period.26 Al Naṣir’s successor was his minor son Yūṣuf al Mustansir (r. 610 20/1214 24). In the pledge of obedience to him, the caliph assured the obligation of dismissing the troops after every campaign, of not
appropriating anything of public benefit, of paying salaries on time and of not isolating himself from the Almohads. It is not clear if these restrictions had been spelled out before, or are an indication of the caliph’s weakness. Al Mustansir had in fact little control of the reins of power and never left Marrakesh, except for a visit to Tinmal. Famine was rampant, a Fāṭimid pretender stirred up rebellion among the Ṣanhāja and the countryside was raided by Arabs and Berbers. The Zanāta Banū Marīn reached Fez.27 Yahyā ibn Ghāniya caused unrest in the areas of Tlemcen and Sijilmāsa. In al Andalus, Alcacer do Sal was conquered by the Portuguese with Crusader help. Al Mustansir died childless.

The vizier Ibn Jāmi‘, descendant of one of Ibn Tūmart’s servants (ahl al dār), an Andalusī with no tribal followers, had ‘Abd al Wāḥid ibn Yūsuf ibn ‘Abd al Mu‘min elected as successor, but his reign was limited to the year 620/1224. Ibn Jāmi‘’s rival Ibn Yujjān, a relative of Ibn Tūmart’s Companion, Abū Ḥafs ‘Umar Īntī, and a Hintāṭī shaykh persuaded the governor of Murcia, the sayyid ‘Abd Allāh, to rule with the title al Ādīl (r. 621 4/1224 7). In Marrakesh, some of the Almohad shaykhs exiled Ibn Jāmi‘ and the caliph was deposed and killed: as a chronicler put it, the Almohad shaykhs had become for the Mu‘minids what the Turks had been for the ‘Abbāsids. Al Ādīl could count on the support of his brothers, governors in Cordoba, Malaga and Granada. But some of his relatives opposed his nomination, among them the governor of Valencia and ‘Abd Allāh al Bayyāsī, who in his stronghold of Baeza agreed to become a vassal of Fernando III of Castile. Al Ādīl was unable to defeat him, while the Portuguese raided the region of Seville. As the Almohad army did not react, the people of Seville went out to fight, but were easily defeated. Contrary to the situation in the Christian kingdoms, the civil population was disarmed and inexperienced, and the Almohads did not try to channel their eagerness to defend their lives and properties by transforming them into local militias. Fernando III helped al Bayyāsī to settle in Cordoba, giving him in exchange three fortresses, but the inhabitants of one of them, Capilla, refused to surrender. Fernando III besieged them with al Bayyāsī’s help. The people of Cordoba, outraged by such behaviour, killed al Bayyāsī and sent his head to al Ādīl in Marrakesh. The caliph himself was killed shortly after, having fallen out with Ibn Yujjān and his Berber and Arab allies, and with other Almohad shaykhs.

His brother Abū ‘l Ulā Idrīs, a grandson of Ibn Mardānīsh on his mother’s side, was named caliph in Seville with the title al Ma‘mūn (r. 624 9/1227 32). He signed a truce with Fernando III by paying the king of Castile León a huge sum (300,000 maravedís), as he needed time to ensure his acceptance in
Marrakesh. The Mašmūda shaykhs, displeased by the support he had among the Haskūra and the Khulṭ Arabs, named another candidate, Yahyā al Muṭaṣim billah (r. twice, 624/1227 and 633 5/1234 6). Almohad failure in resisting the Christians stimulated Andalusī attempts at independence. Ibn Hūd al Judhāmī became the main focus of such attempts. A soldier in the Murcia army, he rebelled against the Almohads in 625/1228, condemning their heresy and ordering the purification of their mosques. He managed to defeat the governors of Murcia and Valencia – the latter, the sayyid Abū Zayd, eventually converted to Christianity while the people of Cordoba expelled the Almohads. Ibn Hūd pledged obedience to the ʿAbbāsids and adopted the title Commander of the Muslims (amīr al muslimīn) previously used by the Almoravids. Unable to stop Andalusī resistance, al Maʾmūn decided to travel to Marrakesh to depose Yaḥyā al Muṭaṣim. He crossed the Straits in October 625/1228 with the Almohad army and 500 Christian horsemen. His departure marked the end of effective Almohad rule. Cordoba and Valencia were lost to the Muslims in 633/1236 and 635/1238, Jaén and Seville in 646/1248. Only the Nasrid kingdom of Granada survived.

In the Maghrib, now depopulated by famine, plague and war, the Almohad tribes retreated to the area of Marrakesh and the Atlas mountains. Al Maʾmūn defeated his rival, massacred the Almohad shaykhs and renounced Almohad doctrine. Under al Manṣūr, there had already been signs of repudiation of Ibn Tūmart’s teachings and his infallibility, as shown for example by a text by Averroes, where the philosopher holds such teachings to be valid for Ibn Tūmart’s age, not for present times. The dismissal of what was in fact the doctrinal basis of the empire – a dismissal that was an attempt to deprive the Almohad shaykhs of the power still held by them, and perhaps also the result of the pressure of Islamic universalism – fatally undermined the Almohad caliphate.

Allied to the Arab Khulṭ and the Haskūra, al Maʾmūn fought the Hintāta and the people of Tinmal. In al Andalus, Seville acknowledged Ibn Hūd, who lost Badajoz and Mérida to the Leonese. Majorca was conquered by the Aragonese in 628/1231 and Menorca acknowledged their authority, paying tribute to them. In Ifrīqiya, in 627/1229 f., the Almohad shaykh Abū Zakariyyāʾ proclaimed himself independent, marking the beginning of the Ḥafṣīd caliphate. Al Maʾmūn died trying to recover Marrakesh from his rival Yaḥyā al Muṭaṣim. Al Maʾmūn’s son and successor, al Rashīd (r. 629 40/1232 42), managed to conquer the capital with an army in which there were no Almohad troops, his main support being Christian mercenaries and the Khulṭ Arabs. The Haskūra supported Yaḥyā al Muṭaṣim, but were defeated,
taking refuge in the area of Sijilmāsa. The surviving Almohad shaykhs then approached al Rashīd through the mediation of the Christian mercenary leaders. Their return to Marrakesh was accompanied by the restoration of the Almohad doctrine. The Arab Khūlṭ, whose leader Masʿūd ibn Ḫumaydān was treacherously killed, then allied themselves with the Haskūrā, raided the area around Marrakesh and besieged the town. Al Rashīd managed to escape and took refuge with his followers in Sijilmāsa, from where he made an alliance with the Arab Sufyān.

In the meantime, Marrakesh was occupied by Yahyā al Muʿtaṣīm and his Khūlṭ allies, but he had neither the power nor the resources to act as a real caliph. The few Almohads who had joined him in Marrakesh defected. Al Rashīd then moved against him with an army formed by Christian mercenaries and the Arab Sufyān, and having defeated his rival in 633/1235, started with great difficulty to reorganise Almohad administration and to collect taxes as far as the Ghumāra region. Part of the surviving Khūlṭ were deported to the Sūs, and their former ally, the Haskūrā chief Ibn Waqārīt, acknowledged Ibn Hūd and in 634/1236 attacked Rabat and Salé. But Ibn Hūd was losing ground in al Andalus, and in 635/1238 Seville pledged obedience to al Rashīd, as did Ceuta and Granada. Al Rashīd tried hard to appease the Banū Marīn, by then active in the Gharb, but a fight erupted, the Almohads were eventually defeated and the Marīnids took control of northern Morocco.

Almohad military weakness made unthinkable any intervention in the Iberian Peninsula, where Fernando III’s advance reduced Muslim territory to Granada and the surrounding regions. Under al Saʿīd (r. 640 6/1242 8), who sought support again among the Arab Khūlṭ and the Christian mercenaries, Almohad disintegration increased, with Yaghmurāsān ibn Zayyān becoming independent in Tlemcen and with the expansion of the Marīnids’ area of influence. In 645/1248, al Saʿīd attempted to regain control of the Maghrib and Ifrīqiya, but was defeated by the ruler of Tlemcen. Under his successor al Murtaḍā (r. 646 65/1248 66), the Marīnids took control of towns of northern Morocco such as Taza and Fez. Ceuta became independent under Abū ʿl Qāsim al Ṭazīfī in 647/1250. Salé, taken by the Marīnids, was attacked in 659/1260 by the navy of Alfonso X.31 Marrakesh itself was attacked by the Marīnids in 660/1262. The diplomatic exchange with the papacy started under al Saʿīd continued in al Murtaḍā’s times, in relation with the nomination of a Franciscan friar32 as bishop in 1246 to cater for the needs of the Christian mercenaries in Marrakesh (a church had been built there under al Maʾmūn). Innocent IV invited the caliph to convert to Christianity and to give possession of fortresses to his Christian soldiers, but his advice was disregarded. As a
result, recruitment of Christian mercenaries became more difficult and this may have influenced al Murtaḍa’s poor military performance. The Marinids inflicted many defeats on him and the caliph seems to have abandoned any attempt at new military campaigns, concentrating instead on building activities. The rebellion of his relative Abū Dabbūs led to al Murtaḍa’s execution. Abū Dabbūs ruled less than three years. Defeated by the Marinids, his head hung in one of the gates of Fez. The Marinid amīr Abū Yūsuf Ya’qūb entered Marrakesh in September 668/1269 and took the title of Commander of the Muslims (amīr al muslimūn). Abū Dabbūs’ sons, one of whom was proclaimed caliph in Tinmal, eventually emigrated to the Iberian Peninsula and put themselves under the protection of the king of Aragon. The Almohad shaykhs who resisted in Tinmal were decapitated in 674/1275.

The Almohad empire had lasted some 140 years. Control of both al Andalus and Ifrīqiya proved in the end too difficult to manage. On the one hand, both regions provided the Mu‘minid caliphs with troops (Arabs from Ifrīqiya and Christian mercenaries from the Iberian peninsula) that allowed them not to depend exclusively on the original Almohad tribal units. On the other hand, they demanded constant intervention. In Ifrīqiya, the ghuzz threat and Arab raids became even more dangerous with the Banū Ghāniya’s activities in the area. Their attempt to restore Almoravid rule failed, but they inflicted great damage on the Almohads by stirring up the nomadic Arabs, feeding their passion for loot, and extending the Arab sphere of action in the Maghrib. Independent rule of Ifrīqiya under the Ḥafsids was the eventual solution to Almohad inability to exert permanent control. In al Andalus, Almohad military might, which depended heavily on the caliph’s presence and massive armies moving slowly and always short of provisions, proved in the long run no match for the damage caused by the local militias of Christian towns. Opposition on the part of sectors of the Andalusī population to both the rule and doctrine of the Almohads contributed to weakening the foundations of the empire. The succession of minors, unable to keep up the essential ‘active and beneficial presence’ expected from the Almohad caliphs, allowed the rise of the Almohad shaykhs and viziers with their rivalries and ambitions and led to civil wars.

Politics and religion under the Almohads

The Almohad historian Ibn Ṣahib al Ṣalāḥ (d. after 600/1203) gave to his official chronicle the title al Mann bi l imāma ‘alā ’l mustaḍ‘afīn bi an ja’alahuμ Allāh a’imma wa ja’alahuμ al wārithīn, ‘[Divine] favour of the imamate granted to those considered weak on earth, and made by God imams and heirs’. The title
is grounded in Qur'ān 28:5, and it implies a reversal of the existing order. The verse had previously been used by revolutionary movements of Shi‘ī inspiration, such as those of Muḥammad al Nafṣ al Zakiyya and the Ismā‘īlīs of Bahrāyn. In its origins, the Almohad movement was closer to Shi‘īsm than to Sunnism, as it started with a charismatic figure, Ibn Tūmart, consistently referred to as the ‘well known rightly guided one and impeccable imam’ (al mahdī al ma‘lūm al inām al ma‘ṣūm) and the ‘inheritor of the station of prophecy and infallibility’ (wārith maqām al nubuwwa wa’l ‘iṣma). His charisma served the legitimisation of Berber rule and the creation of new elites.

Seeking legitimacy: between Shi‘ism and Sunnism

Ibn Tūmart was a Maṣmūda Berber, but eventually he adopted or was given an Arab genealogy that linked him with the Prophet as a descendant of his grandson al Hasan (the ancestor of the oldest Maghribi dynasty, the Idrīsids). He was succeeded by another Berber, the Zanjīta ‘Abd al Mu‘min, whose right to rule as Commander of the Believers (amīr al mu‘minīn) was established in al Baydhaq’s Memoirs by accounts of miraculous signs since his childhood and by the Mahdī’s predilection for him. Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) had difficulties fitting the case of ‘Abd al Mu‘min into his model of dynasty formation, in which a noble lineage makes tribal solidarity (‘aṣabiyya) coalesce around it, because he was a Zanjīta and not a member of the Mahdī’s tribe. ‘Abd al Mu‘min’s adoption of an Arab Qaysī genealogy was meant to solve this problem. It was a genealogy with a long tradition within his tribe, the Zanjīta, and it had many advantages. Qays includes Quraysh, the Prophet’s tribe, and ‘Abd al Mu‘min was moreover said to descend directly from the Prophet on his mother’s side. Qays also includes ‘Abs, the tribe of the Arab Prophet Khālid ibn Sīnān: given that the Qaysīs had been a lineage chosen for prophecy, they were even more entitled to the caliphate (fa hum ahl bayt li l nubuwwa fa ahrā an yakīnī ahl bayt li’l khilāfa). The Qaysī genealogy also includes Hilāl and Sulaym, the Arab tribes that ‘Abd al Mu‘min had to fight in his expansion towards the central Maghrib and Ifrīqiya, and that were eventually incorporated into the Almohad army as a way both to control them and to liberate the Mu‘minids from dependency on the original Almohad troops.

The conquest of al Andalus opened new venues for legitimisation and reinforced the tendency towards Sunnism. It linked the Mu‘minids with a prestigious local caliphate, that of the Umayyads, to which the Zanjīta had been closely connected in the past. The transfer from Cordoba to Marrakesh of the Qur’ān alleged to have belonged to ‘Uthmān was one of the ways in which such a link was established, and Ibn Tūmart’s alleged transmission of
Mašik’s Muwaṭṭa’ was a way to establish a connection with Sunnī al Andalus where Mašikism had become the ‘official’ doctrine in Umayyad times and Ifrīqiya. But the Muʾminids, in their eclecticism, did not disdain to establish links with the other local caliphate, that of the Fāṭimids, as shown by the importance given to their conquest of Mahdiyya, their predilection for Mahdiyya like foundations as in the case of Rabat and the possession attributed to Ibn Tūmart of a Kitāb al jafri reminiscent of Jaʿfar al Šādiq’s. The assimilation between God’s order (amr Allāh) and Almohad/Muʾminid rule also points to Fāṭimid like models. For all the ways (still to be fully analysed) in which they attempted to strengthen their political and religious legitimacy, the Muʾminids’ Berber origins were never forgotten or forgiven. One of the accusations made against Averroes was that, while commenting on Aristotle’s Book of animals, he mentioned that he had seen a giraffe at the court of ‘the king of the Berbers’. Whether true or not, the anecdote is plausible: Andalusī acceptance of Muʾminid legitimacy was of paramount importance for the dynasty, but it was never fully granted.

The elites of the empire

The original structure of the Almohad movement developed under Ibn Tūmart underwent changes under ‘Abd al Muʾmin. The first caliph established a three layered structure: at the top, there were the earliest adherents of the movement (those who had joined before the battle of Marrakesh in 524/1129); then followed those who had joined between 524/1129 and 539/1144f., the date of the conquest of Oran; then the rest of those who had joined the Almohad cause (tawḥīd). With this hierarchy, ‘Abd al Muʾmin preserved the respect due to the survivors of the Councils of Ten and Fifty, and to their descendants, the Almohad shaykhs, to whom he gave employment in the administration of the state as governors or in the entourage of those governors who belonged to the caliphal family. The main role of the Almohad shaykhs was to control their tribes and provide soldiers for the military campaigns. Although their advice was sought, the caliph’s decisions did not necessarily follow it. The Masmuḍa and the Almohad shaykhs came increasingly to feel that ‘Abd al Muʾmin’s fight was no longer theirs, but the defeat of Ibn Tūmart’s brothers and his followers also indicated to them that the preservation of what they had gained and the rewards to come now depended on being on the caliph’s side.

‘Abd al Muʾmin and his successors were interested in keeping open the possibility of new recruitment, as they did with Ibn Mardanīš’s family. It took ‘Abd al Muʾmin twenty seven years before he dared to suggest that he would
be succeeded by one of his sons and before giving preference to his many sons in the administration of the empire. But he had taken earlier steps towards this move, not limited to purging the more disaffected members of the original Almohad tribes, or recruiting new troops among his own tribesmen and the Arabs. He also promoted the training of servants loyal to the dynasty, the ṭalaba and the ḥuffāz, starting an ambitious educational programme. He gathered promising young men from different parts of the empire, together with his own sons and those of the Almohad shaykhs, and gave them both religious and military training (including swimming, perhaps owing to the importance of the Almohad fleet). An indispensable part of the religious training was memorisation of Ibn Tūmart’s creeds and study of the other tracts compiled in his Kitāb. The caliph closely followed their progress, and once trained they served as preachers, muezzins and directors of prayer in the mosques. Some of them the ṭalabat al ḥaḍār formed part of the entourage of the caliph and held sessions of intellectual debate with him. Some joined the Mu‘minid governors and other Almohad officials. Many of these ṭalaba were Berbers and Berber was used both as a language of instruction and a religious language Berber formulas for the call to prayer have been preserved and Ibn Tūmart’s creeds were taught in Berber. Ideally, the ṭalaba should have been able to engage in independent religious and legal reasoning, as servile imitation of late precedents (taqlīd) was censored. Under both Abū Ya‘qūb and al Mansūr, much thought was devoted to the issue of how to establish proper legal doctrine and practice, the main trend being close to Zāhirism in the sense of reliance on the original sources of Revelation. To this end Averroes devoted his legal work Bidāyat al mujtahid wa niḥyat al muʿtaṣīd (‘The beginning for him who is striving towards a personal judgement and the end for him who contents himself with received knowledge’), which helped to direct Almohadism towards reformed Mālikism. In connection with the need to train their elites, but also out of concern for the spread of knowledge among the population at large, the Almohad caliphs promoted the production of encyclopedic works collecting everything that was known at the time about a particular subject, as well as didactic works often in versified form, and this in practically all disciplines. Linked to the ṭalaba (if not part of them) were those who engaged in the study of the rational sciences, to which an impressive impulse was given under the second and third Almohad caliphs as shown by the careers of Ibn Ṭūfayl (d. 581/1185) and Averroes for reasons still to be fully explored. The latter’s disgrace has usually been interpreted as the result of the struggle between Almohads and Mālikīs, but it could be better understood as the result of
internal fights among the Almohad elites themselves, more specifically between those who wanted to preserve the original doctrinal orientation and those more philosophically oriented. Sufism, like philosophy, flourished under the Almohads, but was also subject to suspicion, especially in the Andalusí context, with all the major figures emigrating to other lands, as in the cases of Abū Madyan, Ibn ‘Arabī or Ibn Sallīn. A doctrinal and political movement that had originated with an impeccable imam (and which used the term baraka to refer to the salary paid to the army) could not but be apprehensive regarding what similar charismatic figures might achieve, while at the same time sainthood, if controlled, increased the dynasty’s legitimacy.49

The ṭalāba were not the only specialised bodies in the administration of the Almohad state. There were, for example, also those responsible for the minting of coins with very specific features: square dirhams, dinars with a square inscribed within a circle, with no specification of dates or (usually) of mints.50 The training of these and other ‘civil servants’ of the state helps to explain the high degree of centralisation achieved in the Almohad empire, a centralisation that made possible, for example, the successful movement of the massive Almohad armies, an efficient postal service supporting a sophisticated propaganda system (the caliphs wrote letters that reached almost every corner of their empire), and, most importantly, the collection of taxes. Coins were a fiscal instrument: minted as a monopoly by the state, they represented the extent of its power. Whereas in Almoravid times there had been a massive minting of gold, in Almohad times silver predominated. It is not clear what determined this quasi mono metalism of silver, but perhaps difficulties in controlling the African gold trade. ‘Abd al Mu’mīn had tried to persuade the inhabitants of Constantine to join the Almohads by stressing the difference between the many illegal taxes imposed by the Almoravids and the strict fiscal policy of the Almohads. On the other hand, he seems to have considered as conquered territory all the land of the empire (except for the original nucleus and al Andalus), and thus this was subject to kharāj. The Almohad state later developed a centralised system of territorial concessions that, together with the salaries paid from the fiscal revenues, were bestowed to reward services.51

The writing of Almohad history: the case of the suppression of Judaism and Christianity

In direct relationship to their ambitious political and religious project, the Almohads promoted the official writing of history, as shown in the works by
al Baydhaq, Ibn Ṣāḥib al Ṣalāṭ and Ibn al Ṭaṭṭān, and also in the official letters, many of which have been preserved constituting a valuable source still to be properly exploited. ‘Abd al Wāḥīd al Marrākushī wrote his chronicle in Egypt at a time when the Almohad caliphate was disintegrating, and his treatment, as those by Ibn ‘Idhārī, Ibn Khaldūn,52 Ibn Abī Zar‘ or Ibn al Athīr, reveals to a significant degree what Émile Fricaud has called the process of ‘de almohadisation’ by which many specificities of Almohadism were silenced or omitted.53 As a revolutionary movement, the Almohads initially followed policies that were later considered unacceptable or deviant. Ibn Tūmart, for example, had declared that all the inhabitants of the territories conquered by the Almohads were the slaves of the members of the Council of Ten, some thing that was later remembered with much embarrassment.54 But even more striking was the suppression of the dhimma status of Jews and Christians. After the conquest of Marrakesh in the year 541/1147, ‘Abd al Mu’mīn told the Jews and Christians who lived in the territory under his rule that their ancestors had denied the mission of the Prophet, but that now they (i.e. the Almohads) would no longer allow them to continue in their infidelity. As the Almohads had no need of the tax (jīzya) they paid, dhimmīs had now to choose between conversion, leaving the land or being killed. Christians left for the north of the Iberian Peninsula and few of them converted. Jews decided to stay in order to keep their properties and many converted to Islam. Synagogues were demolished, Hebrew books burnt, and observance of the sabbath and other Jewish festivals forbidden, although Jews continued their practices in secrecy. Al Mansūr, well aware that many Jews were Muslims only in name, forced them to wear distinctive clothes to differentiate themselves from the ‘old’ Muslims.55 No extant source provides a satisfactory explanation of this seemingly unprecedented step, which is probably to be understood within the context of the Prophetic model applied to Ibn Tūmart. The presence of non Muslims was explicitly forbidden by the Prophet in the Ḥijāz. Was the territory under Almohad rule considered a new Ḥijāz in which other religions were forbidden? The fact that the abolition of the dhimma status was attributed not to Ibn Tūmart but to the caliph ‘Abd al Mu’mīn could be explained by the fact that Ibn Tūmart’s activities were restricted to territories where there were no dhimmīs. It was after the conquest of Moroccan cities such as Fez and Marrakesh that ‘Abd al Mu’mīn had to deal with Jews, and after the conquest of Tunisian towns such as Mahdiyya that he had to deal with Christians (who were mostly Normans, as North African Christianity had almost disappeared by then). The first Almohad caliph may have decided to act as ‘Umar ibn al Ḥaṭṭāb did, carrying out the Prophet’s decision to expel non Muslims.56
The Hafsids (627–932/1229–1526)

Introduction

After its temporary unification under the Almohads, the Islamic west became again divided between the Marinids of Fez, the ‘Abd al Wādids of Tlemcen, the Hafsids of Tunis and the Nasrids of Granada. The Hafsids openly claimed the legacy of the Almohad caliphate, and thus Ibn Khaldūn referred to them as ‘al muwahhidun’. The Hafsids were descendants of the Hintātī Berber Abū ‘Umar Ḥāfṣ İnṭī, one of the close Companions of Ibn Tūmart, but they also claimed to have as their ancestor the second caliph ‘Umar ibn al Ḫaṭṭāb. Some of the Hafsids took the caliphal title, sometimes obtaining the acknowledgement of other rulers, especially those of Tlemcen.

Sources on the Hafsids are not abundant. While seventh/thirteenth century chronicles are not preserved, for later periods we can count on the works by Ibn Qunfudh, Ibn al Shamma‘, Ibn Khaldūn and Leo Africanus, as well as the Ta’rikh al dawlatayn attributed to al Zarkashī and the travels (riḥlas) by al Tijānī, al ‘Abdarī and Ibn Battūta. There are also a few biographical dictionaries, such as al Ghubrīn’s ‘Urwān al dirāya dealing with Bougie and the one devoted to Qayrawān by al Dabbāgh and Ibn Nājī. Al Burzulī’s Nawāzīl and Ibn ‘Arafa’s legal and doctrinal works are rich sources for society and culture, while the archival documents preserved in Aragon, Sicily and Italian towns (Pisa, Genoa, Venice, Florence) offer valuable materials for economic history, reflecting the importance of Hafṣid territory for the commercial linking between Europe, North Africa and the Levant.

The rule of the Hafsids lasted for more than three centuries, a duration that has been explained by their ability at keeping a healthy financial situation in their reign, as their army and navy were never very effective, especially after the crisis of the end of the seventh/thirteenth to the beginning of the eighth/fourteenth centuries.

The Hafsids reigned over a territory that comprised Ifrīqiya corresponding to present day Tunisia Tripolitania (in Libya) and the western region of Constantine/Bougie (in Algeria). These two regions tended towards autonomy, and in the case of Bougie this tendency recalls the breakdown between the Hammādids and the Zirids. Reunification was usually achieved not by the ruler in Tunis but by the āmīrs ruling in the western region. In their efforts to stop territorial fragmentation, the rulers of Tunis often sought the alliance of the ‘Abd al Wādids of Tlemcen against Bougie. The Marinids in their expansionist policy managed to conquer Tunis for two short periods
but the population remained loyal to the former rulers, even if they were willing to shift their fidelity from one Ḥāfṣīd to another. Andalusīs’ attempts to secure Ḥāfṣīd help against the Christian advance even acknowledging Ḥāfṣīd sovereignty did not succeed.

Tribes were important in the political history of North Africa because of the support they gave to those in power. On their part, rulers never succeeded in establishing their dominance over the tribes, which then ended up being a factor of instability that aggravated regional conflicts and loss of authority on the part of the state. The Ḥāfṣīds, while always trying to exert control over the Arab and Berber tribes especially to the east and the south, made territorial concessions to them by the end of the seventh/thirteenth century. Between total submission never achieved and total secession, the Ḥāfṣīds found middle terms, such as acceptance of mere declarations of obedience or momentary submission accompanied by irregular collection of tribute. Many other times, by leaving in their place those local chiefs who had assumed power, a more long-term obedience was in effect. Sometimes the Ḥāfṣīds themselves managed to appoint those chiefs, but they had to elect them among local families of notables. The Ḥāfṣīds seldom managed to impose their own men never in the case of nomadic tribes, with the ever present danger of autonomous rule or open dissidence. The tribes profited from ‘Abd al Wāṣīd or Maṣūnid intervention to show open opposition to the Ḥāfṣīds by acknowledging foreign rule. On his part, the Ḥāfṣīd ruler could always play with the dissensions between the tribes or among branches of the same tribe. In the towns, the councils of the notables tended to fall under the influence of one single family in which power passed from father to son: the Banū Muznī in Biskra, the Banū Yamlūl in Tozeur, the Banū Khalaf in Nefta.

The establishment of Ḥāfṣīd rule (603 75/1207 77)

When the Almohad caliph al Nāṣir took the town of Mahdiyya from the Banū Ghāniya in January 602/1206, he left as his deputy in Ifrīqiya the Almohad shaykh Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd al Wāṣīd ibn Abī Ḥāfṣ al Hintātī (r. 603 18/1207 21), the son of Ibn Tūmart’s Companion Abū Ḥāfṣ ‘Umar Īntī. Abū Muhammad ‘Abd al Wāṣīd accepted the position on the condition that he enjoy a high degree of autonomy, which he put to use to halt Yahyā ibn Ghāniya and his Arab allies, thus bringing ten years of peace to the area. There was a failed attempt to pass his post to his descendants, and a Muʿminid sayyīd (a member of the Almohad caliphal dynasty) was sent from Marrakesh as the new governor. But in 623/1226, the Almohad caliph al ‘Ādil appointed another
Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yahyāʾ (r. 625/1228–49) obtained the submission of Arab (Banū Sulaym, Banū Rīyāḥ/Dawāwīda) and Berber tribes and annexed the old Ḥammādīd state (Constantine and Bougie) in 628/1230. The Almohad caliph al Maʾmūn and his successors were unable to react against his bid for independence. In fact, Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yahyāʾ profited from al Maʾmūn’s abandonment of the Almohad doctrine and from his attacks against the Almohad shaykhs mostly belonging to Hintāta, the Ḥaṣṣids’ tribe and in the name of defending the purity of Almohad tradition (‘restorer of the Mahdī’s doctrine’, as Ibn al Abbrār described him), omitted the name of the Muʾminid caliph in the Friday prayer in 627/1229. In 634/1236f., after Cordoba was conquered by the Christians, Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yahyāʾ had his name mentioned in the Friday sermon, although he never took the caliphal title. In 640/1242, Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yahyāʾ obtained the submission of the ‘Abd al Wādīds of Tlemcen and reinforced his area of influence in the central Maghrib by establishing a number of small vassal states. His rule was even acknowledged in al Andalus and by the Marānids. Treaties were signed with Genoa, Pisa and Venice, as well as with Provence and Aragon. From 636/1239, tribute was paid to Frederic II to back maritime trade and Sicilian wheat was sold directly to Tunis. Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yahyāʾ maintained the Almohad elites in his civil and military administration, while at the same time welcoming the Andalusī refugees. In Tunis he built an open air oratory and a college (madrasa).

In 650/1253, his son Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad (r. 647/1249–77), some months after having a maqṣūra (closed area reserved to the ruler) built in the mosque of Tunis, adopted the caliphal title of al Mustansīr bi’llāh. It was a propitious moment: the Muʾminid caliphate was in disarray, the Ayūbids had just disappeared (648/1250) and the ‘Abbāsids were weakened by Mongol advance. When the conquest of Baghdad took place in 656/1258, the Ḥijāz and Egypt acknowledged for a brief period the Ḥaṣṣid caliphate on the initiative of the Sufi Ibn Sabīn. The ‘Abd al Wādīds and Marānids also acknowledged Ḥaṣṣid rule. Internal dissent, including the rebellion of some members of his family often with Arab support, was suffocated. Control over the central Maghrib a permanent headache for the Ḥaṣṣid rulers in Tunis was eventually reasserted, while Arab tribes were set against other Arab tribes and sometimes displaced to facilitate their control. Following the Muʾminid caliphal tradition, al Mustansīr built magnificent gardens around Tunis. Diplomatic activity with Christian states was intense (even a Norwegian ambassador arrived in Tunis in the summer of 1262), as well as with the
African kingdom of Kanem and Bornu. Political developments in Sicily, with the fight between the last of the Hohenstaufen and the Anjou, saw the Ḥafṣīds on the former’s side. The Crusader army that turned towards Ifriqiya probably under pressure from the preaching orders of Franciscans and Dominicans left shortly after St Louis’ death in 1270 when a treaty was signed by which the Ḥafṣid caliph preserved the integrity of his state in exchange for paying money to the Crusaders. In 658/1260, al Mustaṣir ordered the execution of his chancery chief, the Andalusī man of letters Ibn al Abbār, a reflection of tensions within the Ḥafṣid elites.

Internal fission and Marinid expansionism (675 772/1277 1370)

Al Mustaṣir’s death was followed by internal upheavals that lasted more than forty years (675 718/1277 1318). His son al Wāthiq (r. 675 8/1277 9), ruling under the influence of the Andalusi Ibn al Ḥabbabar, eventually abdicated in favour of his uncle Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm. After leading a revolt of Dawāwīda Arabs in 651/1253, this Abū Ishāq had sought refuge first at the Naṣrid court and then with the ‘ʿAbd al Wādid ruler of Tlemcen, with whom a marriage alliance was established later on. Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm’s rise to power was helped by the revolt of the people of Bougie provoked in 677/1279 by Ibn al Ḥabbabar’s hostile policies against the Almohad shaykhhs. He also received military aid from Peter III of Aragon, who was in need of Ḥafṣid allegiance in his struggle with Charles of Anjou.

Once in power, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm (r. 678 82/1279 83), who never took the caliphal title, calling himself ‘the most sublime amīr’ (al amīr al ajall) and ‘the Combatant on God’s path’ (al mujāhid fi sabīl Allaḥ) executed al Wāthiq and his supporters. His son Abū Fāris was appointed governor of Bougie, having as his chamberlain the grandfather of the famous historian Ibn Khaldūn. Peter III of Aragon intervened again in Ḥafṣid policies when he unsuccessfully supported the rebellion of Ibn al Wazīr, governor of Constantine, by landing at Collo. Two months later, the Sicilian Vespers (30 March 1282) made the king of Aragon sail towards Sicily to take advantage of the Anjous’ predicament.

Members of the influential family of the Banū Muznī of Biskra were appointed as governors in the Zab and the Djerid. A man from Msila called Ibn Abī ‘Umāra proclaimed himself Mahdī among the Arab Banū Maʿqil and was later acknowledged as one of the sons of the Ḥafṣid caliph al Wāthiq by the Arab Dabbāb of Tripolitania. In 681/1282, with the support of Berber and Arab tribes of southern Tunisia, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra took control of Tunis and was proclaimed caliph. Abū Ishāq fled to Bougie where his son Abū Fāris obliged
him to abdicate in his favour and adopted the caliphal title al Muʾtamid ʿalā Allāh (end of 681/spring 1283). Abū Fāris who got the support of the Arab Riyāḥ and Safwikīṣh was eventually overthrown and put to death by Ibn Abī ʿUmāra (r. 681/1283). On his part, Abū Ishāq was captured and his severed head exhibited in Tunis. Ibn Abī ʿUmāra eventually alienated the Arabs and the Ḥafṣīd faction that had supported him, being dethroned by Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar, a brother of al Mustansīr and Abū Ishāq.

The new caliph Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar (r. 683/1284) tried to gather as much support as he could and did not persecute those who had served Ibn Abī ʿUmāra. He manifested great respect for living saints and financed many religious buildings. Command of the army was given to the Almohad Abū Zayd ʿĪsā al Fazāzī. The main threat came from Aragon. The admiral Roger de Lauria seized Djerba (683/1284) and later plundered the coasts of Ifrīqiya, while the Aragonese acquired by the treaty of 684/1285 the ‘tribute’ formerly paid by the Ḥafṣīds to the Anjou of Sicily. The new king of Aragon Alfonso III, allied with the Marīnids, supported the rights of the Almohad price Ibn Abī Dabbūs who had taken refuge in Aragon in 668/1269 to the Ḥafṣīd throne, but this attempt failed. In 684/1285, Abū Zakariyyāʾ, a nephew of Abū Ḥafṣ, availing himself of the help of Arab and Berber tribes, took control of the western region (Bougie and Constantine). The next year he marched against Tunis, but was defeated by al Fazaʾī, who repelled him towards the south. Abū Zakariyyāʾ then seized Gabes and advanced towards Tripolitania. In the meantime, Abū Ḥafṣ obtained the help of the ‘Abd al Wādid sultan of Tlemcen, who still acknowledged his suzerainty and attacked Bougie, thus forcing Abū Zakariyyāʾ to retreat in order to defend his capital. In the Djerid, at Tozeur and at Gabes the local population chose their own governors, but paid formal alliance and taxes to the ruler in Tunis. While the Arabs of the south and of Tripolitania showed hostility, the central and eastern Arabs kept their allegiance and obtained grants of land and of revenues.69 On his part, Abū Zakariyyāʾ annexed the Zab and in 693/1294 gave its governor the control of all southern Constantine. He also obtained the allegiance of the lord of Gabes. The Mamlūk sultan al Nāṣir Muḥammad (r. 698/1299) would extend his support to Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yahyā in Tripoli and Tunis in exchange for nominal Mamlūk domination.

Abū ʿAṣīda (r. 694/1295), a posthumous son of al Wāthic, inherited Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar’s rule restricted to Tunis. Abū ʿAṣīda appointed an Almohad shaykh and member of the Ḥafṣīd family, Ibn al Liḥyānī, as his
chief minister. This Ibn al Liḥyānī who later became ruler himself unsuccessfully attempted to reconquer Djerba in 706/1306. Abū ‘Aṣīda had to face disturbances from the Kuʿūb Arabs in the Tell. Relations with Christendom included treaties signed with Venice and Aragon, the employment of Catalan and Aragonese militias whose commander was named by the king of Aragon, and the payment of the tribute due to Sicily complicated by the changes undergone in the island’s suzerainty. As regards the independent kingdom of Bougie, it was threatened by the Mārinids, who had obtained the submission of the Almohad masters of Algiers and continued their expansionist policies. Bougie, after suffering an attack from Tunis in 695/1296 and seeking support from the ‘Abd al Wāḍīds, was then attacked by the Mārinids in 699/1300 while also having to face the hostility of the Arab Dawāwīda. Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yahyā was succeeded in 700/1301 by his son Abū ‘l Baqaʾ Khālid, who tried to win for his side the support of the Mārinids then besieging Tlemcen that his rival in Tunis was also seeking to obtain (while playing this game, Abū ‘Aṣīda eventually lost the ‘Abd al Wāḍid recognition of Ḥafsīd rule). Finally, in 707/1307f., Abū ‘l Baqaʾ Khālid and Abū ‘Aṣīda signed a treaty, according to which on the death of one of the two Ḥafsīd rulers, the survivor will be acknowledged in both Tunis and Bougie, thereby reuniting the kingdom. Abū ‘Aṣīda died first, and the Almohads of Tunis who were against acknowledging Bougie’s ruler proclaimed as his heir a very young Ḥafsīd prince whose reign was very brief (709/1309). Abū ‘l Baqaʾ (r. 709 11/1309 11), however, soon managed to depose him and the two Ḥafsīd branches were reunited.

The union was, however, short lived. The Constantine region defected under Abū ‘l Baqaʾ’s brother Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr, who eventually made himself master of Bougie in 712/1312. In the meanwhile, Ibn al Liḥyānī (r. 711 17/1311 17) who had left Tunis to perform the pilgrimage and met the famous scholar Ibn Taymiyya during his stay in the East became after his return the ruler of Tunis with the support of tribes from the area of Tripoli. During his brief reign, the Almohad army was submitted to a purge and the name of the Mahdī was suppressed in the prayer. On the other hand, Ibn al Liḥyānī assumed a caliphal title with Mahdist overtones, al Qāʾim biʾamr Allāh, and for some reason the Aragonese believed in his secret conversion to Christianity.

Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr, the ruler of Bougie, moved against Tunis (715 16/1315 16) after having resisted two attacks of the ‘Abd al Wāḍīds of Tlemcen (713/1313 and 715/1315) with Catalan naval help. The Tunisians elected a son of Ibn al Liḥyānī, Abū Ḍarba (r. 717 18/1317 18) as their ruler, but he was also unable to resist the attacks of Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr.
Haššid unity was thus restored under Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr (r. 718 47/1318 46), who nevertheless had to face the growing autonomy of many areas and to react against several revolts taking place between 718/1318 and 732/1332. They were stirred up by several pretenders, among them Abū Ḍarba and one of his brothers, as well as a son in law of Ibn al Liḥyānī (Ibn Abī ‘Imrān), who obtained the help of the Arabs and often of the ‘Abd al Wādīds. Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr managed to put an end to the expansionist policy of the sultan of Tlemcen by establishing a marriage alliance with the Marīnidów of Fez. Djerba was reconquered. Abū Yahyā tried to regain control of the territory over which he nominally ruled by following a policy that had been effective in the early Almohad period, that of entrusting the administration of the provinces to his sons, advised by chamberlains of different backgrounds. In Tunis, the Almohad shaykh and powerful chamberlain Ibn Tafrāgin favoured the alliance with the Marīnids, who had annexed the ‘Abd al Wādīd kingdom.

When Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr died in 747/1346, two of his sons disputed his succession, and this offered an excuse for the conquest of Ifrīqiya by the Marīnid Abū ’l Ḥasan. During his brief reign (748 50/1348 50), he alienated the scholars of Tunis and more importantly the Arabs’ support (Ku‘ūb and Ḥākīm), by abolishing the revenues which the Bedouins had been collecting from the settled populations, either through government concession or according to customary use. The ensuing Arab revolt in which a descendant of ‘Abd al Mu’min, the first Almohad caliph, was offered the throne led to the military defeat of the Marīnid sultan in 749/1348. Dissatisfaction was not limited to the east. The Marīnid Abū ’Inān Fāris (Abū ’l Ḥasan’s son) took power in Morocco, while the ‘Abd al Wādīds recovered Tlemcen and the Haššids ruled in Bone, Constantine and Bougie. In Shawwāl 750/late December 1349, the Marīnid Abū ’l Ḥasan escaped from Tunis by sea to find some months later his death in the High Atlas trying to reconquer his reign. The Haššid al Faḍl who was governor of Bone was proclaimed in Tunis. Ibn Tafrāgin availed himself of the help of the Ku‘ūb Arabs thanks to the friendship he had established in Mecca with their shaykh ‘Umar ibn Ḥamza and soon (751/1350) replaced Abū ’l Faḍl.

The very young Abū Ishāq (r. 750 70/1350 69) was in the hands of Ibn Tafrāgin for fourteen years. Tunis had little control of most of the territory nominally under Haššid rule. The Banū Makkī of Gabes and Djerba refused to acknowledge the new ruler, seeking help from dissident tribes, while in the west the Constantine region maintained its autonomy while making several attempts at conquering Tunis (752/1351, 753/1352 and 754/1352). Tripoli was
briefly occupied by Genoa (756/1355) and then handed to the Banū Makkī. Ḥaṣṣid political fragmentation helped again the expansionist policy of the Maṛīnid of Fez, Abū ‘Inān Fāris, who took Tlemcenc, Algiers and Médéa, counting on the support of the Banū Muznī of the Zab and the Banū Makkī of Gabes. Bougie was conquered in 753/1352, leading to the second Maṛīnid occupation of Ifrīqiya (758 9/1357 8), with the capture of Constantine, Bone and Tunis, and the submission of the Djerid and Gabes. Abū ‘Inān Fāris’ and the Maṛīnids’ dream of recreating the Almohad empire ended in 758/1358, as they lost first Ifrīqiya (the abolition of the revenues that the Arab Dawaṭid collected from the settled population is again given as the reason that led to the defeat of the Maṛīnid army) and then Tlemcenc.

Although Abū Ishāq and Ibn Tafraḡīn took the reins in Tunis, the situation continued to be one of fragmentation with Bougie, Constantine and Tunis governed by three different and independent Ḥaṣṣids, and the whole of the south, the south east and a part of the Sahel maintaining their independence. When Ibn Tafraḡīn died (766 1/1364), Abū Ishāq was able to rule in person, with growing dependence on the Kuṭub Arabs and no real gains in controlling the territory. On the other hand, the Ḥaṣṣid of Constantine, Abū ’l ‘Abbās, seized Bougie from his cousin Abū ’Abd Allāh and succeeded in uniting the whole of the Constantine region (767/1366). The weakness of the next Ḥaṣṣid ruler in Tunis Abū ’l Baqā’ Khālid (r. 770 2/1369 70), who was a minor, led to the unification of Ifrīqiya by the Ḥaṣṣid ruler of Constantine and Bougie for the third time.

The century of Ḥaṣṣid power (772 893/1370 1488) and its decline

Abū ’l ‘Abbās (r. 772 96/1370 94) was the restorer of Ḥaṣṣid power and prestige, acting with firmness but without unnecessary violence. During ten years (773 83/1371 81) he successfully strove often himself leading the military expeditions to recover control of the territory; he then concentrated on consolidating his hold over it. His endeavour was greatly helped by ‘Abd al Wāḍid infighting and by rivalry between ‘Abd al Wāḍids and Maṛīnids. Piracy and privateering flourished, with Bougie described by Ibn Khaldūn as one of its main centres.71 Aragon under Peter IV (r. 1336 1387) seemed on the verge of waging war against Ifrīqiya, but eventually it was a Franco Genoese expedition that attacked Mahdiyya (792/1390) and was repelled. The next year treaties were signed with Genoa and Venice.

During his long reign (r. 796 837/1394 1434) Abū Fāris continued his father Abū ’l ‘Abbās’ policies by strengthening Ḥaṣṣid power in the interior and his
own authority against dissident members of his family. Soon, in fact, he replaced his sons and other relatives in the posts he had granted them at the beginning by appointing his freedmen instead, as happened in Constantine and Bougie (798/1396). He followed the same policy in Tripoli, Gafsa, Tozeur and Biskra, where the local dynasties were uprooted after military campaigns conducted by the ruler himself between 800/1397 and 804/1402. Not that he was always successful: his army suffered defeat first in the Aurès (800/1398) and then in the Saharan borders of Tripolitania (809/1406f.). The absence of Abū Fāris from his capital during this campaign favoured a conspiracy, involving some high officials and members of the royal family, that was severely repressed. Soon afterwards Abū Fāris had to face another Ḥāḍid pretender in the area of Constantine and the south east (810 11/1407 8). His success led to the conquest of Algiers (813/1410f.), prelude to the expansionist policies that he would start in 827/1424. The ‘Abd al Wādids’ weakness facilitated Ḥāḍid indirect control over their territory (827 34/1424 31) that was extended even overMarinid Morocco. The Ḥāḍid navy was active in the Straits of Gibraltar against the Portuguese, who had occupied Ceuta in 1415. Abū Fāris also became involved in Naṣrid internal policies, supporting Muhammad IX al Aysar in the recovery of his reign. The building of the palace of the Bardo in Tunis, first mentioned in 823/1420, illustrates how far Andalusi influence had penetrated into Ḥāḍid lands.

The pacification of Ḥāḍid territory by Abū Fāris went together with a well mediated religious policy with social and economic implications. Respect was shown to ‘ulamā’, saints and shariʿās, Sunnism in its Mālikī variant was promoted, heresy was fought against (especially Khārijism in Djerba) and much care was put into the public celebration of the nativity (mawlid) of the Prophet. Public constructions (such as a hospital) and economic reforms (abolition of non Qur’ānic taxes) were undertaken. Privateering (kursān) a main source of wealth was presented as jihad. Abū Fāris took great care in fostering and protecting the pilgrimage to Mecca and his name was mentioned by the official preacher at ‘Arafa as one of the great Islamic rulers. Relations with other Islamic states (Marīnids, Naṣrids, Mamlūks) resulted in embassies and exchange of presents.

Abū Fāris was responsible for the building of fortresses in the north eastern coast, rendering difficult surprise attacks on the part of the Christians. Relations with Genoa and Venice were strained by acts of piracy on both sides. A number of treaties were signed with Pisa, that of 824/1421 when the town was already under Florence’s rule. The treaty signed in 800/1397 followed previous agreements, but more emphasis was put on reprisals.
against the Pisan consuls in case of attacks against Ḥaṣṣid ports. In that same year, after the village of Torreblanca in Valencia was attacked by Muslim forces, a naval expedition granted the quality of Crusade was prepared in retaliation. It aimed at the port of Tédellis under ‘Abd al Wādid rule and not Bougie, another indication of Ḥaṣṣid power, as the kingdom of Aragon seems to have had in mind reaching an agreement with Abū Fāris rather than confronting him militarily. Confrontation took place in 1399 CE when the Crusaders carried out an attack against Bone, but its failure led in 1403 CE to the signing of a treaty. The expansionist policies of the new king of Aragon, Alfonso V (r. 1416-58), led to campaigns against the Tunisian islands. The Ḥaṣṣids reacted with an attack against Malta and by repelling the Aragonese attempt at occupying Djerba in 835/1434.

Abū Fāris, whose wealth, prudent rule and renown were exalted in diplomatic correspondence, died in 837/1434, while conducting personally a campaign against Tlemcen. He was succeeded by two of his grandsons. Al Muntasir’s reign was brief (837 9/1434 5) and was spent fighting rebellious relatives and those Arabs who supported them. His brother ‘Uthmān’s reign, on the contrary, lasted for fifty three years (839 93/1435 88). Continuing his grandfather’s precedent, he was a great constructor, carrying out many hydraulic works, completing the madrasa al Mustansiriyya initiated by his predecessor and founding several zāwiyas in both the capital and other localities. Relations with Aragon, Venice, Florence and Genoa continued, subject to the ups and downs of both official policies and pirate activities. The familiar pattern of rebellion of the sultan’s relatives, tribal dissidence and defection of the towns repeated itself at the beginning of his reign. For seventeen years (839 56/1435 52) he had to fight among others his uncle Abū ’l Ḥasan ‘Ali in the region of Constantine. ‘Uthmān also under took military operations in the south (845 55/1441 51) and gave the provincial governments to his relatives accompanied by one of his freedmen often of Christian background with the title of qā’id. These qā’ids who sometimes ended up as being the only representatives of the sultan proved to be loyal, although sometimes subject to suspicion, as was the case with Nabil, imprisoned in 857/1453 to check the power and wealth he had achieved. ‘Uthmān’s initial success in pacifying the country was praised in an Italian document commenting on the uncommon degree of safety prevailing in Ḥaṣṣid territory.

But this situation was not permanent. Outbreaks of plague in 847/1443, 857/1453 and 872/1468 caused many deaths, with the sultan escaping from the capital to avoid contagion. Tunis suffered famine during the winter of 862/1458. Tribal rebellions added to these difficulties. In 863/1459 the Sīlīn in the
Kabylia and in 867/1463 the Arabs who had caused unrest in the central region of Tunisia were defeated. The sultan tried to impose on the tribes leaders chosen by him, but he seems to have succeeded only momentarily. The need to ensure control of the territory forced ‘Uthmān to move constantly, making his presence visible, according to a pattern well established in North Africa. He also led personally the army in the military campaigns to submit Tlemcen to obedience in 866/1462 and 871/1466, obtaining in 877/1472 the acknowledgement of his suzerainty on the part of the new lord of Fez, the founder of the Waṭṭāsid dynasty. To the usual relations with the Italian cities (Genoa, Florence, Venice) the novelty was added of a treaty signed in 1478 CE with the Hospitallers of Rhodes, who feared an Ottoman attack. In the Iberian Peninsula, Aragon and Castile were united under the Catholic kings, a union that would soon lead to a joint attack against the Naṣrids. Their appeal to the Ḥaṣṣid sultan for his support after the fall of Malaga in 1487 CE was again unsuccessful.

‘Uthmān’s death in 893/1488 was followed by internecine fights among the Ḥaṣṣids, three of whom succeeded each other after brief reigns. The consequences of the fall of Granada in 897/1492 and Ottoman expansionism started to be felt under Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad (r. 899 932/1494 1526). The Spaniards extended to North Africa their policy of conquest to consolidate what they had recently acquired. Bougie and Tripoli fell into Spanish hands in 916/1510. The year 857/1453 had seen the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans and ‘Uthmān is known to have sent two ambassadors to convey his felicitations. Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muhammad’s death in 932/1526 can be taken as the actual end of the dynasty, as from then onwards Ḥaṣṣid rule was virtually nonexistent, with the Barbarossa brothers from their basis in Algiers and other ports initiating a new era that would end with the incorporation of most of former Ḥaṣṣid territory into the Ottoman empire in 977/1569.76

**Almohads, Malikus and saints under the Ḥaṣṣids**

The Ḥaṣṣid Abū Zakariyyā’ (r. 625 47/1228 49) had taken power as ‘the restorer of the Mahdī’s doctrine’, and during his reign the invocation of the Mahdī Ibn Tūmart in the Friday sermon was maintained. It was in 711/1311, under Ibn al Liḥyānī, that the invocation was eliminated, although the *khutba* preserved part of its Almohad character. The Almohad legacy was especially visible in the coins minted by the Ḥaṣṣids.77 The Almohads who descended from those who had settled in Ifrīqiya during the Mu’minid caliphate were the original foundation of Ḥaṣṣid power. Until the eighth/fourteenth century, they constituted the core of the Ḥaṣṣid army, a kind of military aristocracy
entitled to land concessions. They were complemented by the nomadic Arabs with a growing presence from the eighth/fourteenth century onwards. The special position of the Almohads was reflected in Ḥaḍāid ceremonial. When the caliph Abū Zakariyyā held the public audience of justice each Saturday, his relatives were situated to his right, the Almohad shaykhs to his left, while the high officials of the administration were in front of him. In an official reception that took place in Tunis in 734/1334, the order of rank was as follows: in the first place, the chief military commander, then the qāḍī, then the Almohad shaykh Ibn Qunfudh and a doctor, then the secretary, followed by the rest of the military commanders. By the ninth/fifteenth century, the number of the Almohads already reduced after the genealogical inquiries ordered by Ibn al Lihāyānī (r. 711/1311). When the Ḥaḍāids lost their power at the beginning of the tenth/sixteenth century, no Almohad organisation was in place to keep or establish another state. In spite of all their efforts as shown by Ḥaḍāid official historiography, including Ibn Khaldūn the Ḥaḍāids eventually failed to make Almohad doctrine the foundation of their legitimacy.

While the Almohads were still a main component of the state, the Ḥaḍāid rulers found much support in them and sought their intervention, but they also tried to control them and to balance their power with other groups. In the first half of the seventh/thirteenth century, many Andalusīs among them craftsmen and men of letters migrated to Ḥaḍāid Ifrīqiya and they soon appeared as a powerful group in the capital alongside the Almohads. The Andalusīs found employment especially as secretaries in the chancery and stood out for their mastery of Islamic knowledge, excelling in calligraphy, grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history and music. All this conveyed a certain feeling of superiority on their part. The Almohads developed hostility against the Andalusīs and also against the manumitted slaves employed by the caliphs when they threatened their status by increasing their influence in the Ḥaḍāid court. Under al Mustaṣir, who had attracted many Andalusīs to his court and showed them great favour, the Almohads attempted a coup in 648/1250 and in 658/1260 managed to have two Andalusīs, the secretary Ibn al Abbār and the officer in charge of finances al Lulyānī, executed. Other Andalusī favourites during the seventh/thirteenth century were Saʾīd ibn Abī ʿIḥṣayn and Ibn al Ḥabbābar. Only two Andalusis, however, were appointed to the supreme magistrature (qāḍī ʿl jamāʿa), whereas their
nomination as provincial judges found no opposition. Slaves and manumitted slaves gained power and influence during the reign of Abū Fāris (r. 796/837/1394-1434). Mālikism coexisted with official Almohadism during the seventh/thirteenth century and triumphed over it during the eighth/fourteenth century, especially thanks to the work and the influence of Ibn ‘Arafa (716/803/1316-1401). If Almohadism with its insistence on legal methodology and the principles underlying the law had put out of fashion the rich Almoravid tradition of fatāwā (legal opinions) compilations, the return to Mālikism meant the return of jurisconsults (mufīs) and their fatwās. The collection carried out by al Burzulī (d. 841/1438) exemplified this trend. But the Ḥafṣids maintained following the Almohad precedents the periodic meeting of the scholars of Tunis under their presidency to impart justice, and the caliph had the last word in case of discrepancy among the jurists. A striking peculiarity was the respect due to custom (‘āda, ‘urf), as well as to expert knowledge, required, for example, in legal issues dealing with construction and urbanism. The Mālikī Ibn ‘Arafa was the man responsible for banishing Ibn Khaldūn to Cairo, where he died in 808/1406. Ibn Khaldūn’s approach to history and his concern for searching for the causes of both human behaviour and societal changes owed much to the intellectual atmosphere developed under the Almohads with their interest in investigating the principles of each discipline. Sufism had strong political and social implications. The Sufi Ibn Sabīn had been instrumental in bringing about the recognition of the Ḥafṣid caliph in the Hijāz and Egypt after the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 656/1258. The Ḥafṣids openly paid respect to saints, while fearing them, as saintly power and authority could be useful to the dynasty, but also dangerous, in both rural and urban settings. Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar consulted the saint Abū Muḥammad al Murjānī to choose his heir to the throne. ‘Uthmān took the Tunisian miracle worker Sidi Ben ‘Arūs (d. 868/1463) under his protection. In Constantine the saint Abū Hādī channelled local displeasure at Marinid occupation. The famous al Shādhili (d. 656/1258), the alleged founder of one of the most important brotherhoods in the Islamic world the Shādhiliyya eventually abandoned Tunis for Egypt, and was accused of making Mahdist claims. His hagiography abounds in acts that parallel those of a sultan: he extended his protection to those who travelled with him, rewarded his followers with wealth, concluded marriages between his relatives and powerful people, and mentioned that he had his own army of Sufi novices. The Arab Ḥākim revolted against Abū Fāris led by their saintly shaykh Aḥmad ibn Abi Ṣa‘ūna who was eventually put to death in 833/1430, while al Ḥasan (r. 932/50/1526-43).
had to fight against Sidi ‘Arafā (1540), the chief of the ‘marabout’ state founded at Qayrawān by the Shābbiyya tribe.⁹⁵

Notes


3. Évariste Lévi Provençal, Documents inédits d’histoire almohade, Paris, 1928; Arab. text, 50 133; French trans., 75 224.


17. See Chapter 2.
19. ‘Martinez’ has been proposed to explain this name, but for its correct etymology see now María Jesús Viguera, ‘Sobre el nombre de Ibn Mardaniš’, AQ, 17 (1996), 231 8.
27. See Chapter 4.
40. Huici, *Historia politica*, vol. II, 248, 283, 327. The use of *spolia* from al Andalus in Almohad constructions was another way to indicate such a link.
43. É. Lévi Provençal, *Trente sept lettres officielles almohades*, Rabat, 1941, number XII.
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52. A large number of his sociological and political theories are illustrated by examples drawn from Almohad history: Maya Shatzmiller, L’historiographie mérinide: Ibn Khaldun et ses contemporains, Leiden, 1982, 54 65.


56. Maribel Fierro, ‘A Muslim land without Jews or Christians: Almohad policies regarding the “protected people”’, in Christian North, Muslim South: The Iberian Peninsula in the context of cultural, religious and political changes (11th 15th centuries), Frankfurt am Main, forthcoming.


58. Brunschvig, La Berbérie orientale, vol. II, 73, 85 6, 90 2, 94 5.

59. For this area we have now the excellent study by Dominique Valérain, Bougie, port maghrébin, 1067 1510, Rome, 2006.

60. See Chapter 2: M. Brett, ‘The central lands of North Africa and Sicily, until the beginning of the Almohad period’.

61. An overview for the western region in Valérain, Bougie, port maghrébin, 153 73.


70. Ibid. vol. I, 196.

71. Ibid. vol. II, 87.

72. Ibid. vol. I, 217, 219 24; López Pérez, La corona de Aragón y el Magreb, 713, 728.

73. In the treaty with Genoa signed in 1429 CE Abû Fâris was described as 'rex opulentissimus, prudentissimus et magna fama in toto orbe clarissimus': Brunschvig, La Berbérie orientale, vol. I, 238.


75. How this incorporation took place is discussed in Chapter 18: Houari Touati, 'Ottoman Maghrib'.


77. Brunschvig, La Berbérie orientale, vol. II, 155, 167, 185; Valérian, Bougie, port maghrébin, 159.


79. Ibid. vol. II, 75 6, 79 81, 85.

80. Ibid. vol. II, 39 and vol. I, 211 12 (the governor of the Kasba in Constantine in 798/1396 was an Almohad who bore the nîsha al Timmâli), 259.

81. Ibid. vol. II, 51 2, 155 6; Mohammed Salah Baizig, 'L’élite andalouse à Tunis et à Bougie et le pouvoir hafside', in Communautés et pouvoirs en Italie et au Maghreb

83. Brunschvig, La Berbérie orientale, vol. I, 47. On Ibn al Abbār, see above note 68.


85. Ibid. vol. II, 59, 81, 158, 166.


92. Their rise to power in North Africa is discussed in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 18.


The post-Almohad dynasties in al-Andalus and the Maghrib (seventh ninth/thirteenth fifteenth centuries)

FERNANDO RODRÍGUEZ MEDIANO

Historiographic remarks

In 609/1212, the caliph al Nāṣir was defeated at Las Navas de Tolosa. Over the decades that followed, the Almohad empire underwent a slow disintegration to give way to the Naṣrids in al-Andalus, the Banū Marīn in the western Maghrib, the Zayyānids or ‘Abd al Wādids in the central Maghrib and the Ḥafṣids in Ifrīqiya. These dynasties followed common trends and faced common challenges.

From an economic point of view, the establishment and expansion of the three great North African states, as well as the conflicts between them, can be explained by the importance of the trans Saharan trade routes and the need to have access to the cities that controlled these routes and the ports that provided outlets for them. Relations between these states and the Christian lands across the Mediterranean revolved around this trade, and their complexity is illustrated by the struggle for control of the Straits of Gibraltar.

The Almohad political inheritance demanded particular responses from each of them. While the Ḥafṣids claimed to have inherited the caliphate, the other dynasties had to find alternative solutions to the question of political legitimacy, constructing ideologies that would make sense within the political and religious developments that were then taking place in the Muslim west. For example, both the institutionalisation of scholarship through the foundation of colleges (madrasas) and the institutionalisation of the mystical brotherhoods very much need to be seen within a political framework.

The immigration of nomadic Arab tribes (Banū Hilāl and Banū Sulaym) to North Africa and their pillaging of cities and agriculture, even when employed as mercenaries by the Almohad army, would have brought about a destructive
process of ‘Bedouinisation’ and deterioration in the urban settlements, and played a crucial role in their decline. Ibn Khaldūn compared the Hilālī invasion to a plague of locusts. Although the mythical nature of this analogy has been noted, the presence of Arab tribes associated with local ruling elites and prepared to play a role in the system of domination set up by the post Almohad dynasties had an undoubtedly important impact on the Maghrib.

There were also deep changes in the relations among the states of the Mediterranean. If up to that moment the North African dynasties had intervened militarily on a regular basis in the Iberian Peninsula, the Marinid period saw the inversion of that trend. The ninth/fifteenth century Portuguese conquest of Ceuta was the opening move in a new political reality characterised by the expansion of the Iberian kingdoms into Africa. Spain and Portugal would occupy numerous sites on the African coast, the first symptoms of a new era that would ultimately see European expansion on a worldwide scale, and in more specific terms the great confrontation between the Spanish and Ottoman empires in the Mediterranean. The case of Morocco would become exceptional as the only North African territory not under Ottoman domination.

This political transition corresponds to the shift from a period characterised by the relative abundance of historical works in Arabic to a period when there are few authors and scant documentary evidence for any kingdom of the Muslim west. The turning point is marked by Ibn Khaldūn, whose productive period began around 751/1350. In his Kitāb al-‘ibar, the most important section covers the entire history of North Africa. Although North African historiography by no means disappears completely after Ibn Khaldūn, it becomes increasingly necessary to resort to Christian documentary and historical sources, and European archives become more indispensable to our knowledge of the Muslim west, with the lack of archival documentation in Arabic being particularly pronounced for the pre modern period.

Finally, there is what traditional historiography calls the ‘marabout crisis’, the great movement which, in response to the occupation of Moroccan ports by the Christians, and with the support of Sufi brotherhoods, eventually brought to power the Sharīfī dynasties of the mid tenth/sixteenth century. Sharīfism represents the most characteristic political creation of this period. But, more than a direct reaction to outside aggression, it was the result of a complex process in which economic, political and cultural factors combined to create the ideology of a new aristocracy which would ultimately assume full control over Morocco. It was under the rule of the Berber Marinid dynasty that the Sharīfs began their slow rise to maximum power.
The Marīnids of Fez

The first phase of Marmid expansion and the consolidation of power

The Marīnids and the ‘Abd al Wādids were Berber tribal groups belonging to the Zaŭata, who had managed to establish themselves across large swathes of the central Maghrib. The Banū Marīn were nomads whose wanderings took them from the M’Zab oases to the Muluya river valley and southwards by way of Sijilmāsa across the Sahara, even into the ‘lands of the blacks’. In the fifth/eleventh century they found themselves pushed westward into the lands that now roughly correspond to eastern Morocco by the Arab Banū Hilāl. The Banū Marīn probably became Islamised between the fifth/eleventh and sixth/twelfth centuries.

The first phase of the Marīnid conquest of the western Maghrib began in the north east of the country and ended with their capture of Marrakesh half a century later in 668/1269, a victory which signalled the end of the Almohad caliphate. It was largely a combination of favourable circumstances that allowed the Marīnids gradually to extend their rule southwards. In its early stages, Marīnid actions arose as a response to the power vacuum left by the crumbling Almohad state, but did not take the shape of a frontal challenge to the caliphate, being inspired instead by a political and military pragmatism which strove to take advantage of whatever opportunities presented themselves at any given moment, above all for immediate economic gain.

‘Abd al Ḥaqq, described as an ascetic Muslim, led the Marīnid tribes against the caliph al Mustanṣir at the battle of the Nakkūr river in 613/1216. Though the information about this initial phase is unreliable, the battle near the Sebou river the following year that pitted ‘Abd al Ḥaqq against an alliance between rival Marīnids, the Banū ‘Askar on the one hand and the Riyāḥ Arabs on the other, seems to have marked a decisive moment in the Marīnid advance. ‘Abd al Ḥaqq was killed in the battle, but his troops were victorious, and his son Abū Saʿīd ‘Uthmān was able to guarantee the effective establishment of Marīnid power throughout northern Morocco. By approximately 620/1223f., the Marīnids were receiving tribute from not only the Riyāḥ Arabs in the Rif area but also the cities of Fez, Taza and Meknes.

This initial period of expansion took place at a time of famine and demographic turmoil in northern Morocco. Besides the Marīnid insurgency, the caliphate was facing at this time serious separatist movements led by Ibn Hūd in al Andalus, Yaghmurasān in Tlemcen and Abū Zakariyyā’ Yahyā in Tunis.
Despite these various internal and external difficulties, the caliphs al Rashīd and al Saʿīd managed to extend the life of the dynasty for several more decades. In 642/1244 the latter inflicted a sharp defeat on the Marinids at a battle near Fez. This proved only a temporary setback, however. The new Marinid amīr Abū Yahyā Abū Bakr undertook several key initiatives. He was the first to set up the system of territorial concessions known as iqtāʾ’s which became characteristic of Marinid rule and one of the foundations of the oligarchy’s power. This system also implied that Marinid policies were developing into a self-conscious political programme. The southward advance of the Marinids was not accomplished without difficulty. At first, Abū Yahyā had to deal with an alliance between the Almohad caliph al Saʿīd and Yaghmurasaʾn, the new lord of Tlemcen. This episode marked the opening of what would become a state of nearly constant hostility between the Marinids and the ‘Abd al Wādids of Tlemcen.

When, shortly thereafter, Abū Yahyā managed to gain control over Meknes, he had the sermon preached in the mosque in the name of the Ḥafsīd ruler of Tunis, a sign that Marinids now regarded themselves as political rivals to the Almohad caliphs. However, in the political map of North Africa at the time there were many actors cooperating or competing for political, economic and ideological resources. In fact, Abū Yahyā’s rule over Meknes was ephemeral, for the city was shortly retaken by the caliph al Rashīd, and Abū Yahyā, facing Almohad military superiority, had to negotiate a truce with al Rashīd and even assist him against Yaghmurasaʾn, lord of Tlemcen. At this moment, a key opportunity presented itself when the caliph al Saʿīd was killed in an ambush mounted by the ‘Abd al Wādids. Abū Yahyā seized the opportunity: after smashing the remnants of the Almohad army, he forced the surrender of Fez in 646/1248 and then went on to conquer Taza. Shortly afterwards, Rabat and Salé also submitted to his rule. From that moment, the Marinids ruled all of northern Morocco in the name of the Ḥafsīds of Tunis, while the Almohad dominion was reduced to the area of their capital at Marrakesh under the rule of al Murtaḍā. The death of the Ḥafsīd Abū Zakariyyāʾ in 647/1249 may have had something to do with the uprising in Fez that year, when its inhabitants declared their allegiance to the Almohad caliph and requested assistance from Yaghmurasaʾn. However, the ‘Abd al Wādids were defeated and the rebellion was quelled with brutality.

Abū Yahyā’s constant push southwards also followed an economic logic. Between 649/1251 and 653/1255, Abū Yahyā took Tādlā, the Draʾ valley and, most importantly, Sijilmāsa, one of the main commercial centres and there after a constant bone of contention between the Marinids and the ‘Abd
al Wādids. When he died in 656/1258, Abū Yahyā had conquered what Kably calls a ‘coherent economic area’, crucial in North African trade. Ḥafṣid legitimacy gave the Maṛiṇids political justification in their fight against the moribund Almohad regime and the ‘Abd al Wādids of Tlemcen.

The death of Abū Yahyā was followed by a struggle over the succession between his son Abū ‘Umar and Abū Yahyā’s brother Abū Yusuf Ya‘qūb, who was governor of Taza at the time. The conflict was resolved in favour of the latter, who had the support of most of the Maṛiṇid shaykhs, while Abū ‘Umar remained in control of Meknes. Right at the outset of Abū Yusuf’s reign, Alfonso X of Castile attacked the port of Salé in 659/1260, as the response to a call for assistance by Ya‘qūb ibn ‘Abd Allāh, Abū Yusuf’s nephew, who was attempting to set up his own independent fiefdom in Rabat and Salé. However, Alfonso X took this as his opportunity to realise his plans for a crusade in North Africa and sent a great force to take the city. In sharp contrast to the inability of the enfeebled Almohads to mount any response, Abū Yusuf reacted swiftly, retaking Salé in fourteen days, though he was unable to prevent many of its inhabitants from being taken captive by the Castilians. This episode permitted the Maṛiṇids to integrate the concept of jihad into their political discourse, which helped to build support for military intervention in al Andalus that served obvious economic and political interests. Abū Yusuf would end up mounting five different expeditions to the Iberian Peninsula altogether.

It also fell to Abū Yusuf to deal the definitive blow to the Almohads by conquering their capital. A first attempt to take Marrakesh with Ḥafṣid help in 660/1262 failed, thanks to the resistance put up by Abū Dabbūs, cousin of the caliph al Mustansir. However, Abū Dabbūs defected to the Maṛiṇid side and took the city in their name in 665/1266. No sooner had he done so than Abū Dabbūs backed out of his agreement with Abū Yusuf and consequently the Maṛiṇids besieged the city. Though the Almohads called for help from the ‘Abd al Wādid Yaghmurasa’n, the latter was defeated and Marrakesh fell definitively to the Maṛiṇids in 668/1269. Abū Yusuf adopted the title ‘Prince of the Muslims’ (amīr al muslimīn) which had been used by the Almoravids earlier, while still having the Friday prayers read in the name of the Ḥafṣid caliph.

Abū Yusuf was now able to concentrate his attention on southern Morocco. Between 668/1269 and 672/1273, various expeditions were sent against the Sūs and the Dra‘ valleys to roll back the influence Yaghmurasa’n had managed to gain over the trans Saharan trade routes in 662/1263f. By taking control of Sijilmāsa with the help of the Ma‘qil Arabs, Yaghmurasa’n had been able to
promote the trade route that led to the central Maghrib. Now on the offensive, the Marínids beat an ‘Abd al Wādid force at Isly in 670/1272, laid siege to Tlemcen and razed Oujda. They later managed to reconquer Sijilmāsa, making use of firearms for the first time in the history of the Maghrib. Economic calculations were also behind Abū Yūṣuf’s taking control of the Straits ports of Tangier and Ceuta in 672/1273. His goal was to control the entirety of the route that linked Sijilmāsa with its outlet at Ceuta. The surrender of Ceuta took place in the context of an agreement between Abū Yūṣuf and the king of Aragon, James I. 8

Another initiative undertaken by Abū Yūṣuf was the founding in 674/1256 of Fās al Jadīd (‘New Fez’), a new palatine city intended to serve as the administrative and military centre of the Marínids state. 9 Its founding coincided with a massacre of Jews, which caused several important Jewish families to move to a section of Fās al Jadīd called the Mellah (Arabic mallāḥ). Over time, the term ‘Mellah’ came to refer to the Jewish quarter of any Moroccan town. 10

Abū Yūṣuf’s reign meant the end of the Almohad dynasty, the culmination of Marínid expansion in the western Maghrib, the conversion of the Marínids into a political movement that began to construct an ideology that would reinforce its legitimacy, and the beginnings of the consolidation of the economic and administrative foundations of Marínid power. The Marínids had become the dominant power in the Maghrib and were ready for the expansionist adventures of the two great sultans of the dynasty, Abū ‘l Ḥasan and Abū ‘Inān.

Abū Ya‘qūb Yūṣuf’s involvement in Andalusi affairs diminished for several reasons. In the first place, Marínid interventions had had little effect, and the behaviour of the Naṣrids in Granada had provoked considerable disillusionment. In the second place, military resources were still required closer to home for the ongoing conflict with the ‘Abd al Wādids, who had decided to provide support to local rebellions and intervene in the conflicts over the Straits. Abū Ya‘qūb directed most of his energy towards taking Tlemcen, the ‘Abd al Wādid capital. The principal motivation lay in the traditional commercial rivalry between the two states, though the capture of Tlemcen would also be one more step in the expansionist strategy of the Marínids. In fact, by this time Abū Ya‘qūb had received the oath of allegiance (bay’a) of the Sharīfs of Mecca, and this endowed him with a new political status which implicitly allowed him even to challenge the Ḥafṣid caliphate. Though ultimately fruitless, his first siege of Tlemcen in 689/1290 lasted for six months. The Marínids sent at least three further military expeditions against the ‘Abd al Wādids, until at last in 698/1299 Abū Ya‘qūb commenced his famously
lengthy siege of Tlemcen, a culminating moment in the stormy relationship between the two dynasties which would give rise to many legends.11 Abū Yaʿqūb put all his resources into the siege, which dragged on for eight years. In spite of all the expense and effort, however, the besiegers were unable to break the city’s resistance, and finally Abū Yaʿqūb was assassinated in 706/1306.

Abū Yaʿqūb’s successor, his grandson Abū Thābit, reached an agreement with the ‘Abd al Wādids according to which he relinquished the territories the Marinids had captured. He returned to western Morocco to try to deal with the dynasty’s first serious succession crisis which brought about a momentary halt in the Marinid expansion. The main challenge to Abū Thābit’s authority was the pretender ‘Uthmān ibn Abī ‘l ‘Ulā, commander of the Marinid troops in al Andalus (shaykh al ghuzāt), who had established a stronghold in the Rif. Abū Thābit tried to put down this uprising, but died during the campaign. His brother Abū ‘l Rabī’ succeeded him and managed to recover control of Ceuta, which had meanwhile been occupied by the Naṣrids in 705/1306, but he died shortly after receiving his bay’a, in 710/1310.

His successor, Abū Saʿīd ‘Uthmān, was a sultan with a great interest in arts and letters and the founder of several madrasas. His reign also marks the beginning of Marīnid historiography, with works such as al Dhakhīra al saniyya and Ibn Abī Zar’’s Rawd al qirtās,12 testimony to the dynasty’s concern with creating its own dynastic memory. Marīnid chancellery was also organised under his rule. His was an era characterised by a certain inhibition in relation to both al Andalus and Tlemcen. A crisis in the Ḥafṣid dynasty at this time had brought the ‘Abd al Wādids to the height of their power, and they subjected Tunis and Bougie to constant harassment. Meanwhile, Abū Saʿīd ‘Uthmān had to deal with the revolt of his son Abū ‘Ali. This revolt was initially successful in 714/1315, following another fruitless attack on Tlemcen, and Abū ‘Ali relegated his father to the governorship of Taza. However, Abū Saʿīd ‘Uthmān swiftly recovered the reins of power and in turn appointed Abū ‘Ali governor of Sijilmāsa. From that position, by 720/1320 Abū ‘Ali had taken control of the strategic points along the caravan routes. Then, in 722/1322, at the instigation of the Aragonese, Abū ‘Ali managed to seize Marrakesh, pitting it against Fez in what would become a long lasting rivalry. Abū ‘Ali’s ambitions were finally thwarted when his army was beaten. Nevertheless, he was allowed to continue as governor of Sijilmāsa. Meanwhile, Abū Saʿīd ‘Uthmān named Abū ‘Ali’s brother Abū ‘l Hasan as his heir. With a view to a possible alliance with Tunis, Abū Saʿīd ‘Uthmān arranged to have Abū ‘l Hasan marry the Ḥafṣid princess Fāṭima, a political move with enormous symbolic value,
since the Marīnids, having achieved the consolidation of their territorial base, were still involved in promoting the creation of their dynastic memory and wanted to benefit from the Ḥāfṣids’ caliphal legitimacy. However, as Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān was on his way to receive the Ḥāfṣid princess, he died in 731/1331.

The great expansion of the Marīnids and their decline
Abū ʿl Ḥasan represents the apogee of the Marīnīd policy of expansion, and also a turning point in the construction of the legitimising ideology of the dynasty. He continued his father’s policy of renewed Marīnīd involvement in both the central Maghrib and al Andalus. Again, this initiative had a clearly economic motive. The possible creation of a commercial bridge between ‘Abd al Wādid controlled Tlemcen and Sijīlmaṣa (where Abū ‘Alī had been confirmed in his governorship), in combination with ‘Abd al Wādid control of the Mediterranean coast, posed a very serious threat to the economic survival of the Marīnīds. On the other hand, the request by the sultan Muḥammad IV of Granada for help against the Christians offered the chance for a new intervention in al Andalus. One of the first strategic steps taken by the Marīnīd sultan was the construction of a powerful war fleet to fight against not only the Castilians in the area of the Straits but also the ‘Abd al Wādíds along the Maghribi coast.

Abū ʿl Ḥasan’s success in controlling the Sūṣ and Dra’ valleys was due to the help of the Maʿqīl Arabs, and in reward they were granted territorial concessions which turned them into virtual lords of the region. Abū ʿl Ḥasan then gained control of the coast of the central Maghrib in 732/1332 and launched an offensive against Tlemcen, this time with Ḥāfṣid assistance. After a siege, Tlemcen fell in 737/1337, and the amīr Abū Tāshfīn I was executed. This victory was to some extent made possible thanks to the ‘ulamā’ of Tlemcen, who largely favoured Abū ʿl Ḥasan as the new champion of Islam. Abū ʿl Ḥasan presented himself as the protector of the Ḥāfṣids and ultimately the true lord of the Maghrib. Thus, Tunis became his next objective.

Meanwhile, Abū ʿl Ḥasan’s intervention in al Andalus had got underway. The Marīnīd conquest of Gibraltar in 733/1333 was merely a prelude to the crushing defeat of Marīnīd forces at the Río Salado (741/1340) by Christian troops, a disastrous reverse from which Marīnīd interest in al Andalus never fully recovered. Thereafter Marīnīd attention was limited almost exclusively to North African affairs. There, Tunis, the seat of the caliphate, was conquered in 748/1347, the final culmination of Marīnīd expansion. But the weakness of Abū ʿl Ḥasan’s position in Tunis soon made itself manifest. He did not gain popular support in Tunis as he had in Tlemcen, and then the Arab tribes allied
to him, frustrated by his inability to meet their expectations of reward, revolted. Abū ʿl-Ḥasan was defeated in the battle of Qayrawān in 749/1348, and when he attempted to put together a new force his efforts were to no avail. The first obstacle was the Black Death, whose effects reached Tunis in the spring of 749/1348. The second and more serious obstacle was the revolt led by his son Abū ʿInān Fāris, whom Abū ʿl-Ḥasan had left in charge of Tlemcen. Abū ʿInān Fāris seized the opportunity presented by his father’s travails to proclaim himself sovereign and return with great haste from Tlemcen to Morocco in order to preempt any other possible claimants to the throne. As a result, the ‘Abd al-Wādīd and Ḥafṣīd princes quickly recovered their former possessions in Tlemcen, Bougie and Constantine. Thus, in his efforts to prevent his father from reacting militarily or returning to Morocco, where he probably still enjoyed considerable prestige, Abū ʿInān Fāris brought about the loss of all the territories that had been so recently conquered.

Abū ʿl-Ḥasan made several attempts to return to Morocco, but all ended in failure, as he was unable to smash the great coalition that had arisen to oppose him in the central Maghrib between Maghrāwa Berbers and ‘Abd al-Wādīs, aided by his son Abū ʿInān. Having sought refuge in Sijilmāsā, he managed to put together an army with which, despite the defection of his Arab allies the Banū Suwayd, he seized control of Marrakesh. At last he confronted his son’s forces on the banks of the Umm al Rabi’a in 752/1351, but was defeated. He was obliged to abdicate in his son’s favour just before dying in 752/1351.

Abū ʿInān first had to deal with the territorial fragmentation that he had himself caused, enabling the ‘Abd al-Wādīs to reestablish themselves as a power ready to challenge the Marīnid goal of hegemony over the entire region. By 752/1351 Abū ʿInān concentrated his efforts in the eastern Maghrib, where the ‘Abd al-Wādīs were extending their rule towards Hunayn and Oran at the expense of the Maghrāwa principalities in the region. After a swift campaign, Abū ʿInān defeated the ‘Abd al-Wādīd troops at Anghād in 753/1352. This victory opened the way to Tlemcen, where he executed the Zayyānid princes Abū Thābit and Abū Saʿīd.

Abū ʿInān then returned to Fez. The decision not to remain in Tlemcen but to withdraw to his capital provoked the immediate revolt of Bougie and the region of Constantine. Abū ʿInān managed to regain control of Bougie in 754/1353, and later obtained the submission of Constantine, but these uprisings are an indication of the structural difficulties facing Abū ʿInān in attempting to establish his rule over the territory. Even at the moment when Abū ʿInān was busy with the pacification of Bougie, a Marīnid pretender, Abū ʿl Faḍl, who
had taken refuge at the Nasrīd court of Granada, disembarked in southern Morocco assisted by a Castilian fleet and started an uprising among the Saskiwa, which Abū ‘Inān managed to suppress between 754/1353 and 755/1354.14

In 758/1357, Abū ‘Inān achieved the conquest of Tunis, but once more it was short lived owing to disturbances caused by the Riyāḥ Arabs. Abū ‘Inān’s own troops began to defect, and the rumour spread that he was going to be replaced by a rival Marīnid. This prompted Abū ‘Inān to return to Fez, where he put down the opposition by executing a number of Marīnid shaykhs. The following year, Abū ‘Inān resumed his campaign against Ifrīqiya and attacked Constantine and the Dawāwīda Arabs. He then returned to Fez gravely ill, a circumstance exploited by his vizier al Ḥasan ibn ‘Umar al Fudūdī, who proclaimed al Saʿīd successor to the throne, bypassing the presumed heir Abū Zayyān. When Abū ‘Inān had recovered his health, al Fudūdī had him strangled, in 759/1358.

The expeditions of Abū ʿl Ḥasan and Abū ‘Inān against Tlemcen and Tunis had brought out the tension between the autocratic intentions of the two rulers and the centrifugal tendencies of the oligarchy of the Marīnid shaykhs, defenders of their own dominant position at a local level. This group had fuelled opposition to the programme of expansion and had received the brunt of the brutal repression that followed. Furthermore, the fiscal measures adopted by Abū ʿl Ḥasan, which were intended to abolish illegal taxes and abuses, were directed against the privileges of this oligarchy, while at the same time other measures which favoured the scholars, the Sharīfs and the Sufis brought about the rise of a new social elite which supported the caliphal aspirations of Abū ʿl Ḥasan. To a great extent, the assassination of Abū ‘Inān on the orders of his vizier al Fudūdī represents the revenge of the old tribal oligarchy, which thereafter increased its hold on matters of state through a system characterised by the weakness of the sultan’s role and the establishment of strong family solidarities around the viziers, who were able to maintain their grip on power by virtue of a network of nepotism and patronage. The chief families that made up this system were the al Fudūdī, al Qabāʾīlī and al Yābānī. At the same time, if thus far al Andalus had been the target of North African invasions, by the end of Abū ‘Inān’s reign it was the Naṣrids who had a tendency to intervene in North African politics.15 Soon enough, the protagonists of this assault on North Africa from Iberia were no longer Muslims, but the Christian Portuguese and Spaniards.

A lack of sources for the latter part of the eighth/fourteenth century and all of the ninth/fifteenth leaves many gaps in our knowledge of the history of
the last Marīnid and the Watṭāsid dynasty that followed, a history that revolves around complex palace intrigues. Al Saʿīd I was assassinated in 760/1359 and was succeeded by Abū Salīm, a Marīnid pretender backed by Peter I of Castile. Abū Salīm had the vizier al Fudūrī murdered and even managed to reconquer Tlemcen briefly in 761/1360. However, he was shortly assassinated in his turn in a conspiracy led by his vizier ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd Allāh al Fudūrī and the captain of the Christian guard, who put in his place first an elderly man, Abū ʿUmar Tāshfīn, and then Abū Zayyān Muḥammad. Five years later, in 768/1366, this man was also murdered by his vizier and replaced with another Marīnid prince, ʿAbd al ʿAzīz. This rapid succession of sultans disguised a virtual carving up of the country among a small number of local lords: the Arab Maʿqīl held sway over southern Morocco and provided support for the descendants of Abū ʿAli in Sijīlmaṣa; the Rīf area was dominated by the Marīnid prince Abū Ḥassūn, with the backing of the Naṣrids; and Marrakesh was under the control of ʿĀmir, the powerful amīr of the Hintāta Berbers.16

The sultan ʿAbd al ʿAzīz reacted to this slide into political and territorial fragmentation. He recovered control over Marrakesh, helped the Naṣrids to retake Algeciras in 770/1369 and even conquered Tlemcen before his death in 774/1372. Following the brief reign of his son al Saʿīd II (and his vizier Abū Bakr ibn Ghāzī), the rule of his successor Abū ʿl ʿAbbās ʿAbd al Mūḥammad marks the high point of Naṣrid intervention in Morocco. For after he was put in place and then deposed in 786/1384 with Naṣrid help, Abū ʿl ʿAbbās ʿAbd al Mūḥammad was returned to power in 789/1387 once again helped by the Naṣrid sultan. Abū ʿl ʿAbbās Ahmad managed to carry out several campaigns against Tlemcen and forced Abū Tāshfīn II to become his vassal in 791/1389.

In this obscure period of pretenders, sultans and viziers, the cruel war that broke out between Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān III and his uncle Abū Ḥassūn terribly affected the region around Meknes, as witnessed by Leo Africanus nearly a century later. Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān III died in perhaps 823/1420 after a palace plot in which virtually all of his descendants were slaughtered. At this point, an amīr of the Banū Waṭṭās named Abū Zakariyyāʾ had ʿAbd al Ḥaqq, then a one year old boy, proclaimed sultan, thus forcing aside one of Abū ʿInān’s descendants, who had been imposed by the amīrs of Tlemcen. ʿAbd al Ḥaqq’s minority initiated a Waṭṭāsid regency during which three viziers, Abū Zakariyyāʾ, ʿAlī and Yahyā, succeeded each other, until the now adult sultan had the last of these murdered, along with all the other Waṭṭāsids he could lay hands on, in 863/1458. Finally, ʿAbd al Ḥaqq himself had his throat cut in Fez in 869/1465 during a revolt that brought the Idrīsid Sharīf Muḥammad ibn
‘Imrān al Jūṭī to power in the capital. His brief six year reign ended in 876/1472, when Muḥammad al Shaykh al Waṭṭāsī, who had managed to survive ‘Abd al Haqq’s massacre, entered Fez, thus ushering in the Waṭṭāsid period of Moroccan history.

The Waṭṭāsids

The dynasty of the Zanāṭa Banū Waṭṭās, who also belonged to the Banū Marīn, is sometimes regarded as simply the final episode of the Marīnid period. Their assumption of power seems to have resulted merely from the collapse of their predecessors’ rule. In fact, the territorial base of the Waṭṭāsids was limited to Fez and the surrounding area, while other big cities like Marrakesh, Tetouan and Xauen constituted independent principalities. This territorial disintegration coincided with an increasing Portuguese presence on the Moroccan coast beginning in 818/1415, when Ceuta was conquered, and between 876/1471 and 919/1513 Tangier, Arzila, Agadir, Safi and Azemmur fell. On the Mediterranean coast, the Spanish took Melilla in 903/1497. Such moves by the Iberian kingdoms reflected not so much an interest in territorial expansion as a desire to control strategic points on the coast from which to secure the gold trade. Nonetheless, from these points the invaders made incursions into the interior with the help of allied tribes, usually Ma’qil Arabs. Certain regions of Morocco, such as Dukkala, were particularly affected by the Portuguese presence. Traditional historiography has interpreted the rise of the Sa’di Sharifs, with the support of the mystical brotherhoods, as a sort of proto national resistance to this Christian occupation. The underlying causes, however, lay in the disintegration that Moroccan society underwent in the late eighth/fourteenth and early ninth/fifteenth centuries. In addition to economic factors deriving from the eastward shift of trade routes or the decline of centres of artisan production like Fez, the social turmoil may have been caused by a great movement of the population in which the tribes of nomadic Arabs and Berbers, who had until the eighth/fourteenth century been kept at the fringes of the territory, moved into the central plateau, homeland to ruling Marīnids, from the south to the region of the Gharb. Certainly the preponderance of Bedouins and Arabs in the Waṭṭāsid period would explain the Arabisation of the Waṭṭāsid army and state administration during the reign of Muhammad al Shaykh. In addition, the depredations of the Ma’qil Arabs, who had initially been allied to the Portuguese, provoked a popular reaction to not only the Christian invaders but also these Arabs themselves, who were now at any rate allied with the Waṭṭāsid sultans as well. It was this reaction that to a
large extent fuelled the Sa‘did movement in the Dra‘ valley, a movement whose rise to power culminated in the capture of Fez in 961/1554.

Marrānīd intervention in the Iberian Peninsula

Between 633/1236 and 646/1248, Fernando III of Castile conquered Cordoba, Jaén and Seville, and in what was left of al-Andalus the breakdown of Almohad authority gave rise to a period of intense turbulence which finally resolved itself in the creation of the Naṣrīd emirate of Granada. In this context, the intervention of the Banū Marīn in the Iberian Peninsula reflected several interests. First, economic rivalry had converted the western Mediterranean into a political, military and commercial web of alternately cooperating and competing forces, in which Castilians, Aragonese, Marrānīds, Naṣrīds, Ceutis, Genovese and ‘Abd al-Wādids were all involved, resulting in battles, betrayals and pacts—the latter as often as not between Muslims and Christians. Secondly, the Iberian Peninsula represented for the Marrānīds a good opportunity to strengthen their claim to political legitimacy through the fulfilment of jihad, even if its actual practice often failed to match the intended ideal. Furthermore, the Marrānīd sultan and disaffected members of the sultan’s family might simultaneously be doing their own intervening in Andalusī affairs. For the dissidents, the Naṣrīd rulers devised a particular title, ‘shaykh al ghuzā‘, sometimes erroneously translated as ‘chief of the volunteers of the Faith’ but more properly meaning ‘chiefs of the raiders’. These men often became fully integrated members of the Naṣrīd army, and played a highly active role in the stormy political history of the kingdom of Granada. At the same time, the Naṣrīds used the Marrānīd pretenders by sending them against Fez whenever it suited their own political interests.

The first great moment of Marrānīd intervention in the Peninsula corresponds to the rule of the sultan Abū Yūsuf, who mounted as many as five different expeditions between 673/1275 and 684/1285. If the first campaign was a call for help from the Naṣrīd sultan, pressed by both the Castilian army and domestic unrest, Abū Yūsuf’s fourth expedition was at the behest of King Alfonso X of Castile, who needed help in putting down a revolt led by his son Sancho IV. The net territorial result of these campaigns, with the Naṣrīds constantly switching their alliances back and forth between Muslims and Christians and simultaneously exploiting internal dissent within the Marrānīd camp, was that Marrānīd possessions in the Peninsula were essentially confined to small enclaves around Tarifa and Algeciras. When the Marrānīds shifted their attention largely to North African affairs, Tarifa was captured by the Castilians in 691/1292 and then Ceuta was lost to Naṣrīd rule in 705/1306, an event that
coincided with the Naṣrid instigated revolt of the *shaykh al ghuzāt* ‘Uthmān ibn Abī ‘l ‘Ula’, one of the earliest of many Naṣrid interventions in Moroccan affairs. This prompted a military response from the Marīnid Abū ‘l Rabī’, who, thanks to help from Aragon, managed to recover Ceuta in 709/1309. The complexity of the diplomatic web that the Naṣrids had woven about themselves allowed them to overcome the combined threat of Castilians, Aragonese and Marīnids, but momentarily it also enabled the Marīnids to regain some of their territorial losses in al Andalus.

An agreement between Abū ‘l Ḥasan and Muḥammad IV of Granada led to the conquest of Gibraltar in 733/1333. After a four year truce with the Castilians, which allowed Abū ‘l Ḥasan to concentrate on his campaign to take Tlemcen, he resumed his offensive on the Peninsula. Beginning in 738/1338, various Marīnid expeditions challenged the Castilians, while Abū ‘l Ḥasan’s navy took control of the Straits and destroyed the Castilian fleet at Algeciras in 740/1340. However, an expedition led in person by Abū ‘l Ḥasan was defeated by a combined force of Castilians, Catalans and Portuguese at the Río Salado, as we have seen. Further humiliation was inflicted by the loss in 744/1344 of the port of Algeciras, the base for all Maghribi operations in the Peninsula. These defeats signalled the virtual liquidation of Marīnid policy in al Andalus. There remained only the occasional episode, such as the taking of Gibraltar by a Marīnid force in 814/1411, only to be driven out again barely three years later. During the reign of Muhammad V in Granada, the leadership of the *ghuzāt* troops passed into the hands of the Naṣrid sultans, who then initiated their inverse policy of direct intervention in Morocco.

The economic and territorial foundations of the Marīnid state

In the medieval Maghrib, ethnicity was linked to the notion of space rather than to the idea of territorial frontiers. Individual identity was associated with belonging to a particular clan or tribe, and the great state formations were less interested in the establishment of fixed frontiers than in control over economic and political resources, such as mines, trade routes or tribute. States and local communities created a political space of negotiation, domination or disobedience which in the Maghrib crystallised in the stereotypical opposition between the *bilād al makhzan* (‘the land under the control of the sultan’s administration’) and the *bilād al sība* (‘the land of rebellion’). As described by Ibn Khaldūn, these North African states derived from the development of local ‘ašabiyyas (roughly, ‘clan solidarities’), which, at their moment of greatest strength, revealed the underlying tension between the centralising aspirations of dynastic leaders and the fragmenting force of their ethnic base. Tribal
narratives, which use genealogy to refer to the tribe’s own past, constitute a representation of the relations between various groups which are fluid and changing by nature, and not a rigorously precise account of their chronology and past history. In general terms, the genealogical accounts view the establishment of the Marīnid and Waṭṭāsid dynasties as the return to hegemony of the Zanāta Berbers, after being forced into an inferior position by their rivals, the Ṣanḥāja Almoravids, and the Maṣmūda, the tribe to which Ibn Tūmart, founder of the Almohad movement, belonged. From this perspective, the seventh/thirteenth century was the century that saw the rise to dominance of the Zanāta ‘aṣabiyya of the central Maghrib, along with groups like the Banū Iffrān, the Maghrāwa and the Banū Tūjīn. By the same token, the constant rivalry between Marīnids and ‘Abd al Wādids was explained as part of a historical feud between two closely related clans of the Zanāta. However, the Almohad caliphate had been established by a Zanāta Berber, ‘Abd al Mu’min, so that the rise to political prominence of the Zanāta was already a century old.22

The situation in the seventh/thirteenth century Maghrib must also be seen in the light of the presence of large nomadic tribes of Arabs, employed as mercenaries by the Almohads23 and in large part responsible for a great process of ‘Bedouinisation’. Furthermore, that presence determined the very character of Marīnid territorial rule,24 the result of an alliance between the Marīnid shaykh elite and various associated groups, particularly Bedouin tribes, both Arab and Berber. The basis of this alliance was the system of territorial concessions (iqtā’s), which involved dividing up the territory and with it the right to tax its populations. This system was by no means unique to the Marīnids, and was put into practice in areas under ‘Abd al Wādid and Ḥafṣid rule, as well as in many other parts of the Muslim world. In the case of the Marīnids, it was Abū Yahyā who introduced this system that in fact implied the divisibility of power and the virtual impossibility of total territorial unification. Unquestionably, the dividing up of lands and power made considerable sense in a tribal tradition based on the division of resources among peers, but in Marīnid practice it became one of the main tools of political action. Ultimately, the system gave rise to the privatisation of power and the fragmentation of property. The advantages this alliance had for co rulers were stronger than supposed tribal rivalries, as demonstrated by the case of the Ma’qil Arabs, who were competitors of the Marīnids during their initial northward expansion but allies when it came to establishing Marīnid hegemony over southern Morocco.

In general, this system was based on a predatory exploitation of the sedentary population through taxes that were often outside Islamic law.
Abū ʿl Ḥasan attempted to correct this, and presented his rule as one marked by fiscal reform, fairness and justice. However, his attempt to abolish illegal taxes and stamp out the abuses and injustices committed by his predecessors should also be seen as part of a political programme tending towards dynastic authoritarianism and the creation of a caliphate. This was a policy, in short, which attacked the foundations of the Marīnid oligarchy, and it was doomed to failure. The Marīnid system had enabled the Arabs to go from being mercenaries and subordinates in the Almohad period to achieving the status of partners in power. In this way, without introducing material or technical transformations into agriculture, the system contributed above all to the formation of a new ruling elite. It has been observed, however, that the great affluence afforded by African gold permitted the Marīnid sultans to restrict their territorial concessions to high dignitaries or tribal shaykhs only, with rewards for the rank and file paid out in coin or gold. This may have introduced a lower limit in the size of the parcels into which territory could be divided, particularly in comparison with what happened in other parts of the Muslim world. The Marīnid system of rule, then, implied the creation of an oligarchy that was based on ethnicity and therefore retained a powerful centrifugal tendency. Yet this system clashed with the great developments taking place in the region, developments which implicated the states of not only North Africa but also the Iberian Peninsula and which explain the Marīnid attempts to expand their dominion. The internal contradictions of their system of rule meant that these attempts were ultimately bound to fail.

These great regional developments were closely tied to control over the trans Saharan trade, which is one of the keys to the history of medieval North Africa. This trade involved many people and a variety of goods, but its driving force was the gold coming out of deepest Africa. Initially, this gold was exchanged for salt, and this salt gold exchange constituted the basis of trans Saharan commerce—a fact which explains the strategic importance of the salt mines located in North Africa. The trade served to satisfy the growing need for gold among North African dynasties and this demand tended to favour the regularisation of the trade.

From a very early date, this traffic had been organised along two routes: one more westerly, for which Sijilmāsa represented the gateway to the southern desert, and another further east, which found its outlet on the Mediterranean at Tunis. The history of the Almoravids and their southward expeditions can be understood to a great extent as an attempt to control the western trade route. It was largely thanks to the Almoravids that the trade network crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and became systematically involved in the economy of al Andalus.
The sixth/twelfth century also saw the opening of new reception points for the western route, like Marrakesh, Sūs, and the Atlantic ports of Morocco and Tlemcen, linked to Sijilmāsa by a route that passed through Fez for this was the period when the capital of the central Maghrib began to enjoy great prosperity.

Under the Almohads, the North African commercial network was for the first time brought under unified control, and this favoured the stabilisation of the two main routes. At the same time, the definitive opening of the African trade to the countries of Europe led European merchants, particularly Catalans and Genovese, to set up commercial bases in the North African ports. A new international dimension was added to the African trade and the attention of the European powers focused on the importance of these ports as a way to increase their control over this trade. From a general perspective, during these centuries control of the Mediterranean passed from the hands of Muslim merchants to Christians. It was also the period that saw the rise of the kingdom of Mali.

Marīnid expansion reveals the importance of the trade routes as well as their relationship with space. As Kably has observed, this expansion had as its initial objective the establishment of a territorial base from which the Marīnids could seize control of the smaller regional centres and commercial networks. This initial base included the northernmost starting points of the route in the Gharb and the Rif, incorporated the cities of Fez, Meknes and Taza, extended south towards Fazaz and Tadla, and could count on a port (Salé), a mining centre and one of the principal hubs of the trans Saharan trade, Sijilmāsa (disputed control over which led to the dynasty’s first clash with the ‘Abd al Wādids). Having consolidated this initial base, the Marīnids sought to broaden their control to include other maritime outlets like Ceuta in the north and the routes to the central Maghrib with their desert staging points in the south. As this strategy increasingly made the dynasty a force on the international stage, with involvement in Tunis and al Andalus, the contradictions of an internal system dominated by a tribal oligarchy grew more evident, as we have noted, so that ultimately the oligarchy was able to undermine the great plans of Abū ‘l Hasan and Abū ‘Inān and even assume power itself through the great vizier families in the latter part of the eighth/fourteenth century.

The Marīnid eastward push can also be explained in terms of an attempt to control the African trade, as there was a gradual eastward displacement of the trade routes, caused by various factors, among them the insecurity that followed the decline of the Almohad control along the routes, now harassed by marauding Ma‘qil Arabs, the rise of the Marīnids themselves, and a desire on the
part of the sultans of Mali to diversify their gold markets. The heightened importance of the eastern trade routes coincided, furthermore, with the appearance of Egypt as a real player in this trade, beginning in 720/1320. This increased traffic meant greater prosperity for Tunis, at the Mediterranean outlet of the eastern route, and that city was able to develop close commercial relations with European merchants, especially the Aragonese and Genovese. This eastward displacement of the trade routes also explains the Marānid prolonged conflict with the ‘Abd al-Wādids, as well as their diplomatic overtures to Egypt and Mali, where Ibn Batūtā was sent as an ambassador in 753/1352. In the course of the middle ages the demand for precious metals increased enormously, both for domestic Maghribi consumption and for export to meet European monetary needs. For this reason the rich mines that existed in Morocco were also exploited intensively in this period, sometimes to exhaustion. The Marānid experience proved that it was impossible for a single political player to control the entire network involved in the trans Saharan trade (hence the exceptional nature of Almohad success in this respect), and that it was therefore essential to come to terms with the other parties implicated in the trade, especially the Bedouin tribes who ended up settling all along the caravan routes.

Apart from Egypt’s involvement in the trans Saharan trade, in the ninth/fifteenth century a new foreign element began seriously to affect the situation in Morocco, this time in the north and west. One of the first steps taken by Portugal on its road to becoming a world power was the occupation of North African ports, part of its search for direct access to the sub Saharan trade, starting with Ceuta in 818/1415 and proceeding south along the Atlantic coast. This occupation had multiple consequences for Morocco, but one of them was serious damage to its economy. Nevertheless, the western trade routes continued to be operational, and southern Morocco seems to have enjoyed some prosperity, perhaps linked to the mining and trading of copper. The diminished revenue from trans Saharan trade was responsible for the development of a local sugar industry of some importance.

Marānid religious policies

At first the Marānids were a purely pragmatic group who seized the opportunity provided by the decline of the Almohad empire. But the more the Marānids became a powerful political player with a dynastic character and a claim to be the successors of the Almohads, the more the need to create a political ideology became pressing. This obsession determined the religious policy of the Marānids and gave rise to a series of actions intended to enhance
the dynasty’s legitimacy, of which a good example is Ibn Marzūq’s book *al Musnad*, a work devoted to promoting the figure of Abū ’l Hasan.33

One aspect of this desire for legitimacy was a preoccupation with the appropriate choice of ruling titulature, a problem connected with the inheritance of the Almohad caliphate. This precedent was an underlying theme throughout the history of medieval Morocco, and aspiration to the institution of the caliphate waxed and waned according to the respectively shifting fortunes of Ḥaṣids, ‘Abd al Wāḍids and Marīnids. Needless to say, the dispute over political legitimacy in the Muslim west had been profoundly affected by the crisis of the caliphate in the Muslim east that followed the sack of Baghdad in 656/1258. It is highly significant that in 657/1259 the Sharifs of Mecca acknowledged for the first time a western caliphate, that of the Ḥaṣids in Tunis.34 The Marīnids had also initially acknowledged the authority of the Ḥaṣids and conducted the early campaigns that liquidated the remains of the Almohad empire in their name. As they consolidated their political position and expanded, however, the political language of the Marīnids underwent a transformation. Thus, during the increasingly authoritarian reigns of Abū ’l Ḥasan and particularly Abū ‘Inān, Marīnid caliphal aspirations became correspondingly more apparent. Abū ‘Inān replaced the title used by his Marīnid predecessors, *amīr al muslimīn* (‘Prince of the Muslims’), with a new one, *amīr al mu’minīn* (‘Prince of the Believers’), as a sign of this aspiration.

Another factor in this search for legitimacy was the resort to jihad, essentially after Alfonso X’s attack on Salé in 659/1260. It allowed the Marīnīd sultans to present themselves as defenders of the Faith and is omnipresent in the justifications for Marīnid military intervention in al Andalus, even though the reality of these interventions—particularly the pacts that resulted from them—was hardly consistent with this ideal. Nevertheless, the desire to portray themselves as the champions of Islam in the west led the Marīnīds to take a number of specific initiatives, such as the establishment of diplomatic ties with the Mamlūks of Egypt,35 whom the Marīnīds duly acknowledged as defenders of the caliphate after their victory over the Mongols in 658/1260.36 While Abū Ya’qūb cultivated relations with the Mamlūk sultan Muḥammad Ibn Qalāwūn, he was also visited by the Sharīf of Mecca, Labida ibn Abī Numayy. Following this, and perhaps because of their rivalry with the Mamlūks, the Sharifs, who had previously acknowledged the Ḥaṣids, now granted the Marīnīds the *bay’a*.37 This official recognition of the Marīnīds on the international scene coincides with their having begun systematically to organise the annual pilgrimages to Mecca. The first organised pilgrimage, in 704/1304, was sponsored by Abū Ya’qūb, and the expedition took with it a
richly adorned copy of the Qur’an with a brocaded cover for the Ka’ba, a gift which highlights Marinid attempts to link their dynasty with Islam’s holy sites.

Though the Marinids were of indisputably Berber descent, the sultans manipulated their genealogy by Arabising family names and even concocting an Arab origin for themselves in order to enhance their claim to be defenders of Islam. Marīnid sources established a link between their ancestor ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq and the Almoravid amīr Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn, a reflection of the Marīnids’ interest in depicting themselves as the heirs of the Almoravids. More rarely, individual Marīnid sultans claimed to have a shari‘f ancestor, particularly during the final years of the dynasty.

The Marīnids also developed an important relationship with the Sharīfī elite, thus making a key contribution to one of the most important political developments of the middle ages in the Muslim west: the transformation of Sharīfīsm into a political ideology. This phenomenon reached its climax with the development of the Idrīsid cult, particularly after the discovery of what was claimed to be the tomb of Idrīs II in Fez in 847/1437. Idrīs II, the founder of Fez in 192/808, was the son of Idrīs I, a descendant of the Prophet’s daughter and his son in law ‘Alī. Idrīs I had arrived in the Maghrib in the second/eighth century and became the founder of the Idrīsid dynasty of Morocco. The Idrīsids were thus the ancestors of the oldest branch of the Moroccan Sharīfīs, and the discovery of Idrīs II’s tomb is related to the prominence achieved by the Sharīfī elite in ninth/fifteenth century Morocco, and perhaps also to the attempt by the Marīnid rulers to control this elite by patronising the cult of Fez’s founder. It was a vain attempt, however, since in 869/1465 the sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq was deposed and assassinated in a Sharīfī inspired coup, and rule over the capital city passed to a powerful Sharīfī family of Idrīsid origin, the Jūtīs. Though Jūtī domination was short lived, Fez thereafter remained not only the capital of the Mālikī ‘ulamā’ but also an Idrīsid sanctuary.

Sharīfī ideology brought together several different trends, such as the institutionalisation of Sufism and the development of a religious model based on the veneration of the Prophet Muḥammad. One of the clearest manifestations of this cult of the Prophet is the festival celebrating his birth, called the mawlid. Though this festival was already celebrated on a popular level, the various political powers of the Maghrib began to make it official as part of a clearly ideological operation intended to harness the rising Sharīfī ideology to their own pursuit of political legitimacy. In the Maghrib, the mawlid was first celebrated officially by the ‘Aza’id rulers of Ceuta in 648/1250, and thereafter the practice spread throughout North Africa. Among the Marīnids, although the mawlid had been celebrated by Abū Yūsuf, it was his son Abū Ya’qūb
(whose mother belonged to a Sharīfī family) who in 691/1292 instituted it as a festival to be officially celebrated throughout the realm. Among the ‘Abd al Wādīds, the official celebration of the *mawlid* almost certainly began during the reign of Abū Ḥammū Mūsā II, in 760/1359, right after a brief incursion by the Marinids. This is probably related to the ‘Abd al Wādīds’ claim to be of Sharīfī extraction. As for the Nasīrids, the oldest reference to the official celebration of the *mawlid* in Granada comes from 734/1333, during the reign of Yūsuf I. Marinid numismatics clearly show the way that political theology began to shape the concept of *mawlā*, a term that encompasses references to the Prophet, the Sharīfs, God and the mystical lexicon in general.42

Marinid religious policies also included two key phenomena in the history of medieval Morocco: the founding of the great medieval madrasas and the development of organised Sufism.

One of the most long-lasting symbols of medieval Moroccan culture is the madrasa. This institution was given its initial impetus in the west by the Marinid dynasty with the erection of the Madrasa al Ṣaffārīn or al Ya‘qūbiyya, founded by Abū Yūsuf in 675/1276, while he was engaged in building his new courtly city at Fās al Jadīd. Thereafter madrasas sprang up in all the cities of Morocco, although the greatest concentration of these buildings was in Fez, the unchallenged cultural centre of the Maghrib at the time. A significant feature of the Marinid *madrasa*, which distinguished it from the *madrasas* of the Muslim east, was its exclusively official nature, there being a complete absence of privately founded madrasas.43 Besides the specific conditions which the Mālikī doctrine imposed on the creation of religious endowments (*waqf*) and which prevented founders from having any real control over their foundations (the factor which has been used to explain the relative absence of madrasas in al Andalus, for example), this lack of privately founded madrasas in Marinid Morocco seems rather to have been the result of a prolonged and conscious effort on the part of the dynasty to maintain control over the educational system and through it the scholarly elite. In the case of Fez, attention has been drawn to the tensions that were present in the city at the time the first madrasa was founded, for the founding coincided with the construction of the new palatine city of Fās al Jadīd, as well as the anti Jewish pogrom of 674/1276, events occurring against a backdrop of traditional hostility between the citizens of Fez and their new rulers. Hence the construction of the *madrasa* has been interpreted as an attempt by the first Marinid sultans to defuse the city’s opposition to their rule while at the same time facilitating the arrival and settlement of loyal *‘ulamā* of Zanāta origin.44 It is certainly true that the Marinids managed to overcome the
initial opposition of the Mālikī establishment and began to work with them, particularly during the reign of Abū Ya‘qūb and thereafter. This cooperation at first enabled the Mālikīs to draw the Maṭrīnids into accepting Mālikism, which by that time had become a form of orthodoxy in a state of confrontation with what remained of Almohad mahdism. For their part, the Maṭrīnid sultans managed, through the founding of madrasas, to create a monopoly over education and all fields in any way related to it, such as the official form of preaching or the judicature, since appointment to all such positions was under the direct control of the sultans. In this fashion they were able to sponsor the creation of an elite dedicated to the construction of Maṭrīnid political legitimacy.

The madrasa created a cultural model represented by the Mālikī ‘ālim of Fez, trained in all the religious sciences but most particularly in law, a scholar who was the repository of a body of knowledge based on works such as Saḥnūn’s Mudawwana and Khalīl ibn Ishāq’s Mukhtasar. With his strict Mālikism and hypertrophied memory, the ‘ālim of Fez was by no means an isolated or local phenomenon. Fez played an enormous role in the shaping of the scholarly culture of the entire Maghrib, largely by virtue of the fact that the ‘ulama’ of other regions would travel to Fez to pursue their studies. This facilitated, on a regional scale, the establishment of strong ties between the scholars of Fez and Tlemcen throughout the middle ages, despite the mutual hostility of their rulers. To some extent, the Maṭrīnids were able to use this scholarly culture to propagate their image as defenders of religion when they attempted to legitimise their eastward expansion. It is no accident that the man who wrote the longest eulogy of Abū ‘l Ḥasan was Ibn Marzūq, member of a distinguished family of Tlemcen that was representative of this city’s important intellectual tradition during the ‘Abd al Wādīd period.

The institutionalisation of Sufism took place in the Maghrib between the seventh/thirteenth and tenth/sixteenth centuries. Sufism had arrived at the same time as the beginning of the cult of saints sometime in the fifth/eleventh or sixth/twelfth century. Thereafter, what had started out as an individual expression of piety turned into an organised movement which was institutionalised around great mystical brotherhoods. These brotherhoods played a crucial role in Moroccan history, not only because they provided their initiates with a framework for socialisation, an ethical code and a body of doctrine and ritual, but also because they were involved in the management of material resources, participated in the organisation of agriculture and trade and, last but not least, entered the political arena by serving as arbiters of tribal
disputes and acting as either allies or competitors of the sultans even on occasion aspiring to political rule.

Although Sufism was by no means a uniquely Maghribi phenomenon, it quickly acquired special features there. Indeed, one of the most important mystical ways (turuq, sing. tarīqa) to come out of medieval Islam was founded by the Moroccan Abū ’l Ḥasan al Shāhīlī (d. 656/1258), whose influence spread throughout the Muslim world. The importance which al Shadhīlī placed on his Sharīfī ancestry is indicative of the relationship that existed between the development of Sufism, the rise of the cult of the Prophet Muhammad and the formation of the Sharīfī ideology. Two centuries later, the tradition of the Shādhīliyya was given a new reformulation by Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al Jazūlī, to whom most of the later currents of Sufism are linked one way or another. Beginning in the ninth/fifteenth century, the Jazūlīs played a key role in the history of Morocco in general, and in the rise of the Sa’dī dynasty in particular.

Although it could be claimed that there existed a certain inherent tension between the urban Mālikī ʿālim and the rural Sufi saint, such opposition cannot be discerned with any degree of certainty. It is true that the ʿulamāʾ engaged in polemical exchanges with the Sufis. Such disputes were of a diverse nature. From an epistemological point of view, they were related to the claim of the religious scholars that legal reasoning should serve as a model for any epistemological operation. On a more material plane, the scholars of religious law also found fault with the ways the mystical brotherhoods financed themselves. However, there were many individuals who were both scholar and mystic at the same time, which proves that these were not mutually incompatible domains. Be that as it may, what made Sufism important in the Maghrib was the creation of institutionalised brotherhoods and their subsequent conversion into a potent social and political force. In this context, it is understandable that, in addition to supporting the creation of a scholarly elite, the Marānid sultans would also end up providing support to these mystical organisations.

Consequently, in their zeal to build legitimacy, the religious policies of the Marānids ultimately helped to shape two different processes that were occurring simultaneously and actually feeding into each other, namely the development of Sharīfīs (linked to the veneration of the Prophet and the celebration of the mawlid) on the one hand, and the Sufi brotherhoods on the other. In the Maghrib, the confluence of these two factors often occurred around the figure of a mahdī. However, in the end, it was not the Marānids who benefited from the new religious order which all these movements were leading towards, but rather their successors, the Sa’dīs.
The ‘Abd al-Wādids of Tlemcen

The Banū ‘Abd al Wād were Zanāta Berbers from the central Maghrib closely related to the Marinids. At the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth century they governed Tlemcen in the name of the Almohad caliphs. As the Almohad empire based in distant Marrakesh crumbled, Yaghmurasān ibn Zayyān, a member of one of the branches of the ‘Abd al Wādids called the Banū Zayyān (or Zayyānids), managed to found an independent state. The ‘Abd al Wādid state was indissolubly linked to its capital Tlemcen, a key strategic location on both the route that connected Ifrīqiya and the western Maghrib and the route that took trans Saharan trade to Mediterranean outlets at Hunayn and Oran. The economic and commercial importance of the ‘Abd al Wādid capital explains, for example, its long standing relations with European merchants, among them the Catalans. The city’s prosperity nourished a lively artistic and cultural scene, even during the more turbulent and unstable moments in its political history that were brought about by its endless disputes with the Marinids of Fez and the Ḥafṣids of Tunis.

These conflicts were already in existence at the time of the state’s founding, for Yaghmurasān ibn Zayyān was unable to establish sovereignty over his territories definitively until they had first been subjected to a Ḥafṣid occupation in 640/1242, which forced him to recognise the neighbouring regime as the legitimate caliphate, and then an attack by the Almohad caliph al Saʿīd, in 646/1248. The death of the latter in an ambush set by ‘Abd al Wādid troops finally paved the way to independent rule. However, the long period of confrontation with the Marinids commenced at that time, and this enmity caused the ‘Abd al Wādid regime to swing its support back to the last Almohad caliphs in their struggle against the sultans of Fez. As mentioned, this enmity is explained in the sources as an ancient tribal feud, but it was clearly based on the ferocious competition for control of the trade routes. The first serious confrontation between the two dynasties took place when ‘Abd al Wādid forces came to the aid of the inhabitants of Fez, in the midst of an uprising against their new lord Abū Yahyā, and ended in defeat for the ‘Abd al Wādids at the battle of Isly in 647/1250. This defeat was the first in a series that took place over the following years, culminating in a battle for control of Sijilmāsa in 655/1257, which left that city at least momentarily in Marīnid hands. In 662/1263f., thanks to their allies the Maʾqil Arabs, the ‘Abd al Wādids managed to recapture Sijilmāsa, but only held it until 673/1274, when it fell once more to the Marīnids. The hostility between the two dynasties spread even to al Andalus, with the ‘Abd al Wādids becoming involved in the
struggle to dominate the Straits of Gibraltar by making pacts with both Naṣrids and Castilians to thwart Abū Yūsuf’s campaigns in the Peninsula.

The Marīnid Abū Yaʿqūb’s decision to capture Tlemcen once and for all led him to mount three expeditions against the central Maghrib. The last of these culminated in the great siege of the city, into which Abū Yaʿqūb poured all the resources of his state. During the siege, which lasted from 698/1299 until Abū Yaʿqūb’s death in 706/1306, resistance within the city was led first by Yaghmurasa¯n’s son Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān I and then by his successor Abū Zayyān I. Meanwhile, the former amīr had ceased to recognise the authority of the Ḥāfṣid caliphate in 698/1299.

The failure of this siege led to three decades of stability in Tlemcen under the rule of first Abū Ḥammū Mūsā I (r. 707 18/1308 18) and then Abū Tāshfīn I (r. 718 37/1318 37),58 who assumed power after having murdered his father. The sultanate was then rebuilt and the capital was given a real makhzan and a chancellery. It was also during this period, particularly during Abū Tāshfīn I’s reign, that the conquest of territory at the expense of the Ḥāfṣids, who at that time occupied not only Ifrīqiya but also Bougie and Constantine, began in earnest. Unsurprisingly, Abū Tāshfīn I began to reveal his ambition to claim the caliphate by using the title of amīr al muʾminīn, ‘Prince of the Believers’.59 Abū Tāshfīn I expected to capture Bougie and Constantine, but his actions led the Ḥāfṣids to request assistance from Fez. Thus began the period of the great eastward expansion of the Marīnids under Abū ʿl Ḥasan and Abū ʿInān. For the inhabitants of Tlemcen, this period therefore represented a kind of interregnum of Marīnid domination between 737/1337 and 760/1359, with the exception of four years of ʿAbd al Wādid rule under Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān II (r. 749 53/1348 52).

The revolt of the Arab tribes of the central Maghrib was one of the reasons for the failure of Abū ʿInān’s expansion eastward. It was Dawāwida Arabs who returned control of Tlemcen to Abū Ḥammū Mūsā II, who was able to re establish his government thanks to an alliance with the Maʿqil and Banū ʿĀmīr Arabs. However, an attack on Bougie in 767/1366 ended in a crushing defeat for the ʿAbd al Wādid. Shortly after, another Marīnid offensive against the central Maghrib led by the sultan ʿAbd al ʿAzīz managed to capture Tlemcen in 772/1370 and drive Abū Hammū Mūsā II from his capital. He was only able to return to it two years later, after reaching an agreement with the Marīnids. Finally, the combination of new hostilities with the Marīnids and a revolt led by his son Abū Tāshfīn II put an end to Abū Hammū Mūsā II’s rule as well as his life in 791/1389, after which the new sultan declared his vassalage to the Fez amīrs.

As it is for the western Maghrib, the narrative history of the ninth/fifteenth century in the central Maghrib comprises a rapid succession of sultans over lying a complicated tangle of political intrigues which is exacerbated by a notable
absence of documentary sources. In general terms, however, it is clear that once the Marīnid threat from the west had faded, the ‘ Abd al Wāhid domains were subjected to a series of incursions by the Ḥafṣids of Tunis. The caliph Abū Fāris carried out a fierce campaign against both the central and western Maghrib in 827/1424 in which he unseated the sultan of Tlemcen Abū Mālik ibn ‘ Abd al Waḥid, placing in his stead Abū ‘ Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Abī Tāshfīn. This Ḥafṣid offensive made similar headway against Marīnid power, and the sultan ‘ Abd al Ḥaqq eventually also rendered homage to Abū Fāris. Abū Fāris continued to exert a powerful influence over Tlemcen affairs for some time after the campaign, and even conquered it for a second time in 834/1431, setting up a new ‘ Abd al Wādid sultan, Abū ‘ I‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn Abī Ḥammū. 60

Later in the century, the caliph Abū ‘ Amr ‘ Uthmān was prompted to resume Ḥafṣid meddling in the affairs of Tlemcen when his protégé, the sultan Abū ‘ I‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn Abī Ḥammū, was deposed by his rival Abū ‘ Abd Allāh Muḥammad III al Mutawakkil, who rejected the authority of the Ḥafṣids. After several unsuccessful attempts, a Tunisian expedition finally reached the walls of Tlemcen in 871/1466 and forced the ‘ Abd al Wādid sultan to submit to Ḥafṣid rule once more. 61

As with the Marīnids, the history of the ‘ Abd al Wādid dynasty during the tenth/sixteenth century was marked by foreign interference. The Spanish took Mars al Kabīr in 911/1505, Oran in 915/1509 and Bougie in 916/1510, forcing the sultans of Tlemcen to pay tribute and exercising over them a kind of broad protectorate. Furthermore, the power of the Ottoman Turks began to make itself present in the area, and ‘ Arūj Barbarossa, lord of Algiers since 922/1516, momentarily occupied Tlemcen in 923/1517. Caught between these two outside influences, the ‘ Abd al Wādids managed to maintain their autonomy by virtue of complex diplomatic manoeuvres. 62 One of the low points in relations between the sultanate and the Spanish enclave at Oran occurred when a Spanish expeditionary force occupied Tlemcen for twenty two days in 949/1543. The final years of ‘ Abd al Wādid rule were spent resisting pressure from the Turks and the Sa’dī Sharīfs, who occupied Tlemcen in 957/1550, an occupation that was merely the prelude to the definitive fall of the city to the Turks in 958/1551 and the consequent disappearance of the ‘ Abd al Wādid dynasty.

The Nasrīd kingdom of Granada 63

In al Andalus, the power vacuum caused by the disintegration of the Almohad caliphate was filled by various local notables, the most prominent being Ibn Hūd, who proclaimed himself amīr al muslimīn in Murcia in 625/1228. At the time,
al Andalus was rapidly losing ground to the so called ‘Reconquista’ being carried out by the Christian kingdoms. The main impetus to this southward advance was provided by Fernando III, who had succeeded in unifying the kingdoms of Castile and León. In the face of the apparent inability of Ibn Hūd to halt the Christian conquest, new local leaders began to challenge his authority. One of these leaders was Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf ibn al Ahmar (Muḥammad I), who declared independent rule in Arjona in 629/1232 and then began a steady expansion of the territory under his control. In 635/1238 he entered Granada, which he then made his capital. Shortly afterwards, Almería and Malaga acknowledged his authority, making his state the last redoubt of Islam in the Peninsula.

The Naṣrid kingdom of Granada lasted until 897/1492, and its history is largely a story of survival. One of the first actions of the new regime was to reach agreements with the Christian kingdoms, momentarily halting the Reconquista so that the Naṣrids could eliminate their Andalusī competitors. Thus, one of the key moments in the genesis of the Naṣrid kingdom was the treaty of Jaén (643/1246), signed by Muḥammad I and Fernando III, according to which the sultan surrendered that city to the king of Castile and Léon and also agreed to become Fernando III’s vassal. In keeping with the standard formula for pacts of vassalage common in the Peninsula during the medieval period, this meant that Muḥammad I would pay tribute (Spanish parias) to Fernando III and provide military assistance when necessary. This political pragmatism, combined with extraordinary diplomatic skills, largely explains the Naṣrid kingdom’s survival. With the appearance of the various different regimes in the Maghrib, the Naṣrids were able to multiply their opportunities for diplomatic action, converting themselves into key players in the complex manoeuvres for control of the Straits of Gibraltar. Thus, the Naṣrids skilfully exploited the military involvement of the Marīnids in al Andalus, with all its variations, to help guarantee their survival. To the North African factor should be added the onset of a long period of political turmoil within the kingdom of Castile, which sharply contrasted with the demographic density and economic strength of the kingdom of Granada. These two factors combined to keep the Reconquista at bay for a very long time.

The reigns of Muḥammad I and Muḥammad II coincided with the first phase of Marīnid incursions into the Peninsula under Abū Yūsuf. Though the Marīnid sultans themselves gained little from these expeditions in terms of territorial acquisitions, the Naṣrids were able to use them to consolidate their own territories by pursuing a complicated diplomatic strategy that was not above playing off the Christians against the Marīnids, as shown by the cooperation between the Naṣrid army and the Castilians and Aragonese in the conquest of Tarifa from the Marīnids in 591/1292. Naṣrid territorial
consolidation also involved internal pacification, such as when a serious uprising led by the Banū Ashqilūla, governors of Malaga and Guadix, was put down. It was during this period that the Naṣrīd regime set up its seat of government in the Alhambra complex at Granada, from where the state’s administrative apparatus ruled over a territory that was now demographically robust, nourished in large part by a sizeable community of Muslim immigrants from the north.

The reigns of Muḥammad III and Naṣr were particularly marked by the conflict over control of the Straits, which saw the mobilisation of political and military resources by all the powers of the region, including the Aragonese and ‘Abd al Wādīds. For a few years, from 705/1306 to 709/1309, the Naṣrīds even ruled Ceuta. It was also a period which saw considerable dynastic infighting between sultans and pretenders, something that would become endemic in the history of Naṣrīd Granada. Thus, Muḥammad III was deposed by Naṣr in 708/1309 and murdered in 713/1314, Naṣr himself being overthrown in that same year by Ismā‘īl I.

During the reign of Yūsuf I (r. 733/1333–54), despite serious military reverses such as the Marīnid debacle at the Río Salado in 741/1340 and the loss of Algeciras in 744/1344 (which spelled the end of Marīnid intervention in the Peninsula), an economic boom provided stability to the kingdom and allowed the regime to undertake major projects such as the construction of the madrasa of Granada. Yūsuf I’s successor Muḥammad V (r. 755/1354–9 and 763/1362–91) was probably the most important of the Naṣrīd sovereigns. His reign was marked by a strengthening of Granada’s international position, thanks to a combination of circumstances. The internal situation in Castile, torn by the civil war between Peter I and Enrique of Trastamara, enabled Muḥammad V to stabilise his relations with that Christian kingdom, ushering in a period of political stability on that front that was unusual in Naṣrīd history. At the same time, the reign of Muḥammad V saw an inversion in the political balance relative to the states of North Africa. Whereas previously it had been the Marīnids who intervened in Andalusí politics, now the Naṣrīds began to exert their influence in the politics of Fez. A symbol of this new strength was the fact that Muḥammad V himself or a member of his family assumed the role of shaykh al ghuzā‘, a military office previously reserved for Marīnīd princes. Muḥammad V took over the last bastions of Marīnīd power in the Peninsula at Ronda and Gibraltar and used Marīnīd pretenders who had sought refuge at the court of Granada to intrigue against the sultans of Fez. One of these pretenders, Abū ‘l ‘Abbās ibn Abī Salīm, actually seized power in Fez in 776/1374. Muḥammad V’s international contacts extended as far as the ‘Abd al Wādīds of Tlemcen and the Mamlūks of Cairo. The ultimate symbol of this
age of Naṣrid splendour is the Alhambra complex at Granada, which largely achieved its definitive form during these years. By contrast, the ninth/fifteenth century was one long slide into decline, beginning with the loss of Antequera in 813/1410, a heavy psychological and military blow for the Granadines. Military pressure from the Christians was not continuous during this period, but the endless intra dynastic squabbles prevented the Naṣrid authorities from exploiting the opportunities offered by truces or Christian military inactivity. An important role in the interminable series of conspiracies, dethronements and assassinations was played by the family of the Banū ʿl Sarrāj, known to the Christian sources as the ‘Abencerrajes’, who helped several sultans to gain power, among them Muhammad IX, whose rule saw the commencement of a prolonged period of civil unrest. On top of uprisings of religious inspiration, notably that led by Yūsuf al Mudajjan in the city of Granada itself, Muḥammad IX also had to deal with a long confrontation with Muḥammad VIII. This civil war prompted the intervention of Castilian troops under Juan II, who defeated the Granadine forces at the battle of La Higueruela in 834/1431 and imposed on the kingdom a humiliating truce, as well as a new sultan, Yusuf IV. However, Yusuf IV enjoyed only a few months of power before being ousted by Muhammad IX, who then assumed the Naṣrid throne for the third time.

The Castilian advance was relentless over the following years. At the same time, political life within the Naṣrid dynasty grew ever more intricate as a consequence of internal splits that weakened the brief attempts to mount a military response to Castile. The Castilians naturally did what they could to exacerbate these domestic conflicts, by setting a high price for truces or backing one Naṣrid pretender against another, for the Christian kingdom obviously stood to benefit from the economic and political weakening of Granada.

The reign of the sultan Abū ʿl Ḥasan ‘Alī (r. 869 87/1464 82 and 888 90/1483 5) represented one last moment of stability for the kingdom of Granada, a respite which lasted until Isabel I’s assumption of the Castilian throne in 1474 put an end to a long period of domestic troubles in Castile. Her marriage to Fernando II of Aragon led to the unification of the two kingdoms, and the new dual monarchy, known as ‘the Catholic Monarchs’, unleashed the final offensive against Naṣrid Granada in 887/1482. Amidst the vicissitudes of this long campaign, civil war broke out in Granada first between Abū ʿl Ḥasan ‘Alī and his son Muḥammad XI (called ‘Boabdil’ by the Castilian sources), and then between the latter and his uncle Muḥammad XII. With the help of the Castilians, Muḥammad XI was the eventual victor in the civil war, but he was destined to be the last sultan of Granada. Although he made one last bid to resist the Christian advance by requesting aid, as his predecessors had done, from the Mamlūks of Egypt, he...
could not prevent the inevitable fall of the kingdom. The siege of Granada began in 896/1491 and culminated in the surrender of the city to the Catholic Monarchs on 2 Rabī’ I 897/2 January 1492, the last day of al Andalus.

The Mudejars and Moriscos

The end of Muslim rule did not put an end to the presence of Muslims, who could still live as ‘Mudejars’ and, when forced to convert, as Moriscos.66 Mudejars (Arabic mudajjan, ‘subject’, ‘tamed’) first appeared with the Christian conquest of Toledo in 478/1085. But Mudejars were not only Muslims who stayed when their lands were conquered, but also Muslims who immigrated from al Andalus because of conflict or economic need, benefiting from the statute of free persons granted to them in Christian lands. In some cases, Muslim immigrants were also attracted by the opportunities for employment offered by the Christian nobility in need of manpower. Another section of the Muslim population comprised former slaves who, on regaining their freedom, were under no obligation to convert to Christianity. The presence of such sizeable Muslim populations under Christian rule was an exceptional circumstance whose legitimacy in religious terms was denied by many Muslim scholars, and this moral condemnation had the effect of stimulating a flow in the opposite direction, with many Mudejar Muslims migrating to what was left of al Andalus and beyond.67

Mudejar communities in the kingdoms of Christian Spain and their living conditions were not homogeneous. For example, after the conquest of Toledo, very few Mudejars remained in Castile, though as the frontier shifted southward the Muslim population grew larger. This was an essentially urban population concentrated in dispersed locations. At first, kings of Castile like Fernando III respected the pacts they had made with the Mudejar communities, but things changed after the ‘Mudejar Revolt’ of 1264, an uprising which was fomented by the Nasrid sultan. In the kingdom of Aragon, the large Mudejar community was basically a rural population who benefited from the relatively permissive policies of the Aragonese monarchs, though a few violent episodes occurred during the seventh/thirteenth and eighth/fourteenth centuries.

The Mudejar communities were organised around the ‘aljama’ (Arabic al jamā’a, ‘community’). Initially ‘aljama’ referred to the council of notables who oversaw the life of the Mudejars in its legal and religious aspects and represented the community before the Christian authorities. The term eventually came to mean the Mudejar community itself and even the quarters where Muslims dwelt. These ‘aljamas’ were organised around the ‘alcaide’, equivalent to a judge, who represented the highest legal authority for the
community and was at first chosen by that community, although from the eighth/fourteenth century it was often the king who appointed him. An important role was also played by the ‘alfaquí’ as expert in religion and law. A committee of Muslim notables appointed by the king decided how much head tax would be paid by each member of the community and saw to its collection. The total amount of this tax was set by the monarch, and by the ninth/fifteenth century it was becoming increasingly exorbitant. Subject in different measures to Christian and Muslim law, the Mudejar communities were endogamous, since it was forbidden to engage in sexual relations outside the community, and strict rules about what Muslims could wear in public served to reinforce their sense of separateness. Measures like these were intended to emphasise the differences between Christians and the Mudejar (and Jewish) communities, yet at the same time there was growing pressure to convert to Christianity. By virtue of the large proportion of Mudejar crafts men, their influence was strongly felt in areas such as construction and textiles. As for the Arabic language, its use among the Mudejars of Castile and Aragon gradually disappeared outside of religious functions, though in Navarre and Valencia Arabic continued to be spoken into the Morisco period.

The conquest of Granada had great repercussions for the Muslims. The inhabitants of the former Nasrīd territory initially acquired the status of Mudejars. In terms of the density of the Muslim population and their strong sense of identity, the Granadines were by no means similar to the other Mudejars, and despite the initial Spanish policy of peaceful assimilation, the problems of cohabitation soon appeared. The Mudejars of Granada revolted in 1499, and official ‘tolerance’ vanished with the issuing in 1502 of a royal decree obliging all the Muslims of the kingdom of Castile to convert. By means of this forced conversion en masse, the Mudejars became ‘New Christians’ or ‘Moriscos’. In 1609, another royal decree called for their forced expulsion from the Peninsula.

Political, religious and legal pressures intended to suppress the special features of their identity prompted a great Morisco rebellion in Granada (1568–70) and resulted in the deportation of the bulk of the Moriscos of the former kingdom of Granada to Castile (a tiny elite of the Morisco nobility managed to become integrated into Christian society). Though many of the Morisco converts were undoubtedly now sincere Christians, within the Spanish monarchy suspicions about that sincerity persisted. The great fear was that most Moriscos were continuing to practise Islam in secret and thus constituted a kind of Muslim ‘Fifth Column’ in the heart of Spain, ready to provide aid to and request aid from the Ottoman empire. At the same time, the implementation of policies of ‘pureness of blood’ in Spain in this period hindered Morisco assimilation.
The *reconquista* and the Morisco community fed a large scale migration from al Andalus to North Africa. These Andalusí communities maintained a separate identity, with different degrees of social integration. One large contingent which came primarily from Extremadura settled in the port city of Salé, established what has been called a ‘corsair republic’ and had contacts with the Spanish monarchy. A military career or a life among the corsair fleets were common occupations of choice among the Andalusi emigrants. Perhaps it was in Tunis that the Moriscos managed best to integrate, for they ended up playing a key role in the prosperity of that city and also preserved for many years the peculiar traits of their identity, such as the use of *aljamiado*, Romance written in the Arabic script.

3 Marínids

<table>
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<th>Name</th>
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<td>'Abd al Ḥaqq</td>
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<td>'Abd al Ḥaqq (824? 869/1421? 1465)</td>
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4 Watṭāṣids

Muḥammad al Shaykh (876 910/1472 1505)
Muḥammad al Burtuqalı (910 31/1505 24)
Abu Ḥassun (931 2/1524 6), first reign
Abu ’l ‘Abbas Ahmad (932 52/1526 45), first reign
al Nasir al Qasri (953 5/1546 8)
Abu ’l ‘Abbas Ahmad (955 7/1548 50), second reign
Abu Ḥassun (957 61/1550 4), second reign

5 ‘Abd al Wādids

Yaghmurasan ibn Zayyan (633 81/1236 83)
Abu Sa’id ‘Uthman I (681 703/1283 1303)
Abu Zayyan I (703 7/1303 8)
Abu Ḥammu Musa I (707 18/1308 18)
Abu Tash’in I (718 37/1318 37)
MARINIDS
Abu Sa’id ‘Uthman II and Abu Thabit I (749 53/1348 52)
MARINIDS
Abu Ḥammu Musa II (760 91/1359 89)
Abu Tash’in II (791 5/1389 93)
Abu Thabit II (796/1393)
Abu ’l Hajjaj Yusuf (796 7/1393 4)
Abu Zayyan II (797 802/1394 9)
Abu Muḥammad ‘Abd Allah I (802 4/1399 1401)
Abu ’Abd Allah Muḥammad I (804 13/1401 11)
‘Abd al Rahman ibn Muḥammad (813f./1411)
Sa’id ibn Musa (814/1411)
Abu Malik ‘Abd al Wahid (814 27/1411 23)
Abu ’Abd Allah Muḥammad II (827 31/1423 7; 833 4/1429 30)
Abu ’l ‘Abbas Ahmad (834 66/1430 61)
Abu ’Abd Allah Muḥammad III al Mutawakkil (866 73/1461 8)
Abu Tash’in III (873/1468)
Abu ’Abd Allah Muḥammad IV al Thabit (873 910/1468 1504)
Abu ’Abd Allah Muḥammad V al Thabit (910 23/1504 17)
Abu Ḥammu Musa III (923 34/1517 27)
Abu Muḥammad ‘Abd Allah II (934 47/1527 40)
Abu ’Abd Allah Muḥammad VI (947/1540)
Abu Zayyan III (947 50/1540 3; 951 7/1544 50)
al Ḥasan ibn ‘Abd Allah (957/1550)
6 Naṣrids (Banū ‘l Aḥmar)

Muhammad I (629/71/1232 73)
Muhammad II (671/701/1273 1302)
Muhammad III (701/8/1302 9)
Naṣr (708/13/1309 14)
Ismaʿil I (713/25/1314 25)
Muhammad IV (725/33/1325 33)
Yusuf I (733/55/1333 54)
Muhammad V (755/60/1354 9), first reign
Ismaʿil II (760/1/1359 60)
Muhammad VI (El Bermejo) (761/3/1360 2)
Muhammad V (763/93/1362 91), second reign
Yusuf II (793/4/1391 2)
Muhammad VII (794/810/1392 1408)
Yusuf III (810/20/1408 17)
Muhammad VIII (El Pequeño) (820/2/1417 19), first reign
Muhammad IX (al Aysar) (1419 27), first reign
Muhammad VIII (El Pequeño) (1427 30), second reign
Muhammad IX (al Aysar) (1430 1), second reign
Yusuf IV (Ibn al Mawl) (1432)
Muhammad IX (al Aysar) (1432/45), third reign
Yusuf V (El Cojo) (849/1445f.)
Ismaʿil III (849/51/1446 7)
Muhammad IX (al Aysar) (851/7/1447 53), fourth reign
Muhammad X (El Chiquito) (1453 4), first reign
Saʿd (1454 5), first reign
Muhammad X (El Chiquito) (1455), second reign
Saʿd (1455/62), second reign
Ismaʿil IV (1462 3)
Saʿd (1463 869/1464), third reign
Abu ʿl Ḥasan ʿAlī (869/87/1464 82), first reign
Muhammad XI (Boabdil) (887/8/1482 3), first reign
Abu ʿl Ḥasan ʿAlī (888/90/1483 5), second reign
Muhammad XII (El Zagal) (890/2/1485 7)
Muhammad XI (Boabdil) (892/7/1487 92), second reign

Notes


27. O. R. Constable, Housing the stranger in the Mediterranean world: Lodging, trade and travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, Cambridge, 2003, 107ff.


49. The most important works on this subject are H. Ferhat, *Le Maghreb aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles: Les siècles de la foi*, Casablanca, 1993, and Cornell, *The realm of the saint*.


The post Almohad dynasties, al Andalus and Maghrib


Introduction

The Arab conquest of North Africa was a prelude to a series of developments that reshaped the western part of the ancient world and the way it was viewed. When the general ‘Uqba ibn Nāfi’ al Fihri, who was later to become the glorious eponym of numerous Saharan tribes, reached the Atlantic shores (shortly after 63/682), not only had the ‘westernmost’ part, al Magrib al aqsā, been discovered and included into the Islamic cosmos, but also the expansive energies of the advancing Muslim forces had been diverted to the north and south. Within a few decades the largest part of the Iberian Peninsula, al Andalus, was incorporated into the territory of the Umayyad caliphate and brought into direct contact with events along the southern Mediterranean coast and in its hinterland. From there, Muslim traders and pious travellers ventured southwards, at first through areas familiar to them from their Arabian background, and then beyond what was regarded as the confines of the inhabitable world. They explored regions where during a long and changeable process a new geographical and cultural segment arose for the Islamic oecumene. Most of these regions had been unknown to the ancient world. But unlike the Romans, who had shielded their provinces of Mauritania and Africa with a wall (limes) from unpredictable Berber tribes roaming the northern Sahara, the Arabs were concerned not with the protection of a civilisation but with the spread of a religion that eo ipso ignored boundaries. And, unlike the ‘opening conquests’ (futūh) achieved elsewhere by the Muslim armies against states and kingdoms, the Muslim penetration of the Sahara and its fringes neither required nor allowed organised military campaigns. From the very birth to the late fourth/tenth century, the adversaries that Muslim caravans ran into were local rulers, whose authority was restricted either to clusters of oasis settlements, or of nomadic tribal units that interlinked these settlements. Since none of the inhabited regions of the Sahara and downward
towards the great Senegal and Niger rivers was encompassed by the 400 mm isohyets of annual rainfall at that time, the economic basis of its population rested not on agriculture, but on oasis horticulture, cattle and trade.

It was along the axes of this trade that the first Muslim Arabs and proselytised Berbers advanced southward, setting up temporary trading posts at the routes’ intersections and bringing back with them as yet unheard reports of the ‘land of the blacks’ (bilād al sūdān). With these mostly anonymous records, Arabic historians and geographers enriched the knowledge they had inherited from Herodotus and Ptolemy. Until the mid ninth/fifteenth century, when Portuguese captains sailed along the Atlantic coast and up the Senegal and Gambia rivers, the history of the Sahara and the adjacent trans continental savannah belt remained an Arabic domain, i.e. was written in Arabic and seen from the specific angle of its Arabian compilers. Moreover, until the famous historian Abū ‘Ubayd al Bakrī finished his Kitāb al masālik wa’l mamālik, with its section on North Africa, in 460/1068 in Almería, not only were most of these authors of eastern origin, but they were also merely known for their archival skills of second hand narratives. With his Rihla, ‘Travels’, the Moroccan globetrotter Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Baṭṭūṭa (d. 770/1368 in Marrakesh), who travelled across the Sahara to the western Sudān between 753/1352 and 754/1353, contributed the first eyewitness account to this narrative historical tradition. Although a great deal of this written tradition sprang from locally reported experiences that were transcribed and fused with the various literary traditions, the historiography of the Sudān essentially remained an external affair for almost a millennium. The so called Timbuktu chronicles, composed within a few decades of the first half of the eleventh/seventeenth century, abruptly ended this autochthonous muteness and added a local and often puzzling perspective to this history. Inevitably, this specific genesis of Sudānic historiography produced a scale of historicity according to which myths and facts could not properly be separated. Only recently has the poor archaeological and epigraphic evidence of West Africa been seriously perceived as a valid source to counterbalance, or even decipher, the puzzles left behind by the literary text tradition.

Early contacts and settlements

The militant occupation of the urban centres in North Africa went along with a cumbersome spread of the Islamic faith and the Arabic language. Without the particular mixture of cooperation and resistance of the local Berber population, however, this goal could not have been accomplished, nor as
the earliest records attest the penetration of the Sahara. From the Nafūsa mountains in Libya to Sijilmāsa in the Moroccan west, various heterodox Islamic communities (predominantly Khārijīs of Ibāḍī or Ṣufī faith and dominated by Berber tribes) had installed independent regimes. From their centres, traders followed well known routes into the Sahara and established regular relations that suggest temporary Muslim settlements in and even south of the Sahara at a very early stage. In the east, the oasis of Zawīla in the Fezzan (Fazzān), to where ‘Uqba had already advanced, attracted Ibāḍī merchants from 144/761 onwards and developed into a small state that existed until the end of the sixth/twelfth century. From Zawīla, a forty day trip led through the oasis of Kawār, across the central Sūdān, to the kingdom of Kanem (Kānim) at Lake Chad (Kūrī), from where both the Nile (of Egypt) and the ‘Nile of Ghāna’ (the Niger) were thought to issue. In the second half of the third/ninth century, not only was Kawār inhabited by Muslims of partly Berber origin, but also Ibāḍīs had come to live in Kanem long enough to grasp the local language, probably Kanuri, and even to try their missionary skills on the local rulers. A century later, the defeated Hawwāra followers of Abū Yazīd Makhlād ibn Kaydād, who had rebelled against the Fāṭimids, withdrew en masse to the central Sahara. Abū Yazīd was born in Tādmakka (‘This is Mecca’), around 272/885. This town, which is situated in the mountains of Ifoghas (Adrār n Ifoghas) at the northern end of the Titlimsi valley that reaches the Middle Niger at the city of Gao (or Gaogao, Kawkaw), attracted merchants from the north and south and developed into a linchpin of trans Saharan trade. At Tādmakka, mainly salt mined by slaves in the neighbouring salt pans but also imported weapons and even horses were traded for gold, black slaves and leather goods. It linked the northern ports of this trade route, Ghadames (Ghadāmis), Wargla (Warjla), Tāhert and Sijilmāsa, from where the Mediterranean coast was supplied with sub Saharan goods, with the regions west and south of the Niger bend. An Ibāḍī chronicle tells the story of a certain Tamlī al Wisyānī who settled in Tādmakka, amassed a fortune and a treasury full of gold, and every year sent his zakāt (alms) of 5,000 dinars for the poor of his native town of Tawzar. The earliest unmistakably contemporary source of the Muslim population of Tādmakka is Ibn Ḥawqal, one of the few Arab geographers who himself travelled through the Maghrib and included his experiences in his Śūrat al ard (Picture of the Earth), completed c. 378/988:

As for the Banū Tānamak, the kings of Tādmakka, and the [Ṣanhāja] tribes related to them, it is said that they were originally Sūdān whose skin and complexion became white because they live close to the North and far from the land of Kawkaw, and they descend on their mother’s side from the
progeny of Ḥām ... They are the rulers, who combine leadership with learning, jurisprudence \textit{fiqh}, and political skill, as well as some knowledge of biographies and they are versed in traditions and history. They are the Banū Tānamak.\textsuperscript{6}

Virtually nothing is known of how these Banū Tānamak came into contact with Islam and its tradition of learning. It was, perhaps, the steady inflow of merchant immigrants from the north that had turned them \textit{genealogically} white and into Muslims. Tifinaq (Berber script) and Arabic inscriptions on cliffs and tombstones, the earliest of which date back to the year 404/1013\textsuperscript{f.}, leave no doubt about the existence of a heterogeneous Muslim community dominating Tādmakkat around the turn of the millennium.

Although dominant in the Arab geographical and historical literature, much less is known of the western parts of the Sahara until the time of al Bakrī. The (ancient) myths of gold growing like carrots in the sand or like fruits on trees, the ‘silent trade’ and its dreadful black agents did not leave much room for credible reporting. The earliest description connects Ghāna, this fabulous land of gold, with Sijilmāsa at the northern fringe (\textit{sāhil}) of the Sahara. From there, presumably Ibāḍī merchants also established regular contacts with Sūdānic partners of the Senegal valley. Literary and archaeological evidence attributes a major role in these trade relations, between the empire of Ghāna and the tribal Berber realms in the western Sahara, to the town of Awdaghusht, situated in the Mauritanian Tagānt, not far to the north west of Kumbi Śāliḥ, in all probability the capital of Ghāna. According to al Bakrī, shortly before 360/971 Awdaghusht had been subjugated by a ruler of the Berber tribe Ṣanhāja, which extended its authority over more than twenty ‘black’ king doms by making them pay the Islamic poll tax (\textit{jizya}). From the third/ninth century onwards, several of these Ṣanhāja and their rival Zanāta tribes, who controlled the routes through the western Sahara, had adopted Islamic features. The evident laxity of their faith, however, raised questions. At Awdaghusht a first ‘clash of cultures’ became apparent. Arabs and Berbers lived side by side, both at the expense of thousands of black slaves, under the precarious dependency on the Ghāna authorities. Ibn Ḥawqal, who visited Sijilmāsa, attested to these black African societies being deprived of religion and law and order. Various reports describe how Muslims, although enjoying highly respected consular roles and cultural immunities, nonetheless displayed ugly habits, in respect of both morals and religion. Furthermore, the Maghribi jurist Ibn Abī Zayd al Qayrawānī (d. 386/996) declared trade with \textit{biłād al sūdān} to be reprehensible (\textit{makrūḥ}). These voices echo the rather unorganised dispersion of ruthless, risk taking Muslim traders in the oases.
of the Sahara and the trading centres of the southern sāhil, where by the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century small Muslim communities, more or less disconnected, had come into existence. Their domestic and religious bonds to their native towns remained strong, their proselytising efforts poor. Survival in such an isolated diaspora demanded concessions. The Almoravid movement that set out around 426/1035 to combat these concessions was to do much more than that.

The Almoravid reform movement and the rise of ‘Islamic’ kingdoms

The splendid successes of the Almoravid movement in North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula have somehow covered up its Saharan origin and far reaching repercussions on the Islamisation of the Südān. Within forty years (Awdaghush and Ghāna c. 468/1076) the veiled Ṣanhāja camel riders, the dreaded mulaththamūn of the Arabic sources, brought the western Sahara under their control and then disappeared from the West African map as abruptly as they had appeared. This short lived political success and its lasting impact on the modes of Islamic self articulation in the Südān cannot be explained without the characteristic fusion of nomadic mobility and religious austerity that the movement was based upon. Wondrous stories are told about how Ṣanhāja pilgrims were transformed by North African Mālikī scholars into rigid believers and ideological leaders. ‘Abd Allāh ibn Yāsīn, son of a Jazūla mother of Ghāna, was one of them. He managed to unite a confederation of Ṣanhāja tribes, among them partly Islamised and neophyte Gudāla, Lamtūna, Jazūla and Masūfa, under a reformist message that was vividly depicted in the following description of his newly founded headquarters at Aratnannā: all dwellings of the ribāṭ (hence ‘al Murābiṭūn’) were to be of equal height; lying, drinking and music were forbidden; neglect of prayer and improper behaviour were punished with the whip and the bride price was made affordable for everybody. Religious and social reform went hand in hand. Its legal reference was the Mālikī school of law; its operational field was West Africa. The Almoravid movement set off what ended ultimately in the complete orientation of the Südān towards the Mālikī rite. Later reported ‘conversions’ to Islam, in reference to the people of Gao around 471/1078f., may simply refer to conversion from Ibadism to Mālikism.

‘Abd Allāh himself set the example for another central notion in West African Islam. He withdrew to the desert, refrained from consuming meals of legally doubtful origin, and wore the šīf, the woollen garment of the Sufis.
Thus the figure of ‘al Murābiṭ’ entered the scene. The maraboutism of both medieval and modern Islam in Africa tells the story of the thorough Africanisation with a French accent of this figure.

Even when the short political adventure of the Almoravids ended, their influence continued to work. Their Ṣaḥāja followers, Judāla in the south, Masūfa in the east, entered regions that had hitherto come into contact with Islam only superficially, or not at all. South of the Senegal river, the king of Takrūr together with his people, the sedentary Tukulor and the adjacent nomadic pastoralist Fulbe, converted to Islam. So did the king of Malal, who was fascinated by the magical powers of a passing Muslim scholar (mallam), although his Mandingo speaking common subjects were not. Both kingdoms formed part of Ghāna which did not recover from the Almoravid attack. All that can be gathered from the hearsay stories collected over the next two centuries and combined with the earlier reports in the Arabic sources points to a slow expansion of the Muslim faith among the Fulbe, Malinke, Bambara and Dyula populations in the regions between the rivers of Senegal, Volta and Upper Niger. Islam was thus imported into the areas from where the much coveted gold and cola nuts were exported.

The rise of the empire of Mali in the late seventh/thirteenth century must be seen in the light of this steadily expanding system of economic and social relations between the savannah and forest regions in the south of Mali, and the growing trading centres of Walāta, Timbuktu, Gao, Tādmakkat and Takaddā along the southern fringe of the Sahara. To the west of Timbuktu were the Ṣaḥāja tribes of Madāsa and Masūfa, and to the east the Tuareg Berbers who controlled the salt mining and organised the profitable exchange of goods with their Südānic counterparts. Trade and religion intermingled. Profit depended on legal security, communication and the mutual acceptance of cultural norms. The prosperity of the empire of Mali rested on the integration of Islamic norms and the consequent opening up to the wider Islamic world.

Mali and Timbuktu

Although merely a lonesome lantern in the enduring darkness of the history of Islam in West Africa, the Riḥla (Travels) of Ibn Baṭṭūta furnishes essential clues to the understanding of what happened before and after his visit of Mali in 753 4/1352 3. He set off from Sijilmāsa, crossed the western Sahara and after passing through Walāta (Iwālāta) entered Mali at Zāghārī, ‘a big village inhabited by traders of the Südān called Wanjarāṭa with whom live a company of white men who are Kharijites of the Ibaḍī sect called Ṣaghānaghū. The whites who are Sunnīs of the Mālikī school are called by them tūrir [‘white man’ in Mandingo].’
Later, when telling anecdotes of his visits to Gao and Timbuktu (Tunbuktu), he takes up the point of the cohabitation of black and white Muslim communities. Among the latter, odd habits regularly stir his bewilderment: women and men, even a judge (qādī), behave indecently; instead of the paternal, the maternal line dominates hereditary rules; Muslim dignitaries address the kings at court rituals, and pagan poets, side by side with a khatīb, a ‘spokesman’, take part in Muslim festivals. His observations in the Sūdān are illuminating. After all, he spent more time down south at Kābara (Diafarabe?), Zāgha (Diakha?) and Niani at the upper course of the Niger, than anywhere else in Mali. ‘The Sūdān’, he wrote,

possess some admirable qualities. They are seldom unjust, and have a greater abhorrence of injustice than any other people. Their sultan shows no mercy to anyone guilty of the least act of it. There is complete security in their country . . . They do not confiscate the property of any white man who dies in their country, even if it be uncounted wealth . . . They are careful to observe the hours of prayer, and assiduous in attending them in congregations, and in bringing up their children to them. If any one of them possesses nothing but a ragged shirt he washes it and cleanses it and attends the Friday prayer in it. Another is their eagerness to memorize the great Koran . . . Among their bad qualities are the following: The women servants, slave girls and young girls go about in front of everyone naked, without a stitch of clothing on them . . . Then there is their custom of putting dust and ashes on their heads as a mark of respect . . . Another reprehensible practice among many of them is the eating of carrion, dogs, and asses.8

On his way back via the oasis of Tuwāt to Sijilmās, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa left Timbuktu on a camel’s back (100 mithqāl, about 430 g of gold, for a horse was too much for his purse) with a caravan that transported 600 slave girls to Takkadā and Aīr. From there, different desert routes led north to Ghadames, the Libyan coast and, probably, even east through Kanem to Egypt.

The geopolitical orientation of Mali allowed, for the first time in West African history, a direct flow of goods and ideas from the rainforest regions to the Mediterranean and vice versa. This might explain the ‘Rex Melly’ on the Mappa Mundi of 739f./1339 drawn by the Mallorcan cartographer Angelino Dulcert. A few years later, the venerated poet architect Abū ʿIshāq Ibrāhīm ʿal Sāḥili’ from Granada was buried in Timbuktu, next to a merchant from Alexandria. The Mansa kings of Mali maintained diplomatic relations with the Moroccan Marīnids and the Mamlūk sultans of Egypt. A century later, facing the ascent of the Songhay, they even requested assistance from the Portuguese. Mali claimed a seat in the concert of powers and did so by posing
as an Islamic dynasty and rule. In the external Arab sources less in the Rihla
this portrayal is mirrored by the gleam of the gold trade, and pilgrimage
transferred to the Islamic heartlands. When in 724/1324 Mansa Mūsā I (d. 737/
1337), the fourth imperial pilgrim of Mali after Barmandāna, Ulī and Sākurā,
went to perform the pilgrimage (ḥajj) rituals in Mecca he left his country with
one hundred camel loads of gold. He returned in debt. But his generosity
made the exchange rate of gold in Egypt drop 12 per cent for a period of twelve
years.
Mūsā’s reservation to prostrate himself before Sultan Mālik al Nāṣir while
whispering ‘I make obeisance to God who created me’9 reflects the status
Islam had gained in Mali, both at court and among the population. Alongside
pagan office holders, Muslims, whether white or black, were installed as khaṭīb
or qādī. The continuous extension of Mali authority over the Middle Niger
the ‘Zaas’ (or Zuwās), the local Songhay kings of Gao, were finally subdued by
the end of the seventh/thirteenth century and the Tukulor of Takrūr as well
soon afterwards incorporated fairly diverse Muslim communities into the
empire. Oral traditions circulated among the Wolof in which their king, Jolof,
was converted to Islam by the Almoravids. The first Europeans to set foot in
this region were impressed by Muslim counsellors and diviners at their courts.
Most of them were foreigners: Znāga (i.e. Ṣānḥāja), Arabs, Tukulor and
Mandinke. These two latter groups represented a diffusely growing black
Islamic population under the rule of Mali. Among the Tukulor, conversion to
Islam was closely connected to the Torodbe (sing. Torodo), zealous Muslims
of different social status and ethnic origin. Their particular social and religious
function regrouped them into family clans who later contributed decisively to
the spread of Islam among the rural populations along the Niger, some
distance into Hausaland. Quite similarly, the Mande speaking Dyula of
Soninke origin from the Volta basin were organised in clerical lineages.
Their urban based lifestyle, however, focused on trade and teaching. Owing
to their activities during the second half of the eighth/fourteenth century, the
route from the Arkan forests, one major source of the Mali gold, was opened
to Jenne (old Zuburu) and thus connected to the trans Saharan trading centres
on the Niger.
This shift immediately affected the fate of Walata and Timbuktu, roughly
equidistant from Jenne and the salt pans of Taghāza, and of Gao and Kūkiya,
the old Songhay capital and eastern terminus of this spreading network. The
riverbanks, where Ṣānḥāja and Tuareg clans had started to settle, were
becoming the main arena of distribution. There, local and long distance
trade fused, attracting groups from every direction and creating a new type
of political, economic and spiritual centre. Timbuktu was the first town to profit from this. Originally not more than a nomads’ summer camp, it appears in 776f./1375 as ‘Tenbuch’ on the Catalan Atlas of Charles V, drawn by Abraham Cresques. Traders from Walâta, Mali’s northern entrepôt, moved east to Timbuktu. From Jenne, Soninke merchants from Diakha and Kâbara turned north to the river, where lucrative contacts were expected.

The story of the subsequent rise of Timbuktu, from a Masûfà settlement to the most glorious medieval centre of Islamic learning in the Sahel belt, is almost exclusively told by external sources. Their very nature purports a perspective that conveys more mysteries of an ‘Islamic city in Africa’ than it reveals of historical details sufficient to make possible an internal view of the organisation of the city and its development.\textsuperscript{10} Certainly, trade was its backbone. With the exchange of gold, slaves, salt, horses and weapons, fabulous fortunes were accumulated. And soon, ‘much business [was] done there in selling coarse cloth, serge and fabrics like those made in Lombardy’, as the Florentine traveller Benedetto Dei records from his visit in 874f./1470.\textsuperscript{11} Even more crucial than trade seems to have been the common subscription to the tradition of Islamic learning, which contributed more to the integration of the city than any other factor. By the ninth/fifteenth century, Timbuktu was compactly built. The Main Mosque, Jingerebir, probably founded by Mansa Mûsà after his return from pilgrimage in 725f./1325, played a major integrative role, equalled only by the Sankore (‘white lords’) Mosque constructed later, in the second half of the ninth/fifteenth century, in the northern quarter of the city. The denominations of the mosques, the main forums for interaction among Muslim inhabitants and scholars alike, seem to imply again an ethnic segregation. Early references to immigrant scholars and their families, however, suggest a rather geographical set up. From the west, mainly from Walâta, Soninke, Şanhâja and Fulbe may have settled in one ward, while later incoming Şanhâja, Tuareg and Barâbish were drawn to the Sankore quarter despite the fact that there, initially, ‘black’ scholars, presumably Soninke and Wangara, set the tone. The city’s growth under Malian rule rested considerably on that ethnic and linguistic intermixture, and on the Islamic institution of judgeship, the \textit{qadà’}, which ultimately became the main administrative and political function. Patrician families of scholar notables and merchants of different origins alternately provided the office holders. The Malian sovereignty, as represented by the Timbuktu koy (‘king’), was reduced to military defence, namely against Mossi attacks from the south. By 836f./1433, Timbuktu, at that time led by the Südârî scholar and \textit{qâdî} Muğammad Modibo al Kâbarî, or by one of his pupils of the Aqît family, and assisted
by the powerful Tuareg chief Akil (Akillu) of the Maghsharen, revoked the Malian supremacy. Until 873/1468 the city preserved a partial independence. The alliance between the military ‘over lordship’ of the Tuareg and the spiritual authority of the qāḍī clans of the Masūfa Aqīt and the Tuareg And Ag Muḥammad combined power, wealth and learning. The quasi autonomous existence of the ‘city state’ of Timbuktu was abruptly ended by the inexorable rise of the Zaas. Sometime at the beginning of the century, they had moved their royal residence from Kūkiya to Gao. This strategical move was directed against the already weakening supremacy of the Mansas. A series of conquests followed that ultimately amended the entire stretch of river constituting the Middle Niger, inhabited by predominantly Muslim populations, and the trade passing through its western reaches including the ‘golden’ axis Jenne Timbuktu to the Songhay heartland south of Gao. In 872/1468f. Timbuktu was violently taken by the Songhay king Sunni ‘Alī Beri (reigned c. 868 98/1464 92). The city now entered the first of two sharply different phases under Songhay sovereignty, as distinguished by the principal sources for this period, the *Timbuktu chronicles*. While Sunni ‘Alī’s reign is depicted as harsh, alien and near pagan, Askiyā al Ḥājj Muḥammad’s and his successors’ rule (c. 898 999/1492 1590) is described as the era of a new order in which Islamic legitimacy and authority was rightfully secured, by accommodating Muslim scholars and clergies in and outside Timbuktu, the cradle of our chronicles’ authors.

The Songhay empire and the Africanisation of Islam

The rise of the Sunni Zaas and Askiyās of Gao was accompanied by a complex shift of emphasis in Sūdānic Islam. Geographically it moved eastwards, thereby establishing new proximities to regions that hitherto had been only superficially touched by Islamic influences, in particular the vast hinterland between the Lower Niger, the River Benue and Lake Chad. More significant, however, was the shift, albeit ephemeral, of Islamic self understanding from uniting socio culturally fragmentised minorities, to its assertion as an imperial ideology. In retrospect, both processes are captured in the repercussions of the trip of a certain Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al Karīm al Maghīlī (died c. 910/1505f.). He was a Berber preacher, whose missionary zeal led him from the Algerian oasis of Tuwāt to Takkadā, Katsina, Kano and Gao, shortly before the end of the century. Wherever he passed through, he, or the pupils he left behind, propagated a twofold call (*da’wa*), in letter and in spirit: the contemporary kings and rulers of the Sūdān had come to abuse Islam and rely on the political
and spiritual support of venal scholars (‘ulamā’ al sū’). Restoration of an Islamic order and individual salvation from hell could only be brought about by re-erecting justice (‘adl), purifying and renewing religious practice (tajdīd), and leading a jihad against rebels (bughāt), false believers and apostates (murtaddūn), and all unbelievers (kuffār). The details of this ‘reformist’ propaganda that centred around the concept of jihad are contained in a catalogue of ‘replies’ al Maghili composed for Askiyā Muḥammad at his court in Gao.\textsuperscript{12}

Al Maghili’s project may be summarised as an ‘Islamic revolution from above’. All written sources more or less support the impression that Askiyā Muḥammad’s coup d’état in 898/1493 against Sunni ‘Ālī, as well as the former’s subsequent Islamic reform policy, was associated with this project. In actual fact, the transition from Sunni ‘Ālī’s, the ‘mixer’s’, rule to the ‘just government’ of al amīr al ḥājj Muḥammad Askiyā, seems to have been less drastic. In Gao, and especially in its sister city Saney, as well as in Kūkiya, small Muslim communities had been settling for almost half a millennium. Local Arabic epigraphy witnesses their growing importance for, and intermingling with, the old Songhay dynasties. Islamic insignia, both at court and in architecture, are well attested. In contrast, the thinness of the Islamic veneer beyond the urban centres, south and east of the riverside territories where the first Askiyās rapidly expanded their empire, caused severe conflicts for the ruling elites. Perhaps the most sensitive conflict for the implementation of an Islamic government arose from the necessary distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim. According to Islamic law, the sharī‘a, the former could not be enslaved. Slave trade, however, had become increasingly important for the Songhay economy. Therefore, Islamicity had to be defined in terms of orthodoxy. The laxity our sources ascribe to Sunni ‘Ālī and his government did not disappear under the Askiyās. Pagan shrines continued to be venerated and rapacious governors to be accused of unjust taxation; Askiyās themselves were accused of leading an immoral life or only poorly concealing their deficient Islamic faith. The legally sanctioned specific treatments of different types of believers and unbelievers respectively allowed for an inherently Islamic social stratification. At the top were the much cherished and powerful groups of Muslim scholars, often identical with, or related to, local governors and rich merchants. At the bottom, the slowly progressing Islamisation of the Sūdānic peasantry offered much prey for this policy. In an angry report on the problem of the illegal enslavement of ‘black’ (sūdān) African people, Aḥmad Bābā al Timbukti (963\textsuperscript{a} 1056/1556–1627), the most prominent descendant of the Aqīt family, still refers to the propaganda al Maghili had spread. Two centuries later, the leader of the Fulbe jihad in Hausaland, ‘Uthmān dan Fodio,
even copied the ‘Replies’ of al Maghīlī into his proper jihad treatise *The Lamp of the Brethren* (*Sirāj al ikhwān*). The role the ‘ulamā’ of Timbuktu, Jenne and Kābara was entrusted with by the Askiyā administration reflects the Islamisation of the Songhay state. Power was disputed in terms of Islamic norms. Al Maghīlī’s propagation of the *mujaddid* (‘renovator’) and his mission, and his distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims, were grounded in the collective self image of constituting a sovereign part of the Islamic *umma*. It fostered the bacillus of the ‘dubious’ Muslim, the most motivating force in the future expansion of Islam, indigenous in the Südān; and it provided ambitious leaders of dubious *couleur* with sharp tongued ‘reformist’ arguments.

**Kanem-Bornu and Hausaland**

Al Maghīlī had also visited Kano. He ordered King Rumfa to cut down the sacred tree under which the city’s mosque had been erected: the symbolic end of the symbiosis of Islam and traditional religion, of Muslim leadership and divine kingship. At about the same time, *Mai* (king) ‘Ali Ghaji ibn Dunuma (reigned c. 874/909-1470/1503) of Bornu who, on his way to Mecca, met with al Suyūṭī in 889/1484 in Cairo, took the title *khalīfa* as did Askiyā Muḥammad a few years after him and launched a reformist campaign against ‘dubious’ believers in the western neighbourhood.

Quite obviously, the long lasting isolation of these regions from the west had come to an end. The occasional appearance of Islamic titles, Arabised proper names and contemporaneously with the ascent of the Askiyās of Gao ‘reformist’ ideas point to the increasing integration of the Chad region into the Islamic traffic of the Niger bend, from the seventh/thirteenth century onwards. Oral traditions, on the other hand, claim that Kanem, situated at the north eastern end of Lake Chad, became Muslim in the sixth/twelfth century under the legendary Arab hero Sayf ibn Dhī Yazan, who was, in fact, the hero of a mythical romance of later Mamlūk times. A few remarks of Arab geographers, among them the Andalusī Ibn Sa’īd (d. 685/1286), confirm the presence of Muslim scholars at the court of the ‘Sayfids’ at Njimi, but also their tensions with the non Muslim traditionalists. In a letter to the Mamlūk sultan of Egypt, a Kanemi *ma‘* complains in 794/1391f. that Arabs were enslaving his Muslim citizens. Frictions like these may have led to the exodus of the *ma‘* and his followers to the south western end of the lake, and to the foundation of Bornu around its capital Ngazar(ga)mu (Birnin Gazargamu).

The thriving state of Bornu was facing a pagan south, Bagirmi, which was their hunting ground for slaves, and the territory of the Hausa states in the
west. About the time of the rule of ‘Ali Ghaji, some of the Hausa city states (birni, pl. birane) extracted tribute to Ngazargamu. In Kano and Katsina, kings (sarki, pl. sarakuna) ruled over a feudal society. Excluded from both military service and court rituals, Muslim immigrants, Fulbe Torodbe (Hausa: Toronkawa) from Mali, had settled in rural enclaves and introduced a modest tradition of Islamic learning in the region. The Hausa chronicle, moreover, tells the story of Abū Bakr, the son of a Wangara trader from Mali, who became the religious teacher of the Kano Prince ‘Umar ibn Kanjeji (r. 813 24/1410 21). Returning from a longer stay in Bornu, this Abū Bakr convinced his royal pupil to abdicate and withdraw from his sinful courtly life to a life of repentance (tawba). Politically as well, Kano remained under the domination of Bornu. From there the trade routes led up north and from there government patterns were imitated. As in Bornu, the rulers of Kano kept state councils and highly decorated eunuchs; but they also welcomed shuraﬁ, Muslims of noble (Arab) blood, and other Muslim immigrants. Anecdotes belonging to the first half of the tenth/sixteenth century allow us to conclude that Islamic nomenclature was officially accepted at the kings’ courts. Individual conversions seem to have occurred at the upper level and at the fringes of the society, but the majority adhered to the traditional religious belief and performed the sacred rituals.

Thus, the Sahelian world was, by the late ninth/fifteenth century, almost entirely ruled over by rulers who, to varying degrees, took advantage of the legitimacy of Islamic institutions and legal norms provided for their pursuit of authority. The Islamic features we hear about have demonstrative functions and served as promising ingredients in a traditional ceremonious despotism. But they undoubtedly prepared the way for the syncretistic practices that were spreading among the populations and nourishing the coming Muslim reform movements.

Notes
9. Reported by the sultan’s chief of ceremony (mīḥmandār), in Corpus of early Arabic sources, 270.
10. E. N. Saad, Social history of Timbuktu: The role of Muslim scholars and notables 1400 1900, Cambridge, 1983, 2 3.
PART II

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EGYPT AND SYRIA 
(ELEVENTH CENTURY UNTIL 
THE OTTOMAN CONQUEST)
Bilād al-Shām, from the Fāṭimid conquest to the fall of the Ayyūbids
(359 658/970 1260)

Anne-Marie Eddé

The geo-political background

The old divisions of ājnād or military government created by the Umayyads and completed by the ‘Abbāsids were still being used in the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century by the Aleppan writer ‘Izz al Dīn ibn Shaddād to describe Bilād al Shām: these were Jordan, Palestine, Damascus, Ḥimṣ and Qinnasrīn. The border areas, called ‘awāṣīn, between Antioch and Samosata formed the northern limit of this area, a border which changed over the centuries. The Euphrates was, in theory, the eastern border, but from the fourth/tenth to the seventh/thirteenth century, northern Syria and Upper Mesopotamia (Jazīra) remained closely linked. Politically the two areas were often under the same power or different branches of the same family, while, economically, a highly important trade route linked Baghdad to the Mediterranean through the Euphrates valley to Aleppo and then Antioch. Other routes went from Mosul to Aleppo passing through the western part of Upper Mesopotamia.

Southern Syria and Palestine were also linked to Baghdad by the Euphrates route as far as Raḥba, then across the steppe to Palmyra, Damascus and the Palestinian coast. Damascus was closely linked to Egypt by the Mediterranean coast and the south of Palestine. When the settlement of the Franks in this area made this route difficult, it was temporarily replaced by the Sinai route, allowing access from Syria to Egypt via Transjordania. Bilād al Shām therefore extended on the coast as far as al ‘Arīsh on the Egyptian border, while inland Ayla on the Red Sea was usually considered to be its furthest limit.

All this area was geographically diverse with, from the west to the east, the coast and its fortified ports, the double chain of mountains and its depressions, and finally the area where the arid steppe meets the large cities of the interior (Damascus, Ḥimṣ, Hama, Aleppo). This geographical variety often explained
the different kinds of political development. At times the ports fulfilled the role of border points or commercial hubs open on to the Mediterranean. This was where Fāṭimid domination lasted longest. Then, in the first half of the sixth/twelfth century, this same coastal fringe, easily accessible to Crusader reinforcements, was to become the most resistant nucleus of the Latin states. The mountains, which were more inaccessible, attracted Christian and Muslim ascetics. Throughout the fifth/eleventh century to the seventh/thirteenth they were a place of refuge for groups such as Maronites, Druzes and Ismāʿīlīs, who guarded their independence, and who were at times rebellious. The cities in the interior and the steppe, for their part, battled to retain their autonomy. They avoided occupation by the Franks, and remained open to Iraq and Mesopotamia, the source of armed reinforcements and commercial goods.

From the beginning of the Fāṭimid domination to the fall of the Ayyūbids, Bīlād al Shām was never controlled by one single political power. Whereas the Fāṭimids dominated southern Syria, Palestine and the coast as far as Tripoli from the end of the fourth/tenth to the end of the fifth/eleventh century, Fāṭimids, Byzantines and Mirdāsids were locked in a struggle for power in northern Syria. From 463/1071 the Saljuq Turks held a large part of Syria, but never managed to establish themselves long term on the coast and in Palestine. Jerusalem changed hands between the Saljuqs and the Fāṭimids, whereas the main ports on the coast remained theoretically under Fāṭimid domination until the beginning of Frankish rule. The latter, who moved into the area from 491/1098, radically changed the political map of the region. Bīlād al Shām was divided into three parts of varying importance. The Saljuqs and their epigones held on to the great cities of the interior; the Fāṭimids held on to Tyre and Ascalon only, and had to relinquish them to the Franks in 518/1124 and 548/1153; at the height of their power, the Franks controlled the territories to the north and north east of Aleppo, on both sides of the Euphrates, and all of the coastal cities from Antioch to Gaza, Palestine and Transjordania as far as Ayla. From the middle of the sixth/twelfth century onwards, the Franks lost more and more of their territories, first to the Zangids and then to Saladin, until by the end of the century all they controlled was a slim coastal strip from Antioch to Ascalon.

The population of this area reflected both its ancient heritage and the various migrations accompanying the Byzantine, Fāṭimid and Saljuq conquests. The descendants of the Syrian populations prior to the first/seventh century and those of the Arab conquerors had often mixed over time and it was not always easy to distinguish them. The Arabs were still dominant amongst the Bedouins who still led a nomadic or semi nomadic lifestyle: the
Banū Kilāb in northern Syria played a vital political role in the fifth/eleventh century; the Banū ‘Uqayl, who had a great influence in the middle of the fourth/tenth century in central and southern Syria and in the Jordan valley, then disappeared from these areas to regroup in northern Syria and Jazīra; the Banū Kalb, settled between Palmyra and Ḥīmṣ in the fourth/tenth century, were also present in the oasis of Damascus and the Ḥawrān plain a century later; the Banū Ṭayy, to whom belonged the influential Banū ’l Jarraḥ family, were numerous in Palestine. The inhabitants had mixed feelings towards these Bedouins: they accused them of brigandage and treachery, but often called upon them to run their cities, fight alongside them, lead them into the desert or sell them livestock.

Berbers arrived with the Fāṭimids. They were associated with the armies they fought in and were generally fairly poorly accepted by the inhabitants. Westerners (Maghāriba from North Africa and al Andalus) who left their country to settle in Syria in the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries, pushed out by the Christian Reconquista or simply attracted by the intellectual life of the cities of the Near East which they passed through on their pilgrimage route, were a different story. Mainly holy men and scholars, they contributed actively to the cultural and religious life of the Syrian cities. Even more numerous were the Kurds and Turks who moved into Syria from the fifth/eleventh century under cover of the Saljuq invasion, and particularly in the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries. In northern Syria and Upper Mesopotamia there were many Armenian Christians, who had arrived either in the wake of the Byzantine conquests at the end of the fourth/tenth century, or following Philaretos, a Byzantine general of Armenian origin, who governed the Amanus region independently in around 1078. The Saljuq invasion of Greater Armenia in 456/1064 also caused many Armenians to go into exile in the northern Syria area and above all in Cilicia. Finally a small colony of Armenians had settled in the fifth/eleventh century in Jerusalem where they still had a bishop in the sixth/twelfth century. The Franks were to enjoy significant support from all these groups of Armenians.

There were a small number of Nestorians in Damascus and Aleppo until they disappeared from Syria in the sixth/twelfth century. The Maronites were still living in the mountains of Lebanon, but there were many more Melkites and Jacobites. The fact that they lost many of their bishoprics in the fourth/tenth century did not stop them from continuing to play an important role in the Syrian administration until the end of the fifth/eleventh century and the Mirdāsids employed several Christian viziers. But at the time of the Crusades the Christian communities living in Muslim territory saw their situation
deteriorate progressively and the existence of the Latin states had much to do with this. Sometimes suspected of complicity with the Franks and subject to reprisals following violence towards Muslims, the Christians were also victims of the strong Sunnî reactions of the sovereigns who, like Nûr al Dîn or Saladin, wished to apply religious law more strictly, and particularly the regulations concerning the Christians and the Jews. In spite of these crises, however, they were able to live in relative peace until the end of the Ayyûbid period. The arrival of the Mamlûks, on the other hand, was to mark the beginning of a much more difficult period for them.

There have been many studies on the sources available for this period, and it will suffice here to refer to them. Not many archives have come down to us, apart from a few decrees, diplomas, legal certificates and various items of correspondence. The famous documents from the Geniza in Cairo, which provide so much information on Egypt and the medieval Mediterranean, contain scattered information on Syria Palestine, particularly on the coastal ports. Documents have also been discovered in the Great Mosque in Damascus, now kept in Istanbul, of both a public and a private nature, and are still in the process of being published. Local searches and new archaeological digs (including under the sea in some coastal ports) regularly provide their share of archaeological, epigraphic and numismatic discoveries. At present, however, it is largely narrative sources, of which a great many have survived, that provide most of our knowledge about medieval Bilâd al Shâm: universal chronicles, dynastic and regional histories, biographical dictionaries, accounts of journeys and geographical works, legal, administrative, political and religious treatises. Most of these were written by Muslim authors, but Christian sources have also come down to us in Arabic, Syriac or Armenian, not to mention the numerous Latin sources covering the period of the Crusades.

The Fâṭimids in Syria-Palestine: a struggle for domination

Fâṭimid domination in Damascus lasted a little over a hundred years, from 359/970 to 468/1076. In Aleppo, where the Fâṭimids were confronted by the Byzantines, they only managed to gain control in 406/1016, and sustained their domination for less than fifty years. Throughout Bilâd al Shâm they came up against numerous Arab tribes who allied themselves by turn with the Egyptians or their enemies, according to their interests, much of the time resorting to banditry and the pillage of caravans. There was, however, an
important difference distinguishing the Arab tribes of northern Syria and Upper Mesopotamia from those in southern Syria and Palestine. The former tried to establish states which respected the traditional Islamic institutions (for example the Banū Numayr in Ḥarrān and Edessa, the ‘Uqaylids in Mosul and especially the Mirdāsids in Aleppo) whereas the latter, who included the Banū ’l Jarrāḥ from the tribe of the Banū Ṭayy, were drawn more into pillage and plunder than administration.

From 359/970 to the end of the reign of al-‘Aziz in 386/996

The conquest of Syria Palestine was difficult from the start. Yet it was a divided country. Southern Syria was under the control of a governor representing the small Egyptian dynasty of the Ikhshīdids (323 58/935 69), and northern Syria was still under the domination of the Ḥamdānids (332 94/944 1004). The death of the prince of Aleppo, Sayf al Dawla, in 356/967, the weakness of his successors and the disappearance of the Ikhshīdids, swept away by the Fāṭimids, had weakened Syria which was from that time onwards eyed as much by the Byzantines from the north as by the Arab tribes and the Qarmaṭīs of Baḥrayn in the south. The intervention of the latter, the weaknesses of the Egyptian army and probably a lack of preparation go a long way to explain the difficulties for the Fāṭimid conquest. In 359/969f. a first expedition commanded by Ja’far ibn Falāh succeeded in seizing Ramla, Tiberias and Damascus. But the Ikhshīdīd governor of Damascus called upon the Qarmaṭīs, supported by the Būyīds of Baghdad, who took on Ja’far and killed him in 360/971. In 363/974 a second expedition was sent to Syria but the Fāṭimids were unable to establish a lasting presence in Damascus, which was finally given up to a Turkish adventurer called Alptegin in 364/975.

The Fāṭimids, then, did not only meet resistance on religious grounds. The peoples of southern Syria and Palestine were indeed mainly Sunnī, as was the Ikhshīdīd governor, but their Qarmaṭī allies were descended from the same Ismā‘īlī family as the Fāṭimids, and the Būyīds who supported them were Twelver Shi‘īs who recognised the authority of the Sunnī caliph of Baghdad. Rather than reflecting ideological opposition, Syrian resistance was a political conflict between an Arab and Persian east and an Arab and Berber North Africa, between well established local militias and an army seen as foreign.

Damascus and Palestine were nonetheless of great importance for the Fāṭimids. Even though hopes of using them as a base for the conquest of Iraq were gradually dwindling, control of this area remained no less essential to hold back the expansion of the Byzantines towards the south and to counter any attack from the east. Nor were they lacking in economic resources.
reason, the caliph al ‘Azīz (365 86/975 96), advised by his powerful Jewish vizier, a convert to Islam named Ya‘qūb ibn Killis (d. 380/991), was very interested in this region. His vizier’s recommendations reveal in outline Fāṭimid policy at this time: do not take action against the Byzantines as long as they do not attack, settle for a declaration of vassalage from the Ḥamdānids in northern Syria, and do not spare the Arab tribes in Palestine. In southern Syria, al ‘Azīz’s troops succeeded in taking back Damascus in 368/978 from Alptegin, a Turkish governor who had taken power there, but none of the Fāṭimid governors was able to bring order to the area.

In northern Syria, the Fāṭimids encountered even greater difficulties, coming up against the resistance of the Ḥamdānids of Aleppo and particularly from their Byzantine protectors. The latter had begun their great offensive in northern Syria in the middle of the fourth/tenth century and were trying to regain control of the lands lost more than three centuries before. From 351/962 to 371/981, they led several expeditions against northern Syria. They pillaged Aleppo in 351/962 and took Antioch in 358/969. The treaty and tribute they imposed on Aleppo had serious economic consequences for the whole area and all the Fāṭimid expeditions failed to make them withdraw.

So by the death of the caliph al ‘Azīz in 386/996, the Fāṭimids had succeeded in maintaining their domination in Syria as far as Tripoli, which had resisted all the Byzantine attacks, but inland they still had not taken Syria north of Ḥīmṣ. All their attempts in that area had met with the resistance of the Ḥamdānids, who, in spite of their Twelver Shī‘ī beliefs, seemed to prefer the Byzantine protectorate to Egyptian domination.

From the accession of al-Ḥākim to the death of al-Ẓahir
(386 427/996 1036)

The first fifteen years of the reign of al Ḥākim were marked in southern Syria and Palestine by several revolts by the urban populations and the Arab tribes. The conflict was no doubt inflamed by the internal divisions which arose in Egypt following the death of al ‘Azīz, between Orientals, led by Barjawān the tutor of the young caliph, and the Berbers under the command of Ibn ‘Ammār, who each wished to install a governor from their side in Damascus. The chiefs of the Damascene militias exploited this to take power in 387/997, but in the following year they were all arrested and exterminated by the new commander in chief of the Fāṭimid army in Syria, Jaysh ibn al Ṣamṣāma. This fierce repression put the activities of the urban militias on hold for more than twenty years and led the Damascenes to say that the death of Jaysh soon afterwards was a punishment from God.
In Tyre too, the Fāṭimid troops came up against the hostility of the disinherited population. In 388/998, the poor of the city and the ʿahdāṯ, led by a sailor by the name of ʿAllāqa, massacred all the Fāṭimid troops in the city. The rebels called for help from the Byzantines, who sent a squadron, but in vain. ʿAllāqa was defeated and sent to Cairo, where he was flayed alive, and a new governor of Tyre was appointed.

In the early years of the fifth/eleventh century, Damascus had a series of Fāṭimid governors who were dismissed almost as soon as they were appointed by a caliph who feared above all that they would take too much power. From 392/1002 to 401/1011 there were about a dozen. In Palestine between 401/1011 and 404/1013, the Fāṭimid army had to face a large scale revolt by the Banū ʿl Jarrāḥ Arabs and their chief Mufarrij ibn al Jarrāḥ. In 401/1011, the latter had the Fāṭimid governor of Tiberias and Ramla captured and decapitated, and pillaged Palestine with his men. He even attempted to install an anti caliph in the shape of the Ḥasanid amīr of Mecca, Abū ʿl Futuḥ al Ḥasan ibn Jaʿfar. Al Ḥākim recovered the situation by dividing his enemies. The revolt had lasted two years, but it ended in the Fāṭimids’ favour.

The reign of al Ḥākim also marked the beginning of Fāṭimid domination in northern Syria. In 399/1008, the death of Luʿluʾ, regent of Aleppo, who had rid himself of the Ḥamdānids in 394/1004, opened a new period of instability in northern Syria during which power was disputed between his son, al Mansūr, and the Arabs from the Banū Kilāb tribe, led by Ṣāliḥ ibn Mirdās, founder of the future dynasty of the Mirdāṣids. Al Mansūr, defeated by the Arabs, took refuge in Byzantine territory in 406/1016. The Fāṭimids used this as an opportunity to take control of Aleppo. There was de facto power sharing between the Kilabids, who controlled the flat country and the Fāṭimids who ran the cities. The Byzantines, who were tied to the Fāṭimids by a ten year truce, left well alone and even allowed the resumption of trade.

As regards religion, cities such as Aleppo, Tripoli or Tyre had a large Shiʿī population, but, like his predecessors, al Ḥākim did not attempt to impose the Ismāʿīlī doctrine on the whole population. Even if the qāḍīs of Damascus were essentially Shiʿī, throughout the whole Fāṭimid period they tolerated Sunnism and applied Shāfiʿī law to the population. There was therefore no great expansion of Shiʿīsm in Damascus, and the extent of Twelver Shiʿism in Aleppo was due more to the Ḥamdānids’ religious policy than the Fāṭimids’. This stance avoided clashes between Sunnīs and Shiʿīs, in contrast to the situation in Baghdad at the same time, and the revolts in Syria Palestine against Fāṭimid power rarely had religious or ideological origins.
There is fairly little known about the consequences in Bilād al Shām of al Ḥākim’s persecutions of Jews and Christians. Palm Sunday processions were banned in Jerusalem as everywhere else, and the most spectacular measure, without a doubt, was the destruction of the Holy Sepulchre in 400/1009. Other synagogues or churches were destroyed in Damascus and Palestine. Like their fellow believers in Egypt, the Christians and Jews of Bilād al Shām recovered their goods and rights at the end of the reign of al Ḥākim when he allowed them to practise their religion freely again.

Another consequence of the reign of al Ḥākim was the settling of Druzes in several areas of Syria and Mount Lebanon. From 407/1017 the members of this sect attempted to substantiate the divine nature of al Ḥākim, who they said had disappeared in 411/1021 but would return one day. Persecuted in Egypt, they found refuge in the south of Lebanon in the Wādī Taym Allāh at the foot of Mount Hermon, in Jabal Summāq in the north of Syria and in Ḥawrān south of Damascus. In 423/1032, the Druzes of Jabal Summāq proclaimed their faith openly and indulged in all kinds of excesses until the Byzantines of Antioch and the Mirdāsids of Aleppo joined forces to quell them, but the lack of sources about them gives us very little opportunity to trace their history in this period.

The disorder which followed the death of al Ḥākim in Cairo partly explains the political development of Bilād al Shām in the reign of his successor al Zāhīr (411 27/1021 36). The Arab tribes began to cause trouble in Palestine and launched more raids in 415/1024f. The Banū Kilāb, Banū Kalb and Banū Ṭayy acting in concert swore to chase the Fāṭimids out of Syria Palestine and to share the region out between them. The Cairo authorities, short of money, did not have the means to come to the aid of their governor of Palestine, the Turk al Dizbirī. Damascus, under siege, organised its resistance, directed by the civilian elites and the militias, allowing al Dizbirī to get the better of the Arabs. But this did not mean an end to the rebellion. In 420/1029, the Banū Ṭayy and the Banū Kilāb suffered another defeat, and the following year Ḥassān ibn al Jarrāḥ suggested to the Byzantine emperor that they form an alliance to attack Syria. When the expedition resulted in a Byzantine defeat north west of Aleppo, the whole of the Banū ‘l Jarrāḥ tribe returned to northern Syria and settled in the area of Antioch. Ḥassān did not return to Palestine until 433/1041 after al Dizbirī was thrown out of Damascus.

While the southern tribes were pillaging the countryside and cities, in northern Syria, Ṣāliḥ ibn Mirdās, leading the Banū Kilāb, was gaining a completely different reputation for the Arabs. Often praised for his courage and military skills, the Aleppans soon saw him as the only one capable of
bringing order back to their city. The Fāṭimid governor had been assassinated in 413/1022 and Șāliḥ settled definitively in Aleppo in 416/1025, founding the small Mirdāsid dynasty which governed northern Syria and the Middle Euphrates area more or less continuously for fifty years. In 416/1025, Șāliḥ controlled a considerable part of Syria and the Euphrates valley. But four years later his alliance with the Banū 'l Jarrāḥ against the Fāṭimids was to cost him his life in the battle of al Uqhūwāna, on the eastern shore of the lake of Tiberias. His two young sons Naṣr and Thīmāl shared his lands between them. It soon became clear, however, that the Mirdāsids could only stay in power by putting themselves under the protection of one of their powerful neighbours, the Byzantines or the Fāṭimids. In 422/1031, Naṣr, now ruler of Aleppo but unsure about the loyalty of his brother, opted to put himself under the protection of the Byzantines. The signing of this treaty allowed the Byzantines to regain Edessa and Jazīra and to tighten their hold on the Syrian coast.

The reign of al-Mustansīr, 427 87/1036 94

Between the accession of al Mustansīr and the arrival of the Saljuqs, northern Syria was governed most often by the Mirdāsids, who alternated between acknowledging Byzantine rule and Fāṭimid rule, sometimes both at once. When the Fāṭimids felt Aleppo escaping their grasp, they attempted to re-establish direct administration there but were unable to maintain it for very long. By the end of the reigns of al Z.āhīr and Roman III (d. 1034) there was a willingness on the part of all the parties, Byzantine, Fāṭimid and Arab, to negotiate on the question of Aleppo which had been a stumbling block, the two major powers having laid claim to it. In 428/1038, agreement was reached after the emperor Michael IV had advised Naṣr to recognise Fāṭimid sovereignty. A thirty year truce was signed between the Fāṭimids and the Byzantines, who also obtained the right to rebuild the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem.

However, the alliance that same year of the Mirdāsids of Aleppo with the Banū Numayr of Ḥarrān worried the Fāṭimid governor al Dizbīrī, who had just restored order in southern Syria and in Palestine and did not want to see too strong an Arab force re-form in northern Syria and Jazīra. Naṣr was killed in a battle and al Dizbīrī entered Aleppo where he found a warm welcome from a population hostile to the alliance between Mirdāsids and Byzantines. It was, however, a short lived victory. Suspected of personal ambition by the powerful Fāṭimid vizier al Jarjarā‘ī who was worried to see a Turk assuming too much importance in Syria, he was dropped by his army in 433/1041 and forced to leave Damascus. He died shortly afterwards in Aleppo, and nine
months later the Aleppans opened their gates to Thimāl, Naṣr’s brother, who received a certificate of investiture from the Fāṭimid caliph while at the same time obtaining the gratitude of the Byzantines, who granted him the title of magistros in exchange for an annual tribute.

In the following years the Fāṭimid posed Thimāl more problems than the Byzantines, with whom he renewed a ten year truce in 439/1047f. The Fāṭimid decline gathered pace after the death of the vizier al Jarjarāʾ in 436/1045. In that year, al Mustanṣir confirmed the investiture of Thimāl in Aleppo, but their relations remained strained. In 440/1048 and 442/1050, two attempted Fāṭimid expeditions failed, but the new investiture accorded to him by the caliph finally allowed Thimāl to govern his principality peacefully until 449/1057f. The growing difficulties of the Fāṭimid (the split with the Zīrīds, the failure of al Basāṣirī in Baghdad, the instability of the viziers) and the Byzantines, exposed to the first Turcoman raids, should have strengthened the autonomy of the Mirdāsid, had they not themselves been weakened by family divisions, particularly after the death of Thimāl in 454/1062. For the first time the Turcomans entered northern Syria as free men, called to the aid of one or another group. Faced with the powerful Saljuq Turkish army, the days of the little Arab Mirdāsid dynasty, weakened by divisions, by rivalries with other Arab tribes and by the Turcoman pillages, were now numbered.

While northern Syria was slipping away from the Fāṭimid for good, their authority in southern Syria and in Palestine had been weakening progressively since the death of al Dīzbīrī. The future vizier Badr al Jamālī, a freedman of Armenian origin, was appointed governor of Damascus for the first time in 455/1063, but very soon met with the opposition of the Damascus militias. At that time, only the cities of Saydā, Acre, Cesarea and Ascalon were firmly held by the Fāṭimid. Elsewhere, insurgent groups were multiplying. Ibn Abī Ṭaqīl, a qāḍī and merchant, made himself ruler of Tyre in 462/1070. The same year the qāḍī Ibn Ṭammār took control of Tripoli while in Damascus the Fāṭimid authority was still having difficulty in gaining the upper hand. Everything seemed poised for the area to fall into the hands of the Turcomans, whose numbers in northern Syria were constantly increasing.

Overview of the Fatimid period in Bilad al-Sham

Syria was not keen to accept Fāṭimid domination, which explains the period of great instability which followed. The Fāṭimid came up against strong popular resistance, particularly in Damascus, led by armed militias of young people (ahḍāth), put under the direction of a chief (raʾīs) who was often a member of the civilian elite but also sometimes, as in the case of al Qassām al Tarrāb, one
of the people. There has been much debate about the nature of these popular uprisings, which also occurred in Aleppo, Tyre and Tripoli. They were in any case very different from the communes in the west. These militias were chiefly made up of disinheriteds young men, sometimes peasants come into the city, mixed with gangs of ruffians and bandits, and found it all the easier to impose their rule, the weaker the central authority. Their main aim was to defend their city against a foreign invader, but as they were also guilty of numerous acts of pillage, they often lost the support of the urban elites who disapproved of the trouble they caused.

The failure of the Fāṭimids in Syria is also explained by their wavering towards the Byzantines and the muddled organisation of their administration. Each time a governor took too much power or independence, he was considered a threat and eliminated by the Egyptian authorities, which made it impossible to install a power capable both of opposing Byzantine expansion and of controlling the urban militias and the Arab tribes. The behaviour of the Bedouins, who were very unreliable and more interested in pillaging than in installing true political authority, did not help matters. This situation of permanent political fragility also played its part in making Palestine a place of refuge for opponents of the Fāṭimids.

In attempting to maintain its autonomy between its two powerful neighbours, the Byzantines and the Fāṭimids, northern Syria held on to its individuality. Under the domination of the Ḥamdānids and then the Mirdāsids, it tried to develop its links with the Jazīra and went in search of a protector, whether Christian or Muslim. The Fāṭimids never succeeded in imposing their authority in a lasting way and even when prayers were said in the name of the Fāṭimid caliph, this acknowledgement was most often little more than a pure formality. For their part the Byzantines were anxious to extend their control in northern Syria, in Jazīra and on the coast south of Antioch. They never aimed to govern Aleppo directly but settled for imposing their protectorate on it. They often responded to the rebels’ calls to Fāṭimid authority, but this never stopped them from trading or signing truces with their enemies when it was in their interest. The truce signed in 429/1038 opened up a new period in their relations with the Fāṭimids, which from that time became less contentious.

The numerous expeditions by both Byzantines and Fāṭimids had repercussions on patterns of population and economic development. They played a part in the depopulation of the limestone massifs to the south east of Antioch and made it a sort of frontier zone covered in fortresses and small forts. Economic life did not, however, grind to a halt in the whole of Syria as trade quickly flourished again following the truces. In the middle of the
fifth/eleventh century, the travel writings of Ibn Butlân and most of all Nāṣir i Khusraw give a very prosperous image of Syria. There are descriptions of cities where trade and craftsmanship flourished, well supplied with water, with multi-storey dwellings, surrounded by orchards and cultivated land. Cereals, olive trees, fig trees, date palms, sugar cane and various fruit trees are most often mentioned. Some products were exported, such as figs from Ramla, oil from the Jerusalem area, bitumen from the shores of the Dead Sea, copper cauldrons from Damascus and snow from Mount Lebanon, transported by ship to Egypt. The documents from the Geniza also mention sumach, oak apples and dried fruit being exported from northern Syria to Egypt. All these goods were sent by sea or by the coastal route rather than via the interior of Palestine, for reasons of security. Muslim, Jewish and Christian pilgrims also travelled to Jerusalem and Hebron, to the great profit of the Muslim authorities who made large amounts of money in taxes from this. 7

The Saljuq domination in Syria and its consequences

The Saljuq Turks moved into Bilād al Shām in increasing numbers between 457/1064f. and 478/1085f., bringing in their wake significant changes in population, political customs and religious institutions. But they never managed to impose a unified political power. Divisions very quickly gained the upper hand and created a situation favourable to the settling of the Franks in the area.

The stages and modalities of the conquest

The weakening of the Fāṭimids and the divisions of the Mirdāsids in northern Syria created conditions favourable to the establishment of the Saljuqs, who progressed in ways they had already used in Iran and Anatolia. Renowned for their warrior qualities, the Turks were often called upon by princes or amīrs wanting to fight their rivals. The first free Turks to enter Syria in this way were Turcoman chiefs, usually dissenters, who moved temporarily into northern Syria with their troops before going on to plunder Byzantine territories, pillaging everything in their path. Sometimes the Muslim princes who called on their services granted them iqṭāʾs which allowed them to settle long term in the area. Others returned regularly to plunder the countryside and villages, as far as the outskirts of Antioch. The Christian and Byzantine populations were the first to suffer this, but the Muslims did not escape the pillaging.

The Turcomans worked their way down in the same way into southern Syria and the coast, exploiting the Fāṭimids’ inability to defend their possessions
and the wish for independence of the cities they controlled. In 463/1071, Badr al Jamālī himself entrusted a Turcoman called Atṣūz with the task of fighting the Bedouins of Palestine. Believing himself to have been poorly rewarded for this, Atṣūz then occupied the whole of Palestine but without rejecting the Fāṭimid khūṭba and from there launched raids in the direction of Damascus.

The year 463/1071 incontestably marked a turning point in Saljuq progress, not only because the Turcomans succeeded in occupying Palestine, but also and above all because the army of the sultan Alp Arslān was victorious in the decisive battle of Manzikert against the Byzantines, a victory which was to open the doors of Anatolia to the Saljuqs. In northern Syria, Māḥmūd ibn Naṣr decided it would be wise to recognise Saljuq sovereignty in 462/1069f., and from then on prayers were said in the name of the ‘Abbāsid caliph al Qā‘im. Some weeks before the battle of Manzikert, Alp Arslān obtained complete submission from Māḥmūd who was therefore left in Aleppo. But the end of his reign he died in 467/1074f. notable for his cruelties, was not glorious and his sons no longer had the strength to stand up to the ‘Turks.

When Alp Arslān’s successor, the sultan Malikshāh, handed over Syria as an anapage to his brother Tutush, in 471/1078, the latter started by seizing Damascus and Palestine. Badr al Jamālī had been recalled to Egypt in 466/1073f. by the caliph al Mustansīr who had made him a vizier, and Damascus, exhausted by years of poverty and famine caused by the ravages of the Turcomans, was no longer able to resist. Atṣūz, who had returned to the ‘Abbāsid khūṭba in 465/1072f., seized the city in 468/1076 but, two years later, fearing a counter offensive from Badr al Jamālī, decided to hand it to Tutush. The latter took the opportunity of installing himself there and eliminating Atṣūz. He then distributed the iqṭā’s between his amīrs. Jerusalem was handed to the Turcoman Artuq and was passed on to his two sons Suqmān and Ilghāzī in 484/1091.

From 471/1078 to 473/1080f., northern Syria was once again pillaged by Turcoman troops. In 473/1080, Muslim ibn Quraysh, ruler of Mosul, entered the starving city of Aleppo without a struggle. An Arab and a Shi‘ī, he had recognised the caliph of Cairo at the beginning of his career, but in 458/1066 had accepted the alliance offered by Alp Arslān. With him, Aleppo passed even more closely into the Saljuq sphere of influence. However, his ambitions would soon lead him to seek an alliance with the Fāṭimids in an attempt to seize Damascus, something which he never managed to achieve.

The year 479/1086 saw the arrival in northern Syria of Malikshāh, in an attempt to restore order in a region where everyone was trying to expand at
his neighbour’s expense. In 477/1084 Antioch had fallen into the hands of the Saljuq prince of Anatolia, Sulaymān ibn Qutlumush. He had got into conflict with Muslim of Aleppo and killed him in battle in 478/1085, before himself being killed by Tutush who wanted to seize Aleppo. But faced with his brother, Tutush had no choice but to concede. Malikshāh then appointed Yaghi Siyān governor of Antioch, and put his faithful mamlūk, Aq Sunqur, an ancestor of the Zangids, in charge in Aleppo. After the difficult years northern Syria had experienced, Aq Sunqur’s government, which brought order and security, was unanimously appreciated.

The consequences of the Saljuq occupation

The establishment of the Saljuqs in Bilād al Shām had important demographic, political and religious consequences. The Turks were far from unknown in Syria. Already under the Fātimids, Turks had been governors of Damascus and the elite of the Egyptian army included many Turk soldiers, originally slaves. But with the Saljuqs, for the first time, free Turks settled in large numbers in the country.

How many Turks settled in Palestine? This is difficult to say. The numbers of Turks of an age to fight in Damascus in the first half of the sixth/twelfth century has been estimated at around 4,000 to 6,000, excluding the Turcomans living outside the urban centres, who were often accompanied by their wives and children. The number of Turks in Syria continued to grow in the sixth/seventh/twelfth thirteenth centuries. In Aleppo, they first settled in the southern suburb of al Ḥāḍir, towards the end of the Mirdāsid period. Their numbers increased considerably during the reigns of Zangi and, particularly, Nūr al Dīn. The assimilation of these new additions to the population, mainly consisting of warriors, occurred only very gradually. For example, Zangi had his troops camp south of the city of Aleppo, withholding the right to build permanent housing, for fear of destabilising a population already weakened by the difficult conditions imposed by the Franks. Under the reign of Nūr al Dīn, they were allowed to settle long term to the south west of Aleppo, in a suburb called al Yārūqiyya, after their chief Yārūq, and at the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth century a third suburb populated mainly by Turks appeared, called al Zāhiriyya after the Mamlūk settlement which grew up there. In addition to these groups of settled Turks there were also Turcoman tribes who through out the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries continued to live more or less nomadic lives in the steppes to the east and south of Aleppo.

The Turks were not the only ones to accompany the Saljuq expansion. Many Iranian and Iraqi scholars and administrators moved into Bilād al Shām
in their wake, where they contributed in no small degree to the resurgence of Sunnism. Despite nearly a century of Faṭimid domination in Damascus, and the appointment of Shī‘ī qādis, Sunnism and particularly Shāfi‘ism had held strong amongst the population. All the Saljuqs had to do was reinforce it. From the time they took over Damascus, many jurists and specialists in hadith came from the eastern provinces to teach in the great mosque of the Umayyads and in the new law colleges (madrasas) introduced by the Saljuqs. Iranian influence was apparent in the area of Sufism but also in administration. Tutush had an Iranian vizier, Abū ‘l Qāsim ibn Bādī‘ al Iṣfahānī, whose brother, Abū ‘l Najm, was successively vizier of Riḍwān in Aleppo then of Ṭughtegin in Damascus. In this city, at the time of the Saljuqs and the first Būrids, all the viziers were of Iranian origin.

In addition to the madrasas, the Saljuqs introduced new political customs, starting with the Turkish conception of power according to which all the members of the Saljuq family had the right to govern. This is why the apanages granted to the sultan’s brother were important: Tutush is a good example of this. It was at this time that the atabegs appeared, military chiefs who acted as tutors to the sons or nephews of the sultan, who administered his territories and tried to prevent any kind of rebellion against the sultan. The atabegs fairly soon tended to assume a lot of power. After the death of the sultan, an atabeg often married the mother of his pupil and founded his own dynasty. This was the case, for example, in Damascus with Ṭughtegin, the atabeg of Duqāq, the son of Tutush, who founded the dynasty of the Būrids (497 549/1104 54) after the death of Duqāq. Finally, in all their territories, the Saljuqs strengthened and widened the system of iqtā‘s which allowed for the amirs to be remunerated through the granting of fiscal revenue attached to an area or region. With this came the custom of giving the holders of iqtā‘ greater and greater concessions, with correspondingly increasing powers.

One of the frequently discussed questions of contemporary Western historiography is the fate of non Muslims under the Saljuqs. On the eve of the Crusades, Christian propaganda had it that the Christians were massacred by the Turks, to encourage Western knights to go to the aid of their brothers in the East. Should it be deduced that the situation of the Christians changed with the arrival of the Saljuqs? Most historians today now agree that the flood of Turcomans into the area led to pillaging and massacres, of which the Christians were the first victims, but definitely not the only ones. It is true that at a time of invasion and anarchy, when the state responsible for their protection was disappearing, the dhimmis were the most vulnerable. Occasionally they were also victims of the dispoilments of other Christian
communities. But once the period of invasion had passed and order re established, the Christians regained their normal status of dhimmī under the Saljuqs. In Aleppo, this return to normal is borne out by descriptions of the Arab governor, a vassal of the Saljuqs, Muslim ibn Quraysh, and by the often quoted account of Matthew of Edessa about the meeting in 1090 between Malikshāh and the Armenian catholics. The Armenians, like other Christians in the eastern part of the empire, were probably not unhappy to escape Byzantine religious harassments once and for all. If the arrival of the Saljuqs seems to have put an end to the important role of the Christians at the head of the Syrian administration, it was less to do with any sort of religious persecution than because the new leaders were often accompanied by Iraqi or Iranian administrators. In fact, it was above all the Crusades, from the sixth/twelfth century onwards, that brought about a worsening in the position of the dhimmīs before the arrival of the Mongols, which brought even worse consequences for them.

Rapid division
Divisions soon appeared in Saljuq Bīlād al Shām, heightened by the political system (the importance of apanages, the growing power of the atabegs, very powerful muqtas). The system established by Malikshāh in 479/1086 did not last long. His death in 485/1092 was followed by numerous struggles in the eastern provinces of the empire. Tutush, believing that he had a claim to power, got into conflict with his nephew Barkyaṟūq (r. 485/1092-1105). He seized Aleppo and a large part of the Jazīra in 487/1094, but after his death in 488/1095 Syria broke away for good from the central Saljuq power in the East and his two sons Duqāq in Damascus and Rīḍwān in Aleppo, although officially vassals of the sultan, in reality governed independently. They constantly fought over power in Syria while in Antioch the governor Yaghī Siyān played on their rivalry to govern in his own way. When Rīḍwān fell out with his atabeg, Janāḥ al Dawla, the latter declared himself independent in Ḥīms. All these divisions within the Saljuq family itself allowed the amīrs and local civilian elites to maintain their independence in cities such as Tripoli (Ibn ‘Ammār) or Shayzar (Ibn Munqidh).

In Upper Mesopotamia, there were also deep divisions: the Artuqid Turks governed Sarūj and Mārdīn. In Mosul, another Turkish amīr, KARBūqā, had taken power. Small Armenian domains had also grown up in the north of Syria and Upper Mesopotamia: Thoros in Edessa and Gabriel in Malatya. All these circumstances made Bīlād al Shām and Jazīra all the riper for the settlement of the Franks.
Bilād al-Shām and the first Crusades

The arrival of the Crusaders was perceived in the East as one episode among others in the long series of wars in Bilād al-Shām. Arab authors never wrote a separate history of the Crusades: rather they included the account of conflicts with the Franks in their chronicles or local histories in the same way as other significant events of the period. Even though it took them some time to understand the true motivation of the Crusaders, the Muslims could not have been unaware that their own political and religious divisions were depriving them of any means of resistance. Some scholars and jurists attempted to remind them of this when the Franks arrived. But it was several decades later with the arrival of the Zangids that this unity began to take shape and bear its first fruit in the jihad. Bilād al-Shām on its own could not hope to regain its lost territories, and the only possible reinforcements had to come from the east (Upper Mesopotamia, Iraq or Iran) or from Egypt. If the first successes were due to the concerted efforts of northern Syria and Upper Mesopotamia, it was the Syro Egyptian unity achieved in 564/1169 by Nūr al-Dīn’s troops that allowed Saladin to find the financial and human resources for his jihad.

The settling of the Franks and the first Muslim reactions

The Crusader armies arrived at the gates of Antioch in autumn 490/1097, after passing through Constantinople and, not without difficulty, crossing Anatolia. Baldwin, brother of duke Godfrey of Bouillon, made his way towards Upper Mesopotamia, where the Armenian prince Thoros handed over Edessa to him in Rabi’ I 491/February 1098. Several days later, Thoros was killed in an uprising incited most probably with the approval of Baldwin, who seized power and founded the county of Edessa.

After a siege of more than seven months, Antioch was taken by the Franks on 29 Jumādā II 491/3 June 1098 and handed over to the Norman, Bohemond of Taranto, who became the first prince of Antioch. In Muḥarram 492/December 1098, the area of Ma’arrat al Nuʿmān fell into their hands and the inhabitants were put to the sword. The Crusaders then took nearly six months to reach the walls of Jerusalem, which was besieged and captured in a blood bath on 23 Shaʿbān 492/15 July 1099. The massacres carried out in the holy city were deeply imprinted in Muslim memories. The Jews were not spared, many being burnt alive in the synagogue. The two holy places of Islam, the Dome of the Rock and al Aqṣā Mosque, were converted one into a church and the other into a royal residence, subsequently a Templars’ residence from 1118 onwards. Godfrey of Bouillon with the title of Advocatus (Defender) of the Holy
Sepulchre installed a Latin patriarch in Jerusalem. He died the following year and was succeeded by his brother Baldwin of Edessa, who had himself crowned king of Jerusalem in Șafar 494/December 1100.

The First Crusade was over, but the Latin states took several more years to expand and establish themselves. With the support of the fleets from Genoa, Pisa and Venice and the help of the Crusaders who continued to arrive in the East, the Westerners gradually seized all the coastal cities between Antioch and Jaffa. Cesarea and Arsur (494/1101), Acre (497/1104), Beirut and Șaydâ (503/1110) were annexed to the kingdom of Jerusalem, which also extended into the interior particularly to the south of the Dead Sea where the Franks took control, as far as Ayla, of the route towards the Red Sea. In the north the count of Toulouse, Raymond of Saint Gilles, took Tortosa in 495/1102, but died in 498/1105 without taking Tripoli, which did not fall to the Franks until 502/1109. His son Bertrand claimed his inheritance and took charge of the principality of Tripoli, the fourth and final Latin state in the region. In 503/1110 he seized the Krak des Chevaliers which guarded the road to the Hims breach and was to become one of the most powerful fortresses in the area. Bohemond and especially his nephew Tancred extended the principality of Antioch towards Cilicia in 494/1101 and Latakia in 496/1103: this area was at the time under Byzantine control, and was to become a bone of contention between Franks and Byzantines for many years.

The pressure on Aleppo increased, as it was threatened simultaneously by the Franks of Edessa and Antioch. The principality of Edessa expanded progressively north of Aleppo and finished by covering, on both sides of the Euphrates, a large territory which included, at its largest, fortified sites as important as Ma‘ăš, Bahasnă, Samosata, ‘Ayntăb, Tall Băşhir, al ڕavandăn, Edessa, Sarūj and al Bira. The Franks of Antioch, for their part, expanded along the eastern bank of the Orontes and thus came as far as the gates of Aleppo, forcing the city to pay them a heavy tribute in 504/1110f.

The Franks’ success was unexpected, given their lack of numbers and unfamiliarity with the terrain. It can mainly be explained by the deep divisions between Muslims mentioned above. For this reason the Fātimids exchanged embassies with the Crusaders at Antioch and used the opportunity of the Saljuqs’ difficulties in northern Syria to recapture Jerusalem in Ramaḏān 491/ August 1098. The Saljuqs themselves were divided between those of Iran and Iraq, and those of Anatolia. The first group fought amongst themselves over the succession to the throne and the second were taken up by their struggle against the dissident Turks, the Dānishmandids, living in the north of Cappadocia. Many rivalries also set the Syrian and Mesopotamian governors
at odds. While Antioch was being taken by the Franks, when the amīr of Mosul, Karbūqā, arrived to help at the gates of the city, Riḍwān, suspecting him of having his sights set on Aleppo, refused to join forces with him and Karbūqā had difficulty imposing order over his own Turcomans. Equally, when the Franks were working their way towards Jerusalem, the governors of the regions they passed through often preferred to negotiate and pay them a tribute than to unite and fight them.

Very few contemporary Arab sources covering these events have survived, making it difficult to discover the first Muslim reactions to the arrival of the Franks. The earliest chronicles to relate the events of the First Crusade date from the middle of the sixth/twelfth century, at a time when the spirit of the jihad was having a revival. Some lamentations by poets such as al Abiwardī (d. 507/1113) and Ibn al Khayyat (d. 517/1123) have survived, denouncing the Frank invasion and calling on Muslims to respond. More important was the treatise written in Damascus by a lawyer called al Sulami (d. 500/1106). Even though this little work did not reach the audience its author hoped for, it certainly reveals the reaction of a section of the Damascus religious circles in the wake of the First Crusade. In it, the Crusade is put into context within the movement of Christian expansion in the Mediterranean, particularly in the Iberian Peninsula and Sicily. The author explains the success of the Franks as resulting from Muslim divisions, the lack of enthusiasm for the jihad but also the decline of religious observances. He advocates therefore a return to Islam to regain victory, an idea which was to spread and influence the politics of Nūr al-Dīn several decades later.

Yet the reactions of the states were still weak or ineffective in spite of the losses and the now well established status of Holy City which Jerusalem enjoyed. Al Sulami’s contemporaries do not seem to have perceived as clearly as he did the true motives of the Franks. They occasionally confused them with the Byzantines against whom their jihad had waned over the centuries. The local princes were only concerned to preserve their power. The atabeg Ṭughťegin was the one who fought most bravely against the Franks to preserve supplies to Tripoli and communications with Egypt and Arabia. As a result he acquired the image of a brave fighter in the eyes of his contemporaries and he even became a legendary figure in the Frankish epic literature of the thirteenth century CE under the name of Huon de Tabarié. His activity was limited, however, and he himself was forced to sign truces requiring the sharing of harvests in the territories west of Damascus. He failed to save either Tripoli in 502/1109 or Tyre in 518/1124 and did not hesitate, in 508/1114f. for instance, to ally himself with the Franks against other Muslims
when his own interests were at stake. As for the Fāṭimids, after having vainly launched several expeditions against the Franks both by land and by sea, they attempted nothing more after 510/1117. Greatly weakened and with only a meagre fleet, they were probably not too unhappy to see the Turkish threat recede thanks to the presence of the Franks.

As for the ‘Abbāsid caliph of Baghdad and the Saljuq sultan the only ones capable of mobilising the necessary forces for the jihad they seemed little interested in Syrian affairs and much too occupied in settling their internal conflicts. The Aleppans sent them a diplomatic mission to Baghdad in 504/1111, but they only gained inadequate help. The sultan’s army sent to Syria under the command of the governor of Hamadhān largely failed because Riḍwān of Aleppo refused to join forces with it. Another expedition was organised in 508/1115, led this time by the governor of Hamadhān, but it was no more successful as it came up against a Frankish Muslim alliance of Roger of Antioch, Țughteqin of Damascus, Lu’l’u’ of Aleppo and the Turcoman amīr Īlghāzī.

All these conflicts had their consequences for the people. The eastern Christians usually preferred to stay in areas under Frankish occupation, and some were employed as interpreters or secretaries. Many Muslims, on the other hand, and a certain numbers of Jews, were massacred in the first conquests, if they had not been imprisoned or enslaved. Others fled towards Damascus, Aleppo, Egypt or even the less important Syrian cities. This immigration happened off and on until 518/1124. After this there was a sort of modus vivendi between the Muslims and their new masters, particularly on the land where they were more numerous than in the cities, continuing to cultivate their land and pay tribute to the Franks. But immigration did not stop completely, as shown in the well known example of the Palestinian Banū Qudāma family who left Frank dominated Nablus in the middle of the sixth/twelfth century for Damascus. Some scholars and administrators found administrative or religious posts in the court of the Būrīds in Damascus. Amongst them were an ancestor of the historian Abū Shāma (d. 665/1268) and poets mainly from Tripoli or Ma’arrat al Nu‘mān. On the whole they helped to strengthen Sunnism in Damascus, but there were also some Shī‘īs from Tripoli and Jabala. Many of these refugees never returned to their country of origin.10

Towards territorial unity and the rise of the jihad under the Zangids

The Turcoman amīr Īlghāzī, ruler of Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn, two important cities in Upper Mesopotamia, came to power in Aleppo in 512/1118, marking a turning point in the revival of the jihad. Until then Aleppo had been reduced to
relying on its own resources as all the reinforcements arriving from the East were seen as suspect by its leaders. In taking control of Aleppo, İlghāzī began an alliance between northern Syria and Upper Mesopotamia which gave him his first great victory in 513/1119 following the battle the Franks called the Field of Blood (Ager Sanguinis). İlghāzī drew great prestige and a new image of fighter for the faith, but he was still not completely successful. The Turcomans in his army who had come with him from Jazīra were hoping only to go back there once they had got their plunder, thus ruling out any prompt action against the Franks. The core of İlghāzī’s states was still in Upper Mesopotamia, Aleppo being only a dependency in his eyes, and he himself was more of an adventurer than a man of state capable of mobilising a population in favour of the jihad.

After his death in 516/1122, Aleppo went through another period of instability which lasted until Zangi ibn Aq Sunqur, the son of the former Saljuq governor of Aleppo, came to power. During the first years of his reign, Zangi (r. 522 41/1128 46) devoted much time to disputes over the succession to the Saljuq sultanate and the struggle against the Artuqids of Upper Mesopotamia who could at any moment cut off the route between Aleppo and Mosul. But from 1130 he turned his attention towards Damascus, still ruled by the Būrīd dynasty. Būrī (r. 522 6/1128 32), the eldest son of Tughtigin, had succeeded his father. Damascus then went through a period of great political instability marked by the assassination of many leaders, which could have been to Zangi’s advantage. But his two attempts to take the city in 529/1135 and 534/1139f. resulted in failure. Unur, the amīr of Damascus, agreed only to recognise him as sovereign and to mention his name in the khutba, but this did not prevent him, in the interests of preserving his independence, from calling for the help of the Franks on several occasions.

The capture of Edessa by Zangi in 539/1144 marked a new stage in the history of relations between Franks and Muslims. Since İlghāzī’s victory over the Franks in 513/1119, propaganda in favour of the jihad had been increasing, as shown in the honorary titles given to the governors of Aleppo, praising their action as combatants in the jihad. Zangi embodied the hopes for Muslim reconquest and showed that victory was possible as long as the sovereign acted with zeal and determination. In 539/1144, the conditions were right for him. On the Frankish side, there was deep enmity between Raymond of Antioch (r. 1136 49) and the count of Edessa Jocelin II (r. 1131 49). In the kingdom of Jerusalem, the king Foulques died in November 1143. Baldwin III was still a child and his mother Melisende was regent. On the Byzantine side, John Comnenus, who had planned a campaign against Aleppo with the help of
Antioch, died in 1143 and his son Manuel was too involved in ensuring his succession to go off immediately to war. After a four week siege, Zangi seized Edessa on Christmas Eve 1144. The consequences of this victory were immense. In terms of land, the whole eastern part of the county fell into the hands of the Muslims, thus ensuring the security of communications between Aleppo and Mosul. In terms of ideology, Zangi gained great renown and received many gifts and honorary titles from the caliph. The propaganda for the jihad increased and took a new turn as the Muslims realised that the reconquest of all the territories, and especially of Jerusalem, was now possible, while in the West the fall of Edessa led to the Second Crusade.

The death of Zangi, in 541/1146, came too soon for him to realise his ambitions. Mosul and the territories of Jazīra came back to his eldest son Sayf al Dīn while Aleppo and northern Syria fell to Nūr al Dīn (r. 541 69/1146 74). Although the younger, the latter quickly imposed himself as leader of the Zangid family and continued his father’s work. He succeeded in reunifying Aleppo and Damascus, then Syria and Egypt by putting an end to the Fātimid caliphate. More than his father, he displayed his religious zeal and his wish to restore Sunnism, thus joining the efforts of the military men to those of the religious classes, and the pursuit of the jihad to re-establishment of religious law.

Propaganda for the jihad developed greatly under his rule and was expressed in various forms: sermons, narrative texts, treatises praising the merits of Jerusalem, inscriptions on monuments and even the construction in Aleppo of a minbar which would be placed in the Aqsā Mosque in Jerusalem on the day it was reconquered. The image of the sovereign fighting for the faith and anticipating martyrdom as an example to the people spread everywhere.

On the ground, the year 543/1148 saw the offensive of the Second Crusade, led by the king of France Louis VII (r. 1137 80) and the German emperor Conrad III (r. 1138 52). Rather than attack Nūr al Dīn’s growing forces in northern Syria, the Crusaders made the mistake of besieging Damascus in the hope of cutting off relations between Syria and Egypt, and in doing so deprived themselves of their best ally in the area. The amīr of Damascus succeeded in negotiating cleverly by waving the spectre of the arrival of Nūr al Dīn and exploiting the divisions between the Franks of the West and the Franks of the East. Thus the Crusade ended in a fiasco, after only four days of combat, and before Nūr al Dīn had even had time to get there.

The following year, Nūr al Dīn attacked the principality of Antioch and was the victor at the battle of Inab (Șafar 544/June 1149) in which Raymond of Antioch was killed. The truce he concluded with the Franks eased the military
pressure on Aleppo by pushing back the border between the two states towards the Orontes. In Jazīra he finished what his father had started by, in 541/1146, taking back Edessa, where the Armenian population had been in revolt following the death of Zangi. The Armenian Christians and Jacobites had been spared the first time around, but this time they were massacred. With the help of the Saljuq sultan of Anatolia, Nūr al Dīn then reconquered in 545/1150f. the rest of the county of Edessa on the western bank of the Euphrates.

Nūr al Dīn was aware that the jihad could only have a chance of succeeding once Muslim reunification had been achieved, and made this his prime objective. Damascus fell into his hands in 549/1154 and became his new capital. Then the anarchy which prevailed within the Fāṭimid dynasty allowed him to contemplate the conquest of Egypt. This was undertaken by one of his Kurdish officers Shīrḵūh, assisted by his nephew Ṣalāḥ al Dīn (Saladin). Egypt was a tempting prize for Muslims and Franks alike. The former saw it as an opportunity to put an end to the Shīʿī caliphate in Cairo and to find reinforcements for their jihad, while the latter wanted to avoid above all being caught in a vice between Nūr al Dīn’s states and to get their hands on the very rich economic potential of the country.

The Muslims, led by Shīrḵūh, and the Franks, under the command of Amalric, king of Jerusalem, faced each other there between 559/1164 and 564/1169, over three successive campaigns. Finally in Rabi‘ II 564/January 1169, Shīrḵūh entered Cairo. He was chosen by the Fāṭimid caliph al ‘Āḍid (r. 555 67/1160 71) as his vizier, but as he died two months later he was replaced by his nephew Saladin who governed Egypt on behalf of Nūr al Dīn. In 567/1171 while the caliph was on his deathbed, Saladin re established the ʿAbbāsid khūṭba, thus putting an end to two centuries of Fāṭimid domination and unifying Egypt and Syria under the same political and religious authority.

The revival of Sunnism

The Saljuqs strengthened Sunnism in Syria, but this did not mean that Shi‘ism had disappeared. On the one hand, there was still a majority of Twelver Shi‘is in Aleppo, and on the other, a new extremist Ismā‘īlī sect appeared, called the Bāṭinis, but also known as the Assassins (Ḥashīšiyya). The latter opposed the Ismā‘īlī Fāṭimids as well as the Twelvers and the Sunnis. The sect had grown up following a problem of succession to the Fāṭimid caliphate after the death of al Mustansir in 487/1094, and followed a policy of assassinating religious or political figures to achieve its aims. In Aleppo they found firm support from
Riḍwān. Chased out of Aleppo after Riḍwān’s death in 507/1113 by the Aleppans who were very hostile to their activities, they managed to settle around 521/1127 in Damascus where they were tolerated by Tughtegin. But there too they were massacred in a violent popular uprising in 523/1129. From then on the Assassins carried out their activities from their fortresses in the mountain areas between the Orontes and the coast.

One of the ways in which the Sunnī elites tried to combat Shi‘īsm and any other doctrine opposed to theirs was in a policy of founding madrasas. The Shi‘īs in Aleppo had understood this when they violently opposed the building of the first of these in their city between 516/1122f. and 522/1128. When Nūr al Dīn took power in 541/1146 there was still only this one Shāfī‘ī madrasa in existence. He and members of his entourage had a great number built in most of the cities of Syria and Jazīra. At his death, there were eight in Aleppo and about twenty in Damascus. Other establishments more specifically aimed at teaching the traditions of the Prophet (dār al ḥadīth) were also founded.

In the wake of the Saljuqs, Sufism had grown in a spectacular fashion. The great master of Sufism, al Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) spent several months in Damascus between 488/1095 and 490/1096f. and one of the zāwiyas of the Umayyad Mosque was named al Zāwiya al Gharbiyya or al Ghazāliyya to commemorate his stay in the city. In Damascus a more popular form of Sufism was developing, very well illustrated by the figure of shaykh Arslān, who died towards the middle of the sixth/twelfth century. A cobbler by trade, this shaykh was initiated into the mystic way and settled with his disciples in a Sufi lodge (khānqāh) built for him by Nūr al Dīn. Many miracles were attributed to him and after his death his tomb, outside Bāb Tūma, was revered, as it still is today. Nūr al Dīn, it was said, was a great admirer of his and is said to have wished to be buried with one of his relics.

More and more institutions accommodating Sufis were established in Syria. They were already known in Damascus where two of this kind of establishment (duwayrāt) were in existence even before the arrival of the Saljuqs. But it was mainly in the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries that they developed under Iranian influence under the name of khanqāh or ribāṭ. In Aleppo, the people were at first very suspicious at seeing them built, perceiving them as a threat, a Persian innovation linked to reinforcing Sunnism. This also explains their growth under the rule of Nūr al Dīn. The Iranians continued to play a leading role in this until the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century. Thus, in Damascus, the role of leader of the Sufis was taken practically without interruption by the Iranian family the Banū Ḥamawayh al Juwaynī, from the end of the sixth/twelfth to the beginning of
the eighth/fourteenth century. The Sufi establishments which saw such
growth under the Ayyūbids also acted as charitable institutions, housing the
poorest people (such as single women and those without income who had
decided to devote themselves to prayer and worship), who received food and
shelter.

Saladin and the Ayyūbids of Syria

The Ayyūbids inherited the traditions of their predecessors, but also had to
adapt to a new regional context. The jihad reached its height with the victories
of Saladin over the Franks. Yet his successors, divided and threatened by the
advance of the Khwarizmians and the Mongols, often came to terms with the
Frankish power, accepting to deal with them to help them resist their rivals.
The Franks did not succeed, however, in regaining the advantage, even when
Jerusalem was returned to them in 626/1229. Their two Crusades against
Egypt failed and the Latin states, greatly weakened by their own divisions,
political crises and the decline in Crusader spirit in the West, did not last for
long after the collapse of the Ayyūbid dynasty in Syria.

Franks and Muslims in Syria from 569/1174 to 658/1260

Just before his death, Nu¯r al Dīn, concerned at the growing power of Saladin in
Egypt, had been preparing an expedition against him. Saladin (r. 569 89/1174 93),
who had already subjugated Upper Egypt, made safe the route between Egypt
and Syria and taken control of the Red Sea trade route by occupying Yemen,
appeared as the most powerful amir of his states. The divisions amongst the
Syrians after the death of Nu¯r al Dīn and the tender age of the prince succeed
ning him would allow Saladin, in autumn 570/1174, to seize Damascus, Ḥimṣ,
Hama and Baalbek fairly easily and to obtain a few months later his official
investiture by the caliph of Baghdad, al Mustadī, over Egypt and Syria, exclud
ing northern Syria which was left to Nu¯r al Dīn’s son. When the latter died in
577/1181 it was a godsend for Saladin, who, having occupied part of Jazīra,
seized Aleppo in 579/1183. He did not manage to get hold of Mosul, as he had
hoped, but in 582/1186 there was an agreement under which ‘Īzz al Dīn, the
Zangid prince of the city, agreed to help him militarily in his jihad.

Strengthened by all this support, Saladin now focused on the jihad. The
‘ulamāʾ encouraged him with various treatises on the jihad, armour and
military tactics, or with books extolling the virtues of Jerusalem or the
Shaʾm. In the spring of 583/1187 the situation was fairly well in his favour.
Truces had been signed in 576/1180 with the Saljuqs of Anatolia and in 581/1185
with the Byzantines which, for the time being, eliminated the worry of being attacked in northern Syria. The succession crisis in the kingdom of Jerusalem after the death of the leprous king Baldwin IV (1185) and his young nephew Baldwin V (1186) was also helpful to his cause. Guy of Lusignan, husband of Sibyl, the heiress to the throne, had been crowned against the advice of a section of the nobility, including Raymond III of Tripoli, and the kingdom emerged weakened by these disputes.

By attacking a caravan travelling from Cairo to Damascus, Reynald of Châtillon, the prince of Kerak, provided Saladin with the casus belli he had been waiting for. The fighting between Franks and Muslims took place on the Ḥaṭṭīn plain west of Tiberias on 25 Rabi’I 583/4 July 1187. The Muslims, who had the advantage of numbers, surrounded the Franks, far from water, in terrific heat. The king and nearly all the nobility were taken prisoner and this resounding victory, by depriving the kingdom of Jerusalem of almost all its knights, allowed Saladin to seize the major part of the Frank lands. After Acre, Jaffa, Ṣaydā, Beirut and Ascalon, Jerusalem was taken on 27 Rajab 583/2 October 1187. The people’s lives were spared, and those who could pay their ransom fled the city for the coast, while the Aqṣā Mosque and the Dome of the Rock were reconverted into Muslim monuments. After having failed at Tyre, in 584/1188 Saladin retook a large number of fortified places in the county of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch, and gave himself an opening to the sea by taking Latakia. The Franks held on to Antioch and Tripoli and one or two fortresses such as Krak des Chevaliers, Tortosa and Margat. In the kingdom of Jerusalem, the fortresses of Kerak, Montreal and Beaufort also surrendered to Saladin.

This disaster led immediately in the West to the Third Crusade (1189–92), led by three great sovereigns. The German emperor, Frederick Barbarossa (r. 1152–90) died en route in Cilicia and his army dispersed, but the arrival of the kings of England and France, Richard the Lionheart (r. 1189–99) and Philip II Augustus (r. 1180–1223), allowed the Franks to retake Acre in Jumādā II 587/July 1191 after a long two year siege. The treaty signed between Saladin and Richard the Lionheart in Sha’bān 588/September 1192 left the Franks a thin coastal strip linking Tyre to Jaffa, but most of Palestine eluded them. Only the freedom to make pilgrimage to Jerusalem was maintained. Saladin had failed to obtain from the neighbouring states and, most of all, the caliph the support he was hoping for and at his death in 589/1193 left the treasury completely empty, but emerged despite this with a positive image. His role in the fall of the Fāṭimids and his many victories against the Franks made him a legendary figure, in the West as much as in the East.
The Crusades continued to arrive in the Holy Land with more or less success. In 593/1197, the emperor Henri VI could not complete his expedition, but his army retook Jubayl (Byblos), Beirut and Saydā. Later, after the Fourth Crusade was diverted towards Constantinople (1204), the Crusaders focused their efforts on Egypt. They had understood that there lay the heart of Ayyūbid power, and that this was the source of reinforcements in Syria. To take Egypt would be to take Syria in a vice, but it would also assure control of an area of important economic potential. There was a first attempt with the Fifth Crusade between 614/1217 and 618/1221 and a second in 647 8/1249 50 led by Louis IX. In both cases, after having taken Damietta, the Crusaders came up against strong Muslim resistance and their expedition ended in failure.

For her part, Syria felt much more concerned by the negotiations taking place between the sultan of Egypt al Kāmil (r. 615 35/1218 38) and the emperor Frederick II (r. 1215 50) over Jerusalem. After the death of Saladin, Ayyūbid divisions had quickly returned to the fore. His brother al ‘Ādil (r. 596 615/1200 18) succeeded in imposing his sovereignty over his nephews before redistributing all the territories between his own sons, with the exclusion of the principality of Aleppo which was the only one to remain in the hands of Saladin’s descendants until 658/1260. The death of al ‘Ādil was followed by a conflict between his sons. Al Mu‘azzam, in Damascus, was looking for the support of former Turkish soldiers from Central Asia, the Khwarizmians. Worried at the prospect of facing these pillaging hordes, al Kāmil turned to Frederick II in 623/1226 with the suggestion of handing Jerusalem back to him in exchange for his assistance against al Mu‘azzam. The emperor, for his part, was in a difficult position, having been excommunicated by the pope in 1227, and was therefore open to negotiation. His Sicilian upbringing and his interest in the Muslim world also drew him towards it. The death of al Mu‘azzam at the end of 624/1227 did not put an end to negotiation and the treaty of Jaffa in 626/1229 allowed the Franks to retake Jerusalem, with the exclusion of the Temple area or al Haram al Sharif which remained under Muslim administration. A strip of land linking Jerusalem to the coast and several other places such as Lydda, Bethlehem and Nazareth were handed over to the Franks and a ten year truce was signed.

There were strong reactions from both sides. From the Frank point of view, the Church disapproved of this agreement signed by an excommunicated sovereign which left a part of Jerusalem in Muslim hands while pieces of land around the city, which had once belonged to the Church, were not returned. The Muslims, for their part, were disheartened to have to give up Jerusalem
which Saladin had fought so hard for. Emotions were particularly strong in Jerusalem and Damascus. They ran even higher when, during the negotiations, al Nāṣir Dāʾūd, who had succeeded his father al Muʿāẓẓam in Damascus, was besieged by the troops of al Kāmil and his brother al Ashraf. In Rajab 626/June 1229, Damascus surrendered and al Kāmil shared out the lands again, keeping the lion’s share for himself: in addition to Egypt, his control now extended into Muslim Palestine and part of Upper Mesopotamia; al Ashraf inherited Damascus while al Nāṣir Dāʾūd kept only Transjordan.

Until his death in 635/1238, al Kāmil succeeded more or less in having his authority respected, but after him no Ayyūbid sovereign was able to achieve this. His son al Sālīḥ Ayyūb succeeded him in Cairo but did not manage to get his uncle al Sālīḥ Ismāʿīl in Damascus to obey him. Both were looking for an alliance with the Franks and in 638/1240 al Sālīḥ Ismāʿīl even handed Jerusalem back to them just a few months after it had been reconquered by al Nāṣir Dāʾūd. Al Sālīḥ Ayyūb then called on the Khwarizmians, who took back Jerusalem from the Franks in 642/1244 in a bloodbath. A few months later, the Franks in alliance with the Ayyūbids from Damascus suffered their greatest defeat since Hīṭṭīn near Gaza (La Forbie), allowing the sultan of Cairo to seize Damascus in 643/1245 and to reoccupy part of Palestine and then to rid himself of his bothersome Khwarizmian allies by crushing them in Syria in 644/1246.

The Muslim recapture of Jerusalem brought about another Crusade, chiefly French, headed by King Louis IX (r. 1226 70). As this was taking place in Egypt, al Sālīḥ Ayyūb died in Shaʿbān 647/November 1249 and his son al Muʿāẓẓam succeeded him. But on 28 Muḥarram 648/2 May 1250, some weeks after the battle of al Maṣṣūra during which Louis IX was imprisoned, al Muʿāẓẓam was assassinated by his father’s mamlūks who took the throne. This mamlūk revolution of course had important repercussions in Syria Palestine. The Ayyūbid prince of Aleppo, al Nāṣir Yūsuf, immediately seized Damascus in Rabīʿ II/ July 1250 and tried to march on Egypt, but was severely beaten by the Turks in Dhū ʿl qaʿda 648/ February 1251. These divisions helped the Franks and Louis IX who, after his liberation in 684/May 1250, had gone back to the kingdom of Acre. Before returning to France in 652/1254, he managed to achieve from the Mamlūks the liberation of prisoners still held in Egypt, a ten year truce and a territorial status quo in Palestine.

The ʿAbbāsid caliph, very concerned about the Mongol threat to Baghdad, made many efforts to reconcile the Ayyūbids and the Mamlūks, but in vain. In 651/1254, the assassination of Aqtāy, leader of the Bāḥrī Mamlūks in Egypt, led to the arrival in Syria of numerous Bāḥrī Mamlūks, including the future
sultan Baybars. Al Nāsir Yūsuf gave them the warmest of welcomes, and could have used the opportunity of their coming together for another attempt to overthrow the Mamlūks of Egypt, but the desertion of his own troops, his hesitation, his inertia in response to the impatience of Baybars and his men, in addition to the rivalry between him and his cousin al Mughīth from Kerak, weakened him even further. During this time the Mongol threat was becoming more apparent with the fall of Baghdad in 656/1258, and when in 657/1259 an agreement was finally made between al Nāsir, al Mughīth and Baybars, it was too late to save the dynasty.

The foundations of political power

Ayyūbid territory covered a large area including Egypt, Yemen (until 626/1228), Syria Palestine and a part of Jazīra. Under the reign of Saladin, Egypt was the area providing the most money and troops, but he himself only lived there very infrequently, spending most of his time on military campaigns in Upper Mesopotamia and above all in Syria. After his death, a sort of family consortium was established, with, in each important city, an Ayyūbid prince who recognised the sovereignty of the sultan of Cairo. Before his death, Saladin had planned for this power sharing between his three older sons and his brother al ‘Ādil, but in reality it was the latter who quickly took control and redistributed all the lands, with the exception of the principality of Aleppo, amongst his own sons.

This system of a family confederacy had advantages, especially in difficult times, when support was available from other members of the family. But in giving several members of the family fairly wide powers over a given area, it also encouraged personal ambition and divisions. The greatest of these, the ones setting al Mu'azzam of Damascus against his two brothers al Ashraf of Jazīra and al Kāmil of Egypt in the years 621 4/1224 7 lay behind the rapprochement between al Kāmil and Frederick II. There were also very serious consequences for the rivalries following the death of al Kāmil (635/1238) between al Śāliḥ Ayyūb and his uncle al Śāliḥ Ismā’īl of Damascus, leading the former to ally himself with the fearsome Khwarizmians, while the latter sought the help of the Franks. There is no doubt that these incessant rivalries played an important part in the decline of the dynasty.

The concept of family power did not in any sense mean that the authority of the head of the family was not recognised. It was a sovereignty embedded in a greater hierarchical system with, at the top of the pyramid, the ‘Abbāsid caliph of Baghdad, the only one who could guarantee the legitimacy of power. Since the middle of the fifth/eleventh century, the caliph had recognised the
political legitimacy of the Saljuq by granting them officially the title of sultan. The disappearance of this dynasty from Iraq and Iran in the final years of the sixth/twelfth century led very quickly to a devaluation of this title. Already under the reign of Saladin, some chroniclers and biographers had become accustomed to giving him the title. The first Ayyubid sovereigns to use it officially at the head of their titulature were al ‘Adil in Egypt and al Zahir in Aleppo. Then very quickly the Ayyubid princes of secondary cities such as Baalbek, Baṣra or Bāniyās adopted it too. The title of sultan was now devalued and no longer the prerogative of the head of the dynasty, who continued to affirm his authority via other symbols, notably by having his name used on coinage and in the Friday khutba and by reserving to himself the right to mint gold coins. With the exception of a dinar issued by Saladin in Damascus in 583/1187 to celebrate the victory over the Franks, no Ayyubid dinar minted in Syria has yet been discovered.

The Ayyubid armies included many footsoldiers, but it was the cavalry which constituted their real strike force. Figures given for Egypt vary between 8,500 and 12,000 horsemen and recent studies have shown that the principal cities of Damascus and Aleppo could provide between 3,000 and 5,000 horsemen each. In any case, the whole army was never mobilised on the battlefield, as garrisons had to be left in the cities and fortresses and sometimes troops were dispersed over several fronts at a time. It was then necessary sometimes to call on supplementary forces, most often Arab Bedouins and Turcomans, paid, variously, in iqtā’s, out of booty or by taxes raised specifically for the purpose. These Bedouins were however difficult to control and often proved to be fairly unreliable and a nuisance once the danger had passed.

The means of payment for the regular army was the iqtā whose value was measured by the number of men the holder could arm. Until the end of Saladin’s reign the practice followed under Nūr al Din of making the iqtā a hereditary concession was in force. The lands taken back from the Franks gave the sovereigns a large supply of iqtā’s to meet the needs and ambitions of the amirs. This is how great emiral families possessing powerful fortresses were made up. Saladin’s successors made it their business to retake control of these territories to entrust them in iqtā to members of the Ayyubid family, or to administer them in the name of the sultan by a governor (wāli) or a deputy (nāiband), that is, people closely dependent on royal power.

The Ayyubid armies were made up mainly of Turks, freed slaves or free men, of which the number had greatly increased since the beginning of the Saljuq era. The Kurds, originally free, were also well represented in the Syrian army from the sixth/twelfth century, and continued to arrive under the
Ayyūbids. The most striking example were the Qaymariyya, who played a very important role under the reign of al Nāṣir Yusuf. Other Kurds, such as the Shahrazūriyya, arrived in 656/1258 but proved to be much less reliable. Even though the Turks were in the majority, there was not the same large scale recruitment of mamlūks as in Egypt, and the Kurds continued to play an important role which became even more significant after 648/1250 with the gradual dwindling of the power of the great Turkish families of the time of Nūr al Dīn and the rallying of a number of Turkish contingents to the mamlūks of Egypt. The important role at the head of the state played by the non Turkish mamlūks should not be overlooked, as with the two amīrs of Armenian origin, Īthwilr and Shams al Dīn Lu’lu’ who organised the regency of Aleppo and were close counsellors of the sovereigns, the former from 613/1216 to 628/1231 and the latter from 634/1236 to 648/1251.

The feeling of belonging to a particular ethnic group was real and was occasionally expressed in outright hostility. When the Turks took power in Cairo in 648/1250, rivalries only increased. Damascus was handed over to al Nāṣir Yūsuf by Kurdish amīrs in the garrison, rivals of the Turks, and the pillage of Turkish property by Kurdish soldiers which followed the animosity between them. What is more, the divisions within the army were not simply between Turks and Kurds: there were other rivalries, either amongst the Mamlūk Turks, or between them and the Armenians.

The civil and military institutions of the Ayyūbids in Syria were, as in Egypt, inherited from the Fāṭimids, the ‘Abbāsids and the Saljuqs. There were the same offices of wālī, hājib, ustādār, atabeg, shihāna and other palace officials. New military institutions, set to develop in the Mamlūk period, also appeared, revealing a real continuity between the two dynasties, even though in the Mamlūk period the fluidity of the institutions tended to give way to a much more formalised system.

The Ayyūbid viziers in Syria occasionally played an important political role, but their power always remained subordinate to the sovereign, who could dismiss them at any time. Saladin never had a vizier and even his closest advisor, the qāḍī al Fāḍil, who was in charge of the administration of Egypt, never held this title. His successors in Egypt were not that fond of this institution and the only important vizier in Cairo was the very unpopular Saﬁ ‘l Dīn ibn Shukr (d. 622/1225). Damascus, on the other hand, had many important viziers from Diyā’ al Dīn ibn al Athīr (589 92/1193 6) to Jamāl al Dīn ibn Matruh (644 7/1246 9), but it was in Aleppo that there was the greatest continuity to the vizierate, where there were six successive viziers
from 592/1196 to 658/1260, the most important being the great scholar Ibn al Qifti, who was vizier twice.

Economic development, religious life and urban elites

From the time the Fāṭimidss moved into Egypt, the Red Sea trade route to the Indian Ocean had superseded the Persian Gulf route which had made Baghdad’s fortune. By adding Yemen to his Egyptian possessions and denying the Franks access to the Red Sea, Saladin was asserting his wish for tight control over the trade in spices and various precious goods from the Far East and the Indian Ocean. Egypt was the main beneficiary, but some of these goods were also redistributed towards Syria.

In addition to Egypt, Ayyubid Syria traded with all its other neighbours. The Syrian traders met Iraqi or Russian traders in the Byzantine markets of Trebizond on the shores of the Black Sea, at Sivas in the north east of Saljuq Anatolia or at Antalya on the south coast. Trade with the Latin states and the Italian cities was even more extensive. Throughout the sixth/twelfth century, Pisa, Genoa and Venice had developed their commercial links with Egypt above all. In the seventh/thirteenth century the Italians entered the markets in Syrian cities such as Damascus and Aleppo where they sold chiefly textiles, copper, silver and saffron and bought spices, cotton and fabrics. The Venetians signed commercial treaties with the Ayyubids of Aleppo which were renewed several times during the first half of the seventh/thirteenth century and obtained significant privileges in relation to commercial taxes, their personal safety and the safety of their goods, their premises, justice and minting coins.

Despite the conflicts, the trade between the Frankish coast and the city of Damascus was never lastingly interrupted. A record of customs charges from the city of Acre tells us that around 1245 there came from ‘Païenime’, that is Muslim countries, goods from the Far East and Arabia (spices, incense, medicinal drugs), and from Iraq, Syria and Egypt (perfumes, silks, various fabrics, dyestuffs, cotton, ivory, ceramics, salted fish from Egypt, sugar). In the kingdom of Acre shoes, pottery, salt, sugar, vegetables, fruit, olives and oil were produced. From the West came wheat, wine, dried fruit, salted pork, textiles from Flanders and Champagne, hemp, copper, iron and saddles. Some of these products were sold on the spot; others were re exported to Muslim countries.

Commercial prosperity led to the development of markets and commercial premises in all the cities of Syria. In the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth
centuries many caravanserais, providing traders with well protected stopping places, were built or restored on the route from Damascus to Aleppo. At the entrance to cities, other caravanserais accommodated dealers who sold their products there to the market (sīq) traders. In the seventh/thirteenth century the markets expanded, both in Damascus and in Aleppo, extending outside the city walls. Population growth, unfortunately difficult to quantify, led to the development of new suburbs which, little by little, acquired their own markets and great mosques.

The establishment of princely courts in the main cities of Syria Palestine contributed to urban growth. The fortifications of Damascus and Aleppo had already been restored by Nūr al-Dīn, who also endowed each of these cities with law courts and various religious monuments. The Ayyūbids actively pursued this building programme. AlʿĀdil in Damascus and Baṣra, al Muʿazzam in Jerusalem, al Žāhir in Aleppo, al Maṃṣūr and al Muẓaffar in Hama and in Maʿarrat al Nuʿmān, al Amjad in Baalbek, al Maṃṣūr in Hims were all great builders. The fact that the princes were surrounded by a dominant military class encouraged the growth of markets to meet their needs, for example for arms and horses, and the construction of hippodromes required for training and parades. In the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries Aleppo alone had five hippodromes, all in the suburbs apart from the one in the citadel.

The same continuity between Zangids and Ayyūbids can be seen in the policy of religious building. The madrasas, a good number of which had already been built under Nūr al-Dīn, continued to multiply, with a mausoleum for the founder often being added. Saladin founded the first of the Jerusalem madrasas within the St Anne convent in 588/1192 and seven others were built during the reigns of his successors. In the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century there were ninety madrasas in Damascus and forty five in Aleppo. Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī law schools strongly predominated in Syria, but there were also several Mālikī and Ḥanbali madrasas. The first madrasas were often constructed within existing buildings such as renovated old houses or former churches. Many grew up around the Great Mosque and the citadel so as to be near the religious and political heart of the city, while in the seventh/thirteenth century there were more and more burial madrasas outside the walls, near the cemeteries and the fast growing suburbs. The cities were also filling up with mosques, very many oratories (masājid) and institutions teaching the ḥadīth.

Establishments for Sufis grew up in a similar way to the madrasas. New schools of thought influenced both by ancient philosophy and ideas of Iranian
origin spread within the Sufi institutions. Most were controversial and were occasionally roundly condemned by orthodox Sunnī. This kind of disapproval could have lethal consequences, as in the case of the Iranian al Suhrawardī, who founded an illuminating theosophy, and was executed in Aleppo in 587/1191 on Saladin’s orders. The famous Andalusian Sufī Ibn al ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) spent the last ten years of his life in Damascus. His tomb, on the slopes of the Qāsiyūn, became a very popular place of pilgrimage. Shihāb al Din al Suhrawardī (d. 632/1234), who was the caliph’s ambassador to Syria several times, had also some influence on the development of Sufism in this area.

The first Sufi orders (ṭarīqa, pl. ṭuruq) following a certain number of rules and rituals, under a hierarchical system of authority, began to be organised in Damascus at the beginning of the Ayyūbid period. The well known order of Qādiriyya, founded in Baghdad by ‘Abd al Qādir al Jīlānī (d. 561/1166) became established in Syria, especially in Baalbek, around the Yūnīnī family. Two branches of the equally famous Rifā‘iyya, founded by the Iraqi Ahmad al Rifā‘ī (d. 578/1182), also spread in Damascus. One of them, the Ḥarīriyya, very soon became suspect in the eyes of the Sunnī orthodoxy, but a larger group was the Qalandariyya, whose strange practices were influenced by Buddhism. This order was introduced to Damascus in around 616/1219. It declined under the reign of al Ashraf, renowned for his pietism and hostile to any slightly excessive form of mysticism, to recover around 655/1257. The Sunnī ‘ulamā’ were even more suspicious of the movement called the ‘enamoured of God’ (muwallahu‘n), whose theological and speculative positions were at least as worrying as their eccentric and excessive practices.

Besides these often controversial mystical movements, there were many ascetics and pious individuals who were completely orthodox and respected by all the population. These men, from very different backgrounds, advocated detachment from worldly goods, and individual retreat, and often lived near a well known sanctuary or the tomb of a pious person.

The decline of the Ayyubid dynasty
The Ayyūbid dynasty in Syria survived ten years longer than the one in Cairo. It fell in 658/1260 under attack from the Mongol invasion. As early as 642/1244, the Mongols entered northern Syria, coming as near as twelve kilometres to the north of Aleppo. Al Nāṣir Yūsuf tried, as many other sovereigns had done, to play the diplomatic card. Several times, he sent embassies to the Great Khān to try to negotiate, but in vain. In the final
weeks of \(1259/657\), the Ayyūbid cities of Upper Mesopotamia fell one after another and in Șafar 658/January 1260, Hülegü, brother of the Mongol Great Khān, began to besiege Aleppo. He took the city supported by Hethum, sovereign of Lesser Armenia, and some Franks from Antioch. Hama and Ḥimṣ surrendered as soon as they learnt of the fall of Aleppo. Al Nāṣir, abandoned by a number of his troops who were critical of his inaction and had joined the Mamlūks of Egypt, had fled towards Gaza. Betrayed by one of his servants, he was handed over to the Mongols, sent to Tabriz and executed a few months later when the Mongols learnt of their defeat at the hands of the Mamlūks in Syria.

Damascus, abandoned, surrendered to Kitbughā, Hülegü’s general, on 17 Rabī’ I 658/2 March 1260. Al Mughīth of Kerak came and submitted, and was able as a result to continue to rule his lands under Mongol authority and Kitbughā completed the conquest of Muslim Palestine. A few weeks later, the Christians of Damascus, emboldened by the complete religious freedom granted them by the Mongols and probably believing that Islam was in its final days, gave full vent to their joy and publicly humiliated the Muslims. They were to reap severe repression for this following the Mamlūk victory.

In mid Sha’bān 658/26 July 1260, then, the Egyptian sultan Qūṭuz had begun to head for Syria, leading troops which included some of al Nāṣir’s former mamlūks together with Arab and Turcoman contingents. Their victory at Ṭayyibā’at Jālūt in Galilee on 25 Ramdān 658/3 September 1260 and the death on the battlefield of Kitbughā allowed them rapidly to take possession of Syria Palestine. At the end of 658/1260, another offensive allowed the Mongols to reconquer Aleppo, but having been defeated a second time by Mamlūk troops near Ḥimṣ, they left Syrian lands in Jumādā I 659/1261 and withdrew to the east of the Euphrates.

There were subsequent raids, but Bilād al Shām slipped away from them for good, and came under Mamlūk domination for several centuries. The whole area was reunified under the authority of the sultan in Cairo. Very soon, power was represented in Syria Palestine by lieutenants of the sultan of mamlūk origin, based in Damascus and Aleppo, while Ḥimṣ, Hama and Kerak were governed by completely docile Ayyūbid princes. The small Ayyūbid dynasty in Hama managed to survive until 742/1342, but in 661/1263 the cities of Ḥimṣ and Kerak returned to the direct control of the Mamlūks who continued their conquest of Bilād al Shām until 690/1291 and took back from the Franks all the cities and fortresses still held by them.
7 The Ayyūbids: the House of Saladin

Shādhi ibn Marwān

Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb (d. 568)

Asad al-Dīn Shirkūh (d. 564)

(see table 10)

al-Ādil Muḥammad (d. 615)

(see table 8)

Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Yūsuf (d. 589)

al-Muʿayyad Muhāammad al-Zāhir Murād b. al-ʿAzīz (d. 638)

Abū Bakr (d. 657)

Tāj al-Mulūk (d. 648)

al-ʿAzīz Muḥāammad al-Zāhir (d. 639)

Abū Bakr (d. 657)

Tāj al-Mulūk (d. 648)

al-ʿAzīz Muḥāammad al-Zāhir (d. 639)

Abū Bakr (d. 657)

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Abū Bakr (d. 657)

Tāj al-Mulūk (d. 648)

al-ʿAzīz Muḥāammad al-Zāhir (d. 639)

Abū Bakr (d. 657)

Tāj al-Mulūk (d. 648)
9 The Ayyūbids of Hama

Shādhi ibn Marwān
  └── Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb
    └── Shāhanshāh
      (d. 548)

  └── Taqi ‘l-Dīn ‘Umar
      (d. 587)
  └── ‘Izz al-Dīn Farrūkhshāh
      (d. 578)

  └── al-Manṣūr Muḥammad

    └── al-Nāṣir Qilij Arslān
    └── al-Muẓaffar Maḥmūd (married to the daughter of al-‘Azīz of Aleppo)

    └── al-Nasir Qilij Arslan

    └── al-Manṣūr Muḥammad II
        (d. 683)
        (married to the daughter of al-‘Azīz of Aleppo)

        └── al-Muẓaffar Taqi ‘l-Dīn ‘Umar

10 The Ayyūbids of Ḥimṣ

Shādhi b. Marwān
  └── Asad al-Dīn Shirkūh

  └── Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad
      (d. 581)

    └── al-Mujāhid Shirkūh
        (d. 637)

    └── wife of al-Afdal son of Saladin

    └── al-Manṣūr Ibrāhīm
        (d. 644)

    └── al-Ṣāliḥ Ismā’īl
        (d. 658)

    └── al-Zāhir Dā’ūd

    └── al-Afdal Mūsā

    └── al-Mas‘ūd

    └── al-Ashraf Muḥammad

      (d. 662)

Notes


2. B. Lewis and P. M. Holt, Historians of the Middle East, Oxford, 1962, 59 117; C. Cahen, La Syrie du Nord à l’époque des croisades et la principauté franque


The Fāṭimid caliphate (358 567/969 1171) and the Ayyūbids in Egypt (567 648/1171 1250)

YAA COV LEV

Egypt and the historiography of the Fāṭimid–Ayyūbid period

Egypt conquered by the Fāṭimids in 358/969 was rich agricultural land with winter crops (wheat, barley, beans and flax) and summer crops (watermelons, cotton and sugar cane). Egypt’s arable lands were dependent on the Nile whose flow governed the country’s life cycle. The annual rise of the Nile used to begin during June–July and intensified during August. The beginning of the rise made it possible for boats loaded with grain to sail towards the capital and the rising water of the Nile also made the canal of Alexandria navigable. The Nile usually reached its plenitude of 16 cubits as measured at the Cairo’s Nilometer during late August or early September. The new agricultural year began during September or early October when the seeds needed for planting cereals were delivered to the fellahin. Egypt was a wheat producing country and bread was the staple of its population. However, since the Tūlūnid period, flax became Egypt’s main cash crop and its cultivation spread throughout the fourth seventh/tenth thirteenth centuries and constituted one of Egypt’s main exports. Flax was not only exported; there was also a strong local demand for it. Egypt had a long tradition of textile manufacture and its production centres such as Tinnīs, Damietta and Bahnasā enjoyed high international reputation.

Although any demographic assessments are riddled with difficulties, the population of Egypt is generally estimated by modern scholars at 2.6 million at the beginning of the first/seventh century. Medieval demographic assessments were higher and, for example, the tax collector on behalf of the Umayyad caliph Hishām (r. 105 25/724 43) maintained that there were 10,000 villages in Egypt and 5 million people.¹ The exact size of Egypt’s
population on the eve of the Fāṭimid conquest is unclear, but there were Muslims, Copts and a small Jewish minority, while the number of villages was 2,395, of which 1,439 were in the Delta region. This region comprised Egypt’s agricultural heartland and we must assume that the estimate of 10,000 villages for the mid second/eighth century was exaggerated. At the time of the Fāṭimid conquest, the Islamisation of Egypt was, however, only partial. Substantial Islamisation occurred during the fourth/tenth century in the wake of a harsh suppression of Coptic uprisings, which had been sparked by oppressive taxation. Nevertheless, the Egyptian countryside (rif) remained mostly Coptic. The Coptic Church was a powerful institution and a big landowner. The power of the Church was also derived from the fact that Egypt was predominantly a rural country with a low degree of urbanisation. Alexandria was the main Mediterranean port and Fustāṭ was the capital city and the administrative and commercial centre. Fustāṭ was a Muslim town with a Christian and Jewish population whose safety and freedom of religious worship were generally maintained.

Our ability to reconstruct Egypt’s history under Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid rule is seriously hampered owing to the fact that much of the rich historiography of the fourth/seventh/tenth thirteenth century has not survived. Importantly, al Maqrīzī (766 845/1364 1442), who claimed Fāṭimid ancestry and showed great interest in Fāṭimid history, quotes some of the original works by historians of the Fāṭimid period. Al Maqrīzī, in three of his works — a chronicle devoted to Fāṭimid history (Ittiḥād al ḥunafā’), a topographical historical work dealing with Fustāṭ and Cairo (known as Khitāṭ) and a biographical dictionary (al Muqaffā) — quotes extensively from the writings of Ibn Zu‘lq (306 86/918 96), al Musabbihī (366 420/977 1029), al Quḍā‘ī (d. 454/1062), Mubashshir ibn Fāṭik (fl. in the fifth/eleventh century), Ibn al Ma’mūn al Baṭṭā‘īḥī (d. 588/1192) and Ibn Muyassar (d. 677/1278). Ibn Zu‘lq’s biographical dictionary of Egyptian judges (qādīs) is also quoted by Ibn Ḥajar al ‘Asqalānī (773 852/1372 1449), who is our principal source for Ismā‘īlī qādīs who served in Cairo during the Fāṭimid period. Fragments quoted by later authorities are, however, a poor substitute for the loss of the original works. The surviving section of al Musabbihī’s chronicle Akhbār Miṣr epitomises the extent of the lost data. It was a huge work of 13,000 folios dealing with the Muslim history of Egypt rich in information, and its obituaries mirror people from all walks of life.

Al Maqrīzī’s writings are also indispensable for Saladin’s rise to power in Fāṭimid Egypt, his rule and the Ayyūbid period. Al Maqrīzī was familiar with Qāḍī al Fāḍil’s lost chronicle, Mutajaddidāt, and quoted it in Khitāṭ and his history of the Ayyūbid Mamlūk period (Kitāb al sulūk). Qāḍī al Fāḍil’s
Mutajaddidāt, as al Musabbihī’s chronicle, was a very detailed and informative work that recorded events on a daily basis. For the political and military history of Ayyūbid Egypt after Saladin, the most important source is Ibn Furāt’s history. Although the published text is marked by lacunas, Ibn Furāt (735 807/1334 1405) made extensive use of Ibn Nazīf al Ḥamawī (fl. first half of the seventh/thirteenth century) and Ibn Khallikān (608 81/1211 82). Although Ibn Wāsīl’s chronicle (604 97/1208 98) is an indispensable source for the Ayyūbids of Syria, it offers less information on the Ayyūbids of Egypt.

The survival of some Arabic Christian historical works dealing with the Fāṭimid Ayyūbid period adds significantly to Arabic Muslim historiography. The most important work is that of Yahyā ibn Saʻīd al Anṭākī who was a Melkite Christian and fled from Egypt for Antioch in 404/1013 during al Ḥākīm’s persecutions of the non Muslims. His chronicle is an important source for al Ḥākīm’s rule and Fāṭimid Byzantine relations. The History of the Patriarchs of Alexandria is the most important source for the history of the Coptic Church and also provides some information on the history of the Fāṭimid Ayyūbid period. This work is made up of a series of biographies of the Coptic Patriarchs and has a complex textual history.

It must be said that our knowledge of Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid institutions, especially administrative offices, is quite extensive since historians of the Ayyūbid Mamlūk period such as al Makhzūmī (d. 585/1189), Ibn Mammātī (542 606/1147 1209), Ibn Ṭuwayr (524 617/1130 1220) and al Qalqashandī (756 821/1355 1418) have discussed them in detail. Some original Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid documents have survived and supplement information derived from literary sources. The epigraphic evidence for the Fāṭimid Ayyūbid period is also quite extensive and provides sometimes unique information, especially on legitimisation of political power.

The Fāṭimid imams in power (358–466/969–1073)

The conquest of Egypt had been a Fāṭimid goal since the inception of their rule in 297/909 in Tunisia and was motivated by the desire to supplant the ‘Abbāsids, whom they considered as unworthy usurpers.

Earlier attempts to conquer Egypt in 301/914 and 306/919 failed owing to poor Fāṭimid military performances and massive ‘Abbāsīd military and naval intervention. The campaign of 358/969 was launched only after extensive logistic preparations along the route from North Africa and Egypt were completed and Fāṭimid propagandists (du‘āt) in Fustat had secured local support for the new regime. Eventually, the Fāṭimid conquest
of Egypt was achieved without much bloodshed and reflected both the vast military and financial resources that were available to the Fāṭimid general Jawhar and the disintegration of the Ikhshidid regime. In 358/969, the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate, which was under Būyid tutelage, remained passive and later attempts to fight the Fāṭimids by proxy, the Qarmatīs of Bahrayn, failed. Although the immediate impact of the Fāṭimid conquest on Egypt was minimal, in the long term the country underwent many changes under the rule of the Fāṭimids.

The period of Fāṭimid rule in Egypt can be divided into two distinctive phases: before and after the civil war of the 450s/1060s and the early 460s/1070s which also marked a transition from civilian to military rule. During the first phase, the imam was the source of political authority and he ruled through his court, the vizier and the heads of the administrative offices. Although the army was the main buttress of the regime and many corps were stationed in Cairo to protect the palace complex and the regime, the amīrs played no political role in the state. During this period, the political scene was dominated by a number of powerful civilian viziers. Late medieval historians portrayed the vizier Ya’qūb ibn Killis (d. 380/990) as the creator of the Fāṭimid administrative system but his contribution seems to have been exaggerated. They had been captivated by Ibn Killis’s friendly relations with al ‘Azīz, and his fabulous riches and influence. A more realistic depiction of the vizier’s powers is provided by Ahmad al Jarjarāt’s letter of appointment as vizier in 418/1027. The document sets forth what can be described as the ideological framework of, or the justification for, the post of the vizier, invoking the biblical Qur’ānic precedents of Moses, Aharon and Joseph. Clearly specified in the document are the duties of the vizier, who was responsible for fiscal matters and the governing of the provinces. The document also states that the vizier has to act as mediator between the circles supporting the regime, provincial governors, scribes of the administrative offices and finally the subjects. The just treatment of the subjects in the capital and provinces is proclaimed as one of the vizier’s duties, including, if necessary, by dismissal of oppressive governors.7

The vizier was the head of the administration whose structure is revealed through the names of the administrative offices. These were created according to three criteria: function, geography and persona. There were central offices such as the Office of Army or Office of Taxes while other offices were entrusted with inspection duties. To what extent the administrative duties of the central offices were coordinated with offices that were responsible for certain geographical regions remains unknown. Separate offices administered the private properties and incomes of the imam as well as those of other
members of the royal family, including women. The existence of the Office of Army did not prevent the creation of offices which dealt with certain military corps, and the demarcation line between the different offices and administrative duties is far from clear. Overlapping among the various administrative offices must have been widespread.

Our knowledge of the Fāṭimid provincial administration is very restricted. For example, in the 410s/1020s in the town of Ramla, a provincial capital in Palestine, there resided several Fāṭimid officials: the governor, the military governor, the chief of the secret police and intelligence, the fiscal administrator, the audit and the chief of Fāṭimid propaganda. To what extent there was a clear distinction between the responsibilities of the governor and the military governor remains vague.8

The structure of the Fāṭimid army is vaguely attested to in the sources, but its ethnic composition and the status of the troops are widely referred to. In the mid fifth/eleventh century the army was tens of thousands strong and made up of a bewildering assortment of corps, some of which were manned by free born troops while others by military slaves. Africans, Berbers, Turks and Bedouins served in the army, which consisted of infantry and cavalry and other small specialised units such as nafta hurlers and troops employed during siege operations. Most of the infantry regiments were manned by African military slaves while the Turks served as cavalry.9

The foundation of Cairo played an important role in the successful consolidation of the Fāṭimid rule in Egypt. It was a fortified town and its fortifications saved the Fāṭimids during the Qarmaṭi invasion of 361/976. Cairo served as the seat of the Fāṭimid imams throughout the whole period of their rule in Egypt. The palace complex was huge and formed a city within a city in which lived and worked several thousand people. But Cairo was more than a palace city; it rapidly became a thriving urban centre. The Fāṭimid rulers owned vast commercial properties in Cairo, which were rented on a monthly basis. Cairo had an unmistakable Ismāʿīlī character. The imposition of Ismāʿīlism on Egypt was a gradual process that took place between 358/969 and 366/976. It involved the Ismāʿīlisation of the rites of the Festival of Breaking of Ramadān, the introduction of the Shiʿī formula of the call to prayer (adhān) and the appointment of Ismāʿīlī judges who accorded to the Fāṭimid law superiority in cases of inheritance. Even after the Ismāʿīlisation of the religious life in Fuṣṭāt, Cairo retained a more distinctive and profound Ismāʿīlī character and, in this respect, differed from Fuṣṭāt. The Ismāʿīlī character of Cairo was enhanced by the teaching of
Ismā‘īlism (majālis al ḥikma) which took place only in Cairo at the palace and the Azhar Mosque.\textsuperscript{10} The population of Cairo during the fourth/fifth/tenth/eleventh centuries consisted of classes associated with the regime, of which the military was the largest group. Others were administrators and merchant suppliers of the court. These groups were more favourably disposed to the religious propaganda of the regime than the Sunnī population of Fustāṭ, where Sunnī Islam and learning flourished. Beyond the confines of the court and Cairo, Ismā‘īlism won only a limited following in Egypt.

Al Āzīz’s reign (365 86/975 96) was a period of internal stability and saw the establishment of the Fāṭīmid rule in Damascus and Palestine but these achievements were seriously threatened during al Hākim’s rule (386 411/996 1021). Al Hākim’s religious policies brought about social unrest and the propagators who proclaimed his divinity were killed and expelled. These turbulent years witnessed both the decline of families which had long been associated with the Fāṭīmids and the erosion in the position of the Kutāma Berbers as the mainstay of the Fāṭīmid regime. The Fāṭīmid rule was saved through a coup d’état staged by al Hākim’s sister, the princess Sitt al Mulk, who brought about both al Hākim’s demise and the coronation of his son al Zāhīr (r. 411 27/1021 36).

The sliding of the Fāṭīmid state into the devastating civil war of the 450s/1060s and the early 460s/1070s was a result of a struggle for dominance between the blacks and the Turks in the army. This conflict was about position and remuneration and was fuelled by ethnic animosities, different social status of the troops (African military slaves versus Turkish free born warriors) and different military specialisation (African infantry versus Turkish cavalry). The civil war caused large scale devastation: sections of the capital were destroyed, the treasures stored at the palace complex were looted, and members of the royal family fled Egypt. State institutions such as the administration and the tax collection system, the judicature and the army crumbled. In the midst of the havoc al Mustanṣir (r. 427 87/1036 94), the ruling Fāṭīmid imam, contacted Badr al Jamāl, the governor of Acre, and commanded him to restore order in Egypt. In winter 466/1073, Badr arrived with his private army in the Mediterranean port of Tinnis and began a ruthless campaign against the various elements that had seized power in the provinces. The restoration of order had an immediate positive effect on the agricultural output and the flow of taxes. In 469/1076, three years after his arrival to Egypt, Badr defeated the invasion of Egypt led by Āṣīz ibn Uvaq, a Turkish chieftain from Syria.
Badr al Jamālī was the first person in Fāṭimid history who rose to a position of power through an independent power base, i.e. his army. According to the standard medieval Islamic administrative terminology, he is described as a vizier of the sword in contrast to his civilian predecessors, the viziers of the pen. But the full scope of his powers is revealed by his titles. He was addressed as the Most Illustrious Lord and bore the following titles: Helper of the Imām, Sword of Islam, Commander of the Armies, Protector of the Qādīs of the Muslims and Guide of the Propagandists of the Believers (i.e. Ismāʿīlīs). This assortment of titles became the standard titulature of the Fāṭimid military viziers of the sixth/twelfth century.

Badr succeeded in both restoring the power of the Fāṭimid state and the expansion of his independent military power base. The economic recovery was quick and impressive and upon his death in 487/1094 he left 6.4 million dinars in cash, while the total cash reserves of the state were as high as 12,200,550 dinars. Economic prosperity continued under the rule of Badr’s son al Afdal (487–515/1094–1121), whose annual tax revenues stood at 5 million dinars, and it is said that this was achieved without resorting to oppressive methods while maintaining the prosperity of the rural areas.11 Badr rebuilt Cairo and surrounded the town with new walls and he partially re-established Fāṭimid rule in Syria. Parallel with the efforts to revive the economy, Badr created his own corps of military slaves and welcomed the emigration of Christian Armenian military elements to Egypt. His policy towards the Armenians might be explained by ethnic affiliations, since Badr was a Muslim Armenian who rose to eminence through military slavery. But other factors may have been at work too. The creation of a slave corps was, however, a slow process, and Badr’s slave corps was no more than 700 men strong while the recruitment of free-born Christian Armenians was a much faster and cheaper way to create a sizeable army of 7,000 troops. One of the main advantages of the Armenians as military manpower was their ability to fight as both cavalry and infantry.12

The strength of the personal power base created by Badr was revealed upon his death: Badr’s amirs rallied behind their master’s son, al Afdal, and stopped any attempt of al Mustansir to regain full powers. A precedent of a hereditary military vizierate was established, and al Afdal, in his capacity as the new military ruler of the state, determined the succession to the throne upon al Mustansir’s death in 487/1094. Al Afdal established al Mustansir’s youngest
son as the new imam, under the reigning title al-Musta‘lî (487–495/1094–1101). His self-interest was obvious, since al-Musta‘lî was married to Badr’s daughter, but his intervention created a schism within the Fāṭimid movement. According to the Ismā‘īlī political doctrine, the imamate is passed by naṣṣ, i.e. an explicit designation from the imam to his son. Nizār, al-Mustanṣîr’s eldest son, claimed to have been given the naṣṣ by his father and stirred up a rebellion in Alexandria. He was defeated, and died in obscure circumstances, but his followers, the Nizārī Ismā‘īlîs, claimed that he passed the imamate to his grandson. In contrast with Sunnī Islam, where brute force was the ultimate arbitrator into political disputes, in the Shī‘ī–Ismā‘īlī Islam, because of the pivotal role of the imam in the religious and political system, successional disputes turned in perpetual schisms. The tutelage of the Jamā‘ī house of military viziers exacted a heavy political price from the Fāṭimids.

In 495/1101, upon al-Musta‘lî’s death, he was succeeded by his five-year-old son al-Āmir, who eventually in 515/1121 managed to bring about al-Afdâl’s demise. Al-Afdâl’s twenty-seven years of military rule were marked by his failure to deal with the Crusades. Although the Fāṭimids were aware of the advance of the armies of the First Crusade, al-Afdâl failed to comprehend their intentions for a long time. When he realised that he would have to fight the Franks, his military moves were slow and the Fāṭimid army that arrived in Ascalon, shortly after the fall of Jerusalem in Sha‘bān 492/July 1099, suffered a humiliating defeat. Although the Fāṭimids fought the Crusaders in Palestine during the first decade of the sixth/twelfth century, their actions lacked determination and overall strategy. The Fāṭimids were unable to avert the fall of the coastal towns of Palestine and Syria and their navy was no match for the European fleets that supported the Crusades.  

Following the defeat of 492/1099 at Ascalon, al-Afdâl initiated a programme of military reforms, which involved the initiation of a military training programme modelled after the institution of military slavery. Al-Afdâl established seven barracks (ḥujraṣ), where young boys were trained. These, however, were not slaves, but sons of soldiers and civilian employees of the Fāṭimid state.

In the long term, al-Afdâl’s military reforms failed to improve the performances of the Fāṭimid army and the ḥujariyya troops are mentioned in the context of court ceremonies and not combat. The Fāṭimid army of the second half of the sixth/twelfth century was a large force composed of cavalry and tens of thousands of black infantry and was scorned by the Franks for its poor fighting capabilities. Although militarily weak, the army – or more exactly its officer corps – was deeply involved in politics. Al-Āmir was the last Fāṭimid ruler who ruled independently for some years. In 515/1121, after the
assassination of al-Afdal, al-Āmir appointed a new vizier, al-Ma’mūn al-Batā’īḥī, whom he arrested and executed in 519/1125. For five years between 519/1125 and 524/1130, al-Āmir held the reins of power in his hands, being the last Fāṭimid ruler who exercised political authority.

Al-Āmir’s assassination in 524/1130 plunged the Fāṭimid state into a second schism. Al-Āmir’s amīrs became involved in his succession. They ignored the nāṣṣ conferred by their master on his infant son, Abū ‘l-Qāsim al-Ṭayyib, and his designation of him as the heir to the throne. They proclaimed al-Āmir’s cousin, ‘Abd al-Mājid, as the new ruler who was to act as guardian for al-Āmir’s son yet to be born (al-Ṭayyib’s fate is not alluded to in the sources any more). ‘Abd al-Mājid was, however, deposed in a military coup led by Abū ‘Ali Kutayfāt, the only surviving son of al-Afdal. For less than a year, he ruled the Fāṭimid state, but he was assassinated in 526/1131. The demise of Kutayfāt paved the way for the restoration of ‘Abd al-Mājid to the throne and the declaration that he was a legitimate imam in his own right. He ruled under the regnal title al-Ḥāfiz until his death in 544/1149. Both the Nizārī and Ṭayyibī Ismā‘īlīs disputed al-Ḥāfiz’s claim to the imamate, the latter believing that al-Ṭayyib was living in concealment in Yemen.

The predominant position of Ismā‘īlism in Fāṭimid Egypt was slowly eroded during the rule of Badr and al-Afdal and later Kutayfāt, who, in 525/1130, nominated four chief judges, belonging to the Shafi‘i, Mālikī, Imāmī and Fāṭimid schools of law, and empowered them to handle inheritance cases according to their school. Kutayfāt’s policy was the continuation of that of Badr and Ma’mūn al-Batā’īḥī who exempted the Sunnis from being subjected to the Fāṭimid law of inheritance. The four judges nominated by Kutayfāt were removed following his demise, but whether the Fāṭimid law regained its superior position in cases of inheritance remains unclear. However, religious life in Fāṭimid Egypt during the sixth/twelfth century was marked by contradictions. Parallel with the process of the de-Ismā‘īlisation of the legal system there was a marked involvement of the regime in the celebration of Muslim religious festivals, including the introduction of new ones. The most important festival initiated by the Fāṭimid regime was the mawlid al-nābī, Muḥammad’s Birthday. Other mawlidīs celebrated in Fāṭimid Egypt included those of ‘Ali, Fāṭima, Ḥasan, Ḥusayn and the reigning Fāṭimid imam (al-Āmir, for example, celebrated his mawlid in 517/1123). The festival of Muḥammad’s Birthday was later also adopted by the Sunnis and its Fāṭimid origin was conveniently forgotten. Although diluted beyond recognition and divested of their Ismā‘īli content, some religious practices of the Fāṭimid period left their mark on later periods. The North African traveller Ibn Jubayr, who visited
Egypt a decade after the overthrow of the Fāṭimids, left a detailed description of the acts of veneration performed at the shrine of Ḥusayn in Cairo. The cult of Ḥusayn was introduced to Egypt by the Fāṭimids but, it seems, the people venerated him as a member of the Prophet’s extended family (ahl al-bayt) rather than as a Shi‘ī figure. The adoption and spread of certain Fāṭimid religious practices was a result of a receptive mood of the masses, which infused them with a new and different content.17

Throughout the 420s–450s/1030s–1060s, the Fāṭimid state saw the rise and fall of several military viziers and a steady decline of its international prestige. Fāṭimid Egypt became the ‘sick man on the Nile’ – an economically prosperous and politically weak country coveted by its powerful neighbours the Franks and Nūr al-Dīn of Damascus. From 560/1164 to 565/1169 the Franks and Nūr al-Dīn fought on Egyptian soil in an attempt to conquer Egypt, or at least to prevent their adversary from gaining any advantage in it. In 565/1169 the armies of the Crusader kingdom of Jerusalem withdrew from Egypt and Nūr al-Dīn’s expeditionary force led by Shīrkūh and later Saladin achieved supremacy in Egypt.

The rise of Saladin and Ayyūbid rule in Egypt

In 565/1169 Saladin was nominated as Fāṭimid vizier, but the safeguarding of Fāṭimid interests was not his priority. From the position of vizier and with the co-operation of key Fāṭimid administrators he began to undermine the position of al-ʿĀḍid, the last Fāṭimid ruling imam (555–67/1160–71). Saladin fought and destroyed the regiments of black infantry that were stationed in Cairo, dispossessed Fāṭimid amīrs of their fiyās (iqtā’s) and urban properties and established law colleges (madrasas) that symbolised Sunnī Islam. Members of Saladin’s family profited immensely from the establishment of the Ayyūbid rule in Egypt. Saladin’s father was granted the revenues of Alexandria and the Buḥayra province while Saladin’s brothers Tūrānsḥāh and Būrī received the revenues of Upper Egypt and the Faiyūm district. Saladin rendered the Fāṭimid state defunct and obliterated its Ismāʿīlī character even before the death of al-ʿĀḍid in 567/1171.

Saladin and his Ayyūbid successors brought Egypt back to the Sunnī fold and the main instrument of their policy was the establishment of law colleges whose teachers and students were supported through pious endowments (waqfs). The reinstitution of Sunnī Islam went without hindrance and was much facilitated by the fact that during the whole period of Fāṭimid rule in Egypt Ismāʿīlism was merely the state religion of the country, being professed
by the ruling family and people at the court but with little following among the population. In political and military terms, the main difference between the Fāṭimid and Ayyūbids lay in the internal distribution of power within the state, the formation of a new ruling elite and the creation of a new army totally unrelated to the old Fāṭimid military tradition. Although the Fāṭimid imams relinquished political power during the sixth/twelfth century, the Fāṭimid ruler had, until the very end of the dynasty, considerable liquid resources at his disposal and the court played a key political role. The military dictators in the Fāṭimid state failed to establish an independent legitimacy and their absolute powers were presented as rooted in a delegation of authority by the imam. For example, in inscriptions on buildings and fortifications commissioned by Badr al-Jamālī, he is referred to as the client (fâtâ) of al-Mustanṣir, and al-Mustanṣir’s patronymic (nisba) was bestowed on him. The terminology of patronage was employed to describe the supposed subordination of Badr to the Fāṭimid ruler. In reality, Badr’s title Amîr al-Juyûsh (Commander of the Armies) became his patronymic and his military slaves and properties were designated by it. Nonetheless, the fact that Badr consented to be publicly depicted as the fâtâ of al-Mustanṣir is very revealing. The military viziers of the sixth/twelfth century, including al-Afdal, failed to create networks of people with enduring loyalty and vested interests in the existence of their regimes. Saladin managed to legitimise his rule and to create ‘a functioning political system’, to use an expression coined by R. Stephen Humphreys. The Ayyūbids did not claim direct explicit divine authority. They claimed to enjoy God’s assistance and derived their legitimacy from their commitment and participation in the holy war, their support of the ‘Abbāsid caliph and the services rendered him, and being champions of justice. The Ayyūbid sultan al-’Ādil (the Just), for example, was referred to as al-mu’ayyad
(literally, supported and by implication divinely supported), the sultan of Islam and the Muslims who commands armies, fights the unbelievers and is the friend of the ‘Abbāsid caliph. Justice was a common Muslim political and ethical value and the only concept shared by the two different Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid systems of political legitimisation.

Until the death of Nūr al-Dīn in 570/1174, Saladin had to suppress any desire to manifest openly his political ambitions. He ruled Egypt independently, but avoided any public rift with Nūr al-Dīn, his formal overlord. Upon Nūr al-Dīn’s death, Saladin made his ambitions known and sought justification for his impending war against Nūr al-Dīn’s heirs in Syria. Saladin in his drive for legitimacy sought to receive ‘Abbāsid authorisation and presented his future campaigns in Syria as a necessary preparatory stage for wars against the Franks. He presented himself as an ‘Abbāsid servant and warrior of the holy war. Although Saladin fought other Muslim potentates for many years of his reign, his achievements in the holy war – the victory at Ḥaṭṭīn and the conquest of Jerusalem – won him fame and he became a legend in his own lifetime. Only rarely is the non-mythical Saladin discernible.

Saladin’s personal contribution to the creation of the Ayyūbid state was immense and his personal charisma made it a viable political entity. In the absence of strong central administration, the assignments of iqṭā’s ‘became the most crucial factor for maintaining the Ayyūbid state order’, to quote Sato Tsugitaka’s observation. The power to distribute iqṭā’s lay with Saladin and he had to balance three conflicting tendencies: the wish to have his sons inheriting his rule, the need to secure the co-operation of his brothers and the extended family, and the need to reward loyal amīrs. Territorial expansion was vital for maintaining internal stability and satisfying the urge of the ruling elite for wealth, power and status. When faced with conflicting interests between his familial personal concerns and the demands of his extended family and the expectations of the amīrs, Saladin ‘subordinated money to men’, as it has been aptly put by Malcom Cameron Lyons and D. E. P. Jackson. This policy left him in penury but made the others indebted and earned him fame as generous. The extent of Saladin’s political achievement is reflected by the fact that his state did not collapse under the onslaught of the Third Crusade and displayed cohesion in face of repeated military defeats.

Saladin’s engagements in Syria and his wars against the Franks kept him away from Egypt for long periods of time, and in 578/1182 he left Egypt and never returned to it. Until 579/1183 Egypt was ruled by Saladin’s elderly brother al-Mālik al-Ādil. Between 579/1183 and 582/1186, Saladin’s nephew Taqī al-Dīn ‘Umar ruled Egypt as regent for Saladin’s son al-Afdal. In 582/1186,
the government of Egypt was again in the hands of al-ʿĀdil who acted as regent for al-Mālik al-ʿĀzīz ʿUthmān, another son of Saladin. At the time of Saladin’s death in 589/1193, al-ʿĀdil was serving as governor of Jazīra and Diyar Bakr, and al-Mālik al-ʿĀzīz with the support of Saladin’s corps and amīrs became the master of Egypt. He died in 595/1198 and the nominal rule of his son, a nine-year-old boy, lasted only a year. In 596/1199, al-ʿĀdil conquered Egypt and was declared sultan of Syria and Egypt. He died in 615/1218 and his son al-Kāmil became the new sultan of Egypt. Al-Kāmil was deeply involved in the affairs of Ayyūbid Syria and was frequently absent from Egypt. Following al-Kāmil’s death in 635/1238, Egypt was ruled by his son al-Mālik al-Ṣāliḥ Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb, who gained control of the country in 637/1240 and ruled until 647/1249. Al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb died at a crucial moment in the history of Ayyūbid Egypt on the battlefield of al-Manṣūra, while fighting the Crusade of Louis IX. His widow, Shajar al-Durr, with the help of the commander-in-chief of al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb’s army and a small number of other people, concealed his death and sent for Tūrānshāh, al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb’s son, who was in Hiṣn Kayfā on the Upper Tigris. Against all odds, their actions were successful: Tūrānshāh arrived at al-Manṣūra and saw the defeat of Louis IX. However, Ayyūbid rule in Egypt was doomed, because of the animosity aroused between Tūrānshāh and al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb’s military slaves, who killed him and invested Shajar al-Durr as the sultāna of Egypt.26

Army and military institutions

As epitomised by the events that ultimately brought Ayyūbid rule in Egypt to its end, army and military institutions played a crucial role in the history of Ayyūbid Egypt and the history of the Ayyūbid confederacy as a larger political entity. The creator of the Ayyūbid army was Saladin and the army he built was an exclusively cavalry force composed of Turks and Kurds. It was a small and expensive army that was maintained through the iqṭāʿ system. For Saladin’s military build-up in Egypt we have three different accounts: the first concerns a military review held in Cairo in 567/1171, the second refers to Saladin’s army on the eve of its defeat at the battle of Mont Gisard (573/1177) and the third comes from the year 577/1181. In 567/1171, Saladin displayed his army made up of former Fāṭimid elements and new regiments in Cairo in front of Byzantine and Frankish emissaries. The army consisted of 167 ṭulbs, of which 147 were present at the parade. The ṭulb was a tactical formation whose strength varied from 70 to 100 to up to 200 horsemen. In all, 14,000 cavalry paraded and most of the troops belonged to the ṭawāší category while the rest were
qarāghulāms. The archbishop William of Tyre, a renowned historian of the Outremer, writes that Saladin brought 26,000 troops to the battle of Mont Gisard, but only 8,000 of these were ūwāshī and the rest were lightly armed qarāghulāms. The most instructive set of figures refers to Saladin’s budget of 577/1181. The military pay roll included 8,640 cavalry of which 6,976 were ūwāshī and 1,535 qarāghulāms, while the officer corps consisted of 111 amīrs. For the upkeep of the army 3,670,000 dinars were allocated and additional sums were paid to Bedouins. The army, including the Bedouins, was paid through the īqtā’ system.27

In comparison to the Fāṭimid period, the Ayyūbids of Egypt and Syria made a very limited use of infantry and their standing army (ʿaskar) was made up of cavalry only. For example, al-Muʿazzam ʿĪsā had a small high-quality cavalry force of 3,000 while the Ayyūbid rulers of Egypt had between 7,000 and 12,000 cavalry at their disposal. An insight into the military resources that were available to the Ayyūbid rulers of Egypt is offered by al-Nuwayrī’s account of al-Mālik al-ʿAzīz’s campaign into Syria in 590/1194. Al-Nuwayrī (677–733/1279–1333) writes that al-Mālik al-ʿAzīz left Cairo with a force of 2,000 cavalry made up of 1,000 troops of the ḥalqa (to be discussed below) and another regiment of 1,000 troops commanded by twenty-seven amīrs. He left an unspecified number of troops in Cairo and sent a garrison of 700 cavalry commanded by thirteen amīrs to Alexandria and Damietta.28 Ayyūbid armies were regularly augmented by nomads and occasionally by volunteers. The military role of the Bedouins was restricted, and therefore other nomadic groups such as Kurds, Turcomans and Khwarizmians were preferred. Volunteers for the holy war and other irregulars fought in the battles of Saladin as well as other Ayyūbid rulers and were called up by al-Kāmil to fight the Fifth Crusade, although their military value was negligible.

In contrast with the Fāṭimid period, the institution of military slavery played a minor role under the Ayyūbids and the servile component in the Ayyūbid armies was small. Surprisingly, the only contemporary sixth/twelfth-century description of military slavery is provided by William of Tyre. According to him, this institution utilised three sources of manpower: young prisoners-of-war, slaves bought in the slave-markets and the offspring of slave-mothers. William of Tyre says that they were trained in the art of war, and adult military slaves (mamlūks) received pay and large possessions, according to their merits. The military role of the mamlūks was to protect their master during battle, and victory depended largely on the military performance of the mamlūks.29
In many ways, the period of Saladin’s rule was not conducive to a flourishing of the institution of military slavery. Some of the conditions necessary for its proper functioning such as reliable sources for the supply of slaves and economic prosperity were lacking. Saladin spent most of his time on battlefields and had little time to supervise the training of his mamluks. The location of the installations associated with military slavery remains unknown. It seems that only the ḥalqa can be described as a unit composed of military slaves. It was Saladin’s private corps and its existence is attested from a very early period of Saladin’s rule. William of Tyre alludes to its presence at the battle of Mont Gisard by saying that 1,000 elite troops served as Saladin’s bodyguard. They, like Saladin himself, wore a distinctive yellow silk costume over their armour. However, on other occasions, Saladin’s ḥalqa was treated like any other military division and performed the task of advance guard in rotation with other units. During the siege of Jaffa (588/1192), the ḥalqa performed poorly and aroused the anger of the Kurds.

To what extent other Ayyūbid rulers cultivated military slaves is an open question. The Ashrafīyya corps, for example, is sometimes referred to as composed of military slaves (mamluks), but this characterisation cannot be accepted without some reservations. The political involvement of the Ashrafīyya, after the death of the sultan al-Kāmil, is well known and al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb who became the sultan of Egypt saw them as a threat to his rule. In 638/1240, a year after he gained control of Egypt, al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb took actions against the amīrs of the Ashrafīyya and deprived them of their iqṭā’s. In fact, al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb was the founder of the most famous slave corps in Ayyūbid history: the Bahṛi regiment. The Bahriyya was composed of Turkish military slaves and was designated to serve as the mainstay of al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb’s regime. It numbered only 800 to 1,000 mamluks and was stationed at the citadel on the Jazīra island opposite Cairo, which was built by al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb as the seat of his government. They fought well in the battle of Mansūra but felt threatened by Tūrānshāh, who unwisely alienated them.

Al-Nuwayrī quotes in his chronicle a text described by him as the ‘political testament’ of al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb. The text is cast in the form of advice-instructions given by al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb to his son Tūrānshāh and its authenticity is questionable, but it may provide explanations for some of al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb’s policies. Tūrānshāh was advised to trust the mamluks of his father, while the Turkish amīrs were accused of allowing the entry of simple people with no military training into the ranks of the army. Perhaps al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb’s cultivation of military slaves was motivated by both political and military reasons. His aim was to create a corps politically loyal to him and, at the same time, to improve
The fighting capability of his army. But his advice was not entirely consistent, as in the same breath he recommended that his son treat the amīrs well and to expand their iqtā’s in exchange for their commitment to increase the number of the troops they were obliged to provide for the sultan. Political reliance on military slaves had its price, however.33 The death of al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb deprived them of their master and as complete outsiders they had to fend for themselves as best as they could. Perhaps they could somehow relate to Shajar al-Durr, who was of Turkish extraction as they were and presented continuity and stability in contrast to an uncertain future under Tūrānshāh.

The amīrs were not the only ones criticised by al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb. The officials of the Office of Army were accused of obstructing the payment of the amīrs by dividing their iqtā’s among widely scattered locations. Al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb characterised these officials as Copts who deliberately sought to undermine the strength of the army. These accusations reflected an anti-Coptic mood characteristic of Ayyūbid Egypt, a period which saw the circulation of vicious anti-Christian propaganda. The truth of these accusations is hardly an issue. What is significant is the light they throw on the importance of the iqtā. i.e. granting to amīrs the right to collect taxes in the rural areas in lieu of salary, is well known and attested to by a variety of sources. In Fāṭimid Egypt, however, military iqtā was only one form of maintaining the army. Usually, the army received cash payments in several instalments over the year and in other cases black slave troops were settled on land. Saladin expanded the system of military iqtā and eventually it became the main, if not the only, way of maintaining the army. This trend is exemplified by the use of the word khubz (bread) as synonymous with military iqtā. In contrast to the Fāṭimid period, in the Ayyūbid period the muqta’ (the holder of the iqtā) did not pay the tithe. The value of the iqtā was calculated according to the annual average income (qibra) of the fief, and paid in dīnār jayshī, a monetary unit of account. The amīrs, according to the value of their iqtā, were obliged to maintain a certain number of cavalry troops.34

In Ayyūbid Egypt, members of the Ayyūbid family held vast territories designated as an iqtā al-khāṣṣa and they were also entitled to collect non-agricultural taxes. In 565/1169, Saladin’s father was granted Alexandria, the Buḥayra province of the eastern Delta and Damietta as iqtā, while Saladin’s brother Tūrānshāh received as iqtā the towns of Qūs and Aswān in Upper Egypt and ‘Aydāb on the Red Sea. Tūrānshāh’s iqtā yielded annual average income of 266,000 dinars but this was apparently insufficient for his needs since later he received additional iqtā’s in Egypt.35 Saladin skilfully manipulated
the iqtā’ system to serve his goals. He weakened the Fāṭimid army by depriving the Fāṭimid amīrs of their iqtā’s while distributing them among his men. He could achieve this only through the co-operation of Fāṭimid administrators in two of the relevant offices that dealt with iqtā’ in the Fāṭimid period: the Office of Army and Office of the iqtā’. What was the extent of Saladin’s own iqtā’s in Egypt remains unknown and the data concerning the revenues derived from Egypt under Saladin’s rule are sparse and difficult to work with. Qāḍī al-Fāḍil says that in 585/1189 the annual estimated revenue of Egypt from Alexandria to ‘Ayḍhāb was 4,600,035 dinars. Apparently, this sum refers to provinces under the iqtā’ system since he uses the term ‘ibna and says that there were additional sources of income.36 However, it would be highly misleading to assume that Saladin controlled the vast majority of the revenues of Egypt. Three years later, in 588/1192, the income of the office of the sultan’s Private Purse (ḍīwān al-khāṣṣ) was only 354,444 dinars. Al-‘Ādil’s income from Egypt was higher. In 578/1183, when he left the governorship of Egypt in favour of Taqī ‘l-Dīn the annual income from his iqtā’ was 700,000 dinars. In 615/1218, when al-‘Ādil died, there were 700,000 dinars in his treasury and an additional sum was kept at the fortress of Kerak.37

The military iqtā’ had profound repercussions on the administrative and military structure of Ayyūbid Egypt. In order to derive incomes from their iqtā’s, the amīrs, including the sultan, had to employ administrative staff. What could have been the relations between the state administration and the private administrative manpower of the amīrs is not mentioned in the sources. Perhaps the division of the amīrs’ iqtā’s among several locations was an attempt of the state administrators to maintain power in their hands and to keep the amīrs and their staff dependent on them. The pattern of military campaigns was also influenced by the iqtā’ system. From the point of view of the muqṭa’ his presence on the iqtā’ during harvest time was essential. Therefore campaigning was possible only after the harvest during the summer months and must have ended soon enough to allow the amīrs to return to their iqtā’s. The Franks faced the same problems and constraints.

Egypt and the wars of the Crusades

During the Fāṭimid period, Egypt’s involvement in the wars of the Crusades was limited and sporadic, it posed no economic burden, and the ideology of jihad played no role in the Fāṭimid policy towards the Franks. Between 492/1099 and 504/1110, the Fāṭimids lost Jerusalem and all of the Mediterranean coastal towns except for Tyre and Ascalon. In 517/1123, the Fāṭimids invaded
Palestine with ground and naval forces and suffered a humiliating defeat at the battle of Yabne (Ibelin) while their fleet was defeated by a Venetian squadron off the coast of al-‘Arîsh. The failure at the battle of Ascalon in 492/1099 and the two defeats in 517/1123 had a debilitating effect on the Fâtimid will to fight the Crusaders. In 549/1154, owing to internal power struggles in Cairo, the Fâtimids lost Ascalon to the Franks and their ability to send armies to Palestine was impaired. In 552/1157 and again in 553/1158, the Fâtimid military vizier Ṭalâ‘ī’ ibn Ruzzîk launched naval and ground incursions against the Franks, but rejected Nûr al-Dîn’s exhortations to wage with him holy war against the Crusader kingdom of Jerusalem. Ṭalâ‘ī’ ibn Ruzzîk preferred to pay the Franks a modest annual tribute of 33,000 dinars and to maintain a truce with them. The invasions of Egypt by the Franks between 560/1164 and 565/1169 were a result of attendant circumstances. The vizier Shâwar in his private bid for power managed to involve both Nûr al-Dîn and the kingdom of Jerusalem in the affairs of Egypt and to bring them to fight on Egyptian soil for his interests.

The lure of Egypt cast a powerful spell on the Crusader kingdom and the Franks needed few external inducements to get involved in Fâtimid internal affairs. The Franks gathered economic information and possessed a list of Egyptian villages with the incomes derived from them. On the eve of the 564/1168 invasion of Egypt, Amalric, the king of Jerusalem, made various promises to his vassals and allies concerning future grants of fiefs in Egypt.38 The rulers of both Damascus and Jerusalem considered the conquest of Egypt to be a feasible undertaking within their reach. The ultimate failure of the Franks was a reflection of their restricted military resources and tactical mistakes. On 2 Šafar 564/5 November 1168, the Franks conquered Bilbays and massacred the population. Contemporary Jewish sources tell a grim story of the fate of the survivors, who were put on sale in the slave-markets of Palestine.39 The conduct of the Franks inspired awe and brought Shâwar to take irrational steps: on 9 Šafar 564/12 November 1168 he set Fuṣṭâṭ on fire. He was afraid that the Franks advancing from Bilbays would use Fuṣṭâṭ as a springboard for the conquest of Cairo. Cairo, however, was a fortified town and considerable military forces were stationed in it, and an all-out attack on the town was beyond Amalric’s military means. Amalric found himself in a difficult situation. While fighting against Cairo, he faced the appearance of Nûr al-Dîn’s sizeable force to the rear. The withdrawal of Amalric from Egypt (Rabi‘ II 564/January 1169) paved the way for the eventual Ayyûbid takeover.

One of Saladin’s lessons from the Frankish invasions of Egypt between 560/1164 and 565/1169 was the need to fortify the capital, Fuṣṭâṭ-Cairo. In 566/1171, the damaged walls of Cairo were repaired and Saladin embarked on an
ambitious project of encircling the capital by a single wall. The works began in 572/1176 and were never completed, but in 604/1207 the building of the citadel was finished. The citadel was built on the Muqattam Hill on a site which contained small mosques and tombs that were destroyed, but the stone needed for the construction work was procured from dismantling small pyramids at Giza. The citadel became the seat of the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk sultans of Egypt. Another concern of Saladin was the defence of Egypt’s towns on the Mediterranean coast. In Şafar 565/October 1169, a Byzantine fleet supported by the ground forces of the kingdom of Jerusalem converged on Damietta. The Byzantine fleet was composed of galleys, ships adapted for amphibious landing of cavalry on beaches and transport ships. The siege came to nothing, because of deep mistrust between the Franks and the Byzantines, and severe winter storms aggravated the situation of the besieging forces. In Dhu’l-Ḥijja 569/July 1174, the Normans of Sicily attacked Alexandria. According to Arabic sources, the Norman fleet brought an expeditionary force of 50,000 men and a great quantity of equipment, including catapults which shot black stones brought from Sicily especially for that purpose. The defenders, however, put up a strong and effective resistance and the siege was discontinued after two weeks. These two sieges demonstrated the vast naval resources that were available to the Christian Mediterranean powers. In spite of his previous unfamiliarity with the sea and maritime issues, Saladin understood Egypt’s naval needs and was ready to invest in the defence of the coastal towns and rebuilding the navy. During his reign, fortification works were carried out in Alexandria, Damietta and Tinnis and warships were constructed in Cairo. Ibn Abī Ṭayy (575–630/1179–1232), the historian of Aleppo, claims that Saladin’s naval programme began in 572/1176 and involved the building of galleys and recruitment of naval personnel. Al-Maqrīzī writes that Saladin established the Office of Navy and allocated several sources of revenue for its needs. Saladin’s greatest naval achievement was the rebuilding of the navy in Egypt, and his fleets raided Christian shipping off the Palestine coast and were also involved in siege operations against coastal towns. However, the overall performance of Saladin’s navy was poor. It suffered a humiliating defeat off Tyre in 583/1187 and found itself trapped inside the port of Acre during the protracted battle for the town (585–7/1189–91). With the fall of Acre numerous ships and galleys were lost.

Al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb was very aware of the importance of naval power when fighting the Crusades and in his political testament he urged his son to pay attention to the navy. However, his own testimony reveals that the navy was seriously underpaid and its manpower was of poor quality.
Ayyūbid period no effective navy existed and therefore the coast of Egypt was exposed to Christian sea-borne attacks. Tinnis, for example, was abandoned in 585/1189 and eventually destroyed in 624/1227, and Damietta was conquered during the Fifth Crusade of St Louis.

In Rabī’ I 615/May 1218, the army of the Fifth Crusade established a bridgehead west of Damietta, but it conquered the town only in 616/1219. The death of Sultan al-ʿĀdil in Syria in Jumâdâ II 615/August 1218 sparked off a rebellion against al-Kâmil by one of his leading amīrs, the Kurd Ibn al-Mashtûb, whose aim was to install al-Kâmil’s younger brother al-Fāʾîz Ibrâhîm as the Ayyūbid sultan of Egypt. Al-Kâmil abandoned his military camp opposite Damietta and fled south to the small town of Ashmûn Ẓannâh. The flight of the sultan scattered his forces and the Crusaders seized the Muslim camp with its supplies and equipment. The situation was saved by the timely arrival of al-Kâmil’s brother, al-Muʿazzam Īsâ, with reinforcements from Syria. Al-Muʿazzam restored order in al-Kâmil’s camp: he exiled both Ibn al-Mashtûb and Fāʾîz Ibrâhîm to Syria and ordered the demolition of the walls of Jerusalem.

It was a desperate and highly unpopular move, driven by al-Muʿazzam’s fear that the Franks might conquer the town and entrench themselves in it. The fall of Damietta brought al-Kâmil to renew his offer of a peace treaty by which he would grant the Franks extensive territories in Palestine, including Jerusalem, for the return of Damietta. The papal legate Pelagius of Albano – who waited in vain for the arrival of Frederick II – rejected al-Kâmil’s peace offer. Only in 618/1221 did the Crusaders begin advancing south from Damietta towards Cairo, but their advance came to a halt opposite al-Mansûra, while Muslim forces blocked their means of retreat to Damietta. Eventually, the army of the Fifth Crusade surrendered and left Egypt on 19 Rajab 618/30 August 1221.

Al-Kâmil’s readiness to cede Jerusalem, which was not disputed by al-Muʿazzam, set the precedent for the way al-Kâmil dealt with the threat of Frederick II’s Crusade in 626–7/1228–9. Frederick II’s advanced force landed in 625/1227 in Acre and in the same year al-Muʿazzam died, leaving Damascus under the rule of his young and inexperienced son, al-Nāṣir Daʿūd. Al-Kâmil was trying to attain two parallel goals: to negotiate a peace treaty with Frederick II and to dislodge al-Nāṣir Daʿūd from Damascus. During the summer of 626/1228 al-Kâmil seized Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus from al-Nāṣir Daʿūd, and in 627/1229 he reached an agreement with Frederick II. Al-Kâmil ceded Jerusalem, except for the Temple Mount (al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf), and territories along the route from Acre to Jerusalem. Al-Nāṣir Daʿūd tried to create a popular outcry against the agreement, which was also resisted by the
population of Jerusalem that felt forced to leave the town. On the whole, al-Kāmil’s appeasement policy towards Frederick II paid off. He avoided military confrontation with him and was able to dislodge al-Nāṣir Daʿūd from Damascus (summer 627/1229). Although the territories held by the Franks in Palestine stretched from Tripoli to Jaffa, they lacked depth and the position of the Franks in Jerusalem was untenable. In 637/1239, al-Nāṣir Daʿūd, who lost Damascus but received in compensation Transjordan, restored Muslim rule in Jerusalem. The desire to regain Jerusalem was the driving force behind the Crusade of St Louis, whose army took Damietta in 647/1249. The fall of the town started the chain of events that ultimately brought about the demise of Ayyūbid rule in Egypt.

The wars of the Crusades exacted a heavy price from the Ayyūbid rulers of Egypt who, on the whole, were more successful in defending Egypt than their Fāṭimid predecessors. This relative success was a result of historical circumstances and the strength of the Ayyūbid army. The Christian campaigns against Damietta were an attempt to make the most of the European naval advantage, but also reflected the lack of a secure territorial base in Palestine and the absence of adequate local military resources. Everything had to be brought from Europe: troops, equipment and supplies. Saladin’s victory at Ḥattīn and the collapse of the kingdom of Jerusalem had long-term consequences and made any attempt to recreate the kingdom and hold Jerusalem impossible.

Ayyūbid armies proved to be far more capable of resisting the Franks than the Fāṭimid army ever had been, and this was due to Saladin’s military policy that was continued by other Ayyūbid sultans. When the military aspects of the wars of the Crusades are considered, it must be emphasised that the Crusader and Muslim armies of the Fāṭimid–Ayyūbid period were constructed differently. The main military asset of the Franks was the close co-operation between infantry and cavalry and the cavalry charge delivered by the knights. The Fāṭimids maintained a large army of tens of thousands whose main task was to keep the regime in power. To achieve this aim, black slave infantry was instrumental, but the army as a whole was ridden by ethnic animosities and this led to lack of cohesion. Fāṭimid armies that fought the Crusaders performed poorly and were easily defeated. The Muslim armies of the Zangid and Ayyūbid period fought as mounted archers capable of shooting massive volleys of arrows. The different styles of warfare of the Franks and the Muslims were well understood by the Zangid sultan Nūr al-Dīn (541–70/1146–74) of Syria, who is quoted as saying that the arrows of the Turks were the only effective weapon against the knights and their way of fighting. The
Ayyūbid armies, although small, were cohesive when fighting the Franks and were, on the whole, successful.

**Egypt’s international trade and economy**

The Fāṭimid conquest of Egypt was a turning point in the development of Egypt’s position as a Mediterranean trading power. During the North African phase of the Fāṭimid state (298–358/909–69), trade relations were established between the Fāṭimids and Amalfi, and Amalfitan merchants followed the Fāṭimids to Egypt. In 386/996, for example, 160 Amalfitans who stayed in Cairo were killed in riots and goods worth 90,000 dinars were looted from them. The Fāṭimid authorities made every effort to return the looted goods to those who survived the riots and to punish the looters. They put to death Muslims suspected of rioting and looting. The way the Fāṭimids dealt with the riots reveals that they were protecting vital state interests and strove to convince the Amalfitians that the regime would protect them. The executions were instrumental in conveying this message to both the Amalfitians and the local population. In the long term the Fāṭimid damage-control effort proved successful and throughout the fifth/eleventh century Italian and Byzantine merchants regularly visited Egypt.

The massive presence of Amalfitan traders and the high estimate of the goods looted from them can be understood as indicating that by the end of the fourth/tenth century the trade links between Egypt and India were already established. Two accounts from the period of al-Mu‘izz and al-‘Azīz support this assumption. Al-Mu‘izz during his rule in Egypt (363–5/973–5) ordered the purchase of a high-quality Abnūs wood and his order was handled by a merchant named al-Sawādikī, who carried it out through his commercial connections in Hijāz and Aden. The quantity requested by al-Mu‘izz is not specified, but it took more than two months to supply the wood that was shipped from Aden to al-Qulzum. The Abnūs wood grows in Ethiopia and India and was known in Antiquity to both the Jews and the Greeks, and it is quite possible that the wood requested was supplied from Ethiopia. The second report, however, is far more explicit about the commercial ties between Egypt and India. In 385/995, al-‘Azīz received aloewood (‘ūd, used for medical purposes) as a present from India. As scant as the evidence of the Arabic sources is, it points out that towards the end of the fourth/tenth century Egypt’s trade with India was a commercial reality, and this throws new light on the significance of the Fāṭimid conquest of Egypt. During the North African period of the Fāṭimid state a local commercial
system emerged: it connected southern Italy, Sicily and Tunisia, and within this system Amalfi played an important role. The Amalfitians followed the Fāṭimids to Egypt where they got access to spices and Indian goods, and the result was expansion of trade in both volume and value. What began as a restricted local system turned into a truly Mediterranean trade system.

Another point that must be considered is the role of Byzantium in the fourth/tenth-century Mediterranean trade. As has been pointed out by David Jacoby, Egypt’s trade with Byzantium during the fourth/tenth century prior to the Fāṭimid conquest was far more extensive than usually assumed. The Fāṭimids in Tunisia maintained complex relations with the Byzantines, which involved military and naval confrontations as well as diplomatic contacts. The Fāṭimid conquest of Egypt and their expansion into Palestine and Syria turned northern Syria into a zone of confrontation between the Fāṭimids and Byzantium. Although throughout the Middle Ages war and commerce were not mutually exclusive, the hostilities between the Fāṭimids and the Byzantines were not conducive to making the Byzantines the main Fāṭimid trading partners. The small town of Amalfi, unlike Byzantium, neither posed a threat to the Fāṭimids nor challenged their expansion in the eastern Mediterranean and this facilitated Fāṭimid–Amalfi trade relations. Amalfi benefited from its position as a promoter of trade with the Muslim world and, at the same time, maintained good trade relations with Byzantium.

From the fifth/eleventh century onwards the Mediterranean trade of Egypt vastly expanded and Italian and Byzantine merchants became the main trading partners of both the Fāṭimids and the Ayyūbids. Egypt served as a land bridge for the trade between India and the Mediterranean, and spices and other Indian products attracted Muslim, Jewish and Christian merchants to Alexandria and Cairo. The period of the Mediterranean trade during the fifth/eleventh to seventh/thirteenth centuries is well known through the Jewish documents of the Cairo Geniza and the monumental studies of S. D. Goitein and other Geniza scholars, notable among them Abraham L. Udovitch, Menahem Ben-Sasson, Norman A. Stillman, Moshe Gil, Şabîh ʿAwdah and most recently Miriam Frenkel. The documents known as the Cairo Geniza have their origin in the Jewish tradition, which regards writings in which the name of God appears as sacred and requiring to be buried. The Geniza chamber of the synagogue in Fuṣṭâṭ served as the burial room for every kind of writing which originated within the Jewish community of Fuṣṭâṭ, including letters of traders written in Judaeo-Arabic, and occasionally Arabic. The contribution of the Arabic sources must not be ignored. The most important are the administrative texts of al-Makhzûmî and Ibn
Mammātī, which have been studied by Claude Cahen, Hassanein Rabie and Richard Stefan Cooper. These texts provide information on the taxes levied on traders in Egypt and reflect the economic significance of this trade for the Fāṭimid–Ayyūbīd rulers.

It is impossible to provide a full picture of the Mediterranean trade here, but three points must be emphasised. (1) The Fāṭimid expansion in Palestine and Syria also integrated the ports of the eastern Mediterranean in the Fāṭimid trade network. The testimony of the Geniza documents and the account of the Persian traveller Nāṣir-i Khusrāw (439/1047) provide compelling evidence for the commercial importance of towns such as Tripoli and Tyre which were frequented by Muslim and Christian merchants and the Fāṭimid rulers maintained there their own commercial interests.52 (2) The sixth/twelfth to seventh/thirteenth-century commerce of Alexandria was very extensive. The volume and the significance of the commercial traffic that went through Alexandria is mirrored by the presence of 3,000 European and other merchants in the town in 608/1211 and the close commercial relations that al-Āḍīl maintained with a Venetian merchant.53 (3) For Egypt’s Mediterranean trade to prosper, the parties involved had to be flexible and frequently they were faced by difficult dilemma. Arabic sources reflect full awareness of the role of Genoa in the fall of the coastal towns of Palestine and Syria during the Crusades and Qāḍī al-Fāḍil in a letter to Baghdad in 570/1174 referred to the Italians as both enemies and trading partners. Europeans also had to make their choices: much to their dislike, they supplied Egypt with essential naval and military supplies, including military slaves.54

The focus on trade should not obscure the fact that the wealth of the country depended on the agricultural output. In normal years Egypt’s agriculture produced great annual surpluses of grain and flax for export. How the household grain-economy of the Fāṭimid regime worked is known from al-Maqrīzī’s Khiṭaṭ. Al-Maqrīzī, in his account, combined information derived from Ibn al-Ma’mūn (d. 588/1192) and Ibn Ṭuwayr. State lands were scattered all over Egypt and grain for the use of the court was shipped to Cairo, but other shipments went to Alexandria, Tinnīs and Damietta. From these towns grain was shipped to Tyre and Ascalon. Tyre until its fall to the Crusaders in 518/1124 received 70,000 irdabb of grain annually, while Ascalon (lost to the Crusaders in 548/1153) received 50,000 irdabb. In Cairo the regime stored 300,000 irdabb of grain in several granaries (makḥāzin). The regime allocated its grain to the employees of the state and the court, to those who were entitled to state-sponsored charities, to the black corps of the army and navy, and to the royal Guest House. One should add the grain sent annually to
the Holy Cities of Arabia to this list. The grain intended for consumption by the ruler and his family was ground at special mills operated by slave-girls of the palace. The Fāṭimids maintained a fleet of Nile boats that shipped grain and wood needed by the regime to Cairo. Altogether the Fāṭimids had one million irdabbs of grain at their disposal.55

What the accounts of Ibn al-Ma’mūn and Ibn Ṭuwayr describe is how the household grain-economy of the Fāṭimid regime worked. Parallel to this system operated the grain free market. However, the household grain-economy of the Fāṭimid regime and the free market were not strictly separated systems. The grain policy of the regime, as exemplified by the operation of the matjar, had a profound impact on the free market. This term is widely attested to during the Fāṭimid–Ayyūbid period and is generally understood as meaning the Office of Commerce. In the Fāṭimid period, the matjar bought grain on the free market and later sold it for profit. In 444/1052, the vizier al-Yāżūrī urged al-Mustansır to abolish the grain purchases carried out by the matjar, arguing that these were not always profitable. He advised that the matjar practice should be implemented in respect of non-perishable goods such as wood, soap, iron, lead and honey.56 The Ayyūbid grain policy must have been similar to that of the Fāṭimids and, as borne out by the writings of al-Qalqashandī, the realities of the Mamlūk age closely resembled those of the Fāṭimid–Ayyūbid period.57

Large segments of the urban population, if not the majority, lived at subsistence level. Bread was the staple and for many the only food available. When freshly harvested grain arrived at the grain ports of Cairo it was taxed. The taxation of grain is widely documented for the whole period of the middle ages. In the free market several professional groups operated: at the highest level we find the wheat merchants (qammāḥūn) and brokers (samāṣir). The millers (ṭahḥānūn) and flour merchants (daqqāqūn) were buying wheat from the wheat merchants and brokers and selling it to people of the upper and middle middle class (if such terms can be used to describe medieval society). People of these classes often tried to buy the wheat needed for their annual household consumption and they had the means to bake bread for themselves. Other segments of the population – the lower middle class, the working class and the vast urban underclass – were dependent for their supplies of bread on the bread vendor (khabbāz) or the oven-owner (farrān). This dependency had serious drawbacks since the wheat market was almost always a buyer’s market and prices of wheat and bread fluctuated sharply, while buying bread on the streets from the khabbāz was regarded as socially demeaning.
In the period under discussion, two large-scale famines occurred in Egypt: one in 414–15/1024–5 and the other between 595/1198 and 597/1200. When the Nile failed to reach its plenitude the effect was twofold: on the year it occurred – the current year – and of course on the next one. The shortages that occurred in the current year came about as the result of buying for the future or hoarding in preparation for an impending shortage. The actions of the government during the current year were of critical importance. The abolition of taxes on grain, temporarily, could have been an effective tool to combat rising prices of grain and bread. Medieval regimes, however, were very reluctant to abolish taxes on grain. For example, in 415/1025 taxes on grain were lifted only at the height of the famine, but this was too late to have any real effect on prices. Another tool in the hands of the government was the declaration of maximum prices (tasʿīr) for grain, flour and bread. This policy was usually implemented more readily, yet was ineffective and brought sales to a standstill. The most effective tool the government had to combat rising prices and shortage was the selling of grain from its own stocks and forcing people of the ruling class to do the same. These steps were taken during the famine of 595–7/1198–1200 when Sultan al-ʿĀdil distributed grain to the poor, and his example was followed by amīrs and people of means.

Famines were dreaded and horrific and caused immense human suffering. During the two famines of the Fāṭimid–Ayyūbid period people were reduced to cannibalism. The wider demographic impact of famines is, however, far more difficult to assess. The cumulative effect of the 595–7/1198–1200 famine was devastating and signs of depopulation in the capital and the rural areas were visible, but it cannot be said that this famine was responsible for the economic deterioration, not to say ultimate decline, of Ayyūbid Egypt.

The matjar continued to function throughout the Ayyūbid period and its two main aims were to secure a steady supply of strategic materials, such as timber and iron for the state, and levy taxes on European merchants which sold goods to the state. This office also monopolised the sale of alum to European merchants. This monopoly was motivated by the need to pay for strategic materials and the desire to minimise the outflow of gold from the Treasury. The operation of the Office of Commerce throws some light on the economic policies of the Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid regimes. Both regimes were deeply involved in the economic life of the country and used their political authority to secure the supply of agricultural products (grain and fodder) and manufactured goods (textiles and weapons) that the state needed. The production of inscribed textiles (ṭīrāz) and luxurious fabrics came under close governmental supervision and partial monopoly. Certain inscribed textiles
were produced for the exclusive use of the Fāṭimid regime, which also supervised their delivery to Cairo. Textiles played an important role in the ceremonial and social life of the court, and the Fāṭimid regime bestowed garments on the employees of the state on a regular basis. The intervention of the Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid regimes in Egypt’s international trade aimed at maximisation of state incomes through taxation and the procurement of strategic materials that were available only through foreign traders. Parallel with the intervention of the rulers in trade they as well as other members of the ruling establishment were engaged in trade as private people seeking private gains. Furthermore, the ruling elite was also capable of coaxing the merchants into providing tax collection services for them.

Pious endowments, learning and welfare

The payment of zakāt, the obligatory alms-tax, constitutes one of the five Pillars of Islam, but zakāt did not evolve into any kind of social leveller and its handling by the state was a dismal failure. Data on its collection and distribution in medieval Islam is limited and we lack information concerning zakāt for the duration of the Fāṭimid period in Egypt. The earliest concrete information we have in Egypt dates from the beginning of Saladin’s rule. In 570/1171, shortly after the demise of the Fāṭimid dynasty, Saladin ordered the distribution of zakāt among those who were entitled to it, such as the poor, travellers and insolvent debtors.61 Most of the accounts referring to zakāt in the Ayyūbid period deal with the way it was collected and not the way it was distributed, leaving the impression that it turned into yet another form of taxation.

In contrast to the paucity of information concerning zakāt, the sources contain abundant references to ṣadaqa, voluntary charity, and pious endowments (waqf/hubs, pl. awqaṭ/ahbās). The notion of charity was deeply embedded in the ethics and religious thought of medieval Islam. The distribution of ṣadaqa by the Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid rulers, especially on the occasion of religious festivals, is well attested in the sources. Ṣadaqa had many faces. On the personal level, the dispensation of charity was a way to implore God for deliverance and served as expiation for sins committed. Rulers used ṣadaqa as an expression of gratitude to God for victories and, on the public level, the distribution of charity was often politically motivated. Ṣadaqa must be discussed in conjunction with waqf since every pious endowment was by definition a charity dedicated for the sake of God. Legally, a property set apart as a pious endowment was considered as inalienable in perpetuity and became the property of God.
Some of the earliest surviving examples of pious endowment deeds (waqf- fyyāt) are from Egypt and the pious endowment institution is relatively well documented for pre-Fātimid Egypt and throughout the Fātimid–Ayyūbid period. For example, one of the most renowned charitable persons of the fourth/tenth century was the vizier Abū Bakr al-Mādharaʿī, who owned extensive rural properties. He turned some of them into a pious endowment for the Holy Cities of Arabia. His endowment can be regarded as the forerunner of the waqf al-Ḥaramayn of the later middle ages. The earliest known Fātimid pious endowment is the waqf created by al-Ḥākim in 401/1010 for the Azhar Mosque in Cairo as well as other congregational mosques in the capital, including a teaching institution, dār al-ḥikma, that had been established in 365/975. The properties endowed were urban commercial properties in the capital city. In 405/1014, al-Ḥākim set up another pious endowment in support of Qurʿān reciters and muezzins at the congregational mosques of Fuṣṭâṭ- Cairo, the filling in of cisterns, the upkeep of a hospital and the provision of shrouds for the dead. The properties endowed were a mixture of urban commercial sites and rural estates and this combination was not fortuitous. The aim was to assure the longevity of the foundation by diversifying and spreading the properties between urban and rural locations and thus to provide a steady flow of revenues. The urban commercial properties generated income all year round, while rural lands only generated income after the harvest. Al-Ḥākim was also the first known ruler in Egypt who financed a teaching institution through the pious endowment system. In dār al-ḥikma there were several groups of scholars with different specialisations and the institution was provided with books from the palace library. Scholars could copy books there while the cost of paper, ink and the drinking water provided for the users was defrayed by al-Ḥākim.

It was Saladin, however, who institutionalised the use of the pious endowment system for the support of law colleges (madrasas) as a state policy. Saladin’s first law colleges in Fuṣṭâṭ were established when he served as Fātimid vizier and were part of his policy to restore Sunnī Islam in Egypt and undermine the Fātimid state. Other Ayyūbid rulers and members of the military and civilian elite emulated Saladin’s policy. Most of the Ayyūbid law colleges were founded in the capital and, as a result, many urban properties in Fuṣṭâṭ and Cairo and even some agricultural lands were tied up in pious endowments set up for these institutions. Others were built in the Fayyūm, but there is little evidence for setting up of law colleges in other towns or regions of Egypt. Saladin clearly preferred Shāfiʿī jurists and Ashʿarī theology but, during the Ayyūbid period, law colleges were also built for the Mālikīs,
Although the study of charitable institutions in medieval Islam is in its infancy, some waqf-supported charitable institutions are known to exist in pre-Fāṭimid Egypt and others were set up during the Fāṭimid–Ayyūbid period. For example, Abū Bakr al-Mādharāʾī built in the Qarāfa, the area of the cemeteries around the capital, a lodge (ribāt) for ashraʾf women (i.e. the descendants of Ḥasan and Ḥūsayn, the two sons of ʿAlī and Fāṭima), which was supported by a pious endowment. This indicates that it provided not only housing, but also food to its occupants. Sharīfs (ashrāf) were also the beneficiaries of a pious endowment set up by the Fāṭimid vizier Ṭalāʾīʾ ibn Ruzzik in 556/1160. The most impressive charitable institution in pre-Fāṭimid Egypt was, however, the hospital built in 261/875 by Ahmad ibn Ṭūlūn in Fustät. A rich pious endowment was dedicated for its upkeep and it was designated for the exclusive use of the civilian population, with no entrance given to Ahmad ibn Ṭūlūn’s military slaves. In the Ṭūlūnid hospital there was a special ward for the mentally sick and for some time the ruler used to visit the hospital and personally supervise its administration. The subsequent history of the hospital is poorly recorded, but it must have enjoyed support and funding from the Fāṭimid rulers. After Ahmad ibn Ṭūlūn, Saladin was the most enthusiastic founder of hospitals in Egypt. In all, he built three hospitals in Alexandria, Cairo and Fustat, the largest being the Cairo hospital. It had three wards: for men, women and the mentally sick. The hospital was well stocked with medicines, physicians conducted two daily rounds and the ancillary staff carried out their orders. The hospital in Fustat operated in the same way but was smaller. Other charitable institutions, if they existed, are not referred to in the sources.

Charitable services were not necessarily dependent on formal institutions. Pious endowments were also set up to finance charitable services such as ransom of prisoners-of-war and distribution of food. Muslim rulers saw the release of Muslim prisoners held by Christian powers such as Byzantium and the kingdom of Jerusalem as their duty. During the fourth/tenth century, regular exchanges of captives took place between the ‘Abbāsids and the Byzantines, and Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid rulers stipulated the release of Muslim prisoners as part of the agreements they signed with Byzantium. Saladin liberated many thousands of Muslim prisoners in the towns he conquered from the Franks after Ḥaṭṭīn and, in Jerusalem, set free 3,000 captives, whom he provided with clothes. Individuals were also involved in the ransom of captives and Abū Bakr al-Mādharāʾī, for example, paid for the ransom of captured Muslims who were brought for ransom to Alexandria in 343/954. Qāḍī al-Fāḍil went a step further and set up a special pious endowment for the
ransom of captives. He dedicated to that purpose the revenues of a caravan-serai that he owned in Cairo.\textsuperscript{68}

Under medieval conditions, feeding the poor and providing water for the public were the two most essential social services that charitable people could and did provide. A prophetic tradition says that ‘offering water is a charity that brings the greatest reward’. Fittingly one of the oldest known water supply projects is the well constructed in Fustat by the vizier Ja'far ibn Faḍl during the mid-fourth/tenth century. The whole project, which involved a well and seven cisterns, was endowed for public use and is known from an inscription quoted in late literary sources. Food distributions were provided by some of the top-ranking Fāṭimid courtiers and amīrīs. Shaqiq al-Mulk, for example, was a eunuch of the Fāṭimid ruler al-Ḥāfiz (r. 525–44/1130–9) and his Treasurer. He used to distribute food according to a list he had prepared among the people who lived in the Qarāfa cemetery and Muqattam Hill. Even more impressive were the food distributions of Ḥusām al-Dīn Lu'lu', a former Fāṭimid amīr and Saladin’s admiral. Every day he distributed cooked food and 12,000 loaves of bread in the Qarāfa, supervising the entire operation personally.\textsuperscript{69}

The interplay between political, social and religious aspects of the support given by the state to the religious class and the poor is nicely illustrated by the Fāṭimid budget of 517/1123. In that year 468,790 dinars were spent on the army, military activities and the maintenance of the court. The internal breakdown of these expenses remains unknown, but the budgetary items are specified and these include payments for naval and land campaigns against the Franks, salaries to certain military corps, stocking the treasuries of the palace, meat for the palace kitchen, and clothes and goods for the court. In addition, there was expenditure on festivities and processions, including the distribution of charity and support for converts to Islam, payments for the hosting of foreign visitors to the court, the expenses for dār al-ṭirāz and dār al-dībāj (i.e. the production and storage of fabrics and garments used by the court) and payments for governors when they assumed new posts. Another 98,197 dinars were spent on military expeditions and the maintenance of border towns, while the fabulous sum of 767,294 dinars was allocated to cover the expenses of the court of the vizier al-Ma’mūn al-Batā‘ihi, this money being used to pay the vizier and his family and various groups of people employed at his court. It seems that the salaries amounted to 200,000 dinars annually and a certain sum (16,628 dinars) was dedicated for regular payments to very different groups of people: people of noble lineage and poor men and women and beggars.\textsuperscript{70} The Fāṭimid practice of state-sponsored charity to selected groups of the poor went back to Muḥammad ibn Ṭughj al-Ikhshīd (323–34/935–46),


the semi-independent ruler of Egypt, who was the first to pay them *rawātib*. Usually, this term refers to salaries paid to state employees, but in this context it must be understood as meaning state charity paid on a regular basis. During the rule of Kāfūr (355–7/966–8), these payments rose to the fabulous, apparently exaggerated, sum of 500,000 dinars.\textsuperscript{71} Saladin’s budget of 517/1181 comprised two types of payments: to the army and to *qādīs*, jurists and mystics. *Qādīs* were state employees, who received monthly salaries, but other jurists and mystics received, it seems, payments from the state without being formal state employees. Many jurists and mystics were affiliated with *waqf*-supported law colleges and lodges for mystics and, it would appear, did not need direct state support. Saladin’s budget nicely illustrates the nature of medieval Islamic charity which, being either state sponsored or given by individuals, preferred the learned and mystics over the poor. The same is true for *waqf*-supported institutions: the vast majority of these were founded to maintain learning and the mystics rather than for charitable causes.

The wider context against which the question of *sadaqa* and *waqf* must be examined is that of the Islamic state and its obligations, or lack of obligations, to its subjects. S. D. Goitein, for instance, has characterised medieval Islamic states as indifferent to the needs of the ‘faltering individual’.\textsuperscript{72} As a broad generalisation, this reflects Islamic medieval realities well. However, Muslim rulers did support the religious class and occasionally distributed charity to the poor. In the specific cases of the Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid rulers of Egypt, they used the wealth of the country to buttress their rule through maintaining army and court. But they also used it to uphold Islamic values and, to a certain extent, to diffuse social tension and relieve social misery.

**Conclusions**

The Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid rulers left a permanent imprint on Egypt. The most lasting Fāṭimid contribution to the medieval history of Egypt was the integration of Egypt into the Mediterranean trading system and linking it with the Indian Ocean trade. The Fāṭimids also built Cairo, but the Ayyūbids endowed it with Sunnī institutions. The Sunnī character of Egypt was shaped by Saladin and the Ayyūbids while Ismā‘īlism remained only a transient episode in the history of Muslim Egypt. The shaping of the Islamic Sunnī identity of Egypt under the Ayyūbids did not mean that a full Islamisation of the population was achieved. This happened only in the Mamlūk period.
II Fāṭimids, 297–367/909–1171

1 297/909 ‘Abd Allāh (‘Ubayd Allāh) ibn Husayn, Abū Muḥammad al-Mahdī
2 322/934 Muḥammad, Abū ‘l-Qāsim al-Qā’im (son of 1?)
3 334/946 Ismā‘īl, Abū Ṭāhir al-Manṣūr (son of 2)
4 341/953 Ma‘add, Abū Tamīm al-Mu‘izz (son of 3)

358/969 Caliphs in Egypt

5 365/975 Nīzār, Abū Manṣūr al-‘Azīz (son of 4)
6 386/996 al-Manṣūr, Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥākim (son of 5)
7 411/1021 ‘Ali, Abū ‘l-Ḥasan al-Zāhir (son of 6)
8 427/1036 Ma‘add, Abū Tamīm al-Mutanṣir (son of 7)
9 487/1094 Ahmad, Abū ‘l-Qāsim al-Musta’lī (son of 8)
10 495/1101 al-Manṣūr, Abū ‘Alī al-Āmīr (son of 9)

524/1130 Interregnum; rule by al-Ḥāfiz as regent but not yet as caliph; coins were issued in the name of al-Muntaẓar (the Expected One)

11 525/1131 ‘Abd al-Majīd ibn Muḥammad, Abū ‘l-
      Maymūn al-Ḥāfiz
12 544/1149 Ismā‘īl, Abū al-Manṣūr al-Zāfīr (son of 11)
13 549/1154 ‘Īsā, Abū ‘l-Qāsim al-Fā‘īz (son of 12)
14 555–67/ ‘Abd Allah ibn Yusuf, Abū Muḥammad al-‘Āḍīd

1160–71 Ayyūbid conquest

Notes

The Fāṭimid caliphate and the Ayyūbids in Egypt

8. Ibid. 60–1, 67.


The Fatimid caliphate and the Ayyubids in Egypt

46. Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 147.
52. Naser-e Khosrow, Book of travels, 13, 16.
60. C. Cahen, Makḥūzīyāt (Leiden, 1977), index under matjar.
70. Ibn al-Ma’mūn, Akhbār Miṣr, 70–1.
The Mamlûks in Egypt and Syria: the Turkish Mamlûk sultanate (648–784/1250–1382) and the Circassian Mamlûk sultanate (784–923/1382–1517)

AMALIA LEVANONI

The Turkish era of the Mamlûk sultanate

The Mamlûks’ rise to power: a decade of trial and error

The Arabic term mamlûk literally means ‘owned’ or ‘slave’, and was used for the white Turkish slaves of pagan origins, purchased from Central Asia and the Eurasian steppes by Muslim rulers to serve as soldiers in their armies. Mamlûk units formed an integral part of Muslim armies from the third/ninth century, and Mamlûk involvement in government became an increasingly familiar occurrence in the medieval Middle East. The road to absolute rule lay open before them in Egypt when the Mamlûk establishment gained military and political domination during the reign of the Ayyûbid ruler of Egypt, al-Šâliḥ Ayyûb (r. 637–47/1240–9).

Al-Šâliḥ Ayyûb’s army, including his elite bodyguard, the Bahriyya, was mainly composed of Qipchak Turkish mamlûks. Al-Šâliḥ took great care to reserve most iqtâ’s (tax revenues from land assignments) for his mamlûks and to confer the most prominent positions upon his confidants. Shajar al-Durr, al-Šâliḥ’s Turkish slave-girl and later his wife, was one of his regime’s stalwarts without holding any formal position in government. The common background of al-Šâliḥ’s mamlûks and the power they accumulated during his lifetime, coupled with the personal loyalty they felt towards him rather than to the Ayyûbid house, enabled Shajar al-Durr to run the kingdom upon his death in 647/1249, during the Crusader invasion led by King Louis IX of France, and to install his son Tûrânshâh on the throne. Tûrânshâh’s attempts to consolidate his hold on power proved futile and brought about his murder and the eventual removal of the Ayyûbid dynasty from Egypt in 648/1250. The Mamlûks’ victory over the Franks at al-Manṣûra, achieved in the absence of an
Ayyūbid ruler to lead them in battle, gave them a claim to both the traditional title of ‘protectors of the faith’ and rule in Egypt as devoted followers of al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb’s legacy. The Bahriyya mamlūks chose to put Shajar al-Durr on the throne. Her rule, however, was problematic since political and ruling tradition in most Islamic regions, especially in the Arabophonic ones, denied females any formal position in government. Her accession had already aroused technical problems as well as vociferous ideological protests. Since Shajar al-Durr could not fulfil the role of atābak al-ʿasākir, commander in chief of the army, the oath of allegiance was jointly administered to her and atābak al-ʿasākir, indicating the army’s share in government. Normally, one of the prominent Bahriyya amīrs would have filled this post, but fear of power struggles among them led them to choose Aybak al-Turkmānī, a middle-ranking and non-Bahri amīr, for the post. As one commentary has it, Shajar al-Durr married Aybak in order to make him worthy of his exalted role. This arrangement was kept in place for about three months. When the Ayyūbid legitimists took Damascus, the Mamlūks attributed the opposition to their relinquishing the sultanate to a woman and decided to put Aybak on the throne. When other Syrian provinces joined the Ayyūbids, Aybak was replaced, after ruling for only four days, by an Ayyūbid minor, al-Ashraf Muṣā. The Mamlūk victory in the battle of Kurāʾ (648/1251) marked the end of the Ayyūbid struggle over Egypt and brought about the caliph’s recognition of the Mamlūks’ de facto position. Power struggles among the Mamlūks, which had temporarily been put aside, now erupted in full force. Al-Muʿizz Aybak, decisively assisted by Shajar al-Durr, emerged victorious.

During Aybak’s five-year reign, Shajar al-Durr continued to run the country while never allowing him to intervene. When she learned about Aybak’s intentions to marry the daughter of Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’ (r. 607–57/1211–59), ruler of Mosul, she arranged for his murder (655/1257). With Aybak’s death, his Muʿizziyya household was the strongest military household in Egypt and from it emerged his real successor, al-Muẓaffar Qūṭūz. After deposing Aybak’s fifteen-year-old son, al-Manṣūr ‘Alī, in 657/1259, Qūṭūz prepared to wage a holy war (jihad) against the invading Mongols.4

During the 630s/1230s and 640s/1240s the Saljuq sultanate of Anatolia (al-Rûm), Lesser Armenia in Cilicia, the northern Crusader principality of Antioch, and Georgia accepted Mongol suzerainty, a relationship that endangered Syria. The threat was realised when in 658/1260, two years after conquering Baghdad, Hülegü (d. 664/1265), Chinggis Khān’s grandson, led the Mongol army, reinforced by Georgian, Armenian and Anatolian Saljuq contingents, across the Euphrates into Syria.
In the wake of the Mongol invasion of Syria, an influx of civilian and military refugees poured into Egypt. Fugitives from the defeated Ayyūbid armies, and Turcomans and Kurds who had arrived in Syria earlier in flight from the Mongols, all joined the Mamlūk army. Qūṭūz decided to meet the Mongols on Syrian soil and marched, at the head of the Muslim army, north to Acre, the seat of the attenuated Latin kingdom of Jerusalem to secure the Franks’ neutrality. The battle took place in 658/1260, near ‘Ayn Jālūt. The victory left the Mamlūks without any real competitor for hegemony in the central part of the Muslim world and strengthened their popular legitimacy as protectors of Islam.

Qūṭūz then advanced to Damascus to arrange appointments in Syria that symbolised Mamlūk control over the region. Yet Qūṭūz would not reap the fruits of his victory, for he was murdered on his way back to Cairo by a group of Mamlūk amīrs. Baybars, who played a leading role in the murder, was elected as the new sultan in a council of magnates (a’yān al-umārā) assembled immediately after the murder. Mamlūk sources mention various reasons for the murder. It appears that the main reason was the old inter-factional power struggle between the Bahrī and Mu‘izzī mamlūks.

The formative years of the Mamlūk state

During al-Zāhir Baybars’ reign (658–76/1260–77) the foundations of the Mamlūk state were laid. Future generations would consider him as the true founder of the Mamlūk sultanate and the institutions he and his immediate successors established as the classic Mamlūk order. Whether the Mamlūk sultanate’s institutions were originally Ayyūbid or a new Mamlūk creation is still an open question. As was the case with previous regimes supported by armies in the Muslim world, the Mamlūk sultan required two levels of legitimacy, the traditional in the Muslim community and the political within the Mamlūk elite. Since their seizure of power, the Mamlūks had not received an investiture diploma from the ‘Abbāsid caliph in Baghdad, who was traditionally considered the source of legitimacy for new regimes. The renewal of the ‘Abbāsid caliphate in Cairo might have rewarded Baybars not only with recognition of his personal position in power, but also by reinforcing the Mamlūk sultanate’s position as the centre of the new Muslim world. An ‘Abbāsid refugee who appeared in Syria as early as Qūṭūz’s reign was proclaimed the new caliph with the title of al-Mustaṣir, while the new caliph appointed Baybars as sultan over the sultanate territories and all future conquests (659/1261). Al-Mustaṣir was sent off with a small expeditionary force to recover Baghdad from the Mongols. Inevitably, he and most of his
army were slaughtered upon crossing the Euphrates by Mongol troops. Another claimant to the caliphate was appointed in 660/1262; to prevent his involvement in politics, he was held in confinement in Cairo. Further encroachment on the position of the shadow caliphate in Cairo came in the mid-eighth/fourteenth century, when the ceremonial exchange of the bay'a (oath of allegiance) between the ascending sultan and the caliph was abandoned, and henceforth it was only the caliph who gave the sultan his oath of allegiance. Devoid of any ruling power, the caliph nevertheless played an important ceremonial role in legitimising the Mamlûk rule by regularly participating in the sultans’ ascension ceremonies and religious festivals held under Mamlûk patronage. The ‘Abbâsid caliphate in Cairo came to an end with the Ottoman conquest of the Mamlûk sultanate in 923/1517.

With the establishment of the ‘Abbâsid caliphate in Cairo, Abû Numayy, the sharif of Mecca, recognised the Mamlûk sultanate protectorate over the Hijâz and withdrew his recognition of the Ḥafîsî caliph of Tunis. The Mamlûks’ role as guardians of the holy places, Mecca and Medina, in addition to hosting the ‘Abbâsid caliphate in Cairo, symbolised the Mamlûk sultanate’s position as the supreme representative of orthodox Islam. The Mamlûks linked themselves to Islamic institutions also through patronage. They established mosques and colleges for the instruction of Islamic legal sciences (madâris, sg. madrasa), and other centres and lodges for the instruction and worship of Sufism (khânaqâhs, ribâts and zâwiyas) which represented popular Islam. The building of religious foundations, preferably in the centre of Cairo, that included the donor mausoleum and often charity institutions for the vast population, became the custom with Mamlûk sultans. Religious endowments (waqf, pl. awqaâf) were established for legally transferring rural or urban assets of commercial value for the maintenance of such religious and charitable foundations. The religious institutions supplied cadres of religious scholars (‘ulamâ’) and Sufis who were responsible for shaping the normative Muslim codes of conduct and held posts in the religious bureaucracy and the education and judicial systems that granted legitimacy to rulers. Sufi orders enjoyed massive support from the Mamlûks owing to the latter’s reverence for their shaykhs, and probably because Sufism was an easier religious denominator for integrating the multi-ethnic Egyptian and Syrian masses under their rule. The Mamlûks gradually popularised the orthodox institutions of Islam by stipulating their desire for an orthodox curriculum in the Sufi lodges (khânaqâhs) they had founded, and invited ‘ulamâ’, preferably foreigners of the Ḥanâfî madîkhâb, to teach in them, and Sufis to instruct in the madrasas. Consequently, both orthodox and Sufi institutions underwent a process of
moderation, and by the end of the eighth/fourteenth century differences between the functions of the khānqāh, the madrasa and the Friday mosque were blurred. Instruction in Sufism already took place in the madrasas, and mosques and khānqāhs functioned as centres for both Sufi rituals, public recitations of the Qur’ān and Prophetic tradition (ḥadīth), and the celebrations of Muslim festivals under Mamlūk patronage. By the end of the ninth/fifteenth century small mosques scattered all over Cairo functioned as places for prayer, teaching and Sufi rituals.12

Since the Mamlūk elite avoided passing their status to their descendants, it remained a small group of newly purchased slaves with a non-Muslim background within a community with a deep-rooted Arab-Muslim culture. The ‘ulamā’ and fuqahā’, by contrast, especially of the Shāfī’ī legal school who controlled the Egyptian and Syrian judicial system, were recognised as the normative representatives of the indigenous culture. In order to overcome what may have been perceived as social inferiority, the Mamlūks used their ethnic culture as a symbol of their unique status separating them, as a military ruling elite, from the civilian population. They spoke Turkish and preserved their original names, their dress and at least part of their diet. The influence of the Mongol culture, which in certain respects resembled the Turkish one, was also evident, at least in the formative period of the Mamlūk sultanate when thousands of Mongol warriors, the Wāfidiyya, entered Egypt with their families.13 While scholars agree that the Mamlūks directed a distinct judicial system that was not based on the shari‘a, or Islamic religious law, they hold different opinions on the question of whether Baybars based it on the Yāsā, the Mongol legal code founded by Chinggis Khān.14

The Ayyūbid judicial system in Egypt, in which the Shāfī’ī school (madhhab) enjoyed absolute dominance, remained unchanged until Baybars’ rise to power. In 663/1265 Baybars granted representation to the other three Sunni schools, the Mālikī, Ḥanafī and Ḥanbali, by nominating a chief judge (qādī) to each of them. The Shāfī’ī chief qādī henceforth enjoyed only a symbolic supremacy over his counterparts in the judicial system. Baybars intended to increase the prestige of the Ḥanafī madhhab to which the Mamlūks belonged.15 Baybars, however, was unsuccessful in abolishing the absolute control of the Shāfī’ī school over the waqfs in Egypt and Syria which had amassed considerable wealth.

The Mamlūk sultan, like his Ayyūbid predecessors, presided over a form of administrative justice, dār al-‘adl, which rested on his discretion, and dealt with matters of state (siyāsa) and injustice of office-holders in the state administration.16 In theory, the sultan’s secular justice in dār al-‘adl and the qādī’s
religious justice in the *shar*i court were discrete. In practice, however, no real separation existed, for the chief *qādis* advised the sultan on *siyāsa* matters in the *shar*i’s spirit, while they had to adhere to his *siyāsa* decisions and relied on his army for the enforcement of their verdicts.  

The sultan was also the highest authority in the administrative system the Mamlūks had inherited from the Ayyūbids. Traditionally, the Chancery bureau (*diwan al-inshā‘*) was staffed by learned religious Arab civilians, owing to their command of the Arabic language. The access of the senior secretary, *kātib al-sirr*, in *diwan al-inshā‘* to information included in the sultan’s correspondence made him eligible to deal with state postal services (*barūd*) which also dealt with espionage within the sultanate. The financial administration included three bureaux. The *diwan al-māl*, or finance bureau, dealt with land taxes and other sources of state revenues, the *diwan al-khāṣṣ*, or the sultan’s private purse, managed the sultan’s revenues and income from his private estates, and the *diwan al-jaysh* (the army bureau), managed the distribution of *iqṭā‘* and payment of salaries to the army. The financial and fiscal bureaux were traditionally staffed by Coptic clerks, owing to their professionalism passed from generation to generation, and often new converts from among them served as viziers (*wazīrs*). While during the Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid periods the vizier’s responsibility extended over almost all state bureaux, during the Mamlūk period central administrative positions lost their importance to Mamlūk administrative posts in the sultan’s household. Thus, Baybars limited the vizier’s responsibility to fiscal matters only and his functions overlapped those of the *ustādār* (majordomo), whose authority was extended from the management of the sultan’s household to include state financial matters. Similarly, the functions of the *ṣāhib al-inshā‘* overlapped those of the *dawādār* (official pen case bearer) whose duties also included the sultan’s correspondence, postal service, foreign relations and espionage.  

While during the Ayyūbid period the army had been at the beck and call of the ruling house, in the Mamlūk state the Mamlūk army became the ruling elite and the sultan came from within its ranks. It was necessary, therefore, for the sultan to establish clearly defined rules for the normative organisation of the army, guaranteeing the sultan’s sway over the *mamlūks*, especially his erstwhile colleagues. The army Baybars inherited included different Mamlūk factions and numerous refugees for whom the Egyptian army had provided a haven. Baybars created a new framework for a single army subordinate to the central government that comprised three main parts: the royal *mamlūks* among whom were the sultan’s new recruits, the amīrs’ soldiers and the *ḥalqa*, a non-Mamlūk (including the subgroup of the *mamlūks*’ children, *awlād*
The Mamluks in Egypt and Syria

*al-nās*) and masterless veteran Mamlūk corps. The royal *mamluks* were to gain exclusive status, the amīrs’ *mamluks* remained under the direct command of their masters, but were to be placed at the state’s disposal whenever necessary, and the *ḥalqa*, although secondary in status, came under the sultan’s direct control.¹⁹ Turcomans and Bedouins served as auxiliary forces in the Mamlūk army; they took part in campaigns both as cavalry and infantry. In peacetime they carried out military duties of guarding frontier zones, maintaining the royal postal system, and supplying relay horses to the *mamlūk* army.²⁰

Baybars increased the number of *mamluks* in the army and introduced the supply of uniform equipment for the *mamluks* funded by the sultan’s treasury. He maintained the army at a very high level of professionalism and readiness through intensive training and frequent inspections of his troops.²¹ *Mamluks* were usually purchased at a young age. Upon arrival in Cairo, they were quartered in the Citadel barracks and divided into peer groups by age and ethnic origin. Education consisted of two principal stages: religious studies, which continued until adolescence, followed by a period of rigorous military training that only came to an end when the *mamlūk* had attained a high level of military skills. At the end of the training period, *kutta biyya*, the *mamlūk* underwent an emancipation ceremony and was brought into his master’s military service. The *mamlūk*’s career began with a number of low-level offices with a modest salary that gradually increased over time. Senior *mamluks* were granted *iqṭā’s* and juniors received monthly salaries. Baybars introduced a new rank stratification and linked it with the *iqṭā* system.²² The rank hierarchy included, in ascending order, *amīr* of ten, *amīr* of forty or *ṭablkhāna* and, at the top, *amīr* of one hundred. Each rank indicated the normative number of mounted soldiers included in the *amīr*’s retinue and the corresponding size of *iqṭā* he received.²³ Some of the *amīrs* of one hundred, who were also members of the royal council that managed affairs of state, were also appointed commanders of one thousand, a force of some one thousand mounted soldiers in campaigns (*ṭulb*, pl. *ṭalāb*). A hierarchical stratification of offices in the sultan’s court and household administration and governorships was also developed.

In addition to the Islamic legitimacy that Baybars sought for his reign, which was skilfully fostered around his image as a jihad warrior and normative Muslim ruler, he also had to gain royal legitimacy within the military elite. Since he had no Mamlūk household of his own to support his rule upon his ascent, he sought support among his Şāliḥī peers by granting them significant representation in government. Even when Baybars’ household had already been established, only a few of his *mamluks* were appointed to key positions.
With his rivals, however, he was ruthless, regardless of their factional affiliation. Baybars’ authority in Syria was precarious, as over a decade was to pass until unassailable Mamlûk control was consolidated. Separatists who sought independent rule in Syria were gradually removed and replaced by Baybars’ governors. From the 670s/1270s Syria’s assimilation into the sultanate was absolute, so much so that during the eighth/fourteenth and ninth/fifteenth centuries, Syrian urban centres, especially Damascus and Aleppo, served as bases for organising factional struggles over rule in Cairo.

A significant sector with the potential for disorder were the nomads in Egypt and Syria that included indigenous Arab tribes, the Turcomans whose numbers increased in Syria as a result of the Mongol invasion, and the Kurds whose power was waning under the new Mamlûk order. Baybars had to deal first with the Bedouins’ anarchism that had prevailed unhindered in Upper Egypt since al-Šâliḥ Ayyûb’s death in 647/1249. A rebellion was successfully quelled in Qûs but the Bedouins’ defeat was not decisive as they were to challenge the Mamlûk government again and again throughout the Mamlûk period. Bedouin unrest in Syria could cause the sultanate great harm, especially because it might have encouraged the Mongols and their Armenian and Frankish allies to invade Syria. Furthermore, the Bedouins held the trump card of deserting to Mongol territory. This threat, however, became pointless with the signing of the peace treaty between the Mamlûks and the Mongol Ilkhans in 723/1323. The policy of securing co-operation with the Bedouins through the political patronage of powerful chiefs had existed earlier in Syria, but the Mamlûks formalised this policy when Qutuz appointed ʿĪsâ ibn Muhannâ (d. 684/1285), the head of the most powerful Bedouin tribe in the area, as amir al-ʿarab (leader of the Bedouins) in Syria and granted him iqṭāʾs. Baybars confirmed ʿĪsâ’s position and further strengthened the Bedouins’ position as a functional group in the Mamlûk regime system by entrusting their chiefs with the duties of guarding the Syrian frontier with the Mongols, patrolling the roads, and securing the royal postal system and the espionage linked to it. The Turcomans who roamed in Syria and Palestine were integrated into the Mamlûk military machine, mainly as troops guarding the coast against possible Frankish attack. Therefore they were settled along the shore from Gaza to Lesser Armenia.

The strategic importance of Syria as a frontier zone with the Mongol Ilkhans dictated Baybars’ policy towards the Crusader dominions along the Syro-Palestinian littoral, which threatened the free passage of the Mamlûk army and smooth communication between Egypt and Syria. There was also the theoretical danger of Frank–Mongol co-operation against the Mamlûks.
Another interest of the Mamluks was to cripple Europe’s lucrative independent commerce with the Levant and channel it to Egypt under the Mamluk government’s direct control. Baybars conducted intensive military campaigns against the Crusaders with the goal of eliminating the Frankish presence in the region. Owing to the fear of support reaching the Franks from the sea or of a renewed Crusader attack from that direction – as was to take place in 670/1271 when Lord Edward, son of King Henry III of England, led a Crusader force to Acre and gained limited co-operation with the Ilkhanid Mongols – Baybars had the outer shore cities destroyed and their harbours rendered useless. Cesarea, Arsuf and Haifa (665/1265), Jaffa and Antioch (667/1268), and Ascalon (669/1270) were all demolished. On the other hand, Safed (666/1266) and the important strongholds of Shaqif Tirün (Cave de Tyrun), Ḥiṣn al-Akrād (Krak des Chevaliers) and Ḥiṣn ‘Akkār (Bibelaca), all located inland, were repaired and manned with Muslim garrisons. These inland strongholds served as the military rearguard in the Mamluk war against the Mongols and as part of the regime’s inspection bases against insubordinate elements in Syria.

Baybars’ foreign and overseas alliances were patterned to gain support against the Ilkhanid Mongols and the Crusaders, as well as to ensure the sultanate’s commercial interests in the international trade system. The long-distance lucrative trade system stretched from western India, the outlet of both Indian and Chinese produce, to Europe, as far as the Low Countries and the Baltic. The Mongol conquest in Asia revived the transcontinental trade routes between China and Europe via Anatolia, and left the Mamlük sultanate, for about a century, with only marginal profits from the major commercial network. Baybars, and all subsequent Mamlük governments, invested considerable efforts in maintaining Mamlük influence in eastern Anatolia in order to disrupt the caravan route through Iran, and protect Mamlük control of the eastern and western shores of the Red Sea to secure the Indian trade.

Baybars exploited internal rivalries in Europe to his advantage, mainly the confrontations between the papacy and the House of Hohenstaufen. In 660/1261 he resumed the traditional commercial relations that Egypt previously had with Sicily. Friendly relations with Manfred, the Hohenstaufen ruler of Sicily, who was at odds with the pope for his support of Charles of Anjou’s candidacy for ruler of Sicily, might have served Baybars in disrupting the sea-links of the papacy and France with Lesser Armenia and the Mongol Ilkhanate. In 662/1262 a commercial agreement was reached with James of Aragon (610–75/1213–76) and in 665/1266 another with King Alfonso X of Castile (650–83/1252–84). Trade relations were maintained with Marseilles and the Italian maritime cities of Venice and Genoa that dealt with the import of
Mamlûk slaves from the Crimea to Egypt. In 663/1264, Baybars received a delegation from Charles of Anjou which signified European recognition of the Mamlûk sultanate as a great power in the Middle East and signalled the weakening of European support of the Crusaders.  

The tripartite alliance Baybars forged with the Golden Horde and Byzantium, driven by their common enmity towards the Mongol Ilkhanate, was decisive for the Mamlûk sultanate. Michael Palaeologus (r. 651–81/1253–82), the Byzantine emperor, viewed the Mongols’ control of eastern Anatolia as a threat to his eastern territories. The Ilkhan’s alliance with Lesser Armenia also linked them to the conflict between the papacy and Byzantium over the Church’s sphere of influence. Berke Khân (r. 654–65/1256–66), the ruler of the Golden Horde who had recently converted to Islam, had an open conflict with Hülegü as early as 660/1260. Consequently he sought a strategic peace with Byzantium in order to recover the income he had lost because of the interruption of trade with Iran. The alliance with the Mamlûk sultanate was to harass the Ilkhans with the threat of a pincer movement on two fronts. This strategy undoubtedly weakened the Ilkhan’s motivation for a large-scale invasion of Syria. The Mamlûk army was also reinforced by the considerable addition of manpower of the Wâﬁdiyya, the Mongol and Turkish soldiers who had deserted the Ilkhanate for Egypt in two waves, in 662–4/1262–4 and 665–6/1266–7; the former were under Berke Khân’s orders.  

The alliance with the Mamlûk sultanate that was continued by Berke’s successor, Mongke Timur (r. 666–79/1267–80), allowed the Mamlûks the purchase of strategic commodities, but more vital were the Turkish slaves from the Qipchak steppes. Since the overland slave trade routes through the Caucasus and eastern Anatolia were controlled by the Ilkhanids, Egypt depended overwhelmingly on the maritime routes. As part of the friendly relationship, Michael Palaeologus agreed to allow passage through the Bosphorus for Genoese vessels carrying Mamlûk slaves from the markets in the Crimea, then part of the Golden Horde territories, to Egypt.  

In spring 676/1277, Baybars took advantage of a Turcoman revolt against the Mongols in the Taurus highlands to invade eastern Anatolia. He defeated a Mongol army near Elbistan and marched on Kayseri where he was enthroned, but he chose to withdraw before Mongol reinforcements arrived because he could not rely on the fickle alliance he had with the local Turcomans and Saljuqs. The same policy was adopted in 675/1276, when Baybars exploited inter-dynastic conflicts in Christian Nubia to interfere and draw it under Mamlûk influence, thus renewing Nubian–Egyptian commercial relations that had been disturbed in 671/1272.
After about two years behind the nominal rule of Baybars’ sons, Baraka (Berke) Khān and Salāmish, Qalāwūn took power in 678/1279. Al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn’s reign was the continuation of Baybars’ with regard to the consolidation and development of the Mamlūk political and military systems. The acceleration of the militarisation process in the administration was yet another aspect of institutional development during Qalāwūn’s reign. For the first time the vizierate was assigned to a Mamlūk amīr, Sanjar al-Shujā’ī in 682/1283. Mamlūk patronage of Islamic institutions was manifested during Qalāwūn’s rule by the persecution of Christians and the erection of his monumental complex in Fāṭimid Cairo. This included Qalāwūn’s mausoleum, a madrasa and a hospital for the Muslim population of Cairo and its environs.32

In 680/1281, the Ilkhan Abaghā despatched a large force headed by his brother, Mongke Timur, into Syria that was routed by the Mamlūk army near Ḥimṣ.33 Ahmad Tegüder, Abagha’s brother who ascended the throne in 681/1282, sought peace with the Mamlūks but was rejected outright by Qalāwūn, probably because his reign was still too insecure to withstand the army’s disapproval of his peace policy. The victory over the Mongols enabled the Mamlūks to resume the war against the Christians. Between 684/1285 and 689/1290, Qalāwūn initiated military campaigns against Crusader outposts, ignoring the truces signed with some of them before the battle of Ḥimṣ, and by the end of his reign only Acre survived. Consecutive Mamlūk campaigns in 682/1283 and 683/1284 were mounted against Lesser Armenia, officially because of its participation in the battle of Ḥimṣ alongside the Mongols, but practically it was for its wood and iron, and to disrupt the Genoese–Ilkhanid commercial alliance conducted through the Armenian port of Āyās. In 684/1285 Qalāwūn concluded a truce with King Leon II that guaranteed an annual tribute and secured the safe passage of slave imports from the Golden Horde to Egypt through Armenian land. Earlier, in 680/1281, when this land route was still closed, Qalāwūn concluded a treaty with Michael VIII of Byzantium to secure the slave trade through the Bosphorus.34

Genoese–Mamlūk relations were based on mutual dependence on the slave trade from the Black Sea regions to the Mamlūk sultanate. Genoa gained supremacy in western trade in the Levant and the Mamlūk sultanate augmented the vital manpower for its Mamlūk system. However, the Genoese penetration into the Mongol Ilkhanate and the introduction of an alternative route between India and Europe through the Persian Gulf created competition with Mamlūk lucrative trade. To overcome this competition, Qalāwūn reacted with restraint and issued a general proclamation of amān (safe conduct) in 687/1288, which offered the European merchants security, fair
treatment, port facilities and commercial incentives. In 689/1290 Qalāwūn re-
established friendly relations with the Genoese, granting them a stronger
commercial position in Egypt. Qalāwūn also put the rivalries between the
Byzantines and the Ilkhanids, and the Genoese and the Venetians, to his full
advantage. Qalāwūn’s intervention in Nubia and Yemen was designed to
guarantee the sultanate’s trade in the Red Sea as part of the overall notion
he had inherited from Baybars of the sultanate’s position as a great power in
the Middle East and as the intersection between Europe and South-East Asia.

Mamlūk factional power struggles

Qalāwūn’s son, al-Ashraf Khaṭīl, ascended the sultanate in Ramadān 689/
September 1290. About six months later, he captured Acre, the last Crusader
port and capital of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, and brought the Crusader
presence in the Levant to an end. After Acre’s fall, enthusiasm for Crusading in
Europe decreased and the naval cities had a strong interest to resume their
commercial contacts with the Mamlūks. In 690/1291, al-Ashraf concluded a
treaty with Venice, and in 692/1293 with Alfonso III, king of Aragon, which
allowed the import of war materials.

In spite of his military achievements, al-Ashraf did not prove himself a
talented and prudent politician with regard to Mamlūk factionalism. When, in
693/1293, he designed a land survey, in which Qalāwūn’s high-ranking amīrs
were to lose their wealth and positions, they murdered him (693/1293).
Seventeen years of political unrest followed al-Ashraf’s assassination. The
conspirators failed to place their candidate, Baydaraḵ, on the throne.
Kitbughā, one of Qalāwūn’s Mongol mamlūks and head of the loyalist faction
that included the Wafidiyya troops, installed Qalāwūn’s eight-year-old son,
Muhammad, as nominal sultan. About a year later, Kitbughā took the sulta-
nate but unrest jeopardised his reign because of the army’s intolerance
towards the predominance of the non-Mamlūk Wafidiyya. After an attempt
on his life in 696/1296, Kitbughā retired to Syria, and Lājīn, his vice-regent,
took the sultanate.

Al-Manṣūr Lājīn’s reign was dominated by his conflict with his supporters
on the grounds of the cadastral survey (rawḵ) he initiated in Egypt. The ḥalqa
and the amīrs’ shares in the cultivated lands of Egypt were reduced to half in
this rawḵ, from twenty to ten twenty-fourths, while the sultan’s share of four
twenty-fourths remained untouched. One twenty-fourth was kept as a reserve
to compensate those who were dissatisfied with their new allocations and the
remaining nine twenty-fourths were assigned for the establishment of a new
ḥalqa that was planned to support Lājīn’s rule. Lājīn was murdered before he
completed his rawk, and the surplus iqṭāʾs were divided among the magnates. Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad was brought back from exile in Kerak and reinstated in the sultanate (698/1299). His precarious position under two senior amīrs, Salār al-Manṣūrī and Baybars al-Jāshīnkīr, pushed him to abdicate in 708/1308 to Kerak.

Despite the internal unrest, the magnates did not relinquish Mamlūk strategic interests in Anatolia, combining political manoeuvres with military operations to achieve them. The Mamlūks supported separatists and anarchists against the Mongol garrison in the area. They provided assistance to the Mongol general, Sulamīsh, who in 699/1298 rebelled against the Ilkhan Ghazān and in 705/1305 a few hundred of the Mongol troops garrisoned in Cilicia were encouraged to defect to Egypt. The successful offensive against the Mongols in Anatolia, however, was set back because of the internal strife within the sultanate where military elements of Mongol origin were involved. In 698/1298, the vicegerent of Damascus, Qibjaq, who actually was the son of a silāḥdār (arms bearer) from the Ilkhanid court, defected with other prominent amīrs to the Ilkhan territory out of fear for their lives from Lājīn’s vicegerent, Mankūtamur. With Qibjaq’s inspiration, Ghazān invaded Syria in 699/1299. While encamped in Gaza, the Mamlūk army was shaken by a plot by the Mongol Oirat (uwayrāṭiyya) Wāfidiyya to murder the sultan and reinstate al-ʿĀdil Kitbughā. The rebellion was quelled and hundreds of Wāfidiyya soldiers were killed. When the Mamlūk army arrived at Wādī al-Khaznādār, it was too exhausted to engage in combat and retreated in disarray to Egypt, leaving Syria open to Ghazān’s army. However, as in previous occupations of Syria, the Mongol army soon retreated, leaving Qibjaq and a Mongol general, Qitlūshāh, as joint governors of Damascus (699/1300). From his new position, Qibjaq negotiated his return to the Mamlūk sultanate. In 702/1302 two groups of Mamlūk amīrs defected to Ghazān and once again encouraged him to conquer Syria. In April 703/1303 he sent his general Qitlūshāh into Syria, but his army was routed at Marj al-Šuffar, near Damascus. With Ghazān’s death in spring 704/1304, real danger from the Mongols no longer existed.

The Mamlūks’ policy towards the Copts, the local Christians in Egypt, was a matter of criticism and conflict between the ‘ulāmāʾ and the masses, and the Mamlūk ruling elite. Many Copts were employed as clerks in the financial bureaux of the sultans and amīrs. The latter were willing to overlook the financial power and influence the Copts accumulated in their service, because they benefitted from their professional skills in the tax collection from their iqṭāʾs and the management of their income from other sources. Coptic
office-holders aroused general discontent because they were identified with unpopular Mamlûk tax policies, and because of the wealth they amassed under Mamlûk patronage. In 700/1301 the two powerful amîrs, Baybars al-Jâshinkîr and Salâr, were pushed to implement an unprecedented discriminatory policy against the Copts. The direct trigger for this policy was the criticism the Maghribi vizier, who arrived in Cairo, waged against the Mamlûks for their liberal policies towards the ahl al-dhimma. In fact, a year earlier, the Mamlûks were defeated by the Mongols in the battle of Wâdî al-Khaznadâr. The public riots, incited by the ‘ulama’, forced the two amîrs to issue a ban on employing Copts. As a result, many individuals converted to Islam for appearance’s sake in order to retain their offices; mass conversion did not occur. The new converts not only did not sever their connections with the Christian community, but also interceded with their Mamlûk patrons on their co-religionists’ behalf. The Copts were further used as a bridge in the diplomatic relations between the Mamlûks and the Europeans that were vital for Egypt’s transit trade.37

Al-Nâşîr Muḥammad’s third reign, the ‘Golden Age’ of the Mamlûk sultanate

When al-Nâşîr Muḥammad attained the sultanate for the third time in 709/1310, the Crusader principalities and a serious threat of a Crusade from Europe no longer existed. Since their defeat at Marj al-Ṣuﬀar, the Mongols had not made any serious attempt to attack Syria. As early as Baybars’ occupation of Kayseri in 676/1277, the Mamlûks understood that nurturing Mamlûk influence through inter-state politics rather than a direct rule in eastern Anatolia was a more realistic policy. In 723/1323 a treaty was concluded between al-Nâṣîr Muḥammad and Abû Sa‘îd, the Mongol Ilkhan. Their relations, however, remained cold until 728/1328, when the two countries opened commercial and cultural exchange relationships. With the collapse of the Ilkhanate, after Abû Sa‘îd’s death (735/1335), a new state system emerged in Anatolia that enhanced the Mamlûks’ strategy of interference and led to the establishment of buffer zones of Turcoman principalities against invaders and nomad incursions which would remain intact until the end of the sultanate in 923/1517. The Saljuq vassals of the Ilkhanids were ousted from central Anatolia by the Qaramânîds and their principality created an outer buffer zone for the Mamlûk sultanate. In 738/1337, Qaraja ibn Dhu ’l-Qâdir (or Dhû al-Qadr), the leader of the Turcoman clan of Bözöq, seized Elbistan, which was under Ilkhanid protectorate, and obtained a certificate recognising him as vicegerent from al-Nâṣîr Muḥammad. Cilicia was captured in 760/1359 and became a
sultanate province. In 780/1378, the Turcoman Yüregir-oghlu Ramaḍān founded the principality of Ramaḍān and acknowledged Mamlūk suzerainty. The Dhū ‘l-Qādirīd and Ramaḍānīd principalities were the immediate neighbours of the Mamlūk sultanate and served as its inner buffer zone.38

Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad invested efforts to secure Mamlūk control in the Ḥijāz. Al-Nāṣir renovated the Ka’ba, regularly supplied grain to the Ḥijāz and on three occasions during his reign, in 713/1313, 720/1320 and 732/1332, carried out the ḥajj, demonstrating Mamlūk commitment to the Holy Places. Expeditionary armies were repeatedly despatched to put an end to the feuds between the Sharīfs of Mecca and Medina to secure Mamlūk formal suzerainty against the rival posturing of Ilkhan Öljeytü and the Rasūlīds of Yemen for a symbolic presence in the Holy Places. Mamlūk relations with Yemen remained ambivalent and tenuous after the failure of a Mamlūk attempt, in 725/1325, to intervene in succession feuds. Mamlūk expeditions were sent to Nubia in 715/1315 and 723/1323, with the purpose of checking on the Bedouins in the region, since a permanent Mamlūk prefect and a garrison were only maintained in the Red Sea port of ‘Aydhāb. In Tripoli and Tunis support was extended to the Ḥafṣīd Abū Zakariyya’ Yahyā in exchange for nominal Mamlūk domination. Expanding Mamlūk influence from Arabia to North Africa contributed not only to the Mamlūk sultanate’s position as a great power in the Muslim world, but also to the consolidation of Egypt’s place in the long-distance trade. It secured the flow of African gold, with which the Mamlūks paid for the Indian lucrative commodities.

To secure Egypt’s place in the Mediterranean trade, al-Nāṣir sent several expeditions to Lesser Armenia in order to enforce the tribute payment that had been agreed upon in 696/1297, and, more important, to disrupt Mongol long-distance trade to Europe via Anatolian ports. During the 738/1337 expedition, Sis, the Armenian capital, was laid waste, but Lesser Armenia was not conquered until 777/1375. Envoys were exchanged between al-Nāṣir Muḥammad and the king of Aragon with the purpose of bringing Catalan merchants to Egypt. They were granted commercial privileges, and pilgrims were allowed access to Christian shrines. The papal trade sanctions against the sultanate were circumvented by clandestine trade with Genoa and Pisa through Cyprus.

Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s long and prosperous reign might be explained not only by the sultanate’s peaceful foreign relations, but also by policies he adopted to secure a strong rule for himself. Upon assuming control in Cairo, al-Nāṣir eliminated both the Mansūrī amīrs who had limited his authority during his earlier reigns and the disaffected Mansūrī amīrs in Syria who
supported him, with only a handful managing to escape. He bestowed their positions, ranks and part of their wealth on his trusted mamluks from the small corps he had been able to amass during his second reign and exile in Karak. Al-Nāṣir skilfully used this early period of transition to implement his plan for a general land survey (rawk), since his own amīrs were not yet firmly established to reject it, as the magnates had previously done with Lājīn’s in 697/1298. Egypt’s land survey (715/1315) was preceded by a pilot survey in the province of Damascus (713/1313). According to this tax reform, two major taxes were to be levied by the muqta‘ and were only applied to cultivated lands, the kharāj, the tax on agricultural produce, and the jizya or jawl, the annual poll-tax imposed on the non-Muslim inhabitants of the sultanate. Whereas Lājīn did not change the sultan’s share in Egypt’s cultivated lands during the cadastral survey of 697/1298, al-Nāṣir increased it from four twenty-fourths to ten twenty-fourths. The remaining fourteen twenty-fourths were reserved for the amīrs and ḥalqa soldiers. Since the sultan had already controlled the monopoly on emeralds and natron, and the matjar (the state commercial office), he became involved in import and export activities in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and great dealings in grain, sugar and textiles based on the crops produced on his landed estates. The abolition of the post of nā‘ib al-saltana, the vicegerent, in 726/1326 and the suspension of the vizierate during the periods 714–23/1314–23 and 731–40/1331–9 transferred the financial responsibilities and power from the state to the sultan.

While the rawk immediately reinforced the sultan’s power, it had far-reaching ramifications for the army. Although the iqṭā‘s they received were formally worth the same as their previous holdings, in practice their income was reduced because it was no longer based solely on the kharāj tax and was divided in various locations in Upper and Lower Egypt in order to curb the muqta‘s influence and his regional power. The amīrs had to employ more clerks in their bureaux to collect the taxes, and to add insult to injury the Coptic peasants exploited the decentralisation of tax collection and evaded it by moving from village to village, declaring that they had already paid it elsewhere. Muslim circles, especially the Shāfi‘i ulama, criticised the new tax system as a conspiracy instigated by Coptic clerks in order to help their co-religionists and ruin the Muslim government. The ḥalqa troops’ iqṭā‘, which had already been reduced in the rawk of 697/1298, became insufficient for livelihood and was regarded as supplementing income only. Elderly and disabled were already among the ḥalqa ranks during al-Nāṣir’s time. Under his successors, the ajnād al-ḥalqa resorted to relinquishing their iqṭā‘s for payment (nuzūl) and artisans and peddlers and even children took their
place. Having more or less acclimatised to the dismal situation of the ḥalqa, sultans in the ninth/fifteenth century routinely preferred to offer their soldiers the choice of a ‘substitute’ payment (badal) instead of going on expeditions.

Al-Nāṣir’s expanded resources were generously utilised to build a great Mamlūk household, to maintain patronage relationships with influential sectors both inside and outside the Mamlūk elite, and to develop public and private projects that legitimised his royal authority. Al-Nāṣir’s Mamlūk household had been significantly increased through the systematic purchase of new recruits, preferably Mongols and Turks, at high prices in order to encourage their import to Egypt. In order to buy his mamlūks’ loyalty, he showered them with material plenty upon their arrival, while earlier sultans, particularly Baybars and Qalāwūn, had based the training of their mamlūks on stringent discipline, military professionalism and slow, hierarchical advancement. For the first time, royal estates were given as iqtā’ to new recruits lodged in the Citadel barracks in order to supplement their income. To compensate the prominent amirs for their reduced income as a result of the 715/1315 rawk, al-Nāṣir granted them generous unrecorded grants, gifts and additional iqtā’as on an individual basis. The size of the iqtā’ of his amir Bashtāk was kept secret in order not to arouse the envy of Qawsūn, his rival. This reward policy characterised the informal patron–client relationship on which al-Nāṣir sought to achieve autocratic rule. In addition to his prodigal generosity, al-Nāṣir’s relationship with his amirs and office-holders was characterised by suspicion and manipulation which often culminated in sudden arrests and executions. Tankiz al-Ḥusāmī was appointed governor of Damascus in 712/1312 and, in effect, served as governor-general of Syria for about twenty-eight years. Nevertheless, in 741/1340 he lost the sultan’s favour and was put to death. Baktamur al-Sāqī (cupbearer), whose house was frequented by al-Nāṣir, where meals were cooked and served personally by Baktamur’s own wife, was granted far-reaching authority that almost equalled the sultan’s. In 732/1332 he and his son died under suspicious circumstances on their way back from the ḥajj.

Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s expenditure on his personal household was unprecedented. His royal harem was enormous, including an inordinate number of white concubines (jawārī) and muwalladāt, women of mixed extraction. Al-Nāṣir’s generous remuneration policy towards the Bedouins of the Banū Muhannā in northern Syria was part of the efforts to bribe them into severing their relationship with the Ilkhanate and remain under Mamlūk authority. Al-Nāṣir surpassed his predecessors in the exorbitant prices he paid for the prime Arabian horses they supplied.40 A special bureau, established to oversee al-Nāṣir’s building expenditures, reveals the extent of his ambitious plans for
the irrigation system and construction in Cairo. Al-Nāṣir had all government buildings in the Citadel and most of the hippodromes in Cairo demolished and replaced by new ones. New palaces for some of his amīrs, wives and slave-girls were built in Cairo. Al-Nāṣir’s amīrs, of whom only a few were mobilised for expeditions, were granted land in Cairo and its environs and exempted from land and commercial taxes to encourage their involvement in construction and business. The markets, bathhouses, mills and tenement buildings that had been constructed in the western areas of Cairo became the centres of flourishing quarters.41

Signs of a deep crisis were already noticeable during the last decade of al-Nāṣir’s reign. Royal expenditures exceeded revenues and threatened to spin out of control. State intervention in private enterprise that had been introduced by the nāẓir al-khāṣṣ, Karīm al-Dīn al-Ḳabīr, as early as 710/1310, became routine under Sharaf al-Dīn Ibn Faḍl Allāh, known as al-Nashuw, who was appointed to the post in 731/1331. Under al-Nashuw, compulsory sales and purchases (tarḥ and rimāya), confiscation from office-holders who were accused of channelling state resources into their pockets, and profits from coin debasement, randomly complemented and often even surpassed the sultan’s treasury income. Merchants were compelled to buy from the government commodities such as wood, iron, beans and clover at prices of its own choosing, thus promoting the royal monopoly on commerce. The abolition of tax exemption on trade and production that al-Nāṣir had granted his amīrs and the regulation of non-competitive, fixed prices on grain diminished the magnates’ competition with royal enterprises. The magnates who maintained patronage relationships with the financial administration officials, the ‘ulamā’ and the large population brought about the end of al-Nashuw’s career by execution in 740/1339.42

The turbulent reign of the Qalāwūnids
Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s descendants ruled from 741/1341 until 784/1382, but on the whole the magnates, who had accumulated great wealth and power during his reign, held the real power. Most of the twelve Qalāwūnid sultans who reigned during this period were inexperienced and were placed on the throne directly from the harem. All but one, al-Ṣāliḥ ʿIsmāʿīl who died of illness, were deposed by the amīrs and seven were murdered after their deposition. Al-Nāṣir Ḥasan (r. 748–52/1347–51; 755–62/1354–61) and al-Ashraf Shaʿbān (r. 764–78/1363–77) were the only Qalāwūnid sultans who succeeded in recruiting Mamlūk households of their own, owing to their comparatively long reigns. Yet their mamlūk households were smaller than those of the
dominant amīrs’ and each of them was murdered when he attempted to rule autonomously. During his second reign, al-Nāṣir Ḥasan tried to counterbalance the amīrs’ power by encouraging the advancement of Mamlūks’ sons (awlād al-nās) to prominent emirates and province governorships. When the amīrs’ position was threatened and the entire mamlūk system was jeopardised, Ḥasan was murdered by his favourite Mamlūk Yalbughā al-ʿUmarī. Yalbughā acted as viceroy between 762/1360 and 768/1366 until he himself was murdered by his own recruits. Al-Ashraf Shaʿbān carried out a land survey in 777/1376, in which members of the Qalāwūnid House, the asyād, were allocated rich iqtāʾs in Upper Egypt and the vicinity of Cairo. Al-Ashraf’s redistribution of state resources contributed to the general dissatisfaction in the army and led to his murder.

In spite of their attempts, the grand amīrs who held power behind the Qalāwūnids could not seize the sultanate because, in their bid for power, they bribed the low-ranking mamlūks with money and privileges to encourage them to shift their allegiance from one faction to another. However, the extensive mobility of mamlūks between the factions left the amīrs uncertain regarding the support they had organised for their rule. The incessant factional struggles among the magnates over control of the sultanate and the frequent reshuffling of their short-lived coalitions led them to exploit their senior positions to accumulate wealth rapidly. Mismanagement on their part and general weakness of the government damaged the Mamlūk sultanate’s economic and military capacity, thereby undoing al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s achievements within a generation, and aggravating the problems he left for his descendants. When the country was simultaneously hit by natural disasters, such as plagues, floods and droughts, recovery was further hindered and the sultanate entered into a prolonged period of general stagnation. Against this background, the positive trade balance which the sultanate had with Europe during this period was of great importance to the Mamlūk economy. Formal Venetian trade with the sultanate was restored in 745/1345, and other European cities soon followed suit. The renewal of European commerce with the sultanate was the result of political changes in the Black Sea area, namely the disintegration of the Mongol Ilkhanate and the rise of the Turcoman states (begliks) in Anatolia under Mamlūk influence.

In spite of the positive trade balance and al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s improvement of Egypt’s agricultural infrastructure, the sultan’s revenues fell drastically while the sultanic household expenditures increased significantly. For almost fifteen years after al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s death, his harem maintained an informal say in government when iqtāʾ allowances were granted through
women’s and eunuchs’ mediation. They also gained access to the sultan’s treasury and other private enterprises such as sugar presses and flour mills. The Mamlûk magnates were prepared to allow the Qalâwûnid sultans to squander a portion of the sultanic revenues on the harem as long as they could control the rest.\

Another sector that depleted the country’s resources was the Bedouins, whose constant disruptions went unhindered, while the government failed to impose its authority upon them. Immediately after al-Nâṣir’s death, the rivalry between al-Fâdîl and al-Muhannâ over the irrat al-‘arab erupted into open conflict, thereby rendering highways in Syria unsafe. In 753/1352 the clans of Muhannâ ibn ʿIsâ numbered 110, and each held the title of amîr and an iqṭâ’. In the Sharqiyya, an eastern province in the Nile Delta, the Thaʿaliba tribes abandoned their responsibility for the barîd maintenance and joined the al-ʿĀaʿid Bedouins, the recalcitrant rebels of the region. Feuds over domination in Upper Egypt between Bedouin tribes, traditionally divided into Qaysis and Yemenis, increased between 744/1343 and 754/1353. The Yemeni tribes of ʿArak, Juhayna and Balî disrupted communications and harassed government functionaries in their attempt to gain mashyakha (Bedouin headmanship) in Upper Egypt. Upper Egypt was under the de facto control of Muhammad ibn Wâṣil al-Ahdab, chief of the ʿArak tribe, and the local Mamlûk functionaries became dependent on him for the collection of the kharâj. In 754/1353, when the grand amîrs despatched a large expeditionary force against the Yemeni tribes, their power was temporarily curbed, but this did not change their growing prominence in Upper Egypt. Al-Ahdab, who extricated himself unharmed from the Mamlûk attack, came to terms with the government and received the mashyakha in Upper Egypt. The alliance of the Mamlûk government with the Yemeni tribes immediately led to rebellions of the Qaysi tribes, the former allies of the Mamlûks. Consequently, around 760/1360, the ‘Aydâb–Qûs route was abandoned and Upper Egypt was no longer under firm control of the Mamlûks.\

The bubonic plague, called the Black Death, which raged from 748/1347 to 750/1349, decimated between one quarter to one third of the Egyptian and Syrian populations, as it had in Europe. Sixteen outbreaks of major epidemics that occurred in Egypt, and fifteen in Syria, from the 760s/1360s until the end of Mamlûk rule, prevented any demographic and economic recovery. It was at the height of the Black Death and the economic crisis that the Mamlûk magnates decided to call off all rivalries and set up a ruling body intended to represent a consensus amongst them. The new majlis al-mashûra (consultative council) consisted of nine amîrs led by a tenth who held the office of raʾs nawba
(head of guards). Although mutual suspicions remained among the magnates, the majlis al-mashūra set precedents for the restoration of a strong sultanate. The majlis kept the Qalāwūnid sultan in check: he was allowed a grant for his daily expenditures, all of the slave-girls were expelled from the Citadel and salaries of most of the officials were cut by a minimum of one half or two-thirds. When, in 754/1353, the economic crisis deepened, the amīrs were forced to relinquish the state’s management to only one of them. As no one other than Amīr Shaykhū, who held then the atābakiyya (command in chief of the Mamlūk army) dared to assume the responsibility, the majlis members agreed to obey his decisions unconditionally. In order to bolster his special position, Shaykhū was given the title of al-amīr al-kabīr (the great amīr). It was only then that Shaykhū was able to take the large action described above, against the sultanic harem and the Bedouin tribes in Upper Egypt. During the following year, 755/1354, attacks against the Copts erupted throughout Egypt. Under pressure from the ‘ulamā’ and the masses, employment of Coptic clerks was forbidden, but more significant was that 25,000 faddāns (a land measure of approximately one acre) of waqf lands belonging to the Egyptian Churches were confiscated by the government (these drastic actions drove the Copts to mass conversion, thereby representing a significant stage in the ongoing process of conversion to Islam in Egypt). In 779/1377, Aynabak, who at this point held the post of atābak al-‘asākir and al-amīr al-kabīr, decided to make his official residence in the Citadel, the government seat, thus signalling the al-amīr al-kabīr’s position in power. It was while serving as al-amīr al-kabīr and atābak al-‘asākir that Barquq gained independence from factional coalitions and built wide support for his rule. When he lodged his recruits in the Citadel and was the first al-amīr al-kabīr to mint coins bearing his emblem (rank), as sultans customarily did upon their ascent to power, in effect the House of Qalāwūn came to an end.

The Circassian era of the sultanate

Al-Ẓāhir Barquq, the formation of the Circassian state

Barquq’s seizure of power in 784/1382 symbolises the restoration of the non-dynastic Mamlūk sultanate, and the move from a Turkish to a Circassian sultanate. Mamlūks of Circassian (Abkhāz) origin formed the majority in the army and the sultans were drawn from their numbers (except for two who were Albanian or Greek). Contemporary Mamlūk sources attribute to Barquq a deliberate policy of bringing about a change in the army’s ethnic
composition by purchasing Circassian mamlūks in great numbers and advancing them in preference to the Turks. The new Circassian regime was criticised by contemporaries, above all by the moralist historian al-Maqrīzī, who held them responsible for the breakdown of the traditional Islamic order, misrule and mismanagement. Despite the importance that contemporaries attributed to Barqūq’s policies and ethnic animosities to explain the political and social changes in the sultanate, neither the actions of a sole actor nor an ethnic factor could generate such developments. They were rather the result of ongoing processes that took place in the sultanate.

The introduction of Circassians into the Mamlūk army began as early as Qalāwūn’s reign, with the establishment of the Burjiyya corps. After Qalāwūn’s death, they were active partners in the Mamlūk coalitions that twice installed al-Nāṣir Muḥammad in the sultanate, and Baybars al-Jāshinkīr in 708/1308.51

With his death, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad left a large Mamlūk household that had been systematically manned with Mongol and Turkish recruits. During al-Muzaffār Hājī’s rule (747–8/1346–7), the Circassians regained their dominance but were purged from the army by the Mongols and Turks who installed al-Nāṣir Ḥasan on the throne. The Circassians re-emerged in the 750s/1350s, when they formed the majority in the household of Yalbughā al-Umarī, who was not a Circassian himself. The Yalbughāwiyya included over 1,800 recruits (julbān) and it was from their ranks that Barqūq rose to power and deposed the Qalāwūnid house, which under these circumstances became the symbol of the diminishing Turkish hegemony over the sultanate.

In contrast with the increasing influx of the Circassians into Egypt, the number of Turks steadily declined from the late 740s/1340s. The Middle East, like Europe, suffered a drastic depopulation during the Black Death. Its effects on the Mamlūk elite were far more severe than those suffered by the local population that was more immune to diseases.52 The population of the Golden Horde, the Turkish mamlūks’ homeland, dwindled in the second half of the eighth/fourteenth century, inter alia in the wake of the Black Death. Succession struggles in the Golden Horde among the Jōchids’ descendants of Chinggis Khān since the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century and struggles for domination between the Jōchids and the Timurids at the end of the century further depleted the Golden Horde’s resources and population. Mamlūk sources reveal that during the early ninth/fifteenth century the Golden Horde became a wilderness and that export of Turkish mamlūks was forbidden. Circassians, by contrast, continued to reach Egypt without difficulty both as free men and as Mamlūks.
Barqūq’s rise to power was the symptom of another process being undergone by the Mamlūk sultanate, namely the growth of the low-ranking *mamlūks*’ power. Breaches of discipline and public protests, especially of the ruling sultan’s new Mamlūk recruits, appeared, although sporadically, during al-Nāṣir Muhammad’s reign, when they became used to material plenty. During the forty years of rule of his Qalāwūnid descendants, the Mamlūks already possessed the power to lodge their own claims for a share in political decision-making together with the amīrs. Barqūq’s meteoric rise from the service of the aṣyād, the ruling sultan’s relatives, to the highest rank of *muqaddam alf* (commander of the one-thousand horsemen in the battlefield) and active partner in the bipartite rule behind al-Manṣūr ‘Alī, within a mere four months (Muḥarram–Rabī’ I 779/May–August 1377), is a reflection of the power accumulated by the *mamlūks* and the subsequent political chaos.

Barqūq was among the Yalbughāwīyya *mamlūks* who were imprisoned after the assassination of their master, Yalbughā al-‘Umarī, in 767/1365. In 778/1377 he was in the service of Amir Qaratāy, who together with Aynabak was involved in the rebellion against al-Ashraf Sha‘bān and his assassination. This rebellion was initiated by low-ranking *mamlūks*, and both Qaratāy and Aynabak themselves had been until recently low-ranking *mamlūks*. In Ṣafar 779/June 1377, Barqūq and an Asrafi *mamlūk*, Baraka (Berke), were granted an emirate of forty for their part in murdering Qaratāy. About two months later, Barqūq and Baraka conspired against Aynabak and played an active role behind the scenes in the rule of al-Mansūr al-‘Alī. In 783/1381, Barqūq managed to rid himself of Baraka and monopolised power as al-amīr al-kabīr and atābak al-‘asākir, and in 784/1382 seized the sultanate.

In order to build a broad support for his rule, Barqūq carefully promoted the *mamlūks* from the rival Asrafiyya faction (Baraka’s followers) and his own peers from the Yalbughāwīyya, while putting the advancement of his own *mamlūks* in abeyance. The sources show that Barqūq, unlike his predecessors, revived the practice of the first sultans of graduating only one intake of *mamlūks* at a time after a long training period. Barqūq’s conciliatory policy, however, left his rivals with the power to pose a credible threat to his rule, which indeed materialised in 791/1389, when Timurtash al-Asrafi, called Mintāsh, and Yalbughā al-Nāširī, the governors of Tripoli and Aleppo respectively, rebelled. In spite of the force of some 2,000 *mamlūks* he owned (he purchased about 5,000 *mamlūks* during his reign), Barqūq was ousted and the Qalāwūnid al-Ṣāliḥ Ḥājjī (now with the new regnal title of al-Manṣūr) was reinstated in the sultanate. During this rebellion, Barqūq’s previous painstaking efforts to restrict the *julbān*’s power were hampered. When many of his
veteran supporters deserted him to join the rebels, Barquq had no choice but to man the vacant posts with new recruits. Furthermore, upon his return to power (792/1389), after about eight months of confinement in Karak, he quickly rid himself of the majority of his veteran opponents, replacing them with his own mamluks. In order to secure the purchase and maintenance of his julbān, in 797/1395 Barquq established an office, dīwān al-mufrad (‘Special Bureau’, the bureau established especially for payment of the sultan’s mamluks), based on the lands previously held by the Qalāwūnids. The formation of this office was yet another step in the enhancement of the julbān’s power, for it formalised their status. As will be shown, new political and military measures would be necessary to curb their power.

Concomitant with the improvement in the julbān status was the growing involvement of the common people, al-‘āmma, in Mamluk inter-factional struggles for rule. As early as 741/1341, during the power struggle that erupted immediately after al-Nāṣir Muhammad’s death, the commoners were called by rival amīrs to fight alongside the mamluks in their street scuffles. With the increasing shifting of the low-ranking Mamluks among the factions, the amīrs sought the commoners’ support to keep the power balance. Barquq cultivated good relations with the ‘āmma to gain their support. In 781/1379, Barquq prevented his ruling partner, Baraka, from forcing the rabble into corvé or meting out punishment on criminals and inciters among them. In the same year, the ‘āmma stood firmly behind Barquq when Īnāl al-Yūsufī, one of the grandees, rebelled, and they did so again in 782/1380, during Barquq’s struggle against Baraka, which left him as the sole power behind al-Sālih Hājjī. A turbulent marginal group within the ‘āmma were the harāfīsh, living on the fringes of the urban lumpen proletariat. They were miserably poor, vulgar Sufi beggars (ju’aydiyya) and manual labourers of works that the decent members of the community avoided for religious and social reasons. The early Mamluk sultans distributed alms for their relief, while during al-Nāṣir Muhammad’s reign they were occasionally rounded up for forced labour such as digging canals. During Barquq’s reign, the harāfīsh gained recognition, and during the ninth/fifteenth century, through Mamluk patronage, they gradually became organised into groups in Sufi orders, headed by shaykhs responsible for maintaining discipline and distribution of alms among them.

As Sufism became the main vehicle for the integration of the various groups of the population under Mamluk patronage, the traditional positions of the professional ‘ulamā’ and faqīhs, especially the Shāfi’īs, as the leading upper class and agents of orthodox Islam, were eroded. High positions were no longer reserved exclusively for them and persons from the lower classes could
now rise to prominent positions through patronage relations and the practice of payment for nomination. The position of the šarīʿī qādīs was impinged upon when the jurisdiction of the hājibs (chamberlains, or doorkeepers), who acted as delegates of the sultan, was extended to deal with matters beyond the military elite and the diwāns, to matters traditionally dealt with according to the šariʿa. In Barquq’s time, the hājibs’ number was increased from three to five, and at one point during the ninth/fifteenth century reached eighty-six. By the middle of the ninth/fifteenth century, senior amīrs such as the dawādar acquired judicial knowledge and acted as judges. The platforms stationed at the gates of the grand amīrs’ houses ‘sold’ justice to the larger population. The influential among the julbān employed military police to maintain order in their courts and enforce their decisions. Al-Ashraf Qānsūh al-Ghawri (906–22/1501–16) tried on two occasions to centralise the judicial system and ban all courts but the šarīʿī, but was soon compelled to yield to the amīrs’ pressure and leave these courts active.

For some contemporary chroniclers, Barquq’s reign also marked the beginning of the sultanate’s economic decline and signalled the move to copper currency as its salient characteristic. Indeed, in 783/1381 Barquq ordered the minting of a copper coin but it was rejected by the market and it was only during Faraj’s reign that the Mamluk monetary system moved to copper in all business dealings. Scholars studying the Middle Eastern monetary system have identified changes in the global trading pattern and their effects on the bullion supply as the main reason for the crisis. Silver, and to a lesser extent other precious metals, reached the Levant in both bullion and currency from western Europe in exchange for manufactured goods, raw materials and Indian luxury commodities. Gold reached Egypt from the Sūdān and then was siphoned off to India and the Black Sea area in exchange for luxury goods and white slaves. During the second half of the eighth/fourteenth century, this trade balance was changed. The supply of gold from the Sūdān diminished because most of it reached Europe through Morocco and Tunisia. At the same time, silver disappeared from the market because of mining problems in Europe. In order to overcome the bullion shortage, the Mamluk sultans tried to implement reforms in copper currency and fix a single exchange rate to reduce uncontrolled inflation, but market trends proved stronger and eventually went beyond their control. Only in 886/1486, during Qāytbay’s reign (872–901/1468–96), did the crisis come to an end when silver, copper and other metals returned to the market as a result of renewed mining in Europe.

Bullion flow and long-distance trading patterns, significant as they were, do not explain the decline in the domestic economies that were, in fact, the main
source of government income. Land revenues in Egypt dropped dramatically during the Circassian period. In 715/1315, during al-Nāṣir Muḥammad’s land survey, land revenues reached 9,428,289 dinār jayshi (a monetary unit of account), rising to 9,584,284 in 777/1376, while during the Ottoman conquest they totalled only 1,800,000 dinars. Bedouinisation of rural areas in Lower and Upper Egypt might be one of the reasons behind this reduction in the area of cultivated land.\(^5\) As mentioned earlier, Mamlūk authority in Upper Egypt was tenuous because of the Qaysi and Yemeni Bedouin strife over hegemony in the region.\(^6\) Of the 24,000 fādān\(^s\) that had been cultivated at Luxor according to al-Ashraf Shaʿbān’s survey in 777/1376, only 1,000 were cultivated in 786/1384. In order to keep the Arab tribes in check, Barquq moved a fraction of the Berber Hawwāra tribe from the Delta to Girga in Middle Egypt. This move gave the Mamlūk government a respite during which order was restored in Upper Egypt, until the Hawwāra consolidated their power and again jeopardised Mamlūk control in the area. The Mamlūk government’s decentralised system made it difficult to contain the Bedouins. Lower Egypt was divided into eight provinces (excluding Alexandria) and Upper Egypt into seven, each headed by a Mamlūk amīr of forty or ten, according to province size. When Barquq was acting as al-amīr al-kabīr and atābak al-ʿasākir, he had already tried to restore order by uniting the Egyptian provinces under three constituencies, each under the control of an amīr of one hundred. Alexandria, Damanhūr and Asyūṭ were the centres of their niyābāt (governorships). However, this system was quickly abandoned during the civil war that broke out after his death.\(^6\)

Plague depopulation in Egypt was another factor affecting the destruction of agriculture. The lack of inheritance of the iqtāʾ which resulted in its frequent transfer between different muqṭaʾs, the scattering of iqtāʾs in various locations, and the filtering role played by the office-holders in the fiscal administration, all barred the peasants’ demands for a better distribution of wealth between the landlords and themselves.\(^6\) Another reason for the suffering of the peasantry in Egypt was the neglect of the irrigation system as a result of the practice of purchasing appointments that was formalised in 745/1344. Prefects in Egypt did their utmost to recoup the money they had paid for the post, with interest. The dams’ maintenance was thrust upon the villagers in the form of corvé, but since the government failed to provide instructions and the necessary technical facilities, the irrigation system collapsed. The sultans’ efforts to repair it during the second half of the ninth/fifteenth century met with the opposition of the fieh-holders, who claimed the responsibility for its maintenance and levied taxes for this purpose, but in practice they forced the
responsibility onto the farmers. The impoverished farmers deserted their villages for the city, only to swell the numbers of penniless unemployed there. Their influx into the cities kept urban population constant. The steady migration of refugees from the eastern parts of the Muslim world after the Mongol invasions of the seventh/thirteenth and late eighth/fourteenth centuries also enhanced the cities’ populations and created a heavy burden on the state’s resources.

There was no real change in the Mamluk sultanate’s foreign policy during Barquq’s reign. In Anatolia, the Turcoman states (begliks) continued to manoeuvre between Mamluk suzerainty and autonomous rule in order to secure their existence, while the Mamluks would not let them slip from their sphere of influence. In 789/1387, Timur Leng’s conquests in the east had already included Mesopotamia. Barquq reacted with preparations against the Mongol invaders and with a request to form a common front with the Ottomans and the Golden Horde. In 796/1394 Barquq offered asylum to the Jalayirid ruler of Iraq, who fled before Timur, and led an army to al-Bira on the Euphrates to confront Timur. Timur, however, withdrew, and Barquq died before Timur resumed his plans to invade Syria.

After Barquq’s death in 801/1399, the sultanate was plunged into twelve years of civil war over power during which time Barquq’s achievements in restoring order in the sultanate collapsed. Mamluk authority in Upper Egypt was nonexistent during the civil war. The Ottomans seized the opportunity to invade the sultanate’s territory in south-eastern Anatolia, while in 803/1400 Timur Leng invaded Syria. Al-Nâṣir Faraj, Barquq’s eleven-year-old son, set out for Syria to expel the Timurid forces, but a rebellion fomented by a rival faction compelled the prominent amirs in the force to return to Egypt with Faraj, leaving Damascus to Timur’s depredations. In 803/1400, Timur left Syria and turned to Anatolia where he defeated the Ottoman sultan, Bâyezîd I, in Ankara (805/1402).

Faraj’s rule (801–8/1399–1405; 808–15/1405–12) was prolonged because of the deep schisms inside the rival Mamluk factions. Many contenders for rule were eliminated in the long inter-factional struggles which were centred in Syria. Faraj survived six campaigns against rebellious amirs of different factions. Only in 812/1410 did Shaykh al-Mâhmûd, the future sultan al-Mu’ayyad, and his rival Nawrûz al-Ḥâfîzî, the governor of Damascus, become allies and together they defeated and later executed Faraj (815/1412). In order to win broad support for their bipartite rule, they divided the realm. The sultanate was nominally given to the caliph al-Mustâ’in but Nawrûz retained Syria, and Shaykh, acting as atâbak al-‘asâkir, acquired Egypt. After about seven months,
this settlement was broken by Shaykh, who deposed al-Musta’in from both
the sultanate and the caliphate and seized the sultanate.

Al-Mu’ayyad Shaykh, the establishment
of a new factional order

Al-Mu’ayyad’s rise to power in 815/1412 confirmed the Mamluks’ rejection of
dynastic succession. Henceforth, sultans handed down the sultanate to their
descendants by will, but with the knowledge that after a very brief interreg-
num the young prince would be deposed. His replacement by one of the
veteran amirs was generally smooth and without bloodshed. The only attempt
made by a sultan’s son to establish an effective rule, when the rejection of
the dynastic principle had long since become tradition, was that of al-Nāšir
Muhammad, Qāṭbay’s son (901–4/1495–8). Like al-Nāšir Faraj, he was bru-
tally killed by his father’s mamluks.

Al-Mu’ayyad had to cope with the political disorder inside the sultanate and
to rehabilitate its position in the international state order. Al-Mu’ayyad led his
first expedition (817/1414) to Syria to quell the rebellion of the governors
headed by his former ally and rival, Nawrūz al-Ḥāfīzī, who did not recognise
the caliph’s deposition and al-Mu’ayyad’s usurpation of the sultanate. In the
following year, a second campaign was led to suppress the revolt of the Syrian
governors that al-Mu’ayyad himself had appointed. After Syria, al-Mu’ayyad
directed his efforts to the restoration of Mamlūk authority in eastern Anatolia,
where a new political structure had emerged in the wake of the Timurid
invasion. Although Timur’s invasion contained the Ottoman advance into
eastern Anatolia, it brought the Timurid clients, the Turcoman Āq Qoyunlu
(White Sheep) to Diyār Bakr, and the Qara Qoyunlu (Black Sheep) to
Mesopotamia, in close proximity with the Mamlūk sultanate. The threat of a
new Timurid invasion pushed the Ottomans to substitute their emerging
conflict with the Mamlūks over Anatolia with interference in the politics of
the Turcoman principalities to bring them under their protection, while the
Mamlūks stuck to the pre-Timurid state order in Anatolia. Trapped between the
two great powers, the Qaramānid and Dhū al-Qādirid begliks manoeuvred to
obtain gains from the situation. Thus, Meḥmed Beg of Dhū al-Qādir took
advantage of the anarchy that broke out in the sultanate after Barqūq’s death,
and placed his principality under Ottoman protectorate. Upon his accession,
al-Mu’ayyad restored the Dhū al-Qādirid allegiance to the Mamluks, while the
Ottoman sultan Meḥmed I conquered Konya and reinstated the Qaramānid
ruler Meḥmed Beg as his client. Qaramān’s formal annexation was avoided in
order to satisfy Timur’s son, Shāh Rūkh (807–50/1405–75), and the Mamluks,
who insisted on preserving their outer buffer zone untouched. In 822/1419, al-
Mu’ayyad invaded the Qaramâníd territories; Kayseri surrendered and Mamlûk
suzerainty was recognised again. The Mamlûks proceeded to Konya, Nijde and
Laranda, but then it was decided to retreat to Aleppo. This pragmatic decision,
much like Baybars’ in 675/1277, indicates that the Mamlûks recognised their
power limits and remained careful not to risk their forces in expeditions far from
their Syrian bases.

Domestically, the sultanate was in poor condition; the state institutions in
the provinces did not function, the currency was unstable, epidemics of
plague, which recurred in 818–19/1415–16 and in 824/1420, caused grain
riots. In 820/1417 the ʿustâdār (majordomo) Fakhr al-Dîn ibn Abî ‘l-Faraj, who
was responsible for diwân al-mufrad, personally went with his clients and ḥalqa
soldiers to levy the revenues in Lower Egypt, and led a punitive expedition to
Upper Egypt against the unruly Bedouin tribes. The population was com-
pelled to purchase the booty at prices of the government’s choice. Confiscation of the property of office-holders, merchants and other sectors
was frequently implemented to replenish the treasury.

Al-Mu’ayyad’s ambition to reform the army, much as Barqûq’s, did not
materialise. His attempts to balance the Circassian element in the army by
importing Turkish slaves succeeded only to a very limited degree. The ranks of the
amîrs were filled with Turks, mainly with Barqûq’s veteran mamlûks,
and the majority of the army remained Circassian. The enhancement of the
julbân’s political position, which had eroded the amîrs’ authority under the
Qalaŵûnids, was checked from al-Mu’ayyad’s reign onward, by a separation
that was maintained between the amîrs’ level and the sultan’s new recruits.
The Circassian sultans mainly filled the amîrs’ ranks with veteran mamlûks
who had not grown up in their own households and it was from among them
that the new sultan also came to power. This might explain the ninth/
fifteenth-century phenomenon of mamlûks reaching a ripe old age while still
holding senior positions. The julbân, on the other hand, were hardly promoted
to emirates even after a long service under their master, the ruling sultan, and
therefore they lacked experienced leadership to lead them to hold on to power
upon his death. In 824/1421, upon al-Mu’ayyad’s death, his young and
inexperienced julbân were expelled from the Citadel and left to their own
devices in Cairo. The julbân of al-Asçraf Barsbûy (r. 825–42/1422–38), al-Ţâhir
Jaqmaq (r. 842–57/1438–53), al-Asçraf ʿInâl (r. 857–65/1453–60) and al-Ţâhir
Khushqadam (r. 865–72/1461–7) were all expelled from the Citadel without
resistance because they displayed no political sophistication in their negotia-
tions with the veteran mamlûks. After their expulsion, most of the julbân were
absorbed into the amīrs’ households, where they acquired their military and political experience, and achieved seniority in the Mamlūk system. It was during their service in the amīrs’ households that personal relationships between the julkān and other veteran mamlūks were formed in addition to those acquired during their training period in the Citadel barracks. These relationships were later important in the make-up of the amīrs’ stratum of the Circassian regime. Furthermore, these relationship networks also integrated the amīrs’ households into the factional fabric of the coalitions that supported the government.

The departure of the Circassian Mamlūks from the early pattern of Mamlūk factionalism, whereby the rise of new recruits triggered the fall of their predecessors, created co-operation between old and new generations of Mamlūks in politics. Consequently, fragments of factions, yesterday’s allies and rivals, and individuals from the amīrs’ households, could unite in coalitions (ḥizb, pl. ahzāb) through connections that crossed the old factional boundaries. This pluralistic make-up of the Circassian political coalitions for rule called for bilateralism as a unifying force. Typically of bilateral political systems, symbols were utilised to create factional cohesion, the sultan’s sobriquet being one of them. The precedent of using the sobriquet of the faction’s founder as a unifying symbol was set with Ṭaṭār’s rise to power in 824/1421, when Barqūq’s Zāhiriyā split into sub-factions, with each cohering around a contender for rule. Ṭaṭār took the sobriquet ‘al-Zāhir’, after his master al-Zāhir Barqūq, to enhance his legitimacy for rule. In 841/1438 al-Ashraf Barsbāy’s mamlūks adopted his laqab as their factional symbol. All coalitions for power established subsequently were divided into two factions, the Zāhiriyā and the Ashrafiyya, each claiming old patron–client ties going back to two ancestors, al-Zāhir Barqūq and al-Ashraf Barsbāy, respectively. This system of bilateral factionalism might well be the reason for the relative peaceful nature of Mamlūk politics during the Circassian period. The sultans were chosen in negotiations, whereby the opposition faction was not deprived of a relative share in government and state resources. For example, in 865/1461, negotiations between the Ashrafiyya and the Zāhiriyā resulted in an agreement on the rise to power of Khushqadam, the Zāhiriyā candidate, and the reinstatement of Jānim al-Ashrafi, the Ashrafiyya candidate, to his post as nāʿib of Damascus.66

Al-Ashraf Barsbāy: state monopoly on trade and industry

Barsbāy, who was one of the stalwarts of Ṭaṭār’s short regime and the guardian of his minor son, ascended the sultanate in 825/1422.67 Barsbāy’s reign
marked the institutionalisation of the state monopoly on local industry and the lucrative transit trade. State monopoly on trade was made possible when the ancient transcontinental trade routes from China through Iran were diverted to the Red Sea as a result of the new political circumstances in Asia in the wake of Timur Leng’s invasion. In 832/1428, a monopoly on spices was imposed in Alexandria, when Barsbāy compelled European merchants to buy spices from his agents at a fixed quantity and a fixed price. Domestically, a state monopoly was placed on textiles, sugar and other commodities. The long-term results of this policy were disastrous to Mamlūk commerce. The Kārimī merchants, who since the sixth/twelfth century had been involved in long-distance trade and enjoyed state protection, were restricted and eventually disappeared when traders became state officials acting as the sultan’s commissioned agents.68 The increase in the sultan’s revenues from trade was temporary, as the demand for spices soon fell because of the monopoly’s harsh fiscal policies. Consequently, the Mamlūk rulers resorted to the old practices of the sale of offices, confiscation of fortunes and compulsory purchase, which were effective in leading the treasury to immediate recovery.

To protect the lucrative Mamlūk trade, Barsbāy took action in the Mediterranean against the Catalan and Genoese pirates. He conducted three campaigns against Cyprus for its part as a Frankish haven for the pirates. In 829/1426, the island was conquered and its king was reduced to a vassal paying an annual tribute. Barsbāy adamantly opposed Shāh Rūkh’s repeated attempts to provide the kiswa, the Ka’ba cover, for fear that the Timurid ruler of Iran might gain a formal foothold in the Ḥijāz, in close proximity with Mamlūk commercial interests.

Encroachment upon the Mamlūk sphere of influence in eastern Anatolia came from the Turcomans of the Āq Qoyunlu. In response, Edessa was ravaged in 833/1429, and in 836/1432 Barsbāy personally led another expedition to Âmid, the Āq Qoyunlu capital, but failed to conquer the city. Beyond Barsbāy’s achievement of the Āq Qoyunlu recognition in Mamlūk sovereignty, these expeditions marked the beginning of the Mamlūk military decline.

From al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq to al-Ashraf Qāytbāy: social conservatism and economic stagnation

Barsbāy died in the plague of 841/1438. Jaqmaq, Barsbāy’s old friend from their training period and guardian of his son, al-ʿAzīz Yūsuf, ascended the sultanate. Jaqmaq’s piety, most probably coupled with his mature age, determined his conservative and orthodox rule, as was to be the case with the three Mamlūk
sultans that followed him, İnâl, Khushqadam and Qâytbây. As their main goal was to preserve the status quo in the state socio-political order, all these sultans were adherents of Sunnî orthodoxy (according to the Mamlûks’ interpretation) and classical Mamlûk tradition. Qâytbây was much admired by both the civilian and the Mamlûk elites as a benevolent and just ruler, and a true adherent to tradition.⁶⁹

Adherence to Mamlûk classical tradition was demonstrated by recognition of the veteran mamlûks’ seniority, which eventually led to the bilateral factional system discussed earlier. This system called for a wider network of patronage relationships and the necessity for securing formal and informal income to maintain them. It is in this context that the ninth/fifteenth-century phenomenon of transferring state lands, iqtâ‘s, to private hands and turning them into waqfs should be perceived. From Barsbây’s reign onward, the sultans were the greatest beneficiaries of these transactions and it was with the covert incomes from waqfs that they covered extra expenses and fostered their patronage relations with the amîrs and the julkâns. Barsbây was the first to use a large-scale sale of state land to augment his private income. Jaqmaq secured his long rule of almost fifteen years by his prodigal awards to those around him. During his rule not only were iqtâ‘ land sales increased,⁷⁰ but waqf lands were also transferred to the sultan’s treasury.⁷¹ On his death in 857/1453, he left behind empty coffers. İnâl was about seventy-two years old when the sultanate was imposed on him by the Ashrafiyya amîrs who manipulated him. During his reign, the sales of iqtâ‘ lands were tripled, while most of them went to the amîrs. During the four-month reign of Ahmad, İnâl’s son, negotiations between the Ashrafiyya and Zâhirîyya resulted in an agreement regarding the elevation of the Zâhirî candidate, Khushqadam. Upon his ascension, veteran Ashrafiyya amîrs were granted posts and larger iqtâ‘s, while the whole army was bribed to support his rule by iqtâ‘s and grants. The wholesale disposal of the iqtâ‘s taken from İnâl’s julkân was hastily implemented in order to satisfy the mamlûks. When these were not enough, the waqfs of İnâl and his supporters were given out. Qâytbây’s waqfs, which were very likely originally iqtâ‘ lands too, were manipulated to increase unlisted income in his personal treasury, from which he met his mamlûks’ wage demands.⁷²

The growing frustration among the julkân over the sparse representation in the amîrs’ ranks and the lengthy period they had to wait until they could change their position in the power structure led them frequently to vent their frustrations in unruly actions. Jaqmaq was too feeble to suppress his julkân’s disorder. During İnâl’s reign, the julkân’s disrespect towards the sultan, the
amirs and the officials escalated. In 859/1455 they looted the amirs' granaries, dismounted the jurists and other officials, took their horses and mules and seized commodities from shops in the market. Ibn Iyâs mentions that their crimes did not stop until 865/1460 when many of them died in the plague, to his and the population’s relief. From the outbreak of the war against the Ottomans in 886/1481, riots and outrages by jilbân, joined by veteran mamlûks, became common scenes in Cairo. In 891/1486, when Qâytbây could not meet the mamlûks’ demands for increased wages, confiscations of property of office-holders, craftsmen and merchants were implemented as emergency measures with ‘ulamâ’ support. In 894/1489 and again in 896/1490, Qâytbây threatened to abdicate and retire to Mecca in order to obtain the agreement of the chief qâdîs, the ‘ulamâ and the amirs to extort extra money from the producing sectors in order to meet the mamlûks’ demands.

The weak government invited Bedouin unrest. During Khushqadam’s reign, five expeditions were sent to the province of al-Buhârya to suppress the Labîd tribe. In 890/1485, when the Mamlûks had their hands full fighting against the Ottomans, the Hawwâra, the Berber tribe that Barquq had moved from the Delta, sacked the Fayyûm and acted as the true rulers of Upper Egypt. The Bedouins in Syria became unmanageable, wreaked havoc and rendered communication between Egypt and Syria impossible. The government was too weak to impose real Mamlûk authority and the Mamlûk punitive expeditions were designed to play the Bedouins against each other in order to preserve Mamlûk order.

After Barsbây’s reign, it became increasingly difficult to protect Mamlûk trade from Frankish piracy based in Rhodes, while the Mamlûk protectorate on Cyprus was tenuous. In 844/1440 and 847/1443, Jaqmaq sent expeditions to attack Rhodes via Cyprus which failed and compelled the Mamlûks to conclude a peace treaty with the Knights of St John. Mamlûk hegemony in Cyprus was threatened after the death of John II (862/1456), when his son James, who was the Mamlûks’ protégé, was defeated by his sister Charlotte who ascended the throne. The Mamlûks easily took Nicosia but retreated when the siege on Cerines was prolonged, leaving James with a contingent that was too small to tip the balance in his favour. In 863/1459 the Franks had attacked the sultanate’s coastal cities and caused destruction. In reaction, a Mamlûk contingent was sent in 865/1461 to install James on the Cypriot throne under Mamlûk suzerainty. The small Mamlûk contingent that was stationed in Cyprus, however, encouraged James to clash openly with the sultan’s representative in Famagusta in 868/1464. The government’s hesitation to send reinforcements from Cairo led to the Mamlûks’ defeat and the transfer of the city into
James’s possession. The Mamlūks’ efforts were diverted from Cyprus when, in the same year, conflicts with the Ottomans over the hegemony in Anatolia broke out.

Disregard of the new state order that emerged in South-West Asia in the wake of Timur’s invasion and the rise of the Ottomans made the Circassian sultans cling to the buffer-zone strategy in eastern Anatolia that had been established about a century earlier. As long as the Ottomans were occupied with their conquests in Europe, the Mamlūks could preserve the pre-Timurid state order at a reasonable price. It became more difficult after 868/1464, when Mehmed the Conqueror resumed Ottoman expansionist ambitions towards Anatolia. In the same year, Arslân, the Dhū al-Qādirid ruler, who sought Ottoman protection, used the death of Ibrāhīm Beg of Qaramān and the ensuing internal disputes to restore Kayseri, which had been lost to the Qaramānids in 839/1435. The Qaramānids ruler, Ishāq, responded by encouraging the Āq Qoyunlu Turcoman chief, Uzūn Hasan, to expel the Dhū al-Qādirids. After the occupation of the Qaramānid principality, Uzūn Hasan held effective control over the Qaramānid Beg he installed on the throne, while Mamlūk suzerainty remained formally untouched. This arrangement paved the way for a Mamlūk–Āq Qoyunlu alliance against the Ottomans. However, Ḥasan’s conquest of Elbistan, the Dhū al-Qādirid capital, in 869/1465, aroused Khushqadam’s mistrust and prevented co-operation. Consequently, Khushqadam turned to the Ottomans and offered them an alliance, a request that was not welcomed. Instead, the Ottomans chose to regain Kayseri and drive Ḥasan’s vassal out. In 874/1470, Qaramān was formally annexed by the Ottomans. The struggle over the Dhū al-Qādir principality followed when, in 870/1466, Arslân was murdered, probably at Khushqadam’s instigation. The two contenders for rule who were supported by Khushqadam failed to consolidate their positions in power, while Shāh Suwār, a third candidate who allied with the Ottomans, was assisted in his rise to power by their troops. Khushqadam’s attempts to restore control over the Dhū al-Qādirid beglik were rejected by Mehmed II. When Khushqadam died in 872/1467, news arrived that the Mamlūk army in Syria had been defeated by Shāh Suwār while defending Aleppo. This defeat primarily stemmed from the amīrs’ refusal to leave Cairo, for struggles over the sultanate were anticipated when Khushqadam became gravely ill. After Qāytbāy’s ascent to the sultanate, subsequent campaigns were conducted between 872/1468 and 876/1472 until Shāh Suwār was captured and brought to Cairo, where he was executed. However, this Mamlūk achievement was temporary, since the defeat of Uzūn Ḥasan, the Āq Qoyunlu chief, in 878/1473 in Bashkent (today’s Bashkoy) by
the Ottomans and his subsequent death paved the way for the installation of a new pro-Ottoman ruler in Dhū al-Qādirīd Elbistan. The large number of casualties, excessive expenditures and prolonged military efforts that the superior Mamlūk army had to invest in subduing the local Turcoman army of Shāh Suwār inflicted a blow on the prestige of the Mamlūk sultanate as a great power.75

The Mamlūk–Ottoman conflict over Anatolia was accelerated when in 886/1481 Qāytbāy gave asylum to Jem (Cem), Bāyezīd II’s (r. 886–918/1481–1512) brother and rival for the throne. While previously the Ottomans only provided support to their Dhū al-Qādirīd clients, from 889/1484 they joined them in their fight against the Mamlūks. Qāytbāy skilfully led sixteen campaigns between the first Ottoman invasion of Cilicia, the gateway to Syria, in 890/1485, and their defeat in 894/1489 at the battle of Agha Çayırı. He forced the mighty Ottomans to come to terms with the Mamlūks in the peace treaty of 896/1491 and respect pre-war Mamlūk hegemony in eastern Anatolia. The Ottomans ceded the territories they had taken beyond the Taurus range, while the Mamlūks were obligated to turn them into waqf, dedicated to the two Holy Cities. The treaty saved the Mamlūks’ prestige and granted them renewed, free access to the Black Sea slave markets and the metal mines of silver, copper and iron, and the salt mines, including saltpetre, a major ingredient of gunpowder. Nevertheless, this treaty exposed again the Mamlūk anachronistic status quo strategy built around mutual recognition of spheres of influence, and the preference for negotiations for resolving conflicts within the Muslim world, which prevented the Mamlūk sultans from recognising the technological and economic stagnation in the sultanate and the necessity for introducing reforms into their armies.

Al-Ashraf Qānsūh al-Ghawrī: a late attempt at reforms

The growing frustration among the Mamlūk factions over the extensive period of Qāytbāy’s rule, accompanied by the ensuing lack of opportunities to change their position in the political power structure, erupted into intensive factional struggles that brought four sultans to the throne in the interregnum between his death (901/1496) and the appointment of his eventual, more than sixty-year-old successor, al-Ashraf Qānsūh al-Ghawrī (906/1501).76 Uncompromising methods of exiling and eliminating potential rivals were used to secure al-Ghawrī’s supreme power. Three individuals were his confidants and the mainstays of his regime. The first was Tūmanbāy, his nephew, who served as dawādār. The second was Sārī ʿl-Dīn ibn al-Shīḥna, a Syrian juristconsult, who held the Ḥanafī qāḍiship for more than a decade, during
which he provided his patron with the legal techniques for manipulating the waqfs to create a concealed reserve from the unlisted income for his exclusive use. The third of al-Ghawrî’s confidants was al-Zaynî Barakât ibn Müsâ, who rose from obscure origins to serve as bailiff. Under him, confiscation was extended from the wealthy civilian sector, to the Mamlûk elite who had previously been untouchable and the general populace who had so far escaped persecution due to their poverty.77

The ongoing deterioration for over fifteen decades in the producing sectors of the sultanate peaked into economic stagnation. As was mentioned earlier, Egypt’s agricultural potential was no longer fully exploited. Craftsmen and merchants concealed their resources instead of improving their production and output. Egypt’s industry remained traditional, with only minor changes in production techniques, oriented towards limited-scale production of sophisticated luxury goods, whereas in Europe new technologies and mechanisation resulted in wide production of plain and low-priced goods for domestic and foreign markets.78 Products for which Europe once had been dependent on Middle Eastern expertise, such as silk, cotton and sugar, were now widely produced in Europe and then sold in Middle Eastern markets at lower prices. The decline of production in Egypt was also the result of the gradual transfer of industry from private to government hands which suppressed the motivation of the producing sectors to improve quality and production methods.79

The maritime revolution in Europe had transformed the global trade order. In 905/1498, Vasco da Gama appeared in the Indian Ocean, in 907/1500 an Egyptian fleet was attacked off Diu, the north-western Indian harbour, and in 909/1503 a Portuguese squadron sailed close to the Red Sea gateway, while European piracy continued to threaten Mamlûk commerce in the Mediterranean. Al-Ghawrî adopted an aggressive stance in his dealings with European aggression against Mamlûk trade, and allied with the Ottomans, who since 909/1502 had been worried by the growing power of the Safavids and their relations with the Europeans. From 912/1507, an armed force was present in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The alliance with the Ottomans enabled the Mamlûks to obtain timber and iron for the construction of ships, and, from 917/1511, guns, powder, sailors and craftsmen skilled in shipbuilding.80

In 914/1508, al-Ghawrî began establishing an artillery corps, and in 917/1511 a corps of harquebusiers, known as the ‘Fifth Corps’ in the sources, was recruited from outside the Mamlûks’ cadres. This corps was manned by black slaves, sons of Mamlûks, local artisans and foreigners, and paid largely from unofficial resources that had mainly come from waqf manipulation.
Although al-Ghawrī’s innovations were minor in scope, he immediately met stiff opposition from the Mamlûk elite who vigorously defended Mamlûk military tradition, which was their ethos and status symbol. In 920/1514, riots fomented by recruits and veteran mamlûks accused al-Ghawrī of fostering the new corps at their expense. Confronted with the Mamlûk opposition, the economic constraints caused by the collapse of agriculture, and the diversion of the transcontinental commerce from Egypt, al-Ghawrī only gradually instituted his reform, insufficiently to cope with the challenges created by the new regional and world order.

Upon Bâyezîd’s death in 918/1512, his son, Selîm I, seized power in Constantinople and soon led his army into Anatolia to curb the expansionist ambitions of the Safavid Shâh Ismâ’îl. The two linked their aspirations for expansion with the ideology of universal Muslim hegemony. Al-Ghawrī still perceived these new developments in Anatolia in terms of the old status quo in the Muslim world. He estimated that the Safavids could be contained within the former Āq Qoyunlu borders, without Mamlûk intervention. Selîm defeated Ismâ’îl at Chaldiran near Tabriz in 920/1514, and displayed displeasure to the Mamlûks and their vassals, the Dhû al-Qâdirîds, for their neutrality. In 921/1515 the Dhû al-Qâdirîds were invaded and defeated by Selîm. On 25 Rajab 922/24 August 1516, the two armies, Ottoman and Mamlûk, engaged in battle at Marj Dâbiq, north of Aleppo. The Ottoman army included infantry and cavalry equipped with artillery and harquebuses. Al-Ghawrī’s army, on the other hand, was composed of sultanic mamlûks (jîlbân and veterans), amîrs’ sayfiyya troops, and reservists – no harquebusiers from the ‘Fifth Corps’ took part in the battle. The veterans were deployed on the front line and bore the brunt of the battle, while the recruits demonstrated incompetence. The veterans interpreted their deployment as a deliberate scheme to spare the recruits and began to desert the battlefield. When it was reported that Qânsûh al-Ghawrī had died of a heart attack, the rest of his army fled the battlefield. The Mamlûks’ defeat in this battle clearly exposed the problematic structure of the Mamlûk army and its obsolete military skills and armaments. Selîm easily conquered Syria and entered Damascus without resistance. Tûmanbây, al-Ghawrī’s nephew and viceregent, who was proclaimed sultan in Cairo, made preparations to meet the Ottoman invasion of Egypt. On 29 Dhû al-Hijja 922/23 January 1517, a second defeat was inflicted on the Mamlûk army at Raydâniyya, north of Cairo. Tûmanbây was captured and hanged, while Khâyrbak, the former Mamlûk viceroy of Aleppo, was appointed as first Ottoman governor of Egypt. Egypt and Syria became separate provinces of the Ottoman empire.
Conclusion

A variety of theories have been offered to explain the success of the Mamlük institution in the medieval Muslim world. The prevalence and longevity of the Mamlük system led some scholars to characterise it as an outgrowth of Islamic civilisation. Bringing in slaves with a pagan background from outside the borders of Islam has been explained by the proscription of taking Muslims into bondage. Its dominance in Islamic armies has been explained by the shortage of military manpower because Muslims preferred urban, commercial life. The preference of Muslim rulers for purchasing *mamlûks* of nomadic origins, mainly from Central Asia and the Eurasian steppes, for their reputation as skilled horsemen and archers, has been explained by technological developments such as spurs which brought about a change in the army’s make-up – from an infantry-based army to one consisting of skilled cavalry-men. The Mamlûks’ involvement in politics has been explained by the avoidance of the educated Muslim elite of political activity because it did not fall into line with Muslim ideals.81

The constant recruitment of new *mamlûks* into the Mamlük elite and the non-transfer of their rights to their descendants led to problems like schism in their political system, lack of large popular legitimacy and decentralisation of government that threatened the stability of the Mamlük rule. Since the Mamlük sultanate’s foundation, the Mamlûks adopted mechanisms that regulated their tendency towards schism and set the rules for reshuffles in government without damaging the state’s socio-political structure by unbridled violent struggles. The sultan’s legitimacy for rule within the Mamlük elite depended upon the support of his veteran peers (*khushdâshiyya*) and others who cohered as an interest group. His ascent to power was arranged in an agreement whereby the dominant *amîrs* undertook to support his rule, while he was committed to protect their position and economic interests, considered as their inherent rights or moral economy, against rival factions. Infringing this exchange relationship on the sultan’s part justified his deposition, regularly with bloodshed, and the appointment of a new sultan. To secure his position and reinforce his authority over the Mamlük oligarchy, the Mamlük sultan not only cultivated formal and informal patronage relationships with the veteran *amîrs*, but also fostered a new Mamlük household of his own that would, in the course of his rule, provide loyal *mamlûks* to be placed gradually in key positions instead of the veterans.

The cyclical process of the rise of new Mamlük factions triggering the fall of their predecessors, which was characteristic of the Mamlük political system...
during the Turkish period, prevented the development of a consistent attitude towards the idea of dynastic rule. The question of whether the Mamlûks intended to establish a dynastic rule is still open. However, there is agreement among scholars of Mamlûk history that when the Mamlûks did install sultans’ sons in the sultanate, they had no intention of relinquishing power to them. Since the Mamlûk state foundation, Mamlûk sultans had routinely handed down the sultanate to their descendants by will, but after an inter-factional struggle over rule the young prince was replaced by an amîr chosen from among the magnates. Al-Nâşir Muhammad’s third reign was exceptional because, although he was enthroned by his father’s amîrs, he succeeded in establishing an effective rule for himself based on the Mamlûk guard he had recruited during his earlier reigns. The Qalâwûnid rule lasted over forty years after al-Nâşir’s death, primarily because the Mamlûk pattern of conflict management was destabilised and lost its moderating mechanisms. The incessant competition over rule among prominent amîrs, mainly those who were promoted rapidly to emirates during this period, and their encouragement of the low-ranking mamlûks by bribes and privileges to transfer their allegiance from one faction to another, eroded the amîrs’ authority and spawned schism. The rise of the Circassians in 784/1382 signalled the departure from the early pattern of Mamlûk factionalism. The veteran mamlûks’ seniority in the Mamlûk political system was recognised and consequently the sultan’s dependence on the Mamlûk oligarchy increased significantly. The Circassian sultans filled the amîrs’ ranks with veteran mamlûks, while their own recruits (julbân) were hardly promoted during their reign. The julbân’s lack of military power and experience prevented them from holding onto power on their master’s death. After their dispersion from the Citadel, they were absorbed into the amîrs’ households where a co-operation was created between old and new generations of mamlûks, from both the sultans’ and the amîrs’ households, in the formation of coalitions for rule. The pluralistic make-up of the Circassian coalitions for rule called for bilateralism as a new factional order and for new symbols of cohesion, one of which was the sultan’s sobriquet (laqab). From the 820s/1420s the mamlûks were divided into two main factions, the Zâhiriyya and Ashrafiyya, each claiming old patron–client ties going back to two ancestors, al-Zâhir Barqûq and al-Ashraf Barsbây. Bilateralism reduced schism and enabled the Mamlûk oligarchy to enact peaceful settlements for government reshuffles. Negotiations between Ashrafiyya and Zâhiriyya amîrs resulted in agreements on the rise of mature older Mamlûk amîrs to the sultanate, and on the proportional division of rank and state resources between both factions.
Despite their long years of reign, the Mamlûk elite had remained a small group of new immigrants from a slave and non-Muslim background within a community with a deep-rooted Arab–Muslim culture. To overcome their socio-cultural inferiority, the Mamlûks used their ethnic culture as a symbol of their unique status which separated them as a ruling elite from the civilian population. Yet, the Mamlûks succeeded in creating an organic state. They secured their rule by maintaining a fabric of hierarchical patronage relationships that bound all important groups of society to the Mamlûk elite. They controlled the country’s economy by the iqtâ‘ system and their involvement in commerce and industry. Through the iqtâ‘ system they cultivated an informal network of patronage with the urban and rural state administration, mainly staffed with Copts and Coptic converts. They also supported the influential merchants who had been involved in long-distance trade by providing them with state protection both within and without the sultanate. However, the stationing of the Mamlûk elite in urban centres and the absence of significant external threats to the sultanate since the 720s/1320s led to their increasing involvement in commercial life, which encroached on the merchants’ position. In the ninth/fifteenth century the Mamlûks shunted the merchants aside by establishing a state monopoly on trade, and gradually they were compelled to act as the sultan’s commissioned agents. The industry in Egypt was similarly transferred from private to government hands. The monopoly increased the dependence of the large population on the Mamlûk government, but at the same time the Mamlûks paid the price of the growing stagnation in the sultanate economy.

The Mamlûks created popular legitimacy for their rule by perpetuating their image as protectors and patrons of Islamic institutions. They gained great prestige in the Muslim world as guardians of the holy places in Mecca and Medina and by hosting the ‘Abbâsid caliphate. At the early period of the sultanate, Mamlûk patronage of Islam included the establishment of religious foundations, both orthodox and Sufi, with charity endowments for their maintenance. The madrasas they established supplied cadres of ‘ulamâ‘ responsible for the educational and judicial systems that accorded formal legitimacy to their rule, while the Sufi orders which practised popular Islam supplied popular support to their regime. Later, the Mamlûks led to the popularisation of orthodox institutions by inviting Sufis to instruct in madrasas and nominating ‘ulamâ‘ to teach in khânqâhs, and by introducing an orthodox curriculum into khânqâhs. Consequently, both orthodox and Sufi institutions underwent moderation and differences between them became
indistinct. Concomitant with the moderation of the religious institutions was the weakening in the power of critical learned scholars of the Mamlūk government.

It was against the background of the erosion of the Shāfi‘ī ‘ulamā‘ and fuqahā‘ dominance over the Egyptian judicial institutions that tension and rivalry over legitimacy and hegemony arose between the Shāfi‘ī learned scholars and the Mamlūk elite. While the Shāfi‘ī madhhab enjoyed absolute dominance in the Ayyūbid judicial system under the Mamlūks, with Baybars’ reform of 665/1265 it became one of the four schools of law. This reform increased the prestige of the Ḥanafī ‘ulamā‘ who generally legitimised their Mamlūk patrons’ policies. When Baybars also tried to include in this reform the division of the waqf in Egypt and Syria among the four madhhab, he met strong opposition from Shāfi‘ī legists. Mamlūk sultans would repeatedly try to get hold of the great fortunes of the waqfs. From Barsbāy’s reign onward, legal techniques were used to transfer state lands, iqṭā‘, into private hands and turn them into waqfs. It was through the waqf manipulation that the Mamlūk sultans funnelled public funds to their families and gained covert incomes to maintain their patronage relations in the army and the large population. Further erosion in the legists’ situation came when the popularisation of the religious institutions and the judicial system brought persons from lower classes to prominent positions, such as the vizierate, ḥisba, and qādīships, through patronage relations and the practice of payment for nomination. The position of the sharī‘ qādīs was impinged upon when during the Circassian period the jurisdiction of the Mamlūk hujjāb was extended to deal with sharī‘ matters and senior amīrs and even julbān held ‘private’ courts for disputes among the civilians.

Although the Mamlūk army was one of the most highly trained among contemporary armies, its relatively small size imposed a de facto restriction on the Mamlūks’ ability to maintain an effective central government, particularly towards the Arab and Turcoman nomad populations. Throughout their autonomous rule, the Mamlūks did not succeed in effectively subjugating the Bedouins to the central government for any length of time. The Mamlūks tried to secure order among the Bedouins through exploiting inter-tribal conflicts over hegemony, and political patronage of powerful chiefs who were appointed to imrat al-‘arab in exchange for duties such as guarding frontiers, securing the royal postal system and supplying relay horses to the Mamlūk army. In the Delta region the Mamlūks managed to settle the Bedouins in villages, thus bringing about indirect control over them through
powerful families. The settlement of the Bedouins coupled with Bedouin anarchism in different regions of Egypt and Syria constituted a decisive factor in agricultural decline in the Mamlûk state, and the conversion of tilled areas into pastureland.

The small size of the Mamlûk army was a decisive factor also in Mamlûk expansionist policy, particularly when part of it always remained in Cairo and the provincial cities to prevent anti-government uprisings. Beyond their conquests of the Crusading principalities in Syria and Palestine and limited areas in the Upper Euphrates, the Mamlûks maintained a perceptive strategy of spheres of influence under their protectorate rather than direct rule over territories far from their home bases. During the reigns of Baybars, Qalâwûn and al-Nâṣir Muḥammad, in which Mamlûk rule flourished, included in Mamlûk government spheres of influence were Nubia and Cyrenaica. In 725/1325 al-Nâṣir Muḥammad’s attempt to expand the Mamlûk spheres of influence to Yemen, which was of particular importance in the transit trade between the Far East and Europe, failed, mainly for reasons of distance and geographical constraints. On two occasions, in 676/1277 and 822/1419, the Mamlûks avoided the posting of a garrison in the territories they had occupied in Anatolia, and chose to withdraw to Syria. Following the collapse of the Mongol Ilkhanate of Persia in the 740s/1340s, the Mamlûks exploited the vacuum formed in the state order in South-West Asia to establish buffer zones of Turcoman states (begliks) – the Dhû ‘l-Qâdirid, Ramaḍānid and Qaramānid principalities – in eastern Anatolia under their aegis. This sphere of influence was to prevent nomad incursions, and to ensure import of strategic materials and a free overland passage of mamlûks from the slave markets in the Black Sea area. Conservatism led the Mamlûks to stick to their buffer-zone policy and disregard the new political make-up that had emerged in eastern Anatolia in the wake of the Timurid invasion and the rise of the Ottomans in western Anatolia. As long as the Timurids acted as a great power in Anatolia, the Ottomans limited their expansionist aspirations to bringing the Turcoman principalities under their protection. With the defeat of Âq Qoyunlu, the Timurid clients, in Bashkent in 878/1473, the Mamlûk–Ottoman conflict over Anatolia became overt. Although Qâytbây’s campaigns against the Ottomans forced them to restore pre-war Mamlûk sovereignty in Anatolia, they exposed the Mamlûks’ anachronistic strategies and the technological and the sultanate economic stagnation. The Mamlûk praetorian regime barred new technologies that had changed the means and patterns of production in Europe and the global trade order.
Thus, the Mamluks rejected the use of firearms lest their ethos of chivalry which was also their status symbol might be harmed. When firearms were introduced in the sultanate towards the end of Mamluk rule, it was too late and too small in scale to tip the balance against the Ottomans, who gained through their deployment the position of a great power in the new state order.

12. The Turkish Mamluk sultans

Shajar al-Durr (648/1250)
al-Mu'izz Aybak (648–55/1250–7)
al-Manṣūr ‘Ali (655–7/1257–9)
al-Muẓaffar Ḥātūs (657–8/1259–60)
al-Zāhir Baybars (658–76/1260–77)
al-Sā’d Barakān Khān (676–8/1277–9)
al-ʿĀdil Salāmīsh (678/1279)
al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn (678–89/1279–90)
al-Ashraf Khalīl (689–93/1290–3)
al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (693–4/1293–4)
al-ʿĀdil Kitbughā (694–6/1294–6)
al-Manṣūr Lājīn (696–8/1296–9)
al-Nāṣir Muhammad (698–708/1299–1309)
al-Muẓaffar Baybars (708–9/1309–10)
al-Nāṣir Muhammad (709–41/1310–41)
al-Manṣūr Abū Bakr (741f./1341)
al-Ashraf Kujuk (742–3/1341–2)
al-Nāṣir Āḥmad (742f./1342)
Al-Ṣāliḥ Ismā‘īl (743–6/1342–5)
al-Kāmil Sha‘bān (746–7/1345–6)
al-Muẓaffar Ḥājjī (747–8/1346–7)
al-Nāṣir Ḥasan (748–52/1347–51)
al-Ṣāliḥ Sālih (752–5/1351–4)
al-Manṣūr Muḥammad (762–4/1361–3)
al-Ashraf Sha‘bān (764–78/1363–77)
al-Manṣūr ‘Ali (778–83/1377–81)
al-Ṣāliḥ/al-Manṣūr Ḥājjī (783–4/1381–2)
(791–2/1389–90)
Notes

The Mamluks in Egypt and Syria


22. Levanoni, A turning point, 8–10.
33. Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 179–201.
35. Northrup, From slave to sultan, 155–6.
45. Levanoni, A turning point, 81–106.
46. Ibid. 133–42.
47. Ibid. 184–95.
48. Ibid. 173–84.
54. Ibid. 118–32.
55. Ibid. 109–14.
63. Levanoni, A turning point, 137–9, 167–71.

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68. Lapidus, Muslim cities, 126–8.
74. Har-El, Struggle for domination in the Middle East, 80–8.
75. Petry, Protectors or praetorians?, 42–9.
84. I am grateful to my colleagues Prof. Michael Winter, Prof. Reuven Amitai and Prof. Butrus Abu Manneh for reading the early version of this chapter and their valuable comments on it.
Western Arabia and Yemen (fifth/eleventh century to the Ottoman conquest)

ESTHER PESKES

Western Arabia

From the second half of the fourth/tenth century the ‘Abbāsid caliphate’s hegemonic monopoly in western Arabia eroded. The economic and geo-strategic importance of the Red Sea intensified in the wake of the ‘Abbāsid state’s decline, and the basic significance of the Ḥijāz as goal of the pilgrimage (ḥajj) and original abode of Islam widened. In the period under study the region became an object of imperial strategies in which ‘Abbāsids, Fāṭimids, Ayyūbids, Rasūlīds, Mamlūks and others had their share. Within this framework of supra-regional power politics the foundation and consolidation of the Sharīfī emirates of Mecca and Medina, the main local political actors in western Arabia, took place.

In Mecca, descendants of the Prophet Muhammad by his grandson al-Ḥasan took over power during the sixties of the tenth century CE. Thus began Sharīfī government there for nearly a millennium to come. The rise of the emirate coincided with the beginning of Fāṭimid rule in Egypt and it was to the Fāṭimids that the Sharīfīs had to pay allegiance at first. Early Sharīfī ambitions for independence culminated in the proclamation as caliph by the ruling Sharīf in 401/1010. Yet, the Fāṭimids could dominate Mecca, and in 455/1063 their Yemeni vassals, the Ṣulayhīds, temporarily controlled the city to install a pro-Fāṭimid reign after the end of the first Ḥasanid clan in governance, the Mūsāwīs. During the latter part of the fifth/eleventh century and the sixth/twelfth century until the Ayyūbid occupation, Sharīfīs of the then ruling clan of Hawāshim, not least for economic reasons, switched loyalty between the Fāṭimid and ‘Abbāsid caliphates. Under Qatāda ibn Idrīs (r. c. 597–617/1201–20) from whom all later ruling Sharīfīs, the Banū Qatāda, descended, the Meccan emirate reached a high degree of independence before being reduced to a battlefield between the Ayyūbids and the newly established Yemeni Rasūlīds.
for twenty years. In the second half of the seventh/thirteenth century the Sharifs returned to factual control of the city under Muḥammad Abū Numayy ibn Hasan (r. 654–701/1256–1301). Yet, during these years the Mamluks, at first challenged by hegemonic ambitions on the Rasūlid part, took initial steps to lay the foundation of what later on developed into a solid grip on the Meccan Sharifs. Ilkhanid attempts at gaining influence in Mecca did not pose a lasting threat, and infra-Sharīf struggles and a decrease of Rasūlid ambitions facilitated the unfolding of Mamlūk influence from the first decades of the eighth/fourteenth century. The Mamlūks further incorporated the Sharifate into the Mamlūk state structure by appointing the ruler of Mecca to the newly created office of vice-sultan of the Hījāz in 811/1408, and shortly afterwards placed the Meccan port of Jedda under direct Mamlūk governance. Even though constant rivalries within the clan of Sharifs and imperial ambitions of other foreign rulers ever made Meccan politics unpredictable at best, the Mamlūks did not lose control until their destruction in 923/1517. The transition to Ottoman rule was a smooth one, with the reigning Sharīf Barakāt II (r. as main ruler 909–31/1504–25) simply accepting a new suzerain.

By the time the Mamlūks vanished from western Arabia, Mecca had long established itself as the predominant regional power over against its main rival, the emirate of Medina. Other than the Meccan Sharifs, the rulers of Medina were of Ḥusaynid descent. The Ḥusaynids actively took over leadership in the seventies of the tenth century CE, shortly after the Meccan Sharifate was founded. Like their Meccan counterparts, the new Medinese rulers soon had to pay allegiance to the Fāṭimids. Compared with Mecca, information on the political history of Medina up to the Ayyūbid era is scarce. Thus, the Medinese emirate’s position during the Fāṭimid–‘Abbāsid contest for supremacy in western Arabia is hard to ascertain. But encroachments on the Ḥusaynids’ power emanated from Meccan ambitions also. Since the two emirates’ establishment, rivalries had begun which led to Mecca’s temporary control of Medina at least thrice during the fifth/eleventh century. The first Medinese attempt to subdue the Meccan Sharifate does not seem to have taken place before the end of the Fāṭimid dynasty. Qāsim ibn Muhannā (r. c. 566–590/c. 1170–94), from whom all later rulers descended, succeeded in occupying Mecca temporarily in 571/1176. Other than Mecca, Medina stayed outside the radius of Rasūlid ambitions. In the seventh/thirteenth century, when rule over Mecca was often contested between Egypt and Yemen and the Sharīfs themselves, the Ḥusaynids sided with Ayyūbids and Mamlūks and in 687/1288 succeeded in ruling

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Mecca for some months. Yet, in the long run the Medinese Ḥusaynids, as disunited as the Ḥasanids and subject to frequent Mamlûk interference in domestic politics, could not match their Meccan rivals. In consequence, they were formally subdued to Mecca by the Mamlûks at the beginning of the ninth/fifteenth century.

Even though Sunnî suzerainty was firmly established from the latter part of the sixth/twelfth century, the Sharīfs of Mecca and Medina – Ṣaʿd in the former, Imāmī Shīʿîs in the latter – only reluctantly gave up their denominational orientations. In the course of the eighth/fourteenth century Sunnism finally became dominant in the religious institutions of the two cities, but Shīʿî tendencies amongst the ruling Ḥasanids and Ḥusaynids were existent up to the ninth/fifteenth century. None of the emirates could ever rule the Ḥijâz as a whole. At certain times their actual power did not extend much beyond their cities’ and the seaports’ territories, the countryside being under tribal influence. This was due not least to a chronic economic weakness which made them dependent on external support. Despite continuous problems arising from indirect control of the holy places, the Mamlûks stationed small military contingents in Mecca and Medina only in the first half of the ninth/fifteenth century. Yet, they never aimed at abolishing the rule of the Prophet’s descendants, which had become accepted as legitimate by consensus of the wider Islamic world.

Yemen

Until the Ayyūbid conquest (569/1174)
At the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century, Yemen was split up between several political forces none of which was strong enough to overcome regional competitors. The Ziyādid dynasty, based at Zabîd in Tiḥāma, had upheld the ‘Abbāsids’ claim to rule Yemen since the third/ninth century. Yet, their actual sway at the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century did not extend much beyond the western coastal plain. For reason of internal weakness, the Ziyādids faded away in the first two decades of the fifth/eleventh century and made room for the Najâhid dynasty of Abyssinian extraction. In the highlands, the situation was marked by the eclipse of the Yuʿfīrids, rulers of indigenous origin from Ṣanʿā’ to al-Janad until 387/997. The Yuʿfīrids, temporarily nominal followers of the ‘Abbāsids, had for a century been contending with the emerging Zaydī imamate, centred in and around Ṣaʿda. Despite their rival’s extinction the Zaydīs could not assert themselves
as the paramount power in upper Yemen. By the middle of the fifth/eleventh century, the Ismāʿīlī Şulayḥids were taking over as their basis approximately the Yuʿfīrids’ region.

Najāḥids, Zaydīs and Şulayhids were to determine politics in Yemen in the fifth/eleventh century. The Zaydīs, the senior of the three groups, were bound together by a common political vision, namely the imamate of a politically active imam of Ḥasanid or Ḥusaynid descent. But they were profoundly disrupted concerning the realisation of imamate theory. The competitors for the imamate were local descendants of the first Zaydī imam in Yemen, al-Ḥādī Yahyā ibn al-Ḥusayn (d. 298/911), but also claimants newly arriving from the Hijāz. And besides, a pretender coming from the Zaydī imamate in Daylam laid claim to rule. The infra-Zaydī struggle for power resulted at times in violent warfare, but also in a severe dogmatic split when al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Qāsim al-ʿIyānī (d. 404/1013) claimed to be the rightful imam in 401/1010 and furthermore declared himself to be the ‘Rightly guided one’ (mahdī). A mahdist movement named ‘al-Ḥusayniyya’ emerged demanding rule in al-Ḥusayn’s name. Besides, Yemeni Zaydism still had to struggle with a sect called ‘al-Muṭarrifiyya’ founded around the middle of the fourth/tenth century. All this weakened Zaydism as a political force. For some time at the beginning of the sixth/twelfth century, the Yemeni Zaydīs in the absence of their own competent candidates even acknowledged the Zaydī imam at the Caspian Sea.

The second party relevant in Yemeni politics during the fifth/eleventh century was the Najāḥids at Zabīd. Najāh (d. 452/1060), a slave of Abyssinian extraction and provincial governor under the Ziyādīs, took over the remnants of the Ziyādīd realm in 407/1016. In 412/1021, he struck coins in his name and successfully petitioned the ‘Abbāsid caliph for recognition, thus continuing the Ziyādīs’ political standing as nominal vassals of the Sunnī caliphate. But unlike the Ziyādīs, the Najāḥids, who had died out by 554/1159, could never extend their rule beyond Tiḥāma. And more than once their command even in this dominion was challenged by the Şulayhīs. Additionally, fraternal strife for power weakened the dynasty from the second decade of the sixth/twelfth century and slave viziers of mostly Abyssinian extraction took over control of court politics.

The third political force was the Şulayḥīs, named after ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Şulayḥī (d. 459/1067). A Yemeni from the highlands south-west of Ṣanʿā’ and born as a Sunnī, al-Şulayḥī first propagated the Ismāʿīlī daʿwa of Fāṭimid mould by 439/1047 and established his rule rapidly. Before 441/1049 he had already conquered Ṣanʿā’ from the
Zaydīs and took it for his capital. In 452/1060 he drove the Najāḥīds out of Zabīd for the first time. At the same time Aden, which had been controlled by the local Banū Maʿn, together with the surrounding region including the coastal strip of Ḥḍramawt, surrendered. By 455/1063, al-Ṣulayḥī ruled over wide parts of Yemen in the name of the Fātimid caliph, who allowed him to extend his hegemonic ambitions briefly even to the governance of Mecca. Al-Ṣulayḥī’s son al-Mukarram Aḥmad (d. c. 480/1087) and other male members of the house continued Ṣulayḥī reign under the supervision of al-Mukarram’s wife al-Sayyida Arwa bint Aḥmad al-Ṣulayḥī, known as al-Ṣulayḥīyya (d. 532/1138), who later ruled on her own. The seat of power was transferred to the newly erected Dhu Ṣibla and governance of Ṣanʿā’ delegated, alongside a Ṣulayḥīd, to the leader of a local Hamdānī tribal grouping. At Aden governors of Hamdānī (Yām) extraction, from whom the Zurayʿīds later descended, replaced the rebellious Banū Maʿn. For a short time the Ṣulayḥīds still controlled the main parts of Yemen against Najāḥīds and Zaydīs whom they at times had driven out even of their stronghold of Ṣaʿda. Yet, by the end of the century the Hamdānī governors of Ṣanʿā’ had seceded, only to be followed by their counterparts at Aden. Thus came into being the Hamdānī sultans of Ṣanʿā’ and the Zurayʿīds of Aden as independent political powers. This fragmentation of power deepened further during the infra-Fātimid schism after 524/1130 in which al-Ṣulayḥīyya and the Zurayʿīds took different sides. When Ṣulayḥīd power vanished at the death of al-Ṣulayḥīyya, the strife for supremacy in the northern highlands was fought between a still divided but recovering Zaydī party and the Hamdānī sultans of Ṣanʿā’. In the south, the Zurayʿīds, now official propagandists of the Fātimid caliphate in Yemen, took over Dhu Ṣibla and the remnants of Ṣulayḥīd power.

But soon the situation changed fundamentally. The Najāḥīds and their vassals in northern Tihāma, the Sulaymānīd Sharīfs who had risen to importance there by the end of the fifth/eleventh century, came under pressure of a new political force led by ʿAlī ibn Mahdī (d. 554/1159). A native of Tihāma of local tribal extraction and originally belonging to the Ḥanafī legal school (madhhab), Ibn Mahdī appeared around 531/1137 propagating ideas of unspecific extremist tendencies. After violent attacks on the region of Zabīd, the Najāḥīds in 554/1159 fell victim to Mahdīd superiority, and acknowledgement of the ʿAbbāsīd caliphate’s suzerainty vanished from Yemen. The Mahdīds rapidly extended their bloody warfare from their capital Zabīd to the Sulaymānīd territories and those under Zurayʿīd rule. This was the political situation when the Ayyūbīds arrived in Yemen in 569/1174.
From the Ayyūbid invasion until the Ottoman conquest

Beside the political turmoil brought forth by the Mahdids and the Ayyūbid ambition to extinguish their Fāṭimid foes beyond Egypt, Yemen’s geo-strategic importance and function as hinge in the trade between Egypt and India seems to have been the main stimulus for the Ayyūbids’ invasion of Yemen. Led by Saladin’s brother Turānshāh (r. 569–77/1174–81), the Ayyūbid army started its campaign in northern Tiḥāma in Ramadān 569/April 1174 and within five months took Zabīd, Aden, and the lower, and parts of the upper, highlands.40 Mahdīd rule was put to an immediate end. The last exponents of Zurayqīd power and the Hamdānid sultans surrendered during the governance of Ṭuḥtaḵān (r. 577–93/1181–97), respectively shortly after his death.41 Ayyūbid rule itself, which had already ended in 626/1229, was troubled. Problems resulted partly from the reluctance of the Ayyūbid governors to spend their time in Yemen, partly from internal strife for power and individual political ambitions.42 In all, a centralised administration was established, the Ayyūbid fief-system imported and the country put under an increased fiscal pressure.43 The Ayyūbids’ rapid success in the elimination of factional strife and the centralisation of power had a decisive influence on the country’s political and religious structure. At this very point of history the familiar denominational bipartition was inaugurated, dividing Yemen into the coastal plain and the lower highlands in the south with a mainly Sunnī–Shaḥī and the upper highlands with a mainly Zaydī population. The Zaydī party still remained divided for centuries to come and constant rivalry of imams did not allow for the establishment of central-state-like structures.44 But the Ayyūbids had definitely crushed the Zaydis’ local Hamdānid rivals while themselves not being able lastingly to control the northern highlands. The region of Ṣan‘ā’ and the city itself became the much contested area where the two spheres of influence intersected.45

Under the Ayyūbids’ successors, the Rasūlīd (r. 626–858/1229–1454), the final Sunnification of coastal plain and southern highlands was further consolidated. The first members of the Rasūlid clan had come to Yemen in the Ayyūbid army. Their reign began when the last Ayyūbid in Yemen left the country in 626/1229, appointing Nūr al-Dīn ‘Umar al-Rasūlī (d. 647/1249) as his deputy.46 Al-Rasūlī exploited the temporary political vacuum to establish himself as independent ruler and as early as 629/1232 challenged the Ayyūbid hegemony even in Mecca. By 632/1235 he had achieved official recognition on the ‘Abbāsid caliphate’s part. The Rasūlīds
soon turned into truly Yemeni rulers, with Ta‘izz and Zabīd as the main seats of power. Their governance could draw largely on structures of administration the Ayyūbids had initiated. Hence under al-Muṣaffar Yūsuf I (r. 647–94/1250–95) the Rasūlid parts of Yemen were already merged into a political, economic and cultural unit capable of partaking as independent power in supra-regional politics. In this early phase of its history, the Rasūlid state recurrently contested with the Ayyūbids, then with the Mamlūks for supremacy in the Ḥijāz, and in 677–8/1278–9 incorporated the south Arabian coast including the port of Zufār into its dominion. Apart from this, the Rasūlids left a deep imprint on the religious and educational infrastructure of Yemen and its wider cultural history. A multitude of colleges (madrasas) spread throughout the country and served as centres of the Sunnī madhhab out of which the Shāfi‘i madhhab prevailed as the most influential. From the beginning of the eighth/fourteenth century onwards the Rasūlid dynasty showed signs of political weakness, such as the passive bearing of a Mamlūk military intervention in 725/1325 demonstrating Egypt’s regional supremacy, internal struggles for power and troop revolts, and the incapacity to control the tribes especially in Tihāmā as well as setbacks in the confrontation with the Zaydī party. It was due to a combination of such factors and an economic decline that the Rasūlids faded out in civil-war-like circumstances during the last years of their reign and made way for a former loyal vassal, the Tāhirid clan from the southern highlands.

The Tāhirids (r. 858–923/1454–1517) took over the Rasūlid institutions and followed their former masters’ political course, without, however, showing any ambition for other than supremacy in Yemeni politics. A constant struggle with the Zaydīs led to the first more than ephemeral Tāhirid occupation of Ṣan‘ā’ in 910/1505. Yet, the Tāhirids could not enlarge this success much further. In 923/1517, Mamlūk troops, since 521/1515 despatched to the southern Red Sea in order to fight off the Portuguese, marched upcountry towards Ṣan‘ā’ and killed the Tāhirid sultan, who had been reluctant to support the Egyptians. This was the end of the Tāhirid sultanate. Until the Ottoman invasion in 945/1538, the coastal plain and southern highlands were left without a central government for the first time since the sixth/twelfth century. The Zaydīs extended their territories towards the south, while members of the Tāhirid clan still held power in Aden and its hinterland and remaining Egyptian Mamlūks who displayed loyalty towards the Ottoman sultan established themselves in Zabīd.
Najáḥids (Zabīd)

Najäh, al-Mu’ayyad Näsir al-Dîn (412–52/1021–60)
Šulayḥîd interregnum in Zabīd
Sa‘īd ibn Najäh (473–5/1081–3)
Šulayḥîd interregnum in Zabīd
Sa‘īd ibn Najäh (479–82/1086–9)
Jayyâsh ibn Najäh (482–98/1089–1105)
Fâtîk I ibn Jayyâsh (498–503/1105–9)
al-Manṣûr ibn Fâtîk I (503–18/1109–24)
Fâtîk II ibn al-Manṣûr (518–31/1124–37)
Fâtîk III ibn Muḥammad (531–53/1137–58)

Šulayḥîds (Ṣan‘ā’, Dhû Jiblah)

Aḥmad ibn ‘Alî al-Šulayḥî (459–c.480/1067–c.1087), during his last years in joint rule
with his wife
al-Sayyida Arwâ bint Aḥmad ibn Ja’far al-Šulayḥî (−532/1138)

Ḥamdânids (Ṣan‘ā’) (independent rule)

1. Banû Ḥātim (first line)
Ḥātim ibn Ghashîm (492–502/1099–1109)
‘Abdallâh ibn Ḥātim (502–4/1109–11)
Ma’n b. Ḥātim (504–10/1111–16)
2. Banû ‘l-Qubayb
Hîshâm ibn al-Qubayb (510–18/1116–24)
al-Ḥumâs ibn al-Qubayb (518–27/1124–33)
Ḥātim ibn al-Ḥumâs (527–33/1133–9)
3. Banû Ḥātim (second line)
Ḥātim ibn Ahmad (533–56/1139–61)
‘Alî ibn Ḥātim (556–94/1161–98)

Zuray’ids (’Adan) (independent rule)

Abû ‘l-Su‘ûd ibn Zuray (504/1110–?), together with his cousin
Abû ‘l-Ghârât ibn al-Mas‘ûd (504/1110–?)
Muḥammad ibn Abî ‘l-Ghârât (?–?)
‘Alî ibn Muḥammad ibn Abî ‘l-Ghârât (?–?)
Western Arabia and Yemen (to the Ottoman conquest)

Saba ibn Abi ‘l-Su‘ud ibn Zuray (?-533/1139)
‘Alî ibn Saba ibn Abi ‘l-Su‘ud (533–4/1139–40)
Mu‘ammad ibn Saba ibn Abi ‘l-Su‘ud (534–c. 548/1140–c. 1153)
‘Imrân ibn Mu‘ammad ibn Saba’ (c. 548–61/1. 1153–66)
Rule of slave viziers in the name of ‘Imrân’s minor sons (561–71/1166–75)

Mahdids (Zabîd)
‘Alî ibn Mahdî (531–54/1137–59)
Mahdî ibn ‘Alî (?) (554–9/1159–63), possibly in joint rule with his brother
‘Abd al-Nabi ibn ‘Alî (c.559 or earlier to 569/c.1163 or earlier to 1174)

Rasûlids (Zabîd, Ta‘izz)
al-Malik al-Afdal al-‘Abbâs ibn ‘Alî (764–78/1363–76)
al-Malik al-Manṣûr ʿAbdallâh ibn ʿAhmad (827–30/1424–27)
al-Malik al-Ashraf Ismâ‘îl ibn ʿAbdallâh (830–1/1427–8)
Rival Rasûlids’ claims to rule (845–58/1442–54)

Ṭâhirids (Zabîd, al-Miqrâna, Juban)
al-Malik al-Zâfîr ʿÂmir ibn Ṭâhir ibn Ma‘ūda (858–64/1454–60), in joint rule with his brother
al-Malik al-Mujâhid ʿAlî ibn Ṭâhir ibn Ma‘ūda (858–83/1454–78)
al-Malik al-Zâfîr ʿÂmir ibn ʿAbd al-Waḥhâb ibn Dâwûd (894–923/1489–1517)

Zaydî imams (Ṣa’dâ and/or other places in highland Yemen)
al-Mu‘tuqâda Muḥammad ibn Yahyâ (298–301/910–13)
al-Nâṣir li-Din Allâh ʿAhmad ibn Yahyâ (301–22/913–933)
al-Manṣûr Yahyâ ibn ʿAhmad (322–45/933–56)
period without imâm(s)

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al-Dā'i ilā 'l-Haqq Yūsuf ibn Yahyā (358–403/968–1012), rivalled by al-Manṣūr al-Qāsim ibn 'Alī al-'Iyānī (389–93/998–1002), and his son al-Mahdī al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Qāsim (401–4/1010–13) period without imam(s) Ja'far ibn al-Qāsim in the name of his brother al-Mahdī al-Ḥusayn (al-Ḥusayniyya) (413–?
Notes

5. Ibid. 281.
19. Ibid. 207–10.
22. For a discussion of his date of death see ‘Umāra, Ta’rikh, 104 n. 7 and Ayman Fu’ād Sayyid, Ta’rikh al-madhāhib al-dinīyya fī bilād al-Yaman, Cairo, 1988, 124–5.
28. For differing versions of the date of his death see ‘Umāra, Ta’rikh, 119 n. 1.
29. For her name ‘Arwā’ see ‘Umāra, Ta’rikh, 86 n. 9; for the date of her death Ibn al-Dayba’, Qurra, 199; for an evaluation of her reign in the light of Fātimī politics see Samer Traboulsi, ‘The queen was actually a man: Arwā Bint Aḥmad and the politics of religion’, Arabica, 50 (2003), 96–108.
30. Smith, Ayyūbids, 70.
31. Ibid. 63–4.
36. Ibid. 52–6.
38. Smith, Ayyūbids, 32 for the Najāhids’ Friday sermon.
39. Ibid. 33, 55, 60–2.


52. For their background see G. R. Smith, ‘The Ṭāhirid sultans of the Yemen (858–923/1454–1517) and their historian Ibn al-Dayba’, JSS, 29 (1984), 141–54.


PART III

MUSLIM ANATOLIA AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
The Turks in Anatolia before the Ottomans

Byzantium and the Turks before the Turkish invasion

From Constantinople the Byzantine emperors looked across the Bosphorus to Anatolé, Greek for ‘the land of the rising sun’. Anatolé, or Anatolia, roughly the present area of Asiatic Turkey, was the heartland of the Byzantine empire in the eleventh century CE. Favoured with a wealth of natural resources, several natural harbours on the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean, and many well-watered fertile valleys, Anatolia gave rise to countless villages and small towns as well as numerous large cities, most of which were connected with the major trade routes of the Middle East. All this ensured that it was the richest and most populous part of the empire. Indeed, for Muslims the word for Byzantium, ‘al-Rûm’ (Rome), was virtually synonymous with Anatolia.

Byzantium had long been familiar with Arabs and Islam, but distance had precluded much knowledge of the Turks. Byzantium had made diplomatic contact with Central Asian Turks as early as the sixth century CE and later the movement of Turkic peoples across the steppes north of the Black Sea brought them to the empire’s borders in eastern Europe. The first major encounter with Muslim Turks occurred in the third/ninth century. When the caliph al-Mu’tašim (r. 218–27/833–42) made an attempt to capture Constantinople in 223/838, he amassed several armies consisting mostly of Turks and directed them towards Ankara, which he conquered along with Amorium. Al-Mu’tašim had recruited them from Central Asia. Furthermore, by the third/ninth century, various groups of Turks were also serving the Byzantine emperors as mercenaries and guards.

None of this experience, however, prepared Byzantium for the shock of the Turkish invasion at the end of the eleventh century CE. A harbinger of it, not recognised of course at the time, occurred between 406/1016 and 412/1021.
when several thousand Saljuq Turcoman horsemen plundered part of eastern Anatolia. At that time, the Armenian Bagratid dynasty at Ani ruled much of that region, which included Abkhazia along the Black Sea coast and Georgia as well as the lands of the Armenians. Nevertheless, Armenian family and dynastic quarrels, dissension between Armenians and Georgians and their common resentment of Byzantium because of its annexation of part of their territory, not to mention Armenian religious doctrinal differences with Byzantium, undermined military co-operation.

Under these conditions, the Christian forces in eastern Anatolia were ill prepared to fend off the Saljuq raiders. Led by Chaghrı-Beg, a grandson of Saljuq himself, they swept across northern Iran from Khurāsān in search of booty and, it seems, a potential homeland for their kin, the Turcoman tribes caught between the Qarakhānids to the north of Khurāsān and the Ghaznavids to the south. While Chaghrı’s brother Ṭughrıl-Beg vanished into the desert of Khurāsān with most of the Turcomans, Chaghrı headed for the frontier of al-Rūm. His appearance there was completely unexpected. The great mobility of his horsemen, combined with their strange clothing and long hair, caused consternation and fear among the local inhabitants. Chaghrı defeated all the Georgian and Armenian forces that he encountered between Tiflis and Lake Van. Finally, laden with booty, he returned to Khurāsān and reported on the lack of resistance to an invasion and settlement of their people. As a result of this raid Armenian defences collapsed. This aided the Byzantine annexation of remaining Armenian territory, ending its role as a buffer with the Muslim world. And thousands of Armenians immigrated to Cappadocia.

In 431/1040 Ṭughrıl and Chaghrı defeated the Ghaznavids at Dandaḵān, which marked the beginning of the establishment of the Great Saljuq empire and opened the way to the large-scale immigration of the Oghuz Turcoman tribes into the Middle East. Some of these tribes soon reached the Byzantine frontier and began raiding Anatolia. In 440/1048 they conquered Erzurum and went as far as Trebizond and central Anatolia. They plundered Malatya around 449/1057 and Sivas in 451/1059. In 457/1064, Alp Arslân (r. 455–65/1063–73), Chaghrı’s son and Ṭughrıl’s successor as sultan of the empire, invaded Georgia and also took the Armenian towns of Ani and Kars. In 460/1067 another Saljuq army sacked Kayseri, Niksar and Konya. The next year, Turkish raiders reached the Bosphorus.

Byzantine defences in Anatolia were clearly ineffective, partly a result of almost continuous civil strife in Byzantium between the bureaucratic and military parties since the death of the emperor Basil II in 1025 CE. In 1068 CE the general Romanus Diogenes became emperor and, in a series of military
expeditions, attempted to put an end to the growing Turkish danger. In March
463/1071 he set out from Constantinople to capture the fortified towns of
Manzikert (Malázgird) and Akhlât north of Lake Van, dominating major
invasion routes from the east. At that time Alp Arslân was campaigning in
northern Syria. On learning of the emperor’s approach, he turned to meet
him. In August their two armies clashed at Manzikert in one of the great
battles of history. Alp Arslân defeated and captured the emperor, and then
released him after dictating peace terms. The bureaucratic party in
Constantinople, however, deposed Romanus even before he returned to the
capital. This led to a series of civil wars that greatly facilitated the coming
Turkish invasion.2

The Turkish invasion and the rise of the Saljuq
sultanate of Anatolia

We have no evidence that, after this victory, Alp Arslân ordered a systematic
military conquest of Anatolia. Indeed, his attention was immediately drawn to
Transoxania where he faced a crisis with the Qarakhânids. Nor does his son
and successor Malikshâh (r. 465–85/1073–92) seem to have planned the con-
quest of that region, although he, like other Great Saljuq rulers, encouraged
many of the troublesome Turcoman tribes to move to the western frontier. In
any case, the routes into Anatolia were now open and the Turcomans began
to surge along them. The Turkish invasion of Anatolia began, in fact, not as a
traditional military invasion with specific military objectives but as a nomadic
invasion as the tribes sought booty and pastures for their flocks. This was the
start of the Turkification and Islamisation of Anatolia, although most of the
Turks were then only superficially Muslims, a process that would take many
centuries to complete. This nomadic invasion was especially devastating to
the Byzantine village populations who were exposed and undefended.
Consequently they increasingly abandoned their lands. This, in turn, under-
mined both the Byzantine administrative structure in Anatolia and the
Church, which was deprived of its property and revenues.3 The Turkish
invasion of Cappadocia in 467/1074 also forced the Armenian émigrés there
to move to the south-eastern corner of Anatolia and northern Syria where,
with other immigrants from Armenia, they established the kingdom of
Cilician Armenia.

The most important Turcoman chief to appear in Anatolia after Manzikert
was Sulaymân ibn Quţulmush, a member of the Saljuq family. He fled to that
region after his father was killed in a struggle with his kinsmen. Operating
independently, he took advantage of the confusion in Anatolia to move west and seize Nicaea (İznil) and its environs as early as 467/1075. He soon became involved in internecine Byzantine political struggles and at the same time overran much of western and central Anatolia. His growing power aroused the ire of Malikshāh, who sent an army into Anatolia but failed to subdue him. Subsequently the emperor Alexius I Comnenus (r. 1081–1118) concluded a treaty with Sulaymān acknowledging his suzerainty over the territory under his control. Sulaymān then boldly intervened in Syria, but the Saljuq ruler of that region killed him in battle in 479/1086 and captured his son, Qīlî Arslān. That might have been the end of Sulaymān’s budding state had Qīlî Arslān not escaped in 484/1092 following the death of Malikshāh.

Qīlî Arslān (r. 485–500/1092–1107) returned to Nicaea and regained control of his father’s state. This guaranteed Sulaymān’s fame as the founder of the Saljuq sultanate of Anatolia. Qīlî Arslān’s forces and allies began to occupy the Aegean ports and islands offshore. He also extended his authority further to the east, focusing on Malatya. However, a rival Turcoman chief, Dānishmand Ghāzī (d. 497/1104), had established a centre of power in north-central Anatolia around such cities as Tokat, Amasya and Sivas and thus threatened the sultan’s eastern ambitions. Contemporary with Dānishmand, other Turcoman leaders founded additional principalities in eastern Anatolia: those of the Artuqids (494–812/1101–1409) centred at Āmid (Diyarbakır); of the Shāh-i Armanids (493–604/1100–1207) at Akhlāt; of the Mengüchekids (before 512 to mid-seventh century/before 1118 to mid-thirteenth century) at Erzincan; and of the Saltuqids (late fifth century to 598/late eleventh century to 1202) at Erzurum. The Dānishmendids were by far the most powerful. A clash was averted by the sudden appearance of the First Crusade, which made temporary allies of the rivals. Qīlî Arslān annihilated the People’s Crusade of Peter the Hermit in 489/1096 after it crossed the Bosphorus from Constantinople, but in the following year the Crusader army captured Nicaea and defeated Qīlî Arslān at Dorylaeum (Eskişehir). The sultan and Dānishmand then joined forces to harass the Crusaders as they marched across Anatolia to the Holy Land. The western frontier of the Saljuq state receded to the east of Dorylaeum, while the sultan, perhaps making Konya a temporary capital, concentrated on shoring up his position further east, taking Malatya in 498/1104. He intervened in the affairs of his Saljuq kinsmen in Upper Mesopotamia and was killed in battle in 500/1107.

By the time of Qīlî Arslān’s death, the first wave of the Turkish invasion of Anatolia had ended and the political lines were roughly drawn among several new Turkish states, those of the Saljuqs and Dānishmendids being the most
Qılıq Arslan was succeeded by his son Shāhanshāh (r. 502–10/1109–16) who was overthrown by his brother Masʿūd (r. 510–51/1116–56), who really developed Konya as the capital. Masʿūd faced a resurgent Byzantium in the west and the two most powerful rulers of the Dānishmendid dynasty, Amīr Ghażī Gümüşhtegin (r. 497–529/1104–34) and his son Muḥammad (r. 529–36/1134–42) in the east. Amīr Ghażī took Malatya, Kayseri and Ankara, subjected both Cappadocia and Cilician Armenia to his authority, attacked the Crusader county of Edessa and fought the emperor John II Comnenus (r. 1118–43 CE) on the Kastamonu–Gangra front.

Masʿūd’s fortunes changed with the death of Muḥammad and the struggle for succession, which led to the dissolution of the Dānishmendid state. The Turks did not follow the principle of primogeniture in succession. Instead, the state was viewed as the common property of the dynasty. Consequently, all members of that dynasty had a right to be the ruler. This custom hampered the unity of most Turkish states, including that of the Saljuqs of Anatolia. Masʿūd took advantage of the dissolution of the Dānishmendid principality, taking much of its western region. He also repulsed a Byzantine attack on Konya, but reached an accommodation with the emperor Manuel I Comnenus (r. 1143–80 CE) at the news of the approach of the Second Crusade. Masʿūd drove off the army of Conrad III (r. 1138–52 CE) near Dorylaeum in 542/1147 and forced it to continue its journey by ship; and he compelled that of Louis VII (r. 1137–80 CE) to make a wide detour around western Anatolia. Masʿūd then turned his attention to the east. There he co-operated with Nūr al-Dīn, the Zangid ruler of Aleppo and Damascus (r. 541–69/1147–74), against the Crusaders in northern Syria, retook Malatya and invaded Cilician Armenia but died shortly thereafter.

The long reign of Masʿūd laid the basis for the survival of the Saljuq sultanate. The lengthy reign of his son Qılıq Arslan II (r. 551–88/1156–92) guaranteed it, although near the end of his reign he almost undid his life’s work. After seizing Konya and eliminating his brothers, Qılıq Arslan had to contend with two alliances directed against him: one between the Dānishmendids and Nūr al-Dīn and another between Byzantium and Nūr al-Dīn resulting from Manuel Comnenus’ expedition to Cilicia. Qılıq Arslan found himself fighting on two fronts, in the east mainly against the Dānishmendid Yaghi-basan (r. 537–59/1142–64) and in the west against the emperor. Having stabilised the frontier in the east, the sultan made a bold and celebrated conciliatory visit to Constantinople in 558/1162 that resulted in an alliance of his own. This broke the ring of forces arrayed against him and he turned his full attention to the east. By 569/1174 he had captured almost all the
Dānishmendid territory, aided by the death of Nūr al-Dīn in the same year. Relations with Byzantium then cooled as Turcoman bands raided western Anatolia. In 572/1176, resolving to put an end to the increasingly powerful Saljuq sultanate, Manuel Comnenus marched towards Konya. In the pass of Myriokephalon north of Lake Hoyran (Eğerdir), Qılıq Arslân utterly destroyed the emperor’s forces in a battle reminiscent of Manzikert. This victory ended the Byzantine hope of retaking Anatolia. Indeed, henceforth the Greeks referred to it as ‘Turcia’. Two years later the sultan annexed the remnant of Dānishmendid territory and for the first time united all of central Anatolia in one Turkish state, from Kütahya in the west to Malatya in the east and from Amasya in the north to Cilician Armenia in the south. Only a few coastal areas on the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean remained under Byzantine control; and Turcoman raiders threatened even these. Then, around 581/1185 and at the height of his power, Qılıq Arslân withdrew to Konya and divided the sultanate among his sons and other relatives. The inevitable struggle for the throne followed. The Crusading army of Frederick Barbarossa (r. 1155–90 CE) compounded this strife. In 586/1190, as part of the Third Crusade, he marched east across Anatolia, plundering Konya en route, only to drown a few months later in Cilicia. Two years later the sultan was also dead.

The sultanate’s survival can be attributed to the weakness of its enemies as much as to its inherent strength. Kaykhusraw I (r. 588–93/1192–7, 601–8/1205–11) took the throne at Konya as his father’s designated successor, but was plunged into war with his brothers. One of them, Sulaymān II (r. 593–600/1197–1204) drove him from the throne and managed to reunite most of the state. In 598/1202 he even put an end to the eastern principality of the Saltuqids. Sulaymān was briefly succeeded by his young son Qılıq Arslân III in 600/1204. But the Turcomans and various members of the ruling class recalled Kaykhusraw, who had taken refuge in Constantinople, and he regained the throne. This coincided with the capture of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade and its aftermath, which prevented Byzantium from taking advantage of these divisions. Kaykhusraw was therefore able to seize Antalya on the Mediterranean coast in 603/1207, acquiring the sultanate’s first major port.

Two Byzantine states emerged from the catastrophe of the Fourth Crusade: the empire of Nicaea in north-western Anatolia and the smaller empire of Trebizond on the eastern Black Sea coast. Their periodic rivalry played into the hands of the Saljuqs. At first relations were strained between Nicaea and Konya. The loss of Antalya and the sultan’s intervention in Nicaean affairs led
to war. In 608/1211 near Antioch on the Menderes, the ruler of Nicaea Theodore I Lascaris (r. 1204–22 CE) and Kaykhusraw met in battle. Although victorious, the sultan was killed. Afterwards, little changed on the Nicaean frontier. As for the empire of Trebizond, there the Saljuqs had an important strategic objective, the capture and maintenance of a major port on the Black Sea. For this purpose Kaykhusraw had attacked Trebizond, unsuccessfully, in 602/1205f. The seventh/thirteenth century would witness several periods of conflict between Trebizond and the Saljuqs, who were sometimes allied with Nicaea, over access to the Black Sea.4

Kaykâ’ûs I (r. 608–16/1211–20) succeeded Kaykhusraw after quickly overcoming his brothers. Leaving Nicaea as a buffer between Konya and the Franks in Constantinople, he turned his attention to the north, south and east. In 611/1214 he captured Sinop on the Black Sea, opening Saljuq commerce with Crimea. In 613/1216 he recaptured Antalya, which had revolted in 609/1212,5 invaded Cilician Armenia and annexed part of its territory. He was less fortunate in the east where his attempt to seize Aleppo from the Ayyûbids in 615/1218 failed. Nevertheless, Kaykâ’ûs’ consolidation of power in Anatolia, his territorial expansion and his opening of trade between the Mediterranean and Black Sea from the ports of Antalya and Sinop gave the sultanate indisputable dominance in Anatolian politics and trade. The stage was set for the growth of Muslim urban life, that is, the florescence of culture, that took place under his brother, the renowned ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn Kayqubâd.

The zenith of the Saljuq sultanate of Anatolia: the reign of ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn Kayqubâd I

Building upon the accomplishments of Kaykâ’ûs, Kayqubâd (r. 616–34/1220–37) initiated foreign and domestic policies that brought the sultanate to the height of its power and glory. In 616/1221, he began the conquest of most of the Mediterranean coast east of Antalya at the expense of Cilician Armenia, taking the port of Kalonoros, which was renamed ‘Alâ’iyya (Alanya) in his honour. He settled many Turcomans in this region and reduced Cilician Armenia to a minor client state. In the north, he conducted several campaigns against the empire of Trebizond to ensure his possession of Sinop. At that port he built a fleet that he sent against the great entrepôt of Sughdaq in Crimea, which he and his successor controlled from about 622/1225 to 637/1239. In addition to undermining the economic life of Trebizond, which was dependent on Black Sea trade, this conquest and his expanded Mediterranean presence steered enormous commercial wealth through the sultanate. It became
the chief transit centre for trade between the steppes of Russia and Alexandria. In the east he annexed most of Mengüçhekid territory, mainly around Erzincan and Kemakh, in 625/1228.

Yet, in the east, Kayqubād faced his greatest challenge. The rise of the Mongols in Central Asia at the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth century soon had repercussions in Anatolia. The first powerful Muslim state that they swept aside was that of the Khwārazm-Shāh ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad (r. 596–617 /1200–20). His son Jalāl al-Dīn Mangubīrtī fled west, living off plunder, with a large army composed mostly of Turks. By 623/1226 he had reached the eastern border of the sultanate and resolved to conquer Anatolia. Kayqubād held him off diplomatically as long as possible while assembling a coalition of forces from his Christian and Muslim neighbours, including the Ayyūbīds. In 627/1230 Jalāl al-Dīn invaded the sultanate. East of Sivas on the plain of Yassı Chimen, Kayqubād and his allies decisively defeated him. The sultan’s frontier in the east subsequently expanded somewhat to approximate that of Byzantium two centuries earlier. He also incorporated into his service the surviving Khwārazmians who thus represented a minor wave of Turkish immigration into Anatolia. A much larger wave was on the horizon, for the Mongols were not far behind. Turks, Iranians and others who were driven before them were already seeking refuge in Anatolia. Although Kayqubād was then the uncontested master of Anatolia, he was fully aware of the storm that was about to break. He entered into negotiations with the Mongol khān in 633/1236, but died the next year. Only dissension among the Mongols allowed a pause before the storm.

Kayqubād’s reign marked a great flowering of Muslim culture in Saljuq Anatolia. Mosques, colleges (madrasas), hospitals and gardens were built in the major cities and a unique architectural style emerged. Noteworthy were the sultan’s own palaces of Qubādābād at Lake Beyşehir and Kayqubādiyya near Kayseri, and hunting lodges and gardens near Alanya, and caravanserais along the major trade routes. Ensuring the security and flow of trade, the latter were the largest building projects undertaken by the Saljuqs apart from the fortification of a few major cities. Iranian émigrés strongly influenced a burst of activity in fine arts and literature. Indeed, while Arabic was used for certain official and religious purposes, such as building inscriptions, coinage and pious endowment deeds (waqīyyas), and for instruction in the religious sciences, Persian flourished as the literary language of the court. Kayqubād himself patronised the family of the young Jalāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī (d. 672/1273) whose Persian mystical poetry later won undying fame.
At the same time, contact and cultural exchange between the Saljuq sultanate and Byzantium were continuous, affecting their perceptions of each other as well as their respective cultures.\(^8\) It was on the popular level within the Saljuq sultanate, however, that the major cultural synthesis occurred. Increasing conversion to Islam by the indigenous populations, especially Greeks, intermarriage, slavery and growing physical proximity resulted in a pervasive cultural syncretism between Muslims and Christians. This syncretism was reflected in all aspects of daily life, such as vocabulary, food, dress, professions, traditions and religious practices. Religious syncretism resulted, for example, in shared holy sites and rituals.\(^9\) And of course, as it blurred the differences between popular Islam and popular Christianity, it further accelerated the conversion of Christians. The wandering mystics, or dervishes, who exercised enormous power over the Turcomans, exploited this in the conversion of Christians.

The Mongol invasion and the collapse of the Saljuq Sultanate of Anatolia

At the death of Kayqubād, a group of powerful military commanders (\textit{amīrs}) brought his oldest son Kaykhusraw II (r. 634/1237–46) to the throne, although he was not his father’s designated successor. Somewhat weak-willed, the new sultan was initially the creature of one of these \textit{amīrs}, Sa’īd al-Dīn Köpek. Kaykhusraw must have been aware of the looming Mongol threat, but under the influence of Köpek, who eliminated many rival \textit{amīrs}, directed his external policy chiefly towards trying to expand at the expense of the Ayyūbids in northern Syria and eastern Anatolia. At the same time, Köpek’s heavy-handedness alienated the Khwārazmians in the eastern part of the sultanate and they revolted. The sultan finally put Köpek to death in 636/1239 and in alliance with several Ayyūbid principalities crushed the Khwārazmians in 638/1240. Immediately afterwards, a certain Bābā Ishāq, taking advantage of this turmoil, proclaimed himself a prophet and instigated a large-scale uprising among the Turcomans that inflamed much of south-central Anatolia. Around the end of 638/1240, with great difficulty and the use of Frankish mercenaries, Kaykhusraw put down this uprising and killed Bābā Ishāq.\(^{10}\)

The revolts of the Khwārazmians and Bābā Ishāq took a toll on the sultan’s troops and resources and diverted his attention at a critical time. In 633/1236 the Mongols invaded Georgia and in 639/1242 struck Erzurum. Kaykhusraw hastily tried to put together a coalition of forces to stop them. Before they
were all assembled, however, he marched east. In 641/1243 at Köse Dağ east of Sivas the Mongols annihilated the Saljuq army. The sultan fled to Cilicia where he soon died, leaving minor sons.

The Saljuq sultanate never recovered from the Mongol onslaught. In return for a large annual tribute the Mongols allowed it to retain a semi-independent existence. Eight of Kaykhusraw’s descendants held the Saljuq throne for the remainder of the century. Sometimes ruling jointly, sometimes ruling more than once and almost always ruling as one of several rivals who competed for Mongol favour, this spectacle was symptomatic of the disintegration of the state. Banditry, Turcoman revolts and general insecurity prevailed. In 654/1256 the Mongols invaded Anatolia again and temporarily restored order. Meanwhile, several Turcoman principalities began to take root beyond the direct control of the Saljuqs or Mongols. Most powerful was that of the Qaramânis in south-central Anatolia. They and other factions who resented Mongol domination entered into negotiations with the Mamlûk sultan Baybars (r. 658–76/1260–77) and convinced him to invade Anatolia and drive out the Mongols. In 675/1277 Baybars invaded, but an anticipated uprising in support of him did not materialise, so despite initial successes he withdrew. His ally the Qaramânîd Muhammad (r. 660–77/1261–78) did capture Konya in 675/1276 and attempted to replace Persian with Turkish as the official government language.

Mongol revenge was swift. The Ilkhan Abâqâ (r. 663–81/1265–82), the ruler of Iran, invaded Anatolia in 676/1277, killed many of the conspirators and their supporters, and took direct administrative control of the sultanate. The Saljuq rulers became mere puppets. The last one, Maš’ûd III, disappeared in obscurity around 707/1307. During the same period, more Turcoman principalities similar to that of the Qaramânîds began to emerge. Their founders, in flight from the Mongols, represented another wave of Turkish immigration into western Anatolia. The empire of Nicaea could not resist them, for in 1261 CE it retook Constantinople from the Latins and turned most of its attention to the Balkans. Some twenty principalities appeared. The most important were those of the Qaramânîds and then the Germiyânîds centred on Kütahya. Among the most obscure was that of the Ottomans, which crystallised in the far north-western corner of Anatolia around Sögüd at the end of the seventh/thirteenth century. By the beginning of the eighth/fourteenth century, therefore, the Saljuq sultanate had vanished. Its territory had become a province of the Ilkhanids surrounded in part by a mosaic of independent Turcoman principalities. The first stage in the Turkish political domination of Anatolia, with its myriad consequences, had passed.
The Turks in Anatolia before the Ottomans

15 The Saljuqs of Anatolia

473/1081 Sulaymān ibn Qutulmish
478/1086 Alp Arslān ibn Sulaymān, in Nicaea (İz尼克)
485/1092 Qilīj Arslān I ibn Sulaymān, in Nicaea, killed 500/1107
502/1109 Mālik Shāh or Shāhānshāh ibn Qilīj Arslān I, in Malatya
510/1116 Masʻūd I ibn Qilīj Arslān I, in Konya
551/1156 Qilīj Arslān II ibn Masʻūd I, c.581/1185 divided the state among his sons and relatives
588/1192 Kaykhusraw I ibn Qilīj Arslān II, first reign
593/1197 Sulaymān II ibn Qilīj Arslān II
600/1204 Qilīj Arslān III ibn Sulaymān
601/1205 Kaykhusraw I, second reign
608/1211 Kaykāʻūs I ibn Kaykhusraw I
616/1220 Kayqubād I ibn Kaykhusraw I
634/1237 Kaykhusraw II ibn Kayqubād I
644/1246 Kaykāʻūs II ibn Kaykhusraw II
646/1248 Kaykāʻūs II and Qilīj Arslān IV ibn Kaykhusraw II, joint rulers
647/1249 Kaykāʻūs II, Qilīj Arslān IV and Kayqubād II ibn Kaykhusraw II, joint rulers
655/1257 Kaykāʻūs II and Qilīj Arslān IV, joint rulers
657/1259 Qilīj Arslān IV
663/1265 Kaykhusraw III ibn Qilīj Arslān IV
681/1282 Masʻūd II ibn Kaykāʻūs II, first reign
683/1284 Kayqubād III ibn Farāmurz ibn Kaykāʻūs II, first reign
683/1284 Masʻūd II, second reign
692/1293 Kayqubād III, second reign
693/1294 Masʻūd II, third reign
700/1301 Kayqubād III, third reign, killed 702/1303
702/1303 Masʻūd II, fourth reign
707/1307 Masʻūd III ibn Kayqubād III
707/1307 Mongol domination

Notes

2. Speros Vryonis, The decline of medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the process of Islamization from the eleventh through the fifteenth century, Berkeley, 1971, ch. 2, ‘Political and military collapse of Byzantium in Asia Minor’.
4. On Saljuq–Nicaean relations and Saljuq–Trapzuntine relations, see especially Alexis Savvides, Byzantium in the Near East: Its relations with the Seljuk sultanate of Rum in Asia Minor and the Armenians of Cilicia and the Mongols, A. D. c. 1192–1237,

5. On the original capture, revolt and recapture of Antalya, see Scott Redford and Gary Leiser, Victory inscribed: The Seljuk Fetihname on the citadel walls of Antalya, Turkey, Antalya, 2008.


7. For an example of the pervasiveness of Persian literary culture in Saljuq Anatolia, see Carole Hillenbrand, ‘Rāvandi, the Seljuk court at Konya and the Persianisation of Anatolian cities’, Mésogeios, 25–6 (2005), 157–69.


The rise of the Ottomans

THE RISE

The origins of the Ottomans are obscure. According to legend, largely invented later as part of the process of legitimising Ottoman rule and providing the Ottomans with a suitably august past, it was the Saljuq ruler ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn who bestowed rule on the Ottomans. The Saljuqs had however ceased to be the dominant power in Anatolia after their defeat by the Ilkhans, the Mongol rulers of Iran, at the battle of Köse Dağ in 641/1243. Towards the end of the century the Ilkhans too no longer controlled the region effectively, while the other major regional power, the Byzantine empire, was a mere shadow of its former self, unable to maintain any strong hold over its territories to the east. It was out of this power vacuum that the Ottomans, like the other small Turkish states, emerged towards the end of the seventh/thirteenth century.

By 700/1300 Anatolia was peppered with Turkish states (begliks). In the west, spread out along the Aegean coast running north to south, lay the begliks of Qarasi, along the Dardanelles, Šarukhan, based round Magnisa, Aydîn, with its centre at Tire, and Menteshe, based round Balat. Both Aydîn and Menteshe had important trade relations with the Italian city-states, and from early in the eighth/fourteenth century concluded treaties with Venice, the earliest extant with Menteshe dating from 731/1331 and that with Aydîn from the same year.1 To the south, round Antalya, lay Tekke, and inland, Ḥamid, round Isparta. The İsfendiyarоğulları ruled the Black Sea region from their bases in Qastamonu and Sinob. Germiyan, an important state in the early period, was centred on Kütahya, while the most powerful beglik at this time, and one that remained important and constantly troublesome for the Ottomans well into the ninth/fifteenth century, was the state of Qaramân, based round Konya and ruling over a large part of central and southern Anatolia. To the east, between Ankara and Sivas, lay the state of Eretna.

The small, and initially not particularly significant, Ottoman state was wedged up against the Byzantine frontier in the north-west corner of
Anatolia based round Sögüd. Under its eponymous founder, Othmăn, who appears on one coin which has apparently survived from the period as ‘Othmăn, son of Ertuğrul’, the Ottoman state began to expand along the Saqarya river. Byzantine towns, including Bilejik (Bekloma), İnegöl and Köprüüşəɾ fell, and by the death of Othmăn in c. 724/1324 the Ottoman state stretched westwards as far as the Sea of Marmara.

In 726/1326, under Othmăn’s son and successor, Orkhan (c. 724–63/1324–62), the Ottomans took Brusa (Bursa), their first major capital and the burial place of the early Ottoman rulers, starving it into submission according to the contemporary Byzantine historian Nikephoroş Gregoras. İzniq (Nicaea), also under Ottoman siege, fell in 731/1331, and İzmid (Nikomedia), in 737/1337, also reduced by hunger according to Gregoras. Ottoman advance was not merely against the Byzantines. The begliq of Qarasi on the Aegean coast just north of Šarukhan, which appears to have suffered from internal political division, fell to Orkhan, possibly at the end of the 740s/1340s. The Ottomans under Orkhan thus soon became a force to be reckoned with, Ibn Batţûta describing Orkhan as ‘the greatest of the kings of the Turkmen and the richest in wealth, lands, and military forces’. They did not merely interest themselves in military conquest, but swiftly developed diplomatic skills and showed a quick grasp of the economic potential of their growing state. The internal political problems of Byzantium offered them an opportunity which they made good use of. On the death of the emperor Andronikos III in 1341 CE, a civil war broke out between his infant son John V Palaeologos and his mother Anna, on the one hand, and the Grand Domestic, John Kantakuzenos, ‘an illustrious flower of his generation’ for the Byzantine historian Doukas, on the other. Both the empress Anna and Kantakuzenos pursued an alliance with Orkhan, Doukas commenting that while Orkhan enthusiastically ‘responded with great pleasure’ to Anna’s overtures, her ambassadors did not understand ‘who they were summoning for help, and what kind of herb they were grinding to make a plaster for a disease which their sin had brought upon them’. As part of his offer to Orkhan, Kantakuzenos included his daughter. The alliance was sealed, ‘this abominable betrothal’ took place and Theodora was married to Orkhan. Anna was, under these circumstances, forced to turn her attentions to alternative Turkish allies, and approached Šarukhan, whose troops later deserted her for Kantakuzenos. What interested the Turkish troops was not the Byzantine civil war but the wonderful pillaging opportunities of which they availed themselves as they returned home across Thrace. After a period of civil war, Kantakuzenos entered Constantinople in 1347 CE as the senior emperor, with John V Palaeologos as co-regent.
This alliance between Kantakuzenos and Orkhan lasted throughout Kantakuzenos’ reign, until his abdication in December 1354 CE. Ottoman forces were, however, not always reliable allies, those under Orkhan’s son Süleyman plundering the plains near Thessaloniki in 749/1348 rather than attacking their intended target, the Serbian ruler Stefan Dušan. Ottoman ability to interfere in internal Byzantine politics continued and after Kantakuzenos’ abdication, Ottoman troops supported his son Matthew in his unsuccessful bid to seize the throne from John V Palaeologos. Over the next half century, the Ottomans became a decisive factor in Byzantine inter-factional fighting.

The Ottoman diplomatic, and economic, contacts extended beyond Byzantium to other states further west across the Mediterranean. One of the Latin powers to the west with whom the Ottomans had good relations which were to last throughout the century and well into the next was Genoa. In the winter of 1351–2 CE Filippo Demerode and Bonifacio da Sori were sent as Genoese ambassadors to negotiate a treaty with Orkhan.\(^1\) The importance of their services in concluding a treaty which was so beneficial to the interests of Genoa was noted in a letter written in November 1358 CE by the Doge of Genoa, Simon Bocanegra.\(^2\) According to Kantakuzenos, the reason behind this treaty was the Venetian attack on Pera, the Genoese settlement in Constantinople. With Kantakuzenos supporting the Venetians, the Genoese turned to Orkhan for help. Kantakuzenos described the Ottomans as hostile to the Venetians,\(^3\) and indeed Orkhan gave support to the Genoese in their war with the Venetians, the War of the Straits, which broke out in 1350 CE and continued for the next five years. The Genoese clearly valued an Ottoman alliance highly, for when, in September 756/1355, Orkhan wrote to Genoa, requesting freedom from tax for his agents Filippo Demerode and Bonifacio da Sori, who had been the Genoese ambassadors to Orkhan some years earlier, this request was acceded to, even though it was felt that such a concession would damage Genoese interests,\(^4\) since Orkhan’s ‘merits and services’ to Genoa were such that any loss would be balanced by the usefulness of an Ottoman alliance.\(^5\) The importance of Genoese–Ottoman relations is further indicated by a clause in the peace treaty between Byzantium and the Genoese which stated that the treaty was not adversely to affect that concluded between Genoa and Orkhan.\(^6\)

By the time this treaty had been enacted, an Ottoman presence on European soil had become permanent. In 1354 CE a great earthquake struck and destroyed the walls of Gelibolu (Gallipoli) and other towns in the area which were swiftly occupied by Orkhan’s son Süleyman. The Ottomans were to remain in Europe for the next five and a half centuries.
Under Orkhan’s son and successor, Murād I (r. 761–91/1362–89), advance in the west was matched by advance in the east as the Ottomans moved across Anatolia, mopping up the various beglik in their way. Germiyan fell sometime around 777/1375 as a result, according to the account in ‘Ăshiqpashazâde, of a marriage between the daughter of Yakub Beg of Germiyan and Murād I’s son Bāyezid. Hāmid too fell in the same period, again according to ‘Ăshiqpashazâde, as the result of an arrangement, this time a sale concluded between Hüseyin Beg of Hāmid and Murād I.17

Murād also moved some years later against Qaramān, defeating Qaramān in battle, probably somewhere near Konya, in 788/1386. Following the battle Murād besieged Konya but did not take it, according to Neşri, owing to the intercession of Murād’s daughter, who was the wife of ‘Alâ’ al-Dīn of Qaramān.18 Around the same time, Murād conquered Tekke, the beglik based round the important port of Anţalya in the south.

Ottoman relations with other Turkish rulers in Anatolia were not all military but were also marital. Bāyezid was married to the daughter of Yakub, the ruler of Germiyan, one of Murād’s daughters married the Īsfendiyaroğlu ruler Süleymān Pasha, another married the Qaramān leader, ‘Alâ’ al-Dīn, while, according to Doukas, Khīdr of Şarukhan was also married to a daughter of Murād I while, in the following century, a sister of Murād II was married to the leader of Qaramān,19 Murād II married the daughter of the Īsfendiyaroğlu ruler and married his son Mehmed II to the daughter of the ruler of Dulqadrī. The sons of various Ottoman rulers also made political marriages with the daughters of various Christian rulers, Orkhan marrying Theodora, the daughter of Kantakuzenos in 747/1346, Murād marrying Thamar, the sister of Şişman of Tarnovo, and Bāyezid later marrying Olivera, the daughter of Lazar of Serbia, the latter two marriages being made from a position of strength and being designed to ensure Ottoman dominance. Bāyezid also married the daughter of the Countess of Salona, thereby gaining a large chunk of territory. Later, Murād II married Mara, the sister of George Branković, despot of Serbia. These marriages were designed entirely for political purposes and not for reproduction, which was usually carried on by concubines of the sultan.

The Byzantines had come early to the realisation that calling in the Turks had not been such a good idea. With the Ottomans active in Thrace, John V Palæologos, unable to do much to stop them, tried unsuccessfully to interest first Serbia and then Hungary in an anti-Turkish alliance. Disappointed by his mission to Buda, John was taken prisoner on his way home by Tsar Şişman of Tarnovo, to be rescued by his cousin Count Amadeo of Savoy. Indeed, the only active assistance the Byzantines received in their increasingly desperate search
for help from the west came from Amadeo, who, with the support of Francesco Gattilusio, the Genoese ruler of Lesbos and brother-in-law of John V, took Gelibolu (Galipoli) from the Ottomans in August 737/1336. Apart from the efforts of Amadeo of Savoy, help from the west was conspicuous by its absence, for as Demetrios Kydones, advisor to and friend of John V, noted the Franks were very given to promises but refrained from concrete action, while the Turks ‘had already begun to laugh’. Ottoman advance continued apace in the Balkans. Probably around 773/1369 Murād took Edirne (Adrianople), which became the second Ottoman capital after Brusa, and in 1371 inflicted a crushing defeat on the Serbian despots Vukašin and Uglješa at the battle of Çirmen on the Maritsa river. The way into Bulgaria now lay open before the Ottomans. Plovdiv and Zagora fell probably soon afterwards, and Murād appears to have taken over the tsardom of Tarnovo. Ottoman advance was becoming more and more of a menace to the western powers. In 1372 CE Pope Gregory XI proposed an anti-Turkish alliance with the Byzantines, the Latin lords in Greece and the king of Hungary, an initiative which produced no effective result.

In 789/1388 Murād campaigned in Bulgaria. Şišman, seeing that his earlier disobedience in refusing to join Ottoman forces in a campaign against Serbia had been unwise and that his territory was being mopped up, ‘wound a shroud around his neck and … prostrated himself before the feet of the sultan’s horse’, a performance he was to repeat not long afterwards as the precariousness of his vanishing kingdom became ever more obvious. While Şišman managed to stay in place, it was now as the vassal of the Ottoman state. It was not only Bulgaria that suffered from Ottoman advance, for the Ottomans also moved into western Thrace and advanced in Epiros and Albania. Despite the initial successes of Manuel, the son of John V, the Ottomans took Thessaloniki in 788/1387. In Serbia too, the Ottomans were successful, taking Nish, and from the mid to late 780s/1380s they began raiding into Bosnia.

While the Ottomans advanced rapidly into the Balkans, their interference in internal Byzantine politics showed similar progress. In 774/1371 Murād I’s son Šavji and Andronikos, son of John V, revolted against their fathers. The revolt was unsuccessful, Murād blinding Šavji, who then disappears from the scene, and John V blinding Andronikos, though not completely, and imprisoning him. Doukas explains Andronikos’ action as being either ‘because he was powerless and unable to assume a hostile posture against Murad or lacked intelligence’. The result of this revolt was most satisfactory from an Ottoman point of view, for it had the knock-on effect of providing the pope with a convenient pretext for failing to support the Byzantines against the Ottomans, since John V had allied himself with the infidel enemy, and the existence of
Andronikos plunged the Byzantine state into a civil war which allowed the Ottomans to play the role of power broker in Byzantine politics and to reduce the emperor to the status of an Ottoman tributary. Andronikos, with Genoese and Ottoman help, having escaped from prison, turned on his father and brothers, Manuel and Theodore, entering Constantinople and imprisoning them. He agreed to hand his sister over to Murâd in marriage (the sister in fact dying before this marriage happened), apparently paid a considerable tribute, and handed back Gelibolu (Gallipoli). In 1379 CE John V and his other sons escaped and turned to the Ottomans and the Venetians for help. The Ottomans this time backed John V, who once more became emperor.

This level of Ottoman domination in internal Byzantine politics was to continue into the reign of Murâd’s successor Bâyezîd, for it was with Ottoman backing that the son of Andronikos IV, John VII, was able to take the throne in 1390 CE, only to come off it again the following year, removed by John V. The level of Ottoman power to determine the outcome of any Byzantine power struggle was recognised by Kydones. ‘Everyone admits’ – he wrote – ‘that whomever the barbarian supports will prevail in the future.’ Undeterred, however, political in-fighting went on and the ‘old evil … the dissension between the Emperors over the shadow of power’ continued. As a result the Byzantine rulers ‘have been forced to serve the barbarian’. In 1391 CE Manuel II, crowned as emperor in 1392, served a six-month stint with the Ottoman army.

Murâd’s reign was brought to an end by the battle of Kosovo in 791/1389 at which both he and the Serbian leader Lazar lost their lives, Murâd being, in various later accounts, stabbed to death by a man posing as a deserter, in what Doukas describes as ‘an unexpected and novel deed’. This battle, which came to hold such an important place in Serbian historiography, was not in fact of great significance at the time. It was the battle on the Maritsa eighteen years before – not the battle of Kosovo – that opened up the Balkans to Ottoman invasion.

Murâd I was succeeded by his son Bâyezîd I (r. 791–804/1389–1402). Under him, the state expanded very rapidly, Germiyan, Şarukhan, Aydan and Menteshe all falling shortly after the beginning of his reign. He campaigned against Burhân al-Dîn of Sivas and Süleyman of Qastamonu, and in 799/1397 attacked Qaraman, defeating and killing its ruler ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn and conquering the beglik. Bâyezîd also captured Amasya and Sivas, and took Malatya from the Mamlûks. But such sweeping conquests were fundamentally unstable and the shifting and fluid power structures in Anatolia which allowed for a constant switching of alliances rendered any attempt to implement effective Ottoman control extremely difficult.
In Europe the Ottomans clashed with Hungary for control of the lower Danube. Serbia was under Ottoman domination and George Stracimirović and Vuk Branković were brought to heel. Both now served on Ottoman campaigns. With Serbia safely secured, Bâyezîd turned his attention to Bulgaria and by the mid to late 790s/1390s, Şişman had submitted and Tarnovo fallen.

In 796/1394 the Ottomans laid siege to the Byzantine capital Constantinople. Manuel appealed for help to the West. While the French king Charles VI did send Marshal Boucicault to the city in 1399 CE, no other concrete assistance materialised. In 1399 CE Manuel left Constantinople in search of support among the various powers of Europe.

In the same year as Constantinople went under siege, King Sigismund of Hungary assembled an army, made up of soldiers from England and Germany and a Franco-Burgundian force under the command of John of Nevers, son of the Duke of Burgundy. This force, inspired by Crusading ideals but incapable of effective united action, was shattered at the battle of Nikopolis, on the Danube, in 798/1396. According to Johannes Schiltberger, himself captured at the battle, many died rolling down the steep banks of the Danube or drowned after having had their hands hacked off as they clung to the sides of the vessels in the river by those already on board. Many others were captured and lucratively ransomed by the Ottomans. By the end of early 799/1396 Bâyezîd controlled the land south of the Danube.

The Ottomans also advanced southwards, raiding in Epiros and Albania. In the Peloponnese, the Ottomans advanced successfully under the Ottoman commander Evrenos. Such activity was of considerable concern to Venice, which lost Argos briefly to the Ottomans in 799/1397 and which feared for its colonies of Modon and Coron. The Ottomans were not only a major military force on land, but were also active at sea. Ottoman naval activity under Murâd I and Bâyezîd was of some concern to both Venice and Genoa, which regularly despatched ships to keep watch on Ottoman movements, and Ottoman ships took part in the siege of Constantinople.

By the end of the eighth/fourteenth century, Ottoman expansion had been enormous. The Ottoman army had become an efficient fighting machine, able to lay siege effectively and to defeat the enemy in formal battles. Its central forces were the cavalry, the sipâhis, who received tîmârs (land holdings) in return for military service, and the infantry, the janissaries, who formed an elite bodyguard for the sultan. But the Ottoman state was by no means merely a military juggernaut rolling inexorably in all directions of the compass. Ottoman territory represented a significant market for Latin powers and the Ottomans had close commercial relations with them, in particular with the
Genoese with whom there were frequent exchanges of embassies. Apparently in contrast to the other Turkish states, the Ottomans seem to have used their economic power in their relations with the city-states. Murâd I restricted alum export after his annexation of the important alum-producing area of Kütahya in 782/1381 and Bâyâzîd imposed restrictions on grain exports, which he forbade altogether in 792/1390. That a ban on the export of wood and horses, as well as grain, was in place in 802/1400 is shown by the negotiations conducted between the Venetians and the amîr of Aydın. The value the Ottomans placed on trade is also evident in the treaty they concluded with the Genoese in 789/1387.

The Ottoman world was also a cosmopolitan and religiously mixed milieu, in which relations were based very much on accommodation as well as conflict, a world in which the frontiers were fluid and a pragmatic approach to survival was paramount. The fluidity of relations between the Ottomans and their Latin neighbours, which so often ran along lines of pragmatism rather than along any religious or political fault line, is shown clearly by the Venetian Senate’s irritation with Neri Acciaiuoli, Lord of Athens, who was allowing Turkish ships to use the port at Megara. Hard and fast lines of religion seem to have been absent in the early Ottoman state. Described by the Ottoman historian Barkan as the ‘Turkish colonisers’, the dervishes played an important role in Ottoman advance, offering a religion whose spirituality appealed more easily to the conquered populations than a strict, orthodox Islam would have done. The widespread presence of the dervishes is clear from Ibn Battûta’s account of his travels in Anatolia, and indeed the earliest apparent extant Ottoman document, dating from 724/1324, is a pious endowment (waqf) document of Orkhan in which he granted lands at Mekeje on the Saqarya river for the endowment of a dervish tekke.

The state was also linguistically fluid. Diplomatic relations were conducted in Greek, documents on occasion being translated into Turkish. Arabic remained the language of religion and Persian played a large role in state bureaucracy, as well as being a literary language. Much of the government was carried out by the sultan’s slaves, recruited through the levy on captives and from the devshirme, the Ottoman collection of boys from their Christian subjects, a practice which began sometime in the eighth/fourteenth century. From the reign of Murâd I, the role played in government by members of the royal family was severely limited, sons of the ruler being sent to govern provinces under the strict control of their father. On the death of the ruler, only one son would emerge from the race for the throne, the remainder being killed.

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By the turn of the ninth/fifteenth century, Ottoman advance was impressive, in both the east and the west, and even the capital of the Byzantine empire, the seat of that ‘very mischief-making infidel’, was under siege. Various explanations for Ottoman success have been put forward. According to the work of the highly influential Ottoman historian Paul Wittek, the Ottoman state was a ‘gazi’ (ghâzî) state, driven on by religious fervour to conquer the lands of the infidels. For Halil İnalcık, ‘the Holy War or ghazâ was the foundation stone of the Ottoman state’. This theory has come under much attack and the ghâzî element in the early Ottoman state has effectively been called into question. Quite why the Ottomans, as opposed to any of the other small states, rose to prominence, may be related to the existence of long-lasting and successful leaders. The apparent absence of damaging succession struggles in the first century of the state’s existence was clearly of considerable advantage. The Ottoman leaders were skilfully able to benefit instead from the faction fighting of those around them, interfering in Byzantine internal politics and coming to dominate the Byzantine scene, while the European powers were unable to unite effectively or to co-ordinate any action to prevent Ottoman advance. Clearly of great military competence, as Manuel II himself noted, describing the exceptional dedication and endurance of the Ottoman army whose strength and discipline had increased through the century, the Ottomans also displayed considerable economic acumen, and were able to benefit from their commercial relations with the Latin powers.

However, in 805/1402 a whirlwind swept out of the east and Timur, having defeated the Mamlûks in Syria and sacked Damascus, shattered the Ottoman army at the battle of Ankara. Bâyezîd fell captive and his sons scattered. The Ottoman state, which had expanded so rapidly and with such astonishing success, now fractured into fratricidal warfare.

The interregnum

The first of Bâyezîd’s sons to establish himself was Süleymân Chelebi, who made an agreement in Gelibolu in early 805/1403 with the Byzantines, Venice, Genoa and the Hospitallers. Under the treaty, Süleymân, who refers to the Byzantine emperor as ‘my father’, undertook, in the event of a threat from Timur, to provide galleys and sailors for mutual defence. Süleymân became the most important of the rulers in the Balkans, and the Serbian lords, fighting among themselves and seeking Süleymân’s support, did not benefit from Ottoman collapse, Stefan Lazarević instead continuing to pay tribute, now to Süleymân.
With Süleymân established in Rumeli (the Europe section of Ottoman territory), his brothers Mehmed and İsâ fought for control in Anatolia. Mehmed defeated İsâ and took Brusa, only to lose it to Süleymân in 807/1404. Süleymân was by now dominant also in Anatolia and it was to him that the Venetians despatched their ambassador Francesco Giustiniano with instructions to ensure satisfactory commercial conditions for Venetian merchants in the territory of Süleymân, ‘emperor of the Turks’, and to protest against Turkish attacks against Scutari (Shköder) and other Venetian possessions. Süleymân also employed a Genoese, Salagruzo de Negro, to build him a tower at Lapseki (Lampsakos), opposite Gelibolu. The importance of Gelibolu, ‘the Muslim throat that gulps down every Christian nation’, was recognised by the Ottomans from early on, and Süleymân kept his entire fleet there, protected by a strongly fortified castle with a large garrison.

In 811/1409, Mūsâ, who had apparently been captured with his father at the battle of Ankara, had been released after his father’s death and since then had been in the custody of Mehmed, advanced against Süleymân in Rumeli. He was, according to Neshri, sent off there as a result of an agreement between Mehmed, the İs fendiyaroğlu ruler, Mircea of Wallachia and Mehmed of Qaramân, all of whom shared a desire to see the power of Süleymân Chelebi brought down. Mūsâ advanced in Rumeli, where he took Gelibolu in 813/1410. Despite subsequent defeats at the hands of Süleymân, by 813/1411 Mūsâ had triumphed, Edirne had fallen and Süleymân Chelebi had been strangled.

Mūsâ, who swiftly affirmed the treaty made earlier with Venice by his brother Süleymân, did not however stay in power long. Fast becoming unpopular, owing apparently to his policy of killing off wealthy Ottoman lords of Anatolia and seizing their wealth and property, Mūsâ soon began to lose followers. Mehmed, having made a treaty with the Byzantine emperor and thus secured passage for his troops over the Straits on board Byzantine vessels, crossed into Rumeli. After an initial defeat, and a further unsuccessful attack in late 815/1412, Mehmed, supported by troops from the principality of Dulqadir round Elbistan, whose ruler was now his father-in-law, and from the Byzantine emperor, once more crossed the Straits, again on Byzantine ships. In Rumeli he was joined by Stefan Lazarević and other local lords, as well as by the Ottoman commander Evrenos, and forces from John VII Palaeologos, governor of Thessaloniki. In July 816/1413 Mehmed defeated Mūsâ south of Sofia. Mūsâ fled from the battlefield but was pursued, captured and strangled.

During this internecine struggle the Byzantines sought to increase instability among the Ottomans by releasing claimants to the throne. After his defeat by Mehmed in 805/1403, İsâ fled to the Byzantine court. He was soon
afterwards released, on the request, according to Neshri, of Süleymân Chelebi for whom a power struggle between his two brothers was convenient. After Mûsâ's defeat of Süleymân in 813/1411, the Byzantines released Süleymân's son, Orkhan, who had taken refuge at the Byzantine court some time earlier, prompting Mûsâ to attack Silivri, apparently unsuccessfully, and to besiege Constantinople.

The recovery

Once securely on the throne, Mehmed I's (r. 816–24/1413–21) initial actions revolved around establishing peaceful relations with Byzantium and with the various Balkan leaders, and in particular with Serbia. Although Mehmed concluded a treaty with the Byzantine emperor, Manuel himself was more interested in attacking the new Ottoman ruler, and approached Venice with this idea in mind. Venice, however, was not interested in any such plan, as it wished to conclude its own peace with the new ruler. At the same time, the Venetians were once more being harassed at sea by Ottoman shipping, and in a battle between Venetian and Ottoman naval forces off Gelibolu, the Ottomans sustained high casualties and lost twenty-seven triremes which the Venetians led off to Tenedos.

Mehmed spent 818/1415 successfully campaigning in Anatolia and had, by the end of the year, defeated Qaramân and Jüneyd of Aydın, who had seized power shortly after Timur had restored the beglik to its former rulers and whose 'cunningness and rapacity', according to Doukas, had driven the local lords to side with Mehmed. Qaramân was, however, by no means crushed, and the following year was once more attacking Mehmed in Anatolia. Mehmed was also beset by the activities of his brother Muştafa, who launched an attack in Thessaly, but was defeated.

In 819/1416 two revolts broke out, one near Izmir led by Börküje Muştafa and one in north-east Bulgaria under Sheykh Badr al-Din. The revolt of Börküje Muştafa indicates the continued fluidity of religious boundaries, for he appears to have preached a vision aimed at both Muslim and Christian. A 'simple-minded Turkish peasant' who 'taught the Turks that they must own no property and decreed that, with the exception of women, everything must be shared in common – provisions, clothing, yokes of beasts, and fields', Börküje Muştafa 'sought to win the friendship of the Christians', expounding the doctrine that 'anyone among the Turks who contended that the Christians are not God-fearing, is himself ungodly'. Doukas, who apparently received his information from a Christian monk much affected by his teaching, recounted...
that Börklüje Muṣṭafā ‘daily ... sent apostles to the lords of Chios and to the clergy of the Church, explaining to them his doctrine that the only way for all to be saved is by being in accord with the faith of the Christians’. His disciples, who were to go through life ‘adhering to Christian beliefs rather than to Turkish’, wore simple tunics, kept their heads uncovered, wore no sandals on their feet and lived in voluntary poverty. Meḥmed put Börklüje Muṣṭafā’s revolt down with difficulty, killing many of his followers and putting Börklüje Muṣṭafā himself to death.

Sheykh Badr al-Dīn had apparently been appointed chief qāḍī by Mūsā but had been removed from the post by Meḥmed and sent off to İzniq. In 819/1416, at the time of the revolt of Börklüje Muṣṭafā, he crossed to Wallachia. It is probable that he was supported by the İsfendiyaşarolu ruler and by Mircea of Wallachia, both of whom had an interest in seeing Meḥmed attacked. Encamped in the forest of Deliorman, near Zagora, he built up a large following. According to ʿĀshiqpashazāde, he laid claim to the sultanate. His revolt was put down, however, and he was captured and hanged.

In 820/1417 Meḥmed attacked Qaramān once more, and once more obtained Qaramān’s submission. It would appear that Meḥmed of Qaramān had by this time made himself a vassal of the Mamlūk sultan al-Muʿayyad. Meḥmed was also successful against the İsfendiyaşarolu ruler, who sued for peace, granting the revenues of the copper-mining district of Qaştağ to Meḥmed. In 823/1420 Meḥmed took the Genoese colony of Şamsun.

There was also Ottoman advance in Rumeli and in 820/1417 Ottoman forces invaded Albania and took Valona (Vlorë), thus gaining access to the Adriatic. In 823/1419 Meḥmed made a peace agreement with Venice, setting out territorial arrangements, and guaranteeing safe commerce.

In 824/1421 Meḥmed I, ‘virtuous in character and gentle’, a man who ‘truly despised warfare and loved peace’, died. His successor, Murād II (r. 824–48/1421–44, 850–5/1446–51), described by Jacopo di Promontorio, a Genoese merchant who spent many years in the courts of Murād II and Meḥmed II, as a very humane, gentle and liberal man, was immediately faced with two revolts in quick succession, that of his uncle Muṣṭafā and of his brother Muṣṭafā. Muṣṭafā, the brother of Meḥmed, known in Ottoman tradition as Düzme (False) Muṣṭafā, had been kept in custody on Lemnos since his unsuccessful attack on Meḥmed under an agreement whereby Manuel kept Muṣṭafā against a payment made by Meḥmed. Muṣṭafā was now released by Manuel. Having taken Gelibolu, he defeated Ottoman forces under Bāyezid Pasha and moved on to capture Edirne. Here Muṣṭafā indulged in ‘fatuous conduct’, ‘behaving ferociously like a prancing and snorting horse’, according
to Doukas, whose opinion of Muṣṭafā was not high.58 In winter 825/1421 he crossed the Straits and marched towards Brusa. The two armies faced each other at Ulubad, separated by the Nilüfer river. Deserted by Jüneyd, and without giving battle, Muṣṭafā fled westwards to Lapseki, arriving there ‘like a plucked jackdaw’,59 and then over the Straits to Gelibolu. Having made a previous arrangement with Giovanni Adorno, the Genoese governor of New Phokaea (Foça), Mehmed had both a fleet ready and waiting to transport him across the water and military support from the Genoese.60 Muṣṭafā fled but was captured and hanged at Edirne.

In June 825/1422, extremely irritated by Manuel’s action in releasing Muṣṭafā against him and despite Manuel’s attempts to re-establish relations, Mehmed laid siege to Constantinople while Ottoman forces also turned their attention to Thessaloniki. It was at this point that Murād was faced with another revolt. His brother Muṣṭafā laid siege unsuccessfully to Brusa before fleeing to Constantinople. Returning once more to Anatolia, he set himself up briefly in İznik, but was betrayed to Murād and killed in early 826/1423. With the second revolt disposed of, Murād brought the İslendiyaroğlu ruler Mūbāriz al-Dīn and Drakul, son of Mircea of Wallachia, into submission, Drakul leaving his two sons as hostages at the Ottoman court. Ottoman forces conducted offensives in Greece where, in May 826/1423, they destroyed the Hexamilion. With the Ottomans once more in the ascendancy, the co-emperor, John VIII, set off to Europe in the summer of 826/1423 on another of the endless, and fruitless, Byzantine searches for support. While he was away his envoys concluded a treaty with Murād in February 1424 CE under which the Byzantine emperor paid a large tribute and handed over cities on the Black Sea. The Byzantine city of Thessaloniki, under Ottoman siege since the summer of 825/1422, proved unable to resist. In order to avoid its falling into Ottoman hands, the Byzantines ceded the city to Venice, which took over control in September 826/1423. The Venetians were very anxious to make peace with Murād, and tried unsuccessfully to negotiate. Aware, however, that such efforts were unlikely to be successful, the Venetians also made other plans, including the releasing of an Ottoman pretender, called İsmā’īl, whom they had in custody in Negroponte, and investigated the possibility of an alliance with the amīrs of Qaramān, Menteshe and Aydınl. Venice too proved incapable of saving Thessaloniki which fell to the Ottomans in March 833/1430. In the same year Murād made a treaty with his ‘brother the Doge’ which secured peaceful relations and commerce, and guaranteed various territorial arrangements.61 Thessaloniki was not the only Ottoman success in Rumeli. The Ottomans attacked Wallachia in 828/1425 and invaded Serbia the following year. After the
death of Stefan Lazarević in July 830/1427 and the passing of control to his nephew George Branković, both the Ottomans and Hungary were active in the region, the Hungarians seizing Belgrade and the Ottomans Golubats. Hungarians and Ottomans arranged a peace in 831/1428. In 834/1430 Ioannina went under direct Ottoman rule. By 837/1433 the Ottomans had successfully put down a rebellion in Albania and the Albanian lord John Kastriote had become an Ottoman vassal. In 842/1438 Murâd led a campaign in Transylvania. The campaigning of 842/1438–39 resulted in direct Ottoman rule over northern Serbia.

While Ottoman forces made progress in Rumeli, Murâd was faced with other problems in Anatolia. Jüneyd, who had deserted Muştafa at Ulubat, was now back in power in Aydın, and in 827/1424 the Ottomans set out against him. Jüneyd appealed for help to the Venetians, who, although interested in the proposal, prevaricated, still hoping to come to an agreement with Murâd. The Ottomans, with Genoese assistance, defeated Jüneyd, who was killed, together with his entire family. Menteshe seems to have fallen at the same time, though the circumstances are obscure. Germiyan also fell, sometime in the mid 830s/1420s. Several years later, in 840/1437, Murâd marched against Qaramân, forcing İbrâhîm to sue for peace. In summer 847/1443 İbrâhîm, apparently at the instigation of the Byzantine emperor, attacked but fled before the Ottoman forces sent against him and once more sued for peace.

Early in the 840s/1440s, the Byzantines descended yet again into dynastic strife, this time a struggle between the emperor John VIII and his brother Demetrios. Demetrios called in the Ottomans, who, obligingly, laid siege to Constantinople from April to August 846/1442. They also unsuccessfully attacked Limnos.

Hungary, too, was suffering at this time from internal troubles for, on the death of King Albert II in 1440 CE, a succession dispute broke out. This offered a golden opportunity for Ottoman attack and in 845/1441 Ottoman forces moved into Transylvania, but were defeated by the voivoda John Hunyadi. In 846/1442, Hunyadi was again successful against the Ottoman army sent into Wallachia. Hunyadi’s victories, although not of great significance militarily, had a considerable psychological effect, inspiring a certain confidence that the Ottoman menace could be halted. A Christian alliance was set in motion. Earlier, in 1439 CE at the Council of Florence, John VIII had accepted the union of the churches in return for a Christian attack against the Ottomans. In early 1442 CE, Pope Eugenius sent his Apostolic Legate, Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini, to arrange peace in Hungary, which he did by the autumn of 1442 CE. By the summer of 1444 CE a fleet consisting of papal, Venetian and Burgundian ships had set sail for the Dardanelles.
Shortly after the unsuccessful attack against Ottoman territory in Anatolia launched by İbrahim of Qaraman, Vladislav I, the king of Hungary, George Branković, the despot of Serbia and John Hunyadi, the voyvoda of Transylvania, crossed the Danube. There ensued a devastating campaign which continued through the winter of 1443–4 CE, leaving Serbia devastated before Hunyadi, Vladislav and Branković retreated back to Belgrade.

In 848/1444 the Treaty of Edirne was concluded between the Ottomans and Vladislav, Branković and Hunyadi. Despite this treaty, Vladislav was also committed to the plans for a crusade, the joint papal–Venetian–Burgundian fleet having reached the Dardanelles by August, and had undertaken to cross the Danube at the beginning of September on a campaign against the Ottomans. With the joint fleet approaching the Dardanelles and Hungarian forces poised to cross the Danube once more, İbrahim launched an attack against the Ottomans, forcing Murad to cross back into Anatolia, taking with him, however, only the janissary forces and leaving the bulk of his army in Rumeli. Yet again, İbrahim sued for peace without entering battle and the Treaty of Qaraman was concluded in the late summer of 848/1444.

It was at this point that Murad abdicated, unexpectedly, and placed his young son Mehmed on the throne. The reason for his decision is not clear but it was perhaps related to the death in 847/1443 of his son ‘Ala’ al-Din. Very shortly afterwards, Vladislav, together with Hunyadi and Cardinal Cesarini, but without Branković, who preferred to stay out of the campaign, crossed the Danube. Murad, called back into service to face this force, crossed the Dardanelles successfully, with Genoese help, and in November 848/1444 the two armies met at the battle of Varna. The encounter was hard fought: ‘such was the confusion that father could not recognise son, nor son father, and the angels in the heavens and the fishes in the seas were struck by the awesomeness of the battle ... heads rolled like pebbles on the battle field’. The outcome was an Ottoman victory, and a dead king of Hungary, for Vladislav was killed on the battlefield. Murad now returned to retirement. With the unsuccessful crusade on the Danube in 849/1445, which did not result in any effective Ottoman defeat, the danger of a crusade passed.

Meanwhile, the Despot Constantine continued military action in southern Greece. George Scanderbeg, the son of John Kastriote who had stayed at the Ottoman court as a hostage and who, in 842/1438, had been appointed by Murad to the governorship of Krujë which he used as his base in his rebellion against the Ottomans in 847/1443, continued to elude Ottoman control.
In 850/1446 the janissaries revolted. Mehmed was forced to recall Murad, a decision which both Doukas and Neshri ascribe to the grand vizier, Khalil Chandarli. Mehmed’s brief reign was over.

Between 849/1446 and 851/1447 Murad turned his attention to Mistra and Albania, and by early 850/1447 Constantine, the despot of Mistra, was an Ottoman vassal. The following year, Ottoman forces moved against Scanderbeg, who withdrew. Hunyadi, who had escaped from the battlefield at Varna in 848/1444, now began once more to assemble forces for an all-out assault on the Ottomans. While he obtained the support of the pope Nicholas V, the voyvoda Dan of Wallachia, and Scanderbeg, the Venetians were unwilling to become involved. Scanderbeg, busy with his activities against the Venetians in Albania, did not actually join Hunyadi’s forces, which crossed the Danube into Serbia in the late summer of 852/1448. In October the two armies met on the plain of Kosovo. Hunyadi fled the battlefield and the Ottomans emerged victorious.

In the last few years of his reign, Murad directed activities in Greece, taking Arta in 852/1449, and attacking various islands in the Aegean and Negroponte. He also campaigned against Scanderbeg, who managed to survive and keep hold of his stronghold, Krujë. At the beginning of Muharram 855/February 1451, Murad died.

Within less than half a century, the Ottoman state had managed to rise phoenix-like from the ashes of Timur’s victory. Once more, the Ottomans dominated vast swathes of territory stretching both eastwards and westwards. The commercial importance of their territories attracted foreign merchants who were active within Ottoman lands. Relations remained close with Genoa, which on various occasions gave support to the Ottoman rulers. Venice too sought to maintain peaceful relations with the Ottomans, forced to do so in order to ensure the safety of her territories in the region, and because of the commercial interests of her merchants. With an expanding territorial base and a growing economy, the Ottoman state also developed an increasingly complex bureaucracy, which registered in great detail the lands conquered and their productivity. With the conquest of Constantinople by Mehmed II in 857/1453, the Ottoman state extinguished the Byzantine empire and gained a truly imperial capital.

Notes

The rise of the Ottomans


7. Doukas, Historia Byzantina, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1843), p. 199; Doukas, Ducae Historia Turcobyzantina (1341–1462), ed. B. Grecu, Bucharest, 1958, 41; Doukas, Decline and fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, ed. H. J. Magoulias, Detroit, 1975, 64. Doukas’s grandfather lived through the civil war and fled Constantinople for Aydı’n where he was well received. There ‘he adopted his foreign residence for his homeland, and esteemed and honored the foreigner and barbarian as one crowned by God’, Doukas, ed. Bekker, 23; ed. Grecu, 47; ed. Magoulias, 66.


12. 1358.xi.20 = ASG, San Giorgio Manoscritti Membranacei IV, f. 304r.


15. 1356.iii.21 = San Giorgio Manoscritti Membranacei IV, ff. 304v–305r; Belgrano, ‘Prima serie’, no. 18, 126–7.


29. See the entries for embassy-related expenses for the 1390s in the account books of the comune of Pera, ASG, San Giorgio, Sala 34 590/1304, and ASG, Antico Comune 22.


40. Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in medieval Anatolia*, Bloomington, 1983; Rudi Paul Lindner, ‘Stimulus and justification in early Ottoman history’,
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42. 1403 = Thomas, Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum, no. 159, p. 292.
43. 1406.iii.30 = Thomas, Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum, no. 162, pp. 287–301 (‘musulmanum Zalabi imperatorem Turchorum’).
55. 1419.xi.6 = Thomas, Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum, nos. 172 and 173, pp. 318–30.
The Ottoman empire
(tenth/sixteenth century)

C O L I N I M B E R

Introduction

During the course of the tenth/sixteenth century, the Ottoman empire emerged as a world power, both in terms of its real military and political strength, and in terms of the claims of the Ottoman dynasty to universal sovereignty. During the previous century, Mehmed II (r. 855–86/1451–81) had consolidated Ottoman control of much of Anatolia and the Balkan Peninsula through conquest and through the removal of local dynasties or their absorption into the Ottoman ruling establishment. This process of assimilation continued during the reign of Mehmed’s son Bâyezîd II (r. 886–918/1481–1512). Ottoman territory as it stood at the end of Mehmed II’s reign remained the core territory of the empire during the tenth/sixteenth century and later. Viziers and other members of the military–political class were usually of Rumelian origin, that is from the Balkan Peninsula. It was only during the late tenth/sixteenth and eleventh/seventeenth centuries that men of Caucasian origin emerged as rivals to the Rumelians in the contest for political office. The legal–religious elite tended to come from Anatolian Turkish families, as did the secretaries that manned the sultan’s chancellery. It was also Rumeli and Anatolia that furnished the majority of troops and crews for the imperial army and imperial fleet, and provided most of the materials and cash to support military and naval enterprises. Furthermore, the conquest of Constantinople in 857/1453 and its subsequent rebuilding had provided the empire with a permanent capital situated between Rumeli and Anatolia.

The reign of Bâyezîd II saw a temporary halt to large-scale conquest.¹ This was partly a reflection of the sultan’s own pacific temperament, and partly a reaction to the strains of the thirty years of continuous warfare during his father’s reign. The period was, however, crucial in shaping the empire that was to develop during the tenth/sixteenth century. Bâyezîd himself acquired a posthumous reputation as a saint, and his personal piety was probably a factor
in encouraging a consciousness of the Ottoman empire as an orthodox Islamic polity and of the sultan as defender of orthodox Islam. Both Mehmed II and Bâyezîd II encouraged this tendency through their endowment of mosques and colleges (medreses) for training religious scholars (‘ulema). The Eight Medreses of Mehmed II were to remain the most prestigious institutions of learning in the Ottoman empire until the nineteenth century CE, rivalled only by the medreses of the Süleymaniye, completed in 964/1557. However, Bâyezîd’s most distinctive legacy to the tenth/sixteenth century was the codification of secular law. His reign witnessed a systematic codification of the laws governing the related areas of fief-holding, taxation and fines and other penalties, areas of law which in practice lay outside the scope of the sherî‘at. The first general code for use throughout the empire appeared c. 905f./1500, and underwent several recensions between the beginning of the century and 947/1540. It remained in use until the early eleventh/seventeenth century.

Bâyezîd’s reign was most significant in the religious and legal sphere. However there was another development which looked forward to the tenth/sixteenth century. In the war with Venice between 904/1499 and 909/1503 an Ottoman fleet for the first time successfully operated outside the Aegean. The fleet operations of Mehmed II’s time were confined to the Aegean and relied for their success on overwhelming numbers of vessels. The successes of Bâyezîd’s reign – the conquest of the ports of Kilia and Akkerman in Moldavia and the acquisition of strategic fortresses in the Peloponnese – although unspectacular, presaged the emergence of the Ottomans as a naval power during the tenth/sixteenth century.²

However two significant developments which were to define the character of the Ottoman tenth/sixteenth century occurred outside the Ottoman domains. In western Europe by 927–8/1521 the Habsburg monarch Charles V combined in his person the roles of king of Spain, duke of Burgundy and Holy Roman Emperor, while his brother Ferdinand ruled the Habsburg lands in Austria with the title ‘King of the Romans’. This accumulation of power in the Habsburg family created a dynastic power to rival the Ottomans and led to conflict between the two dynasties in central Europe and in the Mediterranean and North Africa. It also led to an ideological competition between Süleyman I ‘the Magnificent’ (r. 926–74/1520–66) and Charles V, with Süleyman’s titulature clearly intended to outshine his rival’s. The early tenth/sixteenth century also saw the rise of the Safavid dynasty in Iran. This led to more than military and territorial rivalry between the Ottoman empire and Iran. The Safavid adoption of Twelver Shi‘ism and the Safavid shah’s claim,
through headship of the Safavid Order, to quasi-divine status created an internal threat to the Ottoman empire, with many of the Ottoman sultan’s subjects, particularly in central Anatolia and Iraq, professing loyalty to the Safavid shah. The sultans countered this threat by periodic persecutions, but equally by counter-propaganda which portrayed the Ottoman sultans as the sole defenders of Sunnī Islamic orthodoxy against Safavid heresy. This development strengthened the self-image of the sultans as righteous Sunnī rulers, and with it the influence of the orthodox ‘ulemā in the empire. Political events thus gave an impetus to an Islamising tendency already apparent during the reign of Bāyezīd II. The Ottoman–Safavid rivalries of the tenth/sixteenth century also had long-term consequences. The Sunnī–Shī‘ī split, with Twelver Shī‘ism as the dominant religion in Iran and Sunnī Islam as the dominant religion to the west of Iran, dates from the conflicts of this period. Furthermore, the location of the current western border of Iran reflects, more or less, the outcome of the Ottoman–Safavid conflicts of the tenth/sixteenth and early eleventh/seventeenth centuries.

Before the reign of Süleymān I ‘the Magnificent’ (906–26/1500–20)

The tenth/sixteenth century was a period when the personality of the reigning sultan was a major factor in determining the politics of the empire. By the beginning of the century, Bāyezīd II was old and apparently ailing. The war with Venice and her allies between 904/1499 and 909/1503 had added important fortresses in southern Greece and Albania to his possessions, but this was his last offensive war. His reaction to the rise of the Safavids in Iran was extremely cautious. Despite their laying claim to Trebizond and occasionally threatening the Ottoman frontier, Bāyezīd’s response was simply to deport known Safavid sympathisers to the Peloponnese and to attempt to close his eastern border to Safavid infiltrators. The infirmities of old age, which perhaps explain Bāyezīd’s inertia in the face of the danger from the Safavids, gave rise to another crisis. Fearing his imminent death, his sons began manoeuvring to secure the succession. In 915/1509, his son Qorqud fled to Egypt, presumably to secure an alliance with the Mamlūk sultan in the inevitable struggle for succession, while another son Selīm, governor of Trebizond, complained that Bāyezīd favoured his brother ʿAhmed.

In 917/1511 the two crises converged. Having returned from Egypt Qorqud faced a rebellion in the area of his governorship in south-western Anatolia. Its leader was a certain Shāh Qulu (‘Slave of the Shāh’), whose family allegiance to
the Safavids and whose own messianic claims added a religious fervour to the uprising. Qorqud retreated before the rebels who advanced northwards as far as Brusa (Bursa). The crisis ended when an army under the grand vizier Khâdim ‘Ali Pasha and Prince Ahîmed pursued Shâh Qulu and his followers across the frontier to Iran. Khâdim ‘Ali lost his life in the final battle.

The Shâh Qulu rebellion discredited Bâyezîd and the claims to the throne both of Qorqud who had retreated before the rebels and of Ahîmed who had not distinguished himself during the campaign. The third brother, Selîm, took no part in these events, but in the meantime pursued his own claims by travelling to the Crimea and, with the support of the khân, invading Ottoman Rumeli. His father temporarily placated him with the governorship of Silistra on the Danube, nearer to the capital than his former seat of government in Trebizond. His attempt shortly afterwards to march on Istanbul and remove his father by force was a failure, and gave his brother Ahîmed the opportunity to claim the throne during his father’s lifetime. It was the janissaries who determined the succession. In 918/1512, a janissary rebellion in his favour enabled Selîm to prevent Ahîmed from entering the capital and to force his father’s abdication.

Selîm I (r. 918–26/1512–20) did not share his father’s pacific temperament, and the course of his reign was markedly different from Bâyezîd’s. By 919/1513 he had defeated and killed both of his brothers, Qorqud and Ahîmed, and executed the male members of their families apart from Ahîmed’s son Prince Murâd, who fled to Iran. With his throne secure, he reversed his father’s conciliatory attitude towards the Safavids. In 920/1514, in his first military campaign after the civil war, he routed the Safavid Shâh Ismâ’îl at Chaldiran and temporarily occupied his capital, Tabriz. In the following two years, he conquered Amîd, Urfa, Mardin and the other Safavid cities and territories in south-east Anatolia and, through his agent Îdrîs of Bitlis, secured the allegiance of the Kurdish tribal leaders of eastern Anatolia. In 921/1515 Selîm extended his territory and influence in this area through the annexation of the principality of Dulqadar around Elbistan and through securing the allegiance of the Ramadanoğlu dynasty of Adana.

The Ottoman occupation of these areas gave Selîm an extended border with the Mamlûk domains in Syria, leading the Mamlûk sultan Qansûkh al-Ghawrî to seek an alliance with Shâh Ismâ’îl in order to counterbalance this threatening Ottoman presence. This provided Selîm with an impetus and a justification for his next campaign. In 922/1516, unable to continue his march eastwards to campaign against Ismâ’îl for fear of a Mamlûk attack across the border, Selîm chose instead to attack Qansûkh al-Ghawrî in Syria, securing a
decisive victory and the death of the sultan at Marj Dābiq north of Aleppo. Qansūḥ’s co-operation with the ‘heretic’ Īsmā’īl provided the justification for the war with a fellow Sunnī Muslim. In the winter following his victory, Selim took his army across the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. The defeat and death of Qansūḥ’s successor, Ṭūmanbāy, at Raydāniyya outside Cairo gave Selim control of all the former Mamlūk domains in Syria, Egypt and the Ḥijāz.⁴ This was Selim’s last campaign. In 924/1518 he planned a further campaign from Syria, presumably against the Safavids, but mutiny in his overstretched army thwarted his ambition. In the last full year of his life, however, the Ottoman domains expanded further when Khayr al-Dīn Barbarossa, an Anatolian pirate who had established himself as ruler of Algiers and Tunis, voluntarily accepted the Ottoman sultan as overlord. Khayr al-Dīn’s motive was presumably to acquire a protector against the power of Spain and other Christian enemies.⁵ Selim himself began naval and military preparations for what Lüfti Pasha (grand vizier, 946–8/1539–41) was later to describe as ‘the conquest of Europe’.⁶ His death in 926/1520 prevented the fulfilment of this ambition.

In 922–3/1516–17, Selim had in a single campaign almost doubled the size of the Ottoman empire. Egypt in particular was to become an important source of revenue, remitting its surplus to the treasury in Istanbul and, perhaps equally significantly, an important source of foodstuffs for the capital. The new territories also brought new problems. The need to defend the sea lanes between Egypt and Istanbul – the only practical route for regular trade and communications – required the development of the Ottoman fleet. The acquisition of Egypt and the Ḥijāz also gave the Ottomans an outlet to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and with it the need to protect traditional trade routes between India and South-East Asia and the Mediterranean, particularly against disruption by the Portuguese. The acquisition of the Ḥijāz also gave the sultan the responsibility of protecting the pilgrimage routes to Mecca by sea and land.

The conquests also brought a new status. The incorporation of the former Mamlūk territories made the Ottoman empire the world’s greatest Islamic power. Furthermore, the acquisition of the three holy cities of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem gave the Ottoman sultan primacy among all Islamic rulers, emphasising the tendency, reinforced by rivalry with the Safavid ‘heretics’, of the Ottoman sultans to present themselves as the defender of Islamic orthodoxy.

Süleymān I ‘the Magnificent’ (r. 926–74/1520–66)

It is customary to think of the reign of Süleymān I as the high point of the Ottoman empire, as much in its material and literary culture as in its political
and military fortunes. This was an image which the sultan himself did much to cultivate with his patronage of the arts, the embellishment of his capital city and his adoption of increasingly grandiose titles intended to reflect his successes on the battlefield and the defeat of his Habsburg and Safavid rivals.

At the time of Süleymân’s accession, however, rival powers underestimated his capabilities. He faced a revolt in Syria, where a former Mamlûk governor, Jânbîrî al-Ghazâli, hoped to establish himself as an independent ruler, and later in Egypt. The expected success of Jânbîrî’s rebellion seems also to have encouraged the Hungarian king Lajos to treat the sultan’s ambassadors disrespectfully, providing Süleymân with the pretext for his first campaign. In 927/1521, having suppressed the revolt in Syria, he attacked Hungary, capturing the fortress city of Belgrade. In the following year, using the fleet which his father had created in the last year of his reign, he besieged and captured Rhodes, expelling the Knights of St John. Both victories had a strategic and symbolic significance. Belgrade was the most important Hungarian bastion against an attack from the south, and its conquest made possible an Ottoman invasion of the kingdom. Rhodes, too, was strategically placed to command the sea lane between Istanbul and Egypt, making its possession essential to the security of communications and trade between Egypt and the capital. Symbolically, these victories created Süleymân’s reputation as a warrior, since his most renowned ancestor, Mehmed II ‘the Conqueror’ (r. 855–86/1451–81) had failed in his assaults on both Belgrade and Rhodes.

The conquest of Belgrade was a preliminary to an invasion of Hungary. This came in 932/1526, when Süleymân defeated and killed King Lajos at the battle of Mohács, precipitating a conflict that was to preoccupy him throughout his reign. Following the departure of the Ottoman army, the Hungarian Estates elected John Szapolyai as king, an appointment which Süleymân later confirmed. However, the Habsburgs also had a claim to the kingdom through the marriage of Charles V and Ferdinand’s sister to King Lajos. In 934/1528, Ferdinand occupied the Hungarian capital and expelled John Szapolyai, precipitating Süleymân’s second invasion of Hungary. In 935f./1529, the sultan reoccupied Buda, replaced Szapolyai on the Hungarian throne, and in September advanced to besiege Vienna. In mid-October, the Ottoman army withdrew. Disengagement did not, however, end the war. In 936f./1530, Ferdinand again besieged Buda, this time unsuccessfully, and occupied the western part of Hungary, drawing Süleymân into a third Hungarian campaign. Hostilities ended with an Ottoman–Habsburg truce which confirmed Szapolyai as king but recognised the division of the kingdom between Szapolyai and Ferdinand.
Peace with the Habsburgs in the west was a signal for war with the Safavids in the east. It is probable that events within his realms had already alerted Süleymān to the danger from the Safavids, even though they did not furnish the pretext for hostilities. The defeat of Shāh Qulu’s rebellion in 917/1511 had not put an end to religiously inspired revolts. In 925/1519 Selim had suppressed the rebellion in central Anatolia of a messianic leader apparently with Safavid sympathies. The reason for the sultan’s hurried departure from Hungary after the battle of Mohács was another rebellion in Anatolia, but the most serious uprising came in 934f./1528, again in central Anatolia and again gathered around a messianic figure, remembered as Qalenderoğlu. There were further disturbances in south-east Anatolia in the same years. The extent to which the Safavids inspired these rebellions is not clear, but fear of Safavid sedition continued to haunt the Ottomans. Qalenderoğlu’s was the last major rebellion of a religious-millenarian character, but for the rest of the century the sultans maintained informers throughout Anatolia to report on the activities of Safavid sympathisers and to secure their arrest and execution.  

However, it was incidents on the border that gave the pretext for war between the two powers. In 934/1528, the Safavid governor of Baghdad had offered the city to the Ottomans, forming the basis of an Ottoman claim. In 936/1530, too, the Safavid governor of Azerbaijan had defected to the Ottomans. These favourable prognostications led Süleymān to launch a campaign against Iran in 939/1533, following the truce with the Habsburgs. In 940f./1534, the grand vizier İbrahim Pasha occupied the Safavid capital Tabriz with no resistance. Later in the same year, Baghdad too surrendered to Süleymān and İbrahim Pasha. From Baghdad the army returned to Tabriz, and finally to Istanbul in 943/1536, after adding Van, Bitlis and Erzurum to the empire. 

During the sultan’s absence, hostilities had again broken out with the Habsburgs, but in the Mediterranean rather than in central Europe. In 941/1535, perhaps in emulation of Süleymān’s role as a war leader but also no doubt with a view to safeguarding his Italian realms against attacks from North Africa, Charles V personally led a successful sea-borne expedition against Tunis. In the following year, the outbreak of war with Venice extended the conflict. The war was to bring into existence a new set of alliances. The growth of Habsburg power challenged the Ottomans in central Europe and on the Mediterranean, but presented a greater threat to France which found itself ringed by Habsburg territories in Spain, the Low Countries, Franche Comté and Italy. For the French king Francis I, the Ottoman sultan provided a counterweight to Charles V and in 942f./1536 Francis and Süleymān formed
an alliance. In 943f./1537, after the outbreak of the Ottoman war with Venice, they planned a joint attack on the kingdom of Naples. Nothing came of the plan. Francis did not invade Italy, and Süleyman, while launching raids on the coast of Apulia, unsuccessfully besieged the Venetian island of Corfu with the main body of his army. In the following year, Khayr al-Din Barbarossa, the former pirate and ruler of Algiers whom Süleyman had appointed admiral in 940/1533, captured most of Venice’s island possessions in the Aegean, prompting Venice to construct an alliance with Charles V, Ferdinand and the pope. The allies were at first successful. In 945/1538, after a Spanish force had captured Kotor on the Dalmatian coast, their combined fleet trapped Khayr al-Din’s ships in the Gulf of Prevesa. The ensuing battle was Khayr al-Din’s most renowned victory, which he followed with the recapture of Kotor. Peace with Venice followed in 947/1540, giving the sultan Monemvasia and Nauplion in the Peloponnese and the former Venetian islands in the Aegean.

The war brought to an end the period of continuous Ottoman conquest, a point that the Habsburg ambassador Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq was to make about twenty years later:

It is now about forty years since Süleyman captured Belgrade, slew King Louis, and reduced Hungary, and so secured the prospect of possessing himself not only of this province but also of territory farther north. In this hope he besieged Vienna; then, renewing the war he captured Güns and again threatened Vienna, but this time only at a distance. But what has he achieved by his mighty array, his unlimited resources, his countless hosts? He has with difficulty clung to the portion of Hungary which he had already captured. He who used to make an end of mighty kingdoms in a single campaign, has won, as the reward for his expeditions, some scarcely fortified citadels and unimportant towns which he has gradually torn away from the mass of Hungary. He has looked upon Vienna, it is true, but it was for the first and last time.

Busbecq’s paragraph draws attention to the obstacles to further Ottoman expansion. In the west and the Mediterranean, Süleyman encountered the power of the Habsburgs who possessed resources, although perhaps not yet a military organisation, on a level with his own. In the east the mountains of eastern Anatolia, Azerbaijan and the Caucasus formed a barrier between his territories and those of the Safavids. Furthermore, although Shâh Tahmâsb, with memories perhaps of Chaldiran, was unwilling to encounter the Ottomans in battle, his use of scorched earth and harrying tactics prevented the Ottomans permanently occupying Safavid territory. The doubtful allegiances of the semi-autonomous Kurdish tribes in the borderlands between the two empires again made the conquest of the region difficult. For wars on
either front, the distance of the borders rendered campaigns of conquest conducted in a single year an anachronism.

For the rest of Süleymán’s reign, the mere preservation of the Ottoman position in Hungary became, as Busbecq was to observe, the sultan’s major preoccupation. The death of King Szapolyai in 947/1540, leaving an infant son, precipitated a crisis. In order to enforce his own claim, Ferdinand immediately laid siege to Buda. The operation failed, but he returned in the following year, this time provoking a major Ottoman expedition. Following Ferdinand’s withdrawal, the sultan did not restore the infant king and his guardian, the bishop of Varad, Martinuzzi, but instead converted central Hungary to an Ottoman province. Transylvania, the eastern part of the old kingdom, came under the authority of Martinuzzi, ruling on behalf of the infant king and his mother. However, the shift of his allegiance towards the Habsburgs complicated the Ottoman position in Hungary. In 949/1542, Ferdinand besieged Buda, again unsuccessfully.

Events in Hungary were part of a wider Ottoman conflict with the Habsburgs. While Ferdinand tried to assert the Habsburg claim to Hungary, his brother Charles V reopened the war in the Mediterranean. In the hope of repeating his victory at Tunis, in 948/1541 Charles V led a naval expedition against Algiers. The campaign ended in disaster and was a factor in persuading Süleymán to accept the French ambassador’s proposals for joint action against the Habsburgs. The result of these negotiations was a collaboration in the western Mediterranean between the French fleet and the Ottoman fleet under Khayr al-Dīn Barbarossa. As a Franco-Ottoman force stormed Nice in 950/1543, Süleymán led an army into Hungary, capturing a string of Habsburg fortresses to the west of the Danube. Once again, however, the war ended in stalemate. A peace between Francis I and Charles V put an end to Franco-Ottoman co-operation and, after two more years of indecisive warfare in Hungary, Charles V and Ferdinand sent an ambassador to Istanbul to open peace negotiations. The outcome was a five-year truce concluded in 954/1547 and based on the territorial status quo. However small the Habsburg concessions were in reality, for the sultan the treaty had a great symbolic significance. By its terms, Ferdinand paid Süleymán an annual tribute for the territory in Hungary that came under his rule and, in the Turkish text of the treaty, Charles V drops the title ‘Emperor’ and is simply ‘King of Spain’. To Süleymān, the tributary status of the Habsburgs vindicated his claim to universal sovereignty and Charles’ titular concessions vindicated his claims to the title ‘Emperor’. Furthermore, the peace in Hungary and on the Mediterranean freed him to confront his enemy in the east.
The rebellion of Shâh Ismâ‘îl’s son, Alqâş Mîrzâ, against his brother, the Safavid Shâh Tâhmâsb, fired Süleymân’s ambition to eliminate his Safavid rival altogether. In 955/1548 Alqâş took refuge in the Ottoman court, and in the same year Süleymân launched a campaign against Tâhmâsb. In July, he occupied Tabriz without resistance but, as in his earlier campaign, he was unable to remain in possession of the city for more than a few days. The campaign ended in 956/1549, having added Van – conquered previously but again lost to the Safavids – to his empire. Perhaps the most significant result of the war was that Süleymân’s absence in the east had provided an opportunity to the Habsburgs in the west. Frustrated in his ambition to achieve recognition as ruler of Hungary, Martinuzzi, as guardian of the boy-king of Transylvania, John Sigismund, transferred his allegiance from Süleymân to Ferdinand and in 957/1550 forced John Sigismund’s mother, Isabella, to give up the crown. At the same time, and probably not coincidentally, Charles V’s Genoese admiral, Andrea Doria, launched an offensive in the Mediterranean, capturing the corsair strongholds of Mahdiyya and Monastir on the Tunisian coast.

These events reactivated the Franco-Ottoman alliance. It was the French ambassador who had alerted Süleymân to the situation in Transylvania, and it was the French king, Henry II, who proposed an alliance whereby the Ottomans would attack Transylvania, while the French invaded Habsburg Italy through Piedmont. Lack of co-ordination and a truce in 959/1552 between Charles V and Henry II ensured that the alliance achieved nothing. Nonetheless, the crisis in Transylvania – Ferdinand continued to press his claim following the murder of Martinuzzi in 958/1551 – and the Habsburg offensive in the Mediterranean provoked an Ottoman response. An Ottoman invasion of Transylvania in 959/1552 resulted in the occupation of Temesvár and Lipova, but did not result in the reinstatement of the king and his mother. On the Mediterranean, as a reprisal against Andrea Doria’s successes, the sultan ordered the admiral Sinân Pasha, in co-operation with the French fleet, to attack Malta, a base for piracy against Muslim shipping. When the assaults on the island failed and the French did not appear, a detachment of the fleet sailed for Tripoli on the North African coast, which like Malta was also a base for the Knights of St John. Tripoli fell to the Ottomans in August 958/1551.

By 961/1553, despite the situation in Transylvania, Süleymân felt secure enough to launch his final campaign against the Safavids, advancing as far as Nakhichevan but without securing any territory or fortresses. The failure of this campaign, together with the unresolved problem of Transylvania, seems to have persuaded the sultan that talking was preferable to war. Negotiations at Amasya between Süleymân and Shâh Tâhmâsb concluded with a treaty in
962/1555 establishing the borders between the Safavid and Ottoman empires. In subsidiary negotiations between the sultan and the Habsburg ambassador Busbecq, Ferdinand refused to abandon his claim to Transylvania, until an Ottoman siege of the Hungarian fortress of Szigetvár persuaded him to change his mind. In 963/1556, the king John Sigismund and his mother Isabella were reinstated on the throne of Transylvania.

Two events in the late 960s/1550s changed the strategic balance between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. First, in 964/1556, Charles V abdicated. His son Philip II inherited his territories in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, but not the Holy Roman empire, leading to a split in the Spanish and Austrian branches of the dynasty. Second, in 968/1559 Philip II and Henry II of France concluded a peace at Cateau-Cambrésis, removing the possibility of a Franco-Ottoman alliance and undermining Ottoman influence in the politics of western Europe. The new situation allowed Philip to respond to a new phase of war in North Africa, where Spain and the Ottoman empire vied for control of strategic coastal fortresses. In 963/1556, the Ottoman admiral Piyaâle Pasha had attacked the Spanish fortress of Oran, and in 964/1557 occupied Bizerta. Philip’s response, after the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis had removed the French threat, was to occupy Djerba off the Tunisian coast. It was, however, a short-lived victory. Piyaâle Pasha retook the fortress and island in the following year.

It was war in the Mediterranean, which aimed largely at gaining control of coastal fortresses, that absorbed most of Süleyman’s naval resources, but the conquest of Egypt and the Hijāz in 923/1517 and success in gaining control of Baṣra in the 950s/1540s also gave the Ottomans an outlet to the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea and the Gulf. However, by this time the Portuguese had disrupted the old routes through the Gulf and the Red Sea, as they attempted to divert trade, especially in spices, round the Cape of Good Hope to Lisbon. In pursuit of this goal, they occupied Hormuz, allowing them to control the passage between the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. In 923/1517, they unsuccessfully attacked Jedda on the Red Sea coast. While the existence of a memorandum of 931/1525, from a certain Selmân Reis to the sultan, outlining the opportunities for seizing control of trade in the Indian Ocean, indicates an awareness of the dangers from the Portuguese and the possibilities for commercial and territorial expansion, the sultan did not respond until the 940s/1530s. It was in this decade that the Portuguese almost succeeded in gaining a monopoly of the spice trade. In 945/1538 a fleet equipped at Suez set sail to besiege the Portuguese fort of Diu in Gujarat. The siege failed, but during the course of the operation an Ottoman force
occupied Aden and gained a foothold in Yemen. In the following decades the Ottomans maintained a squadron at Mocha to guard the entrance to the Red Sea, primarily, one may assume, against Portuguese incursions. In the Gulf, however, the Portuguese successfully prevented the operation of Ottoman shipping beyond the Straits of Hormuz. An attempt to capture Hormuz in 959/1552 was a failure. The effect of Ottoman operations in the southern seas was to create a land frontier against the Portuguese. However, Portuguese domination of the ocean prevented the Ottomans gaining territories beyond this frontier or preserving the old monopoly of the Red Sea and the Gulf as routes for trade between South and South-East Asia to Europe and the Middle East.13

The comparative failure against the Portuguese was not the greatest problem to preoccupy Süleymän during his final years. After the death of his wife Khurrem in 965/1558, when his own demise seemed imminent, the rivalry over the succession between her two sons Selim and Bâyezid broke out into open warfare and the declared rebellion of Bâyezid. Bâyezid’s flight to Iran allowed Shâh Tahmâsb to extract a favourable peace treaty from Süleymân in 969f./1562.

The agreement with Tahmâsb coincided with the conclusion of an eight-year peace with Ferdinand. Süleymân’s aim in securing the two treaties was probably to free his resources for a campaign in the Mediterranean. Ferdinand’s death in 971/1564, and the desire of his son, Maximilian, to reactivate the Habsburg claim to Transylvania, did not alter his intent. In 972f./1565, he sent a small expedition under the governor-general of Temesvár into Transylvania, but reserved the bulk of his forces for the fleet. The campaign of 972f./1565 aimed to expel the Knights of St John – whom Süleymân had already defeated at Rhodes and Tripoli – from Malta. Since the island occupies the strait between the eastern and western Mediterranean basins, a fleet based there was in a position to prevent, or at least disrupt, the passage of shipping between the two. Its control was therefore essential for any power that wished to dominate the entire Mediterranean. However, the attack failed. As if in compensation for the failure, in 974/1566 an Ottoman force occupied the Genoese island of Chios in the Aegean.

It was also perhaps the need to compensate for the defeat at Malta as much as the need to counter Maximilian’s claims in Hungary that persuaded Süleymân to lead his last expedition. In 974/1566, at the age of seventy-two, he accompanied the army to Hungary to lay siege to Szigetvár in the southwest of the country. He died two days before the fortress capitulated.
After Süleymân I (974–1015/1566–1606)

The death of Süleymân I marked a change in the configuration of the empire. Notably, the era of rapid conquest had passed and, although the empire expanded further before 1590, the costs of conquest were to become unsustainable. Süleymân was also the last Ottoman sultan who regularly led his army in battle, although the increasingly unrealistic notion that the first duty of the sultan was as a leader in war was to persist. He was also the last of a line of sultans whose personalities had to some degree shaped the course of the empire’s history, and each of whose reigns had marked a distinctive era. It was perhaps for this reason, in addition to his success on the battlefield, that later generations of Ottomans looked back with nostalgia on his reign and, especially in the troubled eleventh/seventeenth century, regarded the re-establishment of Süleymanic institutions as the model for reform.

However, in the changed circumstances of the empire a return to the days of rapid conquest and warrior sultans was in practice unimaginable. The distance between the capital and the frontiers had the effect of prolonging campaigns. Furthermore, it became increasingly difficult to maintain order along the extended borders, particularly along the eastern and southern fringes of the sultan’s domains, where hostile terrain and uncertain political loyalties rendered effective control difficult. These were the problems that confronted the grand vizier Şoqollu Meḥmed Pasha at the accession of his father-in-law, Selim II, in 974/1566.

In the west, he faced a war with Hungary, while in the south he faced the rebellion of the Marsh Arab Ibn ‘Ulayyân, who had cut communications between Baghdad and Baṣra. In the far south, the Ottomans had lost control of Yemen, and with it control of the entry to the Red Sea. The Hungarian war ended with the conclusion of an eight-year peace in 976/1568. The pacification of Ibn ‘Ulayyân required a river-borne campaign and the bestowal of an Ottoman governorship on the rebel leader. The reconquest of Yemen under Şoja Sinān Pasha took three years between 976/1568 and 978/1570.\(^4\)

It was evidently an assessment of the geographical obstacles to Ottoman control of existing frontiers and to further expansion that led Şoqollu to seek ways to overcome these difficulties. In 976/1568 he ordered the construction of a canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, presumably in order to facilitate the transport of men and materials to Yemen. The plan did not materialise, but Şoqollu nonetheless, in 976f./1569, pursued a similar scheme to construct a canal between the Don, which flows into the Black Sea, and the Volga, which flows into the Caspian. The aim was undoubtedly to enable the
transport of war materials to the Caspian, avoiding the mountain barriers and other obstacles on the land route. This facility would make it possible to counter the immediate threat from the Russians, who had occupied Astrakhan near the mouth of the Volga; to communicate more easily with the lands to the east of Iran; and to attack Iran from the north, bypassing the Caucasus, Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. The plan, however, was a failure. In 977/1569, an attack on Astrakhan failed and the canal remained incomplete.

The planned canals had the potential to change the strategic and also perhaps the commercial situation of the Ottoman empire. The schemes were not, however, revived. The next assault was on Cyprus, and although this was perhaps intended as the first part of a strategy to conquer the Mediterranean islands from east to west, Cyprus, a Venetian colony, lay within the area of the Mediterranean already bounded by Ottoman territories. There were two obstacles to attacking Cyprus. First, the war would be in breach of an existing treaty with Venice, and second, Şoqollu Meḥmed Pasha apparently opposed the plan on the grounds that it would push Venice into constructing an anti-Ottoman alliance. By arguing from Ḥanafī law that peace treaties with infidels are valid only so long as they benefit the Muslim community, the chief muftī Ebu’l-su’ūd removed the objection to breaching the treaty, while the war party, which included the sultan and the two viziers Lâlâ Muṣṭafâ Pasha and Piyâle Pasha, overruled Şoqollu. The attack began in 977/1570 and opened with the capture of Nicosia. Famagusta fell a year later, but the war also produced the consequence that Şoqollu had feared. Venice had enlisted the aid of Spain, the Knights of St John and the pope and, in October 979/1571, the allied fleet destroyed much of the Ottoman fleet off Naupaktos in the Gulf of Corinth. As winter was approaching, the allied fleet did not pursue its advantage, but returned to its home bases. Over the winter of 979/1571–2, the Ottomans constructed a new fleet and by the end of the year Cyprus was secure in Ottoman possession. In 981/1573 Venice formally ceded the island. In the following year, a fleet under Qoja Sinân Pasha and the admiral Uluch ‘Alî expelled the Spaniards from Tunis.

In 981/1574, Selīm II died, but his successor, Murâd III (r. 981–93/1574–95), retained Şoqollu Meḥmed Pasha as grand vizier. A four-year interval of peace followed. In 987/1579, however, Şoqollu was assassinated and his rivals, who had perhaps engineered the murder, came to power. This event coincided with the outbreak of war with the Safavids. In 984/1576, Shāh Tahmāsāb had died and, in the years following his death, the Uzbeks had invaded Iran from the east. The war party around the sultan saw this as an opportunity and declared war in 986/1578. Şoqollu opposed the war, presumably foreseeing a
prolonged conflict in hostile terrain, a situation which the Don–Volga project had aimed to circumvent. However, opposition ceased with Şoqollu’s death. The war did not end until 998/1590, when Shâh ‘Abbâs I ceded the territory in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan and western Iran which the Ottomans had gained in the previous two years.\textsuperscript{17}

With the treaty of 998/1590, the Ottoman empire reached its maximum size. However, Ottoman success in the war was due largely to Shâh ‘Abbâs’ preoccupation with his eastern front and, between 1011/1603 and 1015/1606, he was to recover all the territory lost to the Ottomans. Furthermore the hostilities placed an unprecedented strain on the empire’s resources. This manifested itself in a rise in lawlessness and brigandage in the provinces, increasing indiscipline and desertion in the army, and a deficit in the treasury that was to become chronic. The government attempted to plug the deficit in 993–4/1585–6 by debasing the silver äqche, provoking a riot among the janissaries and other household troops when they received their salaries in this coin.\textsuperscript{18}

The victor in the last years of the hostilities, Ferhād Pasha, was clearly aware of the costs of conflict, and this is probably why he opposed the war that threatened with the Habsburgs following a series of border incidents in Bosnia. However, the war party, led by the grand vizier Qoja Sinān Pasha, prevailed, and 1001/1593 saw the start of a war in Hungary that ended inconclusively in 1015/1606. After a few initial successes, the Ottomans suffered serious setbacks. Most dangerous were the defections of Michael, voyvoda of Wallachia, and Stephen Bathory, king of Transylvania. Sinān Pasha’s expedition against Wallachia in 1003/1595 ended in disaster. In the same year the Austrians captured Esztergom and other important fortresses. Then 1004f./1596 saw an apparent reversal of fortune. Following the capture of Eger in northern Hungary, the Ottoman army won a victory at the battle of Mező-Keresztes. This did not, however, reflect the superiority of Ottoman arms. The Austrian troops had advanced as far as the Ottoman camp and were intent on plunder when the Ottomans launched an unexpected counter-attack. Four years later, in 1008f./1600, the Ottomans captured Kanizsa, but only after the relieving Austrian army had withdrawn, fearing that the flight of the Ottoman troops was intended to lure them into a trap such as they believed had been laid for them at Mező-Keresztes. In the final years of the war an anti-Habsburg revolt in Transylvania and Lâlâ Meḥmed Pasha’s recapture of Esztergom in 1014/1605 marked a revival in Ottoman fortunes. In 1015/1606, the war ended inconclusively. The conflict had shown that, although the Ottomans could still maintain an army in the field for more
than a decade, and more or less hold their own in Hungary, the era of Ottoman military superiority over European enemies was past.

Coinciding with the war in Hungary, the last decade of the tenth/sixteenth century also saw increasing unrest in the Ottoman provinces, and in particular in Anatolia. This was not a new phenomenon. Anatolia had witnessed several rebellions since the beginning of the century, and unrest was chronic: in 965f./1558, for example, the rebel prince Bâyezîd was able to find enough supporters there to muster an army to fight his brother and father. Ottoman chronicles, however, date the beginning of the rebellion to 1005/1596, when the Ottoman commander Jighalazâde Sinân Pasha dispossessed the cavalrymen who had deserted on the field of Mező-Keresztes. Deprived of their fiefs, these men joined Qara Yazıji, a rebel leader in Anatolia who resisted all forces sent against him and continued to plunder the countryside even after the government had attempted to appease him by appointing him governor of Amasya and then of Chorum. The rebellions in Anatolia did not end with the defeat of Qara Yazıji, but continued for almost a decade, forming the melancholy backdrop to the opening of the eleventh/seventeenth century.¹⁹

The monarchy

In the troubled era of the late tenth/sixteenth and early eleventh/seventeenth centuries, it became customary for critics to contrast present ills with past glories, and with the reign of Süleyman I (r. 926–74/1520–66) in particular. While these writers present an idealised picture of the Süleymanic period and an over-simple explanation of the subsequent ‘decline’, they were undoubtedly right to highlight the contrast between past and present.

The most striking contrast was perhaps in the sultanate itself. Since the dynasty’s inception, the primary function of the sultan, at least in the eyes of his subjects, had been as a leader in war. The sultans down to Süleyman, with the partial exception of Bâyezîd II whom his subjects criticised for his failure to lead his armies, had all been war leaders. Süleyman himself, by dying on the battlefield, achieved the double distinction of ‘ghâzî and martyr’. From the time of Selîm II, the sultans relinquished this role. Ottoman subjects, however, continued to regard the presence of the sultan on the battlefield as having a totemic significance. It was for this reason that the remedy for the military disasters of 1003f./1595 was found in insisting that the sultan, Meḥmed III, accompany the army to Hungary in the following year, and the presence of the sultan on the battlefield was seen as the cause of the victories of 1005/1596. ‘If, after this’, commented the chronicler İbrahîm Pechevi, ‘our sultan had
been brought to Buda, all the border fortresses would have been abandoned and would have passed under the control of the Muslims. If he had spent the winter in Belgrade and said: “Our goal is Vienna,” it is certain that the Austrian infidels … would have been subjected to tribute.”

The sultan’s loss of a military role after the mid-tenth/sixteenth century reflected in part the personalities of the sultans who succeeded Süleyman but, more significantly, it reflected a change in the nature of warfare and in the political structure of the empire. Until the mid-century, military campaigns had normally lasted a year: Süleyman’s campaign against the Safavids between 939/1533 and 943/1534 had been as much a royal progress which served to consolidate Ottoman rule in the territory incorporated into the empire during his father’s reign as it had been a military campaign. It had been normal too for the viziers and the chancellery to accompany the sultan on campaign. In the last decades of the century, however, wars became prolonged, and it was simply not practical for the sultan and his government to be absent for long periods on frontiers remote from the capital. Furthermore, government had become more complex. The expansion of the empire during the first half of the century had increased the volume of government business, and in these circumstances a peripatetic sultanate was no longer feasible. In another respect, too, the sultanate changed during the course of the century, emphasising a tendency which had already become pronounced at the end of the ninth/fifteenth. This was the withdrawal of the sultan from public view.

Following an assassination attempt in 897/1492, Bāyezīd II had been reluctant to appear in public. This set a precedent for the sultans who followed him, although the presence of Selīm I and Süleyman I among the army on campaign made them more visible than their successors. When, from the time of Selīm II, the sultans no longer went to war, they appeared in public only on ceremonial occasions. At the same time – unless this is simply the impression given by the chance survival of documents – their role in government seems to have changed, the tendency from the time of Murād III (r. 981–1003/1574–95) being to communicate with viziers and other holders of public office by written notes rather than face to face. It was probably in part this increasing invisibility of the sultan that led reform writers of the eleventh/seventeenth century to see the supposed influence on public affairs of favourites in the inner palace as a cause of the empire’s decline, a phenomenon whose beginning they date to the reign of Murād III.

The sultan’s public appearances were not, however, the main determinant of his public image. What would have been more impressive were the institutions which the sultans and other members of the royal family had
founded in the capital and, to a lesser extent, in provincial cities. Of these, the most impressive were the imperial mosques in Istanbul, which, with their associated institutions, dominated the skyline of the old city. Their effect lay not only in the magnificence of the buildings themselves, but also in their location on the city’s hills. This is particularly apparent when looking from the largely Christian town of Galata across the Golden Horn to the largely Muslim city of Istanbul. From the viewpoint of the Galata tower, the mosques of Mehmed II (874f./1470), Bâyezîd II (910f./1505), Selîm I (928/1522), Prince Mehmed, the deceased son of Süleyman I (completed after 949f./1543) and Süleyman I (964/1557) appear, together with the Hagia Sophia (Ayasofya) which was both their architectural and imperial model, to dominate the city from their positions on its hills. Furthermore, from their situation on the radius of the observer’s field of vision, they seem to dominate the Christian enclave of Galata. In this way their location alone symbolises the ascendancy of the Ottoman dynasty, and the ascendancy, through the dynasty, of Islam over infidelity. Other imperial mosques constructed during the tenth/sixteenth century had similar symbolic functions. The mosque of Süleyman’s daughter Mihrîmâh (970s/1560s) dominates a hill near the Edirne gate, and would have been the first sight of the city for travellers, and for armies returning from wars in Europe. Mosques of the second rank in the capital were usually the foundation of viziers or other imperial servants and, again by their siting, could serve to magnify the glory of their masters. Most notably, the mosque of the grand vizier Rüstem Pasha (968/1561) situated in the market of Eminönü below the great mosque of Süleyman I symbolises the relationship between vizier and sultan.

The imperial and vizieral mosques in Istanbul and other Ottoman cities became, during the tenth/sixteenth century, the visible and public symbols of the greatness of the dynasty. The more specific claims not only to dynastic legitimacy but to universal dominion are also evident in the titles which the sultans adopted during the course of the century. Before the tenth/sixteenth century, Ottoman claims to legitimacy were relatively modest. They claimed, first of all, the title of ghâzi, with the connotation of ‘warrior’ or, more specifically, ‘warrior of the faith’. This not only gave the sultans military and religious credentials, but also, by presenting their wars against Christians as jihad, gave them a legal title to the rulership of lands conquered from Christian dynasties. The crystallisation in the late ninth/fifteenth century of a story relating how the last Saljuq sultan appointed the first Ottoman sultan as his legal successor justified the Ottoman claim to be the legitimate rulers of former Saljuq territories in Anatolia. The early ninth/fifteenth century also
saw the creation of a genealogy tracing Ottoman descent in the senior line from Oghuz Khān, the legendary ancestor of the western Turks. This served to ‘prove’ Ottoman superiority over the neighbouring Turkish rulers of Anatolia and Azerbaijan and to nullify Timurid claims to suzerainty over the Ottoman dynasty. Finally the ninth/fifteenth-century Ottoman chroniclers created a series of tales showing how God, through dreams, had promised sovereignty to the dynastic founder, Othmān (Osman), and his descendants. They also, through tales of Othmān’s marriage to a dervish’s daughter, created a spiritual genealogy to match the physical descent from Oghuz Khān.24

These elements conferring legitimacy on the dynasty were drawn from folk tales and popular religion. They remained embedded in Ottoman historiography during the tenth/sixteenth and later centuries but, during the tenth/sixteenth century, became overlaid with more grandiose claims to sovereignty which reflect the changed position of the empire. Three factors encouraged this change. First, Selīm I’s acquisition of the Holy Cities allowed his successors to adopt the title ‘Servant of the Two Holy Sanctuaries’. Second, competition with the Habsburgs led to an inflation in Ottoman claims. Charles V’s election as Holy Roman Emperor in 925/1519 allowed him to assert universal Christian sovereignty and was undoubtedly a stimulus to Süleymān I’s parallel claim, from the 950s/1540s, to the title of caliph, implying universal Islamic sovereignty. From 954/1547, Süleymān also began to describe himself as ‘Caesar’ or ‘breaker of Caesars’, suggesting that, following the 954/1547 treaty, he regarded the imperial Roman title as having passed to the Ottoman dynasty. This remained an important element in Ottoman–Habsburg rivalry during the eleventh/seventeenth century. The Ottoman claim to the caliphate remained in place until the end of the empire’s existence.25 Third, the rise of the Safavids in Iran and their appeal to many of the sultan’s subjects made it essential for the Ottoman dynasty to counter Safavid claims. In addition to the publication of fetwās pronouncing the Safavids to be heretics, the sultans,26 or rather their propagandists and in particular Ebu’l-su’ūd (chief muftī, 952–82/1545–74), asserted that it was only the rule of the Ottoman dynasty that upheld orthodoxy and the sharīʿa against heresy and false belief. From the mid-century the sultan is described as ‘the one who makes smooth the path for the manifest sharīʿa’. It was undoubtedly the threat from the Safavids that made this increasing emphasis on the Ottoman sultan as an enforcer of orthodoxy a matter of urgency, leading to actions such as the decree of 944/1537 requiring the construction of a mosque in every village where none existed and enforcing public prayer, or the elaboration of a spy network to
report on heretical and, above all, pro-Safavid activities. However, the personal piety of some of the sultans, especially of Bāyezīd II and of Sūleymān I, must also have played a role. So too did the growing influence of the ‘ulemā as the empire emerged as the centre of learning in the Sunni Islamic world.

The changing role of the sultan in the government of the empire therefore reflected the changing political situation of the empire, as did the increasingly grandiose public image of the dynasty. At the same time, the internal structure of the dynasty – which affected the politics of the empire at large – changed during the tenth/sixteenth century. One thing, however, which remained constant was the rule that succession to the throne was open to all the sultan’s descendants in the male line. In 918/1512, Selīm I succeeded to the throne after deposing his father in a coup, and subsequently defeating and executing his brothers. In 926/1520, as an only son, Sūleymān I succeeded unopposed. However, his own sons began the succession struggle as soon as the infirmities of their father’s old age became apparent. In 960/1553, Sūleymān executed his son Muṣṭafā on suspicion, presumably, of plotting a coup. The common assumption was that Muṣṭafā’s execution was the result of a conspiracy between Sūleymān’s wife Khurrem, his daughter Mihrimāh and his son-in-law, the grand vizier Rüstem Pasha, to engineer the succession in favour of one of Khurrem’s sons. When Khurrem herself died in 965/1558, the contest for succession between her two sons, Selīm and Bāyezīd, broke out into open warfare. By presenting himself as an obedient son, Selīm gained his father’s support, defeating his brother at Konya in May 966/1559. Bāyezīd escaped to Iran, forcing Sūleymān to open negotiations with Shāh Tahmāsb. It was only in 970/1562 that Tahmāsb, after using the threat which Bāyezīd presented to his father’s throne as a bargaining tool to extract from Sūleymān a permanent treaty of peace and a large sum of money, allowed an Ottoman executioner to enter Bāyezīd’s prison cell and to execute him and his sons.

The execution of Bāyezīd allowed his brother Selīm to succeed unopposed to the throne in 974/1566. It was after Selīm’s death in 981/1574 that the mode of succession, quite accidentally, began to change. Selīm II had one adult son, Murād, who was serving as governor at Maghnisa. His remaining five sons were children. The grand vizier Soqollu Mehmed Pasha therefore summoned the adult Murād as the only viable candidate for the throne. His reign opened with the execution of his five brothers. Like his father, at the time of his death in 1003/1595, Murād III had only one adult son, Meḥmed, again serving as governor in Maghnisa. Meḥmed’s nineteen brothers were still young children or infants, and Meḥmed’s first act as sultan was to order their execution. These
events led to two developments. First, since both Murâd III and Mehmed III were elder sons, their accessions to the throne established a precedent for the informal establishment of primogeniture as the principle of succession in the eleventh/seventeenth century. Second, public revulsion at the massacre of the young princes in 981/1574 and 1003/1595 led to the abandonment of fratricide as the means of securing the throne. However, the basic principles of the succession remained the same throughout the century. The reigning sultan's sons, on reaching the age of puberty, left the capital to serve as governors in the provinces. On their father's death, the succession went to the son who secured the throne and eliminated his brothers. The formal change in the mode of succession came in 1011/1603 with the accession of Ahmed I. The thirteen-year-old Ahmed had not left the palace for a governorship, probably because he was too young, and he did not execute his brother Muştafa. From this time onwards, princes remained in the palace and, following the precedent of Murâd III and Mehmed III, it was normally the eldest that succeeded to the throne.²⁸

The accession of these two sultans as eldest sons came about in part through a change in the structure of the imperial family which, in other aspects too, affected the wider politics of the empire. It had been the practice of the dynasty, from the eighth/fourteenth century, to reproduce itself through concubines. It had been customary too to limit each concubine to a single son, with each mother and son forming the centre of a household within the imperial family. In the 940s/1530s, by manumitting and marrying his concubine, Khurrem, Süleymân I broke with this custom. Not only did Süleyman have more than one son by Khurrem, including his successor Selim II and the rebel prince Bâyêzîd, but Khurrem also continued to live in the palace after the departure of her sons to their princely governorships. Selim II and Murâd III each also favoured a single concubine. Selim's favourite, Nûrbânû, produced a single son, Murâd, who was already an adult before Selim, presumably as an insurance for the survival of the dynasty, produced his five other sons through different concubines. His son Murâd followed this pattern. Mehmed, his son by his favourite, Şâfiye, was fully grown before he produced his nineteen other sons in the last years of his reign. Both Nûrbânû and Şâfiye, by outliving their consorts and remaining in the palace during their sons' reigns, became powerful political figures. The English ambassador, Henry Lello, described Şâfiye as 'the Queene mother who wholly ruled the great Turk her sonne'.²⁹ Again this presaged the situation in the following century, when at times the queen mothers became dominant political figures.³⁰
Ottoman government and institutions

The vision of the tenth/sixteenth century as the apogee of Ottoman fortune and as the ‘classical age’ of Ottoman institutions is not entirely fanciful. The mid-century in particular was a period of benign economic conditions, with a growing population, expanding agricultural production and a stable currency. Warfare was profitable, bringing gains in territory and producing slaves and other plunder from which both the troops and the treasury benefited. An annual surplus in the central treasury was a symptom of this state of affairs. Politically, it was the era when the international power of the empire was at its greatest: in the 940s/1530s rulers as distant as the king of France and the sultan of Gujarat looked to Süleyman for alliances. The arts of the period from the mid-century onwards reflect the confidence of power. Of these, architecture was the most visible. It was the imperial architect Sinân (d. 996/1588) who, during the second half of Süleyman’s reign and later, created the mature style of Ottoman architecture, most clearly visible in the mosques of Süleyman in Istanbul and of Selim II in Edirne. The second half of the century also saw the artistic peak of ceramic production at İznik, with the finest products of the İznik kilns made visible to the public in the tile-clad walls of the mosques of Rüstem Pasha (968/1561) and Şoqollu Meḥmed Pasha (979/1571) in Istanbul, both by Sinân. The same period saw the creation of a distinctive Ottoman style in imperial textiles, while manuscript production and miniature painting also flourished, particularly under the patronage of Murâd III. It was during this period too that Ottoman literature achieved its ‘classical’ form, both verse and prose writers having mastered the literary prototypes in Arabic and, especially, Persian. In Islamic education and scholarship, the empire became the centre of the Sunnî Islamic world. The Süleymanic period saw, for example, the completion of two of the classics of Ḥanafî fiqh, the Multaqâ ‘l-Abhûr of İbrâhîm of Aleppo (d. 956/1549) and al-Bahr al-râ’îq by the Egyptian Ibn Nujaym (d. 970/1563).

Another feature of the central decades of the tenth/sixteenth century which, for later generations, heightened the impression of stability and grandeur was the presence of commanding figures in the government, who remained in office for years or even decades. İbrâhîm Pasha, grand vizier from 929/1523 until his execution in 943/1536, was the dominant figure of the first half of Süleyman’s reign; Süleyman’s son-in-law Rüstem Pasha, grand vizier from 956/1549 to 960/1553 and again from 963/1556 until his death in 969/1562, dominated the second half. One of Rüstem’s successors as grand vizier, Şoqollu Meḥmed Pasha, held office from 974/1566 until his assassination in
987/1579. Süleymän’s chancellor (nîşânî) Jelâlzâde Muṣṭafâ, remained in his post from 940/1534 until 964/1557, having already served as head of the chancery clerks (re’îs ül-küttâb) from 931/1525. The most imposing legal figure of the mid-century was Ebu’l-su’ûd, who served as chief muftî from 952/1545 until his death in 982/1574, having already served on the sultan’s imperial council as military judge (qâdî asker) of Rumeli from 943/1537 and as qâdî of Istanbul from 939/1533. These men are remarkable not only for their longevity in office, but also for their role in the development of the institutions of the empire.

It was the apparent corruption of these institutions in the decades after the death of Süleymân I, and especially from the 990s/1580s, that reformers in the first half of the eleventh/seventeenth century saw as the cause of the empire’s declining fortunes. The ‘decline’ was apparent most obviously in lack of success on the battlefield, a rapid turnover in the vizierate and other offices of state, and the regular sale of offices, symptoms of decay which had not been apparent in the days of Süleymân and earlier.

The institution which the eleventh/seventeenth-century reformers, quite justifiably, saw as the basis of Ottoman success was the system of tîmârs, the military fiefs which supported the cavalrymen who made up the larger part of Ottoman armies. The sultan’s private infantry corps, the janissaries, were more famous, but limited in the mid-century to 10,000 to 12,000 men as against 40,000 or so tîmâr-holding cavalrymen. ‘Troops,’ the grand vizier Luṭfî Pasha (held office 946–8/1539–41) remarked with reference to the janissaries, ‘should be few, but they should be excellent.’

A tîmâr was a military fief, consisting usually of one or more villages or parts of villages, together with the surrounding agricultural land and pasture. The tîmâr-holder resided on the tîmâr and had the right to collect a specified parcel of taxes. He did not own the land, which remained at the disposal of the sultan, nor was the fief heritable by his heirs. The sons of tîmâr-holders inherited only the right to a fief, but not specifically to the father’s holding. The tîmâr-holder’s right to collect the taxes from his tîmâr was conditional on the performance of military service. Failure to appear on campaign could result in the loss of the tîmâr. Conversely, a tîmâr-holder could, in recognition of service, receive increases in his income by the allocation of extra lands to those he already held. The tîmâr-holder also had an obligation to provide his own horse, weapons, tent, and a certain number of armed retainers, the exact number being dependent on the yield of his tîmâr. The size of the cavalryman’s holding also determined his ‘rank’ in the army on the battlefield.
Timârs were not the creation of the tenth/sixteenth century. Revocable military fiefs were a feature of the late Byzantine empire and its successor principalities, and both the basic principles of Ottoman fief-holding and the specific terminology of the system suggest that the timâr was a Byzantine inheritance. Similarly, a particular form of timâr, where the income was shared between a cavalryman and a private owner, seems to have been a direct inheritance from the practices of the Anatolian Saljuqs. This form of timâr, which persisted into the tenth/sixteenth century, was peculiar to those parts of the Ottoman empire that, in the pre-Ottoman period, had lain within the borders of the Saljuq domains. The means by which the sultans kept timârs under their control also pre-dated the tenth/sixteenth century. From – probably – the late eighth/fourteenth century, the central government kept land and tax registers for every district (sanjaq), which recorded each timâr within the sanjaq, including the name of the timâr-holder, his estimated annual income and the level of his obligations in providing armed retainers, tents and armour. The practice of making registers continued during the tenth/sixteenth century, but with a further development. From the reign of Bâyezîd II it became the custom to preface the land and tax register of each sanjaq with a law-book (qânûnname), which laid out the rates of taxation applied in the sanjaq, together with other statutes concerning the status of peasants on the land and the rights and obligations of timâr-holders. Criminal statutes also appear in the law-books, since it was the timariots and other fief-holders in the area who were responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the imposition of punishments, and who were also the recipients of fines. The earliest of these local law-books forms the preface to the survey register of the sanjaq of Khûdâvendigâr (Brusa) of 892/1487. From that time, until the late tenth/sixteenth century, the compilation of a new law-book accompanied each new land and tax survey.

The compilation of the law-books represents an attempt to systematise fief-holding and, at the same time, to extend sultanic control. The same tendency is evident in a series of decrees issued during the 940s/1530s, laying down rules to establish the value of timârs to which the sons of existing timariots were entitled, and forbidding governors-general to confiscate timârs without reference to the sultans’s imperial council. At the same time, the procedures for accession to a timâr became very tight. A candidate required an initial decree of entitlement, and then a memorandum from the governor-general of the province nominating him to a vacant timâr. This he or his agent had to take to the land registry in Istanbul, which, after confirming the timâr’s existence and value in the register, would, if satisfied, issue a patent in the sultan’s name.
One purpose of these rules was certainly to extend the sultan’s control over fief-holding, but also to restrict entry into the timar-holding class, a point which Luṭf Pasha emphasises when he writes: ‘If one of the re’aya, having by outstanding service shown himself worthy of a timar, as a special mark of favour becomes a cavalryman, his relatives and his father and mother should not enjoy protection.’ The effect of these restrictions on timar-holding was to create what was in effect a closed military class, and it was to this phenomenon that the eleventh/seventeenth-century reform writers looked back as the recipe for Ottoman success in arms. The truth, however, is probably that the need to restrict entry to the timar-holding class arose from increasing competition for a limited number of vacant timars, rather than from a wish to create the warrior elite of the eleventh/seventeenth-century imagination.

The mid-tenth/sixteenth century also saw another development which affected the perception, if not necessarily the reality of timar-holding. In 948/1541, the sultan annexed the central part of the old kingdom of Hungary to form the new province of Buda, at the same time introducing the timar system into the territory. There was, however, no systematic definition of the principles of the system. The law-books contained innumerable statutes relating to the details of timar-holding, both locally and empire-wide, but nowhere defined its legal basis. When, with the formation of the province of Buda, it became necessary to do so, the task fell to Ebu’l-su’ūd. The document remained the basic statement on Ottoman land law until 1274/1858. Ebu’l-su’ūd distinguished between ownership of the land and ownership of trees and buildings above the land. These were the property of private owners, whereas the land itself was the property of the treasury which, in Islamic legal theory, is the property of the Islamic community. Timar-holders did not, therefore, own the land which made up their fief. Nor did the peasants own the land which they worked, although it was heritable in the male line, so long as it was kept under cultivation. Ebu’l-su’ūd, like Ḥanafi jurists before him, used legal fictions to explain how the land, which in legal theory is a commodity in private ownership, had passed into the ownership of the treasury. A more important legal fiction, however, was his redefinition of the taxes which the peasants paid. In particular, he defined the tithe as kharāj-i muqāṣeme, a proportional tax of up to 50 per cent paid on crops. This redefinition allowed him to refute any claim that tithes levied at a rate of more than one-tenth were excessive. The new definition also in principle gave the sultan or his agents discretion to collect ‘tithes’ at any rate up to 50 per cent. Ebu’l-su’ūd’s work had the effect of systematising the land law which underpinned the timar system while simultaneously giving it an Islamic guise and asserting the control of the sultan.
It was the timār system that in the tenth/sixteenth century and earlier formed the basis of Ottoman provincial government in Anatolia, Rumelia, Syria and parts of Iraq. The function of the system was first to provide cavalrymen for the army, and then to provide a local force for the maintenance of law and order. These functions are reflected in the higher levels of administration. The holders of higher-valued fiefs which, during the tenth/sixteenth century, came to be known as ze‘āmets, functioned as ‘officers’ on the battlefield and also had a police function in the area where they held their fief. The totality of timārs in a particular region formed a sanjaq, whose governor or sanjaq begi was also the commander on the battlefield of the timār-holders in his sanjaq. Similarly, a regional group of sanjaqs formed a province, under the rule of a governor-general or beglerbegi who, on the battlefield, was also commander of the troops from his province. A timār-holder could, through the patronage of his sanjaq governor or other commander, earn increases in the value of his timār, but he could not rise to become a sanjaq governor himself. In a few areas, and especially in eastern Anatolia, where governmental control was weak and local particularism was strong, sanjaq governorships were hereditary. Similarly, in Rumeli the descendants of the powerful marcher lords of the eighth–ninth/fourteenth–fifteenth centuries seem to have retained hereditary rights to sanjaq governorships, although not to specific sanjaqs. However, the sultans preferred, wherever possible, to appoint governors from among the men of non-Muslim origin who had received their education in the palace, and hence had no source of patronage except the sultan. It was by this means that the sultans, in an era of poor communications, could keep control of the empire. Appointment as a sanjaq governor could in its turn lead to appointment as a governor-general, and then to the vizierate, the viziers, like the provincial governors, having both military and civil political functions.37

For most of the century this system worked. When calling up an army for a campaign, the survey registers for each sanjaq allowed the government in Istanbul to know the numbers, obligations and names of timār-holders and, when they arrived at the assembly point under their sanjaq begi, to check their names against a muster register. Documents for the call-up, which exist in numbers for the years after 967/1560, inevitably record delays and other hitches in the procedure, but the overall impression is one of remarkable efficiency. It is from the 990s/1580s that symptoms of the ‘decline’ which the eleventh/seventeenth-century writers lament, begin to appear.

A problem with timār-holding was that, for those with lower-value fiefs, the obligations could be disproportionately high, and it is probably this that explains the appearance of timār-holders as participants in the Shāh Qulu...
rebellion of 917/1511, Prince Ahmed’s attempts in 918/1512 to recruit timariots to his cause by offering them posts in the janissaries, and the willingness of others to join Prince Bâyezid’s rebellion in 965–6/1558–9. In the 990s/1580s, their situation deteriorated. The war with Iran meant prolonged campaigns in difficult terrain, with the obligation to over-winter at the front and, in these circumstances, absenteeism, desertion and mutiny increased.38 It was, however, events on the battlefield during the ‘Long War’ of 1001–15/1593–1606 that caused the major changes. During the conflict, the Ottomans confronted a new form of warfare, in which fixed entrenchments and a combination of pike and shot began to play a major role. In these circumstances, the importance of cavalry, which the timar system supported, diminished, while the use of infantry increased. Faced with this new situation, the Ottoman government expanded the numbers of foot-soldiers by more than doubling the size of the janissary corps and by recruiting volunteers who knew how to use firearms. A way of raising the money to pay these troops was to convert former timar holdings into tax-farms, a logical step given that the demand for cavalry was not as great as in previous eras. This fall in the number of timars in turn affected the structure of provincial government, of which the timar system had formed the base. The full force of the changes did not, however, become apparent until the eleventh/seventeenth century.

The same forces brought about further institutional changes during the same era, particularly in the forms of recruitment into the sultan’s service. Here too the mid tenth/sixteenth century left for later generations the appearance of being a ‘classical age’. The sultans ruled the empire as far as possible through their own household, although not through members of their own family. The rule that any male member of the dynasty in the male line was eligible for the sultanate ensured that each succeeding sultan secured his throne through fratricide. Only the sultan’s sons were entitled to provincial governorships and those who were unsuccessful in the contest for succession would not survive their father’s death. Princes descended in the female line were not, it appears, entitled to office above the rank of sanjak governor. In the absence, therefore, of family members, the sultans employed others who had grown up in the imperial household to fill the highest offices. During the ninth/fifteenth and early tenth/sixteenth centuries many of these were members of former ruling dynasties in the Balkan Peninsula who, by conversion and education at the Ottoman court, became part of the Ottoman ruling establishment. In the early part of the century, the two grand viziers Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha and Duqakinzade Ahmed Pasha were representative of this class. From the eighth/fourteenth century, however, sultans had
employed men who had entered their service as prisoners-of-war or as formerly Christian boys levied within Ottoman territory, mainly but by no means exclusively in the western Balkan Peninsula. Most of these men, after a period as farm labourers in Anatolia and after a craft apprenticeship, entered the janissary corps. Others, however, received an education in the palace. Of these, the men who did not leave the palace to join one of the six elite cavalry corps might eventually ‘graduate’ from palace service to provincial governorships. The most successful might then graduate from the governorship of a sanjak to become governor-general and then vizier. This was the normal pattern of progression to the vizierate after the execution of Îbrahîm Pasha in 943/1536, whom Süleymân had promoted – as was his prerogative – directly to the grand vizierate from his office as page of the Privy Chamber.

Most of the viziers of the tenth/sixteenth century had entered the sultan’s service through the levy of boys. A few such as Jighalazâde Sinân Pasha (d. 1014/1605) had been captives presented to the sultan. The majority of janissary recruits had entered the sultan’s service in the same way, and it was the regularity of the system throughout most of the century that left an impression of classical perfection on later generations. At the end of the century, two factors seem to have produced a change in methods of recruitment. First, during the war in Hungary from 1001/1593 to 1015/1606, in order to adapt to new forms of warfare, the Ottomans needed to increase infantry numbers and one way to do this was to expand the janissary corps. With this expansion, the janissaries no longer formed a military elite and the old method of recruitment broke down. At the same time, the levy lost its importance as a form of recruitment for high office. Another impetus for change was the importance which the empire’s frontier in the Caucasus acquired during the conflict with the Safavids between 986/1578 and 998/1590. The region was the scene of much of the fighting, and an area where both sides sought allies and recruits. It was from the period of this war that men of Caucasian origin began to play a conspicuous role in the governments of both the Ottoman and Safavid empires, and that the Caucasus became a new area of recruitment into the sultan’s service.

During the ninth/fifteenth century, therefore, and even more markedly during the tenth/sixteenth, the military–political offices of sanjak governor, governor-general and vizier became the preserve of men of non-Muslim origin. This was not the case with the other institutions of the empire. Members of the sultan’s scribal service were typically graduates of medreses who, with appropriate patronage, might find a scribal position in a great household and finally in the employment of the sultan’s government.
Similarly, the defterdârs (‘treasurers’) appear to have been Muslims by birth. 
This was an office whose importance increased during the century. In the first 
decade of the century a single treasurer sat on the sultan’s imperial council. By 
the end, there were four, administering the revenues of Anatolia, Rumeli, 
Istanbul and ‘the Danube’. The increased number reflected the pressing need 
to find extra revenue in a period of high inflation, when the treasury was in 
permanent deficit, a reversal of the financial situation in the first half of the 
century. The instances in the last two decades of the century of defterdârs 
receiving appointments as governor-general is also an indication of their 
enhanced status and the urgent need to find extra revenue. Previously these 
positions would have been open only to members of the political–military class.40

Careers in the ‘learned institution’, comprising mainly the judiciary and 
medrese teachers, were also the preserve of men of Muslim birth. The network 
of medreses was the foundation of this system. Although each medrese was an 
independent institution with its own endowment, by the end of the ninth/ 
fifteenth century there was a recognised hierarchy of institutions with the 
Eight Medreses around the Mosque of Mehmed II in Istanbul occupying the 
most prestigious position. After their completion in 964/1557, the medreses 
grouped around the Suleymâniye mosque achieved a status equal with these. 
There is evidence that, during the tenth/sixteenth century Süleyman I and, 
after him, Mehmed III attempted to control the syllabus of the different grades 
of medrese, the grade being determined essentially by the size of the endow-
ment and therefore the salary of the teacher.

The usual career for a medrese graduate was as a medrese teacher or as a 
judge (qādī), appointments to these posts being under the patronage of the two 
military judges (qādī’askers), of Rumeli and Anatolia, who sat on the sultan’s 
imperial council. For most graduates, a career as a teacher would be a series 
of humdrum appointments in the lower-grade medreses, the higher grades 
becoming during the course of the century more and more the preserve of a 
small number of learned families. Similarly, a graduate who opted for a career 
as judge could generally expect a lifetime of small-town appointments, with a 
period out of office between each appointment. The judges were, however, in 
many ways the most important figures in the empire’s administration. Their 
courts not only dealt with legal business requiring arbitration, but also acted as 
notarial offices, recording property sales, marriages, inheritance and other 
mundane but essential business. At the same time, the judges carried out 
administrative tasks on behalf of the sultan. The judges and their courts also 
acted as a counterweight to the executive power of the governors-general, the 
sanjaq governors and other provincial office-holders.
By the tenth/sixteenth century there was a recognised judicial hierarchy, with the judges of the present and former capitals of the empire – Istanbul, Brusa and Edirne – occupying the top ranks. With the conquest of Syria, Egypt and the Hijaz in 922–3/1516–17, the judges of Damascus, Cairo and Mecca came to enjoy the same status. However, a development of the tenth/sixteenth century, which became even more marked in the centuries which followed, was that these positions – the ‘great mollaships’ – became closed to ordinary small-town judges, and became the monopoly of the members of a few learned families, who had previously served as professors at one of the Eight Medreses of Mehemmed II. Towards the end of the century, some small-town judgelships received the designation of ‘great mollaships’ as a way of appeasing disappointed candidates for the highest offices. It was from among the judges of the great cities that the two military judges who sat on the imperial council were chosen.

The appointment to judgeships and professorships in medreses was ultimately at the discretion of the two military judges of Anatolia and Rumeli, but holders of high judicial office had the right to nominate candidates who would wait ‘in attendance’ on one of the military judges in Istanbul until receiving a post. During his tenure of office as military judge of Rumeli between 943/1537 and 952/1545, Ebu'l-su'ûd rationalised the system of appointment, without in any way undermining the principle of patronage, by specifying the number of candidates the holders of particular offices could put forward, and how often.

A striking development of the tenth/sixteenth century was the emergence of the mufti of Istanbul as the senior figure in the Ottoman legal–religious hierarchy. The obscurity of the office in the ninth/fifteenth and early tenth/sixteenth centuries is explained perhaps by the fact that the mufti had no executive power, and no place on the sultan’s council. In Islamic legal theory, however, a mufti, as the intermediary between God’s law and the daily affairs of the world, enjoyed a high status, and this was perhaps a factor in the elevation of the office in the Ottoman empire. However, what was more important was the prestige of two of the office-holders, Kemâlpashazâde (held office 931–40/1525–34) and Ebu'l-su'ûd (held office 952–82/1545–74). Ebu'l-su'ûd in particular was important not only as the empire’s supreme legal authority, but also for his institutional innovations. The most important of the mufti’s daily functions was to issue fetwâs, whether for the sultan, for office-holders or for members of the public, and it was his reorganisation of the fetwa office that allowed the muftis from his own time until the twentieth century CE to issue perhaps a thousand or more fetwâs a day, while allowing the mufti at the same time to participate in the politics of the empire. 

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Law in the Ottoman empire\textsuperscript{42} was pluralistic in that members of each religious community – for example, Orthodox Christians – had the right to settle their communal affairs internally. However, the Islamic courts administering Hanafi law covered all parts of the empire and were open to members of all religions, the cases of both Muslims and non-Muslims being settled according to Islamic law. Muslims did not have a similar right to attend a non-Muslim court. Furthermore, it was these courts that heard all cases that involved Muslims and non-Muslims. In these respects Hanafi law was the dominant system of law throughout the empire, and the records make it clear that the Ottoman population, at least in towns and nearby villages, made extensive use of the courts both for litigation and for notarial purposes. In matters of criminal law and the laws of land tenure and taxation, however, Hanafi law was not in force. This was mainly a reflection of the nature of Hanafi law, whose prescriptions in these areas are largely impractical, and in part a reflection of the fact that in these areas Hanafi law did not, in any case, conform to Ottoman practice. What in reality determined the nature of the laws governing these areas was the timār system, and it was in order to regulate the timār system that the body of secular law known as qānūn emerged, as a customary law, during the late eighth/fourteenth and ninth/fifteenth centuries. The last decade of the ninth/fifteenth century saw the compilation of the first written codes of qānūn, together with the first efforts to bring the statutes applying in different areas of the empire as far as possible into conformity. The production of new recensions and altogether new codes continued throughout the tenth/sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{43} With the changes in the timār system in the early eleventh/seventeenth century, the practice was discontinued, creating in the minds of Ottoman observers the impression of a decline from an ideal legal order.

However, of all the factors which impressed later generations that the tenth/sixteenth century was indeed the Ottoman ‘golden age’, the greatest was its continuing success in arms.\textsuperscript{44} The empire seems to have enjoyed superiority over its rivals in the availability of materials for war. The only items that were in short supply were tin for the casting of bronze cannon, sulphur for the manufacture of gunpowder and, to a lesser degree, hemp for the manufacture of rope needed for the fleet. However, shortages were never critical, and where they occurred imports made up for local deficits. Similarly, the empire had greater reserves of manpower than its enemies, and possessed the administrative resources to mobilise troops for war. For the entire century timār-holding cavalrymen made up the largest body in the army. These men had a contractual obligation to serve the sultan and, in principle at least, the
register books allowed the government to estimate the number of men available at any time and to check whether any individual failed to report for the campaign. Similarly, the information available in the register books on the numbers of households in each district facilitated the levies of men, such as oarsmen for the fleet or the infantrymen known as 'azabs, who served only for the length of a single campaign. The tactical abilities of the Ottomans in the field matched the strength of available resources. Their mastery of field warfare, and in particular the tactic of using cavalry to drive the enemy against the artillery in the fortified centre of the line, led to three crucial victories in the first decades of the century: Chaldiran in 920/1514, Marj Dâbiq in 922/1516 and Mohács in 932/1526. Field battles were, however, relatively infrequent in comparison with sieges. By 906/1500, the Ottoman armies were already masters of siege warfare, the most significant development of the early century being the evolution of siege artillery, from consisting primarily of very large cannon to batteries of small and medium-sized pieces. This followed the pattern which Charles VIII had used so successfully in his invasion of Italy in 899–901/1494–5, and which the Ottomans were to experience first hand at the French siege of Mitylene in 906f./1501. At sea too, the Ottomans successfully adopted the techniques (and limitations) of Mediterranean galley warfare, enabling them by mid-century to dominate the eastern Mediterranean and, by virtue of their suzerainty over Algiers, to make incursions into the west. In the long term, however, the failure to master oceanic navigation in the struggle with the Portuguese and to protect the trade routes through the Gulf and Indian Ocean, was perhaps more significant than success in the Mediterranean. Similarly, the changing patterns of warfare on land were eventually to lead to the Ottoman loss of supremacy over European armies. These, however, were problems whose full impact became apparent only in the succeeding centuries.

Notes
33. Tschudi (ed. and trans.), Das Asafname, 36.
36. Tschudi (ed. and trans.), Das Asafname, 43.
46. Gábor Ágoston, Guns for the sultan: military power and the weapons industry in the Ottoman Empire, Cambridge, 2005.
Marking off the period

In this chapter I shall briefly discuss the relations of the Ottoman rulers with neighbouring potentates and, at much greater length, the empire’s domestic affairs. The latter discussion will highlight politically active households within the ruling group; for not only has this been a favourite research topic during the last thirty years or so, such households were also at the core of many early modern polities from England all the way to Mughal India. Another central theme to historians throughout the early modern world is military change and the political repercussions of the latter. I shall discuss this question in conjunction with another major research topic, namely decentralisation on the one hand and recentralizing measures on the other. A discussion of the attempts by Ottoman authors to master intellectually the new situations that they encountered will conclude our chapter.

At the beginning of the eleventh/seventeenth century the Ottomans were still embroiled in the Long War with the Habsburgs of Vienna. Peace was concluded in 1015/1606, with the Ottomans gaining a few fortresses and both sides exhausted to the point of agreeing to an ambiguous peace treaty. The document issued by the Habsburg chancery stated that, by immediate payment of a lump sum, the emperors would be absolved from future tribute payments for ‘royal’ Hungary. By contrast the document emitted by the Ottoman side stated that this was merely a down payment on the tribute of future years, which was to resume at a later date. As both sides wanted a cessation of hostilities, this arrangement held up until 1073/1663.

On the Iranian border, in 1012/1603 Shâh ‘Abbâs reconquered Tabriz, which had been in the sultans’ hands since 998/1590, and defeated a major Ottoman force near Lake Urmia in 1014/1605. Another event marking the beginning of our
period was the defeat of Janpuladoglu ‘Ali Pasha, the governor of Aleppo, who had rebelled with the intention of forming a state of his own (before 1016/1607). 3 While thus the years between 1011/1603 and 1016/1607 were a time of serious troubles, 1008/1600 itself was not unusual in any way.

In the same vein, no momentous events took place in the year 1214/1800. From the Ottoman historian’s viewpoint, 1188/1774 would have been more meaningful, as this was the date of the peace of Küchük Kaynarja that ended a war with Russia which had turned out disastrously for the Ottomans. Through this peace Tsarina Catherine II for the first time managed to have Russian power in the Balkans and the Black Sea region recognised by treaty; moreover this war and the losses it occasioned resulted in a long-term depression from which the Ottoman economy continued to suffer well into the mid-thirteenth/nineteenth century. 4 1188/1774 thus has, with good reason, been considered to mark the end of a period. Another possibility is 1213/1798, the year in which Napoleon occupied Egypt. But quite apart from the fact that the Napoleonic occupation was so ephemeral, we will here deal with the Ottoman empire in itself, and for that reason a date that has acquired highly contested symbolic connotations to both French and Egyptian authors is best avoided. 5 Last but not least, there is the dethronement of Selim III in 1222/1807, which meant the temporary end of military change, which was only taken up again by Mahmud II (r. 1223/1808–1255/1839) in the early 1240s/mid-1820s. Thus though the year 1214/1800 was situated midway in a chain of highly dramatic events, it does not qualify as ‘unusual’ any more than 1008/1600. But if we choose to regard periodisation as largely a matter of convenience, cutting out a ‘slice’ of two hundred years seems as good a solution as any.

Political relations with the outside world

It is impossible to cover the relations of the Ottoman sultans with their neighbours in just a few pages and I shall select but a small number of issues that to the present author appear to be of special significance. We have come to a better grasp of the implications of the fact that the Ottoman empire maintained relations both to its western and to its eastern neighbours, although throughout, eastern concerns are less well documented. Resident embassies were introduced at the very end of our period, but in the tenth/sixteenth and early eleventh/seventeenth centuries, down to the war over Crete, Ottoman envoys of albeit usually rather low rank appeared in Venice with relative frequency. 6 Other courts came to be visited more often during the twelfth/eighteenth century, presumably because after the disadvantageous peace
treaties of Karlowitz (1110/1699) and Passarowitz (1130/1718) it seemed advisable to observe the international scene, Iran included, more attentively than had been true in the past.

Beginning with the embassy of Yirmisekiz Mehmed Chelebi to France in 1132–4/1720–1 ambassadors were expected to write reports that were preserved in the archives, and after some years official chroniclers might be permitted to include them in their works. As the success of such missions was gauged through the ceremonial with which the ambassador was received at the foreign court in question, such formalities occupy a good deal of space in embassy reports. But apparently ambassadors also were encouraged to report on the success with which they had presented the public image of the sultan, as well as on novelties of possible interest to rulers and viziers back home. Thus French garden culture, libraries on Habsburg territory, poetry sessions at the late Safavid court and new palaces erected by tsars and tsarinas all found their way into ambassadorial reports of the twelfth/eighteenth century.

Throughout the eleventh/seventeenth century, hostilities occurred most often with the Habsburgs, the shahs of Iran, the kings of Poland and the republic of Venice. From hindsight we know that conquering and above all retaining large-scale territories at the expense of the first two rulers was difficult if not impossible; but this was not the perspective of the contemporary Ottoman court. While the Long War, terminated in 1014.f./1606, only netted the sultans a few fortresses, the 1094/1683 siege of Vienna came very close to succeeding, and if it had done so, a new Ottoman province would probably have been carved out of Lower Austria. On the Iranian front the eleventh/seventeenth century commenced with Shâh ʿAbbās I reconquering Baghdad and most of Iraq for the Safavids. But the campaigns conducted by Murâd IV resulted in the old frontiers being re-established, and the resultant treaty of Qasr-i Shirin (1049/1639) delineated a frontier that was to remain normative to the end of our period. On the Polish–Ottoman front the most important gain was the fortress town of Khotin on the Dnestr, long disputed between Poland and the Ottoman vassal principality of Moldavia. In 1085/1674 this town was conquered by the sultan’s armies, and the empire retained this important fortress even after the short-lived (1083–1110/1672–99) province of Kamanicha/Podolia had reverted to Poland. But the major gain was surely Crete, the last important Venetian possession in the eastern Mediterranean, conquered 1055–80/1645–69 and soon ‘Ottomanised’ by the establishment of numerous pious foundations. A Venetian attempt at balancing this loss by the occupation of the Peloponnese (in Ottoman: Mora) failed after just a few years. Th
observers both domestic and foreign commented on ‘Ottoman decline’, medium-level powers even with some outside help typically were not able to defend themselves against a determined Ottoman conqueror.11

In the 1100s/1700s the great novelty was the appearance of the Russian empire as a major contender in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions. In 1121–3/1710–11 tensions over the fate of the Swedish king Charles XII, in exile on Ottoman territory after his defeat in the battle of Paltawa, resulted in an Ottoman–Russian war. While the current prince of Moldavia, the famous scholar and musician Demetrius Cantemir, deserted his overlord the sultan to seek protection from Tsar Peter I, in 1123/1711 the Russian army was encircled by the Ottomans near the River Prut, and the tsar obliged to give up the fortress of Azow and promise not to intervene any further in Polish affairs. Cantemir duly followed the tsar to St Petersburg. In the early 1130s/1720s the imminent collapse of the Safavid dynasty prompted the Russian emperor to intervene in the Caucasus: this campaign was preceded by an agreement with Sultan Ahmed III (r. 1115–43/1703–30).12 Serious Ottoman–Russian conflict was probably avoided by Tsar Peter’s death soon afterwards.

For in northern Iran and in the Caucasus, often but not invariably an Iranian dependency, the Ottoman sultan also had plans for expansion, once Shāh Solṭān Husayn had been driven out of Isfahān by the Afghan invasion (1134/1722) and his successor had ceded the Caspian provinces to Russia. In 1137/1724 the sultan’s armies occupied Tabriz, but the treaty concluded in 1144/1732 restored the city to Nādir Shāh of Iran; in the long run the protracted struggles for the Safavid succession thus did not result in any important territorial gains for the sultans.13

An Ottoman–Habsburg–Venetian war (1126–31/1714–18) lost the Ottomans Belgrade, although they reconquered the Peloponnese; Belgrade was moreover regained in 1151f./1739 and from now on formed the Ottoman border fortress vis-à-vis the Habsburg domains. On the whole, the years between 1130/1718 and 1182/1768 were a period of political and economic recuperation, as the wars of this period, apart from the conflict in western Iran, were relatively short. However, the Ottoman government made only limited and sporadic attempts to catch up with the increased firepower of contemporary European and especially Russian armies.

But in 1182/1768 the first Polish partition was regarded by Ottoman policymakers as a major violation of their own interests and resulted in a declaration of war against Russia, now a much stronger force than in Tsar Peter’s time, as a greater mobilisation of resources had been achieved as a result of the reorganisation effected by Catherine II.14 Russian armies soon occupied
Moldavia and Wallachia, while the anarchy behind the front made it impossible regularly to supply the Ottoman troops. In 1183/1770 a Russian naval detachment landed in Mora and destroyed the Ottoman fleet before the Anatolian port of Çeşme. Peace negotiations, in which the diplomat and ‘political intellectual’ Ahmed Resmi played a major role, proved extremely difficult. The peace of Küchük Kaynarja (1188/1774) allowed Russian ships in the Black Sea, hitherto reserved for the supplies needed by the Ottoman state apparatus and the population of Istanbul. Moreover the sultan was forced to accept the ‘independence’ of the Tatar khans, a move completely unacceptable to the Crimean aristocracy. In the following years the attempts of Khan Shahin Giray, who owed his position to the support of Catherine II, to establish himself as an absolutist ruler under Russian patronage failed, and the tsarina annexed the Crimea in 1197/1783. This was the first Muslim territory the Ottomans were obliged to give up, and a sizeable number of Tatar aristocrats emigrated to the sultans’ territories including even Shahin Giray himself after his dethronement. However, the latter’s numerous enemies soon persuaded ‘Abdülhamid I (r. 1187–1203/1774–89) to have him killed.

Throughout these wars and crises, the Ottoman empire and France had never been opponents. This centuries-long entente was due to the rivalry between the French crown and the Habsburgs which involved a multitude of territories all over Europe. However, the support that the French ruler had unofficially permitted some of his noblemen to give the Venetians in the war over Crete, and even to the Habsburgs in the conflict of 1071–5/1661–4, had for a while resulted in a significant cooling off of relations. Moreover in the mid-twelfth/eighteenth century there occurred a renversement des alliances that now linked France and the Habsburg dominions against England supported by Prussia. This new constellation made the Franco-Ottoman entente appear less necessary to French diplomats, and Ottoman military weakness, apparent in the war of 1182–8/1768–74, must have confirmed this tendency.

After France had lost most of her transatlantic colonies to Britain in the course of the twelfth/eighteenth century, a current within public opinion suggested ‘compensation’ in the eastern Mediterranean region, that is, at Ottoman expense. Against this background there occurred the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, followed by a three-year occupation of this province; French naval weakness then permitted an Ottoman reoccupation. This attack resulted in the first Franco-Ottoman war in history, and thus the upheavals occasioned by the French Revolution and its aftermath also led to a complete
reversal of the accustomed pattern of alliances maintained by the Ottoman sultans.

Throughout the eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries British power and ambitions affected the Ottomans only in a limited fashion: there was occasional friction between the British and the ‘rulers’ of the three North African provinces, who in the Ottoman perspective were merely governors with some claim to autonomy. These potentates generally demanded that European states conclude separate treaties with them in order to be protected from corsair attacks, while otherwise recognising the sultans’ suzerainty. As the British had already acquired their own capitulations by the close of the tenth/sixteenth century, the North African power constellation at times resulted in disputes over the validity and limits of these ‘privileges granted by the sultan’s bounty’ as they were viewed on the Ottoman side. In the twelfth/eighteenth century British naval power greatly increased. But as the Mediterranean had become a relatively minor venue for the commerce of London merchants, this did not affect political relations with the sultans until the Napoleonic invasion. However, many Greek merchants, at this time still Ottoman subjects, in the later twelfth and early thirteenth (later eighteenth) centuries acquired British lettres de marque and thus were able temporarily to eliminate their French commercial competitors from Mediterranean trade. Problems of a different kind resulted from the fact that British consuls and ambassadors, just like their European colleagues, employed numerous local non-Muslims and thus granted them foreign ‘protection’. 

But on the whole the interface of the Ottoman and British empires throughout the twelfth/eighteenth century remained limited. Thus the preponderance of the ‘British connection’ in Ottoman foreign affairs during the following century was not part of a longue durée setup but rather a novel development of the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic periods.

‘Political households’ as building blocks of the Ottoman ruling establishment

While largely informal, politically active households were very powerful organisations, and arguably during this period they surpassed most formally recognised institutions in importance. Such non-royal households had existed in the tenth/sixteenth century as well, yet after 1008/1600 their role grew significantly. For by this time, the Ottoman central government was transferring some of the enormous military expenditure necessitated by the
confrontation with Habsburgs and Safavids away from its own treasury to the responsibility of its provincial governors. These latter dignitaries were now expected to maintain large households with sizeable numbers of armed men to be used for policing and also as auxiliary forces on the battle fronts. Such establishments placed their possessors in advantageous positions when it came to competing for high office, and correspondingly a period in official employment provided opportunities to shore up the relevant dignitaries’ domestic power-bases. Viziers were now often selected from among those administrators with the best-appointed households, and being raised in such a setup, whether as a son, as a free servitor or else as a slave and later freedman became the royal road to political power.

*Mutatis mutandis* the structure of the sultans’ palace was imitated by the heads of lesser households who practised similar methods for inculcating absolute loyalty to themselves. Just like the sultans in Istanbul, twelfth/eighteenth-century Cairo or Baghdad magnates acquired slaves from the Caucasus and the lands further north, who were made to convert to Islam and trained in the use of arms. Such freedmen, with few ties to their natal families or clans, were thrown back upon the loyalty to their owners or former owners, in whose households they might with luck rise to prominence through a hierarchy of domestic offices. In other cases poor but free Albanian migrants were taken into household employment: in such cases, the head of the household demanded the loyalty these mountain-dwellers would otherwise have owed to their clan elders. Yet in quantitative terms long-time members of a given ‘political household’ were often outnumbered by the many armed men hired on a short-term basis only.

How a household, judiciously composed, might serve the political and personal aims of a high dignitary becomes apparent from a recent study of the domestic arrangements of the grand vizier Qara Muṣṭafā Pasha, executed after the failed siege of Vienna. His household, however, remained in place even after his death in 1095/1683 although Muṣṭafā Pasha’s sons – one of whom was later to have a political career – seem to have been quite young at that time. When some of the former grand vizier’s properties were returned to his heirs on condition that the debts of the deceased be paid, it was the senior household officers who sold off possessions and procured the necessary funds. Equally noteworthy is the cosmopolitan makeup of this domestic unit, perhaps assembled by the former grand vizier in order to staff the administration of a future Ottoman province in central Europe. Domestic officers included a German-speaking former Habsburg subject from Tyrol and a Pole, probably of gentlemanly background. The grand vizier’s physician was Alexander...
Maurocordato, who had obtained his doctorate in Padua and also acted as the
translator to the sultan’s council. Another close associate of the grand vizier,
killed before Vienna, was said to be of French background, while one of the
household pages was a Spaniard. Maurocordato apart, all these men had
become Muslims, and all except the Spanish page apparently were loyal
even to the dead vizier’s memory.

The household: an organisation encompassing both
men and women

Households in their political, economic and social dimensions have become a
favourite topic in recent historiography not only because of the role they
played in governing the empire, but also because, in this context, some
information has become available on the activities of elite women; the house-
hold has thus become a privileged site for gender studies, Ottoman style. In
the capital the heads of the most powerful households were often linked to the
dynasty as dāmāds or husbands to imperial princesses. Such a marriage usually
necessitated a restructuring of the dāmād’s household. Not only would the
latter be obliged to support the princess, often much too young to fulfil the
role of a wife, in the style appropriate to her rank; a monogamous life-style
also would be expected, and this would mean divorcing a wife or wives as well
as freeing and marrying off concubines. All this might involve financial losses
and also the breakdown of crucial intra-elite alliances to say nothing of
personal ties, and presumably certain powerful household heads were offered
the position of dāmād for just this reason.

Ewliyâ Chelebi’s accounts give us a few glimpses of what marriage to a
princess might be like, seen from the non-royal husband’s viewpoint; his
relative Melek Ahmed Pasha, at one time grand vizier, was married to Qaya
Sultan, daughter to Murâd IV (r. 1032–49/1623–40). The image drawn by
Ewliyâ is that of a devoted couple. When the princess died in childbirth, her
husband was inconsolable. But nevertheless he was soon obliged by Köprülü
Mehmed Pasha, the current grand vizier, to accept marriage to yet another
princess, this time older and, given the importance of seniority in the Ottoman
castle, higher in rank. In one of the ensuing conflicts between the spouses,
Melek Ahmed Pasha apparently claimed that the marriage had taken place
with but minimal involvement on his part, thus confirming the impression
that such unions might be decided over the heads of the bridegrooms
themselves.
Palace women evidently had even less of a say; and from the testimony of an early eleventh/early eighteenth-century Englishwoman who encountered several such ladies, we know that a former ‘queen’, probably a favourite (khaşşeti) of Sultan Muştafa II (r. 1106–15/1695–1703), was much aggrieved by the fact that the reigning sultan had obliged her to take a husband. This presumably amounted to non-recognition of the woman’s status as a former favourite, as normally the companions of deceased sultans were not expected to remarry. Not that Ahmed III (r. 1115–43/1703–30) had a specific alliance in mind; for the sultana was apparently told to choose her own spouse.23

Just as in aristocratic households throughout Europe, women from powerful non-royal Ottoman households also were frequently married off in such a way as to consolidate the strength of the unit into which they had been born. In late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Egypt, household heads forming part of the elite of former military slaves known as mamlûks often gave their daughters in marriage to high-level functionaries within their own domestic setups. By the mid-1100s/1700s this custom was also taking root among the Mamlûks forming the governing elite in Baghdad.24 Since it was these officers, rather than the sons of the household head, who typically succeeded to their patron’s command, power thus passed from father to son-in-law.25 Moreover the head of a powerful household also oversaw the marriages of the widows of his former retainers, giving them away to other members of his domestic establishment. Thus he retained control of that share in the deceased dignitary’s often substantial fortune which the widow inherited according to Islamic law. Both in Cairo and in Baghdad, the weddings of magnates’ daughters were sumptuously celebrated in public. These festivities provided occasions for the freedmen of the grandees in question, now themselves in charge of powerful households, to conform to the ethical norms of upper-class Ottomans by demonstrating their continuing allegiance to their patrons.

Some women from wealthy households might dispense charity on a major scale.26 In Cairo during the late twelfth/eighteenth and early thirteenth/ nineteenth centuries women from rich Mamlûk backgrounds were very prominent among the people establishing pious foundations. Some of the resources involved were inherited. But certain women also had managed to augment their wealth by astute business dealings. Such activities also allowed ʿĀdile Khâtûn, daughter and wife of powerful mid-twelfth/eighteenth-century provincial governors and herself quite a power-broker, to build two mosques in Baghdad.27 But even among notables of much more modest

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standing, a few women controlled substantial resources and demonstrated their status by augmenting family foundations.

The sultan’s household: universal model and outstanding exception

As we have seen, the sultan’s household provided the model for governors, viziers and religious–juridical scholars (‘ulemā) with an ambition to share in the ruler’s power. However, given the at least theoretically absolute dominance of the sultan, his household also had its peculiarities, often of great political significance. Down to the reign of Sultan Süleyman I (r. 926–74/1520–66) it had been customary for any concubine who bore a surviving son to accompany the young prince to his provincial palace, where the latter was expected to learn the art of governing. However, Süleyman’s wish to keep his spouse with him resulted in the obsolescence of this rule; moreover the latter’s grandson Murād III (r. 982–1003/1574–95) was the last sultan to have received training in the provinces.28 Now confined to the Topkapi palace, several sultans of the early eleventh/seventeenth century either came to the throne as young boys, or else had mental problems. In consequence strong-willed queen mothers such as Kösem and Khadije Turkhan came to exercise virtual regencies, and the political experience of these royal women was often considerable.29

In the early 1000s/1600s courtiers based in the Harem were able to exert considerable influence because the sultans now resided in that part of the palace, rather than among the pages in the Third Court, as had been the case until the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century. For given the absolute inaccessibility of the Harem even for high-level officials, the latter could only confer with the sultan if he chose to come out to them, or if whoever exercised power in the Harem could be persuaded to have him brought out. Therefore viziers could only survive by forming coalitions with palace dignitaries, and ferocious rivalries were fought out over the control of the sultan’s person, especially if the latter was a minor or of diminished responsibility. Before accepting the position of grand vizier (1066/1656) Köprülü Mehmed Pasha coped with this situation by having the queen mother swear that he himself and no other would control access to the ruler’s person.

Eleventh/seventeenth- and twelfth/eighteenth-century sultans were also significantly constrained by palace etiquette. This required that the sultan remain all but immobile at his public appearances, and given the extreme
deference that was shown by court personnel, occasions for normal human interaction were few. Ewliyâ Chelebi, in his youth a page of Murâd IV, reminisced how this young ruler had sought release from these tensions in the company of a few intimates, enjoying sports, horseplay and sometimes rather drastic buffoonery. This behaviour was in dramatic contrast to the fearsome, and indeed often bloodthirsty, comportment of this same ruler in his public capacity. Presumably the lengthy sojourns of the court in Edirne during the later eleventh and early twelfth (late seventeenth) centuries also were connected to the rulers’ desire to escape the palace etiquette in the less formal context of what could be defined as an extended sultanic hunt. Later on, when Ahâmed III was obliged for political reasons to reside in the capital, he spent quite a bit of time in the Bosphorus villas of his daughters and expressed an obvious preference for domestic as opposed to palatial architecture. But during great festivals, such as the circumcision of his sons in 1132/1720, even this ruler became the centre of elaborate court rituals.

Mehmed III (r. 1003–12/1595–1603) and his successors tended to keep their former pages around for considerable periods of time, instead of having them ‘graduate’ from the palace school when still young and appointing them to provincial offices, as had been customary in earlier times. A well-known instance is the life-story of Venetian-born Ghadanfer Agha, chief of the White Eunuchs, who remained in the palace for many years, sponsoring writers and building a handsome school of law and divinity (medrese). He was finally executed as a result of palace infighting. In addition to dignitaries with access to the sultan on account of their official duties, there were also people who had happened to catch the fancy of the ruler and whose relatives were then promoted by him: thus the husband of a court lady was called to Istanbul from a provincial position by Sultan İbrâhîm (r. 1049–58/1640–8) and became the new grand vizier.

For the most part, Ottoman princes in the eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries lived isolated and often quite miserable lives in the section of the palace set aside for them, the so-called ‘cage’ or qafes. In general, their educations were limited to religion and poetry, with no introduction to the future concerns of a ruler; in some cases profound weakness and depression were the long-term results of this mode of life. An exception, at the very end of our period, was the education of Prince Selim, later Selim III (born 1175/1761), son of Muştafa III (r. 1171–87/1757–74). The latter took his son with him to attend meetings of the imperial council as well as military exercises. In a revival of tenth/sixteenth-century customs, the prince was...
also allowed to surround himself with a coterie of young well-educated palace servitors, who came to fill important offices once Selim had ascended the throne. 36

Military men: from prebendaries to janissaries and household-based mercenaries

In the early eleventh/seventeenth century, the mercenary rebellions that had been devastating Anatolia since the 990s/1580s at least, known as the Jelâl uprising, were still in process, although grand vizier Quyuju Murâd Pasha had defeated some of the most important chiefs in 1016/1607. 37 In the perspective of present-day historians, military change was the major reason for this unrest; from the viewpoint of many peasants who became mercenaries, a spate of bad harvests in the years around 1008/1600 must have been the last straw. At this time cavalry financed through tax-allotments or prebends, in other words by predetermined sums of money to be collected from specified revenue sources (timârs), was rapidly losing its earlier importance as the main striking force of the Ottoman army. Now a large musket-wielding infantry took over that crucial role. 38 These infantrymen needed to be paid in cash, thus costing more money than the central treasury possessed. One way of augmenting revenues was to transform timârs, which yielded the central treasury no income, into tax-farms, which regularly brought in hard cash. Costs were cut at the same time by hiring mercenaries (lewend, sekbân) for single campaigns only.

Bands of mercenary irregulars served not only in the armies put together by the Ottoman central administration, but also, as we have seen, as short-term retainers in the households of provincial governors. Mercenaries thus often roamed the countryside searching for someone to hire them. If the band was sufficiently large, it might even be worth the leaders’ while to cause significant disturbances, for this might induce the administration to limit damages by incorporating the relevant band into the regular army. 39 As most mercenaries were anxious to find themselves regular sources of income, in the eleventh/seventeenth century they quite often rebelled in order to achieve parity with the members of the regular army (qul). Or else they might put pressure on the governor who had hired them to resist deposition, in other words to rebel in his turn. As to the leaders of such bands, once incorporated into the military establishment, they often found out that their positions were anything but secure, and some were executed on one pretext or another shortly after having achieved a command upon the frontier.
In the course of the Jelâli rebellions the Ottoman government began to station larger garrisons in provincial cities; these were either sent out from Istanbul or Anatolia or else recruited locally (in Damascus: yerliye). Many soldiers in Cairo and Aleppo were affiliated with the janissaries or gunners’ corps (qul); there was also significant growth in the janissary units stationed in the capital itself. Owing to the treasury’s notorious lack of funds, these men were paid mere pittances, especially as their pay was scarcely adjusted whenever the currency was devalued. As a result, janissaries and other soldiers, many of whom had already made money exploiting the possibilities of the urban market in the tenth/sixteenth century, stepped up these activities; the results often resembled black-marketeering rather than ‘regular’ trade. From Cairo to Vidin on the Danube during the 1000s/1600s and 1100s/1700s artisans joined the military corps in large numbers in order to benefit from tax exemptions. In exchange a percentage of the craftsmen’s estates went into the coffers of the paramilitary units to which the deceased had once belonged. In consequence most military corps came to be urban militias rather than regular soldiers, although a number of these men did regularly join the sultans’ armies.

Those soldiers living in barracks rather than in their own homes developed a strong esprit de corps, strengthened by references to flags and more or less mythical stories. Especially in Istanbul and Cairo this social cohesion permitted them to play an often dominant political role. In the Egyptian setting dominance implied control over provincial resources while in Istanbul the fate of grand viziers and sultans depended on at least minimal acceptance by the local janissaries. For, through their links with the city’s artisans, the soldiers were able to muster forces that the palace guardsmen – even if they remained loyal – were not able to counter. As certain lower-level religious scholars might be willing to throw in their lot with the rebels, such revolts could be legitimated in religious terms without too much difficulty.

Even a bid for political power on the highest level was once attempted by a former mercenary-cum-bandit. After first fleeing from the Habsburg front in Hungary, Yeğen ‘Othmân plundered villages in central Anatolia; ultimately he managed to re-enter the regular army. He rose to be a commander of all mercenaries in the sultan’s service, prudently remaining neutral in the military rebellion that deposed Meḥmed IV. Almost by default he was appointed commander-in-chief by the new sultan Süleymân II (r. 1099–1102/1687–91). Later on, in spite of much opposition – he was suspected of aiming for the grand vizierate – Yeğen ‘Othmân Pasha was sent out to dislodge the Habsburgs from Belgrade. His irregulars sacked Ottoman towns and villages
along the army route until he himself was killed in 1100/1689: this ended the mercenaries’ attempt to dominate the empire.

Military techniques

Once on foreign territory, eleventh/seventeenth-century Ottoman armies tended to concentrate on the conquest of fortresses. Pitched battles were rarer in this period than they had been in the 900s/1500s, and were to become once again in the twelfth/eighteenth century. Shâh ‘Abbâs I of Iran countered this strategy by scorched-earth tactics; the latter even included the destruction of certain strong fortifications on Iranian soil. Given the wide earth-filled walls and trace italienne form of seventeenth-century CE European fortified towns, the Ottoman strategy presupposed specialisation in the under-tunnelling of walls and skilful handling of explosives. The eleventh/seventeenth-century travelogue writer Ewliya ğ Chelebi dwelt at length on the competence of Ottoman soldiers in this branch of the military art, the conquest of Candia (1080/1669) forming a prime example. Explosives experts also showed their mettle in the second siege of Vienna (1094/1683); they had all but destroyed the Carinthia gate when Qara Muṣṭafâ Pasha’s besieging army was routed by the troops of King Jan Sobieski of Poland.

Cannons and handguns were in ample supply and, until the Russo-Ottoman war of 1182–8/1768–74, so was gunpowder. Only at the very end of our period did the foreign experts employed by Selîm III decide that gunpowder produced by horsepower-driven mills was inferior in quality to that produced with the aid of waterpower, and a new-style manufacture was built to accommodate this technology. It has often been claimed that the Ottomans were dependent on outsiders for the manufacture of their weaponry; but hiring outside specialists was standard practice in seventeenth-century CE western and central Europe as well. If weapons experts from Istanbul or Cairo did not operate in Europe, Ottoman gunners were highly sought after in India and southern Asia. Nor is it true that the sultans’ soldiers relied excessively on large unwieldy guns; the latter were manufactured mainly as demonstrations of power, while in battlefield situations commanders relied on small and medium-sized guns just as much as their opponents. The variety of gun types used by Ottoman soldiers, who frequently needed to supply their own weapons, did cause problems, and the same thing applied to the many varieties of gunpowder. But standardisation was an elusive goal for European arms producers as well, for both in western/
central Europe and in the Ottoman empire a multiplicity of small workshops accounted for the bulk of production.48

Before about 1111/1700, the supply system of the sultans’ armies functioned reasonably well by the standards of the time, with taxpayers required to bring grain and fodder to previously determined stopping points. Payment, if it occurred at all, was typically much lower than in the open market, with transportation costs also falling on the producers. When supplies owed by given groups of taxpayers were not needed, the latter were usually charged substantial sums of money instead. After 1182/1768 it was to a large extent the disruption of this system that led to Ottoman defeat by the armies of Tsarina Catherine II, and the resulting attacks by hungry and underpaid soldiers on towns and villages in the line of advance alienated many people who had previously been the sultans’ loyal subjects.

Naval power was less central than it had been in the tenth/sixteenth century, as the major enemies of the Ottomans before 998/1590, namely the Spanish Habsburgs, by now were little interested in carrying on the struggle. Major naval warfare occurred during the early stages of the Veneto-Ottoman war over Crete, when the Venetians instituted a blockade of Istanbul that the Ottoman navy broke only with difficulty, after a fortuitous explosion had destroyed the ship of the Venetian commander; otherwise battles were mainly on land. In the second half of the eleventh/seventeenth century the Ottoman navy, like its Mediterranean counterparts, slowly but surely abandoned war galleys, with their great manoeuvrability but low firepower, in favour of units consisting entirely of sailing ships.49 In the wars of the twelfth/eighteenth century, Ottoman sea power was again of limited significance: best known is a major defeat in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1182–8/1768–74, when before Cheshme, Russian ships virtually annihilated the Ottoman fleet (1183/1770).

Household politics, destabilisation and the ʿulemā–janissary–artisan alliance at the Ottoman centre

Against this background we must view the major domestic events of the times, in other words discuss Ottoman political history. Sultan ʿOthmān II (r. 1027–31/1618–22) apparently intended to form a new corps of provincial soldiers to balance the power of the janissaries in his capital. In any event this intention was attributed to him by the latter soldiers, who rebelled, deposed the young sultan and killed him, thus denying the sacral character of the ruler that had been central to the Ottoman sultanate at least since Meḥmed the
Conqueror (r. 855–86/1451–81). On the other hand the revolt of Abaza Mehmed Pasha (1032/1622), governor of Erzurum in eastern Anatolia, was apparently directed against the janissary-dominated government in Istanbul, with the express intention of avenging the death of ‘Othmān II. For the most part Ottoman chroniclers sided with the qul, describing the young sultan as thoroughly misguided and under the influence of ‘evil councilors’; presumably most of them personally stood to lose, had the plans of ‘Othmān II come to fruition. However a minority, including the well-known author Pechuylu (Pechevi) İbrahim and an anonymous Jewish writer, took the side of Meḥmed Pasha and his supporters.

Murād IV, who instituted a reign of terror in an effort to re-establish central control, sought an alliance with a faction of Istanbul’s lower-level ‘ulemā, the so-called Qaḍīzādeliler. Basing themselves on the teachings of the influential scholar Birgili Meḥmed Efendi, these men demanded the abolition of all customs that had entered the life of the Muslim community since the time of the Prophet Muḥammad and his immediate successors. The Qaḍīzādeliler were particularly hostile to Sufism and dervishes; however, Murād IV generally drew the line when it came to the destruction of dervish lodges. This alliance with the Qaḍīzādeliler seems to have paid considerable dividends in terms of legitimacy – the massive killings ordered by the sultan were often welcomed by contemporary authors, including a Balkan Christian who felt that the sultan had punished the oppressors of his own community. In a modified fashion, the Qaḍīzādeliler ‘ideology’ was taken up again under Meḥmed IV, when Sheyk Wānī was influential in the palace as the ruler’s teacher. This time the Mewlewīs or dervish followers of Mawlānā Jelāliddin Rūmī bore the brunt of official hostility because of their use of music and dance in rituals. It was only Sheyk Wānī’s promotion of the fateful Vienna campaign that ended his political power; although even earlier the hostility of the grand vizier Köprülü Meḥmed Pasha had significantly weakened the influence of the Qaḍīzādeliler.

Köprülü Meḥmed Pasha had taken office in 1066/1656, in the early stages of the war over Crete. He managed to procure a virtual monopoly of power as a result of his success in breaking the Venetian blockade and also by his calculated use of extreme violence against political rivals. His son and successor Faḍl Aḥmed Pasha completed the conquest of Crete and for half a century the Köprülüs maintained the most powerful of vizieral households. However, this position was undermined by Merzifonlu Qara Muṣṭafā Pasha, a son-in-law to the Köprülüs, for having lost Hungary to the Habsburgs after the failed siege of Vienna Qara Muṣṭafā Pasha, as we have seen, was deposed and executed. Presumably in a bid to counter Köprülü power, Muṣṭafā II allowed...
his former tutor Feydullâh, whom he promoted chief of the ‘ulemâ hierarchy (sheykh ül-islâm), to dispense widespread patronage and form one of the great households of the time. Even so, Köprülü power was not easily evinced, and the household continued to produce grand viziers into the early twelfth/eighteenth century.

Opposition against Feydullâh’s over-ambitious household strategies combined with Muştafâ II’s loss of legitimacy following the disadvantageous peace of Karlowitz (1110/1699) to produce a broad coalition against the ruler and his sheykh ül-islâm. In addition, rumours that the capital would be transferred to Edirne worried Istanbul artisans anticipating the loss of their clientele. While Feydullâh’s opponents certainly were concentrated among the religious-cum-legal establishment, his attempts to influence military strategy and tactics meant that he had enemies among the officers as well. Thus an ‘ulemâ–janissary–artisan alliance was formed that brought about the assassination of the sheykh ül-islâm and his eldest son, and later on the deposition of the sultan himself. Having come to the throne as a result of the ‘Edirne event’ (Edirne waq'âst) Ahmed III had to promise that he would make Istanbul his permanent residence, and this fact contributed to the rising power of the bureaucracy during the following decades.

Yet this bureaucracy was not in a position to stabilise the throne: for less than thirty years later, another ‘ulemâ–janissary–artisan alliance brought down Ahmed III and his grand vizier Dâmâd Îbrâhîm Pasha as well. In this instance a planned campaign to Iran that failed to materialise was the focus for dissatisfaction among the petit peuple of Istanbul. According to Ottoman practice, artisans had been ordered to equip some of their colleagues to follow the army on the march, but now it seemed that the money had been squandered for no good reason. In this context the luxury of the court became an issue as well, but the details are not well understood. Discontent may have been exacerbated by the fact that some of the newly introduced luxuries were of foreign origin. Moreover, as the Ottomans were forced to evacuate Tabriz in 1142/1729, it was evident that the sultan’s armies had not been very successful during recent years. Whether these matters were grist for the mill of the descendants of the Qâdîzâdeliler oppositionists of the previous century, who probably had not disappeared from the scene altogether, has not as yet been investigated. As to the soldiers, one of whom led the rebellion and gave it his name (Patrona Khalîl ‘iṣâînî) they may well have been discontented because the war in Iran had not provided them with many opportunities for booty or promotions, but this is also a matter needing further study. From quite a different angle, a contemporary author felt that
The sultan had kept his grand vizier in office for too long; therefore the latter’s competitors had despaired of ever seeing their own turn arrive and thus become inclined to throw in their lot with the rebels.\textsuperscript{61}

Just after the end of our period, in 1222/1807, the Qabaqchi Muṣṭafâ rebellion that brought down Selîm III forms yet another example of the ‘ulema–janissary–artisan alliance in action.\textsuperscript{62} However, in this case the complicity of high-level dignitaries, especially the sheykh ʿil-islâm ʿAtaullâh Efendi and the substitute to the grand vizier (ṣadaret qaṣmaqamî) Köse Mûsâ Pasha, was much more obvious than earlier comparable activities of people within the Ottoman ruling establishment. In 1115/1703 and 1143/1730 it had usually been ‘ulema currently out of office, and not high-level dignitaries, that had been willing to throw in their lot with the rebels.

Sultan Selîm had alienated the janissaries and allied militias by his Nizâm-ı J qed or ‘new model’ army, ultimately designed to replace the established military corps. His supporters were much given to factionalism among themselves, and in addition there were the struggles between adherents of the sultan’s reforms and the opponents of the latter within the ruling establishment. All these factors led to a good deal of street-fighting and arson on the part of the janissaries, and these criminal activities alienated most of Istanbul’s inhabitants from the ruler and his ‘unbeliever-inspired’ novelties. In 1222/1807 a revolt broke out among the janissary auxiliaries; when Selîm III gave in to the mutinying soldiers, ʿAtaullâh Efendi and Köse Mûsâ Pasha encouraged the latter to step up their demands and ultimately press for the replacement of the sultan himself. Sultan Selîm could not bring himself to use the ‘new model’ soldiers to crush the rebellion, which therefore ended with the abolition of the Nizâm-ı J edîd, his own dethronement and the short-lived sultanate of Muṣṭafâ IV (r. 1222–3/1807–8). The deposed ruler was murdered shortly afterwards.\textsuperscript{63}

Forestalling rebellion and limiting social differentiation: sultanic power as it was legitimated in everyday life

It is well known that success in war, especially against the infidels, was a major legitimating factor. Yet in the period under discussion only ʿOthmân II, Murâd IV, Meḥmed IV and Muṣṭafâ II participated in military campaigns. Of these four, only Murâd IV could claim successes that were both significant and long-term; yet whether contemporaries thought that he should have gone to war against the infidels, rather than against Iran, remains unknown. That no ruler
of the twelfth/eighteenth century undertook to play the role of a warrior sultan may have been linked to the fact that by now the fortunes of war were considered too uncertain to risk the empire’s major symbol on the battlefield. By contrast, the flag of the Prophet Muḥammad, perhaps easier to remove and protect, was given increasing prominence; such features also indicate that a sedentary monarch now relied more on symbols and ceremonies than on battles in order to stabilise his rule.

Moreover, quite a few eleventh/seventeenth-century authors believed that another significant means of imperial legitimisation, namely the construction of mosque complexes with their attendant charities, was only permitted to those rulers who could boast major conquests over the infidels. Thus Mehmed III had preferred not to build in his own name even though he had been present at the Ottoman victory of Mező-Keresztes/Hachova against the Habsburgs (1005/1596). After all, the Long War continued throughout his reign, no end was in sight by his death in 1012/1603, and no important territorial gains had as yet been made. The Sultan Ahmmed Mosque (completed 1025/1616) became the subject of public debate for similar reasons, as the young sultan had no claim, however tenuous, to victories over the infidels. However, a religious figure close to the ruler, presumably with the latter’s encouragement, vehemently denied that by initiating such a costly venture Ahmmed I had committed the sin of pride. Instead the author claimed that virtues such as generosity could never be practised to excess, and that the sultan’s bounty should be made visible to his subjects. A certain Ja‘fer Efendi, evidently a member of the entourage of Mi‘mār Mehmed, the architect of the Sultan Ahmmed Mosque, also praised this new building in poetry and prose: the ruler and Mi‘mār Mehmed, his former page, were celebrated for having created an image of paradise on earth, as well as a monument to (so far largely non-existent) victories against the Shi‘ī heretics. Moreover, it was also decided to shore up the Ka‘ba, which by the early eleventh/seventeenth century was in a bad state of repair, by a set of decorated iron braces, and this venture also was well publicised.

Both a lack of funds and concern about public criticism may have prevented Mehmed IV from constructing major charities in his own name, instead of merely allowing his mother to do so; and most other rulers of the eleventh/seventeenth century avoided such large projects altogether. However, after the peace of Passarowitz/Pasarofcha (1130/1718) Ahmmed III not only decided to restore pious foundations that had fallen into disrepair, but also established a new mosque complex, in the name of his mother. Later rulers resumed the custom of founding charities in their own names. Located at the very hub of
the city, the Nuruosmaniye begun by Mahmud I (r. 1143–68/1730–54) and completed by ‘Othman III (r. 1168–71/1754–57) is situated at the entrance to Istanbul’s Grand Bazaar, while the Laleli Mosque founded by Mustafa III can be reached from the business area in a few minutes. Certainly the charities of ‘Abdulhamid I (r. 1188–1203/1774–89) were less lavish, but he also established a pious foundation in the busy district of Eminönü; and in spite of extreme financial stringency his successor Selim III built a substantial mosque complex in the vicinity of his newly built barracks near Uskudar. While public debates about these buildings have not as yet become known it makes sense to assume that twelfth/eighteenth-century sultans believed that the sponsoring of mosques, schools and libraries contributed substantially to their legitimacy.

In the early twelfth/eighteenth century, no attempt was made to present the current sultan Ahmed III as a war hero, even though during his reign there was fighting both on the western and the eastern fronts. Instead the Ottoman ambassador to Iran described his ruler as a wise and indeed a bookish person, who regularly consulted with his officials and spent one day a week in the library he himself had endowed.66 The piety of Ahmed III was demonstrated by the regular lectures on the part of well-known religious-cum-legal scholars that the sultan organised and attended in person, a custom that other rulers of the period followed as well.67

Further away from Istanbul the sultans demonstrated their piety by paying out substantial amounts of money to safeguard the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, for ever since 923/1517 the two Holy Cities of the Hijaz were situated within the Ottoman confines. Public revenues financed the soldiers protecting the caravan, and supplies were sent to the inhabitants of Mecca and Medina from pious foundations in Egypt: these subsidies made it possible for the pilgrims to purchase their needs at affordable prices.68 In addition money and grain were remitted to the Bedouins who nomadised near the hajj routes leading to Cairo and Damascus in exchange for the protection that the latter extended to the pilgrims. However, the payment from Egypt decreased significantly from the late eleventh/seventeenth century onward, as local power-holders appropriated larger shares of the available revenue. In consequence hajjis and candidate hajjis were now more likely to be attacked en route.69 Apart from the physical consequences for the pilgrims themselves, who were robbed and sometimes killed, this situation could also lead to legitimacy crises: for protecting the pilgrimage was one of the major services to the Islamic community from which the Ottoman sultans derived their claim to leadership among the rulers of the Muslim world. There was thus a tendency on the part of Ottoman officialdom to treat Bedouins who attacked
the ḥajj caravans as the archetypal enemies, in other words as unbelievers. By contrast the tribesmen regarded themselves as entitled to attack if they had not been paid the money to which they believed they had a legal claim.

Another way of legitimising the sultan was to show that he was actively concerned with the physical survival of his subjects, especially but not exclusively those of the capital. This could be achieved by publicising the fact that the ruler and also his grand vizier visited the markets in disguise. That this was really practised, and not just dreamt up by chroniclers, is apparent from twelfth/eighteenth-century collections of documents bearing notes in the sultans’ handwriting: ‘Abdülhamid I, Selim III and in the early thirteenth/nineteenth century also Mahmūd II all referred to the deplorable conditions they had personally witnessed in the streets of Istanbul. Typically the rulers in question responded to these experiences in strongly worded commands to their grand viziers demanding that the abuses in question cease forthwith; Mahmūd II also went on inspection tours in his Balkan provinces. If it was impossible actually to improve conditions, at least the government had demonstrated its concern with the problems involved.

Other sultanic orders responded to complaints from modestly placed people such as artisans and students in schools of law and divinity (medrese). Craftsmen might complain about rivalry from competing guilds or about disrespect for traditional standards: often such complaints were not referred back to the qādi’s courts, but were decided by the administration itself. For after about 1163/1750 the latter had a much greater amount of information at its disposal, and evidently believed that it was capable of resolving many local problems without recourse to the men on the spot. As the sultans and their administrations involved themselves only when a complaint had been addressed to them directly, we may conclude that Istanbul’s artisans were not much disturbed by this constant intervention on the part of officials, but to the contrary expected and perhaps even welcomed it. Medrese students petitioned the ruler asking for repairs to the schools in which they were supposed to prepare themselves for careers as judges and teachers; and these petitions, including very mundane details, must have brought results often enough for the stream of complaints to continue with some regularity.

A crucial element in this policy of close sultanic involvement in the lives of the Stambouliotes was the enforcing of price controls, especially but not exclusively in the case of bread. Milling and baking had always been tightly controlled. But supervision seems to have increased in the twelfth/eighteenth century, possibly because Istanbul’s grain supplies so often came
from the Balkans, yet during this period agriculture, especially in Moldavia and Wallachia, was often disrupted by war. In consequence there were veritable famines in the Ottoman capital, particularly during the reign of Selim III. Regulation often involving the sultan in person encompassed even the most insignificant details. State-supervised merchants in charge of importing grain, sea captains commanding ships that carried these food-stuffs to the capital, qādis and adjunct qādis of the Istanbul region, guild elders, millers, bakers, porters and even consumers in general were all supposed to keep watch on one another and bring infractions to the sultan’s notice. In quite a few instances, these people in fact conformed to official expectations.

Given the difficulties so often suffered by the ordinary inhabitants of Istanbul, the growing consumption of the wealthier sectors of urban society during the 1100s/1700s became a source of considerable tension; and once again the sultan’s visible interventions might further the legitimacy of his rule. A quantitative study of this tendency towards growing consumption on the part of the well-to-do has not as yet been undertaken. But a variety of indicators suggest that this was in fact a widespread phenomenon. Surviving rooms from this period, which moreover seem to have belonged to Christian notables not of outstanding power or status, show that money was being spent on the decoration of dwellings, not only by the rich but also by the merely well-to-do. Post-mortem inventories from Brusa (Bursa), featuring silk bedspreads, and velvet cushions and hangings, confirm this impression.

More difficult to pin down is the growing role of fashion among the consumption expenditures of the better-off townsmen and women. But quite obviously the sultans of the twelfth/eighteenth century regarded it as one of their major tasks to enforce the social order (nizām-ı ʿālem), and limiting conspicuous consumption among the empire’s subjects was an integral part of this endeavour. Numerous attempts to regulate clothing, at least insofar it was visible on the street, were promulgated in the twelfth and early thirteenth (eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). Certainly such regulation had not been unknown even in the tenth/sixteenth century; but in the 1100s/1700s these attempts gained a stridency they had not possessed earlier on.

A twelfth/eighteenth-century process of social differentiation among the urban population has been well studied with respect to certain towns of southeastern Europe, and something similar presumably happened in other parts of the Ottoman empire as well. It can be assumed that such differentiation resulted in much dissatisfaction among the petit peuple unable to share in this
novel bounty. That the pavilions adorning the gardens of the pleasure palace of Sultan Ahmmed III were taken down after the latter’s deposition (1143/1730) may indicate a concern on the part of Mahmud I to dissociate himself from the luxurious life that had aroused so much hostility against his predecessor. And yet the luxury of the sultans was not a novelty, and thus in and of itself probably not delegitimising; but wealth flaunted by people of subject status, especially but not exclusively non-Muslims, must have aroused more negative reactions. Given this situation, the sultans appear to have attempted, in some instances at least, to reverse the processes of social differentiation. Financial stringency apart, this may be a reason why, in the twelfth/eighteenth century, we frequently encounter the confiscation of the estates of wealthy subjects, quite openly for no other reason than that the deceased had been wealthy. In earlier periods, such confiscations had been limited to the sultan’s servitors only.

Socio-economic differentiation often involved making money by commerce, and the sultans’ Christian subjects were typically better placed in this respect than their Muslim counterparts, although the twelfth/eighteenth-century decline in Muslim commercial activity has been greatly exaggerated. This situation may explain why Christian and Jewish males were quite often targeted as people whose conspicuous consumption disturbed the social order. Moreover, differently from the luxuries enjoyed by non-Muslim women, those favoured by men could be observed by their neighbours with relative ease. However, even more central to this official attempt – at least – to prevent social differentiation from manifesting itself in public was the clothing of Muslim women. Here attempts to regulate sartorial details were reiterated most frequently, and those women who refused to obey were threatened with dire punishments that often included their menfolk as well.

While relatively little was said about the clothing-related transgressions of non-Muslim women, the edicts relating to female Muslims often linked the social order to the compliance of the latter with official regulations. All this is especially noteworthy as, at the same time, Ottoman princesses gained at least vicarious visibility through the elaborate villas that they inhabited on the shores of the Bosphorus. More studies will be needed before we can explain why Muslim women of the subject class were thus singled out for special treatment. Misogyny is certainly typical of the ideological discourse of patriarchal societies in general, and was shared by twelfth/eighteenth-century Muslims, Christians and Jews, but here more specific considerations may have been at work as well. For reasons that are not as yet well understood,
the discourse on Muslim women, who needed to be kept out of the public eye, played a key role in the legitimisation of twelfth/eighteenth-century sultanic rule.

The bureaucracy: a counterweight to decentralisation?

If our documentation on the Ottoman polity is so much broader than that available on most other empires of the early modern period, this is due to the fact that Istanbul remained the capital over many centuries, with a large sedentary bureaucracy accumulating records through good years and bad. As, unlike Iṣfahān or Delhi, Istanbul was never conquered or destroyed, a fair share of this output has survived: yet the number of studies on the workings of this bureaucracy remains surprisingly limited. Most research concerns the qādīs’ courts and the financial division of the central administration.

It has been suggested that before the mid-nineteenth century CE, the Ottoman bureaucracy was ‘patrimonial’ in the Weberian sense of the term, in other words, it was but imperfectly separated from the ruler’s household and had not yet gained the autonomy it was to acquire in nineteenth-century CE Europe. In addition, the training and professional activity of officials was supposedly oriented towards the workmanlike production of documents, including, for those with intellectual and aesthetic ambitions, the study of literary styles and calligraphy. By contrast, designing policies and seeing to their implementation was not part of the responsibilities of a typical bureaucrat. Whether these were indeed the most salient characteristics of eleventh/seventeenth- and twelfth/eighteenth-century officials, or whether there were other significant aspects to their activity, will remain for future scholars to decide.

In European and North American scholarship there has been considerable debate concerning the degree of separation between the religious–juridical establishment (‘ilmiye) on the one hand, and military–administrative careers on the other. Discussions concerning this issue continue to crop up from time to time. Yet there seems to be a consensus that while career lines certainly existed, and became more highly differentiated with the emergence of the financial administration as a separate service branch in the tenth/sixteenth century, it was quite possible to switch in mid-career, though perhaps less easy in the twelfth/eighteenth century than in earlier times. However, those who moved between services generally advanced less rapidly than those who had...
persevered in one single branch of officialdom, as the historian and littérature Muşafâ ‘Alî found out to his chagrin.\textsuperscript{89}

We still know very little about the way in which the mid-twelfth/eighteenth-century expansion of the Ottoman bureaucracy affected scribal recruitment. Yet there must have been new opportunities opening up; after all, from the 1160s/1750s onwards there was an exponential growth of written records. In this period official responses to queries from the provinces, that previously had been recorded for the empire as a whole in the Registers of Important Affairs (mühimme defterleri) and in the Complaint Registers (shikâyet defterleri), were divided up according to the province (wilâyet) from which the query at issue had originated. For most provinces a new register was begun every few years, which meant that the number of recorded edicts was much greater than ever before. In addition the administration of this period also compiled bulky registers of the sultanic commands in the hands of beneficiaries that the latter had to present for confirmation whenever a new ruler ascended the throne. While confirmation had been practised in earlier centuries as well, the manufacture of the new registers and their use in official business must have kept a sizeable number of scribes very busy. In addition, quite a few new bureaux were opened in the financial sector, presumably to provide a counterweight to the decline in central control that unavoidably accompanied life-time tax-farming. However as the sources for prosopographical studies of twelfth/eighteenth-century scribes have not yet been studied, the relevant changes in employment and promotion patterns are but imperfectly known.

Officials of a particular kind: religious specialists in the service of the sultan

When it came to entering the Ottoman bureaucracy and making a success of one’s career, a certain amount of wealth was essential, as secretaries as well as candidate judges and professors often waited for long periods before obtaining their positions. However, in the eleventh/seventeenth century young men from the provinces were certainly able to make middle- and even upper-level careers for themselves as qâdîs and medrese teachers. While the sons of peasants were rarely recorded, merchants, artisans and especially low-level men of religion such as preachers, prayer leaders and administrators of small pious foundations quite often managed to launch their sons on the career path leading to judgeships and professorial positions. Not that these young men
had an easy time of it however, for they competed against other candidates ‘with the proper connections’ inside the ‘ilmiyə’.90

In the twelfth/eighteenth century ‘rising from the ranks’ apparently became more difficult: in an attempt to control future religious–legal scholars more tightly, the professors of Brusa and Edirne, who hitherto had been able to recommend candidates for appointment, were deprived of that right.91 Now it was necessary for all provincial students who aimed at anything beyond purely local careers to pursue their studies in Istanbul, which placed an additional hurdle in the path of these young men. At the same time the privileges accorded to the sons of high-level members of the juridical and professorial hierarchies were increased; the result was a growing separation of the lower ranks, particularly those working in the provinces, from those few men who controlled appointments. At the same time, top-level judges and professors typically formed close ties to the sultans and their entourages. In terms of the centralisation–decentralisation problematic which forms an important aspect of the historiography of the eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries, this ‘aristocratisation’ of the judicial and professorial hierarchy thus worked for an increase of central control.

Policies practised at the Ottoman centre were often replicated mutatis mutandis in the provinces. Thus Hüsuyn ibn ‘Ali, who made himself autonomous ruler (beg) of Tunis about 1117/1705, ensured the loyalty of local ‘ulema, of whom there existed veritable dynasties, by according them various privileges.92 He also furthered certain local saintly lineages (marabouts), but on the whole Hüsuyn ibn ‘Ali was concerned about the possible independence of the latter from his own government, and therefore preferred the more easily controlled institutions of urban Islam. His nephew and successor ‘Ali Pasha, known to be especially devout, followed the same model, and the ‘ulema of Tunis continued to preach obedience to the begs throughout the twelfth/eighteenth century. However, this attempt at legitimisation sometimes backfired, and rebels might openly challenge the decrees of ‘ulema close to the palace by declaring their activities illicit.93

Somewhat different was the role of Orthodox churchmen subordinate to the ecumenical patriarch in Istanbul. While non-Muslim communities did not as yet possess the highly structured organisation they were to acquire only after 1255/1839, the patriarchs and rabbis were recognised by the Ottoman administration and officially instituted by appointment documents (berâ ’ts). These dignitaries paid dues on behalf on their respective flocks and, in a broad sense, were answerable to the government for the behaviour of the latter.94 In the Orthodox Church bishops often farmed the taxes owed by their
respective congregations. When, because of war or pestilence, bishops were unable to defray the taxes for which they had contracted, priests and congregations might be left to their own devices because their ecclesiastical superior had taken flight.\textsuperscript{95}

Taxes were also a major reason why the state apparatus and Orthodox churchmen both opposed the endeavours of Catholic missionaries. The latter attempted to persuade both Orthodox and Gregorian Armenians to become Catholics, or, failing that, to accept Uniate status, i.e. to recognise the supremacy of the pope while retaining their traditional rituals. From the viewpoint of Orthodox churchmen this distinction was of no significance: for, just like ‘real’ Catholics, Uniates also often refused to pay dues associated with the churches they had abandoned. The Jewish community was less centralised than the Orthodox, as the different customs of Spanish, Portuguese and other immigrant congregations were amalgamated only in the course of time.\textsuperscript{96}

**Provincial qāḍīs as an integrative force**

Recent studies also have focused on the day-to-day operation of the courts, and especially on the complicated interplay between litigation on the local level and complaints to the central authorities.\textsuperscript{97} It has emerged that many people even in the smaller Anatolian towns had a basic understanding of the legal system and thus were able to choose whatever venues best suited their interests. Judicial corruption, of which contemporary writers quite often complained, was not a rare feature, and probably unavoidable since candidates spent long years of waiting in order to obtain rather short-term positions. Some qāḍīs may have helped the contending sides to settle out of court. It was also a recognised tactic for people who had not been able to obtain a favourable judgement from a given qāḍī to ‘try again’ under his successor or else apply to the provincial governor or even the sultan’s council in the capital.\textsuperscript{98} As a result, even though in principle qāḍīs’ courts were supposed to provide rapid justice, it was not unknown to have the same dispute crop up again and again over the years.

Group action was another strategy that could bring benefits even to peasant plaintiffs. In at least some of the courts examined, villagers acting collectively, as opposed to complaining as individuals, typically obtained redress for their grievances.\textsuperscript{99} Community values and judgements were taken very seriously by the courts, and might determine the outcome of a given case even if there was no specific evidence against the accused. However, forcing local
power-holders to abide by the courts’ decisions must often have been a thorny problem.

Judicial activities apart, qādīs also hired adjunts and scribes who functioned as notaries for the numerous sales, money-lending ventures, divorces initiated by the wife, manumissions of slaves and other transactions that were brought before them. Although the Ḥanafī school of Islamic law, to which the Ottomans mostly adhered, privileges oral testimony over written documentation, such records were produced and retained even over centuries. Yet it is still somewhat mysterious how the entries in the qādī registers, which were organised more or less according to date, were actually used by the claimants. We may assume that witnesses testified to having seen the entries in question, but there is very little evidence that this regularly occurred. However, if having transactions recorded in writing had been superfluous, it is unlikely that people would have paid money to have it done; but in fact they applied to the scribes in significant numbers. It has been assumed that entries were meant basically for the information of incoming qādīs, who could thus determine the witnesses they should call, or else as a basis for contestants willing to settle out of court. Further research is surely in order. 100

In addition, separate documents certifying the transaction in question (hüjjet) were issued to the parties involved; these were apparently recognised by qādīs all over the empire. However, this was a matter of courtesy, as no qādī was in a position to give orders to another. 101 If the case was contested in a town that was not the place of issuance, the qādī would probably have regarded the document issued by his colleague that was handed over to him by one of the contestants as equivalent to testimony. 102 Whether he emitted judgement accordingly would then have depended on the evidence presented by the opponent.

This was the legal situation, but apparently this type of contestation was not common, and the acceptance of documents/hüjjets emitted by other qādīs was normal practice. To take an early eleventh/seventeenth-century example: liberated slaves, whenever they left the place in which they were known, needed to carry a hüjjet of manumission in order to avoid arrest as a fugitive. However, if they did present such a document to the court, that seems to have been the end of the matter. We possess the testimony of Johann Wild, a former prisoner-of-war turned petty trader who was shipwrecked on Ottoman territory: destitute, he was even given some money as alms by the Cypriot qādī to whom he presented his manumission document. 103 Or was the case so simple merely because Wild had come to the court of his own accord, and nobody had claimed him as a slave?
Presenting a qādī’s certificate also permitted people who had transferred funds by special financial instruments (polise) to recuperate their money in a distant city.\textsuperscript{104} While other instruments for transferring funds had already been in use from the late ninth/fifteenth century onwards, the polise, which functioned like a modern cheque, was first encountered in the mid-1000s/1600s. These certificates were often used in the economic co-operation of foreign merchants and Ottoman provincial governors. The latter needed to remit important sums of money to Istanbul, which they did not care to risk on the road. On the other hand European merchants often made most of their sales in Istanbul and their purchases in İzmir or Şaydâ; this meant transferring money from the capital to the provinces.\textsuperscript{105} Both sides thus saved money and trouble if the merchant paid the governor’s debts to the treasury while receiving money for local purchases from a provincial finance officer, who acted in the debtor’s name. But the method, which in spite of the disapproval of certain jurists was also used in transactions between two Muslims, could not have worked if the qādīs had not more or less routinely recognised one another’s documents. By this practice judges participated in the financial integration of the empire’s territories.

Qādīs were also the lowest echelon in the Ottoman provincial administration: sultanic commands were typically addressed to provincial governors and qādīs only. While judges in charge of a large area might employ adjuncts whom they could send to the villages to hear, among other matters, disputes arising from landholding, the existence of these low-level functionaries was not often acknowledged in official correspondence. As each sub-province was divided into several qādī districts it is tempting to take the qādī as being of lower status than the district governor. But the career lines of governors and qādīs were quite distinct, and moreover the patronage which they both needed came from entirely different sources: the governor would depend on the sultan’s court and his personal connections to military men and tax-farmers, while the qādī expected preferment from the chief jurist and the army judges (qādī’asker) of Rumelia and Anatolia.\textsuperscript{106} As both governors and qādīs reported directly to Istanbul, there was no hierarchal subordination; more frequently the two officials seem to have served as checks on one another.

Qādīs were involved in the collection of certain dues; they also oversaw the administration of pious foundations located in their districts, as their consent was needed before repairs could be undertaken. In such cases the qādīs received a list of the projected expenses for men and materials, and occasionally had these documents entered into their registers. If the expenditure was of
a certain importance, or if the foundation had been established by a member of the Ottoman dynasty, the local qādi might forward the matter to Istanbul. We also find qādis intervening in the appointment process of sheykhds to certain dervish lodges; however, at least where the Bektashi order was concerned, they were often eclipsed by the sheykhds of the central lodge in Hajibektash near Qurshehir.⁸⁷ In a similar fashion, at least in those provinces close to the Ottoman centre, qādis also had a role to play in the appointment process of guild wardens.⁸⁸ We also find the twelfth/eighteenth-century qādis of Bursa receiving the complaints of guildsmen against their own wardens, and quite often deposing the latter.⁸⁹

Official interventions apart, at least some qādis were property owners in the regions where they held office, and established good contacts with certain provincial dignitaries while making enemies of others. Admittedly qādis were frequently rotated, partly in order to prevent too many local contacts. But lower-level qādis were moved around within limited regions only, and did not, to our knowledge, typically get transferred for example from Erzurum to Bosnia. As a result, a qādi in charge of a complicated case might confer with former colleagues who were now living in retirement not far from the places where they had officiated in the past.⁹⁰ In the provinces former qādis and sons of qādis thus often formed part of the local notability.

Tax-farming: squeezing the sultans’ subjects, spreading power and holding the empire together

For an empire run by bureaucrats and relying on a mercenary army, obtaining the necessary cash was a central concern. It can be assumed with good reason, but not actually proven, that the use of currency increased throughout the period under investigation. Given the relative decentralisation typical of the 1000s/1600s and 1100s/1700s, moreover, provincial treasuries and taxes collected by governors and locally established tax-farmers gained an importance they had not possessed in the tenth/sixteenth century. After all, if governors were supposed to form well-supplied households, they had to be allotted the necessary wherewithal.

As financing soldiers and administrators through tax assignments (tīmār) had been central to the empire’s functioning in the ninth/fifteenth and tenth/sixteenth centuries, so in the period after 1008/1600 the most significant institution was tax-farming (iltizām). A tax-farmer contracted to deliver a sum of money agreed upon in advance; this meant that when he received dues in kind, he had to see to their sale. If he collected more than he needed
to deliver, he made a profit; if by contrast there was a shortfall, he had to make up the difference. To ensure that salt, alum and other goods in the hands of a tax-farmer soon left his store-houses some of the local inhabitants might be forced to buy set quantities of these goods at monopoly prices. Throughout most of the eleventh/seventeenth century revenue sources including dues paid by villagers and urbanites, but also state monopolies such as copper or alum mines, were farmed out to the highest bidder, typically for three years. But if, at any point in time, another applicant tended a higher bid the tax-farmer (mültezim) had to relinquish the revenue source he was exploiting or else consent to top the best outside offer. Tax-farmers who did not honour their commitments faced imprisonment or even execution.

From the central administration’s viewpoint, this system had the advantage of providing a relative guarantee that revenues would continuously flow in at least under normal conditions; for when there was a really major catastrophe, the mültezim might attempt to obtain a rebate; with what success depended on circumstances. An obvious disadvantage to both the government and the taxpayers was the fact that large sums of money were levied but never reached the treasury. Moreover, owing to the shortness of the contract period, there was no incentive for the tax-farmer who for instance collected a bridge toll actually to keep the bridge in good repair. Even in the case of serious abuse against the taxpayers, government authorities were often rather lenient to the offender, as long as he remitted the money contracted for.

During the major crisis generated by the war of 1094–1110/1683–99 against the Habsburgs, the administration attempted to remedy this situation by instituting life-time tax-farms (mālikāne). Ordinary subjects of the empire who had been accepted as mültezims as long as they possessed the necessary funds were not allowed to bid for mālikānes. This arrangement supposedly was meant to extend the state’s protection over its poor subjects, keeping away mere money-grubbers, but in fact it cemented the privileges of high-level functionaries. The basic assumption was that a life-time tax-farmer would avoid killing the goose that laid the golden eggs; but in practice things often worked out differently. High-level dignitaries and palace women who held many mālikānes almost never supervised their revenue sources in person, but employed sub-contractors who did not necessarily hold guaranteed positions and thus had no reason to take long-term considerations very seriously. In addition, tax-farmers had to furnish wealthy guarantors. These were normally money-changers (şarrāf)
who accepted the risks connected with this activity in return for a share in the profits. In a sense these guarantors were the silent partners of the tax-farmers and were well placed to secure their own incomes, obviously at the taxpayer’s expense.\textsuperscript{113}

Life-time tax-farmers paid relatively limited and moreover stable sums of money to the treasury every year, the major payment (\textit{mu’ajjele}) falling due when the revenue source changed hands. \textit{Mu’ajjeles} were determined by open bidding; thus, at least under ideal conditions, the down payment, but not the annual rate, should indicate whether the revenue source in question was increasing in productivity or not.\textsuperscript{114} While in principle the bidding for a vacant \textit{mālikāne} was open to a fairly large group of people, in practice many families of provincial magnates managed to hang on to ‘their’ tax-farms over several generations. Only if such a family was finally removed from power, as happened with some frequency in the early thirteenth/nineteenth century, was the government able to repossess \textit{mālikānes} on a major scale. In this late period an attempt was made to mobilise the resources of people of more limited fortune: these could now purchase shares (\textit{sehim}) in tax-farms that the government had succeeded in repossessing.\textsuperscript{115}

Thus \textit{mālikānes} created significant problems, both for the state and for the taxpayer, and at one point the central administration in fact attempted to abolish them. But recent work has shown that, for the empire’s cohesion, life-time tax-farms were also a positive factor.\textsuperscript{116} After all, if a province were to break away and form an independent principality, none of the possessors of revenue sources, who after all had invested important sums of money, could count on receiving their revenues, unless of course they happened to belong to the newly established ruling family. Thus, whenever a provincial magnate showed inclinations towards setting himself up in a separate principality, he could count on the opposition of competing families, and this allowed the sultan’s government to keep a hold on its provinces even with quite limited military means. It has therefore become clear that decentralisation could be helpful in keeping an empire together, and that twentieth-century CE scholarship has placed too much value on centralisation as a ‘progressive’ and ‘positive’ force.\textsuperscript{117}

Another type of interface between tax collection and politics could be observed at the local level. In the eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth century, revenues were typically assessed not on individuals or villages but on entire provinces, and influential people on this level then distributed (\textit{tewzi}) the load further down the line. This activity was a great opportunity for patronage, and as the gain of one village was the loss of another, tenacious
enmities were created that local power-holders might use in struggles against their rivals.\textsuperscript{118}

**Political initiatives ‘from below’**

Ottoman documentation does not make it very easy to study the mental horizons and political cultures of people outside the elite, and few modern scholars have attempted this task. Normally we are confined to accounts of ‘what happened’ as seen through the eyes of bureaucrats working for the central administration. This is especially true of the Anatolian nomads whom, from the early twelfth/late seventeenth onward, the administration attempted to settle on the land. Differently from neighbouring Iran, tribal units had virtually no representation in the Ottoman capital, and the chieftains leading the latter, while deemed responsible for keeping order among their fellow tribesmen, had no input into policy decisions made in Istanbul. Sultans and viziers thus viewed themselves as rulers of sedentary folk, and nomads were considered problematic subjects because they were difficult to tax and in addition might interfere with the fields and gardens of agriculturalists.

Certainly researchers of the last thirty years have done much to discount the notion of an ‘eternal enmity’ between ‘the desert and the sown’, stressing by contrast the many occasions on which the nomads’ sheep and camels complemented the peasants’ grains and grapes. But it still remains true that Anatolian villagers frequently complained about damages inflicted by the nomads’ livestock, that were all the more serious as the nomads possessed horses and were accustomed to the use of weapons, while peasants were disadvantaged in both respects. In the dry steppe and in areas bordering the desert, villagers were only able to maintain themselves if given support by the central administration, and in a drastic fashion this was attempted in the midst of the political turmoil and financial crisis occasioned by the Austrian war of 1094–1110/1683–99.

The idea was that Turkish-speaking nomads were to be settled in south-eastern Anatolia and today’s northern Iraq, where they would both engage in field agriculture and protect the already established villagers from the incursions of desert Bedouins.\textsuperscript{119} Attempts were made to win tribal elders over to the project, and official searches were undertaken to locate suitable places of settlement. However, the administration badly miscalculated, as sites deemed suitable for military reasons and therefore preferred were often not usable for agriculture. Moreover, nomads during the first phase of settlement tend to lose their animals so fast that they need grants on which to survive until the transition to agriculture is completed, to say nothing of the fact that many
tribesmen and women may not have wished to settle. As no aid was forthcoming, hunger soon forced the new settlers to leave their assigned places, and as they now owned few animals they often had no means of survival other than robbery. The first settlement project thus ended in failure, but throughout the thirteenth/eighteenth century the Ottoman administration made sporadic attempts to settle nomads or at least control their movements.\textsuperscript{120}

Resistance against these projects on the part of the people concerned is well documented. The government reacted by demanding that tribal units make promises that they would remain in or avoid certain places in the future, with the penalty of paying often very large sums of money in case of contravention. For the ‘voice’ of the nomads in these matters, however, all we possess are the poems of so-called folk poets (khalql shā‘irleri). But the use of these texts as historical sources is difficult because the relevant texts are often very hard to date, and can therefore not be related to concrete events. Information about the attitudes of nomads to official settlement projects survives mainly from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries CE.

Another instance of a twelfth/eighteenth-century ‘grassroots’ movement, about which we are relatively well informed, concerned Arab Christians, especially those residing in Aleppo. Against the resistance of the ecumenical patriarch residing in Istanbul, supported by and large by the Ottoman administration, these people opted out of the Orthodox Church and became Catholics. Certainly Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries had long since been proposing to Ottoman Christians the option of becoming Uniates, and the Maronites of the Lebanese mountain were already in communion with Rome long before the Ottomans appeared in the area. But the Orthodox inhabitants of Aleppo only became interested in this project by the twelfth/eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{121} Several factors were involved: in the twelfth/eighteenth century the Orthodox Church tended to become more ‘Greek’, in the sense that non-Greek clerics now had few chances of advancement, a situation highly unsatisfactory to the Arabophone community of Aleppo. The leaders of the latter desired more autonomy and a greater voice in church affairs, and when they negotiated their change of denomination they evidently were in a better bargaining position with respect to the hierarchy of their new church than they had been vis-à-vis the ecumenical patriarchate. In addition, twelfth/eighteenth-century Christian merchants were stepping up their activities in Egypt; and for the cohesion of a ‘trade diaspora’ it made sense to belong to a religion/denomination not otherwise much represented in the host society.\textsuperscript{122}

Belonging to the same church as the French, who were their principal trade partners, must also have been an attraction to Aleppine merchants; but
without the other factors outlined, it is unlikely that the community would have spent so much money and effort on this change.

As another movement initiated by twelfth/eighteenth-century urban non-Muslims, we can describe the attempts of the latter to acquire real – or more often fictitious – positions as translators (dragomans, berâths) to European embassies. From the Ottoman administration’s viewpoint, it was a serious loss of both taxes and prestige to have their non-Muslim subjects ‘opt out’ of the empire without ever leaving the sultans’ territories. Yet repeated prohibitions were not very effective, because foreign consuls and ambassadors wanted the money that Ottoman non-Muslims were willing to pay for these positions and because, even at this late date, large retinues were viewed as sources of prestige. Also the ‘capitulations’ that regulated the presence of foreign subjects on Ottoman soil, and that in the political crises of the twelfth/eighteenth century more and more assumed the character of ‘unequal treaties’, made it very difficult for Ottoman administrators to proceed against both bona fide and fictitious foreign subjects. From the perspective of well-to-do Christians and Jews, by contrast, to become foreign subjects meant protection from the tax-farmers who in the later twelfth/eighteenth century tended to make the lives of trading and producing Ottoman subjects extremely difficult. Towards the end of our period certain sultans therefore issued privileges to both Muslim and non-Muslim traders intended to make allegiance to a foreign ruler less attractive; however, this seems to have been a case of ‘too little too late’. Thus the problem continued well beyond the period concerning us here, and only ended with the abrogation of the capitulations during the First World War.

Attempts to master new situations intellectually: the role of political debate

Ottoman political reflection, previously for the most part implicit in historical writings, came into its own during the later tenth/sixteenth century. A format for writing on state problems was the so-called ‘mirrors of princes’ in the Iranian tradition that long before Ottoman times already had been rendered familiar to Turkic-speaking literati through adaptations and translations. These works contained maxims of statecraft including variants of the so-called circle of equity, which proposed that rulers could maintain themselves only if they possessed strong armies. As to the latter, they could be financed only if the subjects paid their taxes, and this in turn was predicated on treating the latter with justice (‘adâlet). Justice was thus regarded as a key value, which could be defined in Islamic terms as adhering closely to religious
law (sheri‘at). But it was also admitted that certain non-Muslim rulers had been able to perpetuate their rule by exercising justice vis-à-vis their subjects.

On the other hand the flurry of eleventh/seventeenth-century advice literature was closely linked to the manner in which Ottoman officials and ex-officials evaluated the situation of the empire, once great conquests had become more difficult and the period of great warrior-sultans receded into the past. Especially the financial crisis of the early 990s/mid-1580s and the accompanying devaluation seem to have encouraged certain officials to think that they were now engulfed by an overall decline. These lamentations were taken at face value by modern historians until quite recently. But now the factional divisions within officialdom have become better known, and we understand that, given this situation, it made sense to emphasise ‘decline’ if one had ‘remedies’ to offer and needed to convince the ruler. Moreover the laudatio temporis acti was after all a conventional and powerful trope: this was driven home with special clarity when it emerged that one of the sons of Bâyezîd II, who lived in the expansive environment of the early tenth/sixteenth century, also complained about the decline of the age.

Financial and/or economic problems were also targeted. Thus an Ottoman chronicler of the early eleventh/seventeenth century participated in the
debate whether the sultans and their officials should participate in commerce or whether their tax privileges would result in unfair competition and thus prevent ‘ordinary’ traders from making the profits which would allow them to defray their taxes. Frequently the sale of offices, which coincided with a growing recourse to tax-farming, was singled out for special condemnation, as were the abuses of local administrators such as qādīs, governors and military commanders. In the so-called ‘justice edicts’ (‘adāletnâme) of the late tenth and early eleventh/late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries similar complaints were addressed, so that some of the authors in question may well have modelled their writings on actual bureaucratic correspondence. Certainly this applied to ‘Azīz Efendi, an eleventh/seventeenth-century official in charge of relations with the Kurdish princes on the Iranian frontier, who advised his fellow officials to treat these magnates with forbearance. After all, at a time when the armies of Shāh ‘Abbās were making progress in Iraq and elsewhere, the Kurdish princes, for the most part Sunnīs, were an important element of Ottoman frontier defence. In the second half of the twelfth/eighteenth century some Ottoman officials discussed questions of reform and recovery in Islamic terms. Others began to pay less attention to precedent and stressed the realities of their own times. In this context the ‘circle of equity’ apparently lost its previous normative force. Ahmed Resmî referred to the lifespan of empires as conceptualised by the North African historian and social philosopher Ibn Khaldūn (732–84/1332–82) in order to justify his own radical critique. Similarly to many of his predecessors, he considered the Ottoman empire to be in its ‘decline phase’ according to the model devised by Ibn Khaldūn, and he stressed that therefore it was imperative to avoid military adventures. Going yet a step further, Ahmed Resmî discussed several sovereigns, by no means all governing empires ‘in a state of decline’, who in his opinion had overestimated their own powers and thus spent their subjects’ resources to no good purpose; their number included Süleymān the Magnificent, otherwise a paragon of sultanic virtue. Acting in conformity to one’s own possibilities was thus espoused as a major political value in itself.

Given the traditional pattern of sultanic legitimisation that had assumed a ruler who constantly enlarged the realm of Islam through his victories against the infidel, such an overriding concern with feasibility in the here and now led to major political problems. After all Mehmed IV and Muṣṭafā II had apparently been deposed mainly because of their glaring military defeats. In consequence late twelfth/eighteenth-century authors disagreed on the question to what extent military strategies and forms of organisation could be
borrowed from the infidels without endangering the sultans’ legitimacy. Some writers claimed that recourse to the traditional virtues of the Ottoman army would suffice to turn the tide.¹³⁶ Others advocated the inclusion of individual borrowed novelties into the military system as it then existed; such a strategy obviously facilitated legitimisation. More difficult from a political viewpoint was the position of the ‘radicals’ who advocated a wholesale revamping of the Ottoman military machine according to European models. But at least until the final crisis that terminated his reign, they possessed the support of Sultan Selim III, who instituted his ‘new model’ army in response to their recommendations.

Regenerating the army was so difficult because of the limited financial means at the disposal of the central government. This situation explains why after about 1183/1770 writers such as Süleymān Penâh Efendi and Râghb Efendi discussed tax reform as a prerequisite for military revival.¹³⁷ Süleymān Penâh pointed out that local power structures including the qâdîs had acquired a vested interest in over taxing the subjects and suggested that a new central bureaucracy should take over collection. Paying for local expenditures by means of local levies (tewzî), that cornerstone of financial administration during the eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries, was to be abolished. But probably since the author knew that such a project could only be realised in the long term, he suggested that for the time being the registers concerning the administration of tax-farms should be made publicly accessible and direct taxation reformed by the preparation of entirely new registers. Some fifty years later, after 1241/1826, Râghb Efendi also suggested an improved mode of registration that would make it more difficult for local notables to obtain exemptions and thus result in a greater degree of justice for the subjects in general. But it was only by the mid-thirteenth/nineteenth century that Ottoman officials adopted the notion of a unified system of taxation applicable to everyone everywhere. This formed part of the greater nineteenth-century CE project of stimulating economic growth by creating a population with uniform rights and duties and differentiated mainly on the basis of property and wealth.¹³⁸

Notes

1. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Virginia Aksan, who has saved me from many infelicities but cannot of course be held responsible for the final result.

29. Ibid. 238 and elsewhere.
35. Ibid. 72–3, 187, 219.
42. El², art. ‘Yegênen ‘Othmân Pasha’ (Hans Georg Majer).
51. İnalcık, ‘Military and fiscal transformation’, 298.
60. Zarinebaf-Shahr, ‘Tabriz under Ottoman rule’.
The Ottoman empire: the age of ‘political households’


70. Ahmet Kal’a et al. (eds.), İstanbul Külliyyatı I, İstanbul Ahkâm Defterleri…. Istanbul, 1997, especially vols. I and VIII.


72. Shaw, Between old and new, 178 and elsewhere.

73. Salih Aynural, İstanbul değişenleri ve finanları, zahire ticareti, Istanbul, 2001, 123.


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84. İsmail Hakki Uzunçarşı, Osmanlı devletinin merkez ve bahriye teşkilâtı, Ankara, 1948, views the entire period as a single block, yet notes the new offices of the twelfth/eighteenth century; Carter V. Findley, Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte 1789–1922, Princeton, 1980; Aksan, An Ottoman statesman.
89. Ibid. 67, 92–5.
93. Ibid. vol. II, p. 22.
94. Steven Runciman, The great church in captivity: A study of the patriarchate of Constantinople from the eve of the Turkish conquest to the Greek War of Independence, Cambridge, 1968.
The Ottoman empire: the age of ‘political households’


97. Ergene, Local court, 44–5.

98. Ibid. 105–7, 176, 187.

99. Ibid. 72.


113. Ibid. 165.


124. Bağısh, Osmanlı ticaretinde gayri Müslümanlar.
135. Abou-El-Haj, ‘Ottoman attitudes toward peace-making’.
138. Ibid. 290.
I4

Egypt and Syria under the Ottomans

BRUCE MASTERS

Introduction

The conquest of Syria in 922/1516 and of Egypt in 923/1517 by Sultan Selim I (r. 917–26/1512–20) decisively altered the balance of power in the Middle East. The elimination of the Mamluk sultanate and the incorporation into the empire of two of Islam’s former imperial capitals, Damascus and Cairo, strengthened the Ottoman dynasty’s position as the champion of Sunnî Islam at a time when their Safavid rivals were establishing Shi’ism as the religion of state in Iran. The sultan’s claim to be the heir apparent of the ‘Abbâsid caliphs was consolidated by the peaceful submission of Medina and Mecca to Selim, following the fall of Cairo. The Muslim character of the Ottoman state was further enhanced by the demographic reality that Muslims had become the overwhelming majority of the sultan’s subjects for perhaps the first time in the empire’s history.

The reduction of Cairo and Damascus to provincial centres administered by a court that was at best forty-five days distant for an imperial messenger diminished their importance on the world stage and no Ottoman sultan after Selim visited either. Yet Cairo was the political heart of the empire’s richest province and Damascus’ position as the starting point for the annual ḥajj caravan was crucial for the maintenance of the Ottoman sultan’s prestige as is demonstrated by one of his imperial titles, the ‘Servitor of the Two Holy Cities’ (khâdim al-ḥaremeyn). Those at court in Istanbul could not be totally indifferent, therefore, to either city’s fate. Damascus and Cairo might hold a less prominent position in the imagined geography of the sultan and his counsellors than the battlefields of central Europe or Iran, but local political elites in Egypt and the Syrian provinces had always to remember in the first three centuries of Ottoman rule that the sultan in Istanbul was the ultimate arbiter of their fates, however remote he might seem to be.
Whether or not Selim’s conquest of Egypt and Syria ushered in a clear break with the political and cultural traditions of the preceding Mamluk era is a matter of ongoing scholarly debate as echoes of Mamluk institutions and culture endured in Egypt until the rise of Mehemet (Muhammad) Ali (d. 1265/1849). The questions of what is the legacy of Ottoman rule over the inhabitants of the Arab provinces and how the Ottoman centuries should be characterised are equally contested. Nationalist Arab historians have generally consigned the Ottoman centuries to their people’s darkest age, with Ottoman imperialism prefiguring later Western imperialism in the region. Although there has been some recent revisionism of this blanket criticism by scholars with Islamist political sympathies, the collective historical memory of Arabs today, as is the case for many in the Balkans, holds that the Ottomans were bad rulers who contributed nothing to the region’s culture and hindered its development in the four centuries they dominated the Arab world.

Other scholars have been more generous to the Ottomans and they have divided the Arab provinces’ history in the early modern period into two distinct phases. Of these, the tenth/sixteenth century is represented as an era of Ottoman political consolidation, economic prosperity and good government that is contrasted to a twelfth/eighteenth century that was marked by a loosening of Ottoman political control in the provinces. In the chaos that ensued, local military strongmen arose who threatened the empire’s continued hold over Egypt and gave the sultans cause to worry almost everywhere. The intervening eleventh/seventeenth century has received much less scholarly attention and is typically characterised as a time of political, economic and cultural stagnation, punctuated by a series of military revolts, none of which seriously challenged the sultan’s authority for long.

Sources

This classification of the Ottoman centuries is a product of the sources that have been used to write the history of the region and is, perhaps, overdue for revision. Until the 1970s, historians of the Ottoman Arab provinces relied almost exclusively on two types of primary sources produced in the empire: local chronicles written in Arabic and European commercial and diplomatic reports that were penned by consuls resident in the region’s port cities and in the inland caravan city of Aleppo. Accounts by European and Ottoman travellers were also mined to add anecdotal colour. The chronicles are an especially important source for writing the history of cities such as Damascus and Cairo to which Europeans sometimes ventured but where they were
seldom in residence. Civic pride compelled individuals living in the Arabic-speaking cities during the Ottoman centuries to record the lives of their notable contemporaries and the events that they considered important.\textsuperscript{4} Political turmoil between contending dynasties led their contemporaries in the Lebanese mountains to do the same. These chroniclers usually were drawn from the ranks of the Muslim educated elite, the ‘ulamā’, but there are extant chronicles written by soldiers, Christians and in one case a barber as well.\textsuperscript{5}

In contrast to this relative richness of local sources in Arabic for the Ottoman period, the inhabitants of the Turkish-speaking cities of Anatolia seem to have been largely reticent in their expression of civic pride and left few literary records of their lives or those of their contemporaries. This paucity of local sources led historians of cities elsewhere in the Ottoman empire to research the archives of the Ottoman central administration and the registers of the Islamic courts before historians of the Arab provinces would do so.\textsuperscript{6} Influenced by the results of their research, historians of the Ottoman Arab provinces began to examine archives in the Middle East in the latter decades of the twentieth century to explore the history of the Ottoman Arab provinces.

Research by André Raymond and Abdul-Karim Rafeq, respectively on Cairo and Damascus, drew attention to the value of the Islamic court records and introduced a generation of scholars to the possibility of employing them to revisit the region’s past.\textsuperscript{7} Studies based on the Islamic court records have highlighted social and economic issues, adding texture to our understanding of how the ordinary people of the Arab provinces lived. The court records have been especially useful in the examination of women’s history, as the male chroniclers were silent as to the conditions of their female relations and European travellers rarely had anything reliable to say about their lives.\textsuperscript{8} They have been equally helpful in documenting the lives of peasants, another category of people who were typically ignored by the chroniclers.\textsuperscript{9}

While the court records have revealed much about the economic and social life in the cities for which they are extant, the role the central government in Istanbul played in the lives of ordinary people in the provinces can sometimes be lost in the richness of detail present in them. Unfortunately, research in the archives of the Ottoman state bureaucracies has not kept pace with the burst of scholarly activity centred on the court records. Several important studies have demonstrated, however, the usefulness of the central state archives in documenting the region’s past and that the Ottoman central government was more aware of conditions in the Arab provinces than the accounts contained in the local chronicles or written by the contemporary European observers might otherwise suggest.\textsuperscript{10}
The implementation of Ottoman rule

The reasons why Selim led his army into Syria in 922/1516 are not entirely clear.\textsuperscript{11} Contemporary Ottoman accounts suggest that the Mamlûks, based in Cairo, were seeking an anti-Ottoman alliance with the Safavid shah in Iran and that Selim launched a pre-emptive strike to forestall that possibility.\textsuperscript{12} All the sources agree that the Mamlûk cavalry was no match for their Ottoman opponents when they met at the field of Marj Dâbiq, outside of Aleppo. Besides their numerical superiority, the Ottoman army consisted of infantry, as well as cavalry, and the former were armed with artillery and harquebuses. The new armaments provided a stunning tactical advantage that the individual bravery of the *mamlûk* warriors could not overcome. Qânsûh al-Ghawrî, the Mamlûk sultan, reportedly died of a heart attack during the battle and his army fled the field. The remnants of the Mamlûk army in Syria offered no serious resistance to Selim, who entered Damascus without a battle.\textsuperscript{13}

According to a story told over a century later to the Ottoman traveller Ewliya Çelebi (d. 1093/1682), Sultan Selim paused in Damascus uncertain as to whether or not he should pursue the Mamlûks to Cairo. In this period of indecision, Muhyî al-Dîn ibn al-`Arabî (d. 638/1240) visited the sultan in a dream and informed him that his tomb in Damascus was in disrepair. The saint then promised that he would deliver Egypt to the sultan in return for the restoration of his resting place.\textsuperscript{14} Whatever the goad, Selim did advance on Egypt, delivering a second major defeat to the Mamlûk cavalry at the battle of Raydâniyya, outside of Cairo, in 923/1517. Later, Selim provided the funds for the refurbishing of the tomb of Ibn al-`Arabî and for the construction of an adjoining mosque to honour the saint in the Sâlihiyya quarter of Damascus.

Selim’s conquest of Syria, Egypt and the Hijâz greatly increased the prestige of the empire and established it as a major obstacle to the expansion of Spanish power in the Mediterranean Sea and that of the Portuguese in the Red Sea. Through his victories, Selim positioned his son, Süleymân (d. 974/1566), to add Iraq and the North African Mediterranean littoral to the Ottoman empire, thereby extending the Ottoman sultan’s nominal control to all the Arabic-speaking lands, except Morocco and the interior of the Arabian Peninsula. The immediate impact of the conquest on the inhabitants of the region was, however, limited. Although Selim was wary of the Mamlûks and executed hundreds of them in both Syria and Egypt, Mamlûk *amîrs* who had switched sides were confirmed as governors with the appointment of Khâyrbak in Cairo and Jânîbîrdî al-Ghazâlî (d. 926/1520) in Damascus.
The retention of former opponents in the governance of the newly won provinces was not unusual for the Ottomans, but it proved to be an unfortunate choice in the case of Damascus. Jānbīrdī al-Ghazālī rose in revolt, upon hearing of the death of Selīm, saying that he had pledged his loyalty to the former sultan alone and not to his son. The potential threat of the revolt diminished, however, when Khāyrbak in Cairo remained loyal to Süleymān and the Ottoman army returned Damascus to the sultan after minor skirmishing. Damascus’ residents did not get off lightly, however, as the Ottoman general, Ferhād Pasha, allowed his troops to pillage the town in retaliation for the revolt. Although he limited the looting to one day only, his treatment of the city did little to enshrine the Ottomans in the collective memory of the city’s inhabitants.

The sultans would appoint men drawn from their own military to the governorships of Aleppo and Damascus following the revolt, and in Cairo after the death of Khayrbak in 928/1522, for the first two centuries of their rule. But in the coastal province based in the city of Tripoli (currently in Lebanon) briefly constituted in 927/1521 and then definitively established after 987/1579, members of the Turcoman Sayfā clan held the post of governor in the late tenth/sixteenth and early eleventh/seventeenth centuries. Local people would also be prominent as governors of the province based in the Lebanese port of Sidon after it was established in 1023/1614. The appointment of Ottomans as governor in the major cities of the Arab provinces was in itself not always foolproof, however, as Muṣṭafā Pasha, who was Sultan Süleymān’s brother-in-law as well as governor of Egypt, rebelled in 930/1524 in an attempt to establish himself as an independent sultan in Cairo. Nevertheless, the appointment of career Ottoman military men to the governorships of Cairo, Damascus and Aleppo provided the sultan with usually loyal eyes and ears.

Aleppo remained under the control of the governor of Damascus in the immediate post-Mamlūk political reconfiguration of provincial politics in Syria. But its governor was independent and deemed the equal of the governor of Damascus by 940/1534. Thereafter, the two main cities of Ottoman Syria had very different political histories, being only briefly united under the same governor at the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century. The provinces governed by both cities were incorporated into the classical Ottoman provincial administration in the aftermath of al-Ghazālī’s revolt. That required a careful survey of the agricultural lands and their subsequent subdivision into viable tax units (timārs). The state then assigned each timār, which might consist of the tax revenues of an entire village and its fields, to a loyal, and often Turkish-speaking, cavalryman (sipāḥi) in return for his
military service. In this way, the state exercised a measure of political control, at least in theory, in the empire’s diverse and scattered villages by quartering loyal cavalymen in each. These provinces were, in turn, subdivided into districts (sanjaqs) with their own military commander (sanjaq begi) who would summon the cavalymen who were assigned lands in his district when needed to serve under the command of the provincial governor.

The application of the conventional Ottoman patterns of provincial governance drew interior Syria more securely into the Ottoman political and cultural orbit than any of the empire’s other Arab provinces. Turkish-speaking Ottomans headed their provincial administrations and these could call on not only the janissaries stationed in provincial capitals but the locally resident sipahi cavalry as well. Egypt also had Ottomans as governors throughout the three centuries of Ottoman rule, but in contrast to Syria its agricultural lands were not surveyed and its revenue sources were farmed out as tax-farms in large units. The tax-farmers were often former mamluks or Bedouins, who provided out-of-pocket funds necessary to hire the provincial cavalry. As such, a variation of the mamluk system survived in Egypt as former mamluks reproduced the system that had recruited them by establishing their own households, either through the importation of new slaves from the Caucasus region or increasingly through the hire of freeborn Muslim mercenaries, usually Turkish-speaking men from Anatolia or the Balkans. These, in turn, might establish their own households if they proved to be successful military entrepreneurs.16

In the process of transforming the former Mamluk territories into Ottoman provinces, the sultans appointed judges from the capital to serve as the chief legal authority in each of the major cities. This constituted a break with the past as the Mamluk amirs had left the interpretation of Holy Law to Arabic-speaking legal scholars who were products of local colleges (madrasas). Whereas the Mamluks had patronised the Shafi’i school of Islamic law, the Ottoman sultans enshrined the Hanafi interpretation, historically preferred by Turkish-speaking peoples, as the law of the land and appointed scholars from the capital to administer it. In addition, the Ottoman sultans were not shy about imposing their own writ, qanun, wherever it did not directly clash with holy law and even sometimes when it did, in the opinion of the more conservative Arab scholars.

With the conquest of Syria and Egypt, the Ottomans became the rulers of a subject people who were unlike any other they had previously encountered. The inhabitants of Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem and Cairo were heirs to a
sophisticated, Muslim urban culture that was almost a thousand years old and which, at times, could be at odds with the Ottoman understanding of their shared faith. This disjuncture between the new rulers and their subjects is evident in the two chroniclers of the transition from Mamlûk to Ottoman rule, Ibn Iyâs of Cairo (d. 930/1524) and Ibn Țûlûn of Damascus (d. 953/1546). Both men were struck by what they viewed as the impiety of Selîm and his army and did not hesitate to label the Ottomans as being ‘bad Muslims’. In part, this reaction was a result of a lack of deference demonstrated by the Ottomans to the Arab religious elites. Unlike the Mamlûks, the Ottoman sultans, if not all of those who served them, had been born as Muslims and were supported by a clergy trained in the madrasas of Anatolia and the Balkans. These did not feel the necessity to defer to their Arabic-speaking colleagues on matters of faith, and that disrespect of local traditions clearly annoyed both authors and coloured how they, in turn, characterised the religious faith of their new rulers.

The question of which version of Islamic law would predominate in the provinces further accentuated the contrast between Syria’s experience under Ottoman rule and that of Egypt. Over the course of the first two centuries of Ottoman rule, the leading ‘ulamâ’ families in Aleppo, Jerusalem and Damascus switched their loyalties from the Shâfi‘î to the Hânafî school of Islamic law. In contrast, Egypt’s Muslim intellectual elite remained loyal to the older dispensation and the Hânafî court in Cairo largely served the Ottomans and Anatolians who were in the city. During the early Ottoman period, the madrasa associated with the al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo emerged as the most important institution of higher learning in the Arabic-speaking provinces. The erudition and pronouncements of its savants were, however, largely irrelevant to the Muslim elites in the capital. Similarly, the Egyptian ‘ulamâ’ were largely indifferent to intellectual currents in Istanbul.

The same could not be said for the Muslim intellectual elites of Syria who were divided as to their allegiances, as some became increasingly drawn to centres of learning in the capital or in Konya and others remained tied by bonds of family and intellectual tradition to Cairo. The degree of ‘Ottomanisation’ of the local culture can also be illustrated by the growth of the popularity of the Mawlawî Sufi order and the cult of Ibn al-‘Arabî among Syria’s Muslim elite. In contrast, the Mawlawî tekke in Cairo tellingly remained largely a curiosity, except for the Ottomans stationed there. This did not mean that Syria’s Muslim elites became completely assimilated into the Ottoman imperial culture, as pride in the Arabic literary tradition
remained strong and Syrian legal scholars only rarely deferred to opinions issued in the capital. Rather the Syrian intellectual elite, much more so than was the case for their contemporaries in Cairo, sought to negotiate a middle ground between a Mamlûk past and their Ottoman present.

Such differences as existed between the two political and religious cultures probably created ambivalence for the sultan’s new subjects over their incorporation into the empire but it spawned little open ethnic tension between rulers and the ruled. Although few Arabs entered the higher ranks of the Ottoman legal establishment or army outside their home provinces before the late nineteenth century CE, Ottoman governors and chief judges usually had local Arabic-speaking deputies. These undoubtedly soothed over most misunderstandings that arose and many of the Ottomans stationed in the Arab lands married the daughters of prominent Muslim families, creating familial bonds with those whom they ruled. Local chroniclers in the first century of Ottoman rule often singled out governors and chief judges both for their good governance and for their ability to speak Arabic. But they also noted the short tenure of office for most who were assigned to their cities and a rapacious governor or judge could quickly follow on the heels of a sagacious one.

Egypt and Syria in the reign of Süleymân

In the centuries following the rule of Süleymân (r. 926–73/1520–66), known in the West as ‘The Magnificent’, nostalgia for the good government that was reputed to have existed under his reign transformed the memory of the tenth/sixteenth century into a ‘golden age’ in the imagination of the succeeding generations of Ottoman historians. The extant historical evidence has so far supported that impression, but it is not clear whether the prosperity that the cities of Syria and Egypt enjoyed after their incorporation into the Ottoman empire was a result of policies the new administration implemented or just good fortune. Peace clearly had benefits for the region and the Ottoman officials were assiduous in negotiating with the Bedouin tribes in both Syria and Egypt to maintain security in the countryside. That peace allowed peasant farmers to extend cultivation into steppe lands that had been abandoned in the early centuries of Muslim rule and for the trade caravans to pass freely between Iraq and the Mediterranean Sea. The extant Ottoman tax records suggest that the population of Syria grew substantially over the course of Süleymân’s reign. Although that conclusion is tentative, it is clear that both Aleppo and Damascus experienced growth in their physical size in the first century of Ottoman rule as new suburbs developed outside the city walls.
There is much less certainty about conditions in Egypt, although Cairo’s physical size, and presumably its population, grew as well.33

The Ottoman elite sought to leave its mark for posterity in all the major cities of Syria through the construction of major religious and secular buildings. This was much less the case for Cairo, where perhaps Ottoman officials were overpowered by the grandeur of the city the Mamluks had handed them. Sultan Süleyman provided the physical imprint of his dynasty on Damascus with the construction of the magnificent mosque on the banks of the Baradā river. Designed in 961/1554 by Sinān (d. 996/1588), it was known by subsequent generations of Damascenes as the Takiyya in a reference to the Sufi zāwīya that was established in its courtyard chambers. Sultan Selim II (974–82/1566–74) added the Madrasa Sālimiya to his father’s mosque and the complex thereafter served as the starting point for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The sultans understood that Damascus held religious significance as the official starting point for the hajj. They therefore sought to impress the pilgrims who would gather in the city with the majesty of the House of ‘Othmān by building a mosque/tekke complex that might rival the city’s other cathedral mosque, the Umayyad Mosque, in its grandeur if not in its religious import. In a similar vein, Süleyman also took pains to rebuild Jerusalem’s city walls and to provide major refurbishing for the Dome of the Rock, in a nod to that city’s place in the spiritual geography of the Muslim faithful; his consort, Khurrem Sultan (d. 965/1558), provided the funds for the construction of an ‘imāret or large public soup kitchen to feed the city’s poor.24

The sultans felt no similar compunction to mark their accession in Aleppo, but the city benefited from the largesse and ambitions of lesser members of the Ottoman political elite. The city’s current or former governors constructed a series of large mosques that were in the by-then classic Ottoman style of flat domes and ‘pencil’ minarets in the tenth/sixteenth century and these permanently altered the city’s skyline. Khusrew Pasha, a former governor in the city who was by then grand vizier, commissioned the first in 951/1544, also from the master Sinān. The mosques constructed in the first century of Ottoman rule in Aleppo remain as a physical testimony to the self-confidence of the Ottomans in the remoulding of the city in their own image, but their importance in the city’s economic history lay in the commercial infrastructure that their founders built to support their upkeep. Khusrew Pasha paid for a qayāriyya consisting of fifty shops, a khān with ninety-five shops, and a covered market street to support his mosque; Duqakinzâde Mehmed Pasha established, around 962/1555, three great caravanserais and two marketplaces to support his ‘Adliyya Mosque.25
The investment in Aleppo’s commercial infrastructure by the Ottoman elite reflected the changing patterns of trade that Egypt and Syria experienced in Süleyman’s ‘golden age’. From the end of the Crusades, Europeans had been trading in the Mamlûk territories for both locally produced commodities and the goods of Asia that had been transported to the port cities of the Levant by caravan. This trend increased with the Ottomans, who were eager for the revenues produced by duties on trade. They extended trading privileges, known in the West as capitulations, not only to Venice, the formerly dominant trading partner of the Mamlûks, but also to merchants from France, England and eventually the Netherlands. By the start of the eleventh/seventeenth century, French and English merchants had largely supplanted the Venetians in the Levant trade, with the English establishing dominance in Aleppo and the French in the coastal cities of Lebanon and Egypt.

The two main centres of trade in the Mamlûk sultanate had been Cairo and Damascus and the commodity prized by European traders in both was pepper. By the end of the tenth/sixteenth century, Portuguese shipping had undercut the cost of transporting that spice by the traditional caravan routes across the Middle East. But trade to the West rebounded with the export of Yemen’s coffee through Egypt and of Iran’s silk through Aleppo. The rise of Aleppo as an international trading emporium came with a corresponding decline in Damascus’ importance to trans-regional commerce. The latter city would remain a major centre of trade within the Middle East, through its association with the hajj caravans, but after the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century it hosted no resident European merchants for three centuries. In contrast, Aleppo flourished in its new role, in no small part because of the investment made by Ottoman governors in its commercial infrastructure. By the end of the tenth/sixteenth century its population had reached an estimated 100,000 souls, surpassing that of its southern rival and establishing it as the third largest city in the empire, after Istanbul and Cairo. In retrospect, whether or not the tenth/sixteenth century constituted a ‘golden age’ depends largely on the perspective of which city’s history one chooses to view it from.

Egypt and Syria in the eleventh/seventeenth century

If the tenth/sixteenth century acquired the patina of a ‘golden age’ in the historical imagination of later generations of Ottomans, the eleventh/seventeenth century, marked as it was by weak sultans and palace intrigues in the capital, was remembered as a period of instability and indecision that
weakened the empire. Not wanting to place the blame for a time of weakness directly on the shoulders of the sultans themselves, later Ottoman historians coined the phrase ‘sultanate of the women’ to define the period, thereby shifting the blame for a perceived decline in the empire’s fortunes to the sultans’ mothers and consorts.27 Although modern historians of the Ottoman past try to avoid characterising the period as one of decline, it is clear that Ottoman institutions were under severe stress, in part because of inflation that in turn brought debasement of the coinage.28

As it became harder for the central state bureaucrats to pay salaries to the increasingly volatile military, they had to arrive at new solutions to pressing problems. Their response was a return to a practice that was already ancient in the Middle East, the conversion of all available sources of revenue into tax-farms. The restraint that the central government could exercise over the tax-farmers was further eroded as the practice shifted from a periodic sale of the tenancies of the tax-farms (iltizâm) to a situation where tenancies could be held for the lifetime of the purchaser (mâlikâne). While this method provided a short-term fix to the sultan’s coffers, it greatly increased the potential for fiscal corruption in the provinces. Many of the tîmârs disappeared in the process, along with the rural stability that they had provided, to be replaced by mâlikânes. Although there were still nominal sipâhîs in Syria in the eleventh/seventeenth century, they rarely appeared when summoned by the governors to war.

The institutions of Ottoman military rule did not change despite these fiscal contractions, however, and that created further problems. Major cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, Jerusalem and Tripoli continued to have janissary garrisons. But local recruits with no bonds of fealty to Istanbul increasingly filled the ranks. As early as 985/1577, an imperial order warned the governor of Damascus that unsuitable locals were registering as janissaries in his city. He was told that if he needed to recruit replacements he should look to the ‘capable, strong and brave, young musketeers from Rûm (Anatolia)’ but he should on all accounts avoid inducting locals or Bedouins.29 In Damascus, the janissaries were divided into two factions known as the yerliye or ‘locals’ and the Qapı Qullar, ‘servants of the Porte’. The latter presumably were originally despatched from Istanbul and had devshirme origins.

The division into two factions within the janissary ranks of Damascus was probably more imagined than real, however. From their patronymics given when janissaries appeared in the court records of Damascus and Aleppo, it is clear that their fathers were more often than not Muslims and they could not, therefore, be products of the devshirme. The Ottoman historian Muṣṭafâ
Na’īmā (d. 1128/1716) was, for example, the son and grandson of janissary officers in his native Aleppo. Many of the janissaries appearing in court did, however, have Turkish or Kurdish names or had nicknames that identified them as coming from Anatolia. Further supporting the hypothesis that the Syrian janissaries of the eleventh/seventeenth century were of Muslim origin but not necessarily Arabic-speaking natives, the quarters of both Aleppo and Damascus in which they lived were typically those inhabited by tribal newcomers: Kurds, Turcomans and Bedouins. Over time, however, their descendants continued to fill the ranks of the corps and established local roots and loyalties, even while maintaining the by-then fictive origins of the two competing factions.

Ottoman authority remained more centralised in Egypt in the eleventh/seventeenth century and its governors enjoyed less room for independent action than in Syria. In addition, Egypt was extremely wealthy; its taxes were one of the main sources of revenue for Istanbul and its rice helped to feed the capital’s population. The sultans could simply not let Egypt devolve out of their control, if at all possible. But even so, the various financial crises experienced by the central Ottoman state in the eleventh/seventeenth centuries had repercussions in Egypt and the nature of its military garrison was changing, even while its outward organisation seemingly remained the same.

The wealth of Egypt encouraged Muslim freebooters from the Balkans and Anatolia to migrate there in search of employment. The recruitment of Muslim mercenaries by provincial governors was an empire-wide phenomenon in the eleventh/seventeenth century, but in Egypt the presence of these armed men did not replace the outward trappings of Egypt’s own ‘peculiar institution’, the mamlūks. Rather, local tax-farmers, who were often Ottoman officials stationed in the province, formed their own households with armed retainers. These were recruited either as mamlūks in the traditional way, i.e. slaves purchased in the Caucasus region, or increasingly as Muslim mercenaries. In many cases, the founder of the household would marry his daughters to those who were in his service, and men so favoured might succeed to head the household when the founder died. Historians have labelled these cohorts as ‘neo-mamlūks’, even though most of the military did not, in fact, have slave origins. But the pull of the Mamlūk past remained very strong in Ottoman Egypt and leaders of the more successful households often established the myth that they were, in fact, of mamlūk origin even when they were not and they were classified as such by the contemporary chroniclers.
Challenges to Ottoman authority: the Jânbüldâds and the Ma‘ns

With growing uncertainty in the empire over whether or not the sultan was actually in command in Istanbul, the military leaders who governed the Syrian provinces in his name in the eleventh/seventeenth century did not always obey direct orders. As such, the representatives of the central state’s interests in the capital had to attempt to balance contending local groups off against each other so that no one emerged to challenge the sultan’s nominal authority. The instability in the military that this balancing act entailed is illustrated by the revolt of Jânbüldâd ‘Alî Pasha (d. 1019/1610) in 1015/1606, the first direct challenge to the continuation of Ottoman rule in Syria since the revolt of Jânbirdî al-Ghazâlî.

The Jânbüldâd family, with their power-base in the market town of Kilis, served as the hereditary chieftains of the Kurds who lived in the Jabal Kurd, a hilly region straddling what is today the frontier between Syria and Turkey. Ḥusayn, ‘Alî’s uncle, had risen to prominence as the defender of the city of Aleppo against the periodic raids that the janissaries stationed in Damascus had launched in the province to collect taxes. Aleppo had at the time no permanent garrison of its own and Ḥusayn rallied his kinsmen and retainers to defend the city and its wealth in 1012/1603 while Naṣûh Pasha, the actual governor, looked on ineffectively from the city’s citadel as the Damascene janissaries ransacked the town. In gratitude, Sultan Ahmed I (1012–26/1603–17) elevated Ḥusayn to the governorship of the province, the first non-Ottoman to be so rewarded.

The relationship between the sultan and the Jânbüldâd clan soured, however, in 1605 when Ḥusayn was called upon to deliver troops in a campaign against Iran. He arrived late on the battlefield of Urûmiyya, where the Ottomans had been defeated, and was executed for treason. ‘Alî raised the clan standard in revolt to avenge his uncle and open warfare erupted in northern Syria and Lebanon as local chieftains weighed whether to stay loyal to the sultan or to back the insurgents. In an attempt to buy time, Sultan Ahmed appointed ‘Alî as Aleppo’s governor while simultaneously raising an army to crush him. The armies met in 1016/1607 and the Jânbüldâd forces were defeated. ‘Alî surrendered soon afterwards and was appointed to a post in remote Wallachia. He was executed for treason in Belgrade in 1019/1610.33

Modern historians have assimilated ‘Alî’s revolt into the broad upsurge in military mutinies, collectively labelled the Jelâlî Revolts, that plagued
Anatolia, starting at the beginning of the eleventh century/end of the sixteenth century and which lasted for several decades.34 But within a Syrian context, the revolt by the Jānbūlād clan represented the testing of the sultan’s authority by armed clans and tribes in the less accessible peripheral regions of the Syrian provinces, whether mountains or desert. For unlike the Jelālīs of Anatolia who were typically armed men looking for employment or plunder, the Jānbūlāds’ success was based on the solidarity and loyalty of their armed kinsmen, and ‘Alī, at least, had more ambitious political dreams as he boasted to European merchants that he would soon be ‘sultan of Syria’.

Given the tribal nature of his political support, Jānbūlād ‘Alī’s revolt could be more readily compared to the troubled relationship that existed between Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʾn (d. 1044/1635) and the Ottoman sultans than to his Jelālī contemporaries in Anatolia. The Maʾn clan held a position analogous to that of the Jānbūlāds in the Jabal al-Kurd in that they were the paramount chieftains and tax-farmers for the Druze region of the Shūf mountains in Lebanon. The Druze country had remained rebellious throughout the tenth/sixteenth century, owing to the mountain redoubts the Druze warriors inhabited and the firearms that they were increasingly acquiring from European traders. But in 993/1585, İbrāhīm Pasha, governor of Egypt, launched a major military operation into the Shūf that succeeded in temporarily disarming the Druze and compelled them to pay the back taxes they owed the sultan. In the aftermath of the campaign, Fakhr al-Dīn emerged as the leader of the Maʾn clan and the dominant political player in the clan-based politics of the Lebanese mountains.

Lebanese historians in the twentieth century CE often lionised Fakhr al-Dīn as the founder of modern Lebanon.35 While it is apparent from the historical record that he was adept at building coalitions between the Druze and Maronite inhabitants of the mountains and in establishing relations with the Europeans, it is not at all clear that he had ambitions to found a nation. Significantly, he never claimed the title of sultan, being content with the traditional title of amīr bestowed on the paramount Druze chieftain. Not daring to dream of independence, Fakhr al-Dīn sought to play various local competitors off against one another while he deftly balanced the interests of the Ottoman state against those of various European parties that were interested in gaining influence in the eastern Mediterranean.

When Jānbūlād ‘Alī rose in revolt, Fakhr al-Dīn sided with him, apparently as a means to eliminate his rival, Yūsuf Sayfā, who was governor of Tripoli. But after Murād Pasha crushed the rebellion in 1016/1607, Fakhr al-Dīn was able to buy his way back into the sultan’s good graces and his son, ‘Alī, was
appointed to head the district of Beirut and Sidon. By 1023/1614, Fakhr al-Dīn had again earned the sultan’s displeasure and went into exile in Tuscany where he stayed until 1027/1618. Upon his return, he was able to regain control over the Shūf mountains and extended his authority into the Biqā‘ valley, Galilee and the Jabal Nablūs. His hold over these districts lasted until the Ottomans once again went to war with Iran in 1042/1633. In order to secure Syria from the possibility of a Druze rebellion, Ottoman troops moved against Fakhr al-Dīn, who was finally captured two years later and sent as a prisoner to Istanbul where he was executed. Fakhr al-Dīn’s death did not end the importance of his clan, as it dominated Lebanese politics for the next fifty years, but no one after him would again threaten Ottoman hegemony.

The careers of Jānbūlād ʿAlī and Fakhr al-Dīn closely parallel each other and illustrate several important points about the nature of Ottoman rule in Syria in the eleventh/seventeenth century. Local leaders in Syria could make themselves indispensable in a century plagued with weak sultans, and even rise to provincial governorships. But at the same time, those who served the sultan in the capital were mistrustful of such men’s loyalties and sought to eliminate them when the opportunity arose. Given the success Istanbul enjoyed in crushing all those who rebelled, there was no actual diminution of Ottoman power in Syria in the period. Istanbul continued to appoint the governors who controlled the major cities of Aleppo and Damascus. But it was also evident that Ottoman power rested on the willing co-optation of local military leaders to maintain the sultan’s nominal authority in the periphery of those two great cities.

The age of the a‘yān in Syria

The devolution of political power into the hands of local people who could ensure the flow of revenue to Istanbul and order in the countryside accelerated across the Ottoman empire in the twelfth/eighteenth century. The Syrian chroniclers of the period collectively labelled their contemporaries who played such mediating roles between the authorities in the capital and the military forces on hand in their native cities as the a‘yān, a term Albert Hourani translated as ‘notables’. Hourani included under this rather loosely defined social category individuals drawn from three disparate origins: those from the ranks of the traditional Muslim intellectual class (‘ulamā‘), leaders of local military units and the ‘secular notables’, i.e. those who had amassed wealth through tax-farming, trade or the management of pious endowments (waqf).
Hourani’s linkage of these three categories of social origins is somewhat artificial, however, as a’yân families who did not gain their prominence from military service never rose to positions of political dominance in their respective cities. A distinction should therefore be made between those who held influence through their wealth or religious authority and those who held it by virtue of the sword. Nevertheless, members of prominent Muslim families from all three categories intermarried and there were often overlapping identities and loyalties. The continued relevance of the social class of the a’yân in our understanding of Ottoman Syria lies in its utility in distinguishing locally based families, whatever their origins, from Ottomans appointed from the capital. Furthermore, these families continued to exercise authority through the end of the Ottoman empire and into the mandate period, and their identification as a’yân by their contemporaries is crucial in understanding their influence and longevity in local politics. They had, in effect, become Syria’s nobility.

Prominent Muslim families had undoubtedly exercised moral and political authority in Syria before the twelfth/eighteenth century, but the transformation of the Ottoman fiscal system into a network of tax-farms allowed members of some families access to wealth that was unimaginable for their ancestors a century before. The Ottoman authorities in Istanbul legitimated this shift in the balance of power by appointing members of a’yân families to important provincial posts such as the mutasallim (acting governor) and muhâşîl (tax collector) in all the Syrian provinces and in some cities as actual governor. Significantly, however, the chief Hanâfi judge in the region’s major cities remained an Ottoman appointee. By way of contrast, muftîs were almost always local and from prominent families. While this pattern of political devolution was present across all the Syrian provinces, the degree to which a’yân families could effectively take control of provincial administration, replacing state bureaucrats and military officers appointed from Istanbul, varied, with Damascus and Aleppo offering two different patterns of a’yân politics that were replicated throughout the smaller provincial centres of the Syrian provinces.

The peace that the Ottoman authorities had brokered with the Bedouin tribes in the Syrian Desert collapsed in the twelfth/eighteenth century, as raids by the Bedouins on the hajj caravans became an almost annual occurrence. This was due to the migration of the ‘Anaza confederation out of Arabia into the Syrian Desert, beginning in the preceding century. The ‘Anaza proved far less tractable than their predecessors, the Mawālî, had been and they forced caravans coming from Iraq to abandon the trans-desert route to Damascus in
favour of one following the Euphrates river to Aleppo, as the latter route could be more easily garrisoned. There was, however, no alternative for the hajj route and the sultan’s prestige suffered as the flow of pilgrims to Arabia was disrupted. To preserve the security of the hajj, Sultan Ahmed III (1115–43/1703–30) broke with two centuries of tradition and appointed Ismā‘īl Pasha al-‘Azm as governor of Damascus in 1137/1725, the first local man to serve in that position since Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī. Ismā‘īl Pasha had formerly proved himself invaluable as governor of the province of Tripoli (Lebanon) from where he had commanded the jarda, a military escort that was sent out with provisions to meet pilgrims returning from the hajj and to escort them to Damascus.

Ismā‘īl Pasha al-‘Azm was the first of several highly effective governors from a family whose ethnic origins are uncertain but who had served as tax-farmers in the region surrounding the central Syrian towns of Hama and Ma‘arra in the eleventh/seventeenth century. The ‘Azmhs dominated political life in southern Syria for much of the following century, with family members serving as governors of the provinces of Damascus and Tripoli on and off from 1137/1725 to 1197/1783. As‘ad Pasha al-‘Azm (d. 1171/1758), who ruled Damascus from 1156/1743 until 1170/1757, enjoyed an unprecedented longevity in the position as the governors of the city who preceded him had held their tenure of office for a year or two at the longest.41

Despite the family’s success in dominating the political life of southern Syria, they served as governors only as long as they could effectively balance contending military forces in Damascus and, more importantly, only as long as those with influence at court suffered them. As‘ad Pasha’s downfall came after he had incurred the enmity of the chief eunuch of the sultan’s harem (gizlar āghāsī), a powerful figure in that age of politically weak sultans. After his removal as governor of Damascus, As‘ad was transferred to the governorship of Aleppo, and in the following year he was summoned to Istanbul, where he was executed on charges of abuse of his office and corruption. That disgrace did not end the family’s role in the politics of the a’yān in Syria as they still provided governors for all of Syria’s provinces in the half-century following As‘ad’s execution, but none reached a comparable position of power or wealth that he had enjoyed.

Having one family with vested interest in Damascus’ well-being provided relief for the city’s inhabitants, who had grown accustomed to governors with very short tenures and no interest in them other than as a source of cash with which to purchase their next appointment. The ‘Azm governors proved no less greedy, but they used some of the wealth they acquired to support the
construction of new public buildings and private mansions that helped to boost civic pride. Their construction of madrasas and caravanserais greatly altered the physical face of their adopted city and boosted the city’s economic and cultural fortunes. The family entered into the chronicles written in their lifetime as local heroes whose justice, generosity and religiosity were praised as a foil to highlight the authors’ general dismay at the rapacity of most of the governors coming from the capital.42

In contrast to the success in Damascus of the ‘Āzm family, no single family emerged as the dominant power in the politics of the a’yān in Aleppo. Rather, a number of families came to prominence and these contested one another for influence over the fractious armies of the street that had emerged in the city over the course of the twelfth/eighteenth century. The two dominant factions in Aleppo were the janissaries and the sharifs (those claiming descent from the Prophet’s family). The sharifs enjoyed prestige in all Muslim societies, so much so that it was the one lineage that could pass from mother to son, and certain advantages under the Islamic legal code. Although sharifs could be found in every city in the Ottoman empire, those claiming descent from the Prophet’s family in Aleppo coalesced into a political faction that contended for power with the janissaries throughout the second half of the twelfth/eighteenth century and well into the next century.43

The sharif faction in Aleppo typically drew its membership from the city quarters that lay within the city walls, while the majority of those claiming to be janissaries inhabited the eastern suburbs of the city where the tribal migrants had settled. There were other social differences as well. Besides including most of the city’s ‘ulamā‘, many of those claiming sharif lineage worked in the guilds involved with textile production; the janissaries were typically to be found in service guilds. Additionally, members of the sharif faction often formed commercial partnerships with the city’s prominent Christian families and many of the prominent sharif families had leading Christian mercantile families as their clients. In contrast, the janissary faction was usually antagonistic to the city’s Christian population and abused them whenever they held the upper hand in the city’s power politics.44 It is, therefore, possible that the two factions represented deeper divisions in Aleppo’s society that were based on economic, social and ethnic differences. But at the same time the boundary between the two could be porous and the only local man to ascend to the city’s governorship, Qitārāghāsī Ibrāhīm Pasha, started his career as a janissary with Turcoman origins and ended it as a member of the sharif.

In the absence of the emergence of one single family as the dominant one, the Muslim elite of Aleppo remained divided against itself at the end of the
twelfth/eighteenth century. Each family saw itself in competition with its rivals and drew upon either the janissary or the sharif armies of the street to support its ambitions. The Ottoman governors posted in the city were able to use that mistrust to prevent any alternative centre of power from emerging even while they could not themselves establish effective control. The result was frequent periods of anarchy when toughs, drawn from the city’s poorest quarters and who claimed either sharif or janissary loyalties, ruled the city while members of prominent families, Muslim or non-Muslim alike, stayed locked in their houses. Aleppo provided an extreme example of the failure of a’yan politics to govern effectively. The sultan was able to retain his nominal hold on the city through the appointment of the city’s governors from his own men but effective control of the city eluded him.

Military challenges to Ottoman suzerainty in the twelfth/eighteenth century

The military of Egypt in the late eleventh/seventeenth century was also plagued by bloody competition between factions aligned with two ‘neo-Mamlûk’ households that had emerged after the Ottoman conquest, the Fiqâriyya and the Qâsimiyya. Within these broadly based confederations there were individual households which might contend with each other as much as they did with their erstwhile rivals. In between the two factions stood the city’s governor, who was appointed from Istanbul. This produced a very unstable political balance in Cairo that broke down periodically into the kind of street violence that was so characteristic of Aleppo half a century later.

Within this shifting power balance in Cairo, a household founded by Muṣṭafâ Qâzdâghlî (d. 1115/1704), a janissary who had himself been a client in the Fiqâriyya household, emerged as the dominant power by the middle of the twelfth/eighteenth century. The Qâzdâghlî household, like those that preceded it, was made up of janissary officers and their retainers who controlled rural tax-farms and customs offices. They also dabbled in trade and offered ‘protection’ to wealthy merchants in a combination of legal and illicit activities that might be compared to those of the ‘crime-bosses’ of twentieth-century USA. In 1160/1747, a subordinate of the household named Ibrâhîm Kâhyâ (d. 1168/1754), who like many in the household began his service as a mamlûk, emerged from the jostling for power to be the household’s unchallenged head. After winning the loyalty of the janissaries, Ibrâhîm created an alliance with Ridwân al-Jalfî who commanded the ‘Azab corps, the other military force in the province. The partnership between the two men lasted
until Ibrāhīm’s death, followed by Riḍwān’s assassination a few months later, and provided Egypt’s inhabitants with a brief period of peace and stability.45

After Ibrāhīm’s death, one of his mamlûks, ‘Alî, who would later be known as Bulûţ Qapan, ‘one who seizes the clouds’ (d. 1187/1773), came to the fore in the internal politics of the Qâzâdâghâl household and took the title of shaykh al-balad or ‘head of the town’ in 1173/1760. That title had been used in the Mamlûk period to denote the military chief in Cairo and the revival of its use in the early twelfth/eighteenth century signified a shift in power away from the governor appointed from Istanbul to local strongmen. ‘Alî, having secured his position in Cairo, began to entertain wider ambitions. He replaced the Ottoman governor of Jedda with one of his own mamlûks in 1184/1770, challenging the Ottoman sultan’s authority as ‘servitor of the Two Holy Places’. Later in the same year, he took an even more audacious step and ordered his forces to invade Syria in an act of open rebellion against his nominal sultan.

‘Alî Beg found two willing allies in his invasion of Syria: Zâhir al-‘Umar (d.1189/1775) and Yûsuf al-Shiḥâbī (d. 1204/1790). Both men were powerful local military commanders in the tradition of the Jânbûlâds and the Ma‘ns. But the control the central government could exercise in the Syrian provinces was weaker in the twelfth/eighteenth century than it had been in the previous century. As a result, their freedom of action was proportionately greater than was that of their predecessors. While the al-Shiḥâbī clan, although nominally Sunnî, had simply replaced the Ma‘ns as the amîrs of the Lebanese mountains, Zâhir al-‘Umar was something of a self-made local hero of the Galilee region whose origins were not dissimilar from those of the ‘Azm clan in Damascus.

Zâhir al-‘Umar was a member of the large Sunnî Zaydânî clan who are presumed to have had Bedouin origins but who had settled in Galilee by the end of the eleventh/seventeenth century. His father and uncles had controlled tax-farms in the region and Zâhir al-‘Umar used that base to build alliances with various local groups, including the Shi‘î clans of Jabal ‘Amîl in Lebanon, by offering protection to peasant cultivators from Bedouin raids. By the middle of the twelfth/eighteenth century, Zâhir moved his base of power to the port city of Acre, which he fortified. With most of northern Palestine and southern Lebanon effectively under his control, he entered into extensive trade relations with the French for the export of cotton that enriched his coffers and allowed him to recruit mercenaries from North Africa.46 In his success in creating a power structure based on an export economy, Zâhir al-‘Umar’s career was similar to that of Fakhr al-Dîn a century before him, and to those of his contemporary derebeg (lord of the valley) warlords in the
Balkans and western Anatolia who also were able to meet growing demands in western Europe for agricultural products from the Ottoman empire.

Unlike the ‘Ažms, who had worked their way up through the Ottoman provincial system, Zāhir al-‘Umar’s political position was tenuous, despite his growing wealth. His official status in the provincial hierarchy of the empire was as a vassal of the governor of Sidon and he held no higher authority from the sultan. Realising that the sultan could, in fact, move against him at any time, Zāhir opted to align himself with ‘Alī Beg, whose forces took Gaza and Jaffā in 1184/1770. In the following spring, Abū ‘l-Dhahab (d. 1189/1775), ‘Alī’s mamliq and lieutenant, arrived with a second Egyptian force and defeated the troops raised by the governor of Damascus. Abū ‘l-Dhahab then entered Damascus supported by the Druze and Maronite Christian retainers of Yūsuf al-Shihābī while Zāhir occupied Sidon. But just when it looked as if the Ottoman control of Syria might be at an end, Abū ‘l-Dhahab turned against his former mentor and returned to Egypt with his army. With that betrayal, ‘Alī Beg fled first to Upper Egypt and then to Acre. After a year in exile, he returned to Egypt to confront Abū ‘l-Dhahab, confident that the other Mamlūk households of Cairo would support him. They did not and ‘Alī Beg was defeated, wounded on the battlefield and taken prisoner by Abū ‘l-Dhahab. He died a week later and Abū ‘l-Dhahab assumed the title of shaykh al-balad.

That debacle ended Mamlūk ambitions in Syria as Abū ‘l-Dhahab pledged his fealty to the sultan. This left Zāhir al-‘Umar a rebel against the sultan with few remaining allies. He sought conciliation with the sultan and in 1188/1774 was surprisingly named as governor of Sidon. But that seems to have been simply a tactical ploy until the sultan could conclude a peace treaty with Russia. In 1189/1775, Abū ‘l-Dhahab invaded Palestine again, taking the city of Jaffā by storm after claiming to be acting at the sultan’s request. Zāhir fled his stronghold at Acre, which was subsequently occupied by the Egyptian forces. Abū ‘l-Dhahab’s sudden death stalled the Egyptian invasion and Zāhir recovered his capital. But at eighty years of age, he was no longer in a position of either physical or political strength and he offered only token resistance to an attack on Acre by the Ottoman navy, during which he was killed by his own men.

After Abū ‘l-Dhahab’s death, the Mamlūk households in Egypt again reverted to faction fighting, with no single household able to dominate its rivals. An Ottoman army under Ghāzī Ḥasan Pasha was despatched to Egypt in 1200/1786 in an attempt to bring the unruly province back under direct Ottoman control. But the Mamlūk amīrs simply retreated into Upper Egypt,
and when Ghâzî Hasan was recalled to Istanbul he was forced to enter into a compromise with the warring households that left the Mamlûks in control. ‘Ali Beg had demonstrated that the sultan’s suzerainty over Egypt existed in name only and that a commander who could gain control of Egypt’s factious Mamlûk households or eliminate them altogether could threaten the empire’s hold over Syria and, perhaps, the survival of the dynasty itself.

In the political vacuum created by the death of Ẓâhir al-‘Umar, Jezzâr Ahmed Pasha (d. 1219/1804), a Bosnian adventurer who had served in Egypt under Bûlûq Qâpân ‘Ali Beg, became the dominant political personality in southern Syria. Jezzâr Ahmed occupied Acre after Ẓâhir al-‘Umar’s defeat in 1189/1775 and was elevated by the sultan to the position of governor of the province of Sidon in 1191/1777, a position he held until his death. In addition, he occasionally was able to secure the governorship of Damascus, with his longest tenure in that office lasting from 1204/1790 until 1209/1795. But Acre remained his base of operations and seat of power, and even when he held the governorship of Damascus he did not take up permanent residence there.

In a century when the politics of Syria were dominated by the aʿyân, Jezzâr Ahmed was a consummate outsider. Having lived in Egypt and risen up the ranks in a Mamlûk household there, he sought to replicate a similar patron–client relationship in Acre, with his own mamlûks sometimes holding the governorships in Tyre and Tripoli. Having learnt from the career of Ẓâhir al-‘Umar, Jezzâr Ahmed was careful to keep himself in good graces with the sultan and his court. His two main rivals for control of southern Syria were the ‘Azm family in Damascus and the Shihâbî clan in the Lebanese mountains. Although the two often worked together against the encroaching influence of Jezzâr Ahmed, the latter usually held the upper hand because of the wealth he was acquiring from a virtual monopoly over the export trade of the territories under his control and the hired men that wealth could obtain; he was even to survive an attempted revolt by his mamlûk subordinates in 1203/1789.

Jezzâr Ahmed’s moment in the international spotlight came in 1214/1799 when he was able to withstand the siege of Acre by Napoleon Bonaparte, albeit aided by an outbreak of plague that ravaged the French ranks. Napoleon’s forces had quickly despatched the Mamlûks in Egypt the year before and he had assumed that the Ottoman empire would offer no stiffer resistance. But Jezzâr Ahmed’s stubborn refusal to surrender when added to the harassment his forces were suffering from the British fleet in the eastern Mediterranean forced Napoleon to reconsider his plans for empire in the Middle East and he returned to Egypt. Napoleon left Egypt not long after his less than triumphant campaign in Syria but his forces stayed on to occupy
the country until 1216/1801, when combined British–Ottoman force secured their surrender.

After Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt, the country never returned to effective Ottoman control. Under Meḥmed ‘Ali, it would again serve as the springboard for another invasion of Syria that might have toppled the ‘House of ‘Othmān’ if the British had not intervened to save the dynasty. Jezzār Aḥmed Pasha was the last warlord to emerge in the Syrian provinces, and after his death governors appointed from Istanbul were the norm in all the Syrian provinces rather than the exception that they had become in the turbulent twelfth/eighteenth century. Their presence in the provincial palaces (ṣarāys) did not mean, however, that the region had reverted back to effective Ottoman rule as that would not return until the period of the Tanzimat (1839–76), when a revitalised empire introduced a modernised army and bureaucracy into the Syrian provinces.

Notes

1. Used here to mean ‘geographical Syria’, the lands that today constitute the modern states of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories.


8. Including, but not exclusively, Antoine Abdel-Nour, Introduction à l’histoire urbaine de la Syrie ottomane (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle), Beirut, 1982; Amnon Cohen, Economic life in Ottoman Jerusalem, Cambridge, 1989; Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900, Berkeley, 1995; Collette Establet and Jean-Paul Pascual, Families et fortunes


Western Arabia and Yemen during the Ottoman period

BERNARD HAYKEL

Introduction

Our knowledge of the political, social and intellectual history of the Ḥijāz and the Yemen during the ‘first’ Ottoman period (c. 923–1218/1517–1803) – that is during the reign of twenty-one sultans, from Selīm I (r. 918–26/1512–20) until the conquest of the Ḥijāz by the Wahhābīs in the reign of Selīm III (r. 1203–22/1789–1807) – remains fragmentary and has to be constituted mostly from primary sources such as local chronicles, biographical dictionaries, travellers’ accounts and the Ottoman and Arabian archives. The secondary literature, on the Ḥijāz in particular, consists of long and detailed lists of discrete events such as battles, floods and the internecine disputes between branches of the local ruling families as well as struggles with Ottoman administrative and military officials. A systematic and analytically informed history of the Sharīfs of Mecca and Medina in the Ottoman period has yet to be written and many lacunae persist. We know very little about the internal politics of the various branches of the family of Sharīfs, their relationships with the Yemeni imāms or the tribes of the Ḥijāz and Najd or even with their Ottoman overlords. We know even less about the social and intellectual history of the two Holy Cities and the tribal hinterland of the Ḥijāz. For instance, the fact that Shi‘ī sentiment, and perhaps outright sectarian affiliation, remained predominant among many of the Ḥijāzī tribes (e.g. Ḥarb, Juhayna) until the arrival of the Wahhābīs in the late twelfth/eighteenth century is virtually unknown.¹ The sketchy entries in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam on this region, and especially for this period, testify to how little is known. There is no published chronology of events and a complete list of the Ḥijāzī rulers does not exist in any of the standard works on Muslim dynasties.² This is remarkable given the region’s religious centrality to all Muslims. The archives (Ottoman and Arab) have yet to be studied fully in any rigorous fashion and research requires knowledge of both Ottoman and Arabic, not to mention tribal law and history. The history
of Yemen, as opposed to the Ḥijāz, is considerably better known as a result of
several studies having been undertaken to detail the Ottoman presence and
influence as well as the local Yemeni reaction to it. Excellent published
chronologies exist for Yemen and the primary sources here are considerably
richer and more numerous, and many of these have now been edited. The
difference in the quality of sources between Yemen and the Ḥijāz is perhaps
due to the fact that Yemen was a considerably richer province, hosting several
flourishing dynasties and enjoying a rich agricultural tax base. Furthermore,
Yemen’s strategic location on the trade route between the Indian Ocean and
the Mediterranean worlds, with its important entrepôt cities of Aden and
Mocha, secured for it a reliable and significant source of revenue. The Ḥijāz,
with its ports at Jedda and Yanbu’, enjoyed some of the same trading privileges
as Yemen, but it has historically remained dependent on Egypt for its finances
and even its food supply, and more generally on the support provided by the
Sublime Porte (i.e. the Ottoman government). Finally, the emergence of
coffee as Yemen’s prime export commodity in the eleventh/seventeenth
century further accentuated the difference in internally generated wealth
between the two regions.

Ottoman views of, and policies towards, the Ḥijāz as well as the Indian
Ocean are now reasonably well established. This is in good measure due to the
work of Suraiya Faroqhi on the ḥajj in the tenth/sixteenth century and that of
Salih Özbaran, and more recently Giancarlo Casale, on the relations between
the Ottomans and the Portuguese over trade and control of the Indian Ocean.

With respect to the pilgrimage, the Ottomans took seriously their claim to
being the ‘Servants of the Two Holy Sanctuaries’ and went to considerable
lengths to secure the safe arrival and return of the pilgrimage caravans (sing.
*mahmal*) of which there were three in this period: the Egyptian (from Cairo)
and the Syrian (from Damascus), by far the most important, followed by the
Yemeni. Assuring the safety of the ḥajj and providing subsidies for the tribes of
the Ḥijāz, its rulers and the poor folk of Mecca and Medina constituted an
important source of legitimacy for Ottoman rule. The Ottomans also engaged
in important restoration and building projects in the Holy Cities further to
confirm their claims. With respect to the Indian Ocean, the Ottomans,
depending on who had the upper hand in Istanbul, alternated in the tenth/
sixteenth century between an engaged policy towards the south-east and
another which shunned projecting their influence into this maritime world,
preferring instead a more restricted and land-based vision of Ottoman power.
The Ottomans, ultimately, had to content themselves with keeping the
Portuguese out of the Red Sea and the upper reaches of the Persian Gulf
and endeavoured to secure their gains in Arabia. Yemen remained under their control for nearly a century (945–1045/1538–1635), and the Ḥijāz for close to three centuries until the Wahhābis wrested it from them in the early thirteenth/nineteenth century. In the eleventh/seventeenth century the Dutch and the British made their entry into the Indian Ocean world as well as the Red Sea, spelling a definitive end to Ottoman maritime and military dominance in the region.

The Mamlûk legacies

In Arabia the Ottomans were the inheritors of three legacies from the Mamlûks whom they supplanted in Syria and finally in Egypt in 922/1517. The first involved the effort to repel the Portuguese, who had irrupted into the Indian Ocean world in 902/1497, and had set up a state (Estado da India) based on commerce and warfare and which threatened to dominate the Indian Ocean as well as the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Ottomans mounted several naval expeditions to dislodge the Portuguese from their strongholds and largely failed. Aden proved to be one of the few successes when it was captured in 945/1538 from a local ally of the Portuguese. The forceful presence of the latter, however, meant that the monopoly that Muslim states and their merchants once enjoyed over the trade of the Indian Ocean was broken forever. The second legacy was the Mamlûk occupation of the relatively rich province of Yemen, domination over which meant tax revenues, the effective protection of the Ḥijāz from the south and control of the trade that crossed into the Red Sea. Here the Ottomans would be confronted with a formidable foe, the Zaydī Shīʿī imāms with a tradition of a righteous rule that depicted the Ottomans as falling beyond the pale of Islam. The Zaydis were ultimately able to defeat and expel the Ottomans from the Yemen in 1045/1635 and to establish a state that would rule the Yemen until the 1260s/1850s, and then again in the twentieth century CE until 1962, after a second Ottoman occupation (1289–1337/1872–1919). Despite their animosity towards the Ottomans, the Zaydis adopted a number of Ottoman ideas and institutions which would make their regime something akin to a Sunnī sultanate in the twelfth/eighteenth century. The third legacy involved the incorporation of the Ḥijāz into the empire. This meant oversight of the pilgrimage and custodianship of the Holy Cities, all of which bestowed legitimacy on the rule of the House of ‘Othmān (Osman). The Ottomans also undertook to extend their security over the trade routes from Egypt down to the Hijāz. As it was under the Mamlûks, the Hijāz remained by and large dependent on Egypt
and was ruled by a semi-independent dynasty of Sharifs in Mecca. These immediately acknowledged Ottoman suzerainty in 923/1517 and the Hijaz officially became part of the empire, but the internecine squabbles of the Sharifs constantly required the intervention of the Sublime Porte, largely in an effort to legitimise the status quo.4

The Portuguese blockade of the Red Sea

The Portuguese arrived in the Indian Ocean at the end of the ninth/fifteenth century and sought to dominate and divert the trade, in spices and other commodities, from South and South-East Asia away from the Mediterranean–Red Sea route and towards Portugal through the route around the Cape of Good Hope. One of the measures they took to accomplish this was to blockade the Red Sea through naval patrols around Bab al-Mandab as well as the occupation of the islands of Socotra, occupied in 913/1507, and Kamaran. They attempted the same in the Persian Gulf for which they took hold of Hormuz in 921/1515. The Portuguese also attacked Jedda in 923/1517 and developed alliances, with the Christian Negus in Ethiopia among others, to accomplish this goal. The effects were extremely disruptive, and initially successful, so that the revenues accruing to the Mamluks in Egypt from the taxes levied on the trade dropped considerably. This led the Mamluks, with help from the Ottomans, to respond by establishing an alliance with the Tahirid rulers of Yemen – short-lived as it turned out – and by sending two fleets, in 913/1507 and 921/1515, to break the blockade and to eliminate the Portuguese presence. The effort failed, but the Mamluks established a political presence in Yemen, brought with them firearms which had not been seen in the region before, and began the process of ending the reign of the Tahirids (858–945/1454–1538), the last major Sunni dynasty to rule Yemen. It was left to the Ottomans to break the blockade.

On the occasion of the arrival of an Ottoman fleet in Yemen in 931/1525, Selmân Reşîs, an Ottoman official based between the Hijaz and Yemen, wrote a report to the Ottoman grand vizier Ibrâhîm Pasha on what to do about the Portuguese. In it Selmân Reşîs argued that the moment was ripe to reverse the power of the Portuguese by, among other things, taking control of the Red Sea through the occupation of ports on either side of the Bab al-Mandab strait, in effect establishing a line of defence from the Horn of Africa to the Haţramawt that would keep the Portuguese out.5 This is the line that would ultimately demarcate the two empires’ separate spheres of influence. However, because of Ottoman conquests elsewhere (e.g. Iraq), it was not until 945/1538 that the
Ottomans would finally make a concerted effort to defeat the Portuguese and put this plan into effect. In this year a fleet led by the governor of Egypt – and future grand vizier – Süleyman Pasha, who had an active interest in the spice trade, arrived in Yemen. Aden was captured and its ruler ʿĀmir ibn Dāʾūd, who had collaborated with the Portuguese, was executed. The fleet continued to India where it was unable to conquer Diu and thereby failed to establish a permanent Ottoman presence in South Asia in alliance with the sultan of Gujarat. Süleyman Pasha returned to Yemen in 946/1539 and established the organisational structures in Zabid for fully conquering and ruling this province. Yemen then became a base for the Ottoman military, from which they could defend against Portuguese expeditions. With this, the Portuguese blockade of the Red Sea was effectively broken, even though the latter did attempt an unsuccessful attack on Suez in 948/1541. By the early 960s/mid-1550s the Ottomans had also consolidated their position on the western coast of the Red Sea, especially in the ports of Zaylaʿ, Maṣṣawaʿ and Sawākīn in the province of Abyssinia (Habash) where they had earlier supported an initially successful jihad led by Ahmad Graʾn against the Negus, which was later reversed by Portuguese intervention. Negotiations between the Ottomans and the Portuguese over the terms of the spice trade began in the 950s/1540s, and whilst these proved inconclusive, the second half of the tenth/sixteenth century saw a revival of this trade through the Red Sea and Persian Gulf routes, both of which the Ottomans now effectively dominated. From the 970s/1560s onwards the Ottomans controlled a greater volume of this trade than the Portuguese did, and it is estimated that the tax revenues from these routes reached as high as 500,000 ducats per year or roughly the equivalent of the annual surplus sent to Istanbul from Egypt. At the turn of the eleventh/seventeenth century, the Portuguese were no longer the dominant power, being replaced by the Dutch, and had given up on the idea of controlling all trade in the Indian Ocean. The Ottomans, too, were no longer able to project their influence into the Indian Ocean and were soon to lose Yemen to the Zaydīs, who actively rejected the Ottoman claim to being the keepers of the Universal Caliphate.

The Ottoman conquest of Yemen

Before the arrival of the Ottomans in Yemen the country’s political landscape consisted of a competition between three distinct groups: the Zaydīs, the Ṣanʿāʾīs and the Shāfiʿī Sunnīs. The Ottoman presence led to the progressive unification of the country under their rule, by subduing or co-opting the various parties. Ultimately, however, the corrupt and brutal nature of their
rule unleashed Zaydi irredentist rebellions. The Zaydis finally managed to expel the Ottomans in 1045/1635 and, along with their tribal supporters from the upper highlands, have dominated Yemen’s politics into modern times. The last of the Sunni dynasties was the Ṭahirid (858–945/1454–1538), whose demise was due to the internecine struggles within the ruling family, the loss of tax revenue due to the Portuguese blockade and most decisively their successive military defeats at the hands of the Mamluks. The latter arrived from Egypt in 921/1515 under the leadership of fleet admiral Ḥusayn al-Kurdi, whom the Ṭahirids refused to assist. The Mamluks established a political presence, which lasted in increasingly diminished and weakened form until 945/1538, and they recognised the suzerainty of the Ottomans in 923/1517 after news of the defeat of the Mamluk army at the hands of Sultan Selim I. The Mamluks initially conquered many of the towns in the Yemeni highlands, including Ṣan‘ā’ in 1517, but their exactions and depredations led to a rebellion of the Zaydis under the leadership of Imam al-Mutawakkil Yahya Sharaf al-Din (d. 965/1558) and his son al-Muṭahhar (d. 980/1572), who then managed to conquer most of Yemen’s territories from the Isma’ilis and Ṭahirids, and pushed the Mamluks to the coastal town of Zabid where they remained confined until the Ottomans arrived in full force in 945/1538.

Ottoman rule in Yemen involved making it into a province (beglerbegilik) entrusted to a governor (beglerbegi) of whom there were twenty-seven over nearly a century of rule (945–1045/1538–1635). This period has been broken down by Frédérique Soudan, who has written the most exhaustive European-language study of Ottoman Yemen to date, into six stages. The first began with the arrival of Süleyman Pasha in 945/1538 who captured Aden, ended Mamluk rule in Zabid and laid out the plan for wresting the country from Zaydi rule. The second, from 946/1539 to 963/1556, involved campaigns of conquest which saw Ṣan‘ā’ fall in 954/1547 to Ottoman forces under the leadership of Özdemir Pasha who made it the capital of the province. The third stage (963–75/1556–68) saw Ottoman power decline, under the leadership of weak and corrupt governors whose only aim was to enrich themselves by over-taxing the population in order to bid for more important posts elsewhere in the empire. This led to another Zaydi rebellion under the leadership of Imam al-Muṭahhar. In one year, 975/1568, the Ottomans lost all the territories in the province to the Zaydi forces and found themselves encircled in Zabid, their last bastion. The fourth stage (976–8/1569–71) witnessed the reconquest of the province under the leadership of the able military general Sinan Pasha. The latter finally consolidated Ottoman authority over the country so that his efforts constitute the definitive conquest of Yemen. The
fifth stage (978–1016/1571–1607) involved the pacification and administrative organisation of the country under more able governors as well as the end of the Sharaf al-Din dynasty of imāms with the passing of al-Muṭāḥhar in 980/1572. The last stage, from 1006/1597 to 1045/1635, saw Ottomans struggling against yet another Zaydi rebellion, this time led by the Imām al-Manṣūr al-Qāsim ibn Muhammad (d. 1029/1620) whose son al-Mu‘ayyad Muhammad ultimately defeated and expelled the Ottomans in 1045/1635, ushering in the reign of the most powerful Zaydi dynasty ever to rule Yemen.7

During their stay in Yemen, the Ottomans patronised Sufis (e.g. Aḥmad ibn ‘Alwān’s cult in Yafrus) as well as Ismā‘īlis against the Zaydis, and ultimately co-opted members of the Sharaf al-Din family, many of whom were sent as hostages to Istanbul. The Sublime Porte found it exceedingly difficult to maintain control over the administrators of this province, in large part because of the great distance from the centre of power. As a result, disputes often emerged between the local Ottoman officials themselves and violence, mutinies and corruption were endemic, most often because the soldiers were not paid on time. So many of these conscripts died in Yemen, because of disease and warfare, that the country acquired the sad sobriquet ‘Graveyard of the Turks’. In terms of its tax revenue system, Yemen was deemed a sālyāne province whereby the governor, after paying all salaries and expenses, had to remit an annual sum to the capital. The actual collection of taxes took place through a system of tax-farming (iltizām). No systematic study has been undertaken of this system or the revenues it generated, and it appears that the Ottoman state was not able to accrue significant revenues from this province after all the local expenses and salaries were disbursed.8

In terms of the administration of justice, the Ottomans gave preference to the Ḥanāfī school of law but also recognised the judgements of local Shāfi‘ī qādis. They appointed judges (none were Turks) to each of the big towns in the province along with a deputy judge who was most often a Yemeni. Important matters were handled by a court in Şan‘ā’, a practice that the Zaydi imāms would later perpetuate. The presence of the Sunnī Ottomans strengthened a trend among some Zaydi-born scholars who argued in favour of a Sunnī-oriented interpretation of Islamic law. Among these, for example, was Sayyid Muḥammad ibn ‘Izz al-Dīn al-Muftī (d. 1050/1640), whom the Ottomans appointed as a muftī in Şan‘ā’ and who issued fatwās (non-binding legal opinions) in accordance with the four Sunnī schools of law. The Ottomans, however, did not impose the Ḥanāfī school on the local population, who remained Shāfi‘ī in Lower Yemen and along the coastal plains and Zaydi in the upper highlands. An important institution the Ottomans
established was the Yemeni pilgrimage caravan to Mecca. The governor who instituted this was Muṣṭafā Pasha al-Neshshār in 963/1556 and it was to continue until 1039/1630. Much attention and money was lavished on this caravan, including subsidies for mounts and foodstuffs for indigent pilgrims, and it was used to pacify regions of northern Yemen through which it had to pass on its way to Mecca. The Qāsimī imāms would reinstate this institution but its history has yet to be fully explored. The Ottomans were also builders in Yemen, leaving many fine new and restored buildings, bathhouses and irrigation projects. The most famous of the buildings is perhaps the Bākiriyya Mosque in Ṣan‘ā’ which was built by Ḥasan Pasha in 1005/1596.

**Zaydism triumphant**

Despite all the Ottoman efforts to claim legitimacy for their rule through Islam, these failed in Yemen and the population felt a profound antipathy towards them. Their unjust practices, especially over-taxation, hostage taking and cruel punishment of prisoners, alienated Yemenis, as did their social habits and alleged loose morals. The Yemenis accused the Ottomans of flouting the edicts of the shari‘a by among other things consuming alcohol and engaging in pederasty. This gave the Yemeni imāms the grounds on which to declare a legitimate jihad against Ottoman rule. Here is what al-Mu‘ayyad Muḥammad (r. 1029–54/1620–44), the second Qāsimī imām and evictor of the Ottomans, says about them:

> They [i.e. the Ottomans] do not belong to those who adhere to the Truth which comes from God. They do not respect God’s interdictions … rather, they authorize luxurious living, perform evil, drink alcohol in the sight and knowledge of all, and commit abomination amongst the community of Muḥammad and in the proximity of mosques.⁹

Zaydism, a sect of Shī‘ī Islam that traces its origins to the Kufan revolt of Imām Zayd ibn ʿAlī in 122/740 against Umayyad rule, established a community in Yemen in the late third/ninth century. It is distinguished by its theology, which includes the doctrine of the imamate with its requirement that righteous rule and religious and secular leadership can only be had through the ahl al-bayt (the descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad through either of his grandsons, al-Ḥasan or al-Ḥusayn). Zaydis insist on having a just ruler who fulfils rigorous qualifications and obligations, and who must make a summons to allegiance (da‘wa) and then rise in rebellion (khurij) against illegitimate rulers. The Sharaf al-Dīn and Qāsimī imāms did just that and they managed to
rally the tribes of Upper Yemen in this bloody struggle against the Ottomans that lasted, with some intermittent truces, until the final expulsion in 1045/1635. The first five Qāsimī imāms held strongly to an uncompromising vision of Zaydism and based their rule on their personal charisma, learning and deeds. They considered the Ottomans to be ‘infidels of interpretation’ (kuffār al-ta’wil) because of their alleged theological determinism (ijbār) and anthropomorphism (tashbīḥ). As such, any territory conquered from the Ottomans could have imposed on it a tax regime of a non-Muslim territory. In effect, this meant that the Shāfi’īs of Lower Yemen could have their lands expropriated or granted as tax-farms to the northern tribal allies of the imāms. The Qāsimīs established a state over the entirety of geographical Yemen, from Asīr in the north, to Aden in the south and reaching Zufar in the east.

By the end of the eleventh/seventeenth century, however, the Qāsimī imamate, beginning with Imām al-Mahdī Muḥammad Ṣāḥib al-Mawāhib (r. 1097–1130/1686–1718), would become a dynastic sultanate, acquiring many of the trappings and administrative framework of the Ottoman state the imāms had once excoriated. Choreographed royal processions, a standing army, administrative structures and the institution of a chief judge were some of the patrimonial forms of governance that the Qāsimīs now adopted. The reasons for this are multiple and involve a decline in the personal qualities of the imāms, but also a long-term reduction of the wealth that poured into the state’s coffers from the coffee trade. On the economic plane the most important development to take place in Yemen during the Ottoman period was the arrival of coffee, allegedly in 950/1543, and most likely from Ethiopia. Yemen enjoyed a monopoly on this product, which would become its major export commodity in the eleventh/seventeenth century and would lure the Dutch and other Europeans to set up factories in the Red Sea port of Mocha, which now eclipsed Aden and Shihr. The maintenance of the Qāsimī state was in good measure due to the revenues accruing from the coffee trade, to the extent that it would be apt to refer to it as the ‘coffee imamate’. The Ottomans for their part were able to tax this and other commodities further up the trade route, at Jedda but also in Egypt. The departure of the Ottomans from the lower part of the Red Sea led to the dominance of Gujarati merchants in this region as well as the arrival of a greater number of European merchants and an increase in piracy. The early Qāsimīs – al-Mu’ayyad Muḥammad and al-Mutawakkil Ismā’īl – ever fearful of the return of the Ottomans to Yemen, led a campaign of correspondence with the Sharīfs Muḥsin ibn Ḥusayn and Zayd ibn Muḥsin of Mecca. This was in order to get the Meccan Sharīfs to join the jihad against the Ottomans and to recognise the Zaydī imāms, in their capacity
as leaders of the House of the Prophet, as the only legitimate rulers of the Muslim umma. The Qāsimī effort failed, as did the Ottoman attempts to reconquer Yemen. The Sharīfs, for their part, stuck to the Ottomans because they realised that the Yemenis could not supplant the Sublime Porte in the Ḥijāz in terms of both power and the provision of subsidies.\textsuperscript{13}

The Sharīfs of the Ḥijāz

The Ottomans went to extraordinary lengths to maintain their sovereign claim over the Ḥijāz, subsidising at great expense the semi-independent rulers of Mecca, the tribes along the pilgrimage routes and the inhabitants of the Holy Cities. As with the Mamlūks before them, they assigned endowments (waqf) in Egypt as well as in Anatolia and Rumeli for the benefit of the Holy Cities, sent an annual subsidy (şurre) with the pilgrimage caravan and required Egypt to send regular shipments of grain to the Ḥijāz. In addition, they allocated half the customs revenues of Jedda and Yanbu‘ to the ruling Sharīf, who often managed to take the whole sum. The Ottomans also subsidised and protected the pilgrimage caravans and severely punished those tribes who attacked them. In short, claiming a measure of control over the Ḥijāz was an expensive proposition, and Suraiya Faroqhi has estimated that this amounted to between one half to two thirds of the annual expenses of a major military campaign, such as the one against the Habsburg empire in 1015–16/1606–7.\textsuperscript{14}

The Ottomans invested this much in the Ḥijāz for two entwined reasons: the religious obligation to safeguard the pilgrimage and the Holy Cities, and the legitimacy that performing this conferred on their rule. They also wanted to outshine the Mamlūks in terms of generosity and thereby claim greater merit in their capacity as the protectors of the holy sanctuaries.

The Sharīfs of Mecca, a family of Hasanids who had ruled Mecca since the fourth/tenth century, recognised Ottoman suzerainty in 923/1517 when the reigning Sharīf Barakāt ibn Muḥammad sent his teenage son Muḥammad Abū Numayy to Egypt to pay obeisance to Sultan Selīm I. With this accepted, a relationship began whereby the Ottomans recognised that they needed the Sharīfs to rule the Ḥijāz, mainly because the latter could wreak havoc in the province by effecting tribal rebellions. As a result, the Ottomans, with a few exceptions, legitimatized the de facto leader among the fractious Sharīfs, whose title was that of amīr. They did this by issuing an appointment rescript as well as conferring on him a robe of honour (khilqa). Medina, which was ruled by a Ḥusaynīd family of Sharīfs until the late eleventh/seventeenth century, was placed under the control of Mecca’s Sharīf, who appointed a deputy there and
in other towns of the Ḥijāz. Power in Medina was divided among the Sharīf or his deputy, the commander of the Ottoman troops in the citadel, the chief qāḍī and the chief eunuch (āghā) of the Prophet’s mosque. In terms of administration the Sublime Porte appointed a governor in Jedda (sanjaq beği), a judge in each of the Holy Cities and a number of other minor officials. The commanders of the pilgrimage caravans were also conduits for Ottoman rule in the Ḥijāz, and their arrival represented a period of tension because they often carried the sultan’s orders, or their amīrs had their own designs, and were accompanied by a troop of soldiers. As with Yemen, the great distance of this province from Istanbul meant that close supervision of the local officials was difficult to achieve and considerable disorder was often the norm.15

In the period between the year 923/1517 and the late twelfth/eighteenth century, thirty-four Meccan Sharīfs ruled in the Ḥijāz. The tenth/sixteenth century was relatively stable in that it saw the long rule of three Sharīfs: Barakāt (902–3/1497–1525), Abū Numayy Muḥḥammad (930–60/1524–53) and his son Ḥasan (961–1010/1554–1601). The eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries by contrast were very turbulent with internecine fights between different branches of the Sharīfian family, mainly the Dhawī Zayd versus the Dhawī Barakāt. Seventeen different Sharīfs ruled in the eleventh/seventeenth century, often jointly and in multiple non-successive periods, and thirteen Sharīfs ruled in the twelfth/eighteenth century. The extent of their power often reached into the Najd, as far as Ḥā’il, and they sporadically launched raids against the Najd’s tribes and settlements. The Sharīfs had a standing army of mercenaries comprising several thousand men from the Yemen and the tribesmen from Mecca’s hinterland as well as some one thousand slaves who were mainly African. The struggle over succession and rule that broke out amongst the Sharīfs often led to urban warfare in the streets of Mecca and with the small garrison of Egyptian soldiers taking sides.

The politics of the Sharīfs were messy, involving plots with, or against, various members of the Ottoman administration as well as high imperial competition over the symbolic value of what took place in the Holy Cities. It was the rare occasion when Istanbul, Damascus or Cairo could impose its writ on Mecca. One such occasion was in 1042/1633 when the sultan ordered that Persians (i.e. Shi’īs) not be permitted to perform the pilgrimage or to visit the tomb of the Prophet in Medina. During the reign of Sharīf Masʿūd ibn Saʿīd (r. 1145–65/1733–52), Nādir Shāh (r. 1148–60/1736–47) of Iran wrote to him demanding that his name be mentioned in the Friday sermon and that an Imāmī Shi’ī be permitted to lead prayers alongside the imāms of the four Sunnī schools of law. Sharīf Masʿūd demurred and handed over to the Ottomans the
Persian emissary who delivered the shah's letter. This same Sharif was also the first to notify the Ottomans of the threat posed by the Wahhābīs. The latter requested repeatedly to be allowed to perform the pilgrimage and were denied this until their wars of conquest of the Ḥijāz in the late twelfth/eighteenth century.

This period of Ottoman oversight of the Ḥijāz saw an increase in the number of visitors and permanent residents (sing. mujāwir) in Mecca and Medina. Certain scholarly families established themselves and some secondary literature on the scholarly networks of the Ḥijāz has claimed that many of the worldwide twelfth/eighteenth-century Islamic reform and revival movements have their origin in the study circles of the Holy Cities, especially in Medina. Certain scholars, such as Ibrāhīm ibn Ḥasan al-Kūrānī (d. 1101/1690) and his son Abū Ṭāhir Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm (d. 1144/1732), acted like transmission nodes for the spread of reformist ideas throughout the Islamic world. These ideas involved some of the following: an insistence on the study of the hadīth sciences and their application in law, ridding Sufism of its antinomian excesses, advocating independent legal reasoning (ijtiḥād) and the shunning of imitation (taqlīd). More detailed studies of the ideas of the twelfth/eighteenth-century reformist thinkers in their various local settings around the Muslim world must be undertaken before any generalisation about the importance of the Ḥijāz's study circles can be made. Furthermore, the content of what was studied and transmitted, as distinct from the mere fact that two scholars studied with one another, must also be undertaken before any broad claims are made. A good case in point is Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1206/1792), who studied in these circles in the Ḥijāz and yet founded a reformist movement that utterly rejected Sufism in all its forms and insisted on a particularly strict theology and religious practice that most scholars of the Ḥijāz, including some members of his own Ḥanbalī school, found utterly objectionable.

The Wahhābīs, the followers of the teachings of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, formed a movement that emerged out of the settled towns of southern Najd, the region of al-‘Ārīd, and sought to bring some measure of stability to the violent and highly unstable situation then prevailing in this region. At its core lay an agreement between the religious reformer Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and an amīr Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd (d. 1179/1766) of the town of al-Dir‘iyya, a short distance from Riyadh. This movement then spread by military and activist preaching throughout the Najd and ultimately conquered much of present-day Saudi Arabia, including the Holy Cities. Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt was a factor in forestalling the Ottomans from sending an army to
defeat the Wahhābīs. Mecca fell to the latter in 1218/1803 and Medina one year later. The Wahhābīs destroyed many domes over the tombs in these cities and effected changes such as the congregational prayer behind one īmām as opposed to the four separate prayer groups behind one of each of the four madhhabs. They also prevented on several occasions the arrival of the Syrian and Egyptian pilgrimage caravans. The total loss of control over the Holy Cities was too much for the Ottomans to tolerate and the Sublime Porte demanded that Muḥammad ‘Alī of Egypt send an army to regain control of the Ḥijāz. After about seven years of Wahhābī control over the Holy Cities, the Egyptian army began campaigning in earnest against the Najdīs, and the first Wahhābī state was defeated when al-Dir‘īyya was destroyed in 1233/1818. With this accomplished, a dramatic chapter in western Arabia’s history came to an end and a new one began. The Egyptians dominated for a few decades, followed by a concerted effort by the Ottomans to rule both the Ḥijāz and Yemen in a much more direct and forceful fashion.

Notes
2. El2, art. ‘Makka’ (A. J. Wensinck and C. E. Bosworth).
4. As opposed to the Hasānid dynasty in Mecca, Medina was ruled by Hasānīd Sharīfs who were dependent on the rulers of Mecca for much of the Ottoman period under consideration.
Western Arabia and Yemen during the Ottoman period


15. This state of affairs is described in detail in Aḥmad Zaynī Dāḥlān’s history of Mecca, Cairo, 1305/1888.

PART IV

NORTH AND WEST AFRICA
(SIXTEENTH TO EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES)
Sharīfian rule in Morocco (tenth–twelfth/sixteenth–eighteenth centuries)

Stephen Cory

Introduction

The early modern period was a time of transition for Morocco. Located close to western Europe, Morocco could not avoid being impacted by the changes going on in that continent. The country was significantly affected by the completion of the Christian *reconquista* of Iberia in 897/1492, along with the ongoing struggles and ultimate expulsion of the Moriscos and ‘New Christians’. Since the Portuguese launched their first colonial enterprise in Morocco, and Spain later established outposts along the North African coastline, Morocco would become one of the first Islamic countries to be confronted with European imperial ambitions.

In addition, Moroccan autonomy was threatened from the east by Ottoman expansion into North Africa during the early tenth/sixteenth century. The Ottomans presented a unique challenge in that, as co-religionists, they appealed to Moroccan leaders in the name of Islamic unity and as defenders of the abode of Islam (*dār al-islām*) from the Christian Europeans. Nevertheless, Ottoman ‘protection’ would include subsuming Morocco into its system, making Moroccan leaders accountable for directives from Istanbul. Such a situation would grant the Ottomans access to the Atlantic Ocean, and for this reason the Sublime Porte frequently meddled in Moroccan politics leading to periodic open conflicts between the two Islamic states. In the end, the Ottomans were unsuccessful in controlling Morocco and in obtaining their coveted Atlantic port. Nevertheless, the proximity of so many acquisitive world powers profoundly influenced Morocco’s political, intellectual and religious development during this period.

Just as important were internal realities that challenged any leader who sought to establish a centralised government. During this period the concept of a Moroccan state, comprising a territory roughly corresponding to its current borders, became widely accepted by most Moroccans. This does not
mean that Morocco comprised a unified entity, however. Historical and geographical factors contributed to a decentralised system in which family, tribe, spiritual leaders and region were more important for individuals than any conception of a Moroccan identity. Morocco’s heavy dependence upon subsistence agriculture, its lack of an established central bureaucracy, the decline of the trans-Saharan caravan trade, the difficulty of collecting taxes and the aforementioned meddling of outside powers all helped create a situation in which Moroccan administrations struggled to fund and maintain the basic services expected of central governments. The rise of Sharifian regimes during this period paradoxically meant that Morocco was ruled by governments with considerable religious legitimacy, yet which were rarely able to exert effective control throughout most of the country.

Moroccan political history during the tenth/sixteenth to twelfth/eighteenth centuries reflects an era in which two dominant sultans – Mawlāy Ahmād al-Mānsūr (r. 985–1011/1578–1603) and Mawlāy Iṣmā‘īl (r. 1082–1139/1672–1727) – were able to create prosperous and relatively successful states, while several other sultans succeeded in maintaining sufficient central (makhzan) authority to sustain functional governments. Yet these periods of comparative stability were sandwiched around extended interludes of unrest (fitna) during which political authority was divided among a number of competitors, making the establishment of an effective central state a near impossibility. This reality led later historians to posit a division between bilād al-makhzan (lands that submitted to the authority of the central government) and bilād al-sība (lands that resisted this authority), while attributing this situation to influences such as ‘tribalism’ or a supposed ‘maraboutic crisis’. The political instability helps explain how a country located so close to Europe could appear so isolated and backward that contemporary European visitors described Morocco’s government as ramshackle, the country as poor and the people as ignorant.

Despite such obstacles, the Sa‘dī and early ‘Alawī dynasties laid the foundations for a surprisingly durable political system, and the ‘Alawī state would become one of the few Islamic governments to survive European colonialism in the modern period. Although repeatedly the target of acquisitive designs by powers stronger than itself, Morocco maintained its independence through the end of the nineteenth century CE. Profoundly affected by the demise of al-Andalus, Moroccans nonetheless continued to develop their shared cultural heritage into the modern era. Ruled by leaders who claimed lineal descent from the Prophet Muhammad and who referred to themselves by the caliphal title, Commander of the Faithful (amīr al-mu‘minīn), Morocco would enter the modern period with a weak central government but a strong sense of its social,
religious and cultural identity, the parameters of which were forged during the tenth/sixteenth through the twelfth/eighteenth centuries.

The rise of the Sa`dī dynasty

The Sa`dī dynasty first arose in the early tenth/sixteenth century, largely in response to Portuguese incursions from their fortresses along the Atlantic coast. These strongholds had been established during a period of aggressive Portuguese expansion that began with the conquest of Ceuta in 818/1415. During the following century, the Portuguese created a series of outposts from Aṣila in the north to Santa Cruz (modern Agadir) in the south. At the same time, the Moroccan Marīnid dynasty was in its death throes, eventually being co-opted by its allies, the Waṭṭāṣīds, who ruled from 823/1420 in the Marīnids’ name.

Despite this transition in power, the Waṭṭāṣīds proved to be no more successful in combating the Portuguese than the Marīnids had been. Unable to expel the Portuguese militarily, the Waṭṭāṣīds made deals with the foreign invaders to preserve their own authority in northern Morocco. By the late ninth/fifteenth century, the southern portion of the country was controlled by various tribal leaders who acknowledged Waṭṭāṣid authority in name only, while contending with each other and the Portuguese for regional dominance. Meanwhile, the European states of Genoa, Venice, Flanders, France, England and Spain competed with the Portuguese for Moroccan trade, exchanging firearms and other European goods for sugar, saltpetre, and mineral resources. Morocco seemed to be overrun by foreigners, a fact that was not missed by local ‘ulamā’ and Sufi shaykhs.

Faced with this impotence by the ruling house, localised opposition to the Portuguese arose in the south, particularly in the Dukkala and the Sūs, where most of the Portuguese economic exploitation was taking place. The Portuguese and a few local allies had committed some notorious abuses, which outraged the inhabitants of Dukkala. Sa`dī authority first appeared in the Sūs and Dra` regions, both of which had been free of government control for over 200 years. In the absence of a strong central authority, the heads of religious orders and local saint cults played an important role in maintaining the necessary alliances for social co-operation and trade. Several zāwiya allies with regional Sharīfian families and became centres of local resistance to the Portuguese.

In the midst of these circumstances, the most influential Sūsī shaykh, Śīdī Mubārak, suggested the people turn to the Sharīf Abū `Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Zaydānī of Tagmadart for leadership. In 915/1510 some local tribes took an
oath of allegiance to the Sharif. He chose the millenarian title al-Qāʿim bi amr Allāh (One Who Has Arisen by the Command of God). Al-Qāʿim’s open reliance upon mahdist and prophetic imagery, along with his initial backing from regional shaykhs, gave the Saʿdis the reputation of being jihad warriors, who utilised religious enthusiasm against the Portuguese in their rise to power.

The growing importance of Sharīfian ideology in Morocco was another element in the Saʿdi ascent. Indeed, the Saʿdis used their Sharīfian identity as a trump card against the Watṭāsids. Sharīfian influence had been increasing since the early ninth/fifteenth century. The movement fed off frustration with the Marīnids, who were accused of not properly honouring the shurāfāʿ, and encouragement from the important Jazūliyya Sufi order. In 840/1437, the Watṭāsids attempted to regain control of these forces when they ‘rediscovered’ the tomb of the famous Sharīfian leader Idrīs II in Fez. However, this event simply added fuel to the fire. Rising Sharīfian power eventually established the shurāfāʿ to establish a short-lived Sharīfian state in Fez during 869/1465, although the Watṭāsids reconquered the city in 875/1471.3 Thus, there was an increasing expectation that only Sharīfian leadership could restore peace and prosperity to Morocco.

Some historians argue that religious fervour alone was insufficient to catapult the Saʿdis into prominence. Vincent Cornell makes the case that the early Saʿdi leaders recognised the importance of establishing a solid economic foundation for their state, and that they demonstrated shrewd management in developing independent funding sources, primarily through trade with Europeans and promoting the sugar cane industry.4 In addition, the early Saʿdis managed effectively to organise and unify the southern regions. Al-Qāʿim capitalised upon traditional tribal alliances to gather a large group of supporters. His sons, Ahmad al-Aʿraj and Muḥammad al-Shaykh, obtained recognition from the Watṭāsids as regional leaders, further strengthening their legitimacy.5 Although Ahmad al-Aʿraj was the older of the two, his younger brother’s superior talents would eventually eclipse him.

Muḥammad al-Shaykh made Tarudant his base of operations in 920/1514. The high regard accorded to him, even by the Portuguese, demonstrates the breadth of his influence. In 931/1525, Aḥmad al-Aʿraj captured Marrakesh and made it his capital. Both brothers traded with European merchants for gunpowder weapons and hired Ottoman mercenaries and European renegades to train their soldiers in military techniques. This approach paid off when the Saʿdis took Santa Cruz in 947/1541. Shortly afterwards, the Portuguese abandoned Azammur and Safi, and Muḥammad al-Shaykh consolidated his
authority by deposing and exiling his brother. In less than three decades, al-Shaykh had become the supreme leader of southern Morocco.

A skilled politician, Muḥammad al-Shaykh maintained his messianic image by taking the title ‘al-Mahdī’, while at the same time working to isolate the Waṭṭāsids through separate alliances with European states. Al-Shaykh also sought to re-establish the Saharan trade, disrupted by Portuguese and Bedouin raids. In 949–50/1543–4, he sent an expedition to the western Sahara, intending to facilitate trade through alliances with Saharan tribes, and to gain jurisdiction over the important salt mines at Ijil. By 961/1554, Muḥammad al-Shaykh had conquered Fez and eliminated the Waṭṭāsid dynasty. Now controlling the entire country, al-Shaykh eliminated potential challengers by repressing important religious scholars and Sufi leaders. It was clear that he did not intend to share power with anybody.

Although he relied upon Turkish mercenary troops as a key element in his army, Muḥammad al-Shaykh had poor relations with the Ottoman government. He was not pleased when the Ottomans backed the Waṭṭāsids in opposition to his own bid for power. Al-Shaykh showed this distaste through frequent verbal slights of Ottoman claims to leadership in the Islamic world. He clearly implied his own superiority through derisive references to the Ottoman sultan as ‘The Sultan of the Fishermen’ and his statement that he would meet the Ottomans in Cairo. It was for such swagger as this, put into action when Muḥammad al-Shaykh briefly conquered Tlemcen on the western borders of Ottoman territory, that Sūleymān the Magnificent had the Sa’dī leader assassinated in 964/1557.

Muḥammad al-Shaykh was succeeded by his eldest son, ‘Abd Allāh al-Ghālib, who placed less emphasis upon the use of messianic imagery, although he did not stray from the dynasty’s reliance upon Sharīfian claims to legitimacy. Al-Ghālib followed his father’s example in at least one area, when he ordered the assassination of potential rivals within his family. For this reason his brothers ‘Abd al-Mu’min, ‘Abd al-Malik and Aḥmad fled Morocco together and took up residence with the Turks in Algiers. Even at this distance, al-Ghālib was able to arrange for the assassination of ‘Abd al-Mu’min. When the sultan passed away after a seventeen-year reign, the pathway appeared clear for his eldest son, Muḥammad al-Mutawakkil, to take his place as ruler.

‘Abd al-Malik had been planning for this moment for a number of years. Although neither al-Ghālib nor his son had tried to improve relations with the Ottomans, ‘Abd al-Malik had used his time in Algiers to good advantage by establishing positive connections with top Ottoman officials. Al-Ghālib’s death
in 981/1574 presented ‘Abd al-Malik with the opportunity he had been waiting for. He persuaded the Ottomans to outfite him with an army, which he led to victory over al-Mutawakkil outside of Fez in 983/1576. ‘Abd al-Malik’s spies had assured him that there was considerable receptivity to his return in Morocco, and they managed to persuade a sizeable battalion of tribal warriors to desert al-Mutawakkil in the heat of battle.7 Triumphant at last, ‘Abd al-Malik marched into Fez as the new Sa’di sultan, while assigning his younger brother, Aḥmad, to capture al-Mutawakkil, who had fled south to the Sūs. After a year of skirmishes in the south, the deposed sultan escaped north again, making it to Aṣila, whence he sailed to Portugal. Unable to rally sufficient support in Morocco to reinstall himself as sultan, and permanently alienated from the Ottomans, al-Mutawakkil sought help from the only available source, the Portuguese Christian infidels and their young king, Don Sebastian.

The events that followed al-Mutawakkil’s flight are among the best known in Sa’di history, and have been recounted many times in European and Moroccan literature. Don Sebastian, concerned with the waning glory of the Portuguese empire and seeking to regain ground lost to the Sa’dis, personally joined al-Mutawakkil with a force of between 18,000 and 20,000 European soldiers. They sailed to Aṣila, whence they marched to meet a much larger Sa’di army at Wādī ʿl-Makhāzin,8 near al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr in north-western Morocco. In the ensuing battle, the Europeans were completely routed and both Don Sebastian and al-Mutawakkil were killed. ‘Abd al-Malik also died during the course of the conflict, most likely of illness. When the dust settled, the one remaining leader was ‘Abd al-Malik’s younger brother, Aḥmad, who ascended the Moroccan throne with a title intended to commemorate the great victory. Henceforth he would be known as Aḥmad al-Manṣūr (the victorious).

Aḥmad al-Manṣūr: the Golden Sultan

The reign of Aḥmad al-Manṣūr represents the high point of Sa’di rule. In fact, al-Manṣūr’s era is often viewed as a golden age for Morocco. For twenty-five years Morocco experienced a rare stretch of peace and prosperity during which the economy was strong and internal opposition was largely controlled. In fact, apart from the seventeen-year reign of al-Ghālib, Mawlāy Aḥmad was the only sultan to rule the entire country between the collapse of Marīnid power in the early ninth/fifteenth century and the establishment of ‘Alawī authority in the late eleventh/seventeenth century. Al-Manṣūr achieved this monopoly of power by focusing on four areas: (1) developing a strong military; (2) keeping the Spanish and Ottomans at bay through a combination
of fortuitous circumstances and diplomatic skill; (3) obtaining considerable economic strength by ransoming European captives, regularly collecting taxes, and controlling the Saharan caravan trade; and (4) buttressing his political legitimacy by promoting himself as a Sharifian Arab caliph in contrast to the Ottomans, who were neither shurafrā‘ nor Arab, and therefore (according to al-Manṣūr) not worthy for the caliphate.

Following his victory at Wādī al-Makhāzin, al-Manṣūr used his military to subdue internal opposition and expand his state. Weston Cook has demonstrated that the Sa‘dīs developed an effective early modern army based on firearms during their six-decade struggle against the Waṭṭāṣids and the Portuguese. Utilising a base of Sūsī and Morisco troops, the Sa‘dīs supplemented with renegades and jaysh tribal warriors. Al-Manṣūr assigned qa‘ids to lead periodic raids against dissident tribes and collect taxes throughout the country. Within a few years of obtaining the sultanate, Mawlāy Aḥmad felt secure enough to send expeditionary forces towards the southern caravan trade routes. Between 991/1583 and 999/1591, al-Manṣūr planned, equipped and launched an invasion across the Sahara of the West African Songhay dynasty. This conquest brought great wealth and tremendous prestige to Mawlāy Aḥmad, even though Morocco’s hold upon West Africa would turn out to be tenuous and short.

Although the military maintained al-Manṣūr’s authority within Morocco and expanded it into West Africa, the art of diplomacy provided a much more effective defence against stronger regimes in Madrid and Ottoman Algiers. The sultan’s royal correspondence demonstrates his ability to play off the Ottomans against the Spaniards, professing friendship to both regimes while utilising their fear of driving him into the arms of the other to avoid making significant concessions. In the 990s/1580s, when Ottoman attention was redirected towards the east after their truce with Spain, Mawlāy Aḥmad made overtures to Queen Elizabeth and took advantage of England’s competition with Spain to play the two European powers against one another. Although Philip II pressured al-Manṣūr for several years to cede him the Atlantic port of Larache, Mawlāy Aḥmad not only avoided making this concession, but also received back Aṣīla from Spain in 997/1589 when Philip sought to curry favour with the Moroccan monarch following the devastating English victory over the Spanish Armada. The perceived importance of Morocco in English foreign policy is reflected in the repeated appearance of Moroccan figures in plays performed on the Elizabethan stage.

One of the main reasons that al-Manṣūr could finance a regular army and exert some diplomatic independence was the financial resources that he commanded for most of his reign. Preceding Sa‘dī sultans had traded actively
with European merchants, exchanging goods like sugar and saltpetre for the finearms that helped fuel their early conquests. However, al-Manṣūr added to this income source a considerable amount of ransom money obtained for thousands of European prisoners of war in the years following the battle of Wādī al-Makhāzin. Captives for whom he could not obtain a ransom were sold off as slaves. In addition, al-Manṣūr’s military might allowed him to collect taxes throughout the country on a more regular basis than his predecessors, a fact that is reflected in complaints about heavy taxation found in the sources. Finally, al-Manṣūr’s conquest of West Africa yielded so much wealth that he became known as ‘al-Dhahabī’ (The Golden One). Both Moroccan and European sources contain abundant stories of the sultan’s conspicuous affluence.

In addition to lavishing wealth upon court poets, favourite servants and other allies, al-Manṣūr directed a considerable amount of his financial reserves to building a magnificent palace in the midst of the qaṣba in Marrakesh. He began construction of this edifice shortly after obtaining power in 985/1578 and did not complete it until some sixteen years later. The centrepiece of the palace was a huge rectangular reception hall named al-Bāḍī‘ (the Marvellous). Aiming to awe visitors with the sultan’s wealth and power, al-Bāḍī‘ utilised Andalusī architectural themes on a scale that seems intended to rival the Ottoman Topkapı palace, which al-Manṣūr probably visited while in exile among the Ottoman Turks during the reign of al-Ghālib.

The sultan primarily used al-Bāḍī‘ as a reception hall for foreign delegations. It also served as the site for al-Manṣūr’s annual celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, the mawlid al-nabī. Mawlāy Ahmad placed considerable emphasis upon this festival, which provided a stage upon which he could visually reinforce his Sharīfian caliphal identity before large numbers of subjects and royal visitors. Primary sources record the stunning impression that this celebration made upon all who were present, an impression highlighted by the magnificent setting of the palace.

The earliest Sa’dī sultans had staked the dynasty’s claims to authority on their Prophetic descent. Nevertheless, it was Ahmad al-Manṣūr who decisively established Sharīfian lineage as a requirement for all future Moroccan sultans. Using panegyric writings and elaborate ceremonies, al-Manṣūr vividly connected Sharīfian lineage to caliphal authority to a degree that had not been seen since the Fāṭimid rulers of Cairo. Such assertions automatically set the Sa’dī state in opposition to the larger Ottoman dynasty, which also claimed the right to lead the Islamic world. Like his father, al-Manṣūr initially flaunted Ottoman authority, a reckless action that almost led to an Ottoman invasion in
After this near miss, Mawlay Ahmed was careful to show respect to the Ottomans, while continuing to declare his caliphal supremacy before his own people. Following the Ottoman peace with Spain, al-Mansur seems to have felt free to assert these claims more openly once again, even to the point of making provocative statements in correspondence to Ottoman leaders in Algiers. In the same way, he used his position as rightful caliph over the Islamic world to justify an invasion of the neighbouring Muslim Songhoy dynasty in West Africa, and seems to have accepted an oath of allegiance from the Bornu of Central Africa. Mawlay Ahmed also made alliances and sought to promote himself as an Arab alternative to the Ottomans in eastern provinces such as Egypt. The tone of his propaganda and the allusions in his ceremonies have convinced some modern historians that al-Mansur was implicitly making mahdist claims for himself.

The sultan’s propaganda exploited the prestige of the shurafi and connected his regime to earlier caliphates such as the ‘Abbásids. Al-Mansur portrayed his military and diplomatic triumphs as the natural results of his caliphal supremacy. Though the Sa’di dynasty would unravel upon his death in 1011/1603, al-Mansur’s rhetoric was so effective that it took another Sharifian family finally to reunite the country sixty-five years later. Though the ‘Alawis disputed the authenticity of the Sa’dis’ Sharifian lineage, they implemented much of al-Mansur’s rhetorical imagery into their own panegyric ceremonies.

The Sa’di fitna

As powerful as the government of Ahmad al-Mansur appeared to be, the central authority of his makhzan fell apart during an extensive civil war waged by his descendants. This rapid collapse, brought on by an implosion of the Sa’di state rather than defeat by an outside power, demonstrates the ultimate failure of al-Mansur’s policies. By focusing on restoring a past caliphal golden age, Mawlay Ahmed had not developed an infrastructure to support Morocco’s transition to a modern state. Rather, his success was based upon a combination of fortuitous circumstances and personal aptitudes such as people skills, attention to detail, and ability to balance different interests to maximise his resources. However, beginning in 1003/1595, circumstances turned against the Sa’dis through a series of plagues, famines and costly rebellions. In addition, the Moroccan failure to maintain political control over West Africa cut off an important source of revenue for the state. Finally, al-Mansur’s heir apparent, Muhammad al-Shaykh al-Ma’mun, turned
out to be corrupt and incompetent. His failed rebellion in 1010/1602 meant that al-Ma’mūn was in prison when his father died, so that the sultanate was available to whichever Sa’dī contender could overpower the others.

As the sultan’s three sons and two of his grandsons battled for supremacy, the country descended into a long and destructive period of fitna. Never again would a Sa’dī sultan rule over both Marrakesh and Fez, as the two cities became rival capitals for competing Sa’dī princes. While the Sa’dīs fought among themselves, other challengers arose to establish independent principalities throughout the country. Led by a variety of military, tribal and spiritual leaders, the various contenders wreaked havoc upon one another and upon the Moroccan countryside. The long-term consequences of this extended period of unrest included the almost complete devastation of the Saharan trade, which for centuries had been a reliable source of income for the country. By the early twelfth/eighteenth century, when Mawlāy Ismā’īl attempted to re-establish Moroccan control in the Sahara, much of the trade had been rerouted to Mediterranean destinations east of Morocco or diverted by European merchants along the Gold Coast of West Africa.

With the loss of the Saharan trade profits, Morocco’s economic potential became increasingly bound up with its dealings with Europe. The most lucrative avenue for such dealings came through the burgeoning corsair movement that arose in Rabat/Salé during the early eleventh/seventeenth century. This business profited from both the collapse of the Moroccan central government and the expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain between 1017/1609 and 1023/1614. Many of these Moriscos ended up in Morocco, and their entry rejuvenated the moribund cities of Rabat and Tetouan. In the former location, the Moriscos established an independent community across the Bū Ragrāg river from Salé. Over the course of several decades, the Andalusīs of Rabat launched an effective corsair movement that served the dual purposes of supporting their community and taking revenge upon Spain.

In addition to profiting from the contraband acquired through seizing European merchant ships, the corsairs obtained ransoms for captured crew members or sold these unfortunates as slaves. The jihadist nature of their operations increased when Rabat/Salé came under the influence of Muḥammad al-‘Ayyāshī in 1024/1615. This Arab military leader used the twin cities as a base for attacking Spanish enclaves, profiting from the corsair trade, and eliminating Sa’dī authority in north-west Morocco. However, his authoritarian tendencies alienated most of his Andalusi clientele, which was relieved to be free of him after he was ambushed and killed by troops from the Dilāʾī zāwiya in 1050/1641. In addition, Jerome Weiner argues that al-‘Ayyāshī’s
strict commitment to jihad against Spain eventually clashed with the goals of the Rabati Moriscos. Some of them seem to have been negotiating a separate peace with the Spanish, which would have surrendered the qāṣba of Rabat to Spain in exchange for clemency allowing the Moriscos to return to their beloved homeland. The proposed agreement fell apart owing to Spanish prevarication, internal conflicts among the Rabatis, al-ʿAyyāshī’s oppression of the Andalusis, and the eventual Dilāṭī takeover of Rabat/Salé.²³

Other military leaders who touted their credentials as jihad warriors played upon Moroccan fears of the infidel to develop local power-bases, even though most of them imitated al-ʿAyyāshī by trading with the Europeans and spent more time fighting other Muslims than they did combating infidels. But perhaps most effective were Sufi holy men who parlayed their reputation as spiritual leaders into worldly authority during the early eleventh/seventeenth century. This was the era of the ‘maraboutic crisis’ widely discussed in French historiography by writers such as Jacques Berque. The title ‘marabout’ is a corruption of the Arabic murābit, which describes a charismatic spiritual leader known for baraka (spiritual power) as manifested through miracle working, an ability to intercede between warring groups of Muslims, and pious deeds. Many of these murābiṭs enhanced their spiritual prestige by claiming Sharīfian status and used their Sufi lodges (zāwiyas) as centres from which they expanded their regional influence. Although Berque and others see the murābiṭs as destructive elements that undermined the legitimate Moroccan government, these holy men maintained their influence over local communities even during periods when a relatively strong central government was in place. Their eleventh/seventeenth-century entrance into the political arena came in response to the Sa’dī collapse but did not initiate it.

The first of the murābiṭs directly to challenge Sa’dī authority was Ibn Abī Mahallī who proclaimed himself to be the mahdī shortly after al-Ma’mūn surrendered the port of Larache to Spain in 1018/1610. Ibn Abī Mahallī garnered sufficient support to conquer Sijilmāsa later that year. He took Marrakesh in 1021/1612 when the Sa’dī prince Mawlāy Zaydān abandoned the capital after a major victory by the mahdist forces. However, Zaydān would reclaim Marrakesh the following year after rallying the Sūsī murābiṭ Yahyā ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Ḥāḥī to his cause. Ibn Abī Mahallī was killed in a battle outside the city walls, and his forces rapidly dispersed upon his death. Despite the short-lived nature of his rebellion, García-Arenal views Ibn Abī Mahallī as a prime example of a pre-modern Maghribi messiah. Such leaders drew upon deeply rooted Moroccan longings for spiritual and societal revival under the leadership of a charismatic holy man whose ascent to power would usher in
the ultimate triumph of Islam. Ibn Abi Mahallī combined extensive training in the religious sciences, mystical divine illumination and positional holiness acquired through an alleged Sharīfian descent. Thus he brought together varying paths to personal sanctity often portrayed as diametrically opposed in the madrasa versus zāwiya dialectic that underlies the theory of the ‘maraboutic crisis’. In contrast, García-Arenal reaffirms the conclusion of other historians who argue for the interconnected nature of these variant roads to spiritual power in the careers of the early modern murābiṭs.24

Of these murābiṭs, none was more successful in the eleventh/seventeenth century than the zāwiya of Dilā’. Its influence expanded outward from the Middle Atlas by 1041/1632, under the leadership of Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr and Muḥammad al-Ḥājj. Initially an offshoot of the Jazūliyya that undertook its spiritual work among Middle Atlas Berbers, the Dilā’iyya allied themselves with the Sa’dīs during the reigns of ‘Abd Allāḥ al-Ghālib and ʿĀḥmad al-Mansūr. When the Sa’dī government collapsed, the Dilā’i leadership took on a more overtly political role, first in the Middle Atlas and eventually throughout northern Morocco. Its prestige was originally derived not only from its staunch Sufi message honouring the Prophet Muḥammad and the šurafā’ but also from its extensive charitable services, which created a sense of Dilā’i piety and a strong loyalty among the recipients of these services. The Dilā’iyya eventually created their own army and established fortified outposts throughout their realms. They promoted learning in their zāwiyas, which became widely respected as centres of scholarship. Dilā’i influence increased to the point that they gained control of most of northern Morocco, including Fez, Rabat/Salé and Tetouan. By 1047/1638 they began to deal directly with Europeans, were viewed as the de facto rulers of the north, and seemed to be the most likely successors to the Sa’dīs in unifying the entire country.

However, the Dilā’iyya were unable to achieve this goal, partially because their open identification with Berber interests alienated Arab tribes. Some of these joined forces with al-‘Ayyāshī, who battled with the zāwiya for control in the north. After al-‘Ayyāshī’s defeat in 1050/1641, some Arab leaders began to ally themselves with southern contenders for power such as the murābiṭ ʿAlī Abū Ḥassān al-Samlālī in the Sūs. Weiner speculates that the central location of the zāwiya worked against it, since the Dilā’iyya had to expand both to the north and the south, as opposed to most Moroccan dynasties which arose in the southern regions.25 However, the biggest hindrance to Dilā’i success in unifying Morocco was the fact that they could not claim Sharīfian status. This weakness left the door open for the rise of another Sharīfian family, when the ʿAlawīs extended their authority beyond their home base in the Tafilalt oasis.
By 1060/1650, the ‘Alawi leader Muḥammad al-Sharīf had established alliances with disenchanted northern Arab tribes, paving the way for his brother Mawlāy Rashīd to reunite the country when he conquered both Fez and Marrakesh in 1078/1668.

Nevertheless, the new conqueror suffered an untimely death in 1082/1672, leaving the sultanate to his untested younger brother Mawlāy Ismā’īl. Much as Aḥmad al-Manṣūr had arisen from the shadow of his older brother almost 100 years earlier, Mawlāy Ismā’īl was destined to become one of the most influential rulers in Moroccan history. His fifty-five-year reign cemented ‘Alawi authority in Morocco, to the degree that more than two centuries of instability and weakness following his death failed to loosen the ‘Alawi hold on the sultanate.

Mawlāy Ismā’īl and the ‘Alawi dynasty

Like al-Manṣūr, Mawlāy Ismā’īl initially had to defeat internal competitors to establish his authority. In Mawlāy Ismā’īl’s case, the sternest challenge came from his nephew, Aḥmad ibn Muḥriz, who managed to garner support for his rebellion in different regions up to his death in 1097/1686. Just as troublesome was a series of rebellions sponsored by Ottoman clients, including the Dilā’ī shaykh Ahmad al-Dilāʿī, who created problems for Mawlāy Ismā’īl in the Middle Atlas mountains. He was not eliminated until 1091/1680, after which his rebellion fizzled out.

As a result of such sustained opposition to his rule, Mawlāy Ismā’īl seems to have derived the conclusion that his only security lay in separating himself from the society that he governed, much as the Ottoman sultans had done in their domains. Using his Sharifian status as justification, Mawlāy Ismā’īl undertook to establish his dominance over all other challengers, including regional/tribal leaders and religious authorities (both murābiṭṣ and traditional ‘ulamā’), who sought to undermine the sultan’s religious legitimacy and/or circumscribe his actions by reference to religious law.

In order to defeat military challenges to his authority, Mawlāy Ismā’īl developed a professional army that included two corps. The first was the Wadāya, consisting of Arab warriors extracted from their tribal setting and enlisted into regiments serving under the sultan’s authority. The second, and more significant, was a black slave army that became known as the ‘Abīd al-Bukharī.26 Mawlāy Ismā’īl seems to have initiated this army out of a desire to establish a military force loyal only to himself. It is estimated that there were around 50,000 ‘Abīd soldiers at the end of his reign.27 Theoretically slaves,
many of the ‘Abīd were originally free black Muslims who were forcibly conscripted into the military. Mawlāy Ismā‘īl established a training centre for the ‘Abīd in Meknes, where they were instructed in crafts and the martial arts. Many of the ‘Abīd remained stationed in Meknes, which became the centre of ‘Abīd power. Others were assigned to man various fortresses established throughout the Middle Atlas and on Morocco’s eastern frontier, where Mawlāy Ismā‘īl had received the stiffest challenges to his authority.

The creation of these military forces not only allowed Mawlāy Ismā‘īl to establish unchallenged supremacy within the country, but also encouraged him to extend his influence outward. As a result, the sultan increasingly began to assert himself in three directions: (1) eastward towards the Ottomans, whose attempts to unseat him could not be forgotten; (2) southward towards the Sahara, where Mawlāy Ismā‘īl hoped to revive the trans-Saharan trade under Moroccan authority; and (3) northward and westward towards the European enclaves that served as irritating reminders of superior European power, even as they provided footholds for the Spanish and British in Morocco. In all three cases, Mawlāy Ismā‘īl experienced some initial success, but would fall short of achieving his ultimate goals.

Mawlāy Ismā‘īl seems to have been particularly motivated to portray himself as leader of jihad against the foreign infidel. Jihad rhetoric appeared in all his dealings with Europeans, including his regular attacks upon the coastal enclaves, his royal correspondence with European monarchs (in which he frequently called upon them to embrace Islam), and his refusal to ransom European prisoners without the corresponding release of at least a token number of Muslim captives. In fact, it was primarily the French refusal to release Muslim captives (the French relied heavily upon such prisoners to man their galleys) that created poor relations between Morocco and France during Mawlāy Ismā‘īl’s reign.

In contrast, the Dutch and English continued to negotiate with Morocco, largely because those two countries were motivated to curtail corsair attacks cutting into their international shipping profits. Viewing the corsair expeditions as a particularly effective form of jihad, Mawlāy Ismā‘īl incorporated the Rabat/Salé corsairs into his military system, eventually transferring most European captives to his direct control in Meknes. Mawlāy Ismā‘īl’s ability to control the corsairs enabled him to obtain considerable weaponry and munitions from the English and Dutch, which he could then use to besiege Spanish and Ottoman fortresses in North Africa. Thus Mawlāy Ismā‘īl’s jihads were largely dependent upon European supplies, a fact that would not bode well for Morocco’s future relations with European powers.28

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Jihad not only justified Mawlay Isma‘īl’s foreign policy, it also provided an excuse for the sultan to consolidate his power within Morocco. The need to finance jihad was cited as the reason for increased taxation and sometimes outright plunder of adversaries, such as his pillage of Fez in 1132/1720. The jihad justified harsh retribution taken against the sultan’s opponents, whose resistance could then be portrayed as detrimental to the interests of Islam. Just as important, the jihad allowed Mawlay Isma‘īl to increase his recruitment and seizure of black ‘slaves’ in order to create new regiments of ‘Abīd troops. The dubious nature of this enterprise is reflected in the repeated criticism that the sultan received from the ‘ulamā’ of Fez. The issue proved to be a constant point of friction between the sultan and the Fezzi elite.

In fact, Mawlay Isma‘īl’s relations with the self-proclaimed religious capital of Morocco were decidedly poor. They began on a bad note when the Fezzis opted to support Ahmad ibn Muhriz’s rebellion at the beginning of Mawlay Isma‘īl’s reign. It took fourteen months for Mawlay Isma‘īl to conquer the city, after which he executed a number of Fezzi leaders and replaced others. Leading members of the Fezzi ‘ulamā’ were critical of Mawlay Isma‘īl’s policies, including his use of non-canonical taxes and forced recruitment of black slave soldiers. An example of Fezzi complaints can be seen in an open letter of reproof that the respected scholar Abū ‘l-Ḥasan al-Yūsī sent to the sultan in 1090/1679.29 Al-Yūsī criticises the sultan for the oppressive actions of his tax collectors. He also accuses him of failing adequately to promote jihad and uphold justice throughout the land. He encourages Mawlay Isma‘īl to seek counsel from the ‘ulamā’ in order to learn how to rule his subjects according to God’s will. Al-Yūsī strongly implies that the sultan’s reign is in jeopardy, should Mawlay Isma‘īl fail to heed his warning. ‘If [the sultan] rules unjustly, violently, arrogantly, oppressively, and corruptly, then he will ... be subject to the terrible punishment and wrath of God on high.’30 Mawlay Isma‘īl could not afford to take such a threat lightly, especially when pronounced by a respected holy man with Dilātī connections and extensive support both in Fez and in the Middle Atlas.

As a result of such opposition, Mawlay Isma‘īl’s dealings with the Fezzis were frequently harsh, including periodically removing key political and religious leaders from their positions, imposing heavy tax burdens upon the Fezzi elite, and dealing out exemplary punishments and executions to deter the possibility of revolt. Having been reprimanded by Fezzi ‘ulamā’, the sultan wrote his own letters of reproof to them, including an epistle in 1108/1697 in which he rebuked the ‘ulamā’ for their opposition over the issue of the ‘Abīd, and another letter in which he attempted to set the common people against
the religious leaders, by praising the former and rebuking/removing the latter from their positions. In 1119/1708, Mawlāy Ismā‘īl forced the leading Fezzi ‘uʾlamāʾ to sign a register of the ‘Abīd, indicating their acceptance of the sultan’s policies. Those who refused to do so were jailed and their property was confiscated.31 In general, Mawlāy Ismā‘īl seems to have equated Fezzi disapproval as tantamount to rebellion and to have viewed Fezzi religious authority as a challenge to his own. For this reason, the sultan established ‘Abīd troops in the fortresses overlooking the old city and he also placed a regiment in New Fez (Fās al-Jadīd) to assure his continued control.

Fez’s loss was Meknes’ gain. After his initial troubles with the Fezzis, Mawlāy Ismā‘īl established his capital in Meknes, located on the other side of the Sais plain and historically a competitor for influence with the more prestigious Fez. The sultan then spent the remainder of his reign turning Meknes into a true capital, funding the construction of new city walls, building sizeable community mosques and other religious structures, and making it the central location for the ‘Abīd. Most impressive among Mawlāy Ismā‘īl’s building projects was the construction of a massive palace intended to rival the Versailles of France. Jealous of any rivals to his glory, Mawlāy Ismā‘īl ordered the destruction of Ahmad al-Mansūr’s opulent Badi’ palace in Marrakesh, utilising many of the recycled building materials in constructing his own palace.

Mawlāy Ismā‘īl could be a harsh taskmaster and would not allow anybody to cross him. He is known for the massive dungeons that he constructed underneath Meknes, which are said to have held thousands of prisoners. The sultan used captured European slaves and criminals as forced labour in his building projects, treating them so harshly that many died in the process of carrying out their tasks. As a result of his powerful military and his reputation for harsh justice, Mawlāy Ismā‘īl is also known for maintaining an unprecedented level of security on the roads, to the degree that the historian al-Naṣirī reports ‘a Jew or a woman could go from Oujda to the Oued Noun without a soul daring to ask whence they came or whither they were going’.32

Mawlāy Ismā‘īl continued the Saʿdī policy of highlighting his Sharīfian lineage as the primary justification for his rule and of laying claim to the caliphal title of amīr al-muʿminīn. He showered privileges upon the shūrafāʾ, making alliances with particular groups such as the shūrafāʾ of Wazzān. By exalting the shūrafāʾ and demoting the ‘uʾlamāʾ, Mawlāy Ismā‘īl sought to drive a wedge between those two groups in Fez and to raise his own position even above that of the shariʿa (traditionally the stronghold of the ‘uʾlamāʾ). At the same time that he was criticising and restricting the ‘uʾlamāʾ, Mawlāy Ismā‘īl added to Sharīfian prestige in Fez by financing a massive upgrade of the shrine.
of Mawlay Idris II, as well as making improvements to the mausoleum of Mawlay Idris I near Meknes.33

But among the shurafa, Mawlay Isma’il placed the Alawı family at the top. In fact, if Aḥmad al-Mansūr can be credited with firmly establishing the principle of the Sharifian amir al-mu’minin as head of the Moroccan state, Mawlay Isma’il should be seen as the architect of the ultimate triumph of the ‘Alawis as the dominant Sharifian family in Morocco. He contributed to their dominance through his long reign and through fathering some 500 sons, many of whom rose to prominent positions throughout the country.

**Fitna** once again

If Mawlay Isma’il contributed to ‘Alawi dominance through his prodigious progeny, he did not add to dynastic stability. Although he reigned for an unprecedented fifty-five years and exercised a level of authority unparalleled in pre-modern Morocco, Mawlay Isma’il’s death in 1139/1727 ushered in another period of fitna. The source of the fitna was similar to that which had launched the fitna during the Sa’di period: competing princes from the ruling family sought to establish their own claims for the sultanate at the expense of other princes. There were a couple of significant differences, however. As mentioned above, Mawlay Isma’il had substantially more sons than the three who competed for political supremacy following the death of Aḥmad al-Mansūr. In fact, seven sons of Mawlay Isma’il achieved the sultanate at one time or another, and several others were suggested as possible candidates or participated in the unrest by supporting one or another of the candidates. More significant, however, was the role played by the ‘Abīd, an organised and fairly cohesive military force that possessed the power and the inclination to serve as kingmakers in the chaotic Moroccan political scene following the death of Mawlay Isma’il. No comparable force had existed during the Sa’di era, which lent a completely different tone to the ‘Alawi fitna of 1139–70/1727–57.

The twelfth/eighteenth-century ‘Alawi fitna also lacked the religious dimensions of the eleventh/seventeenth-century Sa’di fitna. The free-for-all over political authority during the early eleventh/seventeenth century included murābiṭs such as the Dilā‘ī zāwiya, jihad warriors such as al-‘Ayyāshī, and messianic figures such as the mahdī Ibn Abī Maḥallī. Independent operators such as the corsair communities of Rabat/Salé had played a major role, in addition to more traditional players such as the tribal armies of al-Samlālī. In fact, the Sa’di princes often became secondary figures, with their power limited to urban areas such as Marrakesh and Fez.
During the twelfth/eighteenth century fitna, the main groups all fought in the name of an ‘Alawī prince, even if the groups’ real power lay in the prince’s supporters (as it frequently did). The only religious element was the assumed requirement that the new sultan come from among the ‘Alawī shurafa’, with the implication that all candidates presumably possessed the same access to Sharīʿī baraka. The kingmaking role of the ‘Abīd was critical during the ‘Alawī fitna. The ‘Abīd put forth candidates that they felt they could control, and they deposed sultans who were perceived to be operating against their interests. Since they commanded the most effective military force in the country, the ‘Abīd could act without restraint in attacking real or presumed enemies, including entire communities. As a result, there were numerous situations in which the ‘Abīd pillaged cities, murdered men, raped women and stole possessions.

Abdallah Laroui explains the chaos of the ‘Alawī fitna as arising from the failure of Mawlāy Ismāʿīl’s policies much as the Saʿdī fitna arose from the failure of ʿAbīd’s policies. The creation of the slave army, says Laroui, ‘struck a severe blow at agriculture in the southern oases and in the environs of the cities’ by depleting those regions of the manpower necessary to support large-scale agricultural endeavours.\(^{34}\) Thus, a major source of Morocco’s prosperity was crippled. In addition, ‘the isolation of the new army from society’ meant that there was no restraining influence upon their power once Mawlāy Ismāʿīl was gone. ‘The ‘Abīds, who were bound by no loyalties whatsoever, were quite capable of serving anyone who paid them. Thus every crisis of the army became a crisis of the state.’ The murābiṭs had been marginalised after years of hostility from Mawlāy Ismāʿīl. As a result, they could not provide a check on the power of the military. Finally, ‘the main reason for the ‘Alawī sultan’s failure was the incompatibility between his policy and the economic condition of the country, which was no longer capable of supporting an enormous centralised, and moreover parasitic, state apparatus’.\(^{35}\) The only consistent source of income through which Mawlāy Ismāʿīl could pay for his centralisation project was by implementing exorbitant taxes and by periodically authorising his officials to extort the wealth of opponents, such as the Fezzi elite. Both approaches served to undermine the long-term prosperity of the country and to create widespread resentment, which would burst out into the open once the sultan was gone.

Amidst the revolving door of sultans who were appointed and then deposed during the thirty years between 1139/1727 and 1170/1757, one name continued to reoccur. This was Mawlāy ‘Abd Allāh ibn Ismāʿīl, who reigned six times and was deposed five times. Initially chosen by the ‘Abīd to replace
Mawla ʿAbd Allāh was deposed in 1147/1734, reappointed in 1148/1736, deposed again a few months later, reappointed again in 1153/1740, deposed again in 1154/1741, reappointed a fourth time later that year, deposed a fourth time in 1155/1742, reappointed a fifth time in 1156/1743, deposed again in 1160/1747, and reappointed a sixth time in 1161/1748, after which he reigned continuously until his death in 1170/1757.36 Mawla ʿAbd Allāh was never able to gain control over the entire country, but he did manage to counterbalance ʿAbīd influence through building alliances with the Wādaya and the Middle Atlas Berber Ait Idrasen tribal confederation. His repeated ability to escape elimination by the ʿAbīd eventually contributed to nullifying ʿAbīd control over the political process. By the time his son, Sīdī Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh took power in 1170/1757, an ‘Alawī sultan was able to rule over a largely unified Morocco for the first time in thirty years.37

After this chaotic period of fitna, the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad III brought welcome relief to the embattled country. During his long reign (1170–1204/1757–90), Sīdī Muḥammad pursued a more decentralised vision of Moroccan governance, reduced the onerous taxes established by Mawla ʿIsmaʿīl, streamlined government administration, consolidated the Sharīfian victory over the murābiṭs, systematically replaced the ʿAbīd and Wādaya with a smaller and more decentralised military force based upon jaysh tribes, restored Fez as the country’s capital for the first time since the Maʿrūnids, and promoted foreign trade to replace the income lost to the makhzan through the tax reduction.

In this new accommodating model of leadership, the sultan sought to co-operate with local leaders rather than attempt to implement his authority through force. The makhzan appointed governors for key areas, but often would choose men with pre-existing ties to their assigned territory and in many cases granted official recognition to regional chiefs supported by local populations. In conjunction with this policy, Sīdī Muḥammad placed more stress upon the religious significance of his position. Laroui writes that the long-term impact of this approach was that over time “ʿAlawīte power became stabilised; the dynastic struggles and local revolts lost their virulence precisely because of the more and more religious – that is, abstract – nature of [the sultan’s] power.”38

An important reason for the success of this policy was the reduction in taxes, which won widespread support for Sīdī Muḥammad. In contrast to his immediate predecessors, Sīdī Muḥammad gained the reputation of a devout and reasonable man rather than a harsh dictator. For his tax reduction policy to succeed, the sultan sought to replace the lost revenues by streamlining administration and aggressively promoting international trade. The makhzan’s
finances would now be overseen by a financial officer who implemented a strict accounting system, intended to cut down on waste. The smaller army and decentralised administration also served to reduce government costs.

By promoting trade, Sidi Muhammad sought to develop customs duties as the primary source of government revenue. In this venture, the sultan prioritised the development of modern Atlantic ports to attract international shipping. He recaptured Mazagan (al-Jadida) in 1182/1769, ending more than 250 years of Portuguese control. He also promoted Safi, according a monopoly of trade at that port to Denmark in 1170/1757. But Sidi Muhammad concentrated most of his attention on Mogador (Essaouira), hiring foreign advisors to create a modern port and encouraging foreign businessmen to establish offices within the city. The sultan’s pursuit of foreign trade alliances is evidenced by his many treaties signed with European powers. His 1191/1777 decree inviting foreign ships to dock and trade in Essaouira was sent to a number of Western powers, including the United States of America, which was still in the process of gaining independence from the British.

Sidi Muhammad’s emphasis on the sultan’s role as amīr al-mu’minīn led him to place greater prominence upon religious symbolism and ceremony than any sultan since Ahmad al-Mansūr, a ruler he strongly admired and consciously imitated. He promoted a simple, orthodox interpretation of the faith, displaying some sympathy for the revivalist tendencies of the Arabian Wahhabi movement. Like the Wahhabi Sāids, Sidi Muhammad sought to marginalise the murābiṭs, even as he enforced the privileges of the shuraṭ. He engaged in scholarship and supported an annual theological conference with the ‘ulamā’, practices that would be carried on by his son and successor Mawlāy Sulaymān. Sidi Muhammad’s rapprochement with the ‘ulamā’, so actively repressed by his grandfather, was expressed in his decision to restore the capital to Fez.

Although Sidi Muhammad’s approach restored peace to Morocco, it can also be seen as representing makhzan acceptance of a more limited role and as ushering in an era of weak central government, small and ineffective armies, and financially challenged administrations. Laroui writes, ‘As reorganized by Muhammad III, the ‘Alawite regime did not command; it negotiated … The system already contained within it the seeds of foreign intervention, for it depended more and more on foreign commerce that was dominated by foreigners.’ Although Mawlāy Sulaymān would initially reverse his father’s preference for foreign trade, by the end of his reign he was forced to turn to it again in search of funds. Sidi Muhammad’s decentralised, negotiating approach to rule was followed by most of his successors until the end of the

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nineteenth century CE. The spiritual aura of the ‘Alawī amīr al-mu‘minīn increased and the sultan came to be viewed as the only figure who could arbitrate between the multiple interests that divided his diverse country. In fact, this was the only way that a weak makhzan could maintain its titular authority over all of Morocco.

Conclusion

Most historians view the tenth/sixteenth to twelfth/eighteenth centuries as a time of decline for the Islamic world in general and Morocco in particular. Nineteenth-century CE European visitors consistently commented on how isolated, traditional and backward the country appeared. Moroccan visitors to Europe during that period repeatedly marvelled over the scientific and technological advancements that they observed and bemoaned the dilapidated state of affairs in their own country.41 Beyond the subjective observations of eyewitnesses, several factors confirm their conclusions. For example, whenever Moroccan armies fought European armies in the nineteenth century CE, they were quickly and decisively defeated. Trade agreements signed between Morocco and the European powers were heavily weighted in favour of European interests. In fact, Morocco’s history during the nineteenth century CE reflects a steady increase in European influence, culminating with the establishment of the French protectorate in 1330/1912.

How had conditions reached such a state? European historians often blame the traditional, ‘isolated’ and ‘irrational’ nature of Moroccan society, the divided populace (Arab/Berber, rural/urban, murābiṭs/‘ulamā’, etc.), and the closed-minded religious ‘fanaticism’ and ‘fatalism’ of a people who failed to grasp the significance of transformations taking place in the wider world. Moroccan historians such as Laroui and El Mansour challenge the colonial historiography, seeing the problem as more structural in nature. Between the tenth/sixteenth and the twelfth/eighteenth centuries, they argue, the Maghrib was divided between Ottoman and Moroccan spheres, and the state became disconnected from the people that it ruled. Breaking the ‘Khaldunian Cycle’ of tribal-based governments arising from religious revivalist movements, Moroccan governments based their legitimacy upon a Sharīfian ideology that sought to monopolise religious and political authority within the hands of a specific holy family whose baraka enabled it to overcome the inherent divisions within Moroccan society.

From such a standpoint, other authorities appeared to be threats that the government sought to eliminate. Thus the Saʿdīs repressed the murābiṭs once
their dynasty achieved pre-eminent power, even though support from the religious orders had been instrumental in their rise. The ‘Alawīs continued this policy and also worked to restrict the influence of the ‘ulamā’, which meant that the tenth/sixteenth to twelfth/eighteenth centuries were difficult for the city of Fez. Both dynasties attempted to break free from dependence upon tribal armies; the Sa’dīs through the use of renegades and Andalusī warriors, and the ‘Alawīs through a professional slave army. In both cases, the military largely consisted of individuals who were disconnected from Moroccan society, a fact that would have terrible repercussions during the periods of fitna.

Despite the country’s close proximity to Europe and its ongoing trade relationships with European powers, the Moroccan dynasties seemed oblivious to the sources of Europe’s growing success. The greatest Moroccan sultans were mostly preoccupied with restoring a lost caliphal glory (al-Manṣūr) or waging a hopeless jihad against expanding European power (Mawlāy Ismā‘īl). They often seemed unaware of the country’s limitations vis-à-vis the European states or the Ottoman empire. Nor did they promote a long-term plan to stabilise the Moroccan society or economy. With few exceptions, the sultans did not encourage the creation of a Moroccan industry. Instead, they looked for revenue from outside sources (conquests, trade, ransoming captives) or through repressive taxation. Their administrations remained personal rather than institutional, even when sultans such as al-Manṣūr or Mawlāy Ismā‘īl intentionally sought to imitate Ottoman successes in this area. The personal basis of their rule became abundantly clear when these strong sultans died and Morocco fell into extended periods of violent fitna. In fact, most sultans were too preoccupied with trying to gain or retain power even to begin to consider ways to improve Morocco’s long-term situation vis-à-vis the Europeans.

Sīdī Muḥammad III’s decentralised modus vivendi with the regional shaykhs was perhaps the most realistic approach for establishing peace within the country and maintaining a central (albeit largely symbolic) place for the dynasty. In fact, the religious significance of the sultan may have been the most important factor allowing the ‘Alawīs to survive the long period of European interference and dominance that lay ahead. But it was also an admission of defeat: a recognition that it was no longer possible to govern Morocco through a central makhzan. His policy of promoting foreign trade foreshadowed an increasing European meddling and eventual conquest. It would take a forty-four-year French protectorate finally to implement modern systems of governance and administration within Morocco.

But it is possible to overstate this argument. The tenth/sixteenth to twelfth/eighteenth centuries also witnessed successes. In the aftermath of the collapse of
al-Andalus, Morocco became the main site for Andalusí resettlement and the primary heir to an important Hispano-Maghribi cultural heritage. Although colonial historians dismissed Moroccan culture during this era as ‘imitative’ and ‘stagnant’, Moroccans sustained and developed an important cultural heritage, even adopting Andalusí music and art as central parts of Moroccan culture. The establishment of the Sharifian dynasties produced the most durable form of government in the Islamic world: a flexible system that was ultimately able to adapt to the modern era while maintaining a cultural diversity that enriches Moroccan society to this day. When compared to the modern experience of other Islamic countries, Morocco’s post-colonial ‘growing pains’ have been relatively mild, a situation at least partially due to the symbolic power and mediating ability of the Sharifian system, as well as to the political talents of individual sultans. Morocco’s strong sense of self-identity, encouraged by Sa’ādī and ‘Alawī sultans who differentiated their state from that of the Ottomans, laid the foundations for the creation of Moroccan nationalism in the twentieth century CE. The outlines for modern Morocco first began to take shape in the critical era of the tenth/sixteenth to the twelfth/eighteenth centuries.

16 Moroccan rulers (tenth-twelfth/sixteenth-eighteenth centuries)

**Waṭṭāṣids (in Fez, no functional control in southern regions)**
Muhammad al-Burtugālī (910–32/1504–26)
Abū ‘l-‘Abbās Aḥmād (932–55/1526–48)

**Sa’dīs (915–1069/1510–1659)**
Muhammad al-Qā’īm bi amr Allāh (in Sūs) (915–23/1510–17)
Ahmad al-A’rāj: (in Sūs) 923–30/1517–24; (in Marrakesh) 930–51/1524–44
Muhammad al-Shaykh: (in Tārūdānt) 930–51/1524–44, (in Marrakesh) 951–51/1544–9,
(over all Morocco from Marrakesh) 955–64/1549–57
‘Abd Allāh al-Ghālib: 964–81/1557–74
Muhammad al-Mutawakkil: 981–3/1574–6
Ahmad al-Maṣṣūr al-Dhahābī: 986–1012/1578–1603

Note: Between 1012/1603 and 1016/1608 multiple contenders took control of Marrakesh at various times. Between 1012/1603 and 1022/1613 multiple contenders took control of Fez. The main contenders for power during this period were three sons of Ahmad al-Maṣṣūr (Muhammad al-Shaykh al-Ma’mūn, Mawlāy Zaydān al-Naṣīr and Abū Fāris), along with one son of al-Ma’mūn (‘Abd Allāh ibn Muhammad al-Shaykh al-Ma’mūn).
‘Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-Shaykh al-Ma’mūn: (in Fez) 1022–33/1613–24
'Abd al-Malik ibn al-Ma'mūn: (in Fez) 1033–6/1624–7
Muhammad Zaghuda ibn al-Ma'mūn: (in Fez) 1036–7/1627–8
'Abd al-Malik ibn Zaydān: (in Marrakesh) 1037–40/1627–31
al-Walid ibn Zaydān: (in Marrakesh) 1040–5/1631–6
Muhammad al-Shaykh al-Asghar ibn Zaydān: (in Marrakesh) 1045–64/1636–53
Ahmad al-'Abbās ibn Muhammad al-Shaykh ibn Zaydān: (in Marrakesh) 1064–9/1653–9

Seventeenth-century fitna (1012–79/1603–68)

Bū Raghrāg republic (in Salé/Rabat): Supported largely by corsair activities, boosted by an influx of Moriscos expelled from Spain between 1018/1609 and 1023/1614, and encouraged by the weakness of central government in Morocco, Rabat vacillated between formal allegiance/functional independence from the Sa'dī sultans, establishment of a separate city-state (1036–47/1627–37), and domination by northern powers al-'Ayyāshī (1040–51/1631–41), Zāwiyā Dīlā’ (1051–74/1641–64) and al-Khiḍīr Ghaylān (1074–6/1664–6). It was finally conquered by Mālwāy al-Rashīd in 1076/1666.
Zāwiyā Dīlā’ (led by Muhammad ibn Abī Bakr 1021–46/1612–36, Muhammad al-Hājj 1046–79/1636–68): gained control of most of northern Morocco (Spanish enclaves excepted), including Meknès in 1049/1640, Salé/Rabat, Tetouan, the Gharb, and Fez in 1051/1641. They also briefly controlled Sijilmāsa and Tāfīlāt in 1056/1646. However, they lost most of their holdings to al-Khiḍīr Ghaylān and Mālwāy al-Rashīd between 1070/1660 and 1079/1668.
Muhammad al-'Ayyāshī: led jihad against the Spanish in northern Morocco, commanding various Arab tribes in the north, and sometimes Salé, Tetouan, Taza and their regions between 1023/1614 and 1051/1641.
Yahyā b. 'Abd Allāh al-Ḥābi: (in Tārūdānt) 1022–35/1613–26
‘Alī Abū Ḥassūn al-Simlāli: (in Sūs) 1035–70/1626–60; also ruled Dra’a, Sijilmāsa and Tāfīlāt from 1040/1630 to 1050/1640

'Alawīs (1041–1231/1631–1822)

Mālwāy al-Sharīf: (in Tāfīlāt) 1041–5/1631–5
Muhammad b. al-Sharīf: (in Tāfīlāt) 1045–74/1635–64
Ahmad al-Dhahābī: 1139–41/1727–9
Mālwāy ‘Abd Allāh: 1141–70/1729–57 (deposed five times by ‘Abīd and replaced by various pretenders, but managed to regain power every time up to his death in 1757; r. 1141–7/1729–34, 1148/1736, 1153–4/1740–1, 1154–5/1741–2, 1156–60/1743–7, 1161–70/1748–57)
Mālwāy Yazīd: 1204–6/1790–2
Mālwāy Hishām: 1206–7/1792–3
Mālwāy Sulaymān: 1207–35/1793–1822

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Notes

6. Since the Ottomans were administering Egypt at that time, this statement could be taken as a threat that al-Shaykh intended to conquer their North African possessions: *Ta’rikh al-dawla al-Sa’diya al-Takmadārtiya*, ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥim Benhāḍa, Marrakesh, 1994, 31.
8. Estimates on the size of the Sa’dī army vary between 60,000 to 120,000: Cook, *The hundred years war*, 248.

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19. Gannūn, Rasā’il Sa’dīyya, 94.
29. Ibid., 64.
34. Laroui, The history of the Maghrib, 274.
37. Ṣādi Muḥammad, whom his father established as governor of Marrakesh in 1158/1745, was offered the sultanate by the ‘Abīd at least twice between 1162/1749 and 1163/1750, but he refused to unseat his father. He took over as sultan upon the death of his father in 1171/1757: Cigar (ed), Muḥammad al-Qādiri’s Nashr al-mathāni, 216, 226–8.


40. Laroui, The history of the Maghrib, 279.

West Africa (tenth–twelfth/sixteenth–eighteenth centuries)

ULRICH REBSTOCK

Introduction

Towards the end of the ninth/fifteenth century, West Africa’s externality to the Muslim world began to end. Some of the phenomena of this process are easily detected; others are blurred, taking shape only vaguely. The first appearance of the Portuguese caravels on the Atlantic coast in the 1440s heralded a new era. Its immediate effects, however, remained restricted to the coastal regions where the rival European powers founded military and commercial outposts. From there, the Portuguese had, from the first, made a point of capturing local people and sending them back to Portugal as slaves. They had come to search for the sources of gold – and the priestly King John – and returned with a lucrative alternative: ‘black’ gold. Later in the tenth/sixteenth century came the Dutch, followed by the English and the French, who had all begun to establish colonies in the New World. An infamous traffic began that, during its peak at the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century, amounted to an annual export of an estimated 64,000 slaves from West Africa alone.¹ The intrinsic repercussions that the transatlantic slave trade had on the local societies along the Gold Coast, the Guinea Coast, the Senegambia and the coast of the Moors were felt way into the interior. The trade in firearms unbalanced the political equilibrium; the trade in rum and manufactured textiles undermined morale and economy. The effect of the continuous increase in the international demand for slaves on the inner structure of West African societies is uncontested, but has been insufficiently studied. For Muslim communities that contributed to the supply of slaves – whether to be shipped across the Atlantic or to be put up for auction in North African markets – the criteria of enslavement became an urgent and often annoying issue. In 1023/1614f., the jurist Aḥmad Bābā al-Tinbukti (963–1036/1556–1627) introduced his fatwā ‘On the law concerning transported blacks’ with the argument of an earlier scholar, al-Makhlūf al-BalBAL (d. after 940/1533f.):
Slavery is rooted in unbelief (kufr). The unbelievers of the Sūdān are like the Christians, except that they are Mājūs. The Muslims among them, like the people of Kano, Katsina, Bornu, Gobir and all of Songhay, are Muslims whom it is not permissible to own. However, some of them attack others, raiding them unjustly, like the Arabs who attack free Muslims and sell them unjustly. None of them may be lawfully possessed.²

Given the economic importance of slaves for both trade and farming, the issue of the legal state of the Sūdān became a crucial one in the spread of Islam. Conversion protected from slavery. ‘Reform’ ideologies, however, kept detecting ‘bad’ Muslims, and thus the bow-shaped wave of proselytism advanced across the savannah and into the forest regions.

The increasing density of European trading posts along the Atlantic coast coincided with, and even fostered, the shift of trade routes into the safer interior. There, significant movements were a prelude to the end of another kind of isolation. Predatory Arab nomads skirmishing between the Sūs valley and the oasis of Tuwāt, in particular the Banū Ḥassān fraction of the south Arabian Ma‘qil tribe, had turned south. The ensuing conflict with the Berber ‘Znāga’ (i.e. Ṣanḥāja), who had hitherto controlled the trade across the western Sahara, brought Arabic Islam into immediate and massive contact with the Sūdānic populations. By the middle of the eleventh/seventeenth century, the Banū Ḥassān had finally arrived in the Senegal valley. They militarily subdued their Berber rivals and, as a counter-move, ceded to them the religious and spiritual guidance of their segmented tribal society. The political domination of the Banū Ḥassān was accompanied by the thorough Arabisation of the region. Owing to the particular division of functions between the Banū Ḥassān and the Arabised Znāga, commerce and Islamic learning began to flourish among the Zawāyā, the ‘pious settlers’, as the latter liked to call themselves. All was militantly surveyed by the Banū Ḥassān, or luṣūs, thieves, as they were called by the Zawāyā because of the money they had to transfer to the former in return for the ‘protection’. The oases of Shinqīt, Wādān, Tishīt and Walāta, which had close ties with Timbuktu, rose to become junctions of the inner Saharan and trans-Saharan trade. Members of wealthy Zawāyā clans turned to a scholarly life. While on business trips in North Africa, they bought books on Mālikī law, Arabic grammar and Qur’ānic exegesis and started to write commentaries in turn. An indigenous culture of learning began to develop, centred in the few oases and numerous mahāḍir (study camps), from where zealous graduates of different origins carried their acquired knowledge of Islamic piety and norms into the Futa Toro, the Senegambia and further.
The advance of Arab tribes to the south during the ninth/fifteenth century linked the Maghrib closer to the Sahel. In the east, Egyptian Shuwa Arabs penetrated the Chad region. From Tunisia, the Ottomans intervened in the Sahara trade. In 985/1577, a military expedition annexed Fezzan. In the west, the Sa’di sultans of Morocco staked a claim on the lucrative salt mines of Taghaza and Tawdanni. Ultimately, relations worsened to the extent that in early 999/October 1590 Sultan Aḥmad al-Manṣūr (r. 986–1012/1578–1603) despatched 4,000 troops, with the instruction to end the illegitimate rule of the Askīyās of Songhay. The conquest of Gao, which followed in Jumāda II 999/March 1591, was the first and last military conquest achieved, albeit with terrible losses, from the north by the overland route. That, and shortly afterwards the occupation of Timbuktu, brought about irreversible changes. The learned civil elites of Timbuktu, the central seat of learning in the Sudan, and now the seat of a foreign military government, gradually lost its autonomy and reputation. The Songhay state of Gao, the latest in a line of powerful West African states, crumbled as well.

With the fragmentation of power, political authority was parcelled out among local centres. All along the Sahel, from Bagirmi and Wāday in the east, to the Bambara territory in the west, small states came into being. Most, if not all, displayed the traces of the slow but persistent conversion of local collectives; clans of chiefs, tribal fractions, linguistic or ethnic minorities and even specific occupational groups gave voice to various forms of profession of an Islamic faith. The mobility of some of these groups, like the ‘cattle’-Fulbe from the two Futas, or the Wangara-Dyula traders from the heartlands of Mali, effected new patterns of the spread of Islam in black Africa. During the ‘age of empires’, Muslim existence south of the Sahara could be, very generally, depicted as one in quarantine. Muslims, hitherto, were newcomers: arriving as individuals or in family units, as traders, refugees, travellers or professionals, they settled in confined areas, which sometimes developed into urban quarters, and offered their religious services. But they did not remain outsiders. Court functions, regeneration by intermarriage, migration and resettlement, diffused their norms of behaviour, their legal and moral values and their special skills throughout the urban centres where they had lived among themselves and retained their proper religious standards. Examples of this process of intermingling, both socially as well as geographically, abound during the tenth/sixteenth century. In particular, Muslim existence in rural areas became common, albeit marginal. Through assimilation, the world of Islam and that of African traditional heritage drew closer. Mixing with unbelievers – unforeseen by the Islamic orthodoxy and always used as an external
reproach – became inevitable. Although distinct from each other, and sometimes even opposed to one another, the Muslim’s and the ‘unbeliever’s’ social definitions and cultural norms existed side by side. The lines of transition from one group to the other were blurred. Orthodoxy was negotiated within the community, rather than with scriptural references. Being in itself in a state of transition, this particular form of Islamicity adopted distinct shapes dependent on the social environment and the historical circumstances. Until the second half of the twelfth/eighteenth century, Muslim existence beyond the limits of ‘white’ Islam developed within the frame of cultural marginality and social co-existence. The so-called reform movements, or jihads, that rose up at the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century, are rooted in this. They offer a new alternative: the Muslim communitas (umma), purified, incorporated and ‘rightly guided’.

None of these three stages of Muslim existence, however, can be neatly distinguished from one another in terms of time or space. They do not obey a compelling sequence. A striking example of how they may overlap is given by ‘Uthmān dan Fodio’s (1168–1232/1754–1817) jihad ideology: time and again, from the collective performance of both his and his followers’ hijra from Degel to Gudu in 1218/1804 until his death in 1232/1817, he repeatedly and essentially referred to the same arguments with which ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Maghīlī had equipped Askiyā Muhammad at Gao, more than three centuries before and in virtually a different world. The confusing simultaneity of different modes of Islamic living during this period, however, must be considered in the light of our sources. Perhaps the most important phenomenon of the end of the externality of West Africa is the end of the external Arabic sources for its history. With Ibn Khaldūn’s (d. 808/1406) careful record, in his universal history, Kitāb al-‘ibar, of oral historical traditions from Malian scholars he had met, the authentic sources in the Arabic external literature dry up. History, from now on, must be told almost exclusively from internal sources and the few European reports available. The Timbuktu chronicles, the Ta’rīkh al-sūdān and the Ta’rīkh al-fattāsh, composed during the first half of the eleventh/seventeenth century, contribute to it the most. But the scenarios of Muslim activity moved away from the Niger bend. This shift coincides with a change of information. Only a few isolated chronicles, composed by local scholars from the middle of the twelfth/eighteenth century onwards, now recall their Muslim past from oral tradition. Most of these writings – some mere king-lists, like the Wandalá chronicles of northern Cameroon,3 others annalistic and hagiological chronicles like the Ta’rīkh Jabi from the Futa Jalon, or the Amr Ajdādīnā and the Kitāb Ghanjā from the Black Volta region4 – are
difficult to decipher. But they allow us to catch a glimpse of the varieties of Muslims’ ways to live and expand under ‘African’ conditions.

Songhay and Timbuktu

When the Granada traveller al-Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad al-Wazzān – better known under the name Leo Africanus, as given to him by his patron Pope Leo X – visited Timbuktu shortly before 921/1515, he mistook the city for the capital of the Songhay empire. In fact, Askīya princes resided temporarily in Timbuktu and sometimes studied under its scholars in the Sankore quarter. The city’s growing importance as a centre of commerce and learning increased the polarisation of power between Gao, the residence of the royal family and the administration, and Timbuktu, the ‘community of clerics’, in the late Songhay, the Askīya’s period (c. 897–999/1492–1590). Not all of the wealth, which enabled rich merchants and their relatives to retire to a meritorious life of learning and instructing, stemmed from the storage and profitable distribution of goods. Much of it originated from donations and gifts that the Askīya had bestowed on them. Thus, Dāwūd (r. c. 956–90/1549–82), one of Muḥammad’s sons and successors, gave Maḥmūd Ka’ṭi, then qādī of the nearby Tendirma and one of the authors of the Ta’rīkh al-fattāsh, a farm with thirteen slaves and 80 mithqāl of gold – more than the average price for a slave – for the purchase of a copy of the Qāmus, a classical Arabic dictionary. The sympathy of the Timbuktu chroniclers for the generous Askīya seems to stand in sharp contrast to their unconcealed hostility towards Sunni ‘Ali, who had curbed the city’s privileges and endangered the life and property of those scholars who opposed his rule. This juxtaposition has led to rash conclusions:

‘Ali had no use for Islam, the religion of urban communities. Its learned men constituted a state within a state and were critical of rulers for lukewarm attitudes in regard to Islamic laws and indulgence in pagan rites. Confident in his own power, ‘Ali did not need their support and refused to compromise with a religion which involved paying allegiance to a law higher than himself.6

A less selective reading of the chronicles unravels subtler differences. Sunni ‘Ali was not more lax in the observance of Muslim rites than most of the sons and grandsons of Askīya Muḥammad. He performed the holiday prayers of Ramāḍān during his campaigns, records the Ta’rīkh al-fattāsh, and al-Sa’dī (d. after 1065/1655f.), the author of the Ta’rīkh al-sūdān, concedes: ‘Despite his ill-treatment of scholars, he acknowledged their worth and often said: “Without the ‘ulamā’ this world would no longer be sweet and good.”’

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Elsewhere, the conflicting motives are audible: ‘He [i.e. Sunni ‘Ali] snatched away the woman from a poor devil, appropriated her and took her forcefully. May God protect us from that! This is why God punished the people and deprived them of their independence.’ Sunni ‘Ali’s policy jeopardised Timbuktu’s autonomy. He attempted to maintain a distance between Islam and its proponents of rank and status from Timbuktu, and the role he had to play in traditional Songhay cults among his own people, who were in general little influenced by Islam. Writing in retrospect and emphasising both the atrocities of Sunni ‘Ali and his basic esteem of the ‘ulamā’, the chroniclers of the eleventh/seventeenth century try to cope with the two crises that frame the most peaceful and flourishing period of the history of Timbuktu: Sunni ‘Ali’s interregnum (c. 869–98/1464–92), and the incessant decline of the city subsequent to the Moroccan conquest (999/1591). In neither crisis was it the role of Islam in the Songhay culture that was at stake, but rather the leadership of the Timbuktu scholars in defining and upholding the ‘correct’ faith and its translation into action. So influential were the scholars of Timbuktu during the entire century of the Askiaš’s rule, that their perception of Islamic legality overshadowed the multicultural reality of the Songhay state. Along the Niger, downstream at Gao, the capital, at Kukiya and Dendi, imāms led their congregations in mosques right next to pagan shrines; poorly educated Muslims were venerated as holy men, medicine men and diviners; upstream, at Diakha and the nearby Kābara, and in particular at Jenne, Muslim minorities, Soninke and Mandinke, had founded small centres of learning and gained the respect of the local rulers.

Within this broader view of the generation of Islamic lifestyles in the western Sudān, the development of Timbuktu into the undisputed centre of Islamic learning remains exceptional. No other city of that region ever attracted so much attention, nor garnered such a reputation over such a long period. One distinctive feature of this career can be singled out: the city was at all times self-administered internally by its jamā’a (community), an oligarchy of several leading family clans of different ethnic origins who competed for supremacy. The post of the qādī, the highest urban position, was the key to authority. By dispensing justice, the qādī was at the same time a public exponent of the faith and the political representative of the city. When Askiyā Muḥammad appointed, in 964/1498, a certain Maḥmūd ‘Aqīṭ, the offspring of Ṣanhāja immigrants from the Mauritanian Tishīt, this royal prerogative came to an end. During his fifty-year tenure of the judgeship, Maḥmūd managed to establish an equilibrium between the self-assertion of the city regarding the fiscal and political aspirations of the Askiyās, and the
dependence of the latter on their empire-wide reputation as khalīfa, deputy of the ‘Abbāsid caliph of Cairo, and ‘commander of the faithful’. Outliving his royal patron, Mahmūd intervened as some sort of moderator between Askiyā Muhammad’s warring sons and nephews, and succeeded in passing his post on to his eldest son Muḥammad, who occupied it until his death in 973/1565, during the long and peaceful reign of Askiyā Dāwūd (c. 956–90/1549–82). The role of the Askiyās in the administration of Timbuktu became largely restricted to the confirmation of the qāḍī agreed upon by the scholars. He and the district colleagues he installed personified the order of the city by settling the disputes among her citizens and merchants. Thus, one prominent qāḍī and imām is recorded to have declared, sitting at the entrance of the mosque, along with some of his students:

‘Come here those of you who have a claim against someone else unwilling to fulfil his obligations.’ He then would invite people to bring their cases, and judged between them. He commanded and prohibited, passed prison sentences, and inflicted beatings on those deserving it.8

That the qāḍī could also confront the Askiyā and his officials is indicated by Ahmad Bābā when recalling his stout uncle al-ʿĀqīb, another ‘Aqīṭ qāḍī. Al-ʿĀqīb would be submissive to the monarch, but in matters of disapprobation he would suspend his office until the Askiyā would reconcile with him.

Although the ‘Aqīṭ virtually constituted a ruling dynasty of the ‘religious estate’ of Songhay, the continuing growth and prosperity of the city left ample scope for other families and scholars. In the tenth/sixteenth century, some 200–300 qualified literati made a name for themselves in Timbuktu. The Baghayu’u brothers, Muḥammad and Aḥmad, sons of a Dyula qāḍī of Jenne, who had studied in the east under prominent Egyptian scholars, settled in Timbuktu around 957/1550, and founded one of the most influential families in Timbuktu. Aḥmad’s son Muḥammad (d. 1066/1655) is described by al-Sa’da as the last of the great shaykhs of Timbuktu. His uncle Muḥammad became the imām of the important mosque of Sīdī Yahyā, built in honour of a Sufi shaykh who had arrived in Timbuktu before 873/1468. Owing to Muhammad’s intervention, another scholar from Jenne, Muḥammad Kab ibn Jābir Kab, was appointed to the post of khaṭṭīb of Gao, a Songhay office which combined both judicial and parochial functions. In 977/1569, Muḥammad Kidād (Gidadu), the first Fulānī (Arabic for Fulbe) held the post of imām of the Jingereber Mosque. The Soninke family of Maḥmūd Ka’ṭī (d. 1002/1593), a co-author of the Ta’rīkh al-fattāsh who studied with Muḥammad Baghayu’u, became firmly associated with the judgeship of Tindirma.

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This multi-ethnic autonomy of a city that lived on the profitable co-
ordination of the trans-Saharan trade and was led by a ‘community of scholars’
produced a particular intellectual atmosphere. A place where scholars could
make a good living as counsellors, and vice versa, was attractive. From among
the numerous madrasas of Timbuktu – the sources speak of 150 or more
during the tenth/sixteenth century, all of them centred around individual
teachers – the students’ networks spanned the entire region. Books were
ordered and brought from the Maghrib and Egypt. Ahmad Bābā is reported
to have lost as many as 1,600 volumes when he was arrested by the Moroccans
in 1002/1593 and his library seized and sold. These books, which were often
copied and copiously annotated on imported paper by the owners themselves,
integrated Timbuktu into the wider world of Islamic scholarship. Quotations
in locally written works demonstrate that a scholarly education went beyond
the training in Qurān, ḥadīth, theology and Mālikī law. Other disciplines were
available and studied: above all, philological disciplines like Arabic grammar,
rhetoric, prosody and poetry, but also biographical history (ṣīra), logic, astron-
omy and mathematics (ḥisāb). It was upon this variety of fields of Islamic
studies that the reputation of Timbuktu was built. Students and scholars
likewise were attracted from many places; first from North Africa and the
Saharan oases like Walāta, Tuwāt or Awjila, then increasingly from the
Sūdānic south. Their literary productivity can still be assessed in the rich
collections of Arabic manuscripts that survived the social and political decline
of the city during the succeeding centuries. The public Ahmad Bābā Library,
founded in the 1960s, contains close to 10,000 works, a great many of them
composed by local scholars before the nineteenth century CE.

The Saʿdī conquest of Songhay did not disrupt the line of the ruling Askiyā
dynasty. The strategic aim of the Moroccan expedition was not Gao, where
the Songhay kings were granted a privileged but powerless residence in the
royal palace until the middle of the twelfth/eighteenth century. Jawdhar
Pasha, the commander of the Moroccan troops, after putting the Songhay
army near Gao to headlong flight, immediately withdrew to Timbuktu and
established his military headquarters there. The region’s wealth was as pre-
cious to the Saʿdī sultan as the submission of the Askiyā under the sovereignty
of the Sharīf. The latter did not last long – after 1070/1659f. the sultan’s name
disappeared from the Friday khatba – and as for the former, in particular the
direct access to the gold-fields, it remained outside the range of the invaders.
Still, they roundly crushed the resistance of the Timbuktu jamāʿa, plundered
the city, and exiled the leading heads to Morocco. The immediate effects were
deleterious:
Timbuktu became a body without soul. Conditions turned upside down and life and customs changed fundamentally. The lowest rose to the highest ranks and vice versa, the meanest ruled over the most noble. Religion was sold for worldly goods and misleading was acquired for rightly guiding."

Morocco soon lost interest. On the spot, the Arma, as the ‘archers’ (al-rumāḥ) of the occupational force were called, were increasingly being assimilated by the local society. They married local women, and adopted the Songhay language and other practices. In the period 1021–70/1612–60, the Arma regime evolved into a West African state, independent from Morocco. Moreover, Timbuktu’s equilibrium of commerce and scholarship was off balance. Now, under the Pāshālik, the rule of the Arma, the influence of the merchants increased. They no longer needed the ‘uṣūlah as intermediaries, but co-operated directly with the Arma to secure the Niger waterway and other endangered trade routes to Timbuktu. The economic decline could not be stopped, nor the intellectual. Islamic learning degenerated to a part-time job of traders and artisans. Their appellation as Alfa (from Ar. al-faqīh, jurist) refers to the limitations of their scholarly training. The Timbuktu chroniclers, however, uphold a certain sympathy for the pashas and the puppet Askiyās. There, Songhay royalism (Mahmūd Ka’ti was Soninke, after all) and Timbuktu civic pride combined to wrest respect from the Arma for the remnants of the urban patriarchy and the khilāfah, the caliphal authority, of the Askiyā royalty. Al-Sa’dī, the author of the Ta’ríkh al-sūdān and imām of the Sankore Mosque, became chief secretary to the Arma administration – honi soit qui mal y pense.

About ten years after al-Sa’dī’s appointment (1056/1646), the chronicles come to an end. Yet, they had anticipated what is described in the detailed but dull, anonymous, biographical dictionaries composed for the pashas of Timbuktu a century later: the gradually increasing pressure put on the settled populations of the Niger bend by Tuareg confederations from the north; the rival Arma factions who came to recruit Tuareg help in their internecine strife; the violent clashes between branches of the Askiyā lineages. By the middle of the twelfth/eighteenth century, the Arma regime – more than a hundred pashas had ruled, some repeatedly – and the Songhay order were in the process of disintegration. Jihads were being proclaimed against pashas’ rivals and their Muslim followers. The qādīs contended with representative functions. When the Tuareg finally took possession of Gao (1184/1770) and Timbuktu (1201/1787), the political and spiritual leadership in the area returned to the nomads of the southern Sahara.

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Islam in the western savannah

The repercussions of the dominance of Timbuktu were felt all along the River Niger. From urban settlements at its upper course, Kābara, Diakha (Dia or Ja) and Janja, all in the vicinity of Jenne, Muslim scholars of different ethnic affiliations headed north. In Timbuktu, the traces of this influx are old enough to suggest that the tradition of Islamic learning in the city received its earliest influences from this African background. The origins of these parochial Muslim communities at the fringes of the Songhay empire and close to the heartlands of Mali are difficult to determine. Certainly, the gold trade is connected. Already al-Bakrī (writing in 460/1068) was attributing it to black Muslim merchants living at the ‘Nil’ ‘surrounded by pagans’, and speaking a’jam, an unintelligible language. From then on, the patronymic ‘al-Wankarī’ is attached to the dispersion of Mandekan- (Mande language) speaking scholars and traders from the Niger inland delta and the Black Volta. Elsewhere, in an early Portuguese report, the Wangara are described as a particular race of red or brown complexion. Al-Sa’dī emphasises the role of Bītu (Bitu, modern Bighu), a centre of the Wangara:

[Jenne] is one of the great markets of the Muslims. Salt-traders from Taghāza and gold-traders from Bītu meet there. These two sources are without equal in the whole world. People find much blessing in trading there and amass fortunes God alone – praise be to Him – can assess. It is because of this blessed town that caravans come to [Timbuktu] from all directions.10

By the ninth/fifteenth century, Wangara are to be found all along the course of the Niger and as far east as Hausaland, to where a certain shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahmān from Jahaba, south-east of Bamako, had moved with his followers. The expanding range of their entrepreneurial activities brought them into contact with even the Portuguese captains who knew them as ‘Mandinguas’, probably referring to ‘Mandinke’, another group of the widespread Mande peoples in West Africa. Along with the spread of some of these groups, in particular that of the Dyula, Jakhanke and Bambara, went the spread of Islam, across the savannah into the forest regions from the ninth/ fifteenth century onwards.

The Dyula and the Jakhanke

In many Mande dialects, ‘Dyula’ (Juula) came to mean ‘trader’. For themselves – Wangara traders who established a highly lucrative gold trade network between Bighu, north of the Akan forests, and the greater entrepôts of
the western Sudan and the Sahel – it simply meant ‘good Muslim’. This Islamic identity is reflected in their oral and literary tradition, where the Dyula claim ancestral links back to the trading clans of the Soninke people in the ancient Ghana empire, who had converted to Islam through their contacts with North African Muslim traders. Through stages we can only guess at, this ‘conversion’ prepared the way for the development of a lifestyle in which Islamic belief and professional trading combined. Trading, naturally, meant contact with unbelievers. Expanding the relations required flexible modes of arrangement with the host communities. The Dyula, for the most part, settled among ‘stateless’ people, intermarried and started to speak the language of their wives. Sometimes, however, they interfered as a distinct social group in local politics and even appear to be responsible for the Islamisation of traditional states.

From the western extension of this Mande-speaking trade system, represented by the Jakhanke, another form of settlement is reported. The intensification of the Atlantic slave trade supported the formation of smaller states in the hinterland. Muslim traders and clerics were attracted. In 1030f./1621, the British merchant Richard Jobson described towns at the Gambia river that were entirely inhabited by Muslims who married only among themselves, and had – even in times of war – free recourse to all places.  

Most of what is known of these various activities of the Dyula and Jakhanke operating in the ḏār al-ḥarb and in the midst of people untouched by Islam stems back to their proper traditions. They centre around the semi-legendary figure of al-Ḥāj Sālim Suwāre, a Soninke who lived and taught in Diakha (Ja, Zāgha) in Māsina and was allegedly buried there in the earlier tenth/sixteenth century. Several qāḍīs of Jenne and Timbuktu are numbered among his disciples. His teaching developed, among Dyula and Jakhanke alike, into a pedagogical tradition that was built around two major Mālikī texts (al-Muwatta’ of Mālik ibn Anas, the school-founder, and al-Mukhtasar of Khalīl ibn Ishāq), the Tafsīr al-Jalālayn, the influential exegesis of the Qur’ān of al-Mahalli (d. 864/1459) and al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), and on the work about the way Muslims should venerate the Prophet written by the Moroccan Qādī ‘Iyāḍ (d. 544/1149), al-Shifa’ fi ta’rīf ḥuqūq al-Muṣṭafā. The veneer of Islamic erudition was thin, but closely attached to the basic needs of a daily life in which the balance of securing a livelihood in this world without forgoing salvation in the next was precarious. In an environment of kufr, trading, settling, and teaching the Qur’ān became the complementary stations of a lifestyle that was coined by mobility, assimilation to hostile conditions, and the pursuit to uphold an indispensable set of Islamic norms. In such circumstances, jihad was an inadequate means of converting unbelievers, nor was islāh (reform) as
advocated by al-Maghīli in Gao appropriate, when the acceptance of the authority on non-Muslim rulers was required. By leading an exemplary life – often giving way to saintly legends – and committing themselves to education and learning, the Dyula managed to integrate themselves to varying degrees into the villages, towns and states their travels had led them to. They gained respect as teachers and scholars, among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The effective magic of their talismans spread their reputation as healers. Rulers sought their advice and spiritual guidance. Settling down – in some cases – meant dissociating from trade and turning to farming supported by slaves. Many Jakhanke saw themselves as cultivators–scholars for whom only the triad of clerical life – qirā’ā (study), filāḥa (farming) and safār (travel, to avoid sinful assimilation of local customs) – guaranteed adherence to a proper Muslim life and to the tajdid (religious renewal) necessary.

Al-Ḥājj Sālim’s part in the moulding of this ‘Suwārian’ tradition of coexistence remains obscure. Quite obviously, the successful expansion of the Wangara network over more than two centuries generated a collective identity that expressed itself by way of the production of local ‘histories’, lists of kings who were peacefully converted to Islam by wandering shaykhs, and chains of transmission, from teacher to student, that ran back through generations of scholars, ināms and rulers. It is from this collective memory that the slow but inexorable spread of Islam in the regions between the Gambia and Volta river during the eleventh–twelfth/seventeenth–eighteenth centuries can be assessed. Several kingdoms, like those of Gonja, Dagomba and Wala are reported to have come under the influence of a karamoko (Malinke: one who can read) who founded an imamate that soon became hereditary. In Gonja, a certain Muḥammad al-Ayyāḍ (the white) from Bighu helped Sultan Ma’wura (r. c. 990–1009/1582–1600) to conquer a town of ‘infidels’ and thus brought about his conversion to Islam. Elsewhere, as in the region of Kong, where the Saganogo shaykhs later inspired a new style of imamate, the complex process of Islamisation becomes clearer. Until the early twelfth/eighteenth century, the immigrating Dyula remained a minority everywhere and did not engage in proselytising. Still, their animist hosts gradually accepted certain cultural traits identified with Islam. Non-Muslim groups began to clothe themselves and control the spirit world with Islamic supernatural aids. Then the Dyula, who monopolised the salt trade with the Saharan deposits, faced the growing influence of heathen Mande warrior groups. The ensuing conflict with these Sonongui – for the Dyula a simple equivalent of ‘bad Muslim’ – led to a social and religious antagonism that has been observed in many of the ‘half-Islamised’ savannah regions:
The Watara [ruling Sonongui] drank heavily, they married as many wives as they could manage to acquire, and they had a system of inheritance that went from brother to brother rather than from father to sons as the Qur’ān commands. They laughed at the idea of the Holy War, attacking villages for economic and military profit rather than conversion, and they attacked Muslims and non-Muslims alike. They neglected to pray; many of them learned nothing of the Qur’ān, and they consulted the proprietors of animist shrines for divination and protection ... The Watara explained their disregard for the proper ways of Islam by saying it was the business of the karamoghou. The Watara supported the karamoghou, individually and collectively, in return for the favourable exercise of their religious powers.12

The ‘pagan’ Bambara and the Fulbe of Māsina

To the west of Jenne, the imperial Islam of Mali and Songhay had hardly influenced the Mande-speaking Bambara and Bamana peasants. The Timbuktu chronicles simply call them kuffār (pagans) who resisted the ‘Moroccans’ and repeatedly sacked Jenne. Among the Dyula, both denominations came to mean ‘non-Muslim’. By the turn to the twelfth/eighteenth century, between Segu and Nioro, Bambara clans began to stand out against their egalitarian community. The emergence of the states of Segu (c. 1124/1712) and Kaarta clearly displays the readiness of the ruling Kulibali and Diara to integrate Islamic patterns into their governance. Islamic rituals were held at the higher courts, Islamic festivals were celebrated as communal feasts, and Muslim merchants and clerics were welcomed for support. But the Bambara rulers skilfully maintained the balance between traditionalism and Islam. They remained the priests of the central shrines and protection-idols and simultaneously called for the assistance of Muslim clerics to advocate ‘Ngalla’ (Allāh). When Biton, the first Kulibali of Segu, died in 1168/1755, the opposition against the rising influence of Muslims even led to the forcible deposition of his son Bakary, who had openly converted to Islam.

The case of the Bambara demonstrates the particularly slow penetration of Islamic features into the vast rural triangle extending among the urban centres along the Niger, from Segu up to Timbuktu and the Senegal river. Farming prevailed in this area where Soninke (who had been in contact with Islam since the times of the Almoravids), Malinke and Bambara intermingled. Occasional conversion among the Bambara and their neighbours generated a new group identity: the Maraka. It is evident that the Muslim Maraka’s attention to scholarship and clerical pursuits depended largely on their employment of slaves in the fields. This distinctive feature of the Maraka implies a direct relationship to the
increasing demand for – and supply of – slaves, predominantly organised by Muslim traders. In 1210f./1796, while on his way from Kaarta to Segu, where King Mansong resided, Mungo Park was begged by a Bambara woman to inquire about her son, Mamadee, who ‘was no Heathen, but prayed to God morning and evening, and had been taken from her about three years ago, by Mansong’s army’. Elsewhere, alluding to the business aspect of slavery, he describes the Moors as ‘rigid Mahomedans … [who purchase] their sabres and other weapons, as well as their fire-arms and ammunition, from the Europeans, in exchange for the Negro slaves which they obtain in their predatory excursions. Their chief commerce of this kind is with the French traders, on the Senegal river.13

The region, situated between the Futa Toro beyond the Senegal river and Mâsina, stretching west of Jenne, was not an isolated one. Sanhâja and Moorish tribes penetrated from the north. From the Futa Toro, pastoralist Fulbe tribes had migrated to the Niger banks. In 976/1569, Muhammad Kidâu (d. 989/1581), the first Fulbe îmâm of the Jingereber Mosque in Timbuktu, was installed. The office became hereditary among his tribal fellows. Around 1019/1610, the Fulbe Sultan Ḥammâdı Āmina is reported to have defied an attack of the Arma of Timbuktu with the help of ‘heathen’ Bambara. The opaque and sometimes even ambiguous expressions of Islamic faith in Segu and Kaarta may be partly explained by the prejudices and – from the late eleventh/seventeenth century onwards – the silence of the chroniclers. Looked at from a greater distance, they disclose two general tendencies: flanked by the rising Almamy of Bundu in Futa Toro and the Fulbe sultanate of Mâsina, the Bambara rulers had to resort to Islamic concepts of legitimacy in a period of conflicting religious identities. At the same time, Islam was making inroads among the rural populations, the fishermen and peasants. The movement of the Torodbe in Futa Toro, beggar clerics of diverse social status and ethnic origins, as well as that of the settled rural Fulbe of Mâsina who, turning against the corrupt life of the cities at the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century, soon brought about the jihadist caliphate of Hamdullahi (north of Jenne), were expressions of the broader diffusion of Islamic customs and beliefs among lower social strata. The collision there with traditional superstitious and non-Islamic practices blurred the difference between Muslim and non-Muslim. But it prepared the ground for turning the issue of Islam into an argument that could mobilise large parts of the population and be used for political aspirations. The wave of jihads that engulfed the western Sudâni after the turn of this century was fed by just such popular forms of Islamicity and was directed at its purification.
The Senegambia

The formative process of the Moorish society (see above) in the western Sahara culminated in a long series of belligerent conflicts between Banū Ḥassān and Berber tribes, the ‘war of Bubbah’ (shurribbah, c. 1054–85/1644–74). The ultimate military defeat of the Berbers turned out to be a latent victory. Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Daymānī, their charismatic leader, had pronounced the jihad, the first of its kind in West Africa after that of the Almoravids. The repercussions of this movement were complex. North of the Senegal, under the ‘protection’ of the victorious Ḥassānī amīrs of Trārza, Brākna, Adrār and Tagānt, Zavāyā tribal fractions began to intensify old and to establish new ones with partners south of the river. In their ‘desert schools’ (mahāḍir) old Šanḥāja scholarship merged with the need for an Islamic pragmatism that could ensure their social and economic status in a society politically dominated by ‘warrior’ groups. Religious instruction furnished the ‘students’ (tullāb) with the qualifications for controlling the domain of judicial and juridical activities. By extension, this implied the privilege of defining the legal norms that regulated all economic interaction. Islamic learning became the prerequisite and emblem of an ethic that was juxtaposed to and competed with the warriors’ liberalist pride in transgressing these norms, and despising any involvement in commerce or agriculture. This type of bipartite society, in which the conflicting division of roles between Muslim cleric–merchants (or peasants) and warrior infidels was supported by the exploitation of tributaries and slaves, must be regarded as one of the particular phenomena that accompanied the Islamisation of the western Sahel belt.

However, the direct influence of the formation of this Zawāyā culture on the emergence of various Islamic movements in Futa Toro, Bundu and Futa Jalon remains disputed. ‘Moors’ had been recorded in these regions long before by European travellers. In 1109f./1698, André Brue was impressed by the stone mansions of ‘Conjour [Gunjur], the capital of the Marabout republic’. The Torodbe, a distinct group of Muslim cultivators and preachers that appeared in this area at the end of the eleventh/seventeenth century, shared – in some of their proper traditions – a common mythical origin with ‘Arabs of the north’. Arab or Berber Muslims may have moved southwards without their families, found spouses among Senegalese women, and instructed their children in the Islamic religion, who then in time came to marry within their own group, creating a ‘caste’ called Torodbe. Other interpretations point to their eclectic ethnic and social origin. Belonging to the Tukulor, as the ‘Haalpulaar’, the Fulbe population of Futa, were called by the Europeans,
the Torodbe spoke Fulfulde (the language of the Fulbe). After completing their Qur'ān studies, they would travel in mendicant groups throughout the country. As ‘sons of the calabash’ they seem initially to have subsisted almost entirely on the charity of others. The saying ‘a Torodo is a slave’ implies the inferior original status of these groups. Whatever their precise origins, the popular etymological meaning, that ‘a Torodo implores Allāh’, unmistakably links the rise of this group with the beginnings of Islam in Futa Toro. Their common pattern of life, the ‘Turudiyya’, meant to settle and become associated with the inhabitants of villages and towns, to avoid inferior occupations (crafts, herding, fishing), to be learned in the Islamic wisdoms and rituals, to establish schools and mosques in the urban centres, and to invite all individuals to embrace their customs and beliefs. Strong Muslim communities (jamāʿas) came into existence in areas where Islam had not previously existed. Strict Islamic rules were established and the imam looked out for the enforcement of the Islamic law, the shariʿa. Some of these communities engaged in conflict with the ruling Fulbe Deniankobe. Around 1101/1690, under the leadership of Mālik Siy, a Torodo from Podor, groups of Torodbe withdrew east to Bundu, and established an independent imamate that lasted until the French occupation. It attracted other groups – Wolof from the lower Senegal, Sarakhole from the Baule river and various Fulbe groups – and developed proto-state structures: Islamic taxes (khums, zakāt) were levied and, as in other jamāʿas, its territory was clearly distinguished from the ‘land of war’ (dār al-ḥarb) beyond.

Decades later, another figure of the Torodbe movement appeared on the middle Senegal. Sulaymān Bal, who had returned from the jihad-shaken Futa Jalon, won disciples and followers in his fight against both the laxity of the Denianke on religious issues, and the perennial raids of the Banū Ḥassān of Trārza. Throughout his fickle war-career Sulaymān refused to accept the title of imam for himself. Only some years after his death – oral tradition places it in 1189/1775f. – his kinsman ʿAbd al-Qādir Kan, who had earlier studied with the Tarārza, was inaugurated as the first Almamy. His policy was clearly focused on inner Islamic reform, perhaps inspired by his experience among the Zawāyā. By encouraging literacy and public Islamic practices, his leadership brought about a thorough Islamisation of the area. Not only were the ruling Denianke warriors finally supplanted by a religious Torodbe aristocracy. In 1200f./1786, ʿAbd al-Qādir successfully insisted in his coutumes-treaty with the French on their co-operation to suppress any kind of slave trade in which Muslims, in particular the Almamy’s subjects, were involved as victims.
‘Abd al-Qādir had also attacked the Wolof state of Kajoor (Cayor), where militant Muslim clerics raised their voices against the warrior nobility who were unyielding in their non-Islamic behaviour. In Pir, from where ‘Abd al-Qādir had graduated, and Koki, off the pivots of power, Muslim Wolof came into contact with the Torodbe and founded centres of Muslim learning. The local tradition of an Islamic past going back to the sixth/twelfth century evokes only old links of the kings of Jolof with the Almoravids. By the tenth/sixteenth century, the kingdom had disintegrated and Islam had become marginal and – judging from the European reports – dominated by passing foreigners: Moors, Tukulor and others. Some of them were rewarded with land for their functions at court. They settled, worked their soil, intermarried with their neighbours and maintained their faith and customs. Among them, the involvement with the jihad in Futa Toro seems to have set off a strong Muslim movement directed against their ‘pagan’ chiefs. The Wolof ‘griots’ kept reminding their audience of the cruel fate some of the rebellious clerics had suffered at the warriors’ hands. But it would take more than a century until the majority of the Wolof society converted to Islam.

The Islamic history of Futa Jalon, the region where the rivers Gambia, Senegal and Niger originate, before the life-long fight of the wali and mahdi ‘Tcherno’ Aliou Ba (c. 1242–1330/1828–1912) against French colonialism, is in the dark. Aliou’s revivalist movement drew its gains and principles from the message of the just introduced Shādhilī Sufism and from the crumbling rule of the ‘almamate’ initiated by Karamoko Alfa Barry between 1139/1727 and 1181/1767. Alfa Barry and his successor, Imam Ibrahīma Sori, were Fulbe. Or rather, they were Fulbe in language and culture, but not in lifestyle. As Torodbe they had abandoned all pastoral activities and turned to a sedentary life. Their religious prestige was based on the power of their baraka (blessing), the number of children they took charge of until these learned the Qur’ān, and the judicial authority they were entrusted with. Thus, certain families would gain more ‘force’ and incorporate more followers than others. The social fabric of this expanding Torodbe society was lined by a finely shaded system of clientage, not dissimilar to that of the Moorish Zawāyā. By embracing Islam, local Mande-speaking groups and Fulbe alike attached themselves to ‘families of force’ in order to gain protection in exchange for agricultural, pastoral and other services. This exchange of religious, educational and political against economic services formed the backbone of the ‘Sidianke’ or ‘Sediabe’ (from Ar. sayyidi, my master) society, as the patrons were called by their clients, the ‘Rimaîbe’.
The rise of the ‘almamate’ reflects the competition for the leadership among the most powerful Sidiyanke communities and families. The imam was universally recognised as the principal authority on religious guidance, enforcement of the shari’ata, and the direction of military affairs. But it also reflects the successful establishment of an Islamic rule by a class of Torodbe Muslims, who controlled the distribution of land and the profits from its yield, over a society in which being non-Muslim was equivalent to being a slave. The prosperity of the ‘almamate’ was ultimately rooted in the regime’s continuous jihad enterprises against the pagan Mande-speaking and other adjacent peoples who were reduced to slavery. The economic burden of this society came to be borne on the backs of the slaves. Openly stigmatised socially, and forced into distinctive dresses, their women were forbidden to wear jewellery of gold or silver, and their children were not to be instructed in religious matters. They ran their masters’ houses and the artisan shops, they worked the fields, and they were used to supply excess labour capacity to slave traders, tied into not only the internal but also the transatlantic slave trades. In 1190/1776, after half a century of battles and wars, Imam Ibra’hima Sori ended the ‘jihad’ – the one which ‘Abd al-Qādir Kan had joined – against the local ruling Jalonke elites, and the Fulbe imamate was widely accepted. The particular circumstances, however, of the ascent of some few powerful jamā‘as into a rigid Muslim ‘upper class’ that ruled over a vast majority of inferiors and slaves prepared the ground for the Islamic reform movements in the Senegambia some decades later. These were again called ‘jihad’. But they were strongly supported by individuals and groups of all ethnic and social backgrounds that looked to Islam as their source of identity. Despite the sharp dividing lines of status and rank, religious education had spread the knowledge of Islamic values among the population. There, a religious message that calls upon ‘young or old, obedient or rebellious, man or woman, free or slave’ could not pass unheard. This passage within the wīrd (spiritual devotions) of the Tijāniyya brotherhood would have just such an effect a little later.

Hausaland and the Chad region

In the landlocked region to the north of the Upper Niger and River Benue, Islamic influences of the Arabic north and east met those of the Südänic west. Arabic tribes had migrated into the arid plains around Lake Chad. Groups of Wangara traders and clerics appeared in Hausaland and further east. Some of the Fulbe nomads from Futa Toro who had driven their cattle eastwards as far as Bornu turned away from their pastoral life and settled at the fringes of their
peasant-host societies. In the *Kano chronicle*, the anonymous compiler (late nineteenth century CE) of local oral tradition allocates this turbulent period to the reign of Sarkin Yakubu, son of Abdulahi Burja (856–68/1452–63):

In Yakubu’s time the Fulani came to Hausaland from Melle, bringing with them books on Divinity and Etymology. Formerly our doctors had, in addition to the Qur’ān, only the books of the Law and the Traditions. The Fulani passed by and went to Bornu leaving a few men in Hausaland, together with some slaves and people who were tired of journeying. At this time too the Asbenawa [Tuareg from Azbin, Aïr] came to Gobir, and salt became common in Hausaland. In the following year merchants from Gwanja began coming to Katsina; Beriberi [Kanuri] came in large numbers, and a colony of Arabs arrived. Some of the Arabs settled in Kano and some in Katsina. There was no war in Hausaland in Yakubu’s time. He sent ten horses to the Sarkin Nupe in order to buy eunuchs.16

All indigenous sources emphasise the eminent role of the Fulbe element in the process of Islamisation of Hausaland. The impact of the successful jihad of the ‘Toronkawa’, as the Fulbe followers of ‘Uthmān dan Fodio called themselves, most certainly suppressed the memory of other influences, such as from the sultanate of Aïr and the caliphate of Bornu. From the tenth/sixteenth century onwards, both those powers seem to have competed for direct access to the Hausa region. In the distorted view of the jihad literature, the description of the religious tendencies of the ‘people of Azbin’, the Kel Geres and Itesen, is not very flattering: either they are roaming thieves who shed blood, care little for Islam and stick to pagan rituals; or they are blunt pagans who do not even claim to be Muslims; only a few are reckoned among the true believers, or even valued as capable scholars. Muḥammad Bello, the son of ‘Uthmān, assessed Islam in Bornu somewhat differently: its sultans performed the pilgrimage, and enacted the Islamic penalties and laws; Islam was also widespread among the common people who took an interest in reciting the Qur’ān and memorising and writing it out more than anyone else.17

The long Islamic history of the caliphate of Bornu is recorded by the first indigenous sources of the entire region: the so-called *Bornu chronicles* composed shortly after 988/1580 by Ahmad ibn Fartuwa, imam of the ‘amīr al-muʾminīn and sultan of the Muslims’, King Mai Idrīs Alawma (r. c. 978–1012/1571–1603). His praise of the Sayfawa dynasty, whose eternal rule ‘was pre-ordained by the writing on the Guarded Tablets’,18 conveys the extent to which Islamic practice and thinking had become the norm and was rooted among the various populations of Bornu. The shariʿa was imposed upon everybody, the Muslim festivals were celebrated everywhere, and the
maı himself often led the daily prayers. Ahmad repeatedly quotes from various commentaries on the Qur’an, and from Arabic dictionaries. That the maıs of Bornu appreciated Islamic learning is attested by the privileges (e.g. exemption from military service and taxation, generous gifts) granted on extant letter-patents to outstanding Muslim individuals and their clans. ‘Abd Allāh al-Barnawī (d. 1088/1677) was one of them. This scholar (mallam) was versed in theology and esoteric sciences without having studied much. But his baraka attracted students, farmers and hunters alike. The community he established at Kulumbardo, not far from the capital, was subjected to the strict discipline of Sufi practices: a life in poverty and retreat (khalwa), dedicated to prayer and ‘remembrance of God’ (dhikr). Much earlier, a certain Shaykh Sīdī Maḥmūd had come to Aïr and attracted people by his piety and asceticism. These are the first signs of a local, still unorganised mystic movement that was only later fused with the ṭarīqa traditions of the Qādiriyya, the Khalwatiyya and others.

Until the late twelfth/eighteenth century, however, the evidence of the inner state of Islamic affairs in Bornu remains scanty and biased. The gradual decline of the caliphate brought about by Tuareg invaders from the north, raids by the southern pagan Jukun, and the expanding Hausa trade, soon provoked sharp criticism. Muslim scholars raised their voices in accusing the rulers of Bornu of being unjust and corrupt. Hajirmai Muḥammad al-Barnawī (d. 1168/1755) openly castigated the avarice of the rich and the poverty of the poor, and the persistent practice of pre-Islamic rituals. The reprehensions of ‘Uthmān dan Fodio, articulated one generation later on behalf of the spreading discontent and grievances of the rural population in Hausaland, sounded quite similar.

From piety to policy
Leo Africanus’ mention of the Hausa states of Kano, Katsina, Gobir and Zaria – after Ibn Batṭūta’s this is the second and final one in an Arabic external source – implies the supremacy of Bornu over this area. The available indigenous chronicles, the Kano, Hausa and Zamfara chronicles (all composed from the late nineteenth century CE onwards), uncover colourful details of the regional differences, in particular between the western ‘city-states’ of Kebbi, Zamfara and Gobir, and Kano, Katsina and Zaria in the east. In the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century, the Muslim kings of Kebbi had resisted attacks from both Songhay and Bornu. From there, Islamic features spread among the political elites of Hausaland. In Katsina, perhaps supported by the influence of the Wangara immigrants, King Ibraḥīm Maja (r. 956–74/1549–66)
even tried to prescribe compliance with Islamic laws of marriage on his subjects. One century later, Aliyou is reckoned to have been the first Muslim among the Zamfara kings. The rulers of Bagirmi, south of Bornu and east of Zaria, are also reported to have converted to Islam. The majority of the peasant population, however, as observed by Heinrich Barth in 1265f./1849 in Bagirmi, by 'Uthmān’s brother ‘Abd Allāh ibn Fūdī (c. 1180–1244/1766–1829) in Zamfara, and by Muḥammad Bello elsewhere in Hausaland, was hardly touched by Islam:

We must now address the law of enslavement of the people of this country. They fall into three categories. One category consists of the pure believers. These were rare before the appearance of the shaykh. Another category mixes the activities of unbelief with that of Islam. Most of the kings of this country, their troops and their evil scholars, belong to it. And the category of the unbelievers by birth who did not enter Islam. The mass of the Hausa people (sūdāniyyān), called ‘Maghuzawa’ [from Arabic majūs, heathens], belong to it … they may be enslaved.19

This tri-partition is a Sūdānic topos. In pre-jihad Hausaland, the epigones of this perspective, the category of the ‘true believers’, were foreigners. Most of them were Fulbe. Unlike the Wangara merchants, who long since had reconciled their pious aspirations with their rulers’ interests (and thus become ‘mixers’), the Fulbe kept aloof of the capitals and centres of power. Only a few details are known of how they preserved and cultivated their Muslim lifestyle in the countryside. Ethnic coherence, sometimes unmasked as ‘snobbishness’, and the profits from slave-farming provided for a relatively independent communal life and the leisure of scholarship. The widespread links among the Fulbe communities made books and ideas from the outside available. When ‘Uthmān, who was himself descended from a Rimaibe clan, started his career in 1188/1774f. as a wandering preacher among the Fulbe tribes in western Hausaland, the country was torn by endless wars between the rivalling city-states. He witnessed how injustice, corruption and laxity in religious matters got out of hand among the rulers, and poverty and misery within the rural population. At some point of his persistent da‘wa (mission) over thirty years, his reserved admonition ‘to order what is right and to forbid what is wrong’ changed into a programme of political reform. When King Bawa of Gobir died (around 1203/1789) ‘Uthmān’s sermons and writings, some having meanwhile been put into Fulfulde and Hausa verses, had reached larger parts of the population. They were told not only, perhaps for the first time, how to cleanse themselves hygienically and to perform the ritual...
ablutions correctly, but also that their officially Islamic rulers trampled all over the shari‘a. Five years later, a mystical encounter of ‘Uthmān with ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī (d. 561/1166), the Ḥanbalī eponym of the Qādiriyya, set the course. ‘Uthmān was girded with the ‘Sword of Truth’ and instructed to perform the hijra in order to escape the clutches of King Yunfa of Gobir, and to reform (iṣlāh) and renew (tajdīd) Islam in Hausaland.

This synthesis of elements of reformed Sufi brotherhood movements that had been spreading for some time in West Africa and were prominently mediated by the Zāwī scholar Śiddī al-Mukhtar al-Kuntī (d. 1226/1811), with militant jihad strategies, marked the beginning of a new stage in the Islamisation of the Südān. In Hausaland, the Wangara, the Muslim exponents of coexistence with rulers who kept up the worship of traditional deities, were ousted as ‘enemies of God’. Yandoto, one of their centres, was violently taken and destroyed. ‘Uthmān mobilised his jamā‘a of ‘fighters’ (mujāhidūn) against both kings and ‘evil scholars’. The order he intended to erect in its place, however, remained shadowy. From his early statements, it could be summarised as a ‘good Islamic governance’, close to what al-Maghīlī had outlined three centuries before – and just as it was to be revivified by modern Muslim scholars of Niamey, two centuries later. Most important, perhaps, for the initial success of his jihad was his explicit refusal to declare a grave sinner to be an unbeliever, contrary to what his uncompromising teacher, Jibrīl ibn ‘Umar who had twice made the pilgrimage to the Wahhābī dominated holy places, had taught. This dogmatic leniency matches the popular beginnings of ‘Uthmān’s da‘wa. In Hausa, which he did not speak as well as his native tongue, he nonetheless sought to win the Hausa peasantry as followers and believers. Some joined him, like his early lieutenant, the Arewa Hausa scholar ‘Abd al-Salām (d. 1233/1818), only to revolt against his son and successor. The ultimate failure of this revolutionary objective uncovers the spiritual limits of the jihad. Springing from Toronkawa piety, it found spontaneous yet short-lived support among Muslim and non-Muslim Hausas – who and where to draw the dividing line? – and resulted in the supremacy of a religious Fulbe aristocracy. In adjacent areas as well, in Adamawa and Nupe, the Fulbe elites dominated the Islamic reform movements. The crucial certainty of being a Muslim, and being respected as one, was achieved along ethnic lines. In theory, Mālikī law in the hands of Fulbe scholars defined the line; in practice, it was the need for slaves that drew it. The liberation of conversion and confession from social and ethnic constraints, the germ of which was implanted in ‘Uthmān’s mystical experiences, had to be set in motion in other ways.
Notes

9. Ibid. p. 308/ ar. 175.
Introduction

Ibn Khaldūn’s description of the Maghrib of his day is a striking one, one which, as might be expected, illustrates his theory of the fall of civilisations. The Maghrib he describes labours under all kinds of troubles: the impoverishment and weakening of its states, worsening of its peoples’ living conditions, the waning of its trade (particularly with the Südân) and the deterioration of its cities. The Maghribi scholar sees such a decline in the infrastructure of the area that it appears ‘deserted and empty, with the exception of the coast and the surrounding hills’.¹

This view is borne out in post-Khaldūnian Maghrib, which sees its states disintegrating, its agriculture deteriorating and its trade collapsing; and then, while the mountains close in on themselves, the plains face disruption by the Bedouin tribes who no longer have the political allegiances which previously held their taste for power in check. Local notables sprang up everywhere, similar to those described in the ninth/fifteenth-century corpus of jurisprudential law known as the Nawāzīl of Mazoua. When crossing the Ghrīs plain in 921/1515, Leo Africanus noted that the population fell into two groups: on the one hand, the settled population living in the hills in houses ‘very properly built with walls’² and cultivating the land, with on the other hand the nomads living in tents and tending cattle on the plains. This pattern of habitation of the land and the resultant type of work arising from it grew into a relationship of political domination. The settled population was at the mercy of the ‘much nobler’ Bedouins. These nomads were the Banū Rāshid, protégés of the Zayyānids of Tlemcen. The prosperous Ghrīs plain they controlled provided the makhzan with revenue estimated at 25,000 ducats by Leo Africanus (or 40,000 pistols according to Marmol). They were a considerable fighting force, numbering up to 25,000 men, of cavalry and infantry, making them one of the most important groupings in the kingdom. In Leo Africanus’s time, their qā’id was involved in
all the court intrigues in Tlemcen. He was related by marriage to the sultan Abū Ḥammū III and one of his grandsons was a pretender to the throne. After the Banū Rāshid, the Banū ‘Āmir were the other significant great tribe, or rather tribal grouping. Their domination extended over the plains of Tessala, M’lata and Zidour, and they were one of the pillars of the kingdom before participating in its dismemberment by their alliance with the Spanish when they besieged the coast of central Maghrib at the beginning of the tenth/sixteenth century.

At the time when the Nawāzīl of Mazouma were compiled, this Bedouin domain had to face up to the emergence of a new claimant to tribal leadership: maraboutism. This threat grew from the forces of religion rather than arms. In fact it was in the name of a competing religious authority to that of the ‘ulamā’, who were learned in the scriptures, that sharifs and marabouts became the key players in Maghrībi rural life. While the former claimed their hereditary charisma (they claimed a genealogy linking them back to the Prophet of Islam), the latter claimed miraculous powers as shown in their unheard-of claim of proximity to God. Whilst the Bedouin lords expressed their warlike drive, these ritual figures opposed it with their baraka, a type of paroxystic energy. They were peaceful most of the time, but this mysterious force could easily mutate into furia, especially at times of crisis. As a result they were able to reshape the morphology of post-Khalda’ni Maghrib to their advantage, some features of which still exist today.

These homines novi took their place in the Maghrib of the time as a socio-logical phenomenon whose rise was linked not only to the restructuring of tribal rituals urgently requiring living figures, but also to the political vacuum filled by the rise in power of the Bedouin lords. This is why the settled tribes were drawn to them as mediators able to intercede as much between them and the heavenly powers as between them and the powers of this world – a world dominated by Bedouin lords and local notables. In return they agreed to hand over a proportion of their profits. In order to guarantee their own loyalty, they contractualised their commitments in the form of ‘stipulations’ (shartās) which they renewed for their descendants drawn up into sacred lineages. In their way, these men endowed with baraka brought a solution to the widespread crisis of patronage in the Maghrībi countryside in the ninth/fifteenth and tenth/sixteenth centuries. But this came at the price of greater social disintegration. For instead of calming the crisis, they to some extent kept it going. However, this did not prevent them, at a tribal level, from being an important factor in social integration and cohesion.

At the end of the ninth/fifteenth century, the towns faced similar difficulties owing to the weakening or absence of centralised political authority in the
country. As in the mountains and the plains, for their survival they had to
draw on their own resources. Oran, linked to Tlemcen by a fictional link of
sovereignty, comes over as a little trading republic in the hands of numerous
Muslims driven out of Spain, who had populated it and made it prosper.
Strengthened by its very long-standing trade with Italy and also by its pirate
economy, Bougie shook off all royal control. Tlemcen fell into anarchy amid
palace intrigues where ‘kings are dethroned by the ambitions of their sons and
sons fight over their inheritance from their father’. The only areas it con-
trolled were those immediately on its borders. In the east, there was equal
confusion in the kingdom of Tunis. Like the political masters in central
Maghrib, the Ḥafṣids lost all their power. The sultan had so little control
over the capital that he had to resort to protection from a Christian guard. The
coastal cities of Oran, Algiers, Bone, Bougie and Tripoli also became inde-
pendent principalities. They were followed by the towns of the interior.
Capitalising on the shrinking of the territory of Ḥafṣid Ifrīqiya, Constantine
declared its independence. In the south, protected by its insularity, Djerba
escaped in the same way from the authority of the Ḥafṣids. Further west, the
Touggourt oasis had independent sultans.

Following this break-up, the Maghrib found itself with a new geo-political
profile which was to lead to the formation of the different countries which
make up the modern-day Maghrib: Algeria emerging from the combined
debris of the Zayyānid kingdoms in the west, the Ḥammādīs in the centre
and the Ḥafṣids in the east, Tunisia growing up from lesser Ifrīqiya (in
contrast with greater Ifrīqiya which took in the region of Constantine), and
Libya making up its land from its traditional geography of passageway
between Egypt and the Maghrib. The Turks introduced the concept of a
border, hitherto unknown in the Maghrib, to these divisions. Until that
time, anarchy ruled. It was so widespread that a secretary of the Catholic
Kings of Spain was drawn to write with justification in 1494 that ‘the whole
country is in such a state of mind that it seems that God wishes to give it to
their majesties’.4

The weak political situation of the Maghrib in the ninth/fifteenth century
favoured the Spanish, who little by little between 911/1505 and 917/1511
occupied the major points on its Mediterranean coast. What were these
conquerors looking for? Whether these new vantage points were a means of
consolidating the *reconquista* or were a basis for the colonisation of the country
is hard to judge. If it is true that Spain had a policy towards Africa, this was
thwarted by the people of Algiers’ calls to the intrepid Turkish sailors, the
Barbarossa brothers.
The Turks in the Maghrib

The oldest of the Barbarossas, Oruj (‘Barbarossa’ may be a corruption of Baba Oruj) was also the chief of the clan. He started out as a fearsome pirate in the eastern Mediterranean before moving his activity to the coast of the Maghrib. He is said to have had, from 910/1504 onwards, permission from the Hafṣid sultan Abū ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan (r. 899–932/1494–1526) to make La Goulette a base port. The Barbarossa brothers started out with only two vessels, but as a result of remarkable captures their fleet grew to eight galliots in 916/1510. The Hafṣid sultan, who had a share in their profits, gave them permission to take on supplies in other ports and in particular in 916/1510 to establish a secondary base in Djerba for ten or twelve vessels from their fleet. Hailed as champions of their faith, they were held in high esteem by the local populations for transporting thousands of Mudejars to Ifrīqiya.

At the same time as the corsair brothers were sailing the western Mediterranean, the Spaniards began the occupation of Mers El-Kébir (911/1505), Oran (914/1508), Bougie and Tripoli (916/1510). Their failure to take Djerba in 918/1512 did not diminish the achievement of these victories. The fear of suffering the same fate as Oran (where Cardinal Ximenez had orchestrated the massacre of 4,000 inhabitants and the capture of 8,000 others, before consecrating the two main mosques as Catholic churches in May 1509) led most of the other threatened ports to surrender without a shot. One after the other, Tenes (before the capture of Oran), Algiers (in 916/1510), Dellys, Cherchell and Mostaganem (in 917/1511) agreed to pay tribute. Algiers went as far as to offer to Pedro Navarro to build the fortress of the Peñon on one of its islands, its cannons pointing at the town hardly 300 metres away serving as a reminder of why the Spaniards were there.

In 918/1512, despairing of being able to retake the town from its Spanish conquerors, the Hafṣid governor of Bougie called upon Oruj, but the corsair could not carry through the assault. He undertook a naval blockade of the town with his twelve vessels and more than 1,000 Turkish soldiers, while the governor with 3,000 Moors was laying siege on land: it was here that his arm was torn off by a cannonball. He was quickly taken back to Tunis by his brother Khayreddin, and took some time to recover. Back in action in Jumādā II 920/ August 1514, he again attacked Bougie, with twelve ships and 1,100 soldiers, without success. Bad weather and the appearance of a Spanish squadron, combined with a rout amongst the locally drafted troops, persuaded them to lift the siege. As he could not return to Tunis where he was no longer welcome, he established himself in Djidjelli, making it his base port.
This is perhaps where Oruj nursed his political ambitions. If not, why, in addition to helping the population of the area gravely affected by famine, did he also get involved in the disputes between the two main ‘kings’ of Kabylia? In 922/1516 he gained an important ally by contributing to the victory of the leader of the Banū ‘Abbās over his Kūkū enemy. In other respects, it was the international situation that led to the rise of the condottiere.

The news of the death of Ferdinand the Catholic, in January of the same year, reached the Maghrib towns occupied by the Spaniards. The inhabitants of Algiers saw this as an opportunity to free themselves from the Peñon, but they had neither the strength nor the means to act on their own. So they pressed their shaykh, Salīm al-Tūmī, to call on Oruj. The corsair seized the opportunity to occupy Cherchell, which was in the hands of another Turkish adventurer, before bombarding the Peñon – in vain. He nonetheless entered Algiers in triumph. The corsair and his men behaved as though they were in charge. Seeing his authority threatened, the shaykh of Algiers sought ways and means of getting rid of his overbearing ally. He mobilised the Tha‘āliba from the Mitidja – who had been controlling the town since the eighth/fourteenth century – and some of the people of Algiers before obtaining the support of the Spaniards. They all came together to eliminate the corsair. On discovering the conspiracy, Oruj put to death the tribal chief: his son only escaped the massacre by taking refuge with the Spaniards. From then on, the way was open to him to seize power, even at the price of using violence against recalcitrants. The ensuing executions and imprisonments were to become the pattern for the Turkish regime throughout its existence. Following this, he repulsed a Spanish landing led by Diego de Vera on 3 Ramadān 922/30 September 1516. The nobles gave in and Algiers had a new leader.

The ‘king’ of Tenes, an ally of the Spaniards and encouraged by them, tried his hand against Oruj, but the Turkish leader went to meet him and defeated him roundly. Pushing his advantage, he seized Milyāna, Médéa and, ultimately, Tenes. According to the Ghazawāt, it was at this time that the lands conquered by the condottiere were divided into an eastern province, with Djidjelli as its chief city, which was under his authority, and a province of Algiers and lands in the west, the control of which he handed to his brother Khayreddīn.

Owing to their role in throwing off the Spaniards, the Turks were seen as saviours rather than power-seekers. Thus it was that the inhabitants of Tlemcen called upon Oruj to rid them of their king, who had accepted Spanish sovereignty in 917/1511. Entrusting the government of Algiers to his brother Khayreddīn, the new strong man of the central Maghrib headed up an
expeditionary force, which, on the way to Banū Rāshid territory, occupied the small town of Qalʿa, which was put under the control of Ishāq, the youngest of the three Barbarossa brothers. Without too much difficulty the Turkish troops beat the army of the sultan Abū Ḥammu III in open country in Shaʿbān 923/September 1517. Oruj entered the old capital of central Maghrib in triumph. But instead of handing the throne to the pretender Abū Zayyān, who had no links with the Spaniards, he made himself master of the city and sent his soldiers out into the lands of the Beni Snassen. Following this, he began talks with the Watṭāsid sultan of Fez to persuade him to form an alliance against the Spaniards. The Spaniards reacted immediately to this. In Dhū ’l-Ḥijja 923/January 1518, with the help of a large contingent of Banū ‘Āmir, they took Qalʿa and cut off the lines of communication with Algiers. Ishāq and his soldiers were put to the sword. In May, an expeditionary column left Oran in the direction of Tlemcen. This was the beginning of a six-month siege. Oruj resisted, hoping for the support of the king of Fez. But in a customary turnaround, the same populations which had earlier called on them turned on them; he retreated with a small group of loyal supporters to the fortress of the Mishwār. The vice was tightened, and their supplies were cut off. They managed to escape under cover of darkness. They were pursued and caught probably near Río Salado (present-day Oued El-Malah, situated mid-way between Tlemcen and Oran) where, following fierce fighting, they were all massacred in autumn 924/1518.

Oruj’s meteoric career came to a brutal end at the age of forty-four or forty-five. Carried away by his own daring, the corsair had overestimated the support of the local populations and underestimated the strength of the enemy to the extent of putting up fights without ensuring firm back-up. Yet his death did not threaten the Turkish ventures in Africa. To some extent, it relaunched them. It was the start of a new era ‘for the fame and renown of Algiers and Barbary’. Its achievements must not be lost. Having previously operated in his brother’s shadow, Khayreddīn showed himself to be a worthy successor, both militarily and politically.

The defence of Algiers gave him the opportunity of using his talents as a chief. At its collapse, he confronted the expedition led by Hugo de Moncada, viceroy of Sicily, consisting of eighty sailing-ships and 6,000 men according to Manfroni, forty boats and 5,000 men according to Grammont, and 170 ships and 20,000 men according to the Ghazawāt. In mid-August, the enemy disembarked near to the Oued El-Harrac7 and took up positions on Kudyat al-Šābūn, the ‘hill of soap’. With 600 Turks and 20,000 natives, Khayreddīn got the upper hand and forced him to re-embark. At the same time a storm blew
up and led to the loss of a large number of the Spanish vessels. The Turks and their allies took the opportunity of taking many prisoners, including thirty-six higher-ranking officers. Algiers was saved. Now it remained to protect its dependencies. The king of Tlemcen, who had come to help out his Spanish allies, was beaten and his march on Milyâna halted. The Turks considered retaking Tenes, which was the most important port to the west of Algiers, but put this off until the following year. Seizing the opportunity of the population’s revolt against its çaid, the Turks occupied the port area in spring 927/1520 while one of their squadrons of eighteen ships drove away fifteen Spanish ships which had been sent to the aid of the city.

Khayreddin ruled over huge territories in central Maghrib. Building on his brother’s model of administrative organisation, he entrusted the government of the two provinces of the east and the west to two native chiefs, Ahmed ibn al-Qâdî and Muhammad ibn ‘Alî, at the same time as taking the name of Khayreddin (his real name was Khîdr or Khîdîr) along with the title of sultan as revealed by an inscription in the mosque of Algiers, built by him and bearing the date Jumâda I 926/April 1520.

His intention had been to put his kingdom onto a legitimate footing at the same time as securing for himself the assistance at least of the Ottoman empire. To achieve this, he sent to Selim I, the Ottoman caliph, a mission of four ships bearing a petition from the population of Algiers dated Shawwâl-Dhu ‘l-qa‘da 926/October–November 1519, requesting the protection of the Porte and numerous gifts for him and the pashas of the Divan. A few months later he received a decree (khatt-ı sherîf) giving him the title of pasha and designating him ‘amîr of the amîrs’ (beglerbegi). But most importantly the sultan provided him with what he wanted most urgently – 2,000 janissaries and some artillery. They were soon joined by 4,000 Levantines, thanks to their being given permission to enlist volunteers who, according to Haëdo, were granted by the Regency the same rights and privileges as the janissaries. The ‘kingdom of Algiers’ now had the military foundations it was to keep throughout its existence. It was absorbed into the Ottoman empire in 927/1520, it struck its own coins and had Friday prayers – the khîthâ – pronounced on behalf of the caliph.

The reinforcements they needed arrived in time to try simultaneously to put an end to the conspiracy between the people of Algiers and Kabylia stirred up by their former ally Ibn al-Qâdî and to counter another attack on Algiers led by Hugo de Moncada. Abandoned in the midst of the action by the troops of the ‘king’ of Kükû, who had allied himself with the Hašids of Tunis, Khayreddin was forced out of Algiers. He once again took refuge with nine ships in Djidjelli. From there he began to try to reconquer the country. Firstly
he seized Collo in 1521 CE, and then Bone and Constantine in 929/1522. Whether or not he was able to hold on to these towns is not certain, certainly as regards Constantine. For some reason he resumed his activities as a corsair in the Mediterranean, operating with seven ships, increasing to forty-one a year later.

Having regained his power, he returned to reconquer Algiers in 932/1525. His chance came when he was called upon by the disgruntled inhabitants who were losing their income from piracy. There followed the long process of retaking the country. Between 933/1526 and 935/1528, Cherchell, Tenes and Constantine submitted to his authority. Then turning his attention to the Peñón, which was a constant threat to Algiers, Khayreddin attacked with great force. At the end of three weeks of bombardment, the twenty-five men still alive out of 150 surrendered the fortress before meeting their own ends in the beating inflicted on them on 19 Ramadān 935/27 May 1529. The decision was taken to destroy the Peñón and to reuse the debris to build the breakwater which was to link the island on which it stood to the other islands close to the mainland. Algiers finally had a proper port. Meanwhile, nine Spanish vessels which had come to the aid of the fortress were captured.

In 939/1532, Khayreddin believed he had sufficient control of the situation in central Maghrib to confront the king of Tlemcen and to force him to pay a tribute of 30,000 gold pieces, despite the support of a squadron of fourteen Spanish vessels moored in Oran. Times were hard for the Spaniards. Although they occupied Oran and Bougie, they were no longer a serious threat to the 'kingdom of Algiers' encouraged by the success of its corsairs in the Mediterranean. In that year, fifteen vessels from Algiers left to sack the Spanish coasts. They were splendidly victorious: fourteen of the fifteen Spanish boats defending the coast were taken. The boot was on the other foot. The jails of Algiers were full of captives. That year saw a revolt by 7,000 of them, led by twenty Spanish nobles whose ransom of 20,000 sequins had been refused. Their desperate bid failed in a bloodbath.

The Ottomans' ambitions now covered the whole of the Maghrib. In 941/1534, Khayreddin took to sea with a fleet of eighty-four ships, eighteen belonging to him, five to other corsairs, the remaining sixty-one having being newly built with the express mission, ordered by the caliph, of taking Tunis from the Ḥafṣids who were in alliance with the Spaniards. The people of Tunis, far from showing their hostility, welcomed them in Bizerta and La Goulette.

Only short bouts of fighting were needed to enter Tunis in Ṣafar 941/August 1534. Mawlāy Ḥasan (r. 932–50/1526–43) turned to Charles V for
help in recovering his kingdom. The emperor was concerned about Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean and gave his support. At the beginning of the summer of 941/1535, he headed for Tunis leading a powerful armada of 400 sailing ships transporting 40,000 men. He threw out the Turks and returned the fallen sultan to the throne. Under the terms of a treaty putting Hafṣid Ifriqiya under the sovereignty of the Spaniards, the protectors occupied La Goulette and began to build – as they had in Algiers – a fortress to defend Tunis from attacks from the sea. This success resounded throughout all of Christian Europe, heightened by a renewed crusading spirit on behalf particularly of the pope and the Italian princes. Forced back to Bone, Khayreddīn replied with a surprise attack on Mahon where he took 6,000 prisoners and significant booty. This impressive action was his last exploit as leader of the corsairs of Algiers. He was appointed admiral-in-chief (qapudan pasha), and took command of the fleet of the sultan Süleymān. For thirty years he guaranteed the Ottoman navy a complete upper hand in the Mediterranean.

On leaving Algiers, he handed over government to his faithful lieutenant Hasan Agha (943–50/1536–43) whose reign was marked out by Charles V’s expedition of 948/1541. Assured of the neutrality of the king of France, the Spanish emperor put up against the people of Algiers an impressive armada of 516 sailing ships transporting 12,330 sailors and 24,000 soldiers. Fearing an attack by sailors from Algiers, the Spanish fleet landed at the mouth of the Oued El-Harrach on 23 October, at a time of year when the sea is dangerous. Charles V established his camp on the heights of Kudiyat al-Sābūn, since known as the Emperor’s Fort, from where he could dominate the town. In the night of the 24/25 October, the weather worsened and the gathering storm destroyed half of the armada. On 3 November, exposed to the elements and the harassment of the Turks, the Spanish troops embarked on the remainder of the surviving fleet, leaving Algiers with tremendous booty, and even more unexpectedly, a reputation for invincibility which endured until 1245/1830.

At the risk of suffering the wrath of the presidio of Oran, Tlemcen looked again towards Algiers. Encouraged by the victory of the Turks he had supported, the sultan Mawlāy Hasan renounced his allegiance to Spain. The governor of Oran, the count of Alcaudeté, who had a replacement sultan ready and waiting, immediately headed up an expeditory force to install one of the brothers of their old ally, ‘Abd Allāh, on 2 Dhū ’l-Qa‘da 949/6 February 1543. Rejected by the people, the young king was chased out as soon as his protectors had gone. The Zayyānid ally of the Turks recovered his throne. But the instability of central Maghrib was such that, four years later, in the absence of the janissaries who had left Tlemcen to go to the aid of
Mostaganem under siege from the count of Alcaudete, he broke off his alliance and asked for the protection of Spain in 954/1547. In the confusion the Sa’dís – Saharan Sharifs who had beaten the Wattasids of Fez who were more or less allies of the Turks – launched their troops to conquer the neighbouring kingdom. They occupied Tlemcen, seized Mostaganem and made inroads into the valley of the Chelif. The reaction of Hasan Pasha (951–8/1544–51), son of Khayreddin and successor to Hasan Agha, was swift. The Sharifs’ troops were crushed by an army led by Hasan Corso and supported by allied tribes. Mostaganem and Tlemcen were taken back. But instead of installing a new vassal king in the Zayyanid capital, Hasan Corso left behind a Turkish garrison. The old capital of central Maghrib had been assimilated into the ‘Regency of Algiers’. When they ended the Spanish protectorate over Tlemcen, the Turks ended Spanish hopes of ever being able to overcome the hinterland. The whole Spanish policy of restrained occupation of the nerve centres of the coast was destroyed. Unlike the Spaniards, the Turks of Algiers had always tried to leave a garrison in each town in the interior they occupied. This direct government of the country did not exclude other kinds of administration as there were so few of them and the country was so large. Contrary to their rivals, the Turks did not stop at settling on the coast of the country. They dominated the Tell and subjugated the first fringes of the Sahara. In Shawwâl 959/October 1552, Sâlih Re’îs forced the oases of Touggourt and Wargla, more than twenty days on foot from Algiers, to pay tribute to the Regency – which they continued to do until 1245/1830. Two years later, he mounted an expedition against Fez and chased out the Saharan Sharifs, installing a Wattasid sultan of his choice. Under his reign, Yahyâ Re’îs, who between 955/1548 and 960/1552 had spread terror on the Spanish coasts, taking more than 4,000 prisoners, retook Bougie from the Spaniards in 963/1555. The following year, Oran was besieged by land and sea. But the Ottoman galleys were called away to another mission in the Mediterranean, so it was relieved early. As rivalry between Christianity and Islam grew, ‘professional Turks’, as Haëdo called them, continued to flow into the area, giving Algiers more of an edge as the Mediterranean capital. At their peak they were represented by Uluj ‘Ali, a convert from Calabria who became a beglerbegi, the last person to hold this title, between 976/1568 and 1099/1687. Thanks to him, the kingdom of Tunis was incorporated into the Ottoman empire in 977/1569.

At the time when the Turks arrived in the Maghrib, the kingdom faced changes as radical as those facing central Maghrib. The Hajsids, the ruling dynasty, faced the same difficulties as the Zayyanids in Tlemcen. Their
country was divided and their authority practically non-existent. Al-Hasan, caught up in an impossible situation in 932/1526, had to struggle with dissidence in the south of Tunis at the same time as dealing with court intrigues and fending off his son’s rebellion. He held on to the throne thanks to the Spaniards. Yet outside Tunis his protectors offered him little support. In 942/1535, they failed before Mahdiyya. Two years later, their attack on Sousse ended in another failure. And although the energetic Doria overcame Sfax, Sousse and Monastir in 955/1548, these efforts did not lead to anything. Isolated, the sultan had no social support. Abandoned by his troops in his expedition against Qayrawān, he survived the massacre by chance. The whole of the Tunisian south was against him. The whiff of revolt was so strong that his Spanish protectors had to evacuate Monastir.

Exploiting the near lack of succession besetting Ifrīqiya, an unknown corsair came to the fore. Like Khayreddīn, who had freed him from the Genoese who had taken him prisoner in 947/1540, while he was massing his boats on the Corsican shore, Ṭurghūd established his base in Djerba until its liberation three years later. But it was in Tunis that he chose to sell the booty he had taken in the Mediterranean. In 951/1544, he occupied Mahdiyya, before being dislodged by the Spaniards. Surprised in his base in Djerba by Doria’s fleet in 958/1551, he managed to escape thanks to a hastily dug channel. Back at sea, he offered his services to the Ottoman government who were preparing more naval campaigns. Thus he took part in a first campaign against the Order of the Knights of Malta, then a second against Tripoli in 958/1551. The siege of Malta failed while that of Tripoli in Libya was crowned with success. He coveted, and in 963/1555 got, the governorship of Tripolitania along with the title of beglerbegi. With a new base port on African soil, he could concentrate on the reconquest of Ifrīqiya. The south fell like a ripe fruit into his hands. Gafsa, which had once refused him, now opened its doors to him and received him in triumph on 18 Saḥar 965/20 December 1556. Qayrawān – the spiritual capital of Ifrīqiya – submitted to him in its turn on 13 Rabi‘ I 965/3 January 1558. Two years later, he took part in the battle of Djerba. This was an important undertaking for the Ottoman empire since it was planned and prepared for by Istanbul. It resulted in the triumph of the Turks over the Christians, chiefly the Spaniards. Until the end of its life with the siege of Malta in 1076/1665, Tripoli was feared as a Mediterranean power.9

Now the conquest of Ifrīqiya was begun, it fell to the Turks of Algiers to finish the job. In Jumādā II 977/December 1569, ‘Uluj ‘Alī seized Tunis. But the troops he left there were unable to hold on to it. They were chased out by the autumn of 981/1573. In order better to protect the city, Don Juan of
Austria reinforced the Spanish presence with an army corps of 8,000 men. But in spite of their numbers, the Spanish soldiers also gave in. The following year, the Turkish troops retook Tunis and La Goulette. The Ḥāfṣid reign was ended and a dream was shattered. Spanish supremacy on African soil disappeared for ever.

A military regime

Khayreddīn can with justification be called the founder of the ‘state of the Algerians’ – a phrase which for a long time described the regime installed by the Turks in Algiers. By organising it on a military basis it allowed the militia of the janissaries (ojaq) to dominate the running of affairs. Recruited not only from Anatolia, but also from other areas of the Levant, this military aristocracy, which was run on egalitarian lines, elected their chiefs. Any of its members could rise up the hierarchy by seniority, up as far as the āghā, the overall captain of the militia, a position abandoned after a short time in favour of the mansūl-āghā, a sort of honorary āghā. Made up of several companies of variable size, they were accommodated in dormitories of twelve to twenty men (urta), in barracks.

They had a strong esprit de corps, and were very careful to protect corporate interests which a council – the Divan – was in charge of defending. This did not mean that they could not be indisciplined or even brutal. They did not spare their leaders, and would quickly turn their impetuosity against the people. This was due to their annoying habit of confusing their interests with those of the state. Before eventually succeeding in the last quarter of the tenth/sixteenth century, they tried several times to seize power by directing attacks against the beglerbegis and the rival corporation of the reʾīs, the captain of the navy.

In contrast with members of the militia, the captains of the navy were Turks, Moors and, above all, renegades originating mainly from the poorest Christian areas of the Mediterranean (Calabria, Sicily, Corsica.) Attracted by the wealth of Algiers, these adventurers came to turn themselves into ‘professional Turks’ with the aim of achieving glory and fortune, and sometimes to get themselves into the highest positions of state. The reʾīs were mainly involved in piracy but they sometimes joined in the naval campaigns of the Ottoman empire against the Christian enemy powers. In 966/1558, they had thirty-five galleys, twenty-five brigantines or frigates and other ships they could arm should the need arise. Algiers was proud of them as they were the source of its prosperity. From 976/1568, this meritocracy was to share in
the privileges of the ojaq by admitting janissaries into its teams. This initiative appears to have come from Muḥammad Pasha who ‘ended the great discord which had long prevailed in Algiers between the two corps’.

In fact this pasha only soothed the tensions between the two groups, which soon resumed indefinitely.

At the height of the Regency, beglerbegis appointed by Istanbul ruled the country either directly on behalf of the Ottoman sultan, or via the intermediary of lieutenants (khalifas) who sometimes succeeded them while exerting their own authority over the pashas of Tunis and Tripoli. Since the time of the Barbarossas, their ambition had been to found one single state bringing together all the Barbarossa kingdoms. ‘Uluj ‘Alī was the last great ‘king of Algiers’ who wished to fulfil this project, opposed by the militia who feared that if it happened they would be excluded from political decisions. After 996/1587, they managed to convince the sultan that ‘if ‘Uluj ‘Alī conquered the kingdom of Fez, with such a powerful army and already controlling Tripoli where one of his renegades was in charge, he could easily rise up and make himself master of all of Barbary’.

Taking their side, the sultan carried out a reform of the governments of Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers resulting in him delegating his authority to pashas with their appointments being renewed every three years.

This was the situation until the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century. Whereas until now it had been part of the Ottoman army stationed in North Africa, the ojaq emerged, after 1070/1659, as an army holding power to serve its own ends. In that year the chief of the janissaries (āghā al-‘asker) staged a coup d’état which he justified by accusing the pashas sent from Istanbul of corruption and poor leadership of a government hampered in its relations with the European powers. The Regency now had interests which did not necessarily coincide with those of the sultan. Instead of improving the political situation, this show of strength only served to worsen it. The four āghās, appointed between 1070/1659 and 1082/1671, were massacred by the ojaq. On every occasion it was the resources of the state, in particular those acquired from piracy, which were behind the dissent between the militia and its leaders. The assassination of ‘Alī (1075–82/1664–71), the last āghā of the janissaries, who had led the country since 1070/1659, was brought about by the destruction of seven of Algiers’ best ships by a British flotilla. To replace the āghā of the janissaries, the insurgent re‘īs appointed an officer who was given the title of Dey. After 1101/1690, and another dramatic event, the election of the Dey passed from the re‘īs to the militia. From then on, the Regency looked more like a military republic ruled on behalf of the sultan by leaders chosen by the
ojaq and protecting their own interests. Istanbul’s formal link with Algiers continued to consist of sending a pasha, but this was largely an honorary position. In 1123/1711, ‘Ali Shāwush, the tenth Dey, put an end to this ‘duality of power’, nominal in the case of the pashas and real in the case of the Deys, by refusing to receive Istanbul’s envoy and persuading the caliph to grant the title of pasha to him instead.

In Tunis, Sinān Pasha’s victory paved the way for the establishment of a regime similar to that of Algiers. The Regency was administered by a pasha, but the āghā of the militia held great powers. As in Algiers, the ojaq and the body of re’is formed the structure of the Turkish presence in Tunisia. At the end of the tenth/sixteenth century, the ojaq included forty sections of 100 soldiers each, commanded by subaltern officers who were given the familiar title of Dey (maternal uncle). The military council (diwān al-‘asker), where the higher officers (bölük bashi-s) sat, functioned – in the same way as the one in Algiers – as a council of government. Sinān Pasha co-opted native notables to it in order to soften its military nature, and to allow them to participate in decision-making. But the troops who rebelled in 999/1590 against poor treatment by their commanders in the Divan, rejected this system of government. After massacring their superior officers, the janissaries forced the pasha to hand over the running of the army to their immediate superiors, the Deys, who numbered as many as 300, according to Ibn Abī Diyāf. In an identical process to that in which the janissaries of Algiers had seized power, the pasha of Tunis saw his authority wane. After the massacre of the böyük bashi-s in 999/1590, the 300 Deys made up the new Divan. Years of troubles and paralysis followed, until the most able of them – Qara ‘Othmān – managed to dominate his peers and install a monocratic regime, at some time between 1003/1594 and 1007/1598. This change now distinguished the Regency of Tunis from its neighbour in Algiers where the real power remained with the Divan until the beginning of the nineteenth century. In Tunis, the Dey became the leader of the Regency from the time of his election. ‘Othmān Dey (1007–19/1598–1610) and his successor Yūsuf Dey (1019–47/1610–37) brought to an end the authority of the Divan and the pasha. Their good governance helped to bring this about. First they managed to contain the turbulence of the troops, and then they brought order to the country. ‘Othmān Dey conquered the Tunisian south, and, thanks to him, the island of Djerba, which had been under the control of Tripoli since 966/1558, was returned to Tunis in 1013/1604. Yūsuf Dey, on the other hand, building on the work of his predecessor’s peace-making, managed to scotch local insurrections at the same time as repulsing the invasion of the people of Algiers. Under his reign, prosperity returned to
the country. Mosques, barracks, fortifications, aqueducts all sprung up across the land. These large projects were largely funded by piracy, the main source of income for a state possessing seventy ships, and several brigantines.

Yet in the shadow of this powerful Dey, the undisputed master of Tunis, a new Turkish force managed to take shape. These were the Murâdî Begs commanding the troops of the interior charged with keeping order and – as one goes hand in hand with the other – collecting taxes. Thanks to them the regime was to extend its power deep into the country. This was due to Murâd Kûrsû (the Corsican) and even more so to the true founder of the dynasty, his son Hammûda Pasha (1042–77/1632–66), who was finally recognised by Istanbul in 1069/1658 when he was granted the title of pasha. This power increased as the country was pacified in the east and the south. In the borders of Tunis and Algiers, the Murâdîs managed to destroy the powerful tribal confederation of the Banû Shânnûf whose leaders were taking the taxes for themselves in the El Kef at the same time as overpowering the ancient makhzan warrior tribe of the Awlâd Billîl. Further south, they met fierce resistance from the warlike Awlâd Saîd but were able to overcome them.

Here, as in the Regencies of Algiers and Tripoli, the country was too vast to be held by a foreign army of only 3,000 to 4,000 men. The Turks had criss-crossed it with garrisons (in Tunis, Beja, El Kef and Qayrawân) but there were not too many of them. In order to bring it under control, Hammûda Pasha renewed relations with the medieval institution of the makhzan tribes, the most famous of which were the Drîd. In return for tax exemption they helped with the raising of taxes and maintaining order in the countryside. Thanks to them, the power of the Murâdîs was increased. In the middle of the eleventh/seventeenth century it was so great that the Dey’s authority was restricted to Tunis and the surrounding area. The rivalry between the two ended in a show of force. The Murâdîs emerged victorious after a bloody confrontation in 1084/1673 and, on the heels of this, Murâd II (r. 1077–86/1666–75) established a hereditary monarchy. On the death of its founder the dynasty fell into difficulties which continued to worsen, until its final period – from 1086/1675 to 1114/1702 – witnessed a succession of crises, which were to be the final blow. It came to a brutal end in a bloodbath. In Muḥarram 1114/June 1702, after many executions and seizures of goods, Murâd III was assassinated by the āghâ of the sipâhî. To remove any chance of a claim to the head of the dynasty, one Ibrâhîm al-Sharîf set about massacring all the male children of the Murâdî house. He then took power, assuming the titles of both Dey and Beg. But this long-running campaign dragged the country into revolt and instability. The usurper declared war on Algiers in 1117/1705, but lost.
In Tripoli, the Turks were involved in dislodging the Knights of Malta. From the time of Tūrghūd until 1123/1711, the Regency here too was governed by a pasha appointed by Istanbul. As in Algiers and Tunis, there was a military council (diwān al-‘asker) charged with assisting the pasha with the administration of the country. This council was chaired by an officer called a Dey who was simultaneously the commander in chief of the janissaries. Through this dual role, the Deys held one of the keys to power in Tripolitania. They used it to full effect. For while some pashas were energetic military and political leaders, as was the case with Muhammad (r. 1041–59/1631–49) and his successor ‘Othmān (r. 1059–83/1649–72), others freely used their mandate to make themselves rich, leading the militia and the tribes to rise against them. This led to such political instability that, between 973/1565 and 1123/1711, Tripolitania had fifty-one pashas. The Regency in Tunis by contrast had only ten.

A hereditary monarchy

Although the three regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli had been created by the same foreign army, their political development was very different. It gave rise to two contrasting models of sovereignty. Whilst Algiers lived under the grip of the militia, Tunis and – later – Tripoli moved towards the constitution of a hereditary monarchy.

Tunis’ first dynastic experience was with the Murādī Begs, but this was short-lived. The model did not really take shape until the influence of Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf. This was, in other words, once chaos had been avoided, thanks to Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, owing to whom the country was united and successful against the people of Algiers. Taking responsibility for the Murādī heritage, this Beg gave the Tunis Regency its nature of a hereditary monarchy.

Who was Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī? His mother was a native, his father originated from Candia, and he spoke only Arabic. But this did not prevent him from being considered a ‘Turk’. He rose very young to the highest levels of the Murādī court where, a little before 1106/1694, he was appointed khazīnedār (treasurer) by Muhammad Beg (r. 1086–1108/1675–96), while in El Kef his brother Muhammad pursued a career commanding native troops. Two years later he became āghā of the sipāhī, then qā‘id (caïd) of the province of Aʿrād, held to be the most important of the provincial governments. Recalled around 1113/1701, he was promoted to kāhyā or lieutenant to the Beg of Tunis. At the time of the coup d’État of 1114/1702, he took refuge in the Jabal Wislāt. Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf, who needed him, made him come down and confirmed him in his post. Three years later, the country was invaded by the Turks of Algiers.
The war led to another political crisis. The capture of the usurper by the invaders presented Ḫusayn ibn ‘Alî with the chance to dominate the situation. Thus the invasion was repulsed. As a result he was elected Beg by the military, civil and religious authorities in Tunis. His popularity did not suit the Dey, and there was soon conflict between the two men. Without consulting his Beg, the Dey gave the members of the Divan the task of collecting taxes. He aimed to undermine the other’s authority, and to win the loyalty of the higher officers of the militia. He was also trying to deprive his rival of the fiscal income levied from the tribes. With his authority flouted, Ḫusayn ibn ‘Alî reacted forcefully and arrested the tax collectors appointed by his enemy. The show of force ended in violence. With the support of the native population from which he had recruited the members of the regular and auxiliary forces as well as some of the militia, the Beg counter-attacked in two stages. First he eliminated Ibrâhîm al-Sharîf when he was freed by the people of Algiers, then in 1118/1706 he removed the Dey Lasfar whom he replaced with another of his choosing.

Then, turning on the Divan, Ḫusayn ibn ‘Alî submitted it to the same treatment as the other central institutions, reducing it to the status of a mere cog in the administration since at best it had been no more than a useful screen. This reigning-in of the main institution of the Regency was accompanied by a reduction in the number of Levantine recruits in favour of Turks born in the country (the quloghlus) and native soldiers. Refusing to be the elected representative and the leader of an external army, Ḫusayn ibn ‘Alî established himself as the monarch. He made the palace of Bardo, the former residence of the Murādî Begs, the nerve centre of his monarchical system.

Yet the army remained the pillar of his regime. It may have been weakened, but it was still a heavy burden on the state budget. The janissaries and their leaders in fact accounted for more than 60 per cent of the beylik’s expenditure on the central services in 1718 (155,000 piastres out of a total of 244,000) and nearly 50 per cent in 1143/1730f. They were, as ever, a burden on ‘public’ expenditure. As before, the makhzan’s main priority was to find the necessary sums to pay them since only 3,500 out of about 5,000 men in 1148/1735 were in fact conscripted. Yet all was not as before. In the time of Ḫusayn ibn ‘Alî, the non-Turk troops (sipâhî and ‘Arab’ hânba, mızârûs or knights from makhzan tribes), who were either recruited locally or raised in Kabylia, acquired an importance they had never previously had. This was to the extent that out of the income levied on the provinces in 1122–4/1710–12, the mızârûs, allocated a total of 22.5 per cent of total income (121,200 piastres out of about 540,000), received 32 per cent of the total expenditure taken from income and nearly half of military expenditure from the same source. The maintenance of the sipâhî
accounted for 20 per cent of total expenditure and 27 per cent of military expenditure deducted from the same fiscal source. As for expenditure paid out by the central coffers, the amount devoted to the non-Turk soldiers was not insignificant. In 1143/1730f., it stood at more than a quarter of the total expenditure and nearly a third of the military budget, according to a table of military expenditure recently compiled by Mohamed Hédi Chérif, thanks to whom we have enriched our knowledge about this crucial period in the history of modern Tunisia.  

Balancing up the Turkish militia, the native troops ended up weakened mainly as a result of the peace policy initiated between 1118/1706 and 1141/1728 by Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī. Better adapted to the realities of the country, as much for raising taxes as for policing pacification campaigns, the native troops ran down the image of the Turkish soldier who became, in popular representation, the greedy and useless drain on resources.

For all these reasons and others, the Beg had less and less recourse to janissaries from the Levant to the point of stopping recruitment. Through banishment and execution, he got rid of their most dangerous elements, replacing them little by little with quloghlus, that is, with mixed-race troops like him. The Beg thus had a policy of promoting those like him to the highest positions and surrounding himself with them. The Regency in Tunis gave them opportunities envied by their brothers in the neighbouring Regency of Algiers, who were excluded from military roles and command of the militia. Their promotion, which had been unspectacular until now, became systematic under Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī. For if he was to lessen his dependence on a handful of foreign condottieri, his regime needed to widen its social base. This meant a cut in the number of janissaries and, in a highly symbolic gesture, a reduction in their privileges. Other groups who were more established in society enjoyed favours from the Beg which made those granted to the Turks by contrast seem only to have persisted as favours from the Beg in return for services rendered. The restructuring of the Ḥusaynī clientele led to considerable changes in society. The favoured native social groups (mukhabānīs, tribal chiefs, marabouts, Sharīfs, etc.) gradually acquired the legal status of Turk. Also, as a clear indication, when the Beg went off on an expedition, he preferred to leave the Turks and Levantines under the command of an aghā, a kāhyā or any officer with whom he identified more closely, leaving him personally to lead the ‘column of wind’ made up almost exclusively of native cavalry.

This system which was painstakingly set up by Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī was, however, shaken in 1148/1735 by a serious political crisis which threw the
country into civil war, stirred up by another military intervention by the Turks of Algiers who had come to support the pretender ‘Ali Pasha against his uncle. Again, Husayn ibn ‘Ali organised the defence of his country against the expansionism of his restive neighbours. But on this occasion the troops were defeated at Sminja. He was wounded in combat and had to flee. While his nephew was taking Tunis where he proclaimed himself Beg, he found refuge in Qayrawân which had stayed faithful to him, along with a part of the Sahel. For five years, the country was split into two hostile camps. When the Beg’s military and administrative apparatus swung behind ‘Ali Pasha, in the summer of 1148/1736, the balance of power changed. The new Beg found it easier to impose his authority on the major part of the country: all the areas north of Dorsale, the south (from El Djerid up to Sfax and Djerba), not to mention numerous towns and villages in the Sahel, submitted to him. At the beginning of 1152/1740, he laid siege before Qayrawân with an army of 2,000 janissaries and 3,000 to 4,000 native soldiers. The town’s resistance was broken and the old Beg was beheaded. He had fallen victim to the system he himself had helped to set up. Instead of abolishing this system, the new Beg kept it, but changed some features, the most important being his growing monopoly on decision-making. In the period leading up to his flight in 1166/1752, he sidelined ministers and counsellors, taking all decisions himself with his son Mu’nis, thereby completing the autocratic system initiated by the Deys from the beginning of the eleventh/seventeenth century onwards. But the fact remained that this sort of power could not be wielded without the support of a certain number of decisive social groups. This is why, instead of destroying the politico-military apparatus created by his uncle, ‘Ali Pasha reintroduced it, limiting himself merely to changing the personnel of the officers.

The elimination of ‘Ali Pasha in Dhū ‘l-Hijja 1169/September 1756 did not put an end to the system of government introduced by Husayn ibn ‘Ali (1117–53/1705–40). With the support of the people of Algiers, the two sons of the founder, Muhammad Beg (r. 1170–3/1756–9) and ‘Ali Beg II (r. 1173–97/1759–82), picked up where their father had left off. After difficult beginnings, intensified by a revolt led by a grandson of ‘Ali Pasha between 1173/1759 and 1176/1762, the regime found the necessary foundations to allow it to function harmoniously for half a century. When Hammūda Pasha took over the succession from his father, he himself began a long reign, holding power for thirty-two years (1197–1230/1782–1814). The political, military and administrative system created by Husayn ibn ‘Ali continued – *grosso modo* – thanks to the restoration of his sons, who had a policy of moderating the exercise of their powers by relaxing fiscal pressure and getting rid of the hated *mushtarā* (forced
sale to the beglik) which had previously been widely used. Good agricultural conditions (between 1179/1765 and 1189/1775) and a reform of the social basis of the regime did the rest. The militia of the janissaries was never able to recover the power it had once had, until it revolted in Sha‘bān 1226/September 1811. Weakened by the existence within its ranks of quloghlus (who accounted for a half of the 9,000 janissaries around 1222–6/1807–11) and natives, isolated within the country, it was crushed by loyalist troops – most of these natives. This is illustrated by the fact that, at the battle of Sarrāt in 1222/1807, the Turkish fighters only made up one-sixth of the 20,000 men mobilised.

In Tripoli, a similar political development began when the leader of the cavalry, a quloghlu by the name of Ḥamīd Qaramānlī, usurped power in 1123/1711 and, after massacring 300 officers of the janissaries, created a ‘quasi-national’ dynasty which continued until 1251/1835. In Algiers, on the other hand, this could not be achieved. Until the end, the exercise of power there remained in the hands of a foreign force.

Piracy and trade

In the second half of the tenth/sixteenth century the Mediterranean was very prosperous. But rather than discouraging it, this (relative?) prosperity attracted piracy. This shady trade was practised on both coasts, by Christians and Muslims as a predatory economic activity. Alberto Tenenti’s survey of ships en route to Venice or leaving the port in the period 1592–1609 reveals between 250 and 300 vessels pillaged. In ninety cases, the aggressor was known. Muslim corsairs were responsible for forty-four attacks, while Nordics – that is English and Dutch – and Spanish carried out, respectively, twenty-four and twenty-two. Muslim and Christian piracy seem to have been prevalent in the tenth/sixteenth century in roughly equal measure. Muslim piracy was chiefly the domain of Barbaresques, especially from Algiers. In the years 968–78/1560–70, they appear to have carried out regular and orchestrated attacks. In Ramadān 966/July 1559, fourteen corsair vessels were noted near to Niebla on the Andalusian coast. Two years later, fourteen other galleys and galliots were spotted off the coast of Seville. In Dhū ’l-Qa‘da of that same year 968/August 1561, ‘seventeen Turkish galleys’ sailed up the Portuguese Algarve. At the same time, operating in Sicily and off Naples with a fleet of thirty-five sailing ships, Ṭūrgūd seized, in one operation, eight Sicilian galleys. At the end of spring 970/1563, several Barbaresque squadrons were plying the French and Italian coasts. In May, nine ships from Algiers appeared between Genoa and
Savona while twelve other Barbaresque boats, including four galleys, approached Gaeta. In September, there were thirteen on the Corsican coast. At the beginning of that month, thirty-two appeared on the coast of Calabria. These were perhaps the same ones, estimated at thirty, which arrived at night outside Naples. At the same time Țurghūd was sailing off Messina at the head of twenty-eight ships. In Ramadan 971/May 1564, a squadron of forty-two ships appeared outside the Elba. It was made up of perhaps forty-five ships. In that year fifty pirate ships left Algiers, thirty from Tripoli, sixteen from Bone and four from Vélez (where the Peñon which blocked the port was only retaken by the Spanish in September of the same year).

The Barbaresques’ force of attack was considerable. In 974/1566, eight galleys were taken in one operation, and outside Malaga twenty-eight craft suffered the same fate. In one season, fifty ships were looted in the Straits of Gibraltar and on the Atlantic coast of Andalusia and the Algarve, while a raid inland of Granada allowed the Barbaresques to take 4,000 prisoners. They no longer even bothered to work at night: they attacked by day, threatening Valencia, blockading Naples, surrounding Sicily or the nearby Balearics from North Africa. But the Barbaresque corsairs also struck on the coasts of Languedoc, Provence and Liguria. In Shawwäl 976/April 1569, forty ships sailed the length of Languedoc. During the period 988–98/1580s, the range of operations expanded to include Catalonia. Much booty was taken: ‘The poor Christians are weeping in Algiers’, lamented a source in Marseilles. In 987/1579, Haëdo was in despair: ‘Sailing without fear in winter and spring, they cover the Mediterranean, from the East to the West, mocking our ships.’

There was the same pessimism in the reports from the viceroy of Sicily: ‘The corsairs are causing great losses in this area in various coastal areas without towers’, reads one from 1568. The viceroy of Sicily seems even more desperate in a letter sent to Philip II, dated 6 June 1582: ‘The sea is groaning with pirates.’ As the years went by the situation worsened. On 17 May 1585, the Council of Marseilles decided to use the promptest action to put a stop to the ravages made by the Barbary corsairs on the coast of Provence before settling on sending, in winter 1590, a representative to the ‘king of Algiers’ to buy back prisoners. Two years earlier, in June 1588, Venice had led the way by sending a consul to Algiers with the specific task of dealing with Venetian slaves.

The Europeans’ lack of military power and the tension caused at sea by the Barbaresques meant diplomatic action was necessary. The European powers turned first of all to the Sublime Porte. Following the pillage of the Bastion of France by the people of Algiers in 1013/1604, Henri IV protested to his ally in Istanbul. The sultan had the pasha of Algiers strangled. But the radical
example set by this did not prevent the people of Algiers from making French captures. Of 963 seizures made in the ten years 1613–22, 447 were Dutch and 253 French. Their most impressive period was the two years 1515 and 1516 during which their booty was more than 2 or 3 million pounds. In the following years, the Algiers fleet remained as powerful as it was fearsome. In 1633/1623, it was made up of seventy-five sailing vessels and several hundred skiffs. Father Dan saw its boats leave the port in impressive processions:

In Algiers [he wrote] there are seventy vessels, ships, polaccas and large barks, who are all involved in piracy: the first have twenty-five cannons, the others have thirty-five and forty … On the seventh of August 1634, I saw a fleet of twenty-eight of these ships leave Algiers, the most beautiful and best-armed it is possible to see. They set sail in Ponant, to lie in wait for Breton, Norman and English vessels, which at this time were travelling to Spain, to load up with wine, oil and spices. Eight days later, a squadron and eight other ships left the port en route for the East. All the rest had already been at sea for a long time.19

Algiers was full of riches. One Portuguese prisoner speaks of 20,000 captives seized from all parts of Christendom. In addition to Portuguese, there were Flemish, Scottish, Danish, Irish, Spanish, French and Italians. In 1637/1627, the pirates from Algiers sacked the coast of Iceland and reached England in 1641/1631. In the ten years from 1640/1630 to 1650/1640, their piracy was commonplace in the Atlantic. The trade in booty and the ransom of prisoners led to great fortunes being made: ‘In Tunis, as in Algiers, there are men so rich that they do not know how much money they have accumulated’, wrote J.-P. Salvago. They were not all dignitaries of the state. We know that in Tunis, rich traders regularly joined in piracy. This was also the case in Algiers where private citizens were able to participate in arming pirate ships in operations called sharkat nukbāl.20

Piqued by the lack of success of their approaches to the Sublime Porte and unable to overcome the power of Algiers by military means, the Europeans settled for negotiating directly with the people of Algiers, as the king of France had done with Tunis in 1614/1605. A first agreement fell through in 1629/1619, after a re'īs had captured a Provençal ship and executed almost all its crew and Marseilles had taken reprisals by massacring the delegation from Algiers who had come to negotiate. Years of beating about the bush preceded the signing of a treaty between France and Algiers in 1638/1628. The English negotiations did not take as long. Their agreement with Algiers was signed in 1632/1622. In the same year, Holland – who had some 1,200 ships crossing the Straits of Gibraltar in the 1620s – signed two simultaneously, one with Algiers and the other with Tunis. This was after having waited in vain for a solution from
Istanbul in 1026/1617. Like the French and the English, the Dutch had a two-pronged approach, using both diplomacy and strong-arm tactics. Following the example of the French who destroyed the major part of the Tunisian fleet in La Goulette in 1018/1609, the Dutch sent a squadron to weigh anchor outside Algiers in 1034/1624. The admiral of this squadron demanded that all Dutch captives be immediately freed and a new treaty signed and, above all, adhered to. He took the opportunity to remind his interlocutors that he had some corsairs from Algiers as prisoners whom he would not hesitate to hang if they refused. In response to the disdainful attitude of the pasha and the Divan, he did just that. He continued cruising along the African coasts, and as soon as he captured corsairs hailing from Algiers, he returned to Algiers to hang them. With arguments as convincing as these, agreement was found and the treaty was signed in Rabīʿ II 1035/January 1626. In the same year, a similar treaty was made with Tunis. From then on it was the admirals heading squadrons of ships and not diplomats who negotiated. The treaty with Algiers was a model for other European states. But neither this treaty nor subsequent ones were able to rein in piracy by Algiers encouraged by the prosperity of the Mediterranean ‘until 1648 and beyond’. There is a link, as we have seen, between piracy and economic prosperity. Algiers’ dynamism was due to both. ‘It is’ – wrote Braudel – ‘with Livorno, Smyrna, and Marseille what keeps the sea young. Everything depends, of course, on the amount and success of the piracy, even the commons of the poorest donkey-driver of the town, or the cleanness of the streets which is the work of the slaves, or more importantly the building sites, the extravagant mosques, the rich men’s villas, the piping of water due to the work of Andalusian refugees.’

There was joy amongst the people of Algiers at the return of the corsairs, who were welcomed as heroes and benefactors, writes Haëdo: ‘On their return all Algiers is happy because the traders buy slaves and goods brought by them and the shopkeepers sell all they have in their shops of clothing and victuals: there is nothing but eating, drinking and celebration.’

Despite the ravages of the plague, the population of Algiers grew. At the end of the tenth/sixteenth century the city had, according to Haëdo, 12,200 houses accommodating, according to Lespès, at least 60,000 inhabitants, not counting the 25,000 Christian prisoners who were shut up in jails at night or lived in the suburbs. Nearly half the dwellings belonged to Christian renegades, attracted by glory and riches. With the 10,000 Levantines, they accounted for the majority of the population. The Moors – the native citizens – only numbered 12,500. Mudejars expelled from Granada, Valencia, Aragon or Catalonia accounted for 6,000. A further 3,500 Kabylians and an unknown
number of Arabs (3,000?) added to the city’s Muslim population. There were perhaps 5,000 Jews. Algiers was the ‘Mediterranean world’ in miniature. Its cosmopolitanism stemmed from the diversity of its ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. In 1044/1634, its population had as good as doubled, if we are to believe Father Dan who gives a figure of 100,000 inhabitants. Fifteen years later, the city held 35,000 prisoners. Its heart beat to the rhythm of piracy which fed a powerful and continuous migratory flow. According to Haëdo again, the great epidemic which raged during the years 980–2/1572–4 wiped out a third of the population. Six years later, where normally food would be abundant and cheap, famine struck and killed 5,656 Moors or Arabs in Dhū ‘l-Qa‘da 987/January and February 1580 alone. But its prosperity was never threatened owing to the number – thought to be 8,000 – of European adventurers and renegades who converted to Islam to make their fortune or escape slavery. Algiers remained a powerful attraction within the Mediterranean until the end of the eleventh/seventeenth century. It still contributed to piracy, which fed and maintained it. According to information gathered on the spot in 1086/1675, the English Admiral Narbrough believed that the fleet from Algiers was made up of the following ships: two vessels with fifty cannons, five with forty, one with thirty-eight, two with thirty-six, three with thirty-four, three with thirty, one with twenty-four, together with an unknown number of small ships equipped with ten to twenty cannons, perhaps at least seventeen vessels totalling 626 cannons. The admiral concluded that this was an imposing squadron, equivalent to those in European navies, with the exception of more numerous battle squadrons.

The eleventh/seventeenth century was the golden age of piracy from Algiers, but the following century saw it decline. In 1137/1724, the Algiers fleet numbered no more than twenty-four vessels. In 1150/1737, the two largest armed ships had eighteen and sixteen cannons respectively. The rest were three pinks with eight or ten cannons and two chebecks with four and six cannons along with nine galliots, with seven and seventeen rows of oarsmen, armed with one to six cannons. The fleet was much reduced both in number and in firepower compared to what it had been in 1087/1676. Its composition suggests that ‘its use was limited to the fair season and to the Western Mediterranean, capable at the very most of reaching the Andalusian and Sicilian coasts, but certainly not to venture into the Atlantic’.

It was only when war broke out in Europe – the Seven Years War – that it was in a position to strengthen its armament: twenty-seven ships totalling 268 cannons were operational in 1175/1761. There were ten chebecks, of which two were armed with twenty-six cannons and one with fourteen, the others having four
to eight pieces of artillery. The more modest vessels carried four to eight pieces of artillery, though eleven or so had between eight and sixteen cannons; there were also a brigantine with four cannons and four galliots with two cannons each. At the end of the century, the number of peace treaties with the European powers drastically limited the opportunities for piracy. In 1205/1790, Algiers could only arm four ships: a ship with twenty-six cannons, a chebeck with four cannons and two galliots, giving a total of thirty-six cannons! Two years later it was able to equip eight boats and two galliots. In that year the number of prisoners fell to 800. Algiers and Tripoli revealed such obvious signs of weakness that Louis XIV’s fleets crushed them with their fire power in 1095/1683 and 1097/1685 respectively.

Tunis fared no better in arming, during the 1201/1786 campaign, only nine ships – two chebecks of six and eight cannons and seven galliots – where in 1178/1764 it had raised fifteen ships, totalling eighty cannons. This was a far cry from the time of Murād ‘the Genoese’, the Dey from 1047/1637 to 1050/1640, who was said during his career as an admiral (gapudan) to have captured more than 900 sailing ships of all sizes and taken 24,000 Christians into slavery. The truth was that the pirate system which drove the economy of Tunis throughout the first half of the eleventh/seventeenth century did so less after 1077/1660. From that time on, the masters of the Regency ‘lived more off trade than by piracy which is only carried out by some private individuals’, noted the knight Paul sent by the king of France at the head of a squadron to force their hand. Another French observer, passing through Tunis in 1708, described it as ‘the most commercial city of Barbary’. This was borne out by the knight of Arvieux who insisted ‘the dey protects all the shopkeepers’. A very dynamic merchant class pushed their country’s political authorities into a policy of peace. Consequently, when agreeing peace with the Netherlands in 1124/1712, the Beg took note of the arguments of his traders in his Regency. The consul of France was right when he predicted that this peace would last, given that ‘the Tunisians live off their trade alone’. Sixteen years later, when difficulties looked like causing a break with France, it was once again the Tunisian traders who argued for peace. Throughout the twelfth/eighteenth century the income from piracy tended to dwindle. In the years 1130–8/1717–25, a prosperous time, the state coffers were said to swell annually with 100 million piastres, a figure seen as exaggerated by M.-H. Chérif but which he takes as a working hypothesis by relating it to the figures for income for the beglik from foreign trade and related activities. He concludes that between 1133/1720 and 1148/1735, foreign trade brought regular income to the Tunis Regency at least equal, if not superior, to that for piracy in its best years. The Beg himself, with his
entourage following suit, took an interest in its development. This fact did not escape Peysonnel in 1725: ‘The bey and the caïds’, he notes, ‘are the chief merchants in this kingdom.’ To these must be added the Mudejars, the last communities of whom had been expelled from Spain in 1609 by Philip III, and who found here more than anywhere else in Africa a place where they could carry out piracy and a refuge where they could be involved in trade, crafts or agriculture. In Tunis they were particularly involved in developing not only the chechia industry but also silk-weaving, metalwork and ceramics. This enterprising elite needed peace in the Mediterranean. First because the raw material for chechias came from Europe (wool from Spain, vermilion from Portugal and France, tartar from Venice and France, etc.) and secondly because many of them were sold abroad. The industrial and commercial dynamism of Tunis was such that it needed new markets (ṣuqs) for craftsmen and new fondouks (funduqs) for foreign traders. However, most of the trade with the European powers was in the hands of the great Jewish merchants. Like their Muslim colleagues, the Jewish traders and farmers were not without influence over the court of Tunis. More than anyone else in the country, they had an interest in peace with Europe.

The economic dynamism of Tunis reinvigorated its maritime trade. At the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century, the volume of this trade occupied on average 200 ships and accounted for 4–6 million pounds in imports and 8–10 million in exports, a total of between 12 and 16 million, making the Tunisian capital by far the most active port in the Maghrib over Algiers and Tripoli. The effects were felt through the whole of the Tunisian economy, in particular in agriculture, where much was exported, and in the manufacture of chechias which employed thousands of people. By contrast, in the years 1200–1/1785–6, the average amount of trade of Algiers with Europe was less than 3 million pounds, 700,000 in imports and a little more than 2 million in exports. Algiers, whose trade was very imbalanced, exported cereals, wool and leather to Marseilles (67 per cent) and Livorno (12 per cent) and imported wool and cotton textiles, manufactured goods and commodities from the colonies (for example sugar, tea and coffee). The situation in terms of volume was barely different in around 1215/1800. Twenty years later, it seems to have grown. According to figures for the year 1822 given by W. Shaler, consul-general of the United States in Algiers, the international trade of the Regency accounted for about 7 million francs. But the worrying part was that 80 per cent was in imports! Many expensive manufactured and exotic goods were imported. This invasion of imported goods had troubling consequences for the economies of the Maghrib: ‘deindustrialisation’ owing to the difficulties of measuring up to
the competition on the one hand, and the outflow of funds on the other. The figures for 1822 reveal also that the reason why revenue from exports had dropped considerably was that wheat, the main export in the twelfth/eighteenth century, had as good as disappeared from Algiers’ foreign trade. Less than eight years later this trade was worth only around 5 million francs.

Although it was only relative, this development in seafaring trade in the Maghrib could have led to the creation of a merchant navy. Unfortunately ‘there are no Turkish or North African ships in the Christian Mediterranean’. Trade with the Maghrib by sea remained the monopoly of the Europeans, particularly the French before 1207/1792. Of the ninety-two ships stopping at Tripoli in 1179/1765, forty-six were French. In 1203/1788, in Tunis, out of 184 ships registered, 148 were French. From 1199/1784 to 1207/1792, thirty French ships were established in Algiers on a charter, not to mention other ships chartered in Marseilles.

European fleets may have been found in all the ports of the Maghrib, but the reverse was certainly not the case. The Dey of Algiers protested in vain at the poor welcome extended to his country’s ships: he could not make himself heard. The European ports, particularly Marseilles, prevented Maghribi traders from selling their goods with all sorts of petty rules and barriers. The scene was set for economic dependence. It led the Maghrib into irreversible decline. The resumption of piracy during the war years following the French Revolution did not prevent this negative tendency, even if the corsairs of Algiers with the re’īs Ḥamīḏū at their head were full of exploits. The demographic figures reveal the picture. The population of Algiers, which stood at perhaps 100,000 towards the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century, fell by a half by the end of the eighteenth century. It fell again from 50,000 (according to Venture de Paradis) to 30,000 in 1245/1830. The crisis was so serious that the country was now to finalise its divorce from the Turkish minority. Once again it had fallen into a situation which was uncannily like the one of the fifteenth century. Meanwhile the face of geo-politics had completely changed. Europe had become a colonial power. France and England, in the vanguard, would prove this change in the history of the world in the Maghrib.

Military structure and religious acceptance

Why, at the end of the Middle Ages, did the Maghrib agree to be governed by foreign powers? Was it the only solution to the political crisis? All the countries of the Maghrib acquired the constitution of military states. Although it remained sovereign, the furthest reaches of the Maghrib (present-day
Morocco) finally gave in to it. When Mawlay Isma'il (r. 1083–1139/1672–1727) created an army of black slaves charged with the defence of the makhzan, it is clear where the idea came from: ‘[it was] borrowed directly from the Ottomans’.32 Without being occupying forces, the armies stationed in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli remained, more or less, outside society. They were often also brutal in exercising their power. Yet they were never drawn into a regime of terror. Moreover, from the beginning, these armies were too small to impose themselves by violence alone on dissenting societies. In the eleventh/seventeenth century the ojaq of Tunis totalled after all only 3,000 to 4,000 men. Earlier, that of Algiers did not have any greater numbers. Even though it rose to 22,000 men at the beginning of the eleventh/seventeenth century, a hundred years later it was cut by half and was in irreversible decline. In 1203/1788, it numbered only 7,000 men, and hardly more than 4,000 thirty years later. At the same time, the ojaq of Tripoli consisted of 1,500 troops. It should also be remembered that here and there the main body of troops remained stationed in the capital or the larger towns, which explains the astonishment of Hādīdī when he learned that the militia of Algiers in his time included only 6,000 janissaries: ‘And yet with this small number they hold the whole of Barbary under their yoke.’33

In order to govern the country, the Turks divided it into provinces (beglıks). The Regency of Algiers had three in addition to the one of Algiers itself which, having the status of ‘sultan’s residence’ (dār al-sultān), was placed under the direct authority of the pasha or of the Dey. The oldest of the provinces had been created in 947/1540, the one of the south or the Titteri with Médéa as its seat. It was followed in 971/1563 by that of the west, which had a succession of capitals: Mazouna, Mascara and, after its evacuation by the Spanish in 1207/1792, Oran. The last province, that of the east, with Constantine as its capital, appeared in 975/1567. Each was ruled by a Beg who was simultaneously the governor and the tax-farmer general and was answerable directly to the pasha and the Dey of Algiers. The same concern for control over the country required the establishment of sixteen permanent garrisons in the ports and towns in strategic positions. The soldiers were posted for one year and relieved every spring. They then returned to their barracks, where they served a second year before having the third year to rest.

In spite of this strategy, the country was still not strongly manned. But the army still managed to dominate it, thanks to its military superiority. In addition to its administrative system – Algiers in the eleventh/seventeenth century was a model of municipal organisation in the Mediterranean – it introduced new techniques of warfare unknown to the Maghribis, who until
its arrival were still fighting in the same way as their pre-Islamic ancestors: hand to hand fighting with dagger, sabre, lance, stones or arrows. The Turkish army was more technical and impressed the Maghribis with its organisation: iron discipline combined with an *esprit de corps*.

However this ‘modernity’ could only be introduced into the country by adopting its style of administration. The *mahalla*, the flying squad who collected taxes and flaunted their power, was a medieval Maghribi institution. So was the system of *makhzan* tribes who helped to gain the services of warrior tribes in return for fiscal rewards. Finally, its cavalry continued to be made up of Arab and Berber elements, before *quloghlu* mestizos were admitted.

In the same manner, at the beginning of the eleventh/seventeenth century the Tunis Regency returned to Ḥaṣṣid techniques of government. After curbing the power of the great tribal confederations in the west and south between 1038/1628 and 1055/1645, Murād Beg revived the institution of *makhzan* tribes, the best known being the Drīd in the Tunis–Algiers area. In return for fiscal allowances and other advantages in cash or in kind, the auxiliary tribes helped with raising taxes and maintaining order in the countryside. As in Algiers, the same Beg formed a cavalry made up of members of the tribes, called (as in Algeria) a *zmāla*. A group of *sipāḥī* was partly raised in the country and its members dispersed across the three *ojaq* of Tunis, Beja and El Kef, with a fourth base at Qayrawān added in the twelfth/eighteenth century. As in Algiers, the Turks of Tunis set up their garrisons in the large towns (Tunis, Beja, El Kef, Qayrawān) and in strategic places in the hinterland (al-Ḥamma, the territory of the Matmata). Finally the Murādīs revived the Zwāwa infantry corps (called the zouaves by the French), bearing the name of one of the main tribes of Kabylia. At the beginning of the twelfth/eighteenth century there were normally 3,500 to 4,000 tribal knights mobilised in this way each year. Their numbers could be increased in times of need. The advantage of these men to the *makhzan* using them was that they were more familiar than the Turkish troops with the rural areas they were tasked with controlling and they were cheaper: around 200,000 dinars (120,000 piastres) a year. From that sum the partial tax allowance granted to their tribes had to be deducted. The rest – in fact the greater part – of their financial advantages lay in the contributions they helped to collect, to the extent that, in the end, they cost the state very little.

The Turks of Algiers and Tunis – and those of Tripoli too – only dominated the Maghrib by making the best of the divisions, making and breaking alliances with the leaders and social groups who were useful to them in ways both large and small. They were only able to do this by combining the country’s traditions with their own traditions of government.
In Tunisia, where the tribes only assimilated the system of government under the Murādīs (1050–1114/1640–1702), the Turks enjoyed the support of the notables of the town from 999/1590. The town-dwellers sought protection and security against the Bedouins by allying themselves with the Turkish condottieri. They seem to have achieved this when ‘Othmān Dey (r. 1007–19/1598–1610) refused to support the pasha who was wanting to impose more taxes on the citizens or when the Dey Ahmed Khoja (r. 1050–7/1640–7) said to one of the soldiers who came to seize the goods of a trader from Tunis: ‘Are you unaware that these merchants have obligations towards a cāid-lazzam [native farmer member of the makhzan administration]? If this practice of plunder and violence spreads, trade will stop, the cāid’s sources of income will dry up and the ‘askar [janissaries] will not be paid.’

Before contemplating enlisting the support of the economic classes, the Turks sought the support of the ‘ulamā’ on account of their central role in a type of social organisation where religion was the sole source of their legitimacy. To achieve this, they increased their acts of homage towards the most highly regarded religious dignitaries. This is shown in the rescript issued in Ramaḍān 998/August 1590 by the pasha Ja‘far to the ‘Azzūm of Qayrawān, a dynasty of jurists, in the guise of the renewal of a previous certificate exempting them, their clients and their protégés from fiscal demands. This family of ‘ulamā’ did not fail in its obligations towards the city as it entered into the service of the new political masters of the country. A member of the ‘Azzūm family, who had travelled to Tunis to take up the position of muftī, relates in one of his pronouncements (fātwā) how in Ramaḍān 999/July 1591, he, along with other ‘ulamā’ and with the support of a ‘a large crowd’, had led an action aimed at the removal of the Turkish grand judge who was accused of extortion and various misdemeanours. Under ‘Othmān Dey (r. 1007–19/1598–1610), the power of the native ‘ulamā’ was strengthened by the revival of the Ḥāfṣid judicial institution of al-majlis al-sharī‘ī. This council of justice was made up of the supreme qādī (Turk), muftis (locals), a syndic of Sharīfs (descendants of the Prophet represented by one native leader) and representatives of the public authority including renowned jurists.

Once integrated into the system of Turkish domination, the ‘ulamā’ and townspeople showed great loyalty to their legitimated political masters, as when the gates of Qayrawān were closed in Rabī‘ I 1141/November 1728, followed by those of Tunis, Sousse, Monastir and Sfax in the following spring, against the insurgent, ‘Alī Pasha, who had surrounded himself with Bedouins, that is, with people he despised and vilified as ‘aggressors’ and ‘prevaricators’. The majority of the troop was stationed in Tunis, so the citizens’ stance was...
not dictated by any kind of fear of reprisals. The reason for their loyalty lay, as M. H. Chérif explained, in the ‘convergence of their interests with those of the beglik, both demanding “order” in the countryside and the acceptance by the countryside of a certain level of exploitation, vital for the superior institutions of the towns and the state’.35

The situation in the Regency of Algiers was similar but more complex. The towns and the countryside took contrasting views. In the rural areas the powerful warrior tribes constantly trod a path between autonomism and tactical support. This ambiguity was also a feature of the attitude of maraboutism towards the central power. At the same time as supporting it, it as good as directed all the revolts against it.

In the west, where there were many marabouts, they, as war leaders, harried the Spanish in a guerrilla war which was as ineffective as it was opinionated, viewing the presidio of Oran as ‘a dagger stuck in the back of Islam’. The old Islamic institution of the ribâṭ, a (sometimes) fortified monastery from which they took their name, was revived by them at the beginning of the tenth/sixteenth century. From this time we know of the activity of Sîdî Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf and his companions, some of whom were killed in the Spanish sacking of Qal’a in 923/1517 – starting with the father of his hagiographer. The saint, who aroused only suspicion and concern in the court at Tlemcen owing to his mahdist tendencies, had founded there in the previous century a zāwiya which rallied to the Turks. This was followed by other actions, such as that organised around a ‘casa del Morabito’ located on the Oued El-Malah, the Río Salado of the Spanish and the presumed site of the massacre of Oruj and his guards. For ten years the founder of this ‘fortified monastery’ harried the occupants of Oran. He was finally vanquished and killed in 965/1557, in a jornada (expedition) in the course of which 270 of his party were taken captive, including his wife, his two sons and one of his sisters.

A few years later, an Andalusian saint by the name of Sîdî Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Majjâjī built in the port area of Tenes what is probably the biggest ribâṭ of the time, as he could accommodate and feed, along with their horses, a thousand knights. Tlemcen also provided its own contingent of volunteers from the faithful. One of them, Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAshūr (d. 1014/1605), personally led his students into combat against the Spanish. When not in his ribâṭ, he was involved in raising the funds necessary to buy back Muslim captives. At his death, one of his disciples took over. In Mostaganem, another well-known saint, Sîdî Aḥmad Aqaddar (d. 1065/1655), built a large zāwiya and flew the standard of the jihad. At the same time, ‘two leagues from Oran’, another ‘revered marabout’ was resisting at the gates of the presidio. The
action taken by these leaders of a holy war and their successors, such as Sidi Bläha whose zawiya was sacked by the Spaniards in 1108/1696, culminated in the great campaign of 1120/1708 which allowed the Turks to dislodge the Spanish from Oran – for the time being. ‘Seven hundred to a thousand mujāhidīn’,\textsuperscript{36} led by an ‘ālim from Tlemcen, joined in the fighting alongside the regular army. Sources speak of other examples of holy volunteers.

The Turks lavished all sorts of rewards on their enthusiastic allies, particularly in the form of fiscal allowances. But at the same time as they encouraged their influence on the tribal world, they were trying to neutralise them. From experience they knew that the countryside was swarming with all sorts of religious entrepreneurs. Many readily took up arms when their tribal clienteles invited them. They lived on the allowance paid to them by their clienteles, so could not deny them assistance. There was an economic calculation to be made. More than from the open-handedness of the state, they drew their strength from this ‘Holy Treasury’.\textsuperscript{37} In one way or another they would fall out with the central power. This was the source of the combative energy which often drove them.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to believe that the Turks did no more than manipulate religion as a political resource. Very often they showed real respect towards it. In the cities (where it was easier to observe them in their daily lives) they practised a cult of the saints which was sometimes as fervent as amongst the native people around them from whom, after all, they were hardly different, in either social or religious background. In Algiers, for example, the rituals for setting out to sea had – from beginning to end – the hallmarks of a ritualistic religiosity. The corsairs (they preferred to be called mujāhid and ghāzī, a name their sultans also bore) came down to the port to join their ships, passing through the Bāb al-Jihād, the ‘Gate of Holy War’, having earlier visited, in a procession, their protecting saints: Sīdī ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Tha‘alibī, the patron of the city, as well as Sīdī Battaka and Walī Dādah whose hagiographies were linked to the Spanish debacle in 948/1541. The first, who had died a few years previously, was said to have risen from his tomb on the night before the attack by Charles V’s armada to ask for divine protection. The people of Algiers claimed that they knew this because he had left candles lit. The second, who came from Turkey, was said to have struck the water fiercely with his stick and caused the storm which engulfed part of the Spanish fleet. The procession led to the sanctuary of Sīdī ‘Ali al-‘Abbāsi, a Kabylian saint who probably died in 984/1576. It finished with a prayer for the dead. After this the ships set sail, saluting with a few salvos the sanctuary of Sīdī Battaka which, from the top of the cliff, dominated the roads...
near to Bāb al-Wād. During this time the crew, with their eyes fixed on the sanctuary of the protector saint, boomed out in unison ‘Allah is great!’ They had previously taken on board the standards of the saint and of the other sanctuaries they had visited. They hoisted them, to the accompaniment of invocations, whenever danger threatened. To reward their invisible protectors the corsairs readily shared a part of their booty with them. According to the Tashrīfāt, ‘the author of the captures takes out of the booty taken from the enemy the marabouts’ share and the share for buying back captives: these deductions are put in a coffer at the palace and placed near to the Khoja-Defterdar … The distribution of the marabouts’ share takes place every year on the anniversary of the birth of the illustrious prophet and is done under the direction of the Khoja el-Kebir.’

By paying great homage to the ritual figures whose protection the native population sought, the Turks were joining them in the same reference to the sacred. This same population could not have failed to notice that the sanctuaries revered by their political masters were those of the main ethnic groups: one was Moorish, the second was a Turk and the third was a Kabylarian originating – going by his name – from Qal'a, the capital of the Banū ‘Abbās, where there was a marabout lineage which was alternately an enemy and an ally of the Turks.

But the Turks of Algiers, Tunis or Tripoli did not stop at addressing saints dead and alive. They also called on the qūlamā. In the cities these were the most important religious leaders both in their number and in their role. They were the backbone of the religious life of the Muslim population while at the same time being their spokesmen (particularly in times of crisis) via their most influential and respected members. Each time that the Turks conquered a city they took care to win over the religious scholars. Their regime may have been tyrannical, but they could not do without their support. They could snub their social or political role but not their role in laying down the law. Without the consent of the qūlamā, any political power was simply an apparatus of illegal violence. The regime of the Turks in the Maghrib raises many questions, including that of its legitimacy, but even in its darkest moments its legality cannot be questioned.

On a social level, the occasions when the qūlamā took on roles of mediation, intercession, arbitration or representation of ‘public’ opinion were much more common than one might think. We see them behaving as the religious leaders of the countryside. Neither group was able to exercise its magisterial authority without continually negotiating the more or less balanced relations between the rulers and the ruled. The fact that both society and the Turkish army were
Islamic does not explain everything. No state can engage with society in a lasting way if it does not allow the establishment of mechanisms of mediation. When at the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century Turks in Algiers, followed by those in Tripoli at the beginning of the thirteenth/nineteenth, perpetrated more injustices and tightened the fiscal pressure on the rural populations, they destroyed these institutions. In doing so they initiated a cycle of revolt that they were never able to stifle.

The decline

The myth of the invincibility of Algiers which had held since the tenth/sixteenth century was exploded on 14 Muḥarram 1245/5 July 1830. Whereas most of his compatriots in great emotional confusion found various reasons such as the evil eye, the curse of the divine or the prophecy of misfortune, al-Sharīf al-Zahhārī – the last syndic of the descendants of the Prophet of the Turkish era – saw this dramatic event as an objective reality which could be explained by the Khaldūnian theory of political change. In the view of this Algiers notable, the Turks of Algiers lost their state for reasons connected with the length of their reign which had become, by force of circumstance, senile, and with the loss of their corporate solidarity (ʿaṣabiyah). They had become softened by the good life to which they had become accustomed, and in the end they lost their irascible edge. Their will to dominate which lay behind their victorious implantation had evaporated to nothing.

From a historical angle, there was a range of factors which contributed to the ousting of the Turks from Algiers and their replacement by the French. In 1245/1830, the country was so weakened that it was caught out by the invasion. Its population had been afflicted by various catastrophes since the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century. Between 1210/1795 and 1240/1824, it suffered fifteen years of plague, twelve years of famine, ten years of plagues of locusts, three years of drought and two earthquakes. During the same time, neighbouring Tunis had suffered eleven years of plague and eight years of famine. Tripolitania was less affected and escaped with four years of plague and three of typhus.

Whereas the plague had spared Tunisia for some eighty years between 1118/1706 and 1200/1785, it raged for ten years in Algiers and forty in Alexandria. From 1200/1785 the whole of the Maghrib fell into a vicious circle of plague and famine – the disease had reached there by land and sea, spread by infected merchants, sailors, soldiers and pilgrims. In 1207/1792, the plague arrived in Algiers from the Middle East. From there it reached Oran by sea.
before spreading into Orania in two directions: towards Mascara where it arrived in 1208/1793 and towards Morocco via Oujda, attacking Fez and Meknes in 1213/1798, Rabat and Marrakesh in 1214/1799, and Mogador in 1215/1800. From Algiers the disease also spread eastwards. It reached Constantine, at the same time as Blida, in 1208/1793. It reached Tunis via El-Kef in 1209/1794. From there it swooped inland. In the north, it struck Bizerta; towards the south it hit Qayrawān and Gabès. Spreading along the coast it reached Tripoli, where it was spread by Tunisian sailors in 1209/1794.

Overall, the plague raged for many years: it was in Algiers between 1207/1792 and 1217/1802, in Tunis between 1209/1794 and 1212/1797 and in Tripoli between 1209/1794 and 1214/1799. After fifteen years’ absence, it reappeared between 1207/1792 and 1237/1821. Its effect on the people and their activities was great. In 1211/1796f., in Tunis, 25,000 Muslims, 7,000 Jews and 150 Christians died of it, amounting to 25 per cent of the 120,000 inhabitants of the city. In summer 1232/1817, it led to more than 13,000 deaths in Algiers, reducing the population of the city by a good half. Its effects on the Regency of Tunis were more frightening if we go by the figures, which, as with all the figures here, should not be taken too literally. Here, the epidemic of 1199–1201/1784–6 was said to have claimed at least 100,000 lives, and the one of 1233–6/1817–20 took 300,000. Thus the Tunisian population, estimated at 2 million before the epidemic in 1199/1784, dropped by half a million compared to the population following the epidemic which ended in 1236/1820.

The destruction of the plagues was compounded by the effects of shortages and famines, such as those which struck the Algiers area between 1213/1798 and 1215/1800. A measure of wheat (sā‘), which was worth seven to eight francs in the years 1190–1200/1775–85, rose to twenty-eight francs in 1215/1800. From being an exporter of cereals, the Regency of Algiers became an importer between 1213/1798 and 1215/1800. The situation far from improved in the following years. A measure of wheat rose to twenty francs in 1219/1804 before reaching a price of fifty francs in 1232/1816! Terror gripped the country. The Dey was forced to have bakeries guarded by the militia to prevent looting in Algiers, Blida and Boufarik. Drought returned in 1234/1818 and once again the Dey had to import cereals. In desperation the people increased their prayers for rain (ṣalāt al-‘istisqa‘). After 1236/1820, tolerably good harvests alternated with poor ones, without a satisfactory level ever being reached. The situation in the neighbouring Regency was hardly any better. Disastrous harvests in 1232–6/1816–20 forced the Beg to import cereals to lessen their effects – in the capital at least. Judging by the figures we have for the years 1232–6/1816–20, the price of wheat surged. As the cereals trade with Marseilles reveals, the consequences on
external trade for the two regencies were terrifying. Whereas between 
1189/1775 and 1204/1789, the French port records 690 grain boats arriving 
from North Africa, it records only twenty-six between 1231/1815 and 1245/
1829. It must also be remembered that fourteen of the fifteen boats coming 
from the Regency of Algiers had left from Bone. The Regency of Tunis could 
only export seven cargoes of grain, and that of Tripoli four. While the 
agricultural crisis was raging in the Maghrib, the Russians were making inroads 
into the Mediterranean grain market. In 1236/1820, sixty grain boats originating 
from Odessa were counted in Marseilles, as many as the Maghrib could send 
forty years earlier. The arrival of this new competitor suited France who, on 
account of a weighty dispute over earlier deliveries, was happy to turn away 
from Algiers, a long-standing essential supplier. In a knock-on effect, exports of 
oil, wool and sheepskins from Algiers slowed down.40

In Tunisia, whose industry was the most developed of the Maghrib, the 
decline of agriculture was accompanied by the collapse of its entire trading 
economy. The country was a producer of chechias. Its hatmakers produced 
eighteen styles which it exported to North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Levant, Turkey and as far as Persia. This trade held a central place in Tunisian 
exports. In 1245/1829, it brought in 2.6 million francs, less 1 million francs for 
raw materials imported via the ports of Marseilles and Livorno, Portugal, 
Spain, France, Venice and Morea. This dependence on transport was felt in 
sales of the finished product. There were hardly any Maghribi merchant 
vessels sailing the Christian Mediterranean around the beginning of the 
thirteenth/nineteenth century.

The French and the Italians who controlled the fortunes of the Tunisian 
chechia industry themselves started – from the middle of the eleventh/seven-
teenth century for the French, and from the beginning of the twelfth/eighteenth 
for the Italians – to quarrel over its markets. Until the beginning of the 
thirteenth/nineteenth century the Tunisian chechia was protected from com-
petition on account of its quality. But French and Italian products found outlets 
thanks to their competitive prices. In the period 1195–1205/1780s, where 
Tunisian output stood at around 100,000 dozen, French production, located in 
Marseilles and Orléans, reached 60,000 to 80,000 dozen. But for 1236–46/1820s, 
according to the calculations of L. Valensi,41 Tunisian production fell to less than 
70,000 dozen, roughly the same as that produced in France. In the same period 
the Tuscans were producing as many as the Tunisians and the French com-
bined. Faced with this increased competition, the Tunisians ended up losing 
their main external outlets: ‘the [chechia] makers, few in number and bankrupt’, 
writes the French consul in Tunis in 1830, ‘sell in advance products supposedly
made by them which have lost their old reputation in the Levant due to their poor quality and the imitations that are being made in Europe. One after another they are going bankrupt because the enforced sales they have to make on account of exorbitant and usurious interests eat into the products, the costs and the profits. \footnote{Victims of an industrial revolution which increased the Europeans’ production tenfold, and pressurised by fierce usurious capitalism, the Tunisian craftsmen gave in.}

With reduced external trade, and an anaemic pirate economy, the state’s resources dwindled. In response to the disastrous economic situation facing them, the governors of the three regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli successively devalued their currency while simultaneously increasing the tax burden on the rural communities.

According to a table compiled by Daniel Panzac\footnote{Between 1197/1782 and 1245/1830, the local currency lost, in comparison with European currencies, 48 per cent of its value in Algiers and 43 per cent in Tunis. In Tripoli, where the fall was more dramatic, it was devalued by nearly two thirds between 1220/1805 and 1231/1815, revealing the situation in Tripoli to be much more fragile than was the case with its neighbours. Arising from a drop in production and an imbalance in external trade, monetary erosion worsened the state’s financial difficulties. It had as a result to increase the frequency of fiscal demands in order to refloat its coffers. In the Regency of Tunis, the beglik’s share of the rural fiscal contribution stood at 56.2 per cent (983,000 out of 1,750,000 piastres) in 1232/1816 and at 68.7 per cent (96,000 out of 1,400,000) in 1234/1818. Piracy, which contributed 24.5 per cent of the budget in 1232/1816 (429,000), only accounted for 1.2 per cent in 1234/1818. Pressure on the cities remained: they contributed 142,000 in 1231/1815, 180,000 in 1232/1816 (10 per cent), 170,000 in 1233/1817 (7 per cent) and 132,000 in 1234/1818 (9.4 per cent). The drop of 22 per cent recorded in 1233/1817 is linked to the fall in population following the plague in 1233–4/1817–18. This seems to have had the effect of increasing fiscal pressure on the countryside which had an income of nearly a million piastres as in 1232/1816, that is, before the epidemic. More worrying was the rise in arbitrary seizures, in the sale of beglical goods, in the use of treasury reserves and the more or less justified collection of arrears which accounted in the beglik’s income for more than 160,000 piastres rising to nearly 360,000 in 1232/1816. In 1233/1817, these arrears stood at 270,000, before returning to their 1231/1815 level (180,000) the following year. Figures for Algiers are not available, but we do know that the state’s income fell sharply from the middle of the twelfth/eighteenth century, owing particularly to the low income from piracy, as revealed by the register of maritime captures published by A. Devoulx in 1288/1871f.\footnote{In 1199/1784, the state}}
coffers were so depleted that the Dey decided to cut the soldiers’ additional daily allowance by 75 per cent, which had stood since 1184/1770 at one golden sultâni. These financial difficulties were compounded by the costly war with Spain. Dissatisfied with their pay cut, the sailors offered their services to the enemy to bombard the Dey’s palace. Five years later the two parties signed a treaty providing for the evacuation of the presidio of Oran and an exchange of prisoners: according to al-Sharîf al-Zahhâr, out of 18,000 Christian captives in the jails of Algiers, 10,000 were Spanish. But this treaty was more the result of a military impasse than the fruit of Algiers’ success. The country was gripped by a crisis and hardly had the means to get out of it.45 For two years Orania had been harried by a local chief from the religious brotherhood of the Darqâwîyya. This chief, ‘Abd al-Qâdir ibn al-Sharîf, had been involved in a twenty-two-year show of strength against the Turks, whom he accused of injustice and fiscal extortion (maghârim). Taxes were collected with difficulty everywhere. To force the ‘Ash’âsha, the Ḥasham and the oasis-dwellers of Laghouat to pay, the Beg of Oran, Muḥammad al-Kabîr (r. 1194–1212/1780–97), took over as head of the mahâlla. The Darqâwî drew more of the dissatisfied to him. Their mobilisation increased and led to an insurrection involving almost all of the tribes of the west (1220/1805). Even the towns joined in. Mascara opened its doors to the religious leader and the people of Tlemcen – minus the quloghlu – hailed him as their liberator. The insurgents besieged Oran. But they were ill prepared and were repulsed by the Beg Muhammad al-Muqallash, then pursued. Their charismatic leader was forced to flee to Morocco. In the same year, revolt broke out in Algiers. Against a background of a commercial dispute with France, it grew from the grumbling of the militia and the dissatisfaction of the people with the Dey. Some years before, thanks to the firm of Bushnâq and Bakrî, two Jews from Livorno, the Dey had developed a means exclusive to the Regency of exporting his wheat to France, at the risk of upsetting the population and the militia, the successive food crises having made such food exports unpopular. From 1208/1793 to 1213/1798, the two Jewish traders were involved in supplying the southern departments of France with wheat from Algiers, followed by the French armies in Italy and Egypt. Muṣṭafâ Dey (r. 1213–20/1798–1805) came to the aid of the Directoire in financial difficulties, loaning it the sum of 1,250,000 francs, without interest, to allow it to pay in part for what it had bought. While the two traders were paid by the French government under the Consulate, then again at the beginning of the Restoration, the Dey’s payment was ignored. This dispute led the militia to rise up and attack the Dey, his treasurer and his agent Naphtali Bushnâq, killing all three of them, in 1220/1805.
Harangued by a former qaḍī, a crowd of Muslims accused the Jews of being the cause of these sufferings. Turk and native insurgents alike took to the Jewish quarter, raided houses and shops and massacred about 200 inhabitants, leaving the survivors in terrible hardship. There was something rotten in the ‘kingdom of Algiers’. This was followed by palace revolutions. Between 1220/1805 and 1232/1816, six Deys were assassinated by the militia. Furthermore, the split with the hinterland was deep and total. Kabylia was declared a ‘rebel country’46 (bilād al-sībā) from the middle of the twelfth/eighteenth century. The Dey Muḥammad ibn ‘Othmān (r. 1180–1206/1766–91) was hardly able to re-establish calm there. Further south, the oasis-dwellers returned to their secular autonomism. In 1200/1784, the Beg of Oran, Muḥammad Hisal-Kabīr, obtained a sort of submission from the oasis-dwellers of Laghouat and from ‘Ayn Mādī but he had hardly decamped before the area rebelled again. He was forced to return four years later. His relations with Algiers worsened. In 1204/1789, Turkish pressure was such that the most famous of the living saints of the country, Sīdī Ahmad al-Tijānī, founder of a religious brotherhood bearing his name, was forced to leave his zāwiyā in ‘Ayn Mādī to go and live in Fez. The exile was unpopular with those around the leader of the brotherhood. At his death in 1231/1815, his son Muḥammad al-Kabīr, who was not so peaceable, began to develop a huge anti-Turk tribal alliance. With his followers, he allied with the tribes of the plain of Ghṛīs where the Qādirīyya brotherhood predominated, before mounting an assault on the garrison town of Mascara in 1243/1827, but in the absence of the Ḥasham who withdrew at the last minute, the siege was repulsed. Al-Tijānī was taken prisoner, then decapitated.

To these internal tensions were added external threats which hastened events. In Ramadān 1242/1827, the French consul left Algiers annoyed by the fly-swatter incident. A French naval division came to demand apologies. The Dey refused, and a blockade was organised from 24 Dhū 'l-Qa'da 1242/19 June 1827. The Dey and the militia were used to shows of force from the European navies, and did not react. They had not reckoned with the change in the balance of power. They had no idea that their days were numbered. Two years later, sweeping aside feeble resistance, the French entered Algiers victorious.

In this year 1245/1830, mired in financial difficulties, the Beg of Tunis, Husayn II (r. 1240–51/1824–35), lost 2 million francs. The country was on the edge of catastrophe. European pressure on a political power facing serious succession problems was unbearable. The sudden death of Ḥammūda Pasha, on 15 Shawwāl 1229/15 September 1814, after a reign of thirty-two years, had sparked off the
crisis. The Beg ‘Othmān, brother of Ḥāmmūda Pasha, was enthroned in Shawwāl 1229/September 1814, but was assassinated two months later by his cousin Maḥmūd (r. 1229–40/1814–24), who seized power with the complicity of the minister Muḥammad Zarrūq. One of the most respected people in the kingdom, the vizier Yūsuf Šāhīb al-Ṭabbā (‘keeper of the seal’) was, in his turn, killed in Muḥarram 1230/January 1815. But the political confusion in Tunis was far from calming down. Zarrūq, the main architect of the coup d’état, fell foul of his own intrigues. Accused by the two sons of the Beg of inciting the militia to rebellion, he was put to death in Muḥarram 1238/October 1822.

Under Maḥmūd Beg, the state returned to its annoying habit of refloating the state coffers by increasing taxes and introducing monopolies on the sale of certain products – this twin measure particularly affected oil production in the Sahel. Under ‘Othmān Beg, the fellahs had been required to pay a fixed annual fee on their olive trees called qānūn. Denounced as inconsistent with Muslim law, the new tax spawned a wave of protests which led to its abandonment and its replacement in 1235/1819 by a ‘ašhr (‘legal tithe’) on oil. At the same time the product was placed under a state monopoly. One unjust measure was replaced by another, just as unfair. The fellahs were forced to sell their oil to an agency of the makhzan tasked with exporting it to Europe, especially France, at a price well below the market. Under financial pressure, the Beg forced the traders to pay in advance for the oil they had ordered, with no guarantees that it would be supplied or still less that they would be reimbursed. The inevitable soon followed. In 1245/1829, the small amount of oil harvested led to a crisis between the government and the French traders. In his haste to reimburse the French, the Beg took the risk of upsetting the kingdom by levying a financial contribution on the people. He had no way of opposing the Europeans. This was borne out by the events which followed. The following year, a month and a half before the capture of Algiers, the French consul forced the Beg’s hand by making him sign a treaty reiterating the ban on piracy and enslavement of Christians as well as the abandonment of any claim to tribute from European states. This document also gave these states the right to open consulates, and their nationals were permitted to trade freely in that country. Finally there was a ban on any sort of economic monopoly. By imposing these conditions on the people of Tunis, they were effectively dictating their policy with regard to the war in Algeria.

Neighbouring Libya was struggling with the same difficulties. The pasha of Tripoli, Yūsuf Qaramānli (r. 1210–51/1795–1835), was also facing great financial difficulties. Yet his reign had started well. After having consolidated his authority over the country, he re-formed the Regency’s navy (it had thirty-four ships in
1220/1805) and restarted piracy in the Mediterranean. Between 1210/1795 and 1215/1800, they attacked the merchant navies of the United States of America, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and the kingdom of Naples. In 1211/1796, he forced the Americans to sign a treaty with him in which they were to hand over 52,000 dollars, as well as naval equipment. In Dhu l-Ḥijja 1215/May 1801, he declared war on them again. The Americans retaliated by hastening to blockade Tripoli (1218/1803). But this turned into a fiasco. In a weak position, he signed another treaty in Rabī’ I 1220/June 1805, in which he promised to pay a ransom of 60,000 dollars. Amongst the Christian powers there were only the British, now the leading naval force in the Mediterranean, who were in a position to dictate to the pasha how he should treat them. They had occupied Malta in 1215/1800, and so they had a commercial advantage. The island was one of the main markets for Libyan exports. Copying the Ḥusaynīs of Tunis, the pasha of Tripoli created a state monopoly on agricultural and animal exports. He made a lot of money from the sale of sheep and beef cattle to the British fleet in Malta. But after having improved the financial position of the Regency, he fell again into difficulties in the years 1225–36/1810–20, when the income from piracy and the revenues from the monopolies started to dwindle. The British were the main cause of these losses. After having forced him to lift the monopoly on the products sold to them, they tried to reduce the scope for piracy through trading safe-conducts in the Mediterranean. When his financial difficulties grew, the British and French consuls stepped up their pressure on him to pay back his debts to their nationals. Since 1241/1825 the pasha had in fact been borrowing from English, French, Swedish, Danish and Austrian traders. His relations with the Europeans were appalling. A French squadron arrived in Tripoli on 19 Safer 1246/8 August 1830, and forced him to sign a treaty with France the same as one signed the same day by the Beg of Tunis. This document additionally provided for a letter of apology from the pasha to the king regarding his consul, 800,000 francs of indemnities and a breakdown of his naval and land forces. This was far different from the treaties concluded thirty years earlier with the United States of America. To stifle the financial crisis, the pasha devalued the country’s currency seven times between 1245/1829 and 1248/1832, at the same time as increasing taxes and financial demands. He confiscated all properties whose owners could not provide written proof of ownership. In Muḥarram 1246/July 1831, a tribal rebellion broke out, encouraged by the British. The following year, under pressure again from the British consul, the pasha raised a new special tax. His imprudence enraged the country. The tribes who previously had stood aside from the rebellion now joined in, along with the merchants of the Tripolitan Sahel. Three years later, the Qaramânî dynasty disappeared.
Notes

7. Some variability in the transliteration of Arabic and Turkish terms has been unavoidable, because of using the usual current form in order to make them instantly identifiable to the reader.
43. Panzac, Les corsaires barbaresques, 267, 269–70.
44. A. Devoulx, ‘Le registre des prises maritimes’, RA, 15 (1871) and 16 (1872); Merrouche, Recherches sur l’Algérie à l’époque ottomane, I. La course; see especially 11e partie: ‘La course décimante: 1700–1830’.
45. For the crisis in the rural areas of Algeria see N. Saïdouni, L’Algérie rurale à la fin de l’époque ottomane (1791–1830), Beirut, 2001.
PART V

RULERS, SOLDIERS, PEASANTS, SCHOLARS AND TRADERS
Historiography: three types of government

All societies have government in the sense of rules of behaviour, but not all societies have a government to make and enforce those rules. The medieval world of the Mediterranean had inherited a long tradition of such government, beginning with the magistracies of the ancient city-states and culminating in the monarchies of the Roman and Byzantine empires. These, however, overlay a still longer tradition of customary self-regulation by peoples of the mountains, deserts and forests within and without the Roman frontiers, which had revived as the frontier was overrun by these barbarians, and imperial government shrank away towards the east. The tradition of imperial government was renewed by the Arabs, the last of the barbarians as well as the last of the heretics, who carried it back to North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula, as well as to Central Asia and northern India, without suppressing the tradition of self-government among the peoples of the mountains and the deserts whom they brought under their sway. The subsequent history of state formation and organisation in the lands of the Arab empire is a history of the working out of the opposition between these two kinds of government under the rubric of their faith, with its requirement for government in accordance with the Law of God. From the fifth/eleventh century onwards, this triangle took on a new lease of life with the influx of fresh barbarians from outside those lands: the Turks from Central Asia, the Berbers from the Sahara and the High Atlas, and the Arabs from the Libyan desert. Their invasions altered the balance of society, and resulted in a fresh wave of state formation and organisation. In this they were joined by the Armenians, Christians from Anatolia, but opposed by the Franks, the Christians of western Europe. In the course of that opposition, Islam was eliminated from the Iberian Peninsula and Sicily, but much greater gains were made by the Turks in Anatolia and the Balkans, the lands of the Byzantine empire that had never been conquered by the Arabs. The outcome, in the Ottoman empire, was an impressive solution to the problem of state formation and organisation inherent in the three kinds of
government. Only to the south, across the Sahara in tropical Africa, were the terms of the problem modified by the relationship of Muslims to pagans in lands where they had established themselves by settlement and conversion rather than by conquest.

Beginning with the contemporary sources, the discussion has taken three directions roughly corresponding to these three historical elements. The prescriptions of the Islamic law as it developed down to the fifth/eleventh century enjoined obedience to the head of the community, who in turn was required to lead it against its enemies, to collect its revenues from taxation and booty, and to distribute the proceeds equitably. The task of preserving the community by ensuring its obedience to the law was performed on his behalf by the qādi, the judge in accordance with the law, who became as a result a head of the community of more fundamental importance than the monarch who appointed him. Otherwise the ruler enjoyed a wide discretion under the rubric of siyāsa sharʿiyya or lawful policy-making. The constitution of his state as the instrument of God’s government of mankind was set out in al-Māwardi’s Ordinances of government (Al-Ahkām al-sulṭāniyya), an idealised description of the offices of the ‘Abbāsid caliphate written in the mid-fifth/eleventh century and repeated at the end of the eighth/fourteenth in the Prolegomena (Muqaddima) of Ibn Khaldūn. But in the same work Ibn Khaldūn treated these offices as instruments of the many dynasties that came and went throughout the Islamic world. This was a definition of the state that emphasised the personnel of the regime over and above its organisation, measured against an equally idealised description of the just ruler. His responsibility for the welfare of his subjects was the theme of the many ‘Mirrors for Princes’, which described the principles of good government in contrast to bad. These were epitomised in the circular maxim to the effect that there can be no justice without the army; no army without taxation; no taxation without wealth; no wealth without justice, which was derived from the pseudo-Aristotelian Politics known as the Secretum Secretorum (Sirr al-asrār) and labelled by the Ottomans the Circle of Equity. The efficacy of such a regime, which lived to tax and taxed to live, depended upon the conduct of the ruler and his army of soldiers and secretaries, which for Ibn Khaldūn was conditional upon a historical cycle of growth and decay that brought each dynasty into existence only to abolish it. Its rise and fall was to be explained by the radically different constitution of tribal societies, whose ‘aṣabiyya or fighting spirit was the means to state formation through the conquest of the civilised and decadent by the primitive and strong. A crucial role had been played in the Islamic period by religion, which, beginning with the Prophet, had been instrumental in marshalling this spirit for empire-building.
In the secondary literature these three themes of Islamic, state and tribal government have all been taken up in studies of state formation and organisation. While Rosenthal and Lambton, for example, have been concerned with the political thought of the period, others have analysed the practice.\(^1\) The question of organisation was placed in a wider context at the beginning of the twentieth century CE in Hartmann’s description of an Oriental in contrast to an Occidental state.\(^2\) With reference to Byzantium, he suggested that the Oriental state rested upon the paramount right, which could never be alienated, to tax the land in cash and kind. Established under the late Roman empire, this was a right that was certainly acquired by the Arabs in the course of their conquests and inherited by their successors, entering into the legal literature of Islam and underlying the discussions of good and bad government in the ‘Mirrors for Princes’ from the second/eighth century onwards. Noting the extent to which the fiscal practice of the Islamic state deviated from the prescriptions of the Islamic law, modern studies of the subject have emphasised the contrast, of which writers of the period were aware, between ideal and practice in this as in other matters. But the insistence upon the principle in Islam of a single community under a single divine law in a single state which knows no division between the spiritual and the temporal has led writers like Rosenthal to reject the comparison that can usefully be made, as it is by Crone,\(^3\) between the jurists of Islam and the churchmen of contemporary Christendom as religious authorities in potential or actual conflict with the secular conduct of the prince.\(^4\) Rosenthal’s treatment of the dichotomy remains at the theoretical level of revelation versus reason, where he situates the distinction made by Ibn Khaldūn between divine and human law. That distinction is unconcerned with the role of the jurists in the actual conduct of government in Islam, but subordinated to the general requirement of law for the organisation of any state, Islamic or otherwise. In Rosenthal’s reading of Ibn Khaldūn as ‘the theor[ist] of the power-state’, however, this requirement is itself subordinate to a political rather than an administrative definition of the state according to its rulers rather than its rules, a question of who wins power rather than how it is exercised.\(^5\)

For Ernest Gellner, the first question was uppermost. From the Muqaddima he derived his ‘pendulum swing’ theory of Islam, in which a puritan zeal brought in the warrior tribesman to rule over the city-dweller, before it returned to the countryside to bring in a similarly zealous successor. But since this periodicity did not seem to fit the case of the Ottoman empire, Gellner felt obliged to propose the empire as an alternative model of state formation and organisation in the western Islamic world, in which what he
called ‘the elite recruitment procedures’ of its armed forces ensured the permanence of the mamlûk or ‘slave soldier’ state. A further problem was the city, which as the home of a complex society should have been politically active, but which had been emasculated by its dependence upon the warrior state for its protection. For Max Weber this dependence, which contrasted with the capacity of western European cities for municipal self-government, was an aspect of the second question, the way in which power was exercised by the state. The state was the personal property of the ruler, evolving out of patriarchalism into patrimonialism as its personnel expanded beyond the monarch, his kinsmen and his household into a professional army of secretaries and soldiers. These governed and misgoverned in the name of his dynasty until such time as the charisma of its founder was exhausted and his state changed hands or disappeared. Yves Lacoste took a long-term view of the consequences when he analysed the Circle of Equity in the light of Ibn Khaldûn’s explanation of the role played by the army in the economy through the redistribution of the wealth derived from taxation. Insofar as it promoted commerce and industry, this redistribution was an aspect of the city’s dependence on the state for the development of its civilisation. On the other hand, the direct participation of the ruler in commerce was harmful to an economy whose prosperity depended upon his buying rather than selling. Ibn Khaldûn’s criticism of such behaviour justified Lacoste’s Marxist argument, that in his time the identification of merchants with rulers had brought the evolution of the Muslim world to an end, in contrast to the West, where merchants had been free to develop a capitalist economy in opposition to the feudal state.

Such thinking enters into the judgement of historians that the period from the fifth/eleventh century onwards was a period of decline induced by a major change of ruler: soldiers instead of civilians, barbarians instead of the civilised heirs of antiquity, Turks and Mongols instead of Arabs and Persians. In the opinion of Goitein and Ashtor, these warriors established the equivalent of a feudal regime that inhibited economic growth. Their rulers took over what Kennedy has called the ghulâm state that arose out of the demise of the ‘Abbâsid empire in the fourth/tenth century. The earlier term for mamlûk, ghulâm (pl. ghilmân), designated the so-called slave soldier who formed the backbone of the armies of Islam in the Middle East from the third/ninth century onwards, and whose payment was the principal charge upon the revenues of the state which employed him. The link between the military and fiscal organisation of the state became structural from the fourth/tenth century onwards with the development of the iqṭâ’, the allocation of a source of revenue to the warrior in payment for his military service. The equivalence
of the *iqṭā‘* to the European fief as the foundation of a feudal system in Islam is now discounted on the basis of Hartmann’s distinction between the Oriental and the Occidental state. In its various forms, the *iqṭā‘* was nevertheless the principal institution through which the fiscal system of the Oriental state was modified to establish the barbarian invaders of the old Arab empire as rulers of states formed by conquest and organised for war. The question, answered in the negative by Goitein and Ashtor, is how such states could serve the interests of their subjects in accordance with the requirements of Islam and the prescriptions of the Circle of Equity.

The invasions of the fifth/eleventh century

The Arabs, Turks and Berbers who invaded the settled lands of Islam in the fifth/eleventh century were all tribal peoples of the kind described by Ibn Khaldūn, who were attracted into the Islamic world in the context of the rivalry between the Fāṭimids and the ‘Abbāsids for the headship of the Muslim community. Although the ideal of universal monarchy spelt out in al-Māwardī’s description of the caliphate was indeed a fiction, its claim upon the loyalty of rulers and subjects divided the Islamic world politically and religiously between the two contestants, and drew into their conflict the inhabitants of the lands beyond the boundaries of the original Arab empire. Of these, the tribes of the Banū Hilāl, the Arab Bedouin of the northern Sahara, were the least ambitious, but no less influential. Drawn into the quarrel of the Zīrids with the Fāṭimids, their defeat of the Zīrids at Ḥaydarān in 443/1052 provoked the dissolution of Ifrīqiya into a series of city-states, and opened the way to the spread of Arab nomadism across North Africa. While never creating their own empire, these Arabs became essential to state formation and organisation in the Maghrib as warriors who ruled the countryside for the dynasts in the cities.

The invasion of the Turks followed a similar pattern. Nomads out of Central Asia, they defeated the Ghaznavids at Dandānqān in 431/1040, in the course of an immigration that went on to repopulate the highlands of northern Iran, Iraq and Anatolia. But unlike the Arabs, the Saljuq Turks who won the battle of Dandānqān were empire-builders who took over not only the state of the Ghaznavids in north-eastern Iran, but their role as self-proclaimed champions of the ‘Abbāsids and Sunnī Islam. In that capacity they advanced to Baghdad with the declared intention to overthrow the Fāṭimid Shī‘īs in Egypt. With this imperial purpose, what might have remained a local regime in eastern Iran became in consequence an empire in Iran, Iraq and Syria, that
following the defeat of the Byzantines at Manzikert in 463/1071 extended into Anatolia. The Berbers of the western Sahara differed yet again, in that they entered the Islamic world not as nomads but as al-Murābiṭūn, the Almoravids, tribesmen ‘bound together’ into a community of the faithful to wage war upon infidelity. Inspired by the militant Sunnism behind the quarrel of the Zārīds with the Fāṭimids, their conquest of the western Sahara in the 440s/1050s was followed over the next half-century by the conquest of Morocco and finally al-Andalus. In the sixth/twelfth century the empire they created was taken over and enlarged to include the whole of North Africa by their successors the Almohads, al-Muwahhīdūn or Unitarians, a similar community formed out of the Berbers of the High Atlas by the Mahdī Ibn Tūmart. The difference from both the Arabs and the Turks, however, was that the Almoravids and Almohads were not followed out of the desert or the mountains by their fellow tribesmen to create a new population in the lands they had conquered. Instead, their empire formed the framework for the spread of the Hilalian Arabs and their incorporation into the state system they had created. That system was separate from those of the eastern Mediterranean, divided between Egypt and Syria on the one hand and Anatolia on the other.

**Egypt and Syria: the transformation of the Fāṭimid empire**

In the middle of the fifth/eleventh century the model of the state established by the ʿAbbāsids, consisting of monarch, secretariat, army and judiciary, was represented by Fāṭimid Egypt, a grand patrimonial state that had originated in a religiously inspired revolution in North Africa, and established itself in Egypt by conquest. Despite the threat of Saljuq invasion, it survived for the next hundred years, the great exception to the general rule of conquest, but not of transformation. The imam–caliph was an absolute monarch, ruling over Muslims, Christians and Jews as the charismatic representative of God on earth by right of descent from the Prophet. He did so in two capacities, on the one hand as Commander of the Faithful, the leader of the Muslim community, on whose behalf the divine law by which the community was constituted was administered by the chief qāḍī. On the other hand, as head of government, his powers were exercised by a vizier (wāzīr) from the Men of the Pen, the secretariat. In place of the sovereign, the vizier heard the endless petitions which made up the daily business of government in the Islamic as well as the Ancient world, supervised the chancery that issued his decrees and letters.
and directed his army. As head of the administration, he appointed his officers and presided over a series of diwāns, ministries or boards whose chief concern was revenue and expenditure. The most important source of revenue was the irrigated land of the Nile Valley and Delta, followed by trade, business and property. Taxes were customary rather than Islamic, their assessment and collection dependent upon the expertise of Coptic officials and the operations of tax-farmers. These bought their concessions at a fixed price for a fixed period; those who farmed the land taxes were responsible for the cultivation of the land through the building and the cutting of the dykes that controlled the annual flood. Much of the income went to the palace, where it was supplemented by the revenue from the estates of the royal family. But the most important expense was the army, the Men of the Sword. Although the idea of the Muslim community as a nation in arms against the infidel continued to apply, the armies of its states had long ceased to be composed of its citizens. That of the Fāṭimids was a composite force of exotic origin which included Berbers, blacks and Turks, not immigrant nomads but ghilmān, professional cavalrymen recruited as boys from Central Asia. Its most active employment was in central and southern Syria, which the Fāṭimids ruled from Damascus. Here it was an army of occupation under a military governor, who was served by a separate fiscal administration for the old Roman districts centred on the numerous cities on the coast and inland.

The vizier’s appointment depended on the caliph, but the success of his administration upon his skill as a politician with the power of patronage to secure the loyalty of his subordinates in the secretariat and the army. When the vizier al-Yāzūrī was executed in 450/1058, such loyalty was lost by his successors among the Men of the Pen, who proved incapable of forming a government, and in 458/1066 the Men of the Sword intervened. Their fighting brought the administration to a halt, beggared the caliph, and induced a famine that depopulated the country. Syria dissolved back into a series of city-states. But it was the governor of Syria, the Armenian Badr al-Jamālī, whose invasion of Egypt on behalf of the caliph restored order in 466f./1074. A Muslim at the head of a mostly Christian Armenian army, he took plenipotentiary power with the title Commander of the Armies. The vizierate thus passed to the Men of the Sword, mainly Armenians, until the end of the dynasty in 567/1171. Their power depended upon command of the army, which enabled them for many years to reduce the caliph to a figurehead, and eventually to replace him as head of state. But until that Weberian moment when the charisma of the dynasty was finally exhausted, their authority continued to depend upon their appointment by the imam–caliph,
the only way in which foreigners like the Armenians, of immigrant and ultimately Christian origin, could claim to represent the representative of God on earth. While the royal city of al-Qahira (Cairo) as distinct from the civilian city of al-Fustat was heavily fortified, Badr al-Jamali and his successors entered into the ceremonial routine of what Geertz has called, with reference to Indonesia, the Theatre State, of which the monarch was the Exemplary Centre, with his servants and subjects ranked beneath him in a descending order of Graded Spirituality. In this hierarchy, the Men of the Pen were restricted to the administration, where they paid the army through the allocation of iqta’s to the troops. These consisted of land-tax-farms that were assigned to the military either individually, for them to enjoy the income after the Treasury had taken its stipulated share, or collectively, to pay a regiment or tribal contingent. A fiscal device to match expenditure to revenue, as tax-farms they gave the soldiers a vested interest in the regime. A new mission was supplied by the Crusaders, whose invasion of Syria and Palestine enabled the viziers to pose as the champions of Islam, fulfilling the duty of the caliph to defend its lands against the infidel. In all these ways, their military regime was a token of the new age.

The Saljuqs in Syria

Taken over by the Armenians whom it had enlisted in its army, the Fatimid state in Egypt was nevertheless very different from the empire of the Saljuqs, created out of all the states they had conquered. While he championed the cause of the Sunnī ‘Abbāsid caliph, and took from him the appointment to rule the entire Muslim world in his name, its creator Tughril Beg was no minister like Badr al-Jamali but a ruler in his own right, transformed from an immigrant Turcoman chieftain into a patrimonial monarch of Islam with the title of sultan. His armies were built around Turkish ghilmān, while the Turcoman nomads who had followed him were increasingly marginalised. But to bring their various dominions under central control, he and his successors turned to the Men of the Pen in the persons of two great viziers, al-Kunduri and Nizām al-Mulk, ‘the Pillar of the Kingdom’. A consummate politician, Nizām al-Mulk was a great lord with his own army of ghilmān and wide patronage, that enabled him to utilise the iqta’ more widely than in Egypt, both as a grant of revenue in return for military service and as an instrument of provincial government, a delegation of political as well as fiscal rights in return for loyalty. At the same time he put into effect the religious justification for the Saljuq empire through the foundation of madrasas or colleges for the formal teaching of Sunnī Islam. But like al-Yāzūrī in Egypt, he himself remained a
servant not a master, trying in vain through his ‘Book of Government’ (Siyāsat-nāma) to persuade the sultan Malikshāh of the merits of civilised, centralised government in the hands of the Men of the Pen. The system he created survived his murder in 485/1092, but the empire did not. Unlike the unitary regime of the Fāṭīmids in Egypt, the state which Nizām al-Mulk had laboured to build for the sultan ran counter to the Turkish custom of a family dominion shared by its members, and began to disintegrate on the death of Malikshāh in the same year. By the middle of the sixth/twelfth century the power of the sultan as head of the family was confined to eastern Iran, while the rest was progressively divided between the various royal princes, the atabegs or senior commanders who had initially been their tutors, and Turcoman chieftains who had established their own dynasties.¹⁷

In Syria, added to the empire in 471/1078, and ruled until 488/1095 by Tutush, the brother of Malikshāh, Damascus and Aleppo became separate capitals under his sons Duqāq and Riḍwān, each of whom was succeeded by his atabeg. At this local level the inheritance was secured by the tutelary role of the atabegs as trustees of a state staffed by Turkish soldiers under a commanding officer, and Arab secretaries of the chancery, treasury and army. But both regimes depended upon an alliance with the raʾīs or headman in command of the aḥdāth or civic militia, who was joined at Aleppo by the qāḍī at the head of the largely Shiʿī community. Their authority went back to the fourth/tenth century, when both cities had put up a fierce resistance to the Fāṭimids, and had evidently survived the intervening years of Fāṭimid rule at Damascus and that of the Mirdāsids at Aleppo. It flourished under the Saljuq princes, who needed the goodwill of the townsfolk just as the townsfolk relied on them for defence in an age of endemic warfare. At Damascus the Būrid dynasty of the atabeg Tughtegin was paralleled by that of the Banū ʿl-Ṣūfī, with whom the position of raʾīs became hereditary. At Aleppo the Shiʿī qāḍī Ibn al-Kashshāb determined the resistance to the Crusaders while seeking a new prince for the city after the death of Riḍwān in 507/1113 and the murder of his atabeg Luʾluʾ in 510/1117. Until its fall to the Crusaders in 502/1109 Tripoli was ruled by a dynasty founded by the qāḍī Ibn ʿAmmār. It is clear that while these cities may have lacked a statutory form of government, they were nevertheless largely, and if necessary wholly, self-governing under the leader of the militia, who may have originated as a proletarian gangster, or the head of a wealthy and influential family. The authority of these headmen, moreover, was formalised by accession to the offices of the Islamic state, to that of qāḍī, and at Damascus by the promotion of the raʾīs to the rank of an officer of the prince. The result was a series of city-states that may not have been municipalities after the
Roman and medieval European fashion, but demonstrated the ability of the citizens to take their government into their own hands.18

The role of jihad

In these circumstances, the energies of the Saljuqs only gradually returned to empire-building in Syria, in confrontation with the Crusaders in the course of the sixth/twelfth century. Despite the conquest of Anatolia from Byzantium, the defence of the Sunni ʿAbbāsid caliphate against its Shīʿī rivals, which had brought Ṭughhril Beg to Baghdad, had not developed into holy war upon the infidel. And despite the subsequent loss of Jerusalem to the Crusaders, specifically Muslim retaliation was slow to develop as the heirs to the Saljuq empire in the west fought each other as well as the Franks. Treating the Crusaders as allies as well as enemies, they failed to make common cause against the infidel with the Fāṭimids in Egypt, or respond to the call to holy war by the occasional preacher, until the atabeg Zangi at Mosul in northern Iraq emerged from the conflict as the builder of a new Saljuq empire with the annexation of Aleppo in 521/1127 and the conquest of the Crusader state of Edessa in 539/1144. In Saljuq fashion, his dominions were divided at his death in 541/1146, but from Aleppo his son Nūr al-Dīn went on to annex Damascus in 549/1154. As Nūr al-Dīn’s imperialism brought him into conflict with the Franks, this finally became a holy war dedicated to the recapture of the Holy City of Jerusalem. Accomplishment, however, was left to his Kurdish commander Saladin, for whom the dedication was essential to the creation of yet another Saljuq-style dominion.

The dedication followed on from Saladin’s appointment as Fāṭimid vizier, in which capacity he abolished the Fāṭimid dynasty in 567/1171 in the name of the ʿAbbāsid caliph. The fulfilment of this long-standing Saljuq ambition was necessary to secure his position as the new ruler of Egypt, the base from which he drove the Zangids from Damascus and Aleppo, and reduced the head of the dynasty at Mosul to submission, in the twelve years following the death of Nūr al-Dīn in 569/1174. Such expansionism at the expense of fellow Muslims rather than the Latin states was sanctioned by Baghdad as the building of Muslim unity against the Crusaders, with whom Saladin clashed no more than two or three times in these years. But when in the year after the submission of Mosul, he did indeed destroy the Latin kingdom at Ḥāṭṭīn in 583/1187, he did so in a battle he could not have expected to fight. His parade down the eastern frontier of the kingdom was a repetition of his march after the occupation of Aleppo in 579/1183 – a demonstration of his commitment to war upon the infidel in justification for his war upon the dynasty he had once served. That it
ended as it did was the result of an uncharacteristic Frankish blunder. Suddenly in possession of Jerusalem, Saladin almost lived to regret his success, coming close to defeat by the Third Crusade. His championship of the faith had, however, served its purpose. Formed within the Saljuq state system by a Kurd from the tribal population of northern Iraq, the empire he had won in the name of Islam survived his death in 589/1193 as a family dominion that united Egypt with the whole of Syria.19

In that dominion, the imperative of holy war receded into the background, only exceptionally forced upon his Ayyūbid successors by the Fifth and Seventh Crusades. Otherwise they were content to reach agreement with the kingdom of Acre after a century of warfare, whose legacy of insecurity was apparent in the removal of the seat of government in Egypt from the old royal city of al-Qahira to the new Citadel, and the massive strengthening of the citadels of Damascus and Aleppo. Internal conflict was perpetuated by the division of the dynasty between some six different capitals, but controlled for much of the time by the paramountcy of the ruler of Egypt – a patriarchal dominion on the patrimonial basis of the former Fātimid state. Still organised for war, the dynasty was able in this way to preside over an era of relative peace and considerable prosperity, in which the cities benefited from trade and the endowment of mosques and madrasas. Such piety on the part of the princes built religion into the fabric of the state while serving the material interests of scholars and citizens.20

The Mamlūk empire

The Saljuq state system, represented in Egypt and Syria by the Ayyūbids, came abruptly to an end with the Mongol invasions of the mid-seventh/thirteenth century, to be superseded by that of the army created by the last great Ayyūbid sultan. After the Armenians and the Kurdish Ayyūbids, al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb’s Qipchak Turkish mamlūks took the development of the ghulām state to extremes. His creation in Egypt of an ethnically homogeneous force of mamlūks large enough to form an artificial tribe was the first step towards its installation as the ruling elite after its murder of his successor in 648/1250 – the first demonstration of its ‘aṣabiyya under provocation from the incoming Tūrānshāh. The accident of the Mongol invasion of Syria in 657/1259 then delivered the whole of the Ayyūbid realm into its hands following its victory at ‘Ayn Jālūt in 658/1260. The consolidation of its empire was the work of Baybars, a sultan in the image of Saladin as champion of Islam against the Mongols as well as the Franks, but unlike his predecessor the first among equals rather than the founder of a dynasty. Under the Mamlūks, heredity
gave rise to the Qalāwūnid dynasty in the eighth/fourteenth century. But in the context of Mamlūk factionalism, it was never more than a factor in the succession, so much so that by the ninth/fifteenth century the son of the previous sultan was regularly enthroned and deposed to make way for a senior member of a previous royal household.

The politics of the succession were the expression of two constants, first of all the perpetuation of this artificial tribe of warriors by continuous recruitment from ethnic groups still largely beyond the pale of Islam – the Qipchak Turks followed by the Circassians from the Caucasus. Imported as boys into Egypt by slave traders, and brought up to arms as a chivalrous elite with its own esprit de corps, they were divided among the households of the greater Mamlūks, to which they owed their immediate loyalty. Second was the state itself, which retained control of this elite through the allocation of iqṭā’s on a non-hereditary basis, at the same time employing the recipients, in time-honoured manner, to cultivate the land for the fisc. Each mamlūk was a tax-farming landlord, responsible, through an agent, for the irrigation as well as the revenues of the land which constituted his iqṭā; the bulk of these revenues then went to the Treasury, leaving the yield of certain taxes to the mamlūk himself as the income to which he was entitled. The incorporation of the mamlūks into the fiscal system was the latest example of the strength of the title of the state in Egypt to the land and its taxes.21

Ruling its rulers in this way, the state which the Mamlūks controlled reverted from the family dominion of the Ayyūbids to a monarchy like that of the Fāṭimids, with a single sultan, sanctioned by a puppet ‘Abbāsid caliph, in place of the imam–caliph. The Ayyūbid principalities of Syria were converted into provinces under the control of a Fāṭimid-style nā‘ib or viceroy at Damascus in charge of the whole of the country. In Egypt, the administration remained unchanged in form, function and personnel, although its Coptic members were under pressure to convert, and changes in ministerial responsibility reflected a growing preoccupation with finance. Thus the nāẓir al-khāṣṣ or steward of the sultan’s domain replaced not only the vizier as supervisor of the financial departments, including the diwān al-jaysh for the iqṭā’s and pay of the army, but the nā‘ib or lieutenant of the sultan in the government of the country. As the need for income became acute in the ninth/fifteenth century with the decimation of the peasantry by the plague, the administration fell increasingly into the hands of its leading families, many of whom were of Coptic origin, who acted as financiers of the sultan.

When the state then resorted to commercial monopolies, it invited Ibn Khaldūn’s condemnation of its interference in the marketplace as well as his
denunciation of oppressive taxation. Both were subversive of the Circle of Equity, whose justice consisted in the defence of the subject’s livelihood, either in general, through an equitable regime, or in particular through the redress of individual grievances, and both have been adduced as factors in the eventual downfall of the Mamlūk sultanate. Riven by faction, afflicted by plague, and eventually hit by the Portuguese capture of the spice trade, late Mamlūk Egypt nevertheless continued to recycle the wealth of the state through the marketplace, where the Mamlūks were in alliance with the shopkeepers, and through the endowment of charitable foundations, often in association with the tomb mosques of the Mamlūk aristocracy. Such endowments, waqfs, made under Islamic law, were widely employed as investments in property for the benefit of the donor as well as the foundation, and were a major factor in urban growth. From the fiscal point of view, they were a particular instance of the allocation of a specific source of revenue to a specific purpose, of which the iqtāʾ was the prime example. Indeed, where agricultural land was given in trust, the donation was a form of iqtāʾ which obliged the peasants to cultivate. With labour scarce, similar attempts were made to tie the peasants on the military iqtāʾs to the land, perhaps with little success. Meanwhile the sultans maintained the age-old practice of receiving petitions on a weekly if not daily basis, a routine which was central to their conduct of affairs. As a public performance of justice, it was central to the tradition of the Theatre State, of which the sultan was the undisputed head. Like the Fāṭimid caliphate before it, the Mamlūk sultanate eventually succumbed only to invasion.

Anatolia

In contrast to both Syria and Egypt, where the Saljuqs and their successors took over the Muslim states of a largely Muslim land, those that they formed in Anatolia were new creations in a foreign country with a non-Muslim population. Their history, however, followed a similar trajectory of conquest and disintegration followed by gradual but systematic unification in the course of the sixth/twelfth century. By the beginning of the century, Anatolia was divided between the Byzantines in the west, a Saljuq dynasty eventually located at Konya in the south, and Turcoman dynasties in the north and east. The ruin that Ibn Khaldūn attributed to the invasion of settlements by nomads was changed to an apparent prosperity by chieftains who turned through their raiding of the countryside from herdsmen into warlords based not on the tent but on the cities, much as Ibn Khaldūn envisaged. But although
the title of ghāzī taken by the Turcoman chieftains in the north might mean ‘fighter in the holy war’, and illustrate his dictum that nomads required some religious purpose to cohere into a fighting force capable of state formation, it may be no more than a loaded translation of the Turkish alp or hero, which invested the Dānishmandids, for example, with an Islamic charisma. The reconstruction of the economy and the society was more closely associated with the expansion of the southern realm of the Saljuqs of al-Rūm at Konya, which by the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century covered almost the whole of Anatolia. Ruled by a branch of the royal Saljuq family, this was not a family empire like its progenitor or its Ayyūbid contemporary, despite a period of some ten years at the end of the sixth/twelfth century when the realm was divided amongst the sons and nephews of Qılıj Arslan, but an increasingly centralised state under a monarchy which drew its secretaries from Iran, and maintained its army without, it seems, recourse to the iqṭā‘. Exercising its right of taxation by right of conquest through a combination of Islamic principles with indigenous Byzantine forms of landownership and fiscal practice, it recreated Hartmann’s Oriental state in the homeland of his Byzantine paradigm, under a sovereign who took for himself the title of sultan. As with the Great Saljuqs, the title carried with it the notion of defender of the faith, but like that of ghāzī did not commit them to holy war, despite their position on the frontier of Islam and Christendom. Unlike the Ayyūbids, the Saljuqs of al-Rūm found such a commitment unnecessary. The Crusades almost literally passed them by, while there was little religion in their resistance to Byzantine attempts to reconquer the country, or in their seizure of the opportunity presented by the fall of Constantinople to the Fourth Crusade, to secure an outlet to the sea at Antalya and emerge as a Mediterranean power.

As in Syria, this impressive evolution was terminated by the Mongols. But where the Mamluks immediately took the place of the Ayyūbids, the annexation of the sultanate to the ilkhanate deferred the reconstitution of an independent Anatolian state for a hundred years. When it was finally accomplished by the Ottomans in the second half of the eighth/fourteenth century, their empire nevertheless resembled that of the Mamluks, with the Balkans in place of Egypt as the base of their power. It was from their second capital at Edirne that the Ottomans set about the subjugation of the heirs to the sultanate in Anatolia: the two Turcoman and one Mongol dynasty at Kütahya, Konya and Kayseri on the plateau, and the remaining three Turcoman ghāzī states on the Aegean coast. They themselves had begun their career on this raiding frontier with the Byzantines in the first half of
the eighth/fourteenth century, repeating, it may be, the success of the Turcomans in the fifth/eleventh, when their scouring of the countryside isolated the towns and forced their surrender; that of Bursa initiated the construction of a dynastic state by their second prince Orkhan. With the passage of the Dardanelles in the 750s/1350s, the movement of the raiding frontier into Europe first gave them Edirne and then a widening horizon of territory, vassals and allies that brought Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia and Byzantium itself into Rumelia, the European wing of their empire. In the process, the enslavement of prisoners taken in this constant warfare to form a bodyguard of infantry archers for the sultan turned an army of light cavalry into a much weightier fighting force. It was with this corps of janissaries, and contingents from his Balkan vassals and allies, that Bâyezîd I conquered Anatolia at the end of the century. And it was the loyalty of this corps that enabled the dynasty to survive, in a way that the Saljuq of al-Rûm had not, the catastrophe of a second Mongol invasion by Timur in 804f./1402, in which Bâyezîd was defeated and captured. Down to the death of Mehmed II in 886/1481, the pattern of conquest resumed, with further expansion in the Balkans followed by the eventual recovery of the whole of Anatolia.

By the end of the ninth/fifteenth century, with Constantinople itself as their new capital, the Ottomans had reunited the lands of the old Byzantine empire, bringing the extensively Islamised lands of Anatolia together with the predominantly Christian lands of Rumelia. From these Balkan lands their new empire derived its particular strength and its distinctive character. It was not a family dominion like that of the Ayyûbids, or a centralised state like that of the Mamlûks, but a conglomeration of domains, provinces, subordinate principalities and allies under the overlordship of the sultan. Dynastic marriages were extensively employed to bind these disparate dominions to the throne, but the sultan himself was ceaselessly at war to compel their obedience, force others to submit, and resist the invasions of rival imperialists – Hungarians, Venetians, Mongols, Turcomans of the White Sheep, and finally the Mamlûks. Like Saladin, the sultan was fighting on two fronts in a war of conquest that was also a war of survival, but on a far grander and more ambitious scale. Like Saladin again, he was fighting in the name of Islam, earning the title of Great Ghâzî in practice as well as theory. But although like Saladin and his Ayyûbid successors he was the head of a dynasty, like the Mamlûk sultan he was the sole ruler, having eliminated his brothers at his accession. His accession depended, like that of his Egyptian counterpart, on the support of an elite corps of slave soldiers, who never, on the other hand, presumed to favour one of themselves for the throne. In his extended household they were joined by a
ministerial elite, initially recruited from the jurists of Anatolia, then drawn by Mehmed II from the Christian aristocracy of the Balkans; like the janissaries, its members became Muslim in his service, employing Turkish rather than Greek, Persian or Arabic as the spoken and written language of government. Becoming Turks in this way, these soldiers and secretaries were the exact opposite of the Turcomans who provided the cavalry of the regime or continued their raids on the expanding European frontier. But unlike the Iranian servants of the Saljuqs, who had sought to incorporate the dynasty into the state they had created, the incorporation into the dynasty of these recruits from the lands they had conquered enabled the Ottomans to succeed where Niżām al-Mulk had failed, in binding their disparate dominions into a tighter and tighter union.

The western Mediterranean

In the fourth/tenth century the Maghrib or Muslim west had been divided between two rival patrimonial states, those of the Umayyads in al-Andalus and of the Fāṭimid and their Zīrid viceroy in Ifrīqiya, the former Byzantine province of Africa that comprised eastern Algeria, Tunisia and Tripolitania. They had clashed in northern Morocco and western Algeria, which were fought over by their tribal Berber allies. Overthrown by revolution and invasion in the fifth/eleventh century, both were replaced by city-states until the whole of al-Andalus and North Africa was incorporated by conquest in the Almoravid and Almohad empires. Meanwhile the catalyst for the disintegration of Ifrīqiya, the invasion of the Bedouin Arab tribes of the Banū Hilāl, introduced a third factor into the equation of government in the Maghrib.

The city in the western Islamic world

The factors were not as simple as they appear in the structural analysis of Ibn Khaldūn, in which the difference between the complex but incoherent society of the city and the simple but spirited society of the tribal countryside is bridged by the dynastic state. The reliance of the urban population on the prince for its protection was by no means absolute. While they lacked a municipal constitution, it is clear from the example of Syria that Muslim cities around the Mediterranean, which had grown out of colonies of warriors and merchants, did indeed govern themselves to a greater or lesser degree in the presence or absence of empire. In al-Andalus, the collapse of Umayyad rule at Cordoba in 399/1009 had precipitated the formation of a score of city-states
under princes of various provenance. In North Africa, such states had formed from the very beginning in the lands to the west of Ifriqiya, where they colonised the routes into the Iberian Peninsula and down to the Sahara. In Ifriqiya they appeared in the fifth/eleventh century with the disintegration of the Zirid realm. Like the city-states of Syria, those of al-Andalus and North Africa were suppressed by conquest in the fifth/eleventh and sixth/twelfth centuries; but some survived their incorporation into the Almohad empire to last until the ninth/fifteenth century. Ibn Khaldūn himself was a principal witness to those of his own day, as well as a chronicler of their history from the fifth/eleventh century onwards. Such independence was a natural development out of a well-structured urban society that contributed to its own defence, was governed largely by consent, and was certainly capable of revolt.

Its political character was illustrated by the cities of Ifriqiya. Of the Syrian trio of prince, raʾīs and qāḍī, the prince ruled at Mahdiyya, Sfax and Gabes and the raʾīs at Tunis, Tripoli and Gafsa down to the middle of the sixth/twelfth century. The qāḍī made only a brief appearance alongside the raʾīs at Tripoli in the middle of the century, when the princes were the Normans of Sicily. Their attack upon Mahdiyya in 517/1123 had mobilised the citizens in its defence; their subsequent occupation of the coastal cities from Sousse to Tripoli was a critical event which turned on the willingness of the citizens to accept their rule. Under the terms of that occupation, Gabes was left in charge of its prince from the dynasty of the Banū Ḫāmiq, while the internal affairs of Tripoli and Sfax were entrusted to leading citizens. Within a few years, however, the arrangement was overturned by popular revolution led by these erstwhile collaborators, on the eve of the final expulsion of the Normans from Mahdiyya by the Almohads. The importance of such notables for the government of their cities is clear, but so is that of the populace, which was prepared both to submit and to resist. Resistance was not necessarily to the infidel as such; the citizens of Tunis under the native dynasty of the Banū Khurāsān endured a long siege by the Almohads before they capitulated to these champions of Islam. The constitutional issue raised by such behaviour is best examined in the case of those cities which gained or regained their independence after the Almohad conquest.

By the end of the seventh/thirteenth century, under the Ḥafṣids at Tunis, Tripoli was once again governed by a raʾīs at the head of a shūrā or council. Politically it was divided into factions, which after the expulsion of a Ḥafṣid appointee about 720/1320 generated a struggle between two families, the Banū Ṭāhir and the Banū Thābit at the head of two clans, the Mazūgha and Zakūja. The Banū Thābit won, and by the end of the century had converted
their leadership (*ri‘āsa*) into a principedom, ruling over Tripolitania in alliance with the warrior Arabs of the countryside until the city was finally recaptured by the Ḥafṣids in 803/1401. At Biskra, an oasis city on the edge of the desert in eastern Algeria, a similar passage from *shūrā* to *ri‘āsa* to petty sultanate took place from the fifth/eleventh to the beginning of the ninth/fifteenth century under the Banū Sindī, the Banū Rummān and finally the Banū Muznī, who ruled as clients of the Ḥafṣids in alliance with the warrior Arab Dawāwīda, until once again the city came under the rule of Tunis. At Ceuta, the rule of the ‘Aṣafīds followed by the Ḥusaynids displays the same elements of a council of notables and rival families, together with an armed citizenry.

The evolution towards hereditary monarchy seems a natural progression towards the norm of the Muslim state, but the element of consent remained. At Tripoli the reimposition of Ḥafṣīd rule took place with the approval of its notables, whose representative character continued to be a factor in the constitution of the dynastic state.

**Prophecy and empire**

The cities of Ifrīqiya existed in partnership with the tribes of the Banū Hilāl and Sulaym in the countryside, where the Arabs confronted the native Berber population. At the far end of the Maghrib, the situation was quite different. Out of the conflict between the Zirīds and the Fāṭimids, which had drawn in the Hilalians at the outset of their career in North Africa, came the invasion of the Almoravids (al-Murabitūn), Berbers of the western Sahara ‘bound together’ in the cause of militant Sunnī Islam to make war upon heresy and paganism. However, as John Wansbrough remarked of the Kutāma who brought the Fāṭimids to power in Ifrīqiya in the fourth/tenth century, ‘That the propaganda in this particular case should have been Ismā‘īlī is historically, but not phenomenologically, relevant.’ The phenomenon was the structural militancy of a tribal society in which self-defence and solidarity were, as Ibn Khaldūn said, the means to survival, and its susceptibility to the call to holy war. Although the propaganda was now in conscious opposition to Ismā‘īlism, the outcome was the same. A struggle for supremacy between rival clans of the Ṣanḥāja resulted in the paradoxical conversion of a stateless society into a disciplined community under the dictatorship of the prophetic figure Ibn Yāsin, which formed an army of conquest. Where the Kutāma had taken over a state, the Almoravids created an empire where none had existed before in the Sahara, Morocco and western Algeria, before recreating the centralised state of al-Andalus. As the empire grew, its government evolved from a theocracy into a centralised monarchy under the dynasty founded after the
death of Ibn Yāsīn by Yūsuf ibn Tāshfin. While the Almoravids became a military aristocracy commanded by his relatives, the Banū Turgūt, the rule of the law that they championed came into the hands of the Mālikī jurists, and the administration into those of Andalusi secretaries.

Over such an immense area, however, whose African territories had never before known central or even state government, the rule of the amīr al-muslimīn or Commander of the Muslims was thinly stretched. The Sahara reverted to tribalism under a warrior coupled with a clerical elite. In Morocco and western Algeria the administrative infrastructure was lacking to amalgamate a disparate population of townsfolk and tribesmen in mountain and plain into a subject body. Government depended upon control of the cities of the north, notably Fez and Tlemcen, and the oasis city of Sijilmāsa, from the new capital at Marrakesh, via the strategic routes that ran south across the Sahara, east to Irīqiya and north into al-Andalus. There the administrative structure existed, but Almoravid rule was only acceptable as a defence against Christian invasion from the north. The Almoravids themselves, unsupported by Turcoman-style immigration from the Sahara, were too few for the task, needing the forces of al-Andalus in the peninsula, Christian mercenaries and black slave soldiers in the Maghrib. Meanwhile the law, which had justified the conquest of the empire by Yūsuf ibn Tāshfin after the death of Ibn Yāsīn, became a question of piety on the part of his son and successor ʿAlī, and a distraction from the work of government. A revolution that demonstrated the weakness of the regime was required to preserve its empire and perpetuate its legacy in North Africa.

After the Fāṭimids and the Almoravids, the revolution of the Almohads (al-Muwahḥidūn or Unitarians) confirmed Wansbrough’s and indeed Ibn Khaldūn’s dictum on the structure of tribal society and its susceptibility to the appeal of faith. Like the Almoravids, the Maṣmūda of the High Atlas were transformed into an army under the dictatorship of their prophetic figure Ibn Tūmart, inspired by a doctrine as opposed to the legalism of Ibn Yāsīn as that legalism had been opposed to Fāṭimid Ismāʿīlism. The final product of the Fāṭimid challenge for the headship of Islam, it may have been phenomenologically irrelevant to his success, but was historically important, not only as the occasion for his mission. As a doctrine of the mahdī, the emissary of God for the rectification of the world, it set its adherents apart from the mass of the population as a religious as well as ethnic and political elite. At the same time it governed the formation and organisation of their state. Their tribal regiments were led by a combination of the disciples of the Mahdī and the shaykhs of the Maṣmūda, a marriage of religious, political and military authority which was
the strength as well as, ultimately, the weakness of the government they
wrested from the Almoravids in the middle of the sixth/twelfth century. It
was the disciple and caliph of the Mahdi, ‘Abd al-Mu‘min, who led the
Almohads to victory and added Ifrīqiya to the empire, and his descendants
the Mu‘minids who ruled it. But it was the shaykhs who maintained
the community and provided the regime with its force. The division was bridged
on the one hand by the appointment of shaykhs in the manner of Saljuq
atabegs to act as guardians to the princes of the dynasty in their posts as
provincial governors. On the other hand, the sons of the shaykhs were
recruited by the dynasty as ṭalaba or ḥuffāz, a corps of officer cadets educated
as scholars and trained as warriors to staff the administration of the empire.32

Mosques and minarets affirmed the supremacy of the doctrine, while city
walls ensured defence against the continual threat of rebellion and invasion. At
the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth century the appointment of the
shaykh Ibn Abī Ḥafṣ as viceroy of Ifrīqiya brought the empire finally under
control, only for the disastrous defeat by a Christian coalition at Las Navas de
Tolosa in 609/1212 to initiate a struggle for power between the dynasty and
the shaykhs. In 627/1230 this culminated in a massacre of the shaykhs by the
caliph al-Ma‘mūn. With the dialectical conflicts of the past 300 years at an end,
no further religious revolution was at hand. Instead the empire disintegrated
into Ifrīqiya under the Ḥafṣids, Tlemcen under the ‘Abd al-Wādids, Granada
under the Nasrids, and finally Morocco under the Marīnids. Where the Ḥafṣids
were Almohads, the Marīnids like the ‘Abd al-Wādids were drawn from the
nomadic Zanāta who had fought for the Umayyads against the Fātimids, and
now inherited the state of Morocco, the principal creation of the Almoravids
and Almohads. From Morocco, the Marīnids dominated the Maghrib for the
next hundred years, as they endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to reconstitute
the empire. Underlying their failure, however, was the lasting achievement
of the Almoravids and Almohads. Where the Romans, from a base at Carthage
in the north-east, had divided North Africa between civilisation and barbarism,
the barbarians they had excluded, turned state builders by Islam, had unified it
from Marrakesh in the south-west, on the far side of the Roman frontier.
While the unity did not last, its framework endured in this community of rival
states.33

Government and people

The royal fortress cities of the Alhambra at Granada, Fās al-Jadīd at Fez, the
Mashwar at Tlemcen and the Qaṣba at Tunis housed the dynasty and its
personnel, variously split between servants, soldiers and secretaries. The
The welfare of the subject nevertheless remained the ideal, put into practice by the redistributive character of the system, in which the wealth of the state gave widespread employment in the households of the great, and found its way into the commercial economy of the city. It was moreover consciously pursued in ways which demonstrated the commitment of the ruler to the community while serving a practical political purpose. The channels were provided by religion, no longer revolutionary or reformist but consensual. Theatrical ceremony was theatrically staged with the building of fortresses, palaces and mosques that not only gave work, but symbolised the power and glory of the faith. With doctrine everywhere back in the hands of the Mālikī schoolmen, the law as administered by the qāḍī and explicated by the muftī, the...
jurist, not only served to regulate the affairs of those within the area of the main cities. By its nature it articulated disputes into which not only the public but the monarch himself might be drawn as the ultimate arbiter. As heirs to the Almohads and their attempt to educate the populace, the Marinids in particular sought to win over the opinion of that public and reach out to the provinces through the foundation of madrasas, residential colleges that drew in students from the country. And right across the Maghrib the state patronised the zāwiya, the residence of the marabout, the murābiṭ, who under the influence of Sufism had turned from a holy warrior or militant reformer into a saint who gave his blessing to society. Colonising a countryside overrun by warrior nomads or torn by tribal disputes, the marabout commanded both respect and obedience. His hospitality and protection not only secured the routes, but attracted a following of settlers who gathered around him, a major factor in the reconstitution of rural society. From the point of view of the state, he became an agent of government beyond the competence and often the reach of its army.

The new monarchies

Between c. 854/1450 and c. 957/1550 the state system that derived from the invasions of the fifth/eleventh century was completely transformed. That transformation coincided with, and was in large measure provoked by, the comparable transformation of the state system of Christian Europe, with the revival of France, the unification of Spain and the formation of the Habsburg empire. Revolution returned to Morocco, but the principal actor in the western Islamic world was the Ottoman empire, which took over Mamlūk Syria and Egypt as well as Iraq before being drawn into the Maghrib by the war with Spain.

The Ottoman empire

Between 886/1481 and 918/1512, the expansionism which had driven the formation of the empire in Anatolia and the Balkans in the eighth/fourteenth and ninth/fifteenth centuries gave way to the regularisation of its government. Instead of campaigning in person, Bāyezīd II remained at Istanbul, where the regime of the following century took shape. Like that of the Fāṭimid at the beginning of the period, it retained the basic elements of palace, secretariat, militia and judiciary, but their amalgamation into a single imperial service is a measure of the distance travelled over the intervening centuries of state formation and organisation by the invaders and colonists of
the old Arab and Byzantine empires. That amalgamation was formally accomplished by legislation, which for the first time converted the practice of government into a body of state law, kanun (qânûn), sc. canon, to stand officially alongside the law of Islam on the authority of the sultan. Like the practice which it endorsed, kanun was primarily concerned with taxation and crime, in which respect it separated the servants of the state from its tax-paying subjects, and placed them under a separate jurisdiction as ‘the army’, whether military or civilian. Its promulgation was then of theoretical as well as practical importance. As a rule of conduct for the army in the Circle of Equity, kanun was the instrument of justice, whose reign was the principal justification for a ruler who, unlike the Fâtimid caliph, could not claim descent from the Prophet.36 As a definition of that army and its duties, it expressed the subjection of its members to the sultan in exchange for the privilege of office. Membership was assured by recruitment, education and qualification, employment determined by the needs of government.

Through recruitment and employment, the Ottoman empire of the tenth/sixteenth century created a unified system out of the innovations of the past 400 years. From the time of Bâyêzîd II, training for ministerial responsibility was combined with slave soldiering when the devshirme or Collection of boys from Christian households mainly in the Balkans took not only the place of captives as the source of recruits to the janissaries, but that of the Balkan aristocracy as the source of candidates for high office. The majority intended for the janissaries were qualified by years of manual labour, but the viziers of the future were educated in the palace school in the manner of the Almohad talaba. The formation and identification of this newly Muslim, newly Turkish elite with the dynasty was completed by the marriage of those who rose highest in its service into the royal family. Meanwhile the ethnically Turkish cavalry, which formed the bulk of the army, had been converted into a hereditary caste by the allocation of tîmârs, the Ottoman version of the pronoia, the Byzantine equivalent of the iqtâ'. Like the Mamlûk iqtâ', the tîmâr itself was not hereditary; but it was allocated by the state on a hereditary basis to the sons of previous cavalrymen. Excluded from these forms of recruitment and their rewards, the Muslim population could enlist in the service of the state through the madrasa/medrese, which served to qualify its students for entry into the salaried ranks of the teaching profession, the secretariat and the judiciary.

If the graduates of the palace school provided the empire with its high command, it was the secretariat that operated across the whole range of government through the manifold instructions it issued and the voluminous
records it kept. Government itself was divided between the military and the
civilian. The former descended from province to sanjaq to timār, which unlike
the Egyptian iqtā and that of the Saljuqs of al-Rūm, entitled its holder to
collect all the taxes on its land, as well as to punish offences by its peasant
cultivators. In return it delivered a large and well-equipped army of horsemen
for the continual campaigns of the growing empire. The latter descended
through the judiciary to the qāḍī (kadi) of each town district, and ascended
through the qāḍī’asker (kadiasker) or military judge of Anatolia or Rumelia to
the high Divan or Council at the apex of the regime. Not only did the qāḍī at
the base of this hierarchy have jurisdiction over all the inhabitants of his
district; he was the local agent who carried out the directives of central
government. At the summit, the qāḍī’askers not only exercised the separate
jurisdiction applicable to the army. As members of the Council, they handled
the petitions and complaints which had traditionally, in Egypt for example,
been dealt with by the vizier or the Mamlūk sultan and his officers. This
incorporation of the qāḍī, the chief magistrate of the Muslim community, into
the administrative apparatus of the state was accompanied by the formal
integration of the Islamic law itself into the procedures of government. A
parallel hierarchy was established for the müftı or jurisconsult who advised on
matters of law, headed by a grand mufti to whose opinion the sultan himself
felt obliged to defer. In this way an institutional solution was found to the
long-standing opposition between religious ideal and governmental practice,
one which validated the Ottoman sultan together with the Circle of Equity,
sanctioned with the addition of a final formula: ‘The holy law orders the state;
there is no support for the holy law except through royal authority.’

Conversely, a state organised for war came in this way to operate as a state
organised for peace. The state not only lived for war, but lived by war. The
tenth/sixteenth century saw the Black Sea encircled, the Iranian world
pushed back, and the Arab world added to the empire together with the
Maghrib as far as Morocco. The creation of a fleet required a further effort of
government to build and man the ships through labour services and con-
scription arranged by the qāḍī. But Egypt in particular was a profitable
acquisition, and the difficulty of ruling such a vast dominion was not imme-
diately apparent. Riding this wave of conquest, justice was not only done but
seen to be done at Istanbul, where in the second court of the palace of Topkapı
the people in the shape of petitioners met with the sultan in the guise of the
grand vizier in Council. The theatrical aspect was in evidence in parades and
processions, and in the uniforms which graded the ranks of the army below
the monarch, the exemplary centre. If taxation and conscription left the
peasantry poor, the civilian sector of the army gave wide employment, while
government spending was lavish, trade and manufacturing prospered, and the
cities grew in size. As previously in Egypt and Syria, they benefited from pious
foundations, which in Ottoman fashion served not only the community,
but the practical and ideological purposes of government. The great
tomb-mosques of the sultans at Istanbul replicated the zāwiyā of the Sufi
saint, with their hostelleries, hospitals and soup kitchens, their Qur’ānic schools
and madrasas, all supported by rents from the properties with which they were
endowed. They were a powerful statement of the piety as well as the grandeur
of the dynasty that represented God on earth, all the more necessary in view of
the challenge of Sufism. The sultan himself was affiliated to a Sufi order, as
were his janissaries, but complete institutionalisation was impossible. Not
only did Sufism represent an alternative form of organisation to the state. Its
association with the Safavid enemy in Iran, and its appeal to the Turcomans in
Anatolia and the frontiersmen in the Balkans, made it both rebellious and
potentially revolutionary.

Morocco

In Morocco, created by the appeal of Islam to the tribes and subsequently the
home of maraboutism, Sufism was both rebellious and revolutionary. As in
the Ottoman empire, however, it was countered by a different claim to power,
that of Sharifism, based on the claim to descent from the Prophet. By the
ninth/fifteenth century this claim had generated a whole population of sharifs,
whose hereditary holiness overlapped the hereditary holiness of the marabout
and the tariqa or way of the Sufi while preserving the distinction of lineage. Its
challenge to the legitimacy of the Berber Marinids culminated in 869/1465 in
the execution of the last Marinid sultan by the sharifs of Fez, who ruled the city
until it was recaptured by the Marinid Wattāsids in 876/1472. This extraordin-
ary demonstration of a city’s political capacity, paralleled only by the revolt
of the Ifrīqiyan cities against the Normans in the sixth/twelfth century, took
place in the context of the Portuguese capture of Ceuta in 818/1415. By the
early tenth/sixteenth century the Portuguese had occupied almost all the
Atlantic ports as far as Agadir, while, following the extinction of the kingdom
of Granada in 897/1492, the Spaniards had occupied cities along the
Mediterranean coast as far as Tripoli. The opposition encountered by Spain
was that of the corsairs seeking revenge for Granada, which drew the
Ottomans into the western Mediterranean. In Morocco, the Portuguese
were opposed by the marabouts, either individually or by tariqa. Where in
the central and eastern Maghrib it was the Ottomans who displaced the
enfeebled ‘Abd al-Wādids and Ḥafṣids, in Morocco such saintly opposition gave rise to an indigenous revolution begun by a sharīf from the south. With maraboutic blessing, Muḥammad al-Qā‘īm emerged in 915/1510 as the Mahdī destined to revive the fortunes of Islam. Unlike either the Almoravids or the Almohads, he had no specific doctrine, nor a particular tribal following, nor an overriding commitment to holy war, only the charisma to gain the support of the similarly charismatic Jazūliyya brotherhood, and attract recruits to an army equipped with firearms obtained from the Portuguese, Spaniards and Genoese. In 961/1554 his son Muḥammad al-Shaykh finally took possession of Fez to recreate a Moroccan empire. Threatened by its Ottoman and Iberian neighbours and endangered by a disputed succession, this was precariously stabilised for twenty-five years by Aḥmad al-Manṣūr al-Dhahabī following the rout of the Portuguese at al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr in 985/1578.

The name of Sa’dī subsequently given to his dynasty to deny its claim to descent from the Prophet merely emphasises the importance of the claim vis-à-vis the Ottoman sultanate, which lacked this ultimate title to the caliphate. Otherwise, from a capital at Marrakesh where he built himself a palace, Aḥmad al-Manṣūr endeavoured to create an Ottoman-style army with a corps of janissary-style musketeers of largely European origin, and an administration in the hands of ministers who met in regular sessions of the royal Divan. A city of tents took this government on tour around a country imperfectly unified, without a docile peasant but a large tribal population, which lacked the recent tradition of a centralised state. Like its Ottoman exemplar, it was nevertheless intended for further conquest. Marīnīd-style expansion to the east was blocked by the Ottomans, but to the south Aḥmad al-Manṣūr imitated the Conquistadors of Spain in the Americas with an expedition to secure the gold of the western Sūdān. His musketeers destroyed the army and the empire of Songhay, but failed to reach the goldfields, and were left to themselves at Timbuktu when Aḥmad died in 1011/1603 and his regime crumbled. Without the institutional strength of the Ottoman empire, it failed to survive the subsequent dispute over the succession. By the middle of the eleventh/seventeenth century the empire had ceased to exist, its place in the south, at Marrakesh and at Fez taken by the great marabouts of the Atlas whom the Sa’dīs had repressed but never exterminated. It was nevertheless recreated at Fez in the 1070s/1660s by sharīfs from the south-east, and made permanent by the length of reign of their second sultan Ḣūmā‘īl (r. 1082–1139/1672–1727). With the threat from maraboutism at an end, the triumph of Sharifīsm was assured as the necessary qualification for the Moroccan throne. It came, however, at the cost of a government which dispensed with central
administration, relying on the simple expectation of the monarch that he and his household army in the immense palace complex at Meknes would be provisioned by the gifts and services of the men he sent out as governors to live off the land they ruled. By the end of the reign these had formed a series of provincial dynasties, but rebellion was inhibited by the threat of force provided by an army of black slaves and tribal cavalry. This organisation of the state for repression rather than war preserved its empire, but the distinction between a *bilād al-makhzan* or land under tax and a *bilād al-sība* or land ‘running to waste’, the mountains where collection was difficult or impossible, expressed a reality of government from the time of the Almoravids.

Notwithstanding the rudimentary character of this regime by contrast with that of the Ottomans, by contrast with that of the Saʿdīs it survived thirty years of fighting over the succession to Ismāʿīl. So, after the traumas of the past 300 years, did Fez, whose jurists had remained hostile to the claim of both the Sharīfian dynasties to religious authority on the strength of their ancestry. During the reign of ʿṢidd Muḥammad (1170–1204/1757–90), they confronted the sultan’s construction of the port of Essaouira for trade with Europe. The purpose was fiscal, but the issue much more than an affair of the *makhzan*. The leadership of the community by the Commander of the Faithful was questioned by this breach of a century-old aversion to dealing with the infidel. The argument was won by a scholarly monarch who insisted on a revision of the *Mālikī* curriculum and attitude to the sources of the law, but its significance was more than theological. If justice was rough and the contract implicit in the Circle of Equity crudely enforced, under the ‘Alawī dynasty a Moroccan community of the faithful had become a reality along with a Moroccan society, formed as the servants of state settled together with the *shārifīs* and greater marabouts into a hereditary aristocracy.38

The evolution of the Ottoman empire

By the end of the tenth/sixteenth century the organisation of the Ottoman state for war had reached the limit of its capability to sustain the expansion which had called it into existence. As the wars of conquest came finally to an end, the empire faced the same military and financial problems as the early modern states of its European rivals, and solved them in a similar way. The transformation of army and administration was accompanied by prolonged internal disorder, the loss of territory to Iran, Austria and eventually Russia, and the extensive independence of Egypt and North Africa. It was consequently seen in terms of decline by Ottoman observers who, in the absence of
an alternative vision of the state, called in vain for a return to the standards of the past. Their diagnosis, for which they found support in Ibn Khaldūn, is a commonplace of the modern literature. No more, however, than its western European contemporaries did the state collapse, and its modification is better understood as evolution.

The evolution of the state

The evolution began with the recruitment of a much larger force of infantry musketeers from the Muslim population of Anatolia. Many more thousands strong, the janissaries thus became a corps of free Muslims, joined by still greater numbers of sekban, musketeers paid only on campaign. This shifting of the balance away from Rumelia to Anatolia revived the old problem of bringing the Turkish heartland under control. Throughout the eleventh/seventeenth century disbanded sekban regrouped as jelālis, brigands who turned from banditry to rebellion in their demand for janissary status. The janissaries themselves, rioting over pay, meanwhile murdered the sultan ‘Othmān (Osman) II and continued to get rid of the ministers they disliked. Forming an alliance with the bazaar, they went into trade, while tradesmen joined their ranks to make them almost a city militia. The problem of forming a government at Istanbul was compounded by the palace environment in which the princes of the dynasty were raised; providing no sort of education for the sultanate, it was a seat of irresponsible power in the hands of the inner household of women and eunuchs. With the ending of the devshirme, however, the ministerial class was more widely recruited, and central government developed socially, with the formation of households and retinues outside the palace. Administratively it followed suit. The grand vizier and his office, eventually installed in a vizieral palace, ‘the Sublime Porte’, came to take over the direction of the state from the Imperial Council at Topkapi, while the chief scribe at the head of the secretariat rose in importance as head of the administration. Meanwhile the posts of provincial governors were increasingly filled by nominees from the centre rather than from the provincial administration itself.

The provincial level was the level of taxation, where change began with inflation. This wiped out the old cavalry along with the value of the timār, breaking the original connection between timār, taxation, military service and government, at the same time that it increased the need of government for cash. Levies that had previously served to finance campaigns now became regular taxes, while others were imposed as required. Collection was centralised through the provincial governor, who in turn relied upon tax-farmers and
wealthy local notables, a’yān, to take from the peasant. Non-Muslims paid their poll-tax through their millet or religious community; guilds in the cities were similar agents of the state, while the qāḍī continued to function as both judge and local administrator. The significance of the regime lay in the appearance of the a’yān following the allocation of timārs to courtiers and their clients, the passage of state land into private ownership, and the formation of large estates. In its adjustment to the financial demands of modern warfare, a central organisation for war had by the twelfth/eighteenth century generated a local society organised for peace. Into that society the Ottoman army, still visible in the uniforms pertaining to each rank, blended to form a wider whole.39

**Syria, Egypt and North Africa**

In the Arab provinces, the Ottoman army was an army of occupation, but one whose forces had by the end of the tenth/sixteenth century turned against government from Istanbul. In Syria and Egypt a three-cornered struggle developed as the janissaries and other units found themselves in conflict not only with the governors sent from Istanbul, but with local aspirants to power. In Syria with its mosaic of peoples their competitors were of different origins at different times, and equally opposed to each other; but by the twelfth/eighteenth century these aspirants had come to power by appointment as Ottoman governors rather than forming states of their own. In Egypt the Mamlûks had survived the Ottoman conquest in the capacity of a landholding military aristocracy incorporated into the Ottoman regime as warriors and tax-farmers. Regrouped into great households under hereditary amīrs with the Ottoman title of Beg, their factional rivalries effectively prevented the restoration of the Mamlûk sultanate. By the twelfth/eighteenth century they were nevertheless in control of the country, and by its end both they and the Syrians were aspiring to independence.40

To the west of Egypt, on the other hand, it was the Ottoman army that took power in the Regencies of Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers. These were new political units that created the present political division of North Africa from Morocco to Egypt, beginning the formation of the modern states of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria several hundred years before those of the Ottoman Fertile Crescent. With the eviction of the Spaniards and the abolition of the ʿAbd al-Wādids and Ḥafṣids, the janissary forces sent to garrison the cities taken by the corsairs faced only local and uncoordinated opposition from the tribes of the interior. With an end to the overrule of these conquests by the corsair admirals of the Ottoman fleet, these forces then became the effective
power in the new provinces, able to resist the governors sent from Istanbul and restrict the corsairs to their piracy. While never endangering their hold over the country, which increased over time, their internal rivalries nevertheless delayed until the end of the eleventh/seventeenth century the establishment of the Deys at Algiers, and until the twelfth/eighteenth century the foundation of the Qaramânî and Ḫusaynid dynasties at Tripoli and Tunis. These were formed by the Begs who controlled the country outside the capital as commanders of the cavalry which collected the taxes. In the Regency of Algiers there were three such Begs stationed inland at Mascara, Medea and Constantine, but monarchy at Algiers fell to the Dey, a company officer of the janissaries whom they elected, deposed or assassinated more or less at will.

While the struggle for power was frequently bloody, Ottoman-style armies continued to rule in the name of the sultan on Ottoman lines. Relations with the empire remained close, with janissaries recruited from Anatolia, palace slaves at Tunis acquired from Istanbul, Hânâfi Turkish jurists to represent the law, and Ottoman-style mosques and palaces. Affairs at Algiers were conducted by weekly council meetings of the principal officers of state; at Tunis households formed around the princes of the royal family. Economically but efficiently, government itself was steadily rebuilt and strengthened after the breakdown of the state in the wars of the tenth/sixteenth century. The cities were well kept, while the tribal interior was held with a minimum of force through alliances with makhzan tribes. The army was built into society by marriage, which generated an indigenous population of quloghlu or ‘sons of the sultan’s slaves’, and into the economy by waqf. The principal means of investment in the cities, waqf was a major factor in urban growth, coupled with the formation of great estates in the settled countryside. From the end of the eleventh/seventeenth century, investment in piracy dwindled, but exports to Europe increased. Here again, an organisation for war was becoming an organisation for peace.

Islam and the state in sub-Saharan Africa

South of the Sahara, there was no tradition of the Oriental state, nor any Arab conquest to establish it. On the evidence of social anthropology, the formation of African kingdoms from the array of stateless societies is attributed to the acquisition of dependants, their organisation to the assimilation of customary chieftaincies into a state structure. Islam nevertheless entered into the process from the fifth/eleventh century onwards, with the growth of Islamic empires in the western and central Sūdān and of Islamic city-states.
on the East African coast, followed by the city-states of Hausaland and the sultanates of the eastern Sūdān. The Islam in question is the civilisation of North Africa and the Middle East as it impinged upon sub-Saharan Africa, but its impact has usually been studied in terms of Islamisation, most recently by Levtzion and Pouwels; conceptually this has suffered from the tendency exemplified by Hiskett to measure the result against a definition of Islam as it is supposed to be. The problem has been the lack of adequate evidence from the first few hundred years. The suggestion that the empires of Ghana, Mali and Kanem came into existence to profit from the trans-Saharan trade in gold and slaves, and that the Swahili city-states began as colonies of Muslim merchants, is no longer an acceptable explanation, but points to the importance of the Muslim merchant at the court of the African prince. The meeting of these two very different persons with two very different traditions of government took place on the basis of religion, in which the distinction between scholars and statesmen initially coincided with the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim.

The principle that Muslims outside the dār al-islām must continue to live by the law received two expressions in the course of the fifth/eleventh century. On the one hand the Ifrīqiyan jurist al-Qābisī ruled that Muslims living in the pagan Bilād al-Sūdān should elect a nāẓir, ‘a watchman’, to administer the law with the consent of the pagan ruler. Where there was no such ruler, however, the watchman, as in the case of Ibn Yāsīn, the prophetic figure of the Almoravids, became his own enforcer. These two prescriptions, the one for Muslim self-government and the other for Muslim state formation in non-Muslim territory, intertwined in the western and central Sūdān down to the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century. In the fifth/eleventh century, Muslim merchants from the Maghrib lived in their own townships, out of which developed the Muslim cities of Kumbi Sālih, Walāta and Timbuktu. Ruled by their qādis, these cities became centres for the merchant tribes of the Sahara, whose scholarship, legal and literate, was an instrument of their commerce. From the seventh/thirteenth century these tribes were joined by the Dyula, a Mande people likewise engaged in learning and long-distance trade from a centre at Jenne, who spread across to Hausaland to the east. By the tenth/sixteenth century the Muslims of Timbuktu were sufficiently strong and self-confident to resist the attempts of the Askīyā dynasty of Songhay to rule and tax the city. In the eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries, however, the Moroccan conquest of Songhay in 991/1591 freed the Muslims of the western Sūdān from state control, and the scholars of the Fulāni people turned to holy war upon pagans to create their own states.
In the fifth/eleventh century, it is possible that the empire of Kanem in the central Sūdān was taken over by a dynasty of Muslim merchant origin engaged in a trans-Saharan slave trade based on slave raiding. But in its organisation, it conformed to the pattern of the successive empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhay, in which Islam was a creed adopted by indigenous rulers who governed largely pagan subjects in accordance with ancestral belief and custom. Its value in their case was political and economic. Expressed in the ostentatious pilgrimage of Mūsā, Mansa of Mali in the eighth/fourteenth century, Islam was their way into the wider world with which they dealt in slaves, gold and salt, horses, arms and prestigious luxuries. The Muslims who served this purpose, and who supplied their administration with its element of literacy and numeracy, were still frequently expatriates in their own quarters, while the role in that administration of the Sūdānese officers of Islam, the qāḍī and the khaṭīb, was limited to the court and the Muslim minority. The Askiyās of Songhay were the first to think of ruling by the law of Islam, only to find themselves faced, in their conflict with the jurists of Timbuktu, with the familiar problem of principle versus practice. The situation was in contrast to the position down the eastern side of the continent, where indigenous states or empires were either non-existent, or Christian in the case of Ethiopia, or, in that of Mapungubwe/Great Zimbabwe, too far inland for Muslim settlement. Instead, from at least the fourth/tenth century, Muslim merchants from Egypt and the Gulf had established a close relationship with the village headmen with whom they traded down the coast of the Indian Ocean. The archaeological evidence shows the appearance of mosques at the centre of townships of African type which were progressively rebuilt in stone – a finding consonant with the Bantu syntax but Arabic vocabulary of the Swahili language. This blending of native with Islamic authority gave rise to indigenous Muslim cities under indigenous Muslim dynasties, most notably at Kilwa, whose rulers reinforced their Islamic credentials with a claim to foundation by immigrants from the Gulf. By the eighth/fourteenth century, such rulers were Muslim sultans conducting their affairs in the same way as the Mamluks. Yet a third kind of state formation had occurred in the Horn of Africa, where Muslim merchants advancing from Zeila up the Rift Valley had created a whole row of states in pagan territory without apparent recourse to holy war until they came into contact with an aggressive Christian Ethiopia. By the ninth/fifteenth century, all had submitted to Ethiopia apart from Adal on the far side of the Rift Valley, whose merchants and rulers were torn between appeasement and jihad.48

The political revolution of the tenth/sixteenth century in North Africa and the Middle East, however, was echoed to the south of the Sahara by a parallel
transformation of the political scene. In 999/1591 the build-up of Islamic empire in the western Sūdān was abruptly terminated by the Moroccan invasion which destroyed Songhay a year before the Portuguese occupation of Mombasa completed their control of the city-states of East Africa. Meanwhile in 950/1543, Portuguese fusiliers had enabled the Ethiopians finally to defeat the holy warriors of Adal, which by the end of the century had disintegrated. This collapse of the Islamic state system at either end of the range of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa was meanwhile offset by its development in the central and eastern Sūdān, within the orbit of the Ottoman empire. Unlike the empire of Songhay, the empire of Kanem-Bornu at the end of the tenth/sixteenth century acquired the trained musketeers to re-establish itself as a major power. It was nevertheless unable to annex the walled cities of Hausaland, the capitals of Muslim dynasties in command of armoured cavalry. Such armies were for slave raiding, in the case of Bornu perhaps mainly for the slave trade with the Sahara and the Mediterranean. In the case of the Hausa states, it served primarily to create a productive slave peasant population as well as great households. In both cases, Islam continued to serve the political and economic purpose of relations with the wider world, conducted in large measure through Ottoman Tripoli; the role of the law, served by its scholars, was largely symbolic, though concubinage and the seclusion of upper-class women affected the structure of the household. That was true also of the sultanates of the eastern Sūdān, from the Funj who established themselves on the Nile in the tenth/sixteenth century to the dynasties of Waday and Darfur in the eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth. All were African kingdoms involved in the monopoly of trans-Saharan trade with Egypt, which in Waday and Darfur in particular was a trade in slaves. But in their case Islam entered much more systematically into state formation and organisation with the immigration and colonisation of the countryside by maraboutic holy men, many from the Ḥijāz. These were granted land with powers of government, greatly extending the grasp of the state on the population.

This new maraboutism encountered the older tradition of North Africa in the central Sahara at Murzuq in the Fezzan, where the Awlād Muḥammad, a Sharifian dynasty from Morocco, had been invited to settle the disputes of the population. The previous annexation of the Fezzan by Kanem-Bornu in the seventh–eighth/thirteenth–fourteenth centuries gave the dynasty a strongly Sūdānese character, but for its literacy it too relied upon marabouts to whom it granted land in the oases. In the western Sūdān, on the other hand, the reappearance of pagan kingdoms after the downfall of Songhay had revived
the urgency of al-Qābisi’s injunction to the expatriate merchants in the Bilād al-Sūdān to submit to pagan rule. In the eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries the alternative, to follow the example of Ibn Yāsin and his murābiṭs, became increasingly attractive to the Fūlānī scholars who turned to the formation of jihadist states in Senegambia over to the west. These in turn led up to the great jihads of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, first and foremost that of ‘Uthmān dan Fodio in Hausaland, where the enemy was not paganism but disregard of the law by Muslim rulers. In challenging their right to rule, however, he was going far beyond the situation in West Africa. As scholars like himself became increasingly affiliated to the growing number of Sufi orders that stretched across the Islamic world, the Qādirīyya ṭarīqa in the western and central Sūdān had become a school with wide trans-Saharan connections, not least with the Wahhābī movement in Arabia. Its members thus joined in the much wider movement for the Islamic reform of the state which was prompted by the concessions of the Ottoman empire to the new form of paganism represented by the West. While the Ottomans turned towards secularism, rebellion in Arabia, scholarly opposition to the sultan of Morocco, and maraboutic opposition to the Dey of Algiers, signalled the reopening of the confrontation between Islam and the state which the Ottomans in their heyday had so successfully overcome.

Notes

37. Ibid. p. 49; more generally, C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The structure of power, Basingstoke, 2002.
47. E. N. Saad, Social history of Timbuktu, Cambridge, 1983.
Conversion to Islam: from the ‘age of conversions’ to the *millet* system

MERCEDES GARCÍA-ARENAL

The process of conversion

At the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century the majority of the people living in the territories under Muslim rule were themselves Muslim. What has been called ‘the age of conversions’, a period which we now believe encompassed the first three centuries of Islam at the very least,\(^1\) was coming to a close. The traditional interpretation of Islamic history maintained that conversion to Islam took place on a massive scale during the great wave of conquests that took place over the roughly 100 years following the Prophet Muḥammad’s death. However, since the 1960s, scholars of diverse aspects of the early Islamic world have provided the basis for a reinterpretation of the sources. The result is a new consensus that this ‘age of conversions’ was somewhat longer than previously thought.\(^2\) In most areas, it appears that the rate of conversion to Islam showed its steepest growth in the late third/ninth century and the fourth/tenth,\(^3\) and in some regions, such as al-Andalus, the process of conversion continued into the beginning of the sixth/twelfth century.\(^4\) There has been a more limited interest in the study of conversion processes that occurred after the initial large-scale phenomenon; this does not mean that in the late medieval and early modern centuries waves of mass conversion to Islam did not take place.

The new body of work on the ‘age of conversions’ was just one part of a great revisionist debate revolving around early Islam and in particular the shaping of what would later come to be recognised as Sunnī Islam. According to the new view, this formative period occupied the three centuries after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad in 11/632, rather than just one. Naturally, this revisionist debate is not free of controversy, but Muslims and non-Muslims alike have observed that what Muḥammad’s followers experienced as ‘Islam’ during the actual lifetime of the Prophet and his Companions must have been quite different from the experience of being Muslim three centuries
later, by which time most Muslims were the descendants of Christians (and to a much lesser extent Jews and Zoroastrians). This is because in its formative period Islam must inevitably have been affected by its assimilation of so many converts from other religions, in particular Christianity. The Christians of the Middle East were members of ancient communities with highly developed traditions of law, education and religious discourse. It is difficult to imagine that the development of Islamic traditions would not have been affected by the assimilation of large masses of converts from these older communities. Furthermore, the very nature of conversion itself must have been affected by this process of assimilation, given that Islamic dogma and law were as yet incompletely defined at this time and the concept of ‘Believer’ was itself still in flux. According to some scholars, the first century of Islam seems to have been a period when the line between Muslims and the ‘People of the Book’ (ahl al-kitāb), i.e. Jews and Christians, was very vaguely drawn indeed.

The scholars who have addressed these issues have had to pose the question: At what point was a convert regarded as a Muslim and could legitimately regard himself as such? The answer varied by geographic region and according to the various stages in the evolving definition of Islam, yet, as we shall see, it had not become completely rigid even in the historical period we are dealing with here. During the earliest centuries of Islam, the first step in conversion consisted of a kind of ‘adherence’, expressed in changes in outward appearance and social behaviour, which allowed initial entry into the community of believers. Hence conversion had a gradual, progressive character that did not involve a sharp break with the past. Familiarity with Islamic dogma and ritual was acquired only after the convert had been immersed in a community that was already regarded as Muslim.

The appearance of sectarian movements such as the Zaydīs, Ismā‘īlīs and Ībādīs also played an important role in the conversion process, since such sects showed considerably more proselytising zeal than did the armies of the initial Muslim conquerors. Some of these sects, particularly the Khārijīs with their concept of salvation through community, were eminently attractive to populations on the periphery of the new empire. Similarly, Sufism played an important role later on in the Islamisation of new regions like Anatolia and sub-Saharan Africa, and in the re-Islamisation of areas that were nominally Muslim but were far removed from the centres of culture and power, like the rural areas of Morocco.

Some conversions seem to have been motivated by internal divisions and sectarian conflicts within the non-Muslim communities. The social restrictions, inferior legal status and heavy tax burden imposed by the Muslim rulers

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on their non-Muslim subjects undoubtedly also played a role. Socially motivated conversion depended on the existence of social contact between Muslims and non-Muslims. The greater the proportion of Muslims in the population the steeper the conversion curve.

During the centuries in question here, Islamic societies counted on a fully developed and clearly established set of practices and beliefs, and the era of the great Muslim territorial conquests was long over, with the exception of Asia Minor and the Balkan Peninsula. In fact, the Islamic empire was beginning to witness the loss of Muslim territory, at the hands of either Spanish Catholics or Russian Orthodox Christians, and a reverse flow of conversion from Islam to Christianity.

In the lands surrounding the Mediterranean, non-Muslims subject to the *dhimma*, ‘covenant of protection’, had become or were becoming reduced to the social status of ‘minority’, regardless of their number. Within Islamic society new patterns of inclusion and exclusion developed which affected not only these non-Muslim minorities but also recent Muslim converts, and which were a reflection of the fact that to a great extent the Muslim community had acquired a clear-cut definition, while the minority communities in question generally retained defining ethnic or linguistic characteristics. However, though the boundaries between groups were now more sharply defined, they were still porous, and fluctuated according to political events such as territorial gain or loss, giving rise at times to fascinating instances of cultural mixing and even religious hybridity.

As in all societies where membership in the majority group confers privileges, the minorities living in Muslim lands had two ways of gaining access to those privileges: they could convert, or they could disguise and tone down the more visible of their distinguishing features. The latter course of action to some degree involved sacrificing identity in the interest of security. In response, however, the majority religious community could tend to emphasise the minority’s separateness, for example introducing obvious discriminatory elements in dress, honorific titles and personal names, or assigning the minority a separate physical space, such as a specific neighbourhood – a characteristic feature of the Islamic city beginning in the late middle ages. Spatial and communal segregation became a component of the social fabric and was often followed by specialisation in occupations and professional fields.

At the same time, however, Muslims, Jews and Christians were all members of a single society that shared language, traditions and social customs. Moreover, they were all heirs to the religious culture of late antiquity,
expressed in a common language of ritual that included religious processions, festivals and sacred practices, such as the practice of *ziyāra*, or the visiting of the tombs of saints and prophets, places endowed with therapeutic or talismanic value.⁹ Above all, the three religions shared many holy places: sites like the Cave of the Patriarchs and the Tomb of Ezekiel in Palestine were visited equally by Jews, Christians and Muslims.¹⁰ Such common religious practices continued to exist even in times of armed conflict, as can be seen in the areas that came under Crusader control in Palestine, with Franks and indigenous Muslims participating in *ziyāra* to the same sites.¹¹ In al-Andalus, Muslims took part in the celebration of festivals associated with the solar calendar, such as New Year’s Eve or the Feast of St John.¹²

The relationships among the various religious communities coexisting in this society became more strained in times of political upheaval or whenever there arose the threat of attack from outside enemies. In moments of economic or social crisis, too, the minorities were obvious scapegoats, particularly when members of these subject *dhimmī* groups had managed to attain public posts that entailed political or economic power. Thus, the minorities suffered whenever their members entered into direct competition with Muslim elites, above all when they were used pragmatically and then protected by Muslim political rulers. Movements of rebellion against such rulers then turned high-profile members of the minority into propitiatory victims. The minorities also became the targets of persecution whenever there was an upsurge in the preaching of a more fundamentalist or militant interpretation of Islam, or whenever messianic or millenarian movements arose. At such times, of course, persecution affected not only non-Muslims but also those Muslims who failed to fall into line behind the movement. Such crises, as we shall see, never failed to bring in their wake instances of religious conversion among the victims of persecution.

Conversion still meant first of all a social change and a change in ritual; first came the outward change, and the inner change followed. The dimension of conversion that was tied to outward identity and culture was more prominent and heavily emphasised than the truly religious dimension. This phenomenon was in turn accompanied by a certain laxness on the part of the Muslim political and religious authorities in verifying the sincerity of the convert, a laxness that nonetheless did not exclude on some occasions the restricting of converts to their own separate spaces within Muslim society. This can be seen in the case of the ‘*uluḫ* (sing. ‘*ilj*) or ‘*Renegades*’ and, as we shall see, of the *bildîyyûn*, *musâlima* and *dönnê*, the mere denomination of whom as separate groups serves to illustrate the limits to their full acceptance within the Muslim
community. After all, the most objectionable features of the minorities, features intended precisely to set them apart, were not automatically erased upon conversion, and in fact the disappearance of these differences actually aroused fear in the majority social body, which would then attempt to keep the convert separate by means of accusations of unethical professional practices, or of maintaining links with his former co-religionists. Above all, conversion was accepted reluctantly when it was likely to create social or economic competition for members of the majority.

The territory under Muslim rule, or dār al-islām, can be divided into two parts: the frontier regions and the Muslim heartland. There is much to be said about conversion in the frontier regions, which had only recently come under Muslim control or influence (such as Asia Minor and the Balkans, conquered by the Turks during this period, and sub-Saharan Africa) and sometimes experienced repeated shifts in political and religious allegiance. The heartland of dār al-islām, on the other hand, constituted areas in which the cultural and political structures of Islam had been firmly entrenched for centuries. Here, conversion on a mass scale no longer occurred save in times of severe internal crisis or confrontation with external enemies. A further distinction could be drawn between the Muslim but non-Arab territories at the core of the Ottoman empire on the one hand and the Arabic-speaking lands on the other. Islam was by no means uniformly established even within a single unit of territory. Islamic institutions were more firmly implanted in the cities than in remote or inaccessible rural zones, like the mountains of Lebanon, for example. There also existed differences between areas where Sunnī Islam predominated and regions largely inhabited by Shīʿīs. I will confine myself here to conversion between Islam and those religious communities legally recognised as the ahl al-kitāb and therefore coming under the dhimma covenant of protection, in other words, Jews and Christians.

The Islamisation of Asia Minor and the Balkans

In the middle of the fifth/eleventh century, Asia Minor and the Balkans were entirely Christian. Yet by the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century, Muslims constituted the great majority of the population in Asia Minor and an important minority in the Balkans.

Between the early fifth/eleventh century and the end of the sixth/twelfth, a significant influx of Turcoman tribes into Asia Minor had taken place, such that by around 473H/1081 Byzantine power had been severely eroded in the peninsula. Byzantine attempts to recover control had the effect of
concentrating the Turcomans in the central Anatolian plateau, which soon became almost completely Muslim, while Christians continued to hold sway in the coastal areas. Thus, in the seventh/thirteenth century, the Saljuq sultanate of Konya was surrounded by Christian territories, with the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia to the south-east and the Greek kingdoms of Nicaea and Trebizond to the west and north. The sultanate experienced economic growth and cultural blossoming, which exercised a strong influence on its neighbours. However, this stability vanished at the end of the seventh/thirteenth century, ushering in a period of internal strife that proved disastrous for Christian institutions. The Saljuq territories were replaced by Turkish principalities, the exact nature of which is open to debate, but the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia lasted until 776f/1375 and Trebizond until 865f/1461. The Turkish principalities eventually came under Ottoman rule through conquest or marriage. At the end of the ninth/fifteenth century, the Islamic institutions of Anatolia absorbed the bulk of the members of the now disorganised ancient Christian communities, which were rapidly Islamised.

The expansion of Ottoman power from an initially small base situated at the frontier between the Christian and Muslim worlds has points in common with the first centuries of the Arab conquest. From the eighth/fourteenth century to the second half of the ninth/fifteenth, the Ottoman state consisted of a Muslim minority ruling over a Christian majority. By the end of the ninth/fifteenth century, however, the Islamisation of Asia Minor was already apparent, albeit more complete in central and western Anatolia than in the north and east, where sizeable Christian communities continued to exist. However, the flow of religious belief in Asia Minor fluctuated and is rarely easy to pin down with any precision. The Mongols, for example, originally of a Shamanist tradition, accepted Christianity prior to adopting Islam. In fact, the Ottoman elites expended considerable energy on turning the nomadic tribes of Anatolia into Ottoman subjects and imposing the Ottoman (Hanafi) version of the shari'a on these territories. Conversion to Islam was thus in effect also a process of ‘Turkification’.

Furthermore, the Islamisation of a particular demographic group through conversion to Islam is not the same thing as the Islamisation of a particular geographic region, which often took place when the Christian population simply fled or was reduced to captivity following military defeat. This population might also be transplanted and replaced wholesale by incoming tribes of Muslim nomads. Indeed, in the early years of their rule the Ottomans adopted a series of political measures known as sürgün, in which forced emigration was followed by the colonisation and settlement of depopulated

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areas (a procedure which the Byzantines had employed before them). Though the main purposes of such measures were demographic and economic, they obviously also played a major role in the Islamisation of those geographic areas.

In the Balkans, Islamisation and the survival of Christianity were opposite sides of the same coin, and the phenomenon is much easier to describe, first because it occurred at a later date and secondly because contemporary Ottoman documents provide a wealth of detail. Before the Ottomans penetrated the Balkans in the eighth/fourteenth century, Muslim communities in this region had been virtually non-existent, with the exception of the Muslim quarter of Byzantine Constantinople, where Muslims had a mosque and commercial facilities. Even by the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century only 18 per cent of the inhabitants of the Balkans were Muslim. Islamisation was more pronounced in the cities than in the countryside, yet even in the cities the number of Muslims deriving from religious conversion remained small relative to the number of those descended from Muslim immigrants. The regions with the highest degree of Islamisation were Silistria, Herzegovina, Thrace, Macedonia and Bosnia. Islamisation in the Balkans never reached the decisive proportions attained in Asia Minor. An obvious sign of the persistence of Christianity is the continued presence of the Orthodox Church. So too is linguistic continuity, though this should be viewed in its proper context: Bosnian and Bulgarian Muslims continued to use Slavic languages, just as Albanian Muslims spoke Albanian and the Muslims of Crete and the Black Sea continued to speak Greek. In fact, the Bosnians even developed a version of their Slavic language written in the Arabic alphabet.

Certain Christian practices survived even in the Islamised towns of Anatolia and the Balkans, which continued to celebrate seasonal festivals associated with the Feasts of St George, St Barbara and St Tryphon, as well as the religious market fairs known as ‘panegyrics’.

In southern Anatolia and particularly in Albania a sort of syncretic religion arose that combined Christian and Islamic elements. The clearest manifestation of this was the Bektashi order of dervishes, which first appeared in the sixth/twelfth century and saw its fullest flowering in the ninth/fifteenth.

In connection with conversion, there was one Ottoman institution which had a detrimental effect on Christian populations and for which there existed no Islamic precedent, being indeed in clear conflict with the concept of the dhimma covenant. This was the devshirme, the forced expatriation of boys or young unmarried men from the various Christian communities of the empire, particularly Slavs and Albanians. These boys of Christian origin
were converted to Islam and then educated and trained to serve in the civil service and armies of the Ottoman state. In this fashion, Slavs and Albanians were turned into not only Muslims but also Ottoman Turks. The *devshirme* was in use from the eighth/fourteenth century to the end of the eleventh/seventeenth, though its most systematic and numerically most significant application occurred during the tenth/sixteenth.

The Christian communities of the Middle East

Until the end of the sixth/twelfth century, there existed within the territories of Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon flourishing Christian communities – Copts, Melkites, Jacobites, Nestorians and Maronites – with deeply rooted ecclesiastic and communal institutions as well as a significant social and political presence. The outburst of active hostility directed at the Christian communities by both Muslim rulers and the Muslim populace during the seventh/thirteenth century has traditionally been attributed to two factors: the Crusades and the Mongol invasion. The traditional interpretation claims that local Christians suffered the reprisals of the Muslim majority because they practised a religion shared with the Crusaders on the one hand and favoured by the Mongols on the other. However, recent studies have shown that social and economic factors were just as important as external military threats in arousing Muslim animosity and resentment.18

Regardless of the causes for this resentment, one of its consequences was the conversion of Egyptian Copts to Islam on a large scale during the second half of the seventh/thirteenth century and the first half of the eighth/fourteenth. The Coptic community was subjected to extremely heavy pressure to convert by their Mamlûk rulers, because the Muslim masses of Cairo and other cities resented the influence that Copts wielded in the government, as well as their obvious prosperity. On repeated occasions this resentment expressed itself in violent attacks on Copts and their properties, outbreaks that endangered the social and even political stability of the Mamlûk state. Popular resentment against the Copts was also clearly directed at the Mamlûk rulers who employed and protected them, and was furthermore fuelled by the burdensome fiscal measures that the rulers decreed and their Copt functionaries then implemented. The Bahri Mamlûk sultans found themselves forced by popular pressure to take measures that included promulgating the Covenant of ’Umar and placing restrictions on the employment of Copts in the state administration. This Covenant of ’Umar (which had been applied to varying degrees on previous occasions) was intended to segregate and
humiliate the dhimmī population by, for example, obliging them to wear distinctive clothing, or forbidding them any means of transport except foot or donkey. It also forbade Christians and Jews from repairing or decorating existing churches and synagogues and erecting new ones. The Covenant was read aloud in Cairo and Damascus, while simultaneously dhimmīs were removed from public office. The result was a wave of conversions to Islam that shrank the Coptic population to a small minority.

The sincerity of such essentially forced conversions was immediately called into question. Resentment of the continued prominence or wealth of the new converts, who began to be known as the musālima (those who have adopted Islam), continued to make itself felt, and the converts were accused of favouring their former co-religionists and setting up networks of mutual support and social advancement. They were denounced as not being true Muslims, especially by one sector of the scholarly elite, or ‘ulamā’. Earlier, the Mamlūks had built many mosques and madrasas in both Egypt and Syria for the teaching of Islamic sciences, as well as khānqāhs for the Sufis, all of which they had paid for by means of private waqf endowments. Because of the large number of such institutions and the financial advantages they enjoyed, the numbers of ‘ulamā’ had also grown considerably and many of them then had difficulty finding the sort of employment within the court and state administration that they felt was appropriate to their newly acquired social rank. Since all military and political posts were restricted to members of the Mamlūk elite themselves, the local ‘ulamā’ could only aspire to positions within the civil service. Yet here they found themselves in competition for these posts with non-Muslims, who had predominated in the state administration ever since Umayyad times – hence the hostility of the ‘ulamā’ towards the Christian elite.

The ‘ulamā’ of Syria were likewise hostile. The Damascene scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) wrote treatises and delivered public diatribes in which he attacked the non-Muslim communities. Syria in particular had suffered greatly as a result of the Crusader and Mongol incursions, and both events engendered bitterly anti-Christian sentiments among Syrian Muslims, because many Christians had either collaborated with the foreign invaders or prospered during the brief period of Mongol rule in Syria.

The exception among Christian groups was the Maronite community, which did not merely survive but actually grew in numbers and strength from the relative safety of its base in the mountains of Lebanon. Yet of all the eastern Christian groups, it was the Maronites who were most closely allied to the Crusaders. Indeed, after the Crusaders were finally driven from the coast
of Lebanon, the Mamluks sent several military expeditions between 699/1300 and 704/1305 to bring the Maronites and the neighbouring heterodox Muslims to heel. A further punitive expedition was despatched in 768/1367, following an attempted invasion by the Catholic king of Cyprus. However, these punitive expeditions had no lasting effects, and thereafter the Mamluks allowed the Maronites to live as they pleased as long as they continued to pay tribute. Perhaps the most important factor in the survival and development of the Maronites was the fact that they never sought positions of power in the civil or financial institutions of the Mamluk state.

Jews and Christians in the Muslim west

In 477/1085 Toledo was conquered by the Christians. As a result of this, a large number of Mozarabs, that is, Arabised Christians who had been living under Muslim rule, were inspired to cross over into Christian territory. This marked the high point of a migration which had actually been going on since the end of the Andalusí Umayyad caliphate. But it was the year 518/1125 that proved truly decisive for the Christian communities of al-Andalus, for it was then that the army of Alphonso I, king of Aragon, was able to penetrate as far south as Granada, but had soon to draw back. As a result, the Andalusí Christians who had made common cause with his campaign were obliged to withdraw northwards with him. After this episode, the Almoravid authorities decided that, by aiding a foreign enemy, those Christians had broken the dhimma covenant. This provided the justification for the subsequent deportation of all the Christians still remaining in al-Andalus to Morocco, where a number of them ended up serving with the Christian mercenary units. An unknown number of Andalusí Christians preferred conversion to deportation. Those Christians who were deported either converted once they were in Morocco or emigrated to Sicily or the Christian-held lands of Iberia, with the result that by the sixth/twelfth century there remained virtually no Christian communities within the Muslim territories on either side of the Straits of Gibraltar.

Nonetheless, there did remain sizeable Jewish communities in al-Andalus. These communities had played an important cultural and social role in al-Andalus in the preceding centuries. They even managed to achieve political prominence: the Ibn Naghrila family of Granada played a key role in government under the Zirid dynasty. This prominence was a mixed blessing, for the actions of one of them, the vizier Yûsuf ibn Naghrila, sparked violent popular disturbances and a massacre of Jews in 459/1066. There also existed Jewish communities in the Maghrib.
The non-Muslim communities (largely Jews) of the Islamic west suffered harshly during the early years of Almohad power. The Almohads, followers of the Mahdī Ibn Tūmart, had created a veritable religious and political revolution, a movement with a markedly messianic character. During the early years of this movement, when they were still engaged in the struggle for power with the Almoravid dynasty, the Almohads withdrew the status of ‘Believer’ from their Almoravid adversaries and all others who failed to adhere strictly to their doctrines. This legitimised their fight against fellow Muslims and gave them licence to seize Muslim persons and possessions as legitimate booty.

Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that during the reign of ‘Abd al-Mu‘min, which began in 542/1147, the dhimma covenant protecting non-Muslims was declared null. In principle, the effect of this declaration was to force all non-Muslims to convert to Islam. This abolishment of the dhimma pact was so unusual and so contrary to Muslim law that Arabic sources hardly mention it, therefore it is not known with certainty how long this situation lasted or what its real effects were. Many Jews in the areas under Almohad control chose to go into exile in either the Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula or the Muslim territories of Egypt and Syria. As with the Copts of Egypt, the sincerity of those Jews who remained and converted was questioned, and they were discriminated against and obliged to wear distinctive clothing in all the areas under Almohad control.

Nevertheless, this outbreak of repression against the Jews was apparently short-lived. It also appears to have been more intense in the frontier regions than in the heart of the empire, judging from the fact that the Jewish philosopher Maimonides, for example, fled from Córdoba in al-Andalus to Fez in Morocco. At some particular moment, Jews were clearly allowed to return to their religion without fear of accusations of apostasy, so that after the Almohad caliphate disintegrated Jewish communities flourished again everywhere in the Islamic west except al-Andalus.22

In Morocco, these communities – and particularly that of the capital Fez – attained a position of great prominence under the Marīnid dynasty. Jews were given posts managing the dynasty’s finances or as diplomatic and commercial envoys to the Italian republics and the monarchies of the Iberian Peninsula, and in general played an important role in the economy. This situation ultimately provoked resentment in Fez, and the eruption of violence against the Jews was once more related to the fact that it was the Jews who were responsible for actually implementing the harsh tax policies devised by their rulers. At the time of the worst outbreak, the Marīnid sultan Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb (d. 685/286) had just founded a palace complex on the outskirts of
Fez named Fās al-Jadīd (‘New Fez’) to serve as the seat of his administration and personal guard. In order to extend the protection of that guard to part of the Jewish population of Fez, he decided to provide a special quarter for them called the Mellah (mallāḥ) within Fās al-Jadīd. A large number of rich Jewish merchants preferred to convert to Islam rather than abandon the commercial heart of the city, which was a prime location for the carrying out of their professional activities. During the first half of the ninth/eighteenth century, these rich merchants of Jewish origin – who were known by the derogatory term bildīyīn or ‘city-folk’ because they could claim neither Arab descent nor tribal nisba (‘kinship’) – began to compete with the Sharīfī elite for the monopoly over the qaysariyya, the centre of the capital’s luxury trade. The Sharīfs tried to drive out the bildīyīn on various occasions by accusing them of fraudulent business practices. They also complained that the bildīyīn’s ignominious origin was inappropriate to the sanctity of the site, since the old city of Fez was hārām (‘sacred’) owing to the fact that it contained the tomb of Mawlay Idrīs, a descendant of the Prophet. The bildīyīn, whose numbers now included several important Islamic scholars, responded with the counterargument that discrimination among Muslims was not permissible in Islam.23

Outside Fez, commercial rivalry claimed other Jewish victims in the Maghrib, most notably those involved in trade in the oasis towns of the Tuwāt, key points along the caravan route that connected Morocco with the western Sūdān.24 Here the militant preachings of Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Maghīlī (d. c. 843/1440), a reforming jurist and shaykh of the local zāwīya (Sufi lodge), ignited popular resentment and provided religious legitimacy for it. This was a region that was technically outside the control of any political authority, which allowed al-Maghīlī to claim that the Jews had broken the dhimma by not paying the jizya (protection tax) to any Muslim political power. The result was an outburst of violence against the Jews and the destruction of their synagogue. These events also sparked a long controversy among the Islamic scholars of the time, who criticised al-Maghīlī and the religious arguments he had put forward.25

There was another outburst of violence against Jews in Fez, with subsequent conversions, in the events that put an end to the Marīnīd dynasty.26 As in the case of the violence at Tuwāt, the conflict coincided with difficult economic times and a political power vacuum aggravated by the first incursions by the Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula into North Africa, culminating in the capture of several ports on the Moroccan coast. The first such episode, the taking of Ceuta by the Portuguese in 818/1415, was more of a shock to western Islam than the fall of Granada. These conquests had serious
economic consequences because they sealed one of the main maritime outlets of the lucrative trans-Saharan trading routes.

After the Marinids, both the Sa'di and the 'Alawi dynasties continued to employ Jews in important positions in the civil and financial administration as well as the diplomatic service until the twelfth/eighteenth century. These Jews of the makhzan (state apparatus) were made up of families that amounted to virtual dynasties of viziers and secretaries and managed to ride out intradynastic power struggles and palace coups with their positions of influence intact. This prominent position of Jews became an unquestioned feature of Moroccan society, and the Jewish community remained the only minority of any consideration in Moroccan territory until the founding of the state of Israel in the twentieth century CE led to large-scale Jewish emigration.

The Renegades

A characteristic phenomenon of the history of the Mediterranean between the tenth/sixteenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries is what the Arabic sources call ‘uluj (foreign) and the Christian sources refer to as the ‘Renegades’ (i.e. apostates). The war between the Ottomans on the one hand and primarily Spain but also the Venetians on the other yielded an endless stream of prisoners-of-war. Though the great naval clashes ended in the 977–87/1570s, the taking of captives continued to thrive in what Braudel has called ‘la petite guerre’, the war of the Barbary corsairs. For more than two centuries, based in Mediterranean ports from Tripoli in Libya to Tetouan and Rabat in Morocco, Muslim corsair ships preyed on the coasts and shipping routes of the northern Mediterranean. This corsair war reached its peak between 987/1580 and 1049/1640, when its main base was the Regency of Algiers, set up by the Barbarossa brothers in 923/1518.

One of the primary goals of corsair activity was the taking of human captives, around which there developed a thriving business in ransoms. Scholars now calculate that between 1500 and 1750 at least a million European Christians were captured either temporarily or permanently in North Africa. While awaiting the payment of ransom, these captives were forced to work in the docks and shipyards, or as domestic servants in the houses of wealthy families or the courts of the rulers. An unknown but considerable number chose to escape captivity by means of conversion to Islam. It is estimated, for example, that in 1043/1634 there were some 8,000 such ‘Renegades’ in Algiers.

Various factors must have been involved in a captive’s nominally voluntary decision to convert, among them desperation about the chances of being
ransomed, ill treatment or the desire to regain freedom. But these captives must also have been attracted by the opportunities which membership in Muslim society offered. These captives were often seized from among the peasantry of the poorest regions of the northern Mediterranean. In the regencies of North Africa they found themselves in a less rigidly stratified society than the ones they had left behind, a society where fortunes could be made and where they could achieve social ranks far higher than what they could ever aspire to in their countries of origin. Admission to Islam was a relatively simple matter and institutions that might put a new convert’s religious sincerity and compliance with Islamic precepts to the test (such as the Inquisition) were absent.

In the Maghrib, the Renegades soon played an important political and military role. Renegades served in the rulers’ guard, the army and the public administration. They also joined the crews of the corsair galleys. Nevertheless, the very name by which they were known in Arabic, ‘ulūj, suggests the limits of their acceptance. Muslim society did not actively restrict the ‘ulūj in any way, yet it did confine them to their own political and social space, where they lived among themselves, forming bonds of clientele or kinship with their former masters or the rulers. Thus, conversion was linked to not only manumission but also a system of patronage.

A relatively small number of these Renegades later opted to return to their countries of origin, a move which obliged them to reconcile themselves with the Catholic Church by way of the Inquisition. As a consequence, there exists a considerable body of archival material on this subject, which has yielded a flurry of scholarly work on ‘Allāh’s Christians’. These studies reveal not only how porous the religious frontier that divided the Mediterranean was at the time and the constant back and forth flow of religious identities across it, but also how conversion was regarded respectively within contemporary Muslim and Christian societies and what social roles were permitted to converts in each.28

The Renegades coincided in time as well as space with the presence of another large group of converts who represent the same process in reverse. It is the wholesale conversion to Christianity of an entire Muslim community.

The Moriscos

In the Iberian Peninsula, the gradual conquest of Muslim lands had placed under Christian control Muslim minorities whose status in medieval Christian society was initially governed by a formal covenant not unlike the dhimma,
such that Muslims were permitted to practise Islam and run their own affairs according to their own laws. While this situation of legal tolerance persisted, these Muslims were known as Mudejars. Their situation deteriorated dramatically after 897/1492, with the capture by the ‘Catholic Monarchs’ (Fernando II of Aragon and Isabel I of Castile) of the kingdom of Granada which brought under the rule of a single dynasty for the first time all the territories now known as Spain. They then began to carry out a series of measures designed to homogenise conditions throughout their territories, including a unified body of laws governing religious practice and belief. The Jews of Spain were the first victims. In 1492 they were given the choice between exile or conversion to Catholicism. Most chose the former and moved to either Morocco or the lands of the Ottoman empire where they swelled the ranks of communities in the Balkans, Asia Minor and Palestine.

Between 1502 and 1526 Fernando and Isabel promulgated decrees along the same lines as the decree of 1492, but this time targeting the Muslims. The resulting forced converts, known as Moriscos, were subjected to surveillance and repression by the Inquisition. In 1567 the use of Arabic, spoken or written, was forbidden alongside other social and cultural features. The Morisco question developed into a social problem in early modern Spanish society, which was at one and the same time insistently vigilant as to the complete assimilation of the Moriscos and yet fearful that that very assimilation would ‘contaminate’ the Christian community.

At different times in the various regions of Spain where they lived, the Morisco communities alternated between complete assimilation and the stubborn practice of a crypto-Islam. Yet even in the latter instance, the Moriscos gradually lost knowledge of the Arabic language and, for want of mosques, scholars of Muslim law and Islamic institutions, their Muslim culture became debased. Nevertheless, a large of body of textual material has come down to us from the Moriscos written in what is known as aljamía, namely Romance written in the Arabic alphabet and sprinkled with syntactic calques and Arabic religious terminology.

The Moriscos were finally expelled from Spain between 1609 and 1614. On the one hand, they were perceived as being incapable of assimilation, and on the other, they were accused of both connivance with the Barbary corsairs and acting as a ‘Fifth Column’ for the Ottomans – hence a constant menace within the heart of the Spanish nation. The vast bulk of exiles settled in the Maghrib. There, from Tunis to Rabat, the Moriscos came to occupy a social space not unlike that allotted to the Renegades, from whom they were not always easily distinguished. They lived in the same
neighbourhoods, practised the same occupations, served side by side in militias and palace guards and on corsair ships, and worked together as translators and secretaries. Like the Renegades, the Moriscos were confined to their own closed social space for nearly a century. Their membership in the Muslim community continued to be held in doubt, and of both Moriscos and Renegades it was said that they knew ‘neither how to be Muslims nor how to be Christians’, that they were people with neither beliefs nor convictions nor loyalties, who ‘had no Law in their hearts’.

In the twelfth/eighteenth century there came about a radical shift in the balance of power between the northern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean, and the flow of captives dried up as corsair activity declined. By that time the Moriscos had become totally assimilated into their host society. Their former presence in North Africa is attested to only in a handful of Spanish surnames, lingering family traditions and the architectural features of buildings in certain quarters of the coastal towns.

The Morisco phenomenon had its nearly contemporary counterpart at the opposite end of the Islamic territories covered in this volume where the Tsars of Russia, another dynastic power undergoing a phase of expansion and determined to make religion inseparable from state and national identity, launched the conversion to Christianity of the Muslim Tatars.

The Tatars of Kazan and the Crimea

Between the seventh/thirteenth and tenth/sixteenth centuries the Russian principalities had gradually been conquered and brought into vassalage by the Muslim Tatar rulers of the Golden Horde. However, in the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century, the great princes of Moscow, claiming that their vassal status under the khâns of the Golden Horde entitled them to do so, undertook the conquest of areas that still lay ostensibly under the rule of the heirs to the Mongol empire. The Russian expansion began under Ivan the Terrible (r. 1547–84), who took Kazan, capital of the Volga khanate, in 1522, and Astrakhan further down the Volga. Military conquest was followed by the systematic occupation of this territory by the Russians. Beginning in 962/1555, a policy of forced conversion was introduced and the population was pressured to accept religious assimilation. However, this did not imply ethnic assimilation. That is, converts acquired the same legal status as that enjoyed by other subjects of the tsar, but they were not Russified. They were allowed to maintain their Tatar identity and continue to use the Tatar language, though it eventually began to be written in the Cyrillic alphabet – a kind of
aljamía in reverse. The Orthodox liturgy was even translated into Tatar for the benefit of the new converts.

The Russian authorities tore down mosques, transferred the waqf endowment properties to the state and expelled the mullâs from the cities. Islam was reduced to a religion of the rural peasantry, and many mullâs became the leaders of reformist and revolutionary movements. In the first half of the twelfth/eighteenth century, Christian missionaries based in Kazan founded special schools where Muslim children who had been forcibly separated from their parents were raised as Christians. Muslims were driven from all villages in which converts also lived so as to keep the new convictions from being contaminated by their former co-religionists. And legislation established the death penalty for any Islamic preaching or religious discourse that was critical of Christianity.

In 1774, Catherine II the Great (r. 1762–96), following a series of wars against the Ottomans and their Tatar vassals in Crimea, used the terms of the treaty of Küchük Kaynarji to annex the steppes on the northern shore of the Black Sea, including Crimea. Military occupation was followed by colonisation, Russification and the initiation of Christian missionary activity. Nevertheless, Catherine adopted a policy towards the Muslims in the new territories that was considerably gentler than those of her predecessors. In 1788 she restored the legal right of Muslims to practise their faith freely, and Muslims were conceded the same legal status as all other subjects. However, these rights proved ephemeral. Under the reign of her successor Alexander I, the peninsula was flooded with Russian colonists and the Tatars had no choice but to emigrate. In the decades after 1783, over a million Muslim Tatars moved to the lands of the Ottoman empire settling in Turkey, Rumania and Bulgaria.

Jewish messianism and conversion

The mystic Sabbatai Zevi, born in Smyrna in 1626, founded one of the most significant Jewish messianic movements. His teachings aroused an intense messianic expectation among not only the Jewish communities of Christian Europe but also the Jews of the Muslim world, whether in the Ottoman empire, Iran, Yemen or Morocco.

The year 1666 was thought to be the date of the coming of the Messiah, so at this time Sabbatai Zevi and his followers carried out what they hoped would be a triumphal march through Istanbul. However, the Ottoman authorities instead arrested Sabbatai Zevi, forced him to convert to Islam and eventually
exiled him to a small village in Albania, where he died in 1676. A large number of his disciples believed that his conversion was consistent with his being the Messiah and duly followed his example, while maintaining their beliefs, particularly those of Cabalist inspiration. For decades these nominal converts from Judaism constituted a compact, well-defined and endogamous group, known in Turkish as dönme, with its largest communities in Smyrna, Salonika and the Istanbul–Bursa area. This was clearly an unusual case of collective conversion in that it was both voluntary and feigned. The Ottoman authorities apparently never took the trouble either to verify the sincerity of these conversions, or to punish the apostasy involved when some of the dönme reverted to Judaism.32

Outside Ottoman lands, events followed a different course. In Iran,33 Morocco34 and especially Yemen,35 the messianic zeal of the Sabbateans provoked repression by the authorities and disturbances among the Muslim masses. A large number of the Jews of these countries converted to Islam as a consequence.

Concluding remarks

The set of case studies presented here (to which others could be added), diverse in characteristics, impact and geographical location, have been selected because they help us better to understand social mechanisms in the Islamic societies in which they took place. They illustrate the conflicts that arose after the early centuries of great mass conversions to Islam, during the period when non-Muslims had been reduced to playing a minority role and when the limits of their participation in the society of the Muslim majority were definitively established. These examples also reveal the process by which each religion developed a characteristic communal identity which would eventually lead to a sense of national identity.

In 897/1492, Muslim political power vanished from the Iberian Peninsula. The Ottomans converted Syria, Palestine and Egypt into provinces of their empire in 922/1517 and extended their rule over the regencies of Tunis and Algiers. The relative tolerance that existed within the Ottoman empire attracted not only Jews expelled from the Iberian Peninsula but also Calvinists from Hungary and Transylvania, Silesian Protestants and Russian Cossacks. All these sought refuge in Ottoman territory or requested assistance from the Sublime Porte in their struggles to resist Catholic or Orthodox persecution.

By the end of the tenth/sixteenth century, all the main conversion movements had taken place, and non-Muslims were fully integrated into Ottoman
society. This integration was mediated by means of what is known as the *millet* system (Turkish *millet* from Arabic *milla*, religious community), a system that recognised and regulated the existence of non-Muslim confessional groups. The Sublime Porte retained absolute power, and was the final arbiter in the event of disputes among communities. However, within each community personal and family life were governed by the laws of each particular religion, and the maximum authority was the spiritual leader of each community. These communal leaders then negotiated directly with the Ottoman state authorities on questions involving the state–community interface, such as state taxes, or conflicts between community and state criminal law. Thus, the individual was conceived as having no relation with the state outside the framework of membership in a religious community. One clear benefit of the *millet* system was its ability to limit inter-communal conflict. Such conflict was minimal, for example, during the tenth/sixteenth and eleventh/seventeenth centuries. However, another consequence of the *millet* system was that ties between communities hardly existed, and bonds at an individual level, through marriage for example, were rare, so that there was virtually no movement from one group to another. The *millet* system lasted until the end of the period covered in this volume, a period that ends just as colonialism and nationalism make their momentous appearance.

Notes

Conversion to Islam


Introduction
Throughout history, financing the military has always represented a difficult endeavour for states, while being essential for the survival of societies. Dissatisfied soldiers represented a high risk of instability and violence. They would either cause riots or even attempt an upheaval against the ruling dynasties. Armies with a high percentage of professional mercenaries, who had no emotional connection to the inhabitants of the land they were fighting for, were even more susceptible to failures in the remuneration system. Muslim societies were no exception to this rule. Once the initial religious impetus and motivation of the armies of the early Islamic period had ceased, the financial aspect became increasingly important, even more so after the stream of booty collected during the early military successes came to a standstill as did the Islamic military campaign as a whole in the second/eighth century.

This required a change of policy in order to keep the military satisfied. The so-called iqṭāʿ system was initiated in the fourth/tenth century in the Muslim east by the Iranian dynasty of the Buʾyids. Soldiers were granted the tax income of specific lands in exchange for military service (khidma). In combination with military slavery, the iqṭāʿ system became the prevalent method of payment for the military in the eastern and central Islamic lands. The system reached its peak during the Mamlūk reign in Egypt and Syria (648–923/1250–1517) and continued in a modified way right up to the Ottoman period. The evolution of the military in the Muslim west was certainly influenced by this development but remained, as in many other aspects, distinctively different.

Aspects of Islamic taxation in early Islamic times
Until today, certain aspects of the Islamic taxation system have remained the subject of discussion and debate. As an example, the usual term used for the Islamic land-tax is kharāj, meaning literally ‘reward’ or ‘fee’ (Qurʾān 23:72 and
18:94), with no direct link to the taxation of land as such. The same term is used by some early authors to refer to the poll-tax (jizya).\(^1\) Cahen rightly pointed out that kharāj is ‘in fact found with reference to various specific taxes, thus causing considerable confusion’.\(^2\)

In the following centuries, legal scholars developed a tax frame in which the meaning of kharāj became clearer. Differences were established in the treatment of the poll-tax of Muslims and non-Muslims. Land-tax was also differentiated between areas of originally Muslim provenance and newly acquired areas. These classifications were made regardless of whether the owner had become Muslim over time or not. In only a few cases, a neo-Muslim was able to ‘convert’ his land to the status of ‘Muslim’ as well, thereby ‘converting’ it to another tax class.

The main taxes a non-Muslim had to pay were the poll-tax (jizya), which constituted approximately 10 per cent of his income, and the land-tax (kharāj) for his non-Muslim land, which constituted 20–30 per cent of its revenue. He did not have any claims on war spoils, but he did not have to serve in the army either.

The tax burden for an average Muslim was an alms-tax (zakāt) of about 2–10 per cent of his revenue, and another tax levied on his land, which could be either the tithe of the revenue off his Muslim land (‘ushr), or the land-tax (kharāj) levied on newly occupied land. Furthermore, he could claim a share of war spoils (ghanīma) due to his military service in the army, for which he had to be available at any time.\(^3\)

The tax burden on non-Muslims, as compared to the advantages of being a Muslim, did not constitute such a heavy load that conversion to Islam occurred out of sheer financial necessity.

These new definitions streamlined the taxation system in theory, but in practice it only drew the debate to another level. Detailed issues, such as how much zakāt was to be paid for the ownership of camels, were still left unsolved and hotly debated among Muslim jurists. A ratio system was often agreed upon in which, for example, the owner of five to seven camels had to pay the zakāt with a sheep. The owner of seventy-six to ninety camels, however, had to pay two three-year-old camel mares.\(^4\) However, such questions were of secondary importance, compared to the question of when a piece of land was to be considered ‘Muslim’. This was an important question because of the different rates of taxation assigned to the two categories of land. Many an owner attempted to be exempt from paying the higher ‘non-Muslim’ land-tax (kharāj), by paying the lower ‘Muslim’ land-tax (‘ushr). Having land reclassified as ‘Muslim’ became increasingly difficult to achieve, and as a result the ‘ushr
tax was slowly replaced by the much higher *kharāj* tax everywhere, to the detriment of many a law-abiding taxpayer. Both terms were then used synonymously in the later Muslim periods.  

### How to pay a military slave? On the genesis and evolution of the *iqṭā‘* taxation system prior to 648/1250

Even though many aspects of early Islamic taxation are subject to debate, there is no doubt about who eventually used up most of the levied tax: the military. An order of the caliph ‘Umar I (r. 13–23/634–44) thus reads:

> I have decided that the mobile booty shall be spread among the deserving, after having deducted the fifth [for the leaders]. I shall leave the land to the same tenants who already worked on it, and they will have to pay *kharāj* [land-tax] and *jizya* in order to provide for the soldiers, their children and their successors.

According to Abū Yusūf (d. 182/798), the caliph refrained from distributing the land itself among his soldiers, and by avoiding scattering his army he was able to retain an effective fighting force. Payment for the soldiers was centralised in the *dīwān al-jund* (Office for Army Affairs).

At the same time, however, some conquered land was handed out to Muslim notables and officers in addition to normal payment. These parcels of land were called *qaṭā‘i‘* (sing. *qaṭī‘a*), and even though they were technically ‘given’ to the notables their ownership still resided with the state, at least in theory. The owners of these strips of land had to pay the standard tithe (*‘ushr*) as tax. The actual practice differed considerably from the theory in that the concessionaires often took the land as private property (*milḵ*) and refused to hand back the rights of ownership to the administration. Therefore, the rulers resolved upon the method of not handing out the rights of ownership of land *per se*, but instead the concessionaires got the right to levy tax from the lands attributed to them. This new form of land payment was at first called *iqṭā‘*. The advantage for the concessionaire lay in the fact that, while he had to pay the tithe of the revenue off his *iqṭā‘*, the *‘ushr*, to the state, he could demand from his tenants the higher *kharāj*, his income thus being the difference between *‘ushr* and *kharāj*. So far once again the theory. In practice, it was very difficult to obtain anything at all from the *iqṭā‘* holders, the *muqṭa‘*s. The Iranian Būyid dynasty (r. 334–447/945–1055), who controlled de facto the territories of Iran and Iraq in place of the powerless caliph in Baghdad, did
react to this development. The Būyids handed out iqtāʾs without connecting any kind of tax duties to the ownership of an iqtāʾ. In the following centuries, iqtāʾ Būyid-style was to become the main element in the remuneration of soldiers, thus also becoming the most important factor in the taxation systems of the entire Middle East. The old fiscal administration was meanwhile reduced, as the muqtaʾs managed their iqtāʾs through their own agents and slave soldiers (sing. ghulām). It seems that only individual taxes, like the poll-tax, the zakāt and trade taxes, had to be paid directly to the state via its agents.

In connection to the evolution of the iqtāʾ system new developments in the military system took place, including radical changes in the function and form of the armed forces. The old Bedouin armies, which had been the traditional mainstay of the classical Arab armies, lost their position of prominence, and were replaced by non-Arab forces. First and foremost, Iranian ‘new-Muslims’ constituted the new backbone of the ‘Abbāsid armies. But the real military revolution came with the introduction of slave soldiers, starting in the third/ninth century. Military slavery was to dominate the composition of Muslim armies in the central Islamic lands for centuries to come. The ‘Abbāsid caliphs al-Maʾmūn (r. 197–218/813–33) and al-Muʿtaṣim (r. 218–27/833–842) recruited professional soldiers out of the ranks of slaves on a large scale. They were usually brought in from the peripheries of the empire and were preferably of Turkish origin. On a legal basis, they did not differ from household slaves, apart from the fact that they were automatically manumitted on completing their military training. They were then allowed to occupy key positions within the state. Turkish predominance in this military system meant that largely Arab societies were dependent on the use of armies whose soldiers were linguistically and culturally distinct.

Large-scale use of Turkish slave soldiers (mamlūks) restricted the Arabs’ influence to the civil sector, which was a considerable price to pay. Although this process sometimes faced harsh criticism from contemporary authors, there was no call for the abolition of the institution of military slavery. In the process, the Arab population got more and more used to the rule of the Turkish military upper class. Their rule was seen as God-given and was never really challenged by, for example, large uprisings. Moreover, there was the prejudice expressed by authors like Abū Ḥāmid al-Qudsī (d. 888/1483) at the end of the ninth/fifteenth century, that Arab Egyptians were unmartial people and not able to protect themselves. Therefore the Turks would cheerfully shoulder the burden of the holy war and devote their lives to the defence of the community of believers. Even the Arabs themselves felt that they were not as capable of upholding the banner of Islam as powerfully as the
Turks were. It was the military conquests of the Turks that made the Arabs stand out among other peoples. The Arabs themselves based their prestige upon the circumstance that they were the chosen people in religious matters through the authority of the Arab Prophet Muhammad. Thus, after the Mamlûk sultan al-Ashraf Khalil (r. 689–93/1290–3) had conquered Acre from the Crusaders in 690/1291, he was praised in a panegyric: ‘Praise be to God, the nation of the cross has fallen. Through the Turks the religion of the chosen Arabs has triumphed.’\(^{15}\) In order to achieve such military triumphs though, the Turkish slave soldiers had to be paid. The \(\text{iqtā’}\) system proved to be very convenient for this purpose, as it was not the land directly but the income of the land-tax which was given to the soldiers, thus limiting the soldiers’ control over the peasants. The use of \(\text{iqtā’}\) became widespread under the regime of the Buyid Mu‘izz al-Dawla (r. 334–56/946–67), when \(\text{iqtā’}\)’s were only handed out to the military commanders and to the Turkish military slaves. Payment in cash was reduced to a minimum.\(^{16}\)

By the time the Buyids were replaced by the Turcoman dynasty of the Saljuqs, in the middle of the fifth/eleventh century, the \(\text{iqtā’}\) system was so widespread that its abolishment was not an issue anymore. The Saljuq vizier Nizâm al-Mulk (d. 485/1092) laid down the fundamental laws of the \(\text{iqtā’}\) system in his work on the structure of government, \(\text{Siyāsāt-nāma}\). The concessionaire (\(\text{muqtā’}\)) of an \(\text{iqtā’}\) had to accept that none of the population of his \(\text{iqtā’}\) were directly under his control. He had no rights over the land itself or over the peasants living on the \(\text{iqtā’}\) land. Instead, his benefits only included the financial revenue from his \(\text{iqtā’}\).\(^{17}\) The revenue of the individual \(\text{muqtā’}\) was calculated on the basis of an assumed revenue per year (\('\text{ibrà’}\)) for a certain area of land. The connections between the \(\text{muqtā’}\) and the land he ‘owned’ were minimal. He would be garrisoned in a town, in most cases far away from his \(\text{iqtā’}\), and all that mattered was that the agreed revenue kept coming. Contemporary authors often lamented the drawbacks of this system. The state lost control of the agricultural sector and, at the same time, there were allegedly no investments which could improve the productivity.\(^{18}\) The farmers were guaranteed a certain amount of independence, which enabled them to live without too much interference of the \(\text{muqtā’}\). Furthermore, the rights over an \(\text{iqtā’}\) land were not inheritable, and as such could fall back to the state at any time. After the original tenant had died, the \(\text{iqtā’}\) went to a new generation of imported military slaves instead of the children of the former \(\text{iqtā’}\) holder. Furthermore, most \(\text{iqtā’}\) tenants were not given their \(\text{iqtā’}\) for life, but rather for a certain period.

The Saljuqs extended the \(\text{iqtā’}\) system from Iran and Iraq to Syria, where they ruled from the fifth/eleventh century. A \(\text{mamlûk}\) (military slave) of the
sultan Malikshāh (r. 465–85/1072–92), named Aq Sunqur (white falcon), was appointed governor of Aleppo in 480/1087. His son Abū ʿl-Muẓaffar Zangī became ruler of Mosul and Aleppo (r. 521–41/1127–46). At that time a young Kurdish officer called Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Yūṣuf ibn Ayyūb, later to become Sultan Saladin (r. 567–89/1171–93), was in the service of the Zangid dynasty of Aleppo. Saladin’s father Ayyūb had come from the region near Erivan and had entered the service of the amīr Abū ʿl-Muẓaffar Zangi of Aleppo. Ayyūb belonged to a reservoir of freelance horse-warrior mercenaries. Ethnic ties or social origins were not important for a successful career within the Saljuq empire. Together with manumitted mamlūks, the mercenaries constituted the backbone of the Muslim armies fighting against the Crusaders.

When a Zangid army entered Egypt at the end of the sixth/twelfth century, Saladin was amongst them in company of his uncle Shīrkuḥ (d. 564/1169). After his uncle’s death Saladin took over command of the army. Two years later he declared himself independent from his Zangid overlords, abolished the Fāṭimid caliphate and began to install the Saljuq iqṭāʾ system. The Fāṭimids had until then retained the original iqṭāʾ system, according to which a muqtaʿ was not obliged to render military service in exchange for the rights to an iqṭāʾ. Furthermore, the old ‘ushr/kharāj system was still in place, according to which a landlord could levy the kharāj tax on his land and hand only the smaller ‘ushr tax (the tithe) to the state. Saladin abolished this system and introduced the Būyid and Saljuq military iqṭāʾ, an adequate option for an army with a high proportion of military slaves. The change to the new system was rendered all the more easy by the fact that the Fāṭimid administration had already developed methods for calculating the annual revenue (‘ibra) of agricultural land. Despite the existing records it took some more years of reforms before the system had been completely adjusted. Therefore Saladin undertook a cadastral survey to determine annual revenues in the years 571–6/1176–81 and it was calculated that the Chancery of the Army (dīwān al-jaysh) could afford to maintain 111 officers, 6,976 heavy horsemen and 1,553 light cavalrymen.

The Ayyūbids introduced another novelty. For the hypothetical tax revenue (‘ibra) which represented the average tax revenue of bad and good income results of previous years a fictitious accounting unit was introduced, the army dinar (dīnār jayshi). The army dinar was thereby composed out of a fluctuating value of cash and contributions in kind. Ibn Mammātī (d. 606/1209) reports for the time of Saladin that the value of the dīnār jayshi was ¼ dinar and 1 irdabb (90 litres) of cereals.

In contrast to the Mamlūks later, the Ayyūbids allowed the inheritance of iqṭāʾs, especially in the Syrian part of their empire, thus following the Zangid
example. In newly conquered Egypt though, inheritance of iqtā’s can only be found three times, which shows that the Ayyūbids tried to limit this practice, as it was deemed detrimental to the battle readiness of the army.\textsuperscript{23}

The introduction of the iqtā system in Ayyūbid Egypt made it the prevalent taxation method in the Middle East. It even survived the Mongol conquest of Iran and Iraq in the seventh/thirteenth century. The Mongols first abolished the iqtā system for a short while, but as the agricultural sector declined, it was reinstalled. The Ilkhan Hülegü (r. 654–63/1256–65) had begun to distribute grazing land (yurt) to his soldiers following the Mongol conquest. They certainly needed it for their three or four horses, which they used in battle. Apparently the Mongol soldiers had only the right to use the agricultural products and not the land itself. Therefore it is not clear whether there existed a difference between the yurt and the iqtā. The Ilkhan Ghāzān Khan (r. 694–703/1295–1304) reinstalled the iqtā system. He also tried several administrative reforms to bring the peasants back to the devastated countryside.\textsuperscript{24}

The iqtā system continued in post-Mongol Persia. Under the Timurids, who ruled over Persia in the ninth/fifteenth century, it became more and more hereditary. The iqtā was now called suyūrgḥāl, a word of Mongolian origin meaning ‘favour’, a system that continued in Iran at least until the twelfth/eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{25} Apparently the suyūrgḥāl entailed more administrative and legal rights for the holder than the iqtā.\textsuperscript{26}

**Military slavery and the iqtā system at its peak: the Mamlūk example**

In Egypt the combination of military slavery and iqtā reached its peak after the ascension of the Mamlūk dynasty. The last Ayyūbid sultan, al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb (r. 637–47/1240–9), had imported Turcoman military slaves (mamlūks) by the hundreds. When his son tried to expel them from their positions, the mamlūks revolted and took over the empire. They then copied the recruitment system of their former masters, and continued to import children from the Qipchaq steppes, in order to train them in Cairo.\textsuperscript{27} It was essential that the young mamlūks were bought outside the Islamic realm. That way, they learnt the principles of Islam as well as the art of horse riding (firūṣiyya). Upon the completion of their studies they were officially manumitted, and received a horse and an iqtā assignment out of the iqtā’s of their masters. As the mamlūks formed a social elite within the surrounding Arab society, they were the only ones allowed to ride on horses, among several other privileges. Their knowledge of the Arabic language was rudimentary. They spoke Turkish among themselves and carried
Turkish names, with a clear separation between the *mamlûk* military community and the Arab civil society. The sons of the *mamlûks*, the *awlâd al-nâs* – ‘wanderers between two worlds’ as the link between the Mamlûks and the Arabs – were not allowed to the highest positions in the army and had to fight among other ‘free-borns’ even if they still enjoyed a privileged social status.\(^2^8\)

The Mamlûks’ victories against Crusaders and the Mongols granted them a high reputation among their subjects. As the mostly Turkish-born *mamlûks* defeated their Central Asian Mongol ‘cousins’ in 658/1260, Abû Shâma (d. 665/1268) stated that ‘against any (evil) thing there is a cure from its own kind’ (*wa-li-kulli shay’in āfatun min jinisihi*).\(^2^9\) both *mamlûks* and Mongols were fierce horse warriors.

As for the details of *iqtâ* practice in Mamlûk times, we know neither how much military service the *muqta* had to do in exchange for being granted an *iqtâ* nor the exact percentages the *muqta* was paid in kind or in cash. Contemporary sources, however, indicate that the tax revenue of the *iqtâ* would have been paid to the *muqta* using both methods.\(^3^0\) Al-Qalqashandî (d. 821/1418) gives a very short description of the *iqtâ* system in his handbook on Mamlûk administration:

> In this empire, the *iqtâ’s* are being given to *amîrs* and the troops. In general, the *iqtâ* over which the *muqta* can exert his right of taxation, consists of land and villages, about which he can decide according to his own good. Sometimes this includes amounts of money to be gained from the revenue, but this is rather unusual.\(^3^1\)

At the beginning, the Mamlûks had adopted the Ayyûbid system. Most prominently, the Mamlûk sultan Baybars (r. 658–76/1260–77) handed out *iqtâ’s* in much the same way the Ayyûbid sultans had done.\(^3^2\) According to al-Qalqashandî, the best land was given to the leading *amîrs*; for them each *iqtâ* would include between one and ten villages. A second class of *iqtâ* was given to the simple rank and *lei* of the *mamlûk* soldiers. Up to three *mamlûks* would have to share here the rights of a village. Free-born soldiers, who were called *ajnâd al-ḥalqa* (‘soldiers of the ring’), and who consisted of Kurds, Arabs and the sons of *mamlûk* soldiers (*awlâd al-nâs*), were given a third class of *iqtâ*. In the latter case, the number of soldiers sharing an *iqtâ* would be bigger, and thus the respective shares smaller. These kinds of *iqtâ* were also handed out to local auxiliary troops, which were garrisoned in the provinces in order to complete special military duties for the sultans.\(^3^3\)

At the beginning of his reign, Baybars had to deal with the last Crusader states, pushing the Franks out of Syria, and keeping the Mongols away from it.
In this geo-strategic situation, Baybars had other priorities than reforming the iqṭā’ system. It seems he distributed the land conquered from the Crusaders among his amīrs following only partially the iqṭā’ system. Part of the land was given to the amīrs in the form of property (milk), and in some cases he agreed upon iqṭā’s being inherited. These extraordinary measures should be put into the context of the consolidation of Mamlūk rule. For example, one of the most fundamental laws of Mamlūk administration was not yet articulated: that power could not be inherited, that it had to be handed down, in the sultan’s case, to the first subsequent generation of mamlūks, and not to the sultan’s son. The decision against inheritance marked a clear departure from the Ayyūbid practice. At the same time, the new Mamlūk system boasted a Chancery for the Army (dīwān al-jaysh), which was the central administrative office for the government of iqṭā’.

Under Sultan Qalāwūn (r. 678–89/1279–90), the iqṭā’ system seems to have become more rigid and organised. Qalāwūn ordered his governors to draw up detailed lists of the revenue of individual iqṭā’s in their provinces. Then he pushed for an increase of this revenue in order to assure the regular payment of the muqta’s. Qalāwūn explained to his son al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ how he was to govern Egypt during his father’s absence:

> As far as the secretaries of the muqta’s of the amirs and the soldiers are concerned, the prince [al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ] shall strengthen their hand, so that the law shall be obeyed. The prince shall in no case let the dealings with the muqta’s out of sight, lest he damages the readiness of the amirs and soldiers for their military service.

In other words, the control of the iqṭā’ revenue was of heightened interest to the sultan.

The first massive reform attempt of the iqṭā’ system in Mamlūk times came in 697/1298 and was undertaken by the sultan Ḫusām al-Dīn Lājīn al-Manṣūrī (r. 696–98/1296–99). The reforms were named after the old Egyptian word for land distribution, rūk, which is why it became known as al-rawk al-ḥusāmī. This was the first land registration since the days of Sultan Saladin 120 years earlier. Ḫusām al-Dīn Lājīn al-Manṣūrī’s reform abolished the so-called himāya (protection). Under it, the iqṭā’s of the free-born cavalry troops (the ajnād al-ḥalqa) were being controlled by the leading amīrs, who, however, only gave part of the revenue from the land to the troops, keeping most of it for themselves. Unfortunately for the ajnād al-ḥalqa, the positive effect of the abolition of the himāya was outweighed by the negative impact of the main aspect of the reform. While the ajnād al-ḥalqa were now able to collect the tax
of their *iqṭāʾ* directly, the cultivable sizes of the various tenures on the whole were reduced, thus also making an impact on the revenue of the *ajnād al-ḥalqa* and the *amīrs*. The amount of land handed out as *iqṭāʾ* was reduced from twenty twenty-fourths of the total available land to eleven twenty-fourths. The sultan kept four twenty-fourths for himself and earmarked the remaining nine twenty-fourths of the land for the new generation of military slaves who were slowly entering the ranks. Additionally, these reforms reduced the influence of the already installed Mamlūk *amīrs*, thereby strengthening the political pull of the sultan’s new household slaves. This in turn brought the sultan into conflict with many of the established *amīrs*, who had seen their powers seriously curtailed, which eventually resulted in the sultan’s murder in 698/1299.39

Even if this specific reform was aborted, the idea of reforming the *iqṭāʾ* in order to ensure a more equal share of the *iqṭāʾ* between the ruling sultan’s *mamlūks* and the *mamlūks* of his predecessor would eventually survive. It was in the interest of the individual sultans, and in the interest of the Mamlūk state, to prevent violent fights from erupting over the repartition of land. In the ensuing reform process, the *ajnād al-ḥalqa* lost their influence in the military and ceased to be a main force in the Mamlūk empire. Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (r. 693/1293, 698–708/1299–1309, 709–41/1310–41) actively promoted reforms of the *iqṭāʾ* system, and *al-rawk al-nāširī* was named after him. The *rawk* was first applied in Syria in 713/1313, save Tripoli, where it was introduced in 717/1317, and Aleppo, where it was introduced in 725/1325. In Egypt, the reform was applied in 715/1315. The sultan’s share of the cultivable land of each *iqṭāʾ* was increased from four to ten twenty-fourths, a share from which the sultan was supposed to pay his own *mamlūks*. The established *amīrs* and the *ajnād al-ḥalqa* received fourteen twenty-fourths of the available *iqṭāʾ* land, which was three twenty-fourths more than they had been given under the *al-rawk al-ḥusāmī*, but still six twenty-fourths less than they had had under the old *iqṭāʾ* system. This time the reform seems to have been accepted by the *amīrs*. Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad managed to make the sultan financially independent from the established *amīrs* and thus to strengthen his position.40

There were exceptions to the rule. In the Mount Lebanon area, the way in which the *rawk* was being applied would have meant that many local soldiers would have seen a reduction of the size of their *iqṭāʾ*’s. These soldiers and their clans, like the Buḥturid family south of Beirut, had as their duty the protection and defence of the Lebanese coastline in exchange for their *iqṭāʾ*’s. The *rawk* would have meant reducing the liberties and effectiveness of the local military
structures. The Buḥṭurid leader Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ḥusayn (d. 751/1350) went to Damascus and asked for the Buḥṭurids and their troops to be exempted from the rawk, pointing to the vital role the Buḥṭurids had played in the defence of the Lebanese coastline, even without being paid out of the Mamlūk state’s treasury. If the territory of the Buḥṭurids was to be included in the rawk reforms, it would bring about the ruin of the family and the region, and this would weaken the sultan’s influence in the area considerably. The sultan eventually officially exempted the Buḥṭurids from the rawk. 41 This affair, known only from one source written by a member of the Buḥṭurid family, suggests that there were other exceptions to the rule and that putting the rawk into action in the Mamlūk empire was a difficult task. Many of the more established amīrs would have conspired against the sultan in order to increase their revenue, but none of these plots seem to have been fruitful, as the sultan remained in office until his natural death in 741/1341.

The rawk was accompanied by the tendency to split up the iqtā’s of the amīrs geographically. By dispersing the iqtā’s all over Egypt and Syria, the sultan avoided that the amīrs could obtain control over a large portion of connected territories. This would have meant a considerable increase of the power-base of the amīrs. Simultaneously the most important iqtā’s of the sultan were concentrated near the capital in the province of Giza. 42

The rawk remained in action after the sultan’s death, without any indication of any later rawk. A renewed rawk would have had to deal with shrinking revenue in the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century, when the plague depopulated whole areas of the Mamlūk empire, severely reducing agricultural production, and thus also the revenue. 43 At the same time, a document dated from 767/1366 reveals that the implication of iqtā seems to have differed from the theoretical aspects. This decree put emphasis on the legal theory of iqtā by ordering the amīrs to keep only ‘their’ third of the revenue, and to hand the other two-thirds to their soldiers. This means that the practice was quite different. Additionally, the Army Chancery (dīwān al-jaysh) seems to have lost count of the army’s effective strength around that time. The state therefore had no means to determine how many troops each amīr had, a failure that severely impeded its ability to calculate the shares of iqtā, for which knowing the number of troops was vital. 44 In the early ninth/fifteenth century, the decrease in revenue of the iqtā also led to a reduction in the number of amīrs and mamlūk soldiers. 45 Estimates range from a maximum of about 12,000 mamlūk soldiers during the first half of the eighth/fourteenth century, to a number between 4,000 and 6,000, a decrease that mirrored the decline of the population. 46
Under Sultan Barsbay (r. 825–41/1422–38), the mamluks became dissatisfied with their revenues and several crises erupted, the harbingers of a development still to come that contributed significantly to the economic downfall of the Mamluk empire.

Between the seventh/thirteenth and the tenth/sixteenth centuries, agricultural revenue sank from 9 million to 2 million dinars. At the same time, the depopulation caused by the plague meant that salaries for the surviving millers, porters and craftsmen exploded between 761/1360 and 823/1420. In Syria, the situation was even worse as it was ravaged after Timur’s (d. 807/1405) attacks by clashes between mamluk officers. Funds which could have been used to revitalise the agriculture and economy were spent instead on acquiring new mamluks. In this period of uncertainty and falling income, the struggle for redistribution erupted into open fighting among the muqtas. Amirs and mamluks attempted to take away iqta’s from theawlād al-nās. According to Ibn Iyās (d. c. 930/1524), himself one of the awlād al-nās, mamluks entered the houses of the awlād al-nās in 914/1508 and beat them up in order to take away their iqta documents. Ibn Iyās lost his iqta to four mamluks, but recovered it later.

It looks as if the newly arrived mamluks had become envious of the awlād al-nās’ iqta’s, even though the share of iqta’s belonging to the individual awlād al-nās had continuously decreased in the ninth/fifteenth century. Nonetheless, the land which was controlled by the awlād al-nās had continuously increased in the ninth/fifteenth century. This was because many iqta’s had been transformed into religious foundations (waqf) shortly before the death of the respective iqta holder, thus preserving these domains to their heirs, i.e. the awlād al-nās, who then served as custodians for the endowments. In theory, this should have prevented these former iqta lands from being reclaimed by the authorities, as they were now officially God’s land. According to Islamic law, only property (milīk) could be transformed into a religious foundation (waqf). However, the system had a loophole used by many muqtas’ iqta’s were handed back to the state, only to be bought back shortly afterwards by the previous muqta’s. For the state, this meant a financial gain in the short run, but at the same time it lost valuable land in the long term, land which could have been used to maintain the army by distributing new iqta’s to mamluk soldiers. Additionally, Islamic law prevented the state from taking back the land, so that it was irrevocably lost for the iqta system. The privatisation of the land developed fast, and at the beginning of the tenth/sixteenth century, ten twenty-fourths of the overall cultivable land was already transformed into waqf property, thereby leaving only fourteen twenty-fourths for the iqta
system of the Mamlûk state. For Lucian Reinfandt, this rapid increase of the 
waqf land means that by the end of the Mamlûk sultanate the iqtâʿ system had 
been undermined, if not factually replaced by the system of religious endow-
ments. Thus, even though the amîrs and mamlûks managed to provide their 
heirs with property in the long run, the potential for frustration multiplied 
tenfold within the community of the newly arrived mamlûks, who saw 
themselves as being deprived of their rightful means of subsistence, especially 
since their regular salaries and bonuses, paid in addition to the granting of the 
iqtâʿ, began to be distributed less frequently. The plundering of the Cairo 
markets for two days by mamlûk soldiers after the bonus payments had not 
been paid in the spring of 916/1510 seems to have been a logical consequence 
of this fiscal policy. The iqtâʿ system had ceased to function effectively and, 
even if the much-needed reforms had been implemented by 916/1510, the 
Ottoman conquest in 923/1517 could hardly have been stopped. Nevertheless, 
the duality of military slavery and the iqtâʿ system had been an important 
factor for the inner stability of the Mamlûk empire. The concept of non-
inheritance of the iqtâʿ was well suited to the needs of a military system in 
which the next generation of soldiers was bought on the slave markets in 
Central Asia, by insuring that there was enough land available to maintain 
them. Only when this system started to fail in the ninth/fifteenth century did 
the mamlûk army fall into decay as well.

Some like it central: the Ottoman approach 
to taxation and armies

The Ottoman military superiority over the Mamlûks at the beginning of the 
tenth/sixteenth century was not only based on the decay of the Mamlûk iqtâʿ 
system. Other aspects played a vital role as well. First, the reluctance of the 
mamlûks to use firearms, which they regarded as contrary to their pride as 
horse warriors, hindered their effectiveness against the Ottoman army, which 
boasted an infantry equipped with firearms. Second, the failure of the 
Mamlûks to develop a successful naval policy, thereby leaving the eastern 
Mediterranean in the hands of European and later, starting in the second half 
of the ninth/fifteenth century, Ottoman fleets. Unlike the Mamlûks, the 
Ottomans sultans displayed far more flexibility in coping with and adjusting to 
new military developments in the ninth/fifteenth century, a flexibility which 
gave them a huge advantage in their struggle against the Mamlûks.

The Ottoman empire had emerged out of the bankrupt Saljuq empire in 
western Anatolia at the end of the seventh/thirteenth century. In the first
decades of the Ottoman conquests, ‘Othman I distributed land to his relatives and military leaders. Until then, soldiers had received only part of the booty, but through this distribution of land a sort of feudal aristocracy began to develop in the early years of the eighth/fourteenth century. Under Orkhan (r. 724–61/1324–60), military expansion continued in Anatolia and the Ottoman armies even crossed into Europe. While the practical solution of distributing land to officers as a means of paying them apparently continued, new troops were only paid during military campaigns. While not on campaign, soldiers were able to cultivate farms which had been given to them by the government as a means of subsistence.

This system of paying soldiers continued until 769/1368 when Murād I (r. 761–91/1360–89) introduced the timār payment system. Under this system, every experienced soldier received portions of land, called timār (care, attention), which resembled the Saljuq iqṭā in that the holder of a timār only received the tax income from the land in exchange for military service. Despite these resemblances, Josef Matuz argues that the timār system evolved independently from the Saljuq iqṭā.

Another area where the Ottoman military system differed from the Mamlūk practice was the issue of military slavery. The Ottomans did not have to buy slaves because they captured enough youths in the constant warfare of the eighth/fourteenth century to fill their ranks. It was probably during the reign of Sultan Murād I that the Ottomans started to keep a fifth (pencik) of the young prisoners of war in order to man an elite infantry corps, the janissaries (yeni çeri, meaning new troops). The youths were first sent to live with Turkish families in Anatolia, where they worked on farms, learned Turkish and were exposed to Islamic popular practices. After acculturation and physical maturation, they were put through military training and joined the corps. Like young mamlūk soldiers, janissaries had to live in the barracks after completion of their training and they were not allowed to marry, which isolated them from the local society. Completely loyal to the sultan, they were fierce warriors who did not fear death on the battlefield. Their brutal battle style spread terror among the European armies in the Balkans, just as the mamlūks had done to the Crusaders a hundred years earlier.

Following the Ottoman defeat at the battle of Ankara in 804/1402, Sultan Mehmed I (r. 816–25/1413–21) reunited and stabilised the empire. In the following period, the sultans apparently attempted to centralise the control of all the land within their realm. In 883/1478 Sultan Mehmed II (r. 848–50/1444–6 and 855–86/1451–81), the conqueror of Constantinople, tried to ‘sultanise’ all arable land, in the words of Baber Johansen. With only few exceptions, all
arable land was regarded as state property (mīrī); even the land of religious endowments was not spared.60

Although Bāyezīd II (r. 886–917/1481–1512) handed back some of the pious foundations, the Ottoman sultans clearly regarded all the land within their empire as state property. As a result, the Ottoman empire of the ninth/fifteenth and tenth/sixteenth centuries witnessed a very high grade of centralisation and the development of a high administrative efficiency, well attested in the military and in the civilian sectors.

Apparently in the early ninth/fifteenth century or even slightly before, the method to recruit janissaries was changed to satisfy the increasing demand for troops. The new practice was called devshirme (collection of youths). It meant that Christian subjects living in the Balkans had to pay a human tribute to the sultan in the form of a certain number of young boys. This tribute was irregular in size and frequency of occurrence.61 The youths were converted to Islam, trained as soldiers and incorporated into the janissaries. The most able also had the chance to be enrolled in the palace school instead of joining the military. This represented a unique opportunity for the converted Christian boys, whose education would enable them to rise to the highest offices within the Ottoman empire. Although the devshirme certainly caused considerable distress, it offered significant advantages to the chosen children. One important point of criticism, however, was the legal aspect of this practice of enslavement.

The Mamluks, in order to be in accordance with Islamic law, had always made sure that the young military slaves they imported came from outside the Islamic realm and were not already Muslim. The Ottomans proceeded illegally in this respect, as it was forbidden to enslave Christians within the Muslim realm. According to the Qur’ān, Christians, as ‘People of the Book’, should pay the special head-tax, but should be granted protection. However, while this question remained a theoretical topic among jurists of the tenth/sixteenth century, the practice went on unchanged.62 The Mamluks practised the enslavement of young non-Muslims for the army legally, but the Ottomans got it much cheaper.

By the beginning of the tenth/sixteenth century, the tīmār system appeared in a standardised form. Land was divided into private property, religious endowments and land at the disposal of the sultan, the latter category being by far the largest percentage and the one from which the sultan would eventually distribute land as tīmār. It was split into three categories: the smallest category was the tīmār, with a value up to 20,000 āqches (Ottoman silver coin) per year. The minimum income for which a tīmār holder was
obliged to serve in the military lay around 3,000 āqches. With this sum he was not obliged to equip other armed men as well. The second category known as ze’āmet went to higher officers in the army and gave an income of 20,000 to 100,000 āqches, and the third category (khass) was the largest, with an annual income of more than 100,000 āqches, and was reserved for viziers, provincial governors and other Ottoman dignitaries of the highest class.

Usually, the tümar holder obtained a village or a group of villages as tümar. He was entitled only to the tax income of the peasants. Like the iqṭā‘, the tümar did not grant to the holder additional rights over the peasants. Two differences, though, were that the tümar holder was responsible for keeping public order on his tümar and that he was supposed to reside on the tümar land itself or at least in the province of the tümar.

How effective the influence of the tümar holder was on agricultural production is a matter of debate. Josef Matuz argues that the tümar holder only appeared in order to collect his rent and the state tax, which he was to render to the authorities, whereas Colin Imber stresses a regular presence of the tümar holder on his land.63

One significant characteristic of the tümar, similar to the iqṭā‘ system, was that it could not be inherited. However, there was a system to take care of the children of a dead tümar holder and in a few cases the tümar of a deceased holder was passed on to his sons. Another resemblance to the iqṭā‘ lay in the fact that the peasants were free and not serfs to a feudal overlord. It has been argued that the tümar system also bore a striking resemblance to the Byzantine institution of pronoia, which literally means ‘care, attention’, because of the use of similar terms and measurement sizes. In the pronoia system, as in the tümar system, land was revocable and the soldiers did not obtain ownership. The Ottoman rulers would have become familiar with pronoia while campaigning in the Byzantine Balkans.64

While a Byzantine origin seems plausible, the division of tümar land into three categories resembles what the Mamluks did. Moreover, the Ottomans started the same system of recruitment of soldiers as military slaves as the Mamluks had done, and the Ottomans must have been acquainted with the system since some of the military slave trade routes ran through their territory. So we can assume that the Ottomans took elements of existing systems in order to create something new that they found appropriate for their state. In any case, the resemblances of pronoia, iqṭā‘ and tümar are striking and underline the fact that the grant of tax revenue of land and not the land itself was a dominant feature in the payment of the military in the Middle East at least from the fourth/tenth century and Būyid times.
However, a large part of state land was not handed out to timār holders but
remained under the central fiscal administration, which tried to increase the
revenues from this land. During the reign of Sultan Meḥmed II (r. 855–86/1451–81) the iltizām (tax-farm) model was installed alongside the timār system. The tax-farmer was responsible for collecting the taxes of a certain region. Not only did he receive a salary, but everything he collected above the amount which he had to give to the state remained in his pocket. Therefore tax-farming turned out to be very lucrative for the iltizām holder – so much so that the government auctioned the rights of tax-farming among interested merchants. In the long run this would turn out to harm the timār system.65

Nevertheless, at the beginning of the tenth/sixteenth century the timār system was still very much functioning. Using the timār system, a large and permanent force of cavalrymen could be maintained which could be easily gathered during the campaigning seasons. Until the late tenth/sixteenth century, Ottoman armies were largely constituted of these timār holders. The potential effective size of such a timāriot army was around 100,000 soldiers, thus representing a huge army by the standards of the tenth/sixteenth century and by far larger than the contemporary mamlūk forces, which consisted of about 6,000 professional mamlūk slave soldiers and approximately 20,000 auxiliary troops.66 Such a huge army had to be maintained and the Ottoman empire developed a huge appetite for new land. The whole administration relied on further expansion – this being a striking difference from the Mamlūks, who had never really tried to expand their sultanate after the early victories against Crusaders and Mongols.

At the beginning of the eleventh/seventeenth century, the Ottoman expansion came to a halt and the Ottomans suffered defeats at the hands of the Austrian Habsburg and Iranian Safavid armies. Contemporary authors blamed the deteriorating condition of the provinces, which were also torn by revolts, as a reason for this development. Interestingly, timār holders also joined the revolts. Their income seems to have been damaged by a general drop in agricultural production at that time.

The Ottoman authorities tried to solve their financial problems by reducing the silver percentage of the ḡeqe by almost 50 per cent. The janissaries could not be fooled, however, and a revolt of the soldiers against the debased coinage was the result. Therefore the government adopted a different approach to solve its financial problems. The authorities transformed timār land into tax-farms. By doing so the government increased its revenue at the expense of the peasantry, whose situation deteriorated.

Another development also harmed the existence of the timār cavalrymen. The wars with the Habsburg empire at the end of the tenth/sixteenth century
had shown that the Ottoman provincial cavalrymen were inferior to the Austrian infantry. The lesson the Ottoman authorities learned was that they had to increase the size of their infantry forces, such as the janissaries, as firearms became more and more important. This transformation proved to be problematic, as it required the central government to fund an increasing share of military expenses through cash payments to the infantry in place of relying on timârs to pay for the provincial cavalry. The cavalry (the sipâhi army) lost its position as the backbone of the Ottoman army to infantry regiments.

The main problem in this evolution was not that the devshirme as recruiting tool increasingly lost its importance, thus changing the ethnic composition of the military, but that the arduous training accompanying the devshirme was abandoned. The ranks of the janissaries were swollen therefore with ill-trained soldiers and they became the largest military body in the Ottoman army.67

Moreover, timârs became more hereditary and were assigned in increasing numbers to members of the civilian administration. As a result, fewer timârs supported cavalrymen, but more supported men from the administration. The collapse of the old timâr system and its increasing replacement by tax-farming became evident by the mid-eleventh/seventeenth century. This transformation led to a decentralisation of the empire and was commonly seen by scholars as an important step towards the beginning of the end of the Ottoman empire.

In recent publications, however, it is disputed whether the shift from the timâr system to tax-farming and other forms of a more direct personal taxation really represented a symptom of decline or whether it was a sign of a successful adaptation to new circumstances and helped the Ottoman empire to stay competitive with its neighbours.68 The common picture of the Ottoman empire as the ‘sick man of the Bosphorus’ is mainly a back projection from the nineteenth century CE and historians have then assumed the beginning of an Ottoman decline from the mid-tenth/sixteenth century onwards, and every evolution which happened in the empire afterwards as part of the overall decline, which then fitted the general line of argumentation. However, this would mean a period of 350 years of decline, a period which is even longer than the total existence of the Mamlûk empire. How could such a weak empire achieve such huge efforts, like, for example, the second siege of Vienna in 1683?69 It will suffice here to remark that by the twelfth/eighteenth century there had been a distinct shift within the Ottoman empire from the timâr system to tax-farming, and from provincial cavalry to foot soldiers, mainly janissaries, where the initial recruiting system of the janissaries had been altered and more and more free-born Muslims from Anatolia joined their rank.
Iqṭā‘s for tribes: the situation in the Muslim west

The history of land tenure in the Maghrib remains a topic which is in need of much more research. Developments concerning taxation and the military were distinctively different from those in the Muslim east. This can certainly be attributed at least in part to the fact that the link between the Muslim east and the Maghrib was considerably loosened after the downfall of the Fāṭimids in Egypt in the sixth/twelfth century. In connection with what has been discussed so far, two aspects will be dealt with: military slavery and the iqtā‘ system.

To speak about military slaves in the context of the Maghrib means first of all to speak about the enslavement of Slavs. These Slav slaves, generally known as ṣaqāliba, came to al-Andalus as early as the third/ninth century. It seems that they were pagan Slavs captured by the Franks in eastern campaigns and then sold to the Muslims of al-Andalus. Some of them were even exported further to the Muslim east. Among those who stayed in al-Andalus, the most were employed in the palace and civil administration in different capacities, with numbers that are said to have increased from 3,750 to 13,750 during the reign of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III (r. 300–50/912–61), the first Cordoban Umayyad caliph. But only a small number appear to have been employed as military slaves. After the downfall of the Umayyad caliphate in al-Andalus, some ṣaqāliba founded short-lived Taifa kingdoms. The same development occurred in Fāṭimid Egypt. The famous conqueror of Egypt in 358/969, the Fāṭimid commander Jawhar, was himself of the ṣaqāliba. After the fifth/eleventh century, the number of ṣaqāliba decreased. One factor was that the Balkans had stabilised, at least for the time being, and the purchase of slaves became more difficult; another factor was the growing importation of Turkish military slaves, which led to a decrease in the number of the ṣaqāliba in Egypt.

With the diminishing importance of the ṣaqāliba, large-scale military slavery disappeared from Maghribi armies. The armies were now formed out of local tribes. The great Berber empires of the Almoravids and the Almohads give the best examples of this transformation. It was not until the eleventh/seventeenth century that Mawlah Ismā‘īl (r. 1082–1139/1672–1727), the ruler of the Moroccan ‘Alawī dynasty, set military slavery on the agenda again. He purchased large numbers of black slaves from all over the country for his army. These soldiers were trained and then helped to expel the Spaniards from al-Mahdiyya and Larache as well as the English from Tangiers in 1092–1100/1681–9. Estimates speak of up to 50,000 ‘abīd (slave) soldiers at the end of his reign. Despite this success, tribal and religious
leaders protested against the practice of using black slaves. According to them, a slave should not be used for the jihad and free Muslims should not be enslaved. Behind this criticism stood the idea that Mawlay Isma'il had reduced the influence of the proud tribes. Therefore, the project of the black slave army was no longer pursued after the death of Isma'il and this army vanished. Morocco once again fell into two parts – the party of the government (makhzan) and the ‘land of dissent’ (bilād al-sība). Nevertheless, household slavery and smaller military slave soldier units still existed in Morocco until modern times.

In the Ottoman states in North Africa, janissaries played a prominent role, but they belonged to the Ottoman system and cannot be portrayed here as Maghribi military slaves; moreover, janissaries were increasingly recruited from Anatolian Muslims and not from the Balkan Christian population. It is still interesting to note that from the beginning of the eleventh/seventeenth century until the second half of the twelfth/eighteenth century, a Turkish-speaking elite composed of several thousand corsairs and janissaries ruled without difficulty over hundreds of thousands of local inhabitants in the corsair states of North Africa. This accomplishment is reminiscent of that of the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria.

Land tenure in the Maghrib generally followed the same patterns as in the east. There were three types of land: privately owned land (mīl), religious endowments (ḥubs, the Maghribi term for waqf), and the public domain (makhzan). Therefore, the rulers could give the land of the third category as iqtā', but there was a significant difference between Maghribi-style iqtā' and its eastern counterpart. It seems that the military iqtā' was a rare exception. While mercenaries and soldiers apparently received salaries, high officials like the chief qaḍī or the head of the chancellery received iqtā's in the form of the tax income of a village. This is quite understandable, given the fact that standing armies in the Maghrib were certainly not very large in numbers and the rulers were dependent on the powerful Berber or Arab tribes for support. And these tribes would certainly not have given their land as iqtā' to military slaves. Moreover, there are examples of the bestowment of iqtā' land by the rulers on the tribes. In many cases this land was permanently lost to the ruler as the tribes transformed it into their mīl. Therefore the tribal structure of Maghribi society is a key element to understanding the iqtā' system there. It was not meant to support an elite military force but was structured so as to keep the tribes calm. Importing Turkish slave soldiers would have been a logistic problem as well, and experiments with black military slaves were only short-lived, possibly owing to the fact that the
white military slave, the *mamlūk*, enjoyed a far higher reputation in the Muslim world than the black household slave, the ‘*abd*. Therefore, the rulers of the Maghrib had to deal with their tribes concerning the issue of land tenure. In times of a strong central government, *iqtā’* land was rendered back to the public domain, and in times of a weak government it became the *milk* of the *muqṭa*.

**Conclusion**

Besides the Bedouin, another social actor, the soldier of slave origins, or the Mamlūk ... is now, just as much and even more so than the Bedouin, held responsible for the stagnation [of the Islamic world].

With this sentence Jean-Claude Garcin sketches a common view among scholars working on the Middle East. Garcin does not agree with this view, which he qualifies as somehow Eurocentric.

Like him, I am not in favour of such a statement. The duality of military slavery and its accompanying *iqtā’*/tīmār system was too successful for too long a time to be qualified in such a manner. From the implementation of this system by the Būyids until the decay of the tīmār system in the Ottoman empire, the *iqtā’* system survived for more than 650 years. Furthermore, nobody nowadays would think of blaming medieval European feudalism for the outbreak of two World Wars in Europe in the twentieth century CE. Thus, one has to be careful when classifying systems which from our point of view seem to be very strange or anachronistic. After all, for the inhabitants of the medieval and early modern Middle East the military slave was a common sight and an everyday reality. The duality of military slavery and the *iqtā’* system was one concept which was developed to ensure the outer and inner security of Muslim empires. It represented a unique approach of Muslim societies to deal with the aspect of the military and taxation. Therefore, further studies might also concentrate on why this duality is a Muslim phenomenon. Meanwhile one has to stress that this system indeed worked quite well and that, for example, both the Mamlūk and the Ottoman societies only began to be out of balance when the original concept of *iqtā’* and tīmār ceased to be implemented and the relationship between taxation and financing the military was not followed through any more. However it should be noted that the Ottoman empire proved to be apparently more flexible in dealing with a new implementation of reforms concerning the military and taxation than the Mamlūks had ever been.
Notes

2. Elz, art. ‘Kharāj. In the central and western Islamic lands’ (C. Cahen).
3. Al-Ismail, Das islamische Steuersystem, 170.
4. Elz, art. ‘Zakāt’ (A. Zysow).
5. Elz, art. ‘Ushr’ (T. Sato).
7. Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-kharāj, 14.
11. Ibid. 30.
13. Ibid. 167.
18. Elz, art. ‘İktīsād’ (C. Cahen).
23. Sato, State and rural society in medieval Islam, 10, 70.
32. Sato, State and rural society in medieval Islam, 77.
37. Paulina Lewicka, 'What a king should care about. Two memoranda of the Mamluk sultan on running the state’s affairs’, Arabistyczne I Islamistyczne, 6 (1998), 5–45, at 33 (English translation); 32 (Arabic text).
42. Halm, Ägypten, p. 46.
44. Ahmad Darrag, L’Égypte sous le règne de Barsbây 825–841/1422–1438, Damascus, 1961, 35.
45. Ibid. 37–9.
47. Darrag, L’Égypte sous le règne de Barsbây, 42–52.
52. Ibid. 32–6.
53. Ibid. 32.
59. Ibid. 40, 106.
60. Baber Johansen, The Islamic law on land tax and rent, New York, 1988, 81; El2, art. ‘Mehemmed II’ (H. İnalık).
61. Matuz, Das Osmanische Reich, 56.
63. Matuz, Das Osmanische Reich, 56; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650, 194.
64. Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650, 194.
65. Matuz, Das Osmanische Reich, 56.
71. El2, art. ‘al-Saqâliba. In the central lands of the Caliphate’ (C. E. Bosworth).
volume: Stephen Cory, ‘Sharīfian rule in Morocco (tenth-twelfth/sixteenth-eighteenth centuries)’.


Trade
Muslim trade in the late medieval Mediterranean world

OLIVIA REMIE CONSTABLE

Introduction

Muslim trade in the Mediterranean world was strikingly different in the later medieval period than it had been in earlier centuries. During the fifth/eleventh century, control of Mediterranean shipping and commerce began to shift from Muslim to Christian hands as a result of crusade, conquest and the growth of the European economy. In the earlier medieval period, Muslim regions of the Mediterranean had been integrated by commerce and communications, even when they were politically divided under the rule of different dynasties. By the sixth/twelfth century, however, warfare and territorial losses had eroded earlier Muslim commercial networks, while new European markets and merchants had emerged on the scene. Muslim trade continued in North Africa and Nasrid Granada, as well as in some Christian Mediterranean ports, but the challenges to commerce and communications, and new political and religious divisions, forced Muslim merchants to shift their business affairs and routes of trade.1

Although Islamic merchants and ships did not disappear from the Mediterranean during the later medieval period, data on Muslim merchants become scarcer than in earlier centuries, and it is clear that their activities became more restricted. Ifriqiya ceased to be an important hub for Muslim merchant traffic by the sixth/twelfth century as their commercial activity increasingly focused on Egypt and eastern Islamic lands. At the same time, while commodities continued to enter the Mediterranean via Alexandria and other eastern ports, these items were mostly purchased by western Christian merchants and carried across the sea on European ships. Thus, whereas much of the southern Mediterranean had once been integrated within the mercantile sphere of the wider Islamic world, by the later middle ages it had become a region of interface between Muslim and Christian trading networks.

From the first/seventh to the fifth/eleventh centuries, trade in the Mediterranean region had been dominated by Muslim and Jewish merchants
based within the ‘abode of Islam’ (dār al-islām). These traders connected markets between east and west, linking Muslim port cities such as Seville, Tunis, Palermo and Alexandria within an extended commercial sphere that stretched as far east as the Indian Ocean. These businessmen maintained trading ties beyond the Mediterranean, through a broad network of partners, representatives and commercial associates. Muslim traders, pilgrims and other travellers moved freely throughout the Mediterranean, the Near East and beyond, so it was by no means unknown for a merchant based in Egypt to be found trading in al-Andalus and the Maghrib in one year, and then doing business in Aden and India a few years later.\(^2\) Within the Mediterranean, a limited number of Christian ports, including Venice and Amalfi, also had access to Muslim markets and maritime routes by the fourth/tenth century. This European presence would steadily increase in later centuries, as European consumers became more eager for eastern goods, and traders from Genoa, Venice, Barcelona and other Christian cities travelled to Iftiqiya, Egypt, Syria and Byzantium seeking commodities coming from and through Muslim lands. Muslim and Jewish merchants also continued to trade along maritime and overland routes, linking markets in al-Andalus and North Africa with Egypt, but their traffic was more limited than before and competition was greater. Thus, the Mediterranean remained a vital commercial region for trade in the Islamic world, but the context and control of this traffic changed over time.\(^3\)

Political and military unrest in the medieval Mediterranean region did not necessarily diminish trade. This is clear, for example, during the Andalusi Taifa period in the fifth/eleventh century, when Muslim merchants flourished despite political and economic disarray. Competition and insecurity of travel were much more of a threat to commerce, and Muslim and Christian governments sometimes worked together to suppress piracy and promote trade despite ongoing hostilities.\(^4\) But because medieval Muslim states in North Africa and Spain often had different diplomatic and economic goals, commercial affairs in the Muslim Mediterranean were rarely dictated by government policies. Instead, most medieval mercantile theory and practice were negotiated between merchants, consumers, jurists and local officials. Similarities across regions in taxation (for example, the ‘ushr, a 10 per cent tax on imports, and the qabāla, usually a percentage of receipts after sale), commercial facilities (such as the dīwān and the funduq), coinage, weights and measures and trade structures seem more the result of merchant pragmatism and Islamic law than of any unified trade policy imposed by regional administrations.

Diplomatic sources do indicate an interest in the promotion and protection of trade on the part of Islamic governments, but because most surviving trade
treaties are in European languages, these versions tend to reflect the interests of Christian rather than Muslim traders. Some contain reciprocal clauses, however, as in the case of a Marinid treaty with Pisa in 738/1338, promising that Pisans should treat ‘Saracen merchants and sailors coming to Pisa’ with the same terms of safe-conduct accorded to Pisans trading in Morocco. Islamic governments often limited the movement of Christian merchants in Muslim territories, usually restricting them to port cities and requiring that they stay and store their goods in official hostels and warehouses. These policies protected access to commodities arriving from the interior (gold, spices, agricultural products) and promoted Muslim overland commerce. Local governments also had an interest in protecting regional interests, especially in terms of food supply and allocation, either through controlling the price and storage of grain and other staples, or through encouraging the import of necessary supplies. Some Muslim rulers even entered the commercial sphere by owning and leasing merchant ships, perhaps for their own profit.

Arabic sources on trade in the medieval Mediterranean are not dissimilar to those for other areas and periods. Prime among these are legal opinions (fātwaš), especially the massive collection by the Maghribi jurist al-Wansharīši (d. 914/1508), manuals on contracts (watha‘iq), geographical texts and chronicles. Texts dealing with the control of the market (ḥisba) are likewise useful, but these tend to address local market concerns rather than long-distance trade. Although very few Arabic merchant letters or contracts survive to document trade in the Mediterranean, the vast array of Judeo-Arabic documents preserved in the Cairo Geniza amply address this gap, at least until the seventh/thirteenth century. The many correlations between Geniza evidence and Arabic data, especially in terms of trade practices and partnerships, indicate that Jewish and Muslim merchants operated in similar ways within the dār al-islām. Also, because the Geniza texts were preserved by accident, there is no reason to believe that Muslim merchant culture was not equally writing-intensive. Chance survivals of medieval Arabic merchant letters and documents, and data from legal texts and contractual handbooks, indicate a reliance on written materials, although these were not routinely preserved for posterity. Even in regions where Muslims came under Christian administration, in Spain and Sicily, Arabic documentary forms continued to be employed. From the middle of the sixth/twelfth century, there are also extensive sources in Latin and other European languages, including notarial registers, merchant accounts, urban legislation and commercial treaties between Islamic and Christian states, all of which provide data on Muslim trade. Material evidence from coins, textiles,
ceramics and other durable commodities further enhances our knowledge of late medieval Mediterranean commerce.

Commodities

Throughout the medieval period, trade in the Mediterranean – as elsewhere in other periods – was driven by supply and demand. Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) described commerce as making a profit ‘through buying goods at a low price and selling them at a high price, whether these goods consist of slaves, grain, animals, weapons, or clothing material’.

Although some merchants took advantage of rising prices by hoarding goods, this practice was frowned upon, especially in the case of foodstuffs. More frequently, merchants made a profit by travelling abroad, since, as Ibn Khaldūn also pointed out, ‘merchandise becomes more valuable when merchants transport it from one country to another. [Merchants who do so] quickly get rich and wealthy. The same applies to merchants who travel from our country to the East.’ Medieval traders always hoped to buy goods at one rate and sell them for a higher price elsewhere, and they often relied on commercial partners to buy and sell goods abroad, or to supply them with information on distant market conditions. Geniza letters are filled with requests for data on prices or details about shipments of goods. A typical letter from the later fifth/eleventh century, sent from a merchant in Tunisia to a partner in Egypt, noted the arrival of eastern goods, quoted local prices (in both Muslim and European currencies), and made suggestions for future purchases:

The goods sent by you arrived safely through God’s grace, namely: two small bales of pepper in the ship of the Sultan, four bales of flax … and one bale of brazilwood … The price of pepper this year is very low, a qīntār being sold for twenty-five dinars, one half to be paid in [Sicilian quarter dinars] and the other in Pisan currency … This year the price of flax was very low in al-Mahdiyya and in Sicily. However, the spices sold well because of their rarity … Lac [goes for] forty, because of its rarity. Sal ammoniac, two manns cost one dinar; its price has fallen by now. Mastic, one qīntār, twenty-five dinars. Myrobalan, a mann as from half a dinar; yellow myrobalan, one qīntār, ten dinars. Both are in small demand … As far as [other spices] are concerned, cardamom, aloe and nutmeg – buy whatever God puts into your mind.

Muslim consumers purchased goods ranging from expensive spices and luxury textiles to ordinary foodstuffs and everyday fabrics. Demand varied for different commodities, and Ibn Khaldūn recommended that a ‘merchant who knows his business will travel only with such goods as are generally needed by
rich and poor, rulers and commoners alike. [General need] makes for a large
demand in his goods. If he restricts his goods to those needed only by a few
people, it may be impossible for him to sell them.\textsuperscript{13} Tastes and availability
changed over time, according to variations in politics, regional production and
other factors, and traders constantly needed to monitor the market.

Many of the commodities driving Mediterranean commerce during the
later middle ages had been important to earlier Muslim trade in the region.
This was the case with many \textquote{spices} – a broad category of goods including
flavourings, medicinal drugs, aromatics and dyestuffs. Spices had been traded
during the early middle ages, and even in Roman times, but there are
increasingly abundant references to their traffic during the later medieval
period. Geniza letters, like the one cited above, are filled with details, as are
Arabic geographical texts and Latin merchant documents. The range of spices
is too extensive to do more than cite a few examples.\textsuperscript{14} The most desirable and
expensive varieties, such as pepper, cinnamon, ginger and cloves, usually
came from the Far East, and arrived in the Mediterranean via trade routes
through the Near East and the Indian Ocean. These luxury items were in
growing demand throughout the medieval and early modern periods, in both
Muslim and Christian regions.

Several spices were produced within the Mediterranean world, and were
trafficked in this region and exported to eastern markets. These included
saffron, mastic, cumin, ambergris and qirmiz. This last, a dyestuff extracted
from insects, and praised by al-Maqqa\r\i (d. 1041/1631) for producing a
crimson of unparalleled excellence, provides a good example of such trade.\textsuperscript{15}
Geniza letters from the fifth/eleventh century mention shipments of Spanish
qirmiz to Tunisia and Egypt, and the geographer al-Bakr\i (d. 487/1094) noted
that the best qirmiz was produced in Valencia and other Andalus\i regions and
\textquote{exported to foreign lands}.\textsuperscript{16} Iberian qirmiz later appeared in Italy (it was
called \textit{grana} in Italian), where it was for sale in Lucca as early as 1192. Italian
and Catalan commercial treatises from the eighth/fourteenth century listed
Spanish and Proven\c{c}al \textit{grana}, and varieties from Murcia and Valencia – where
qirmiz was probably produced by Mudejars (Muslims living under Christian
rule) – appeared in the Florentine Datini archives (1383–1411).\textsuperscript{17} Evidently,
qirmiz was one among a number of Mediterranean commodities that con-
tinued to be produced and traded in the Mediterranean, even in areas that had
shifted from Muslim to Christian rule.

Besides spices, many other types of commodity were regularly traded across
the late medieval Mediterranean. These included textiles of all varieties, in the
form of raw fibres (cotton, flax, wool and silk), woven cloth and clothing.\textsuperscript{18}
Some were eastern imports, but many were manufactured within the Mediterranean region. Egypt, for example, exported vast quantities of flax to other regions of the Mediterranean during the fifth/eleventh and sixth/twelfth centuries, and Geniza merchants were constantly in communication about prices, qualities and demand. Often, they delivered Egyptian raw flax to Sicily and Ifriqiya, where it was woven into cloth and re-exported. In the early fifth/eleventh century, 30,000 pieces of fine Sicilian cloth, probably linen, were inventoried among the belongings of a Fatimid princess in Egypt.

Many Muslim towns in al-Andalus and the Maghrib were famous for textiles woven in local ateliers. The geographer al-Idrisi (d. 560/1166) remarked that al-Mahdiyya produced fabrics that were extremely fine and beautiful, which merchants carried to many other places. He likewise reported 800 workshops for silk in Almeria, that produced striped brocades and other patterned fabrics. Andalusi silks appear frequently in Geniza correspondence, mentioned by merchants trading in Ifriqiya and Egypt during the fifth/eleventh and sixth/twelfth centuries, and silks were also sought by elite consumers in Europe. Brocade pieces in a chasuble associated with Thomas Becket bear an inscription recording their creation in Almeria in 510/1116.

Although fabrics from Granada, North Africa and Egypt continued to be traded during the later Middle Ages, regions of textile production and demand shifted over time. For example, cotton cultivation had been introduced into the Mediterranean by the fourth/tenth century, when it was noted in Ifriqiya, Sicily and Spain, but trade in cotton became more popular several centuries later, after cultivation had become more widely diffused. Silk cultivation had also diversified by the later medieval period. Whereas silk production had once been a closely guarded secret in early medieval Byzantium, later spreading to al-Andalus, Sicily and a few other Muslim regions, by the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth century sericulture was widely practised in Christian Spain and Italy. Mediterranean wool was likewise a long-standing item of commerce, but the wool trade broadened over time, as ateliers in northern Europe offered new markets for wool produced in Italy and Castile.

Many of the commodities traded within the Mediterranean were bulky and heavy items that were more useful than luxurious. These included hides, paper, timber and iron. North Africa had long exported hides for leather and parchment, and these are prominent among goods listed in Arabic commercial letters written from Tunis to Pisa in the early seventh/thirteenth century. Al-Andalus was likewise famous for dyed Cordoban leather,
exported both to Muslim and to Christian lands, and for paper. Geniza documents mention Andalusī paper in the sixth/twelfth century, and the late seventh/thirteenth-century Andalusī market inspector (muḥtasib) al-Jarsīfī included regulations for paper and parchment makers in his treatise. Paper also began to be produced in Europe, and exported to Muslim markets, and by the ninth/fifteenth century, the jurisconsult (muftī) Ibn Marzuq of Tlemcen (d. 842/1439) lamented that only Christian-made paper was available in the Maghrib.

Traffic in timber was particularly affected by political and military changes in the medieval Mediterranean world. During the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries, some of the best regions of old-growth forests, in Spain and coastal Syria, had come under Christian control. Writing in 549/1154, al-Idrīsī recalled that Tortosa (conquered by Ramon Berenguer, Count of Barcelona, in 1148) had shipyards where ‘they construct large ships with the wood that is produced in the mountains of that region’. Meanwhile Bougie, still in Muslim hands, maintained ‘a shipyard where they build large vessels, both sailing ships and galleys’, because the nearby mountains and valleys produced excellent timber and there were also resources for pitch and iron. Medieval Christian law codes routinely banned traffic in timber to Muslim ports because of its naval significance, yet sources indicate ongoing commerce. Italian merchants carried timber to Egypt, especially in the later sixth/twelfth century when Saladin was reconstructing the Egyptian navy. In a letter to the ‘Abbāsid caliph, dated 570/1174f., Saladin justified generous concessions to European merchants on the grounds that they provided vital materials to Egypt. During the later middle ages, even though trade in timber was constrained and Mediterranean maritime routes were dominated by Christian ships, some Muslim shipping continued.

Foodstuffs were another important element of Mediterranean trade, especially grain, dried fruits and olive oil. More than in the case of luxury goods, trade in grain and other foodstuffs reflected regional needs and differences in production, and traffic was generally limited to shorter distances owing to the perishable nature of the goods. Grain was traded from Sicily to North Africa during the early medieval period, and this traffic appears to have continued even after the Norman conquest of the island in the later fifth/eleventh century. Ifrīqiya, in return, exported olive oil to Sicily. Naṣrid Granada also depended on imports of grain and other staple goods, this time from Ifrīqiya and the Maghrib, since its mountainous territory made grain production difficult and labour expensive. In exchange, Granada exported olive oil, silk, sugar and dried fruits, especially the figs for which the region was famous.
The ninth/fifteenth-century geographer al-Ḥimyarī reported that figs from Malaga were ‘carried to Egypt, Syria, Iraq and even, perhaps, as far as India, for they are the sweetest and most aromatic fig’.36

Sugar cane was another eastern plant that had been introduced into the Mediterranean world during the early medieval period, but sugar cultivation and commerce only became big business in the later middle ages. Latin Christians first encountered sugar in the eastern Mediterranean after the First Crusade, and it rapidly found a market in Europe.37 Sugar was also grown in al-Andalus, Sicily and North Africa by the fourth/tenth century, and is well documented from the sixth/twelfth century, when the agronomists such as Ibn al-‘Awwām described its cultivation.38 Sugar later became a staple crop in Nasrid Granada, whence it was exported to both northern and southern Europe, until sugar began to be produced in the Canary Islands in the ninth/fifteenth century.39

Slave trading was also a reality in the medieval Mediterranean world, especially in the aftermath of territorial conquests. During the early middle ages, slaves represented one of the most important exports from Europe to the Muslim world, but sources of northern slaves became limited with the expansion and Christianisation of European territories.40 By the later medieval period, therefore, many slaves came into the Islamic world from north of the Black Sea, transported by Italian merchants through Byzantine lands to be sold in Egypt and Syria. Other slaves – both Muslims and Christians – were taken as military captives and later fell into slavery. During the seventh/thirteenth century and after, sources record the sale of captured Muslims in southern Europe and mention enslaved Christians in North Africa and Egypt.41

**Merchants and commercial travel**

Both in the Mediterranean and elsewhere in the Islamic world, it was not uncommon for Muslim merchants to combine commerce with other professions. Arabic biographical dictionaries and other sources often cite scholars and doctors who were also merchants. However, as is made clear in Geniza correspondence, successful long-distance trade demanded time, training, flexibility, capital investment and a far-flung network of business partners and commercial connections. For the most part, merchants involved in large-scale commerce had to concentrate on their business affairs, and this tendency towards professionalisation increased over time during the medieval period.

Needless to say, not all merchants involved in Mediterranean trade dealt in large quantities over long distances. Many businessmen operated on a much
smaller scale, as local retailers, agents, ship-owners and middlemen, and in a
degree of other positions related to commerce. Most travelling merchants had
sedentary partners, and many people invested money in trade without doing
the work themselves. Even among professional wholesalers, there were many
different methods for making a profit. Some traders made money by carrying
commodities from one region to another; some handled imports and exports
in one location; others stocked goods and waited for their price to rise. Most
traders worked with partners, sharing investments, risks and profits, and many
operated within extended family networks.\textsuperscript{42} One fifth/eleventh-century fam-
ily based in Egypt included four generations of merchants, with members
doing business in Tunisia, Sicily and al-Andalus.\textsuperscript{43}

More than in the eastern Islamic world, much of the commercial traffic
in the Mediterranean involved a combination of maritime and overland travel.
Port cities were important, including Almería, Malaga, Oran, Tunis and
Alexandria, and these emporia linked land and sea trade. For instance,
al-Idrīsī remarked that both ships and caravans came to Bougie, making this
city ‘an entrepôt for merchandise. The inhabitants have been enriched by
commerce … and the merchants of this town trade with counterparts from the
western Maghrib, the Sahara and the Mashriq, trading in all types of mer-
chandise.’\textsuperscript{44} Trade patterns could change, however, and although the same
author observed that al-Mahdiyya was still ‘one of the ports most frequented
by merchant vessels coming from the east and from the west, from al-Andalus,
from Bilād al-Rūm and other countries’, he added that while ‘in the past they
brought great quantities of goods and money here, this traffic has diminished
in our period’.\textsuperscript{45}

In conjunction with maritime travel, caravan routes across North Africa
continued throughout the later middle ages. When Ibn Battūta travelled from
Tangier to Alexandria in 726/1325f., his route was entirely overland.\textsuperscript{46} But
caravan traffic could be disrupted by warfare, political changes and other
turmoil, such as the Bedouin incursions in Ifrīqiya in the fifth/eleventh
century. Sea travel could likewise be endangered by bad weather, naval
actions and piracy. These latter were especially prevalent from the fifth/
eleventh century onward, with crusade and conquest, and as the quickest
and safest Mediterranean sea routes were taken over by European shipping.\textsuperscript{47}
Nevertheless, Muslim merchants continued to travel by both land and sea,
transporting goods between Granada, the Maghrib, Ifrīqiya and Egypt, and
they often chose to voyage on Christian ships. One Egyptian trader sailed on
Venetian boats from Alexandria to Tunis and Tripoli in 866/1462, then made
his way overland to Morocco, where he took a Genoese ship to Granada,
before returning to Egypt on Genoese vessels with stops in several North African ports.\textsuperscript{48} It has often been noted that Muslim merchants rarely travelled to ports in southern Europe. Instead, most commerce between Christian and Muslim regions was carried out by European traders. As a result, commercial transactions between Muslim and Christian businessmen generally took place in the Islamic lands to which Christian traders travelled. This pattern is very evident in a series of Arabic letters written by Muslim traders in Tunis to Italian merchants in Pisa during the first decade of the seventh/thirteenth century. Apparently, political events had forced the Pisans to return home at short notice, leaving their business affairs in disarray; their Muslim correspondents begged them to return to settle debts and complete other transactions. There is no suggestion that the Muslim partners might travel to Pisa to deliver the goods and collect payments.\textsuperscript{49} In light of this common reluctance to travel to Christian markets, the permanent Christian conquest of Muslim territories in the Iberian Peninsula and Sicily, and the briefer Christian occupation of the Crusader States, meant that the Muslim sphere of commercial activity in the Mediterranean was considerably diminished.

There are several reasons that may help to explain the apparent disinclination of Muslim merchants to visit European ports. Most importantly, while Christian merchants trading in Muslim lands could easily find churches and other Christians, there were no Muslim communities in medieval Europe, and no facilities to accommodate the needs of Muslim travellers. It would have been impossible to find either the buildings and institutions (mosques, bath houses and \textit{funduqs}) or the human infrastructure (\textit{\text{halāl}} – i.e. those who followed Islamic norms – butchers, agents, translators) to facilitate regular Muslim trade in Italy or southern France. The situation was somewhat different in Sicily and the Iberian Peninsula, which continued to be home to Muslim communities into the seventh/thirteenth and tenth/sixteenth centuries respectively, and in Byzantium, which had always had closer relations with Muslim lands. In Constantinople, there are references to a mosque and commercial compound for Muslim merchants in 1203, just before the disruptions of the Fourth Crusade, and then again in 1293 after the Palaeologan restoration.\textsuperscript{50}

On top of the lack of necessary facilities, Muslims were discouraged from travelling to Christian lands and trading with Christians. Mālikī jurists, who represented the dominant school in the Maghrib and al-Andalus, issued strongly negative opinions on the question of travel to Christian lands, although their repeated rulings may in fact reflect the prevalence of such
traffic. In the first half of the sixth/twelfth century, the Tunisian jurist al-Māzarī (d. 536/1141) ruled that Muslims should not travel to Christian lands for any reason, and that trading goods to Christians would cause prices to rise and generate funds for Christians to use in fighting against Islam.\textsuperscript{51} However, other data indicate that such travel was not uncommon. In 580/1184f., for example, the Andalusī pilgrim Ibn Jubayr sailed from the Near East to the Iberian Peninsula, via Norman Sicily, on Genoese boats in company with a large group of other Muslim pilgrims and merchants.\textsuperscript{52} Ongoing juridical disapproval suggests that Muslim visits to European ports, and transport on Christian ships, continued throughout the later medieval period. In the ninth/fifteenth century, al-Wanshariṣī prohibited Muslims from visiting or living in lands under Christian rule.\textsuperscript{53} Ironically, even the Breviario Sunni by the qāḍī Iça of Segovia, an aljamiado text written in 1462 for Mudejars in northern Castile, repeated the traditional injunction ‘do not live in the land of unbelievers’.\textsuperscript{54}

Christian sources occasionally mention individual Muslim traders travelling to and from European ports, but we cannot estimate levels of trade based on these rare data. In 1222, Muhammad ibn al-Muhallam (Macometus benelma halam, in Latin), a merchant from Ceuta, sold a cargo of tin, sugar and cinnabar in Genoa.\textsuperscript{55} Five years later, a Muslim trader from Alexandria, called Alfaquim in Latin (perhaps al-Hākim in Arabic), was party to a partnership contract drawn up in Marseilles.\textsuperscript{56} In 1259, three Tunisians rented a ship in Genoa to return to Tunis.\textsuperscript{57} Similar references continue in later centuries. In 1327, for example, Tunisian traders travelled on a Catalan ship to Almería and Malaga by way of Christian Sardinia and Mallorca, and in the 1340s, a Maghribi merchant in Mallorca booked a passage for Genoa.\textsuperscript{58} Much later, some European ports established facilities for Muslim merchants, with the foundation of a funduq for Ottoman merchants in Ancona in 1514 and in Venice in 1612, suggesting a regularisation of commercial traffic.\textsuperscript{59}

There is much more extensive data for Muslim travel to and from the kingdom of Aragon, where there was still a resident Mudejar population until the early tenth/sixteenth century, and from Sicily, which appears to have maintained its long-standing trade connections with Ifrīqiya. In many cases, family ties and other connections between communities in the Maghrib, Granada and Christian Spain facilitated this ongoing commerce. For example, the Ripoll family, a successful and extensive Mudejar merchant clan, maintained trading connections in the kingdom of Aragon, Granada, North Africa, Italy and Egypt during the ninth/fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{60} At the same time, commercial traffic flourished between North Africa and Naṣrid Granada, which depended on the outside world for many basic supplies.
Overall, it is clear that Muslim merchants continued to travel and trade in the later medieval Mediterranean world, where their commercial success demanded a complex mixture of pragmatism, access to information and adaptability. Some traders limited their business to markets within the dār al-islām, while others ranged more widely despite the fact that this increasingly entailed travel on Christian ships and even visits to Christian ports. Meanwhile, sedentary Muslim merchants based in al-Andalus, North Africa and Egypt did business with foreign Christian merchants arriving from Genoa, Venice, Barcelona and other European cities. At the same time, natural and manufactured products produced in the eastern Islamic world, in the Maghrib and in Nasrîd Granada were trafficked throughout the Mediterranean, the Near East and northern Europe. Commerce in the Mediterranean flourished during the later middle ages precisely because this region was a zone of economic interface between Europe and the Muslim world.

Notes

Muslim trade in the medieval Mediterranean


34. Michael Brett, ‘Ifrīqiyya as a market for Saharan trade from the tenth to the twelfth century AD’, JAH, 10 (1969), 347–64, at 349.
42. On partnership, see Abraham Udovitch, Partnership and profit in medieval Islam, Princeton, 1970.
43. Constable, Trade and traders, 91.
44. Al-Idrīsī, Nuzhat, 260; Description, 105.
45. Al-Idrīsī, Nuzhat, 281; Description, 126.
50. Constable, Housing the stranger, 149–50.
55. ‘Liber magistri Salmonis sacri palatii notarii’, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 36 (1906), 100; Jehel, L’Italie et le Maghreb, 137.
Muslim trade in the medieval Mediterranean

Overland trade in the western Islamic world (fifth–ninth/eleventh–fifteenth centuries)

JOHN L. MELOY

Introduction

Overland trade in the western half of the Islamic world was conducted through an extensive network of routes connecting cities and towns from western Asia to North Africa and across the Sahara to Central and West Africa. Long-distance trade was a complex enterprise, requiring knowledge of diverse markets and commodities and access to an extensive support system providing expertise in navigation on long routes most often across harsh terrain. It was highly lucrative not so much in terms of volume, but rather in terms of the high value of small quantities of luxury goods, transported at considerable risk. Overland trade routes of the fifth/eleventh century were based on a network of routes pioneered in the first centuries of Islam, the major achievement of which was the commercial conquest of the Sahara by Muslim merchants. The long-distance overland network often used Arabic as a common language, Islam as a common religion, and the shari‘a as a common legal system, all in constant dynamic with indigenous traditions and languages. However, trade during this period was not simply an economic story; rather, it concerned also cultural exchange and the disposition of political power. The trading system influenced wealth, power and people in the Islamic heartland as well as outlying areas.¹

Islamic historians have argued for the centrality of Tunisia in the trade of the Mediterranean and the Sahara in the earlier Islamic centuries. Halfway between the shores of the Mashriq and the distant west, Tunisia also provided easy access to trans-Saharan trade routes and Mediterranean Europe. Goitein acknowledged that Geniza evidence from these centuries was sparse but he found that the far more numerous letters dating to the fifth/eleventh century indicated that Tunisia was fast losing its commercial prominence, as indicated by the Qayrawānī businessman who expressed, in a message written in the middle of the fifth/eleventh century, his intention to move to Egypt because
'the whole of the West is not worth a thing anymore'. Although the letters indicate a significant reduction in the role of Tunisia in the fifth/eleventh-century Mediterranean, Qayrawân continued to be a central market for the Sahara trade into the sixth/twelfth century and its overland routes remained a vital part of long-distance commerce.  

Networks of commerce and control (fifth–seventh/eleventh–thirteenth centuries)

Around the turn of the fifth/eleventh century, three dominant regions of commercial activity emerged in the western half of the Islamic world. Two of these, based in the Maghrib and the bilād al-sūdān, enjoyed close commercial relations. The third, based in Cairo, although it had ties to the European and African west via maritime or coastal land routes, was oriented to the eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. In the far west, the Almoravids and later the Almohads imposed economic coherence on the Maghrib, extending their reach into al-Andalus, and established commercial ties in West Africa. The establishment of a new Fāṭimid capital in Cairo in 359/970 provided a new commercial centre of gravity in the eastern Mediterranean and south-western Asia, the pre-eminence of which lasted for centuries. While agriculture was always the basis of these political economies, the long-distance trade in luxury commodities was significant enough – whether for economic reasons or for social prestige – that these states worked to facilitate and control their trade networks. States were as interested as merchants in reaping the rewards of commerce.

The Almoravids and Almohads directed considerable energy to control their trade with their neighbours to the north and south. Prior to the rise of the Almoravid movement, the Ṣanhāja tribal confederation had thrived from its control of the trans-Saharan trade routes in the west until they lost control of Awdaghust to the rulers of Ghana. In the middle of the fifth/eleventh century, once the reformist movement took shape as a political force, the Almoravids, whether driven by economic or ideological motives, conquered Sijilmāsa and Awdaghust, giving them control of both the northern and southern termini of the western Sahara route. The Almohads, also driven by reform and powered by the Masmūda Berbers of the Atlas Mountains, were less preoccupied with control of the Sahara as long as they could control the sea coast. Threatened by incursions of the Norman Sicilians, they directed their conquest eastward, securing ports from Tripoli at the eastern edge of the Maghrib to Māssa on the Atlantic coast and establishing a lively maritime trade protected by commercial treaties with the Europeans.
Until the fifth/eleventh century, the chief trading partner of the Maghribis in the Südän was the Soninke kingdom – the capital of which has been excavated at Kumbi Ṣâliḥ in Ghana – and its successors until the rise of Mali in the seventh/thirteenth century. Exchange was also conducted with the city of Gao lying further to the east on the Niger river. To the west of Ghana was Takrûr, a smaller polity whose name later came to denote in Egyptian circles the entire region of the western Südân. The trade routes across the Sahara led to the string of trading towns of the Sahel, a region of commercial and cultural transition between the Arab and Berber Muslim north that gradually penetrated the band of the Sudanese savannah lying just north of the forested coastal region where the gold fields were. Awdaghust, two months’ journey from Sijilmâsa, was about fifteen days north of the capital of Ghana. To its east lay the Sahelian town of Tâdmakkat (or Es-Suk), with links further eastward to the copper mine at Takaddâ, northward across the desert to Tâhart and Qayrawân, and southward nine days’ travel to Gao. The transitional nature of commercial and cultural exchange between the foreign Muslim merchants and the indigenous population of the Südân is evident in the configuration of the towns of Ghana and Gao; al-Bakrî (d. 487/1094) described both as dual towns, consisting of an indigenous capital with a Muslim commercial town nearby. Other dual settlements have been found in the western Sahel, suggesting a broader pattern of initial caution in contact between Muslim merchants and local residents. Traders did not serve as agents of Islamisation; rather, the network and contacts they created allowed the spread of Islam to take place gradually in the political centres of the Bilâd al-Südân from Takrûr to Kanem, often through the agency of local rulers, who were the sponsors of the Muslim merchant communities.

Muslim long-distance traders extended their control across the Sahara to trade and to secure the resources to trade. Early on, the Massûfa tribe of the Şanhâja held the site of Taghâza, mentioned by Ibn Ḥawqal (fl. fourth/tenth century), and probably known to al-Bakrî as Tâtantâl, a salt mine on the route between Sijilmâsa to Awdaghust. At Taghâza, a location so barren that the mining town itself was built from salt, including the settlement’s mosque, the Massûfa used slave labour obtained in the Südân to extract large slabs of salt which they transported to Awdaghust to trade for gold. Little detail is known about the salt trade aside from naive information in the Arabic sources about the silent trade and the one-for-one exchange of salt for gold. However, if we can extrapolate from later periods, the market for salt was probably quite diverse. Salt and natron of numerous kinds were required for culinary, medicinal and industrial purposes, the latter including textile and leather...
goods preparation and livestock production. Aside from salt compounds, Sudanese commerce also demanded other commodities, such as textiles, coral and carnelian beads, spices, and manufactured goods. Excavations at the site of Awdaghust in Tegdaoust have produced ceramics from al-Andalus, the Maghrib and Ifrīqiya as well as glass possibly from al-Fuṣṭāt, dating from the late third/ninth to the early eighth/fourteenth centuries. Cowrie shells, used as currency in the Bilād al-Suḥān, have been found at numerous archaeological sites. The most favoured type, *Cypraea moneta*, was imported from the Maldives, probably via North Africa. In the north the most coveted Sudanese commodity was gold, minted as fine-quality dinars by both the Almoravids and the Almohads, which affected markets across the Mediterranean basin. Ivory was also in great demand. Perhaps the most unusual archaeological find was recovered from Gao Ancien: a cache of over fifty tusks of hippopotamus ivory, preferred over elephant ivory for inlay work. While the principal commodity in demand by long-distance traders from the western Suḥān was gold, Kanem near Lake Chad in the central Suḥān yielded primarily slaves, marketed through the entrepôt of Zawīla and used for agricultural and domestic labour as well as military manpower. Other commodities from the central Suḥān included alum from Kawār, salt and natron from Bornu next to Lake Chad, and various aromatics and perfumes, such as frankincense, camphor and civet.

At the eastern end of the Mediterranean, and connected to the Maghrib by overland and maritime commercial links, the Fātimids of Egypt also facilitated and controlled trade. Egypt’s commerce flourished owing to its agricultural and industrial production, especially of flax, a major crop for export and for the local industry. The state’s support of the textile industry is most evident in the *dār al-ṭirāz*, the institution of factories that produced richly embroidered textiles, an integral part of the Fātimid administration, which awarded these cloths as prestigious gifts. The royal fashion for ṭirāz was adopted by lower classes to the extent that the sale of it to the public also constituted a significant source of commercial revenue for the state, according to one report amounting to income of over 200,000 dinars in a day. The Fātimids were not reliant on west African gold since they had their own supply in Nubia and the Wādī al-Allāqī mines in the Red Sea mountains. Their gold coins were of extraordinarily high purity, often reaching levels of 98 or 99 per cent during the reigns of al-Mustaʿlī and al-Āmir.

The establishment of a capital in Cairo, and the Fātimid state’s encouragement of commerce, allowed Egypt to become a significant link in east–west trade, the success of which was due in part to Baghdad’s decline as a market. Egypt’s far-reaching commercial connections are evident in the Geniza letters
as well as the excavations at al-Fustāt. The latter have produced a wide variety of trade goods from both local and distant production centres. Andalusī lustre wares, Italian protomajolicas and Chinese celadons and porcelains are the most obvious imported luxuries; floor mats were also imported from Iran, Palestine and Alexandria.\(^7\) Trade was also conducted between the Islamic lands and the Byzantine empire in spite of intermittent conflict. As early as the turn of the fourth/tenth century, Muslim merchants conducted trade in Constantinople; aside from occasional interruptions, their commercial presence continued through the Palaeologan period, often supported by treaties between Byzantine and Muslim rulers. When negotiations between Saladin (r. 564–89/1169–93) and Isaac II Angelus (r. 1185–95) resulted in the renovation of a mosque in Constantinople, a delegation was sent for the inauguration, attended also by merchants and other travellers.\(^8\) During this period, one of the most direct glimpses into Byzantine–Islamic trade, although not overland commerce, is the early fifth/eleventh-century shipwreck discovered off the Anatolian coast at Serçe Limanı just north of Rhodes, which yielded a diversity of goods – glass cullet, glass bottles and ceramic vessels, most of which have an Islamic provenance, as well as a large number of reused Byzantine amphorae, which circulated as far as south Russia and Romania.\(^9\) However, maritime trade between Anatolia and Egypt and Syria was probably more often in bulk goods like timber. Muslim merchants in Constantinople also traded in a variety of luxury goods, including 'Baghdad-style' garments. Trade with the Turks in eastern Anatolia was in wax, raisins, hides, wool and flax. From Constantinople, caravan routes extended eastward across Anatolia. Antioch and Aleppo were important emporia for trade with Syria, Malatya channelled trade into Mesopotamia, and roads from Sivas, a centre which attracted also Russians and Qipchaks from the north, ran due east to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iran. The eastern regions were also connected to the port of Trebizond on the Black Sea, via Erzurum. Once established in central Anatolia, the Saljuqs provided security and new markets for luxury goods.\(^20\)

Long-distance overland commerce was conducted primarily by caravans because it was safer, whether across dangerous terrain like the Sahara, or well-populated regions like \(\text{bilād al-šām}.\) Ibn Jubayr (d. 614/1217) joined one of the regular caravans of merchants that travelled from Damascus to Acre.\(^21\) However, in some regions at times, a traveller might feel safe enough to travel with simply a guide, as did Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (d. 770/1368f. or 779/1377) in Mali. In North Africa, caravans were led by specialists who knew the routes and their wells, were familiar with the people along the routes (who could demand protection fees) and could navigate by the stars. Travel across the
Sahara was difficult. According to al-Idrīsī (d. 560/1165?), the trans-Saharan caravans preferred to set out in the autumn, evidently to avoid spending the summer in the Sūdān. Caravans would travel in the coolest hours, taking a break from late morning until late afternoon, and then travelling late into the night. On some legs of the journey water was scarce, or barely potable. Yāqūt (d. 626/1229) mentioned ‘fetid and lethal water, which has none of the qualities of water other than being liquid’ and described how, as a last resort, ‘they slaughter a camel and save their lives with what is in its stomach’. Even with sufficient water, the trip was dangerous: Ibn Baṭṭūṭa recorded the death of one of his travelling companions who was separated from the main party.  

Merchants travelled the length of North Africa by sea and land. Maritime travel is documented relatively well by the Geniza letters; as Goitein noted, however, this may reflect the religious restrictions against the Jewish letter writers from travelling on the Sabbath and he regarded the Geniza letters as unrepresentative sources for land trade. Nonetheless, the letters are informative about overland trade. Regular caravans connected the Maghrib with Egypt on a seasonal basis, and were called mawsim. There were regular caravans, especially during the winter months, between Sijilmaṣa and Qayrawān, where they stopped for a few days before heading on to Egypt. In addition, there are references to caravans travelling during midsummer as well, probably serving those who were not able to travel by ship since maritime traffic was highest in the spring and autumn. While Goitein estimated that in the fifth/eleventh century about 8,000 merchants travelled on the sea routes between Tunisia, Sicily and Egypt in one year, the lack of documentation for overland traffic prevents any estimate of volume. It is possible, however, to get some idea of the scale of overland trade in terms of caravan size. One Geniza letter mentions a spice caravan travelling from al-Qulzum (Suez) to Cairo numbering 500 camels, which, as Goitein observed, was considered very large.  

Al-Idrīsī mentioned that the wealthy merchants of Āghmāt in southern Morocco typically dispatched caravans of 170 or 180 fully loaded camels. Michael the Syrian (d. 1199) mentioned the loss of about 400 Persian merchants travelling from Constantinople in one Anatolian snowstorm. Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) reported the claim of the ambassador of Takaddā to the Marinid sultan, Abū ‘Inān al-Mutawakkil (r. 749–59/1348–58), that an annual caravan from Egypt passed through his city on its way to Mali with as many as 12,000 camels.  

While this figure seems exaggerated, a caravan of 25,000 camels was recorded by North African authorities in 1913. Typical caravans are more likely to have numbered in the hundreds. As reported in the Geniza, a ship’s bale (‘īḍl) was approximate to a camel load (ḥimal), each being about 225 kilograms. The
so-called ‘lost caravan’ site in the Ijäfen dunes of Mauritania, dated to the sixth/twelfth century, comprised 3,260 cowrie shells, weighing nearly 4 kilograms, packed in animal skins, and 2,085 bars of brass, weighing a total of about 980 kilograms, divided into 50 kilogram batches. The excavators concluded that this assemblage was the cargo of part of a caravan.30

The overland trading network was wide-ranging and intensive, but it involved considerable uncertainty. Of course, business relationships were governed by the various instruments of contractual law, but the successful long-distance trader needed reliable contacts and information to minimise risk. The network of the Maqqarī family of the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century is illustrative. The five sons of Yahyā ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Maqqarī established an equal partnership which spanned the Sahara. Abū Bakr and Muḥammad were based in Tlemcen (Tilimsān), ‘Abd al-Wāḥid and ‘Alī were based in Walātā, which by the seventh/thirteenth century had replaced Awdaghost as the principal southern terminus of trade, and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān was based in Sijilmāsa. Their network allowed them to provide critical market information to each other:

The Tilimsānī would send to the Sahrawī the goods which the latter would indicate to him, and the Sahrawī would send to him skins, ivory, nuts, and gold. The Sijilmāsī was like the tongue in the balance, indicating to them the extent of rise or fall in the markets and writing to them about the affairs of merchants and countries. And so their wealth expanded and their status grew.’31

The Maqqarīs are also reported to have dug wells and safeguarded the security of traders across the Sahara. Against this image of industrious private enterprise in the Sahara, from Ghana to Anatolia we more often see the diligence of the state in facilitating the flow of long-distance trade, and controlling it in the cities and towns forming the commercial network. In the western Sahel, Muslim merchants were confined to commercial towns. The Zirids, Almoravids and Almohads of North African regimes constructed or expropriated funduqs, which served as places of commercial exchange. The Fāṭimid and especially the Ayyūbids also built numerous funduqs. The Saljuqs of Rūm constructed khāns (trading centres) and bridges on the roadways of Anatolia.32 Commerce as seen through the prism of the Geniza documents has often been described as a world of laissez-faire commerce. The commercial world was indeed one of remarkable mobility but, given the interests of state officials in commerce, the Egyptian case may well be representative. It is likely that ‘the lines between commerce and administration, between individuals acting for their own profit and those same men acting on behalf of the government, were often blurred’.33
Foundations of empire (seventh–ninth/thirteenth–fifteenth centuries)

The seventh/thirteenth century saw a number of changes in long-distance commerce across the western half of the Islamic world, restoring earlier connections and asserting new modes of control. By this time the Islamic lands along the southern Mediterranean shore were tightly locked into the European-controlled Mediterranean economy. Overland trade from Asia, secured by the Mongol conquests, added to the supply of goods passing through the Red Sea. The rise of the empire of Mali in the Bilād al-Sūdān reinvigorated the contact with North Africa and Egypt. Under the Ayyūbids and the Mamlūks, Cairo continued to maintain its position as a major commercial centre in the global economy, and with the decline of its industry it directed considerable attention to the benefits of long-distance commerce. Urban institutions continued to be used to facilitate and control commerce; control of inter-city trade routes and the merchants themselves became a concern as well, as expressed by the Ilkhan Ahmad Tegüder in a letter to the Mamlūk sultan Qalāwūn, stating that traders are ‘the foundation of empire’.

Prior to the seventh/thirteenth century, commerce entering Anatolia had largely served local consumers, especially the courts at Konya and Constantinople. Claude Cahen observed that with the subjugation of the Saljuqs to the Pax Mongolica, commerce in Anatolia became part of long-distance commercial connections that tied Europe to the heartland of Asia. Overland traders from Syria, Mesopotamia, or especially Tabriz in Iran, who had formerly served local demand, now preferred to go to the seaports of Trebizond on the Black Sea and Āyās on the Mediterranean. Marco Polo noted the importance of the latter port when he passed through it to the interior. Sivas remained a critical junction for these inland routes, its importance signalled by the establishment of a permanent Genoese representative there in 1300. While some trade moved westward into Anatolia, such as Anatolian wool for the Byzantine textile industry, better markets were to be found via Italian shipping. According to Simon of St Quentin (fl. 1245–8), Turkish red woollen caps were exported to Europe. The mineral wealth of Anatolia also fed this international trade: lapis lazuli, salt, alum, silver and copper. The Ilkhans maintained and monitored these overland routes, just as the Saljuqs had, by building caravanserais, but they also controlled the movement of merchants by posting officers at regular intervals to collect dues for safe passage. Traders coming from Central and East Asia preferred a more direct route passing through the territory of the Golden Horde to the Black Sea port.
of Kaffa (where the Genoese received permission to trade in 1266), which was a critical port for the trade in mamlūk from central Asia and the Caucasus until alternative routes opened after the Mamlūk–Ilkhanid peace in 723/1323.37 The overland Asian trade resulted in the export to Europe of Chinese porcelain, at least in modest quantities, starting in the late seventh/thirteenth century. The greater cultural impact of this contact, however, was on Egypt and Syria. Even during hostilities with the Mongols, trade in luxuries continued to the extent that Mamlūk artistic taste was dominated by Ilkhanid art.38

Trade from the Bilād al-Sūdān, along the routes across the western and central Sahara, continued to be directed to the North African states but the routes and emporia underwent a series of changes. In the seventh/thirteenth century, the primary west Saharan route, still passing from Sijilmāsa via the salt mines of Taghāzā, shifted eastward to Walātā.39 Of the late medieval North African states, the Marānīds were the most ambitious in attempting to control the Bilād al-Sūdān commerce. In the mid-eighth/fourteenth century, sultans Abū al-Ḥasan (r. 731–49/1331–48) and Abū ʿInān (r. 749–59/1348–58) directed campaigns against the northern termini of this trade, Tlemcen under the Zayyānīds and Tunis under the Ḥafṣīds.40 With regard to the southern termini, the Marānīds exchanged diplomatic missions with the rulers of Mali and it is possible that Ibn Baṭṭūta’s journey to Mali was under the sponsorship of the Marānīd sultan. Sudanese rulers were as ambitious as the Marānīds. The ruler of Kanem, Muḥammad Dunama Dibalemi (r. 618–57/1221–59), conquered the Fezzan to secure the route northward to Ḥafṣīd territory. Further west, Mansa Ulī (r. 653–68/1255–70), the son and successor of Mari Sun Dyaṭa (r. 627–53/1230–55), founder of the Mali empire, conquered Walātā, which required the trans-Saharan firm of the Maqqārī brothers, mentioned earlier, to ingratiate themselves with the Malinke rulers. In the eighth/fourteenth century, Sijilmāsa declined and the oases in Tuwāt and Gurārā, to the east, became the staging point for caravans to the south. Emporia in the south shifted eastward as well. Gao and Timbuktu, with easy access to the Niger river, supplanted Walātā as commercial centres. In the ninth/fifteenth century, the Songhay empire established its capital at Gao and became the first Sūdānic state to extend its control northward to the salt mine at Taghāzā.41

The centre of gravity of West African trade thus gradually shifted from the culturally mixed region of the Sahel to the Bilād al-Sūdān proper. Insoll has argued on the basis of excavated trade goods as well as tombstone inscriptions from Gao Ancien that in the seventh/thirteenth century trade in the western Sūdān had become indigenised; an elite continued to control trade, but this was a local elite that had converted to Islam. Indeed, trade in the Mali empire
was a primary instrument of imperial control. Mali officials assiduously protected the rights, property and passage of foreign traders and the ruler held a monopoly on strategic imports, such as horses and metals. Of course, gold remained the West African commodity that dominated the reputation of the region. The kings of Mali, however, did not have direct control over gold, although unusually large nuggets of gold were reserved for them; instead they enjoyed control over the routes to gold-producing regions and ceded control over them to the indigenous groups who worked the fields.42

Starting in the seventh/thirteenth century, commercial ties increased between Egypt and the bilād al-takrūr. The ḥajj, scholarly exchange and trade tied the western Sūdān to the Islamic heartland via an overland route that largely skirted the North African littoral, running northward from Tādmakkat to Ghadames and Tripoli or to Ghāt and the oases of Egypt’s Western Desert. The economic reputation of Mali was reinforced by the lavish pilgrimage caravans of several of its rulers, who passed through Cairo on their way to Mecca, and the wealth distributed by Mansa Mūsā I (r. 712–37/1312–37) was especially notorious for its alleged impact on the economy of Egypt.43 In Mamlūk-period scholarly writing, there is a greater interest in the affairs of the Bilād al-Sūdān, reflecting increased scholarly contact and awareness of a vibrant Muslim state on the other side of the Sahara. Egyptian merchants became a noted presence in the trans-Saharan trade, mentioned by a number of Arabic sources starting from the seventh/thirteenth century as well as European reports from the ninth/fifteenth century. Among the former, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa noted that the inhabitants of the copper-mining town of Takaddā traded annually with Egypt from which they imported fine cloth and other goods.44 Slaves continued to be exported northward from Kanem and Bornu, in exchange for horses, and also from Mali, whose human exports were in demand in the Maghrib. Most African slaves in Egypt were from the central Sūdān, Nubia, and East Africa, although their ranks did include Takrūrīs.45 Trade between eastern Sūdān and Egypt did not commence until the conversion of the Funj sultans in Sinnār at the turn of the tenth/sixteenth century, although regular caravans along the Darb al-Arba‘īn did not operate until the eleventh/seventeenth century.46 Commercial and cultural contacts with Egypt are also evident in the slave trade that passed southwards to Bilād al-Sūdān. Ibn Faḍlallāh al-‘Umarī (d. 749/1349) reported that central Asian mamlūks served in the retinue of the rulers of Mali.47

As in earlier centuries, the lands of the eastern Mediterranean constituted a critical juncture between the commerce of the Sahara and the Mediterranean and that of Asia. Under the Fāṭimids Egypt’s industrial production, especially textiles, endowed it with a robust commercial position in intercontinental
trade. However, manufactures decreased under the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks, leading Egypt and Syria to trade in raw materials rather than finished goods. The textile industry was the first to unravel. Egypt continued to export some fabrics; al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442) mentioned high-quality silk, for example, although on a much-reduced basis. However, the country as a whole relied on the importation of cheap cloth from Europe as well as India, while exporting cotton, flax and wool. Other industries deteriorated as well: sugar, soap, glass. In the eighth/fourteenth and ninth/fifteenth centuries, Egypt and Syria regularly imported foodstuffs. Thus by the seventh/thirteenth century, the European economy started to overshadow that of Egypt and Syria, leading Ashtor to posit a dual economy in the ninth/fifteenth century. For example, southern European olive oil was 50 to 100 per cent more expensive in Egypt than olive oil from Syria. As Egypt and Syria became more dependent on the transit trade from the Indian Ocean world, so they also became dependent on the European-controlled transit trade across the Mediterranean, even to North African destinations. In the seventh/thirteenth century the Iberian Peninsula started to direct its products to Europe. Egypt and Syria did likewise.

The Ayyūbids and Mamlūks were still able to maintain their economic position owing in part to their connections abroad; trade was indeed the foundation of empire. The conquest of Yemen, under the leadership of Saladin’s brother al-Mu‘azzam Tūrānshāh (r. 569–77/1174–81), ensured Ayyūbid domination of the transit trade between Aden and Egypt until the time of the Rasūlids. Saladin has been credited by some with originating the protectionist policy of excluding European merchants from operating in the Red Sea and in the interior of the Ayyūbid lands. The desire to control foreign commercial activity continued from the Fāṭimid period, as evident in the use of safe-conducts and funduqs ‘to regularize, exploit, and control Christian merchant activities’. In Egypt and Syria this trend reached its height in the ninth/fifteenth century with the exploitation of all merchants, to the extent that Ashtor asserted that it ‘was the ruin of the upper stratum of the Levantine bourgeoisie’, leading to ‘the decline of [the medieval Islamic] countries, with their economic and political submission to the Western powers’. The consequences of a trade-oriented foreign policy are more evident in the Mamlūk period. Āyās, the Mediterranean entrepôt of the trans-Asian trade, was a repeated target of the Mamlūk military in the late seventh/thirteenth and eighth/fourteenth centuries and in 722/1322, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (third reign, 709–41/1310–41) won 50 per cent of the port’s customs revenue as tribute. Of course, the Red Sea route was particularly valuable to the Mamlūks for its access to the spice trade, although caravans between Bilād al-Shām and the
Gulf are documented into the ninth/fifteenth century. Unlike the Fāṭimids and Ayyūbids, the Mamlūks never attempted a serious invasion of Yemen, relying instead on direct rule and proxies to control trade as it passed through the ports of the northern Red Sea.

While mutual trust and friendship still had a role in trade, political forces played a much larger role in commerce. The heightened concern of rulers with trade meant that traders, like the Kārimīs, had also to concern themselves with political powers. The Kārimīs were a prominent group of wealthy businessmen most often associated with spices but who dealt in other goods as well. Goitein observed that the term, first attested in the Geniza documents from the fifth/eleventh century, indicated a convoy or group of merchants. Although they were by no means the dominant traders at this time, Goitein suggested that they outlasted their competitors because they were able to get protection from the regimes in Yemen and Egypt, which allowed them to flourish in the eastern trade. Maḍmūn, the representative of the merchants in Aden in the mid-sixth/twelfth century, established agreements ‘with the rulers of the seas and the deserts’ to protect his convoys and caravans. In the eighth/fourteenth century the Kārimīs had a reputation for tremendous wealth and lent money to the Mamlūk and Rasūlīd sultans, as well as, most famously perhaps, Mansa Mūsā of Mali, who exhausted his funds on his return from the pilgrimage. These merchants are said to have engaged in business from the Maghrib to China, although the biographical data suggest that they operated in fixed circuits of business, primarily in Bilād al-Shām, Egypt and Yemen. The precise nature of the group, however, remains unresolved: a formal guild with an established hierarchy, a constellation of firms or a group that co-operated informally. However, the Kārimī merchants should not be taken as representative of the commercial community. The Vienna documents,datable from the fourth/tenth to the eighth/fourteenth centuries and of uncertain provenance, reveal primarily transactions of bulk commodities in the Nile valley. Another important source of texts, from an archaeological context, is the collection of Quseir letters, which provides an ethnographic view of ‘stationary merchants’, in the late sixth/twelfth and early seventh/thirteenth century. The family of Abū Mufarrij dealt primarily in the grain trade between Qūṣ in the Nile valley and Mecca, and had not infrequent contact with Yemen, although the site also contains trade goods from Indian fabrics to West African iron money. Noteworthy is the absence of evidence for large-scale trade in pepper, which would support the conclusion that during this period the long-distance spice trade was dominated by the Kārimīs. The
Vienna and Quseir texts thus reveal an important dimension of long-distance commerce – trading in bulk commodities – overlooked in most literary sources, which are more preoccupied with luxuries.\(^5\)

Overland trade in the western half of the Islamic world grew from much older interconnections, its primary markets reorienting themselves in roughly the fifth/eleventh and seventh/thirteenth centuries. It has been argued that long-distance trade reached a new level of integration in the seventh/thirteenth century, forming a Eurasian world system based on interdependence and lacking hegemonic hierarchy. Certainly an Afro-Eurasian network had existed; however, the degree of integration in contrast to the centuries immediately before and after the seventh/thirteenth century remains difficult to determine. Others have observed that the main markets of overland trade that forged these channels of integration consisted themselves of hierarchies of control. None of these centres of power proved to be especially durable. More long-lasting was the work of the long-distance Muslim traders themselves, who laid the groundwork for the creation of an intercontinental cultural commonwealth.\(^6\)

Notes


Overland trade in the western Islamic world

Al-Maqqar.


28. El2, art. ‘Tidjāra’ (Maya Shatzmiller).


36. Cahen, *The formation of Turkey*, 90, 239, citing Simon of St Quentin.


Introduction

Competing political and economic strategies informed the Ottoman state’s policies towards commerce and merchants. At the core of the economic worldview of the sultans and their advisers was an appreciation of the revenues that the transit trade of luxury goods produced. The fifth/eleventh-century Qutadghu Bilig said of merchants, ‘associate with them as they come and go and do business with them, and give them what they require. For they have acquired all the choice and beautiful and desirable things of the world.’ It was a sentiment with which the Ottoman elite would agree. The sultans were also acutely aware of the strategic possibilities of trade, both as a weapon against their enemies and as a way of rewarding allies. Lastly, as the empire expanded and Istanbul’s population grew to number in the hundreds of thousands, the Ottoman court sought to implement policies to ensure the flow of vital commodities to the capital in order to foster social stability. Further complicating the picture, prominent jurists in the empire pronounced some of the policies implemented to achieve these strategic goals as being contrary to Islamic legal traditions. Those, as interpreted by the judges in the empire’s Muslim courts, supported the free flow of trade and established a bias in favour of Muslim traders. Given these competing aims, those who governed the empire were not always consistent in their approach to trade as the Ottomans sought to keep pace with shifts in the global patterns of commerce that were occurring outside the sultan’s realm.

The Ottomans in a global economy

Although international networks of trade connecting Europe, Asia and Africa predated the empire, the emergence of the early Ottoman beglik coincided with an increased demand among European elites for the luxury products of
Asia. Italian merchants, having entered the Levant markets as suppliers to the Crusaders, moved to establish friendly trading relations with the post-Mongol Muslim states in the eighth/fourteenth century in the pursuit of profits. The Ottoman sultans undoubtedly were aware of those commercial trends and positioned themselves to take advantage of them. The Ottomans conquered much of western Anatolia during the reign of Sultan Orkhan (726–63/1326–62) and their capital at Brusa (Bursa) emerged as a major commercial hub in the trade of Iranian silk to Italy.

In particular, the Ottomans nurtured commercial relations with Genoa. Hopes for a continued, special relationship with the sultanate encouraged the Genoese to remain technically neutral during the siege of Constantinople in 857/1453. In acknowledgement of that decision, Sultan Mehmed (r. 850–2/1446–8, 855–86/1451–81) allowed the Genoese, following the city’s conquest, to retain their property in Pera/Galata, which lay across the Golden Horn from the old Byzantine capital, and to trade on favourable terms within the empire. Strong commercial relations with Genoa were obviously good for imperial revenues. But they also served Ottoman strategic interests in countering the ambitions of Genoa’s long-time rival Venice as it sought to slow the advance of the Ottomans into the lucrative markets of the Levant by creating military alliances with the sultan’s enemies.²

The fall of Constantinople propelled the Ottomans into a position as one of the leading powers of the Mediterranean basin and they were quick to take advantage of their new capital’s location. A revived Istanbul provided the Ottomans with a stranglehold over the Black Sea trade of grain, slaves and furs. Most of these commodities were consumed within the empire, although slaves from the Ukraine and the Caucasus region were highly valued in the Mamluk empire to the south and Italian merchants sought to import Black Sea wheat. Furthermore, the interlocking and complementary markets of the Black Sea and the Aegean, of which Istanbul provided the commercial heart, constituted the most dynamic internal trading zone in the empire. From it came the commodities that fed the sultans, their armies and the population of Istanbul, as well as the wood and stone of which the city was built. With the Black Sea and the Aegean largely secured for the empire by the end of the ninth/fifteenth century, the Ottoman sultans could look beyond the empire’s heartland to seek expanded commercial and strategic opportunities, as in the Ottoman political imagination the two could not be easily separated.

The central position of the empire in the networks of global trade was enhanced by the Ottoman conquest of Aleppo in 922/1516 and Cairo in 923/1517. Aleppo had served as one of the main centres in which European
merchants might obtain Iranian silk and pepper from the Indies for at least a century before its incorporation into the empire. With its fall and that of Damascus in the same year, the Ottomans were in possession of all the western termini of the overland caravan routes from Iran and India to the Mediterranean Sea. Further south, Cairo served as the northern anchor of the trans-Saharan caravan trade in ivory, gold and slaves. But it was also an important importer of Asian spices, and most especially pepper. One of the reasons historians have suggested for the invasion of a fellow Sunnî Muslim state was the desire of Sultan Selîm (917–26/1512–20) to defend that trade from threats posed by the growing European naval presence, both in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean. After the fall of Cairo, naval operations mounted from Egypt secured the ports of the Red Sea as the sultans embarked on a policy to challenge the newly established Portuguese naval domination in the trade of the Indian Ocean. The Ottoman state’s ability to play a role in that trade was further augmented with the conquest of Baghdad in 941/1534, followed by the peaceful annexation of the port of Başra a decade later. Başra provided the Ottomans with a base from which to counter the Portuguese, who were aggressively raiding Muslim shipping in the Persian Gulf from their fortified position on the island of Hormuz.

Throughout the tenth/sixteenth century, the Ottoman state attempted to preserve the flow of Asian spices to the Middle East by establishing diplomatic and military missions to Muslim states in India and Sumatra and setting up a state monopoly, operating out of Cairo, for the import of spices. But ultimately, the contest between the Ottomans and the Portuguese was a draw as the interests of individual merchants and investors triumphed over the commercial ambitions of either the Ottoman or the Portuguese empire. After a brief interruption, pepper again followed the old trade routes and was purchased by European traders in Cairo and Aleppo. But the practice of global commerce was changing, and in the following century the Dutch and the English successfully challenged the Portuguese dominance of the trade of the Indies. With the rise of privately funded trading companies in Amsterdam and London, backed by improved naval warships, northern Europeans could more profitably obtain the commodities of South and South-East Asia directly from the producers than they could through either Portuguese or Ottoman intermediaries. Muslim merchants, however, continued to supply Asian goods to the Ottoman empire until the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century.

Western Europe’s international trade in the age of exploration and conquest was increasingly in the hands of joint-stock trading companies that held monopolies for their country’s commerce in specifically designated regions of
the world. England’s Queen Elizabeth I granted such powers to the Levant Company in 1581 to trade in the Ottoman empire and a similar joint stock company was established in Amsterdam in 1625. Those two companies, along with French merchants who were regulated by the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce, would handle much of the Ottoman trade to the West for the next two centuries. Previously, individual European merchant houses had conducted much of that commerce across the Mediterranean. These were mostly based in Italy, although not exclusively so, and Ottoman merchants, both Muslim and non-Muslim, could be found in the Italian port cities as well.\(^9\) Merchants following in those traditions did not disappear with the rise of the trading companies. The Venetians, in particular, were able to weather the arrival of their new competitors for at least another century.\(^10\) Armenian merchants, originally from Iran and the Ottoman empire, also established commercial houses in various European ports during this period.\(^11\) But with stricter governmental controls over imports at the European ports, the opportunities for independent traders diminished as the trading monopolies proved extremely effective in controlling the European end of the trade of the Levant.\(^12\)

Two commodities, European woollen broadcloths and Iranian raw silk, dominated the Levant trade in the eleventh/seventeenth century. The Europeans also purchased goods produced within the empire such as cotton yarn, dried fruits, carpets and gallnuts (used in the dyeing of cloth); in return, they imported tin, paper, clocks and silver coins into the empire. But these secondary commodities were often an afterthought purchased by company factors to fill up holds of ships that might otherwise sail partially empty. Iranian silk easily comprised more than half of all goods purchased by the Europeans in the Ottoman empire in the eleventh/seventeenth century and woollen cloth over half their imports. Although the inhabitants of Istanbul created a local trade deficit with their growing appetite for European imports, the balance of trade in that century was in the Ottoman empire’s favour. A steady flow of silver from the West was needed to make up the difference, although the directors of the English Levant Company consistently opposed the export of silver as detrimental to sound business practice in their mercantilist view of trade.\(^13\) Ottoman merchants used much of that silver, however, to buy imports from the East and, overall, the empire had a net negative international trade balance in bullion.

Both sultans and shahs appreciated the strategic importance of the silk trade to their rivals. Sultan Selim sought to embargo Persian silk from entering his realm during his campaign against the Mamluks. In the early eleventh/seventeenth century, it was the turn of Shah ʿAbbās (r. 995–1038/1587–1629)
who attempted to turn his country’s silk trade into a state monopoly and direct it both northward towards Russia and south to his ports on the Persian Gulf, thereby denying his rival the benefits of the transit trade. But as was the case with the spice trade, these interventions had little lasting impact. With ‘Abbās’ death, the Armenian merchants transporting Iran’s silk returned to the well-established overland caravan routes that led to the Ottoman cities of Aleppo and Izmir.14

Aleppo had been a major destination of the caravans connecting Asia to the Mediterranean for centuries, if not millennia. The trade in Iranian silk in its markets simply replaced pepper, which had been its most profitable commodity in the preceding century. But the silk trade helped to recast Izmir from a minor port to one of the empire’s most important cities. That development was aided by the presence of the factors of the European trading companies who recognised the value not only of the silk that was arriving in the city from Iran but also of the agricultural products of the port’s hinterlands. The Europeans transformed the port with their warehouses, taverns and homes, creating a small replica of a European port city, known as the ‘Street of the Franks’, on Ottoman soil. Izmir presents us with an example of economic growth fuelled by an unregulated market in opposition to the tightly controlled model that the sultans sought to impose on their capital that will be discussed below.15 Izmir was the first of several ‘colonial’ port cities, eventually including Alexandria and Beirut, which would emerge on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean as the Ottoman empire was pulled into a global economy dominated by western Europe. Significantly, it never became a provincial capital. Rather Ottoman officialdom thought of the city as being somewhat unsavoury owing to its reliance on trade and the presence of large numbers of foreigners and Ottoman non-Muslims living there and they made very little personal investment in the city.

Another Ottoman port that benefited from the European commercial expansion in the eastern Mediterranean was Salonika (Thessaloniki). It had once been a major Byzantine city, but its economic fortune went into decline with its definitive conquest by the Ottomans in 833/1430. The city’s commercial prospects revived, however, with the influx of Iberian Jews who had been expelled from their homeland. The sultans encouraged the Jews, many of whom had been active in the woollen industry of Spain, to settle in the city in the tenth/sixteenth century by granting them a monopoly over the supply of woollen cloth to the palace and the army. That activity transformed the city and it emerged as a major exporter of the agricultural and industrial output of the Ottoman Balkans long after its woollen industry had collapsed, because of European competition.16
With the increasing political instability that plagued Iran in the twelfth/eighteenth century, the export of silk to the Ottoman lands declined. With that development, the British Levant Company greatly reduced its operations in the empire as its factors scrambled to find products that could be marketed at home. The French merchants were more successful in their adaptation and began to cultivate relations with the politically dominant Druze and Maronite families in Lebanon to expand the production of local silk to be exported for the use of the silk textile industry centred in Lyons. In Cairo, the French merchants specialised in the trade of Yemeni coffee, a product that was increasingly popular in continental Europe. But that trade experienced a decline of its own as the French began to cultivate coffee on plantations established on their Caribbean possessions.

By the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century, New World coffee was competing with that of Yemen in the markets of the Ottoman empire. With that development, the Ottoman empire ceased to play a major role in the global transit trade that had enriched it in the earlier centuries. Whereas the empire’s merchants had once enjoyed a commercial reach well beyond the empire’s boundaries, increasingly the empire’s external trade was largely bilateral with Europe alone, as European merchants or their agents imported most of the Asian or African goods that entered the empire. The one exception to this pattern of European dominance was the slave trade. In return, the empire had become a major exporter of agricultural products, grown locally for western European consumers. In the process, the Ottoman empire was reduced to a role on the economic periphery of a world economy dominated by the European nation-states.

Capitulatory regime

The legal underpinning of the European trade with the Ottoman empire lay in the decrees issued by the sultan that gave dispensations to the European merchants to live and trade in the empire. Islamic law held that all states that were in the dār al-harb (abode of war), i.e those not headed by a Muslim and governed by Islamic law, were technically at war with the empire. European merchants, therefore, needed an ‘ahidnāme, literally a ‘pledge letter’, that would guarantee them the sultan’s protection (isti‘mān). Such grants were known generically in Europe as ‘capitulations’, from the Latin capitula, ‘headings’, and intiyyāzāt, ‘exemptions’ in Ottoman Turkish. Unlike treaties promulgated between sovereign states in Europe, the sultan granted such a decree unilaterally at the request of a particular nation’s ambassador.
These decrees permitted European merchants to reside in specified Ottoman cities and to conduct trade with minimal tariffs and interference but generally asked for no reciprocity for Ottoman subjects from their respective nations. The resident Europeans were not subject to the jizye, unlike the Genoese of Galata, nor were they compelled to abide by Islamic law in issues of their personal status. This was not a break from the practice either of earlier Muslim rulers or of those Muslim rulers who were the Ottomans’ contemporaries. But over time, the nature of the relationship between sultan and European merchants changed as the European nations came to view these decrees as actual treaties, negotiated between two sovereign states, rather than simply being exemptions granted to the merchants through the munificence of the sultan.

The Ottoman sultans understood the strategic implications of the treaties and sought potential allies who might undercut their main rivals in the eastern Mediterranean, the Venetians and later the Habsburgs, by proffering non-belligerent European powers special dispensations for trade, usually in the form of a lower rate of tariffs. The sultans were willing to allow the Europeans to expand their privileges as they viewed the transit trade as a reliable source of revenue anyway. With that motive, even the Venetians were not shut out from trading in the empire. In times when the Republic was not at war with the sultan, it too was granted an ʻahidnāme; Venetian merchants simply had to pay higher tariffs than their trading rivals.

Sultan Süleymān (r. 926–74/1520–66) issued the first of these ‘special-relationship’ treaties to France in 941/1535. Similar treaties with England, the Netherlands and Poland followed. The treaties with Poland were unique in that they established reciprocity by granting Ottoman merchants, usually Armenians, the same rights in Poland that Polish merchants enjoyed in the empire. The capitulatory treaties were only valid, however, as long as the sultan who issued them was alive. Additionally, the sultan could revoke them unilaterally in times of war when the resident foreign merchants from the belligerent nation were forced to leave the empire and their goods were confiscated.

For the first century and a half of their existence, the capitulatory treaties merely established that the Europeans could live in the Ottoman empire, but provided few other advantages beyond the lower tariffs that were offered to the ‘friendly nations’ (düwel-i muḥibbe). Even so, those rates were still higher than the transit and import taxes levied on Muslim merchants trading in the empire. The Europeans in that era had to live within the laws and regulations of the Ottoman state and often suffered the disadvantages of trying to do
business in a society that they did not completely comprehend. As few Europeans learnt Ottoman Turkish, they were largely dependent on their translators, dragomans, who were usually Ottoman Jews or Levantines.

The legal situation of European merchants resident in the empire changed, however, as the balance of military power began to shift in Europe’s favour. With the sultan’s ‘ahidnāme with France in 1084/1673 and that with England two years later, the Europeans were given the right to take any commercial dispute worth over 4,000 āqche, a relatively small sum, to Istanbul where their ambassador would be present at the litigation. This enabled the European merchants to circumvent the authority of the Islamic courts in the cities where they resided. The option of going to Istanbul did not end the Europeans’ use of the local courts when Islamic law was perceived by them as working in their favour, but it gave them another strategy in commercial disputes with Ottoman subjects. But by the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century, almost every European nation had negotiated a comparable treaty and it was no longer simply the sultan’s allies that were so rewarded. Muslim merchants saw that privilege as undermining the advantages given to them by Islamic law and they frequently protested against the right of the Europeans and their protégés to take litigation to the capital. Although Muslim jurists often supported their appeals to the sultan for redress, they seemingly had little apparent effect.

One of the unintended results of the capitulatory treaties after 1084/1673 was the acceleration of the emergence of a non-Muslim merchant class in the empire by giving special privileges to those of the sultan’s subjects who worked for the Europeans as translators. These included that they would pay the same customs duties as their European patrons, be exempt from paying the jizye and other collective taxes imposed on their religious communities and enjoy the right to take any commercial dispute with ordinary Ottoman subjects to Istanbul for adjudication. Many of the critics of the capitulatory regime point to its wholesale abuse by the European consuls who obtained berā’ts (patents) far in excess of the numbers to which they were entitled for their protégés and to the unfair commercial advantages that came with such a berā’t. The Ottoman bureaucrats were well aware of these potential inequities inherent in the institution, however. To counter the possibilities of abuse, they consistently invoked two principles: the banning of dragomans from trade and the enforcement of the limit placed on the number of individuals who could legitimately be employed by a European consul. Such attempts were usually blocked by interventions of the European consuls, and by the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century some of the wealthiest non-Muslim merchants in the empire enjoyed dragoman status.
Although the participation of the dragomans in trade was annoying to their Muslim competitors, the capitulatory regime was not solely responsible for the emergence of wealthy non-Muslim merchants. Catholics from Dubrovnik, Orthodox Ottoman Christians and Armenians had controlled the overland export trade from the Balkans to eastern and central Europe from the time of the Ottoman conquest of the region. From the twelfth/eighteenth century onwards, Greek merchants and ship captains dominated the trade of the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Ottoman islands of Crete and Cyprus. Syrian Melkite Catholic merchants controlled much of the external commerce of Egypt, in both the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Further east, Jewish merchants were prominent in the trade between Basra and India. In all of these areas, men who were nominally dragomans for European consuls were involved in the trade. But rather than creating the opportunities for becoming a wealthy merchant, dragoman status was usually something a merchant sought to protect his position once he already achieved commercial success. Dragoman status did not necessarily create wealth but it did secure it.

Although the emergence of a prosperous class of non-Muslim merchants was not directly linked to patronage from the European consuls, there can be little doubt that their change in economic status was tied to the Ottoman empire’s growing dependency on trade with the West. Simply put, prejudice on both sides of the religious divide made it difficult for Muslims to continue to participate in international trade once it was carried almost exclusively on European-owned ships. There were still cases of Muslims dealing directly with the European merchants, especially in the Arab provinces. But increasingly such contact was left to non-Muslim middlemen. Along trade routes where there was very little European economic penetration, however, Muslim merchants continued to dominate commerce. This was most obviously true for the caravan trade connecting the various regions of Arabia. But Muslims were typically the leading merchants in inland trading centres such as Damascus, Baghdad, Ankara and Diyarbakir, well into the following century.

Owing to the survival of the records of the European trading companies, scholars have concentrated on the European role and their local non-Muslim partners when discussing the Ottoman empire’s international commerce. But the court records of various Ottoman cities show that merchants from Iran, India, Central Asia and North Africa were also participants in Ottoman trade at least to the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century. But as Muslims ruled those merchants’ homelands, Ottoman officials did not treat them as aliens, enemy or otherwise. Rather, merchants from fellow Muslim states, whether they were Muslim or non-Muslim, were subject to the same Islamic law that
governed Ottoman merchants. As such, there was no need for sultanic decrees guaranteeing their right to trade and travel freely as the holy law already did so. While the Armenian merchants from Iran acquiesced to litigation in Muslim courts, they chafed under the provision that they had to pay the *jizye* to the sultan as well as to the shah. They were finally granted an exemption from that requirement in 1101/1690, but it was not until 1848 that the Iranians negotiated their own capitulatory treaty with the sultan. With it, the Iranians gained the quasi-extraterritorial status that the Europeans had enjoyed for almost two centuries.26

State interventions in trade

There is little doubt that international trade was important for those who ruled the Ottoman empire, but internal trade generated the bulk of the profits that its merchants made and provided greater tax revenues for the sultan’s coffers than was generated by import and export tariffs. With its physical size and its diversity of climates and ecological zones, the empire constituted a micro world system in itself. In trying to regulate the empire’s internal trade, the Ottomans used two very different strategies. The first was to impose state control over the provisioning of the capital and the imperial army.27 The monopolies that such provisioning required were strategic necessities that dwarfed any purely economic concerns. If there were insecurity along the empire’s borders or civil unrest in its capital, the empire might fall, or at the very least the sultan might lose his throne as he did in 1143/1730. The other strategy was almost a polar opposite of the first and held that free trade should be encouraged. Centuries of Islamic economic experience had taught the sultans and their advisers to promote the flow of trade by imposing minimal tariffs on the caravans, providing security along their routes and through the construction and maintenance of commercial infrastructure at state expense. Ottoman policies towards internal trade could thus be summarised rather simply. In cases where the state’s political interests were at stake, those concerns took precedence over the market. Otherwise the state’s intervention in trade was to be kept at a minimum and applied only if the free flow of trade was threatened.

Istanbul’s population, which approached half a million in the tenth–eleventh/ sixteenth–seventeenth centuries, consumed an overwhelming array of products, both imported and domestically produced. Almost all the city’s trade arrived by sea. That made it possible for the state to provide the city inhabitants with foodstuffs that were otherwise prohibitively expensive in the inland cities
of the empire. Rice provides a good example of that economic reality. While only the wealthy consumed it in the interior of the empire, it was a staple for much of the population of Istanbul, thanks to state-subsidised sea transport. Sugar, spices and coffee came to Istanbul from Egypt, besides rice; from markets closer to the city in the Balkans and western Anatolia, merchants or state agents would bring olive oil, wheat, fruits and meat on the hoof. The supply of meat was a particular concern, and throughout the two centuries following the city’s conquest the Ottoman authorities compelled individuals to act as the state’s agents in the procurement of live sheep that were then sold at fixed prices to butchers in the city. Compulsion was necessary as the individuals involved usually lost money on the transactions owing to the fact that the meat was sold in the capital at prices below what it could fetch in the unregulated provincial markets.28

The wheat trade of the Black Sea and the export of sugar and rice from Egypt were also carefully regulated and monitored by the authorities in the capital. Such state intervention was relatively uncommon in Muslim history, but it represented an adaptation of Byzantine practices that, in turn, echoed those of ancient Rome. The emperors, like the sultans, had to supply a population that had outgrown the capacity of the free market to provide the necessities of life for the urban poor in an imperial capital. Within the city’s markets, the state exercised considerable control over other aspects of commerce as well. Periodically, the merchants and guild representatives would meet with state officials to draw an official price list (narkh defteri) for all the commodities that were sold in Istanbul. Copies of the list would then be distributed to the city’s judges, who were authorised to compel compliance in the marketplace.29 Outside the capital, state intervention in the market occurred only in times of economic crisis, such as drought or locust infestation. Otherwise, provincial markets were left to the natural forces of supply and demand, although guilds could set their own price structure internally. Once agreed upon, the local judges would impose that price structure on errant members, if necessary. Islamic legal scholars, outside the capital, considered such attempts at price fixing illegal, however, and provincial courts, particularly in the Arab provinces, were ambivalent at best about them.

Whether or not the intervention of the Ottoman state in Istanbul’s trade had a positive effect on the empire’s economy is still an open question. But there can be little doubt that the sultan’s commitment to keep the trade routes open did help to secure the regional caravan trade at a time when competition from the European trading companies threatened to give it a fatal blow. Throughout the empire, the state constructed and maintained bridges and
caravanserais that would aid the caravans’ progress and provide security for the merchants travelling with them. Garrisons were also maintained at strategic points to guard the merchants against bandits, or in the Arab provinces against Bedouins. The most prestigious of all the routes so protected was the Sultan’s Road, running from Üsküdar to the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina.

In 1080/1669, Ibrāhīm al-Khiyārī (d. 1083/1672) set out from his native Medina to follow the Sultan’s Road to Istanbul. Along the way, he meticulously recorded the caravanserais, garrisons and bridges that the Ottoman state provided to keep the road open. He also recorded a close encounter with Bedouin raiders that made such infrastructure necessary. In addition, he recorded the location of regional markets that had sprung up along the road to provide various local commodities to the travellers. With upwards of 20,000 pilgrims travelling the route each year, the annual hajj was probably the single largest motor of the Ottoman economy, after the army. Prices for all sorts of commodities would rise as the pilgrims approached Damascus at the start of the pilgrimage and prices for Yemeni coffee, Indian cotton cloth and spices plummeted in the city upon their return. A similar economic impact occurred all along the route in each of the cities through which the pilgrims passed.

In addition to the direct investment of the Ottoman state into the commercial infrastructure of the empire, those who enjoyed the sultan’s favour and patronage contributed significantly to the construction of commercial infrastructure through the institution of pious endowments (waqfs). Although the beneficiary of the waqf was usually a charity, the building of marketplaces and commercial buildings almost invariably accompanied the construction of a new mosque or other institutions such as hospitals or soup kitchens for the poor; the rent from the worldly properties would subsidise the spiritual aims of the endowment.

There was a tremendous building boom throughout the empire during the tenth/sixteenth century in which high-ranking Ottoman officials and their wives invested large sums in the construction of commercial structures that would support charitable causes. In the process, the cities of the Ottoman Balkans benefited greatly and new cities such as Sarajevo came into being. Although urban growth supported by waqfs was most noticeable in the Balkans, other cities in the empire enjoyed court patronage as well. The commercial heart of the city of Aleppo, for example, doubled in size throughout the course of the tenth/sixteenth century. Ottoman officials who were, or had been, stationed in the city paid for the construction of new markets and
caravanserais to support three new Ottoman-style mosques that were built in that first century of Ottoman rule in the city, putting an Ottoman face on the skyline.\footnote{Yûsuf Khâş Häjib, \textit{Wisdom of royal glory (Kutadgu Bilig): A Turko-Islamic mirror for princes}, trans. Robert Dankoff, Chicago, 1983, 184.}

As was the case with the Muslim states that pre-dated it or were its contemporaries, the Ottoman empire sought to promote trade whenever possible. But its concerns were focused on commerce itself rather than on the merchants who conducted it. In contrast, the western European nations consistently pressured the Ottoman court for commercial advantages for their own nationals after the eleventh/seventeenth century. That was, perhaps, to be expected as the ambassadors at the Ottoman court were typically commercial agents for the joint stock companies rather than crown-appointed diplomats. For the Europeans, diplomacy was all about trade and little else mattered. That gave them a single issue when negotiating with Ottoman officials for whom trade was only one issue of concern. Awareness of the nature of that imbalance came very late to the sultan’s advisers and the empire would suffer the consequences in the nineteenth century CE.

Notes

The ‘ulamā’

MANUELA MARÍN

Introduction

Scholars (‘ulamā’, sing. ‘ālim) constitute the most fully documented social group of pre-modern Islamic societies. Information is so abundant that in some cases we can track specific families across considerable geographical and chronological distances and carry out quantitative sociological analyses.¹ This wealth of information comes to us directly from the ‘ulamā’ themselves, as they were careful to leave detailed written records of their names, activities and professional accomplishments in the form of thousands upon thousands of biographical entries compiled in what are known as ‘biographical dictionaries’.

The image that the ‘ulamā’ convey of themselves is one of individuals fully dedicated to the study and dissemination of knowledge (‘ilm). The ‘ulamā’ preserved and spread the revealed Word, the deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and the legal system which gave form to their society. As the individuals who shaped and interpreted this knowledge, the ‘ulamā’ regarded themselves as ‘heirs of the prophets’. Their social practices were calculated to preserve and pass on their rank, just as the ‘ulamā’ preserved and transmitted their knowledge, from one generation to the next. Thus, biographical dictionaries have been regarded by some modern scholars as the Islamic counterpart of the official archives that we find for the medieval Christian West.²

In spite of an acute sense among the ‘ulamā’ themselves that they constituted a collective entity, it is difficult to define them as such. A particular individual was recognised as an ‘ālim by his own peers, or when the number and devotion of his disciples earned him fame as a teacher. But there existed no ‘profession’ of ‘ālim as such, to which one might gain access through a pre-established process and which would then automatically lead to salaried employment in the public administration (at any rate, not until the end of the ninth/fifteenth century, when the Ottoman state established just such a
It is true that only an ‘ālim could be eligible for certain posts, such as those that required a complete mastery of jurisprudence. But there were ‘ulamā’ who earned a living by professions that were far removed from the world of learning, or who were independently wealthy. In short, the social origins and professional careers of individual ‘ulamā’ varied considerably, and this fact conditions any attempt to study them as a homogeneous body. They all had one thing in common, which was their devotion to the pursuit of knowledge.

We cannot know for sure the process by which the authors of the biographical dictionaries decided which individuals were true ‘ulamā’ and hence worthy of inclusion in their works. This is especially the case for the lesser ranks of scholars. Many individuals are listed simply as ‘learned men’: besides their names, all we know about them is the fact that they had studied under a particular scholar. By contrast, it is a relatively simple matter to discern the elements of excellence that would earn a scholar the lengthy biographical entry of a great ‘ālim’, though it must be noted that these elements might vary considerably from one historical period to the next. One of the basic prerequisites was having studied under a large number of illustrious masters. No less important was having in turn attracted a large number of disciples. It was also essential to have mastery of more than one area of knowledge, a character of exemplary virtue and a life guided by impeccable piety. In certain regions and periods, the most renowned ‘ulamā’ were distinguished by having had links with Sufism. Descent from a family of ‘ulamā’ unquestionably also facilitated an early entry into the ranks of the renowned, but it by no means guaranteed it. High value was placed on individual effort, and the ability to earn one’s own reputation counted for a great deal, given that the hierarchy of prestige among the ‘ulamā’ was based on the degree of recognition among his peers that an individual achieved. Specialisation in a particular branch of learning might also play a decisive role. In Timbuktu, the highest of various clearly defined ranks among the ‘ulamā’ was reserved for those who specialised in Islamic jurisprudence (fuqahā’, sing. faqīh).³

The ‘ulamā’ displayed their awareness of belonging to a special category by outward signs of identity. The Baghdad judge Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798) is thought to have introduced the wearing of particular clothes by those who exercised public functions associated with religious law. Throughout the period covered in this volume, the ‘ulamā’ were clearly recognisable in their communities by not only their clothes but also their headdress. At the same time, they were always expected to conduct themselves with decorum and
avoid signs of ostentation. When they failed to comply, they could expect stern criticism. As members of the learned elite, their conduct and appearance had to serve as models for the rest of society.

The ‘ulamā’ and the cities

Cities were the natural milieu of the ‘ulamā’, and it is no accident that many of the Islamic ‘histories’ of cities like Baghdad and Damascus are in reality records of the ‘ulamā’ who flourished in them. In the areas with high urban densities, the number of ‘ulamā’ was correspondingly large, while in the countryside their presence was minimal. Cities tended to become the hubs of networks that drew from the surrounding rural areas. During the sixth–seventh/twelfth–thirteenth centuries, for example, the town of Qūṣ in Upper Egypt was the centre from which life in the neighbouring villages was regulated, and these villages would send their likeliest young men to Qūṣ to be trained as ‘ulamā’. Cairo exerted a similar attraction over the Nile Delta. By contrast, it was political circumstances that turned the port city of Ceuta into a haven for ‘ulamā’ fleeing the fighting between Almohads and Ḥafṣids, while in similar fashion many ‘ulamā’ of Saragossa and Valencia made their way to Murcia and Almería as the Christian conquests advanced southwards across the Iberian Peninsula. The capitals of the Ottoman empire – Bursa, Edirne and above all Istanbul – played similar roles as centres of political power that provided support and structure for the scholarly world.

Thus, the city was the habitat of choice for scholars. It was in the city that the most illustrious masters were likely to be found and it was therefore the place where one could receive the best education. Once such an education had been acquired, an ‘ālim could expect to find the sort of employment with the religious or legal establishment that would allow him simultaneously to engage in scholarly activities, thereby playing his part in a civilian elite that represented a counterforce to military and political power.

Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the capacity of rulers to draw the ‘ulamā’ into their circles of influence. The presence of a strong dynastic power tended to generate a centripetal movement among the scholarly elite, particularly when a ruler had himself a strong personal interest in knowledge, or was generous in his financial patronage of scholars. And scholarly presence at the court enhanced the ruler’s religious legitimacy. In fifth/eleventh century al-Andalus many Taifa (‘party’) kings were closely linked with scholarship. The court of al-Muẓaffar, king of Badajoz, was noted for its ‘ulamā’, whose fields of specialisation ranged from religion and law to poetry.
and literature. In Denia, Mujahid al-‘Amirī was responsible for setting up an influential school of Qur’ānic reading. The Ottoman sultans took this active involvement to its fullest realisation: they turned the ‘ulamā’ into a body of state employees. On the other hand, the demise of a particular dynasty sometimes had repercussions on the ‘ulamā’ who had prospered under its patronage, as seems to have occurred at Tlemcen with the fall of the Zayyānids.

The education of the ‘ulamā’: curriculum, teachers and texts

The training to become an ‘ālim typically commenced at an early age, and the sources mention more than a few scholars who began their education while still small boys. A boy’s first teacher was often his father or other relative, assuming that they were ‘ulamā’ too. Within the intimacy of the family environment, it was also not unusual for women to be taught how to read and write by their fathers, brothers or husbands, and occasionally women were even introduced to more specialised branches of knowledge. Further learning could only be gained by attending lessons taught by the great masters in these teachers’ homes, or in mosques and madrasas, which were all out of bounds to women.

For those young men eager to become ‘ulamā’, it was essential to accumulate a curriculum based around apprenticeship to the leading scholars of the day, both at home and abroad. At the heart of the system lay on the one hand the body of knowledge itself, expressed in spoken or written form, and on the other the link that developed between teacher and disciple through the transmission process. It is a system that has often been characterised as personalised, fluid and unstructured, to the extent that some have even rejected the term ‘system’ altogether as being inappropriate to the way in which students were turned into ‘ulamā’. Comparison with the university traditions of the Christian West are not always helpful, for in the Islamic societies there were indeed no universities, degrees or syllabuses as such. However, the cultivation and transmission of knowledge obeyed clearly defined rules, rules that were created and maintained by the ‘ulamā’ themselves in order to guarantee their monopoly over the social practices related to the realm of scholarship.

One example of the complexity of the rules governing this ‘scientific’ behaviour is the very specific vocabulary developed to describe the different processes of textual transmission. Another example is the clearly defined
gradations used by the authors of the biographical dictionaries to categorise the merits of their subjects. And in the dictionary entries, the list of teachers that each ‘ālim studied under conveys exactly the same meaning as the degree awarded by a Western university. An aspiring ‘ālim had to choose his teachers carefully according to their rank and reputation, for by studying under them he would acquire something of their personal authority, and he would become one more link in a chain of inherited recognition. This formally unstructured system of learning underwent a great change during the Ottoman period, when the ‘ulamā’ became state functionaries through a process that filtered out the less suitable candidates. The final result was a powerful hierarchical structure of a sort previously alien to the world of Islamic scholarship.

Prior to the Ottoman period, the acquisition of scholarly knowledge was an undertaking at once highly personal, since it was based on individual merit and the unique relationship that arose between each master and disciple, and at the same time clearly collective, given that it involved participation in a broad network of intellectual contacts. These two aspects overlapped in the written formulas to describe the relationship between a teacher and his students. Beginning in the sixth/twelfth century, these formulas crystallised into a special bibliographic genre (fahrasa, barnāmaj, muʿjam) particularly popular in the Islamic west. Ibn Khayr (d. 575/1180) organised his fahrasa by grouping the books which he had studied and transmitted according to their contents, the great majority dealing with Prophetic Traditions (ḥadīth), grammar and literature, but with a few chapters devoted to works on law, genealogies and the interpretation of dreams. In his muʿjam, Ibn al-Abbār (d. 658/1260) reproduces fragments of a letter that Abū ‘Alī ʾl-Šadafi sent from Denia to his colleague al-Rikli (d. 513/1119f.). Thanks to them, we can reconstruct the sort of information that ‘ulamā’ exchanged among themselves. In his letter, Abū ‘Ali tells his friend of the professional opportunities he may expect to encounter in Baghdad. He also reports that he has lost several of the books he had acquired during his stay in the East when he was shipwrecked on the return voyage, but notes that among the books he managed to save is a copy of the Kitāb al-qarīḥayn that contains a chapter missing in the copy owned by al-Rikli. Finally, Abū ‘Alī updates his correspondent on his personal situation. On his way home to al-Andalus, he learned that his parents had died during his absence. He managed to endure these and other travails thanks to the help of a family in Valencia that took him in because he had made the acquaintance of a relative of theirs while he was in Alexandria. This
family of ‘ulamā’ attended Abū ‘Ali’s battered spirit with such solicitude that he ended up marrying one of the host’s daughters.¹⁶ Al-Ṣadaﬁ’s letter to al-Riklī touches on several key themes: the importance of having demonstrably reliable copies of texts in order to make progress in learning; the bonds of friendship and the constant intercourse between scholars over large distances; and the networks of kinship relations that grew up around an ‘ālim’s professional activities.

If they had sufficient means at their disposal, the ‘ulamā’ became virtual bibliophiles, amassing substantial libraries, and the ever-growing written output made it essential for the ‘ulamā’ to be sure that any books they obtained were of the highest quality. Rulers were sometimes behind the creation of large libraries, while individual ‘ulamā’ often made great efforts in the acquisition and conservation of the texts that constituted their principal working tool. Documents from the Haram al-Sharīf in Jerusalem include an inventory of the possessions of an ‘ālim from the eighth/fourteenth century – sufﬁciently obscure as to be absent from the bibliographical dictionaries – in whose library books on Sufism and Šāﬁ‘ī jurisprudence predominated.¹⁷

The personal library of a high-ranking ‘ālim might contain a very large number of books indeed. The number of books owned by the Egyptian al-Qādī al-Fādil (d. 596/1200) was truly spectacular, and even if we leave a certain margin for exaggeration, it points to the excellence of a collection which had clearly beneﬁted from the earlier sale of a Fātimid dynasty library.¹⁸ After the madrasas were created and grew in size and number, they developed their own libraries, which tended to have a more public orientation.

Despite the importance of written texts, they could never completely replace the oral tradition. As noted, personal contact between teacher and student was regarded as essential for the proper transmission of scholarly knowledge. In certain ﬁelds, indeed, oral transmission was absolutely indispensable. This was particularly the case for the Prophetic Traditions, a discipline that witnessed a major revival in the sixth–seventh/twelfth–thirteenth centuries. The most celebrated scholars in this ﬁeld were those who most readily undertook the riḥla, or voyage in search of reliable informants, that is, the teachers who possessed the best chains of textual transmission (isnād). Traditionally, Syrian traditionists travelled to Khurāsān or Iraq, both areas renowned for the qualities of their specialists in ḥadīth. However, the Mongol advances made the trip progressively more hazardous, until eventually the fall of Baghdad in 656/1258 initiated a reverse ﬂow, with ḥadīth scholars from Baghdad taking refuge in Damascus or Cairo.¹⁹
Travels in search of knowledge

Such travels for the purpose of rounding out one’s education were a prominent feature of scholarly life. During the formative period of the Ottoman empire, Turkish ‘ulamā’ would travel to Egypt, Persia or Turkestan to study under the great masters who resided in those distant parts. The ‘ulamā’ of the Islamic west most frequently undertook such journeys, often availing themselves of the opportunity that such a trip provided to fulfill their obligation to make the pilgrimage to the Holy Sites of Islam. These ‘Maghribis’ (a term that included the Andalusīs) had a sizeable presence in Alexandria, Cairo and Damascus, and even in provincial cities like Qūṣ. In fact, the flowering of Qūṣ in the sixth/twelfth century was due in part to the presence of shrines of saints, most of them Maghribīs, who had settled, died and been buried in the city. Their tombs became the focus of pilgrimage and in turn attracted new visitors from abroad. In Damascus, though Maghribī immigrants never achieved the same degree of influence as scholars from Palestine and Kurdistan, they constituted an important segment of the city’s ‘ulamā’ in the seventh/thirteenth century, and were particularly well known as specialists in Qur’ānic readings and hadīth. The Andalusī mystic Muḥyī ‘l-Dīn Ibn al-‘Arabī was protected by the Damascene Banū Zakī family and even buried in the family pantheon, where his memory is venerated to this day.

The important role played by such journeys in the training of the ‘ulamā’ can be seen in the appearance in the first half of the sixth/twelfth century of a new genre of literature: the travel account. A combination of geographical description and narrative of the traveller’s progress, both territorial and intellectual, these travel accounts provide valuable evidence of how the web of personal contacts that linked an aspiring ‘ālim with his peers in other regions might become established, and show us how such contacts stimulated such a person’s intellectual development.

The earliest example to have survived, albeit in fragmentary form, describes how the Sevillian Abū Bakr ibn al-‘Arabī (d. 543/1148) decided, while still young, to travel east in order to broaden his intellectual perspectives. Egypt does not seem to have made much of an impression on him, but he devotes considerable attention to Palestine. Ibn al-‘Arabī spent three years in Jerusalem, and he describes the experience of attending a scholarly lesson for the first time while in that city. Finding himself completely out of his depth, he urged his father to proceed to the Ḥijāz without him, for he was determined not to leave Jerusalem until he had acquired all the
knowledge that the city had to offer him, chiefly in the realms of dogmatic theology (kalām) and the science of legal fundamentals, both disciplines that had hitherto received scant attention back home in al-Andalus. Ibn al-ʿArabi’s stay in Jerusalem also allowed him, he reports, to meet and debate with Jewish and Christian scholars, who freely voiced their opinions, as well as Muʿtazilīs and scholars of the different schools of Islamic law. His account suggests that such contacts were not something he had been accustomed to in al-Andalus.  

Ibn Jubayr’s (d. 614/1217) riḥla has come to be regarded as such a paradigm of its genre – alongside Ibn Baṭṭūta’s classic work – that it has diverted attention from the no less valuable travel accounts by other Maghribī authors such as Ibn Saʿīd (d. 685/1286), al-Tijānī (d. after 711/1311), Ibn Rushayd (d. 721/1321), al-Tujībī (d. c. 730/1329) and al-Balawī (d. after 767/1365). The last known example of this genre to be written in al-Andalus is a riḥla by the mathematician al-Qalasādī (d. 891/1486), in which he describes in detail the fifteen years he spent away from Baza, his native town, and the visits he made to Tlemcen, Tunis, Cairo and Mecca. Al-Qalasādī’s riḥla is a goldmine of information about the learned elites of these cities and his own hometown, as well as the ‘ulamāʾ of Granada, capital of the Naṣīrid kingdom.  

Less common were the visits of eastern ‘ulamāʾ to the Maghrib, though accounts do exist of such journeys. Once the Mamlūk regime allowed the creation of a broad secure zone around the main travel routes, members of the scholarly elite could choose to pursue their professional careers at any one of many diverse points spread over an immense geographic area. Al-Kūrānī (d. 894/1489), who came originally from Anatolia, lived in Samarqand and Cairo. Al-Tustarī (d. 828/1425) lived in Yemen, India, Ethiopia, Mecca and Cairo.  

The madrasas and the professionalisation of the ‘ulamāʾ  

Until the fifth/eleventh century, with a few very local exceptions, the process of transmitting and disseminating knowledge had depended on the existence of teachers and students, who developed their own methods to recognise and evaluate the quality of their professional competence. Then, in Baghdad the first madrasas were founded, buildings whose sole function was to serve as a venue for educational activities. In the following century, madrasas began to be founded in large numbers also in Egypt and Syria. The
Ayyūbid princes, particularly Saladin, were instrumental in the spread of this ‘institution’, which brought about profound changes in the world of scholarly learning.

The rise of the madrasas has traditionally been linked to the ‘Sunni revival’ movement that the Ayyūbids promoted. More recent interpretations have focused instead on the fact that every madrasa was established as a private charitable foundation that depended on the generosity of those individuals prepared to leave a pious endowment (waqf) for its upkeep. The laws governing waqf rather than any particular political strategy made the creation of the madrasa possible, and it was these laws that also guaranteed their independence and longevity. Exclusively intended for educational purposes, the madrasas had a special function that set them apart from mosques and seem therefore to have constituted a key step in the trend towards a professionalisation of the ‘ulamā’ and the institutionalisation of the system by which knowledge was transmitted. The very latest research, however, has shifted the focus of this interpretation by highlighting the multiple functions of the madrasas and the different ways they served ‘ulamā’, wealthy families and the representatives of political power.

The founding of a madrasa depended on someone having both the desire and the resources to do so. Such a person, therefore, was characteristically either a ruler or the relative of such a ruler, or a member of the military or urban elites. In the Mamlūk period, at least twenty-two madrasas were established in Egypt by either the sultans or their families, who had at their disposal vast sums of money. Commemoration of the founder was at least part of the motive for founding a madrasa among the Mamlūks, and several of these rulers financed the construction of truly monumental edifices, such as the madrasa of the sultan al-Nāṣir Ḥasan, which had room for up to 506 students. Madrasas were similarly founded by the Ottoman sultans and their families or members of the Ottoman urban elites, particularly in Istanbul, where the imperial madrasas exceeded in number and size anything previously seen in the Islamic world.

Women were also among the founders of madrasas. This on the one hand gives an idea of the financial means available to such women and on the other reveals the important role that the founding of a madrasa played in the public activity of the powerful classes. It has been calculated that one quarter of all the madrasas built in Ayyūbid Damascus were founded by women. ‘Ulamā’ themselves were sometimes also able to establish their own madrasas. In Qūṣ, Ibn Daqīq al-Īd, who had settled in the city in 612/1215,
founded a madrasa which ended up attracting a large number of experts in both the Mālikī and Shāfi‘ī legal schools.30

To the advantages already noted for a founder of a madrasa who belonged to the highest circles of power we might add the fact that founders and their families were often buried within the madrasa precinct, thus guaranteeing themselves the baraka associated with a site dedicated to the promotion of religious knowledge. Furthermore, resources placed at the disposal of a madrasa became invulnerable to possible confiscation. The relatively high degree of depredation endured by civil populations at the hands of military elites or foreign conquerors explains why many resorted to making waqf endowments. Foundations were also a way not only to get around inheritance laws but also to maintain some form of control over family assets short of actual possession.31

The specific conditions of each foundation were spelled out in the endowment deed (waqfiyya) of each madrasa. The madrasa’s founder could choose to be also the administrator (nāżīr) of the endowment or at least oversee the appointment of that officer. He also had the power to define the intellectual orientation of the madrasa or determine which school of law the madrasa’s teachers had to pertain to. A founder’s control of a madrasa was naturally greater if he decided to take up residence on the madrasa premises and could supervise at first hand its functioning.

The previous system of teaching based around the figure of the individual teacher and his network of disciples persisted both within the madrasas and without. Mosques and the private homes of teachers continued to serve as classrooms. The madrasas held no special educational status – in other words, they did not constitute bodies whose legally recognised purpose was to impart education. Teachers could teach either in the madrasa or at home or in both places, for what gave authority to a student and allowed him to become an ‘ālim in due course was not the fact that he had attended a particular madrasa but the fact that he had studied under a particular master.

The madrasas proved to be very successful as an institution for the advantages they offered the founders and for the benefits they gave to the ‘ulamā’, especially by guaranteeing them a steady income from the performance of their scholarly activities. Prior to the development of the madrasa, those who had wished to devote themselves to religious knowledge might find it difficult to do so unless they were of independent means. This explains why many ‘ulamā’ had only been able to pursue their scholarly interests by simultaneously earning a living as craftsmen or merchants.32 Employment within the
legal establishment was another option, though not always a welcome one, since it placed the ‘ālim in a position of direct dependence on the rulers.

The fact that madrasas were supported financially by independent foundations – notwithstanding the fact that many of the benefactors came from the ruling class – completely changed the world of scholarship. A part of the endowment set up for the upkeep of a madrasa was reserved for not only the payment of salaries to teachers but also financial assistance for those students who could not support themselves. Previously, whether they taught in their own homes or at mosques, the ‘ulamā’ had received financial contributions of some sort from their students. The madrasa initiated a gradual professionalisation of the ‘ulamā’, who could now live off their own income without needing to depend on having wealthy students in their classes. At the same time, the world of learning became more accessible to all levels of Muslim society. In Cairo, the madrasas played an important role in a different sort of social integration, by helping the sons of the mamliiks (awlād al-nās), who were not allowed to follow their fathers’ footsteps into positions of military power, to seek other professional outlets.\(^{33}\) Finally, as part of the systematisation of scholarly endeavour undertaken by the Ottomans, even the madrasas themselves pertained to a kind of hierarchy based on the salaries offered to the teachers they employed. Having taught at one of the highest-ranking (and thus better-paying) madrasas was an indispensable requirement for access to the top posts in the Ottomans’ legal–religious establishment.\(^{34}\)

The madrasas and the social practices of the ‘ulamā’

Since the madrasas were primarily intended for the training and education of future ‘ulamā’, it was largely ‘ulamā’ themselves, sometimes as founders and always as teachers and employees, who shaped the institution in such a way that its goal was not simply the transmission of knowledge but also the transmission and preservation of social practices intended to maintain the ‘ulamā’’s own status. Of the two main social effects that the madrasas had – the professionalisation of the ‘ulamā’ and the opening of the world of learning to all social classes – only the first was universally true. The second was always conditioned by the social practices of the dominant elites.

A noteworthy example of these practices is the clause included in the endowment deed of one madrasa which permitted the filling of teaching posts by hereditary succession. This meant that a teacher could be succeeded by a son or other relative, or even by a ‘spiritual son’, in other words a
favourite disciple. This practice of hereditary succession was widespread and represented one of the most effective ways by which the ‘ulamā’ kept their privileges within their own community. In some cases, sons took over from their fathers when they were still very young and lacked the training to be teachers. This problem was solved by the appointment of a substitute (nā’īb), who assumed the post until the ‘heir’ had acquired the necessary experience and stature.

At least in Damascus, the practice was for teachers to be formally appointed to madrasa posts by the sultan, and each post was supported by a permanent stipend (maʿlūm) depending on the financial capacity of each endowment. As a result, there grew up a kind of informal hierarchy in the terms that each post offered (as opposed to the formal system established later by the Ottomans), naturally leading to competition among scholars for the positions that paid best. If a teacher was particularly renowned, he might hold posts in different madrasas at the same time, thus augmenting his earnings. In early ninth/fifteenth-century Cairo, the several teaching posts held simultaneously by Sīrāj al-Dīn ‘Umar, the most important Ḥanafī jurist of his time, allowed him to accumulate great wealth.35

This context favoured a system of patronage. The most important ‘ulamā’ oversaw the awarding of jobs and competed among themselves to place their own protégés. The judge Ibn al-Zākī took advantage of the opportunity offered by the Mongol occupation of Damascus to take control of all the city’s madrasas and distribute their posts among his friends.36 Even in less exceptional circumstances, disputes among ‘ulamā’ for the most coveted jobs were common, for those who managed to secure such posts found their fields of influence considerably enhanced. Strategies of competition were based on kinship relationships and the ties of loyalty and dependence formed between masters and disciples.

The madrasas were not simply arenas of competition and conflict, however. Many ‘ulamā’ actually lived within their walls, as did students coming from abroad. Travelling scholars, pilgrims and merchants could also find temporary lodging there.37 The madrasas were thus points of personal contact, where the ‘ulamā’ could exchange information among themselves and form bonds of friendship. The madrasa had another equally important function, which was to house the madrasa library, often made up of the large collections left by the scholars who had lived there. As a major element of the urban structure, the madrasa was also the hub of a complex network of religious activities and services. Besides the teaching of classes, daily prayers and recitation of the Qur’ān took place on its premises. The
maintenance of the madrasa community necessitated the creation of service jobs and generated subsidiary economic activity, whose impact is difficult to calculate but which was surely beneficial to a madrasa’s immediate surroundings, providing employment to those craftsmen and merchants involved in construction, papermaking and bookbinding, and the provision of food and light.

It was above all in Syria and Egypt that the madrasas flourished, becoming an essential feature of the urban intellectual and social landscape. In Anatolia, the founding of madrasas did not take place on a large scale until the seventh/thirteenth centuries, paralleling the progressive Islamisation of the region. In the Muslim west, the first Andalusī madrasa of which we have evidence was established in Granada by the Nasrid sultan Abū ‘l-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf (I) in 750/1349. In the Maghrib, the learned and wealthy bibliophile Ibn al-Sharrī (d. 649/1251) founded a madrasa in Ceuta in which he also made an endowment consisting of his personal library. This founding seems to have been exceptional in character, and it was only later that the Marinid dynasty promoted the creation of a large network of madrasas that spanned the Maghrib.

The tardy acceptance of the madrasa in the Muslim west has been attributed to a hindrance that is religious in nature. The Maliki school of religious law that predominated there did not allow the founder of a waqf endowment (in these regions called a hūbs, pl. aḥbās) to be at the same time its administrator. This restriction eliminated some of the advantages associated with setting up a madrasa discussed above. Nevertheless, the fact is that once the Marinids determined that the founding of madrasas would serve their political interests, they were clearly able to do so unimpeded. Like the Ayyūbids in the Muslim east, the Marinids succeeded a dynasty that had created its own fiercely ideological elite (in the former case the Fātimids, in the latter the Almohads), and one of the several factors that is thought to have been decisive in the growth of the madrasas in the east was precisely the need to replace the existing potentially hostile elite with new elite groups who largely owed their existence to the Ayyūbid regime and would therefore give it loyal political support. In the Maghrib, the Marinids resorted to the same strategy, with the difference that their programme of madrasa construction, started in Fez in 675/1276, was exclusively promoted by the political rulers themselves, who even set aside the poll tax paid by the Jewish community for the financing of madrasas. The dynasty’s tight control over the new madrasas guaranteed that the ‘ulama’ appointed to teach in them remained docile instruments in the hands of their rulers. This strategy
drew criticism at the time from the renowned scholars who had been passed over when posts were being handed out, and they vented their spleen by accusing the ‘ulamā’ of the new madrasas of being ignoramuses.40

Scholarly knowledge and social mobility
The central role played by scholarly activity in Islamic societies has often been remarked upon. Through learning it was possible in theory to transcend handicaps of social origin or economic status. It is true that the ‘ulamā’ cannot be described as a homogeneous group, given that in principle dedication to the world of scholarly endeavour had no particular social connotation. Indeed, as we have noted, the ‘ulamā’ of the earlier centuries of Islam usually depended for their livelihood on either some other form of employment or inherited wealth, though some were also paid for their teaching.41 This continued to be true in later periods, although the situation changed substantially with the professionalisation inherent in the permanent salaried positions offered by the madrasas. What were the social origins of the ‘ulamā’? Might or might not becoming an ‘ālim alter an individual’s prospects of social advancement? We need to ask whether the apparently easy access to the world of scholarship did not in reality mask a rigid hierarchical stratification.

We should keep in mind first of all that the ‘ulamā’ not only were a heterogeneous group in social terms, but also drew careful distinctions among themselves in terms of intellectual achievement and social origins. For example, we see that in Qūs in Upper Egypt, side by side with ‘ulamā’ coming from well-off families, there were others who lived off the income provided by small agricultural holdings, commercial activities, or flour or sugar mills. Once trained in the madrasas of the city, the more promising among these students of modest means took up posts as readers of the Qurʾān, teachers, court witnesses and muezzins, or pursued careers in the judiciary.42 In other words, what we see is a set of individuals who were fully incorporated into a system of individual advancement that guaranteed the integration of their economic, social and intellectual pursuits. Therefore, the evidence provided by the biographical dictionaries – in this specific case, the dictionary by al-Udfuwī (d. 706/1306) – seems to confirm that the ‘ulamā’ community offered the possibility of a certain amount of advancement within it on the basis of intellectual achievement alone.

A different – though not completely opposed – situation can be seen in Timbuktu. The traditions of this city granted to its ‘ulamā’ a degree of public
recognition that gave them the authority to act as the representatives of city interests before the political authorities and thus endowed their role with great social prestige. The ‘ulamā’ of Timbuktu perpetuated their status through a complex system of transmission of knowledge in which family and economic ties played a key role alongside the relationship between masters and disciples (mulāzama). However, the ‘ulamā’ of Timbuktu clearly differentiated among themselves according to their degree of learning and social origins. At the apex of society were those ‘ulamā’ who belonged to powerful families, while somewhat lower down there was a stratum consisting of ‘ulamā’ with only a basic background in the Islamic sciences and limited expertise in Qur’ānic interpretation and Prophetic Traditions. These lower-ranking ‘ulamā’ were, almost without exception, tailors by profession – or more precisely, the profession of tailor was only open to those who wished to become ‘ulamā’. In this fashion, students of slender means were assured financial support during their period of study. By apprenticing themselves to a master tailor, who was naturally also an ‘ālim, such students were able at one and the same time to receive an Islamic education and to learn a practical craft by which they could make a living once they reached adulthood. The large number of tailors’ workshops recorded for Timbuktu at the end of the tenth/sixteenth century, as well as the numbers of apprentices working in them, gives some idea of the importance of that industry and its connection with the world of the ‘ulamā’.43

There are many recorded cases of social advancement being the reward for knowledge, and this may explain why several modern scholars have claimed that this powerful current of social mobility ensured a close relationship between the ‘ulamā’ and the rest of society.44 As an illustration of social movement in a somewhat different direction, we have observed previously how the sons of the mamlūks found a place in society as ‘ulamā’.45 Something similar occurred in the case of women, for whom becoming a scholar offered a rare opportunity to achieve a socially acceptable form of public recognition. Nevertheless, as we have noted, the participation of women in the world of scholarship was quite different from that of men because of the social conventions that governed social contact between the sexes. Though women might found madrasas, they could neither hold teaching positions nor attend the classes that were taught in them. All the students who lodged in the madrasas were single men, and even where an ‘ālim lived in a madrasa with his family we have no indication that his womenfolk took any part in his academic activities. Furthermore, given that the madrasas served above all as training schools for those who went on to
staff the legal–religious administration, it made no sense to admit women, who would have no access to such positions.

This does not mean that the development of the madrasa left women entirely outside the world of learning, as the madrasas did not completely replace the traditional sites for the transmission of knowledge, and it was in these places that women continued to find a niche. Female members of an ʿālim’s family had the best chances of obtaining a specialised education, by studying under their father or husband, as already noted. Outside the purely family context, once women had achieved sufficient recognition as scholars, they were allowed to transmit their knowledge to students of either sex. Some idea of their presence in the scholarly community is given by the fact that, of the 130 scholars mentioned by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) as having mastered the Prophetic Traditions (ḥadīth), thirty-three were women. In fact, in the Muslim east, transmission of the ḥadīth seems to have been a particular speciality of female ʿulamā’. For one thing, the transmission of the Prophetic Traditions required above all a superb ability to memorise, in other words the qualities of patience and perseverance in one’s studies that were traditionally associated with women. For another thing, the rules governing the transmission of the Prophetic Traditions favoured those of advanced age, for the older the transmitter, the fewer the links in the chain of transmission from the original source. In this arena, women could easily compete with men, and would become preferred transmitters if they managed to survive all the men of their own generation. This tendency was not universal. Though al-Andalus had its share of women scholars, they were not known as ḥadīth specialists. Instead they specialised in the different styles of Qurʾānic reading, a discipline that saw a spectacular flowering in al-Andalus beginning in the fifth/eleventh century.

It thus seems clear that the system did indeed permit a certain amount of both vertical mobility (to the sons of merchants, craftsmen and small landowners) and horizontal mobility (to the sons of mamlūks and women). A possible further sign of horizontal mobility is the permeability of the division between employment in the legal–religious establishment and employment in the civil bureaucracy. But beyond looking at individual cases, it is actually a question of knowing how competition was organised for access to such salaried and socially prized jobs as were not directly controlled by the political or military authorities.

It would seem obvious that the rise of the madrasa offered many Muslims the chance to acquire the training they would need to join the urban elites. Even where the madrasas were practically nonexistent, as in al-Andalus, the
acquisition of learning itself was viewed as a legitimate path to upward social movement. Nevertheless, the truth is that personal talent was rarely sufficient in itself to achieve social advancement. Above all, having the right family connections could greatly facilitate one’s entry into the networks that monopolised education, the courts and the system of patronage. This is hardly surprising, given that family contacts played an equally important role in the formation of other social elites (a’yān, ‘notables’), foremost among them the military class and the civil bureaucracy. Family networking in the case of the ‘ulamā’ was a particularly appropriate mechanism because it combined a structure designed for the transmission of knowledge with kinship relations. It is no accident that the vocabulary used to describe the former is closely linked to the terminology of the latter. The transmission of knowledge was organised along genealogical lines, parallel to those used to trace family origins. In a society intensely concerned with the precise identification of ancestry for any person of social consequence, the genealogy of the transmission of an item of knowledge acquired an equally legitimising function.

The ‘ulamā’ and their kinship networks

A special note has already been made of the relationship between the madrasas and particular families, and that many of the jobs in these institutions were passed on from father to son. In Mamlūk Cairo, the study of this practice has led some to conclude that the social world of the most privileged ‘ulamā’ was not as permeable as has been supposed, with the opportunities for jobs and careers concentrated in the hands of a few families. Research about other Islamic cities has yielded similar results. Thus, certain families have been identified that constitute ‘ulamā’ dynasties, such as the Banū Marzūq of Tlemcen (fifth–tenth/eleventh–sixteenth centuries) or the al-Buqlīnī, the predominant family of Cairo in the eighth–ninth/fourteenth–fifteenth centuries, whose members held important posts in both the madrasas and the legal systems of their respective cities. The al-Buqlīnī family brought together the various ingredients needed to make it a focus of urban power: the possession of scholarly knowledge, social prestige, political connections and wealth. A similar phenomenon can be seen in Ottoman times, when an ‘ālim’s professional status tended to be simply inherited.

Such ‘ulamā’ dynasties did not always manage to survive for long, however. Social and political changes affected them just as such things affected the other components of society. Sometimes the emergence of a particular family would be quickly followed by its sudden demise. Such an event can be easily
detected in the biographical dictionaries by noting the absence of posterior family members. This historiographic phenomenon indicates not that the family itself disappeared, but simply that its members ceased to play an important role in scholarly circles. The rise or fall of ‘ulamā’ families sometimes coincided with moments of political upheaval. A good illustration of an ‘ulamā’ family weathering a major political crisis and then accommodating itself to a new power group is provided by the Banū ‘l-Jadd of Seville. The family began their rise to prominence during the Almoravid period, occupying posts in Seville and Niebla, the region from which the family originated and where they were major landowners. However, it was under the Almohad regime that Abū Bakr Ibn al-Jadd (d. 586/1190) joined the caliph’s inner circle of power and became one of his most senior advisers, as well as one of the most prominent citizens of Seville. The Banū ‘l-Jadd held onto their position until the conquest of the city by Fernando III of Castile in 646/1248, at which point they moved to Malaga. In the ninth/tenth century they moved again, this time to Morocco. There, under the family name al-Fāsiyyūn, they acquired such enormous prestige that by the eleventh/twelfth century they had become the most important family in the city, their influence extending into all cultural, economic and religious areas. Abū Bakr ibn al-Jadd skilfully navigated the historical circumstances which came his way: he knew how to gain the Almohad caliph’s favour and then use his new personal power and the power of his family to compete against the other family groups of Seville. In the cities of al-Andalus, the transition from the Almoravid emirate to the Almohad caliphate had brought with it a radical shift in the balance of power among local notables, and not all the ‘ulamā’ families were able to weather the change as dexterously as the Banū ‘l-Jadd.

A similar transition took place in Damascus as Nūr al-Dīn (d. 569/1174) and his successors upset the traditional situation of the local ‘ulamā’ by the introduction of the madrasa. The new salaried positions that became available provided a new field of competition that was open not only to members of the local elites but also to individuals and families from outside the city. As a result of this, several important Damascene families lost the status they had enjoyed previously, while others managed to find a place for themselves in the new patronage structure.

The ‘ulamā’ and the political establishment

There exists a general consensus that after a particular unspecified date sometime during the early ‘Abbāsid period the ‘ulamā’ assumed the mantle
of religious authority in Islamic society. To what extent did the ‘ulamā’ maintain a critical attitude of moral oversight relative to the political establishment, or did they rather adopt a more prudent posture of co-operation which would secure them all sorts of advantages? As the ‘ulamā’ were not a homogeneous group, the answer to this question must be of commensurate complexity. In fact, the ‘ulamā’ reflected a spectrum of positions relative to political power, positions expressing a sense of either shared or conflicting interest, which derive sometimes from individual attitudes and at other times from the ‘ulamā’ s collective consciousness of being the standard-bearers of specific religious and social values.

It was not uncommon for ‘ulamā’ to take on political roles, especially as advisers to the royal court. This reality should be weighed against a theoretical stance common among the ‘ulamā’ that they should stay far removed from the corridors of political power and reject all contacts with the powerful.59 These were not mutually exclusive positions, however, since it was often the political circumstances themselves that determined the ‘ulamā’ s behaviour. For instance, when changes of dynasty and foreign invasions were critical moments for the greater civil community, the leading ‘ulamā’ would assume the role of representatives acting on behalf of that community to negotiate with the new political masters the conditions for survival. A good example of this can be seen in Damascus, where in 699/1299 the ‘ulamā’ negotiated with the Mongol army to prevent the sack of the city, and even urged the city’s Mamlūk governor to surrender – a vain effort, as it turned out. Another example is offered by the qādis who acted as rulers in al-Andalus.60

Conversely, political rulers sometimes intervened quite actively in the world of the scholars, and not just by dispensing jobs and funds. The judicial reform undertaken during the reign of Baybars first in Cairo (663/1265) and then in Damascus (664/1266) involved a fundamental change in the legal–religious order. Whereas previously a single Shāfī judge had been the highest legal authority, that role was now to be shared equally among four chief judges, each representing one of the four schools of Islamic law. This move has traditionally been interpreted (and reasonably so) as an attempt by Baybars to undermine the unity of the religious establishment, as embodied by the Shāfī chief judge. The sultan also assumed the power to appoint not only judges but also teachers for the madrasas and preachers for the mosques. Following these reforms, judges obviously found their room for manoeuvre considerably reduced, though on occasion they still managed to stand up to the sultan, such as when Baybars attempted to
take over the Ghuta orchards at Damascus to finance his campaigns. Similarly, in the Ottoman state, the elaborate legal system incorporated a judicial hierarchy whose summit was occupied by two supreme judges, who were members of the imperial dīwān. The mufti of Istanbul (also called the shaykh al-islām) did not belong to the dīwān. Nevertheless, along with the chief vizier, this man held the second-highest post in the Ottoman state after the sultan. In the Ottoman system, the ‘ulamā’ were subordinate to political authority and many operated entirely within the judicial structure.

Albeit lacking a judge’s executive powers, the preacher or khaṭīb performed a social function whose symbolic value also linked religion with political power. Although much of the khaṭīb’s job was highly ritualised, it was nonetheless of supreme importance, because at the Friday prayers he gave public voice to the ‘ulamā’’s endorsement – or questioning – of a ruler’s legitimacy to the public. The khaṭīb might also pay a price for this role. When al-Sulamī, the preacher of the Grand Mosque of Damascus, dared publicly to censure al-Malik Ismā’īl’s policy of collaboration with the Crusaders, he was jailed and then exiled in Cairo.61

Tensions between ‘ulamā’ and political rulers arose, therefore, in situations where the former maintained a relatively independent attitude, in other words when they freely juggled tactics of adherence to the regime and confrontation with it. The ‘ulamā’ were the repository of sacred knowledge, and this endowed them with a moral authority that the political and military elites lacked. Yet these elites needed precisely that moral authority to confer legitimacy to their rule, and therefore needed the co-operation of the ‘ulamā’. The only way that a political ruler could attempt to bypass this limitation was by claiming to be himself the supreme religious authority, that is, by proclaiming himself caliph, and thus above the power of the religious community. Within the historical period covered by this volume, this strategy was resorted to by both the Fāṭimid and the Almohad regimes. And though the ideological orientations of these two regimes were quite different from each other, their practical approaches to social control were also similar, being based around the creation and organisation of new ‘ulamā’ elites who were entirely at the service of the regime’s politico-religious programme.

The structure used to spread the Fāṭimid doctrine and programme was a network of itinerant missionaries who combined their dedication to learning with the practice of a manual craft. In this system, the ‘inner’ hidden knowledge was available only to those devotees who had been initiated into the secret. However, the ‘outward’ forms of interpretation of the law
were revealed at public sessions open to the entire population, with special sessions for women. Throughout this system, whose unquestionable effectiveness has led the period extending from the mid-fourth/tenth century to the mid-fifth/eleventh century to be dubbed ‘the Shi'i century’ of Islamic history, the ‘ulamā’ played an indispensable role in the propagation of the politico-religious doctrine of the Fāṭimids. They even earned a new name: a Fāṭimid ‘ālim was known as a dā‘ī, or ‘summoner’, who disseminated what they believed was a revived and renewed Islam. Like the ‘ulamā’ of Sunnī Islam, they were primarily teachers and guarantors of orthodoxy. But unlike their Sunnī counterparts, they formed part of a specific political programme to which they showed an unwavering adherence. They constituted therefore a hugely effective political instrument, as can be seen in the surviving documents that describe their pedagogical methods. Even so, among the Fāṭimid ‘ulamā’ we also find evidence of the social tactics employed in Sunnī Islam, particularly the transmission of ideological power down generations of the same family, as illustrated by the continued presence of descendants of al-Qādī ʿl-Nuʿmān at the apex of the dā‘ī hierarchy.62

This very strict hierarchy distinguishes the dā‘īs from other ‘ulamā’ groups. The dā‘īs received their instructions and ideological orientation from the Fāṭimid imam by means of letters from the central authority. They passed on the doctrine at gatherings (majālis, sing. majlis) which were directed at different social groups and in which the transmission of learning was graded according to the degree of initiation possessed by the participants. This structured use of scholars and scholarly knowledge was an efficient instrument for the propagation of Fāṭimid beliefs and practices, and thus constitutes a clear example of political activity coming from within a scholarly group itself rather than from an external political master.

A specific group of ‘ulamā’ performed a similar role for the Almohads, whose rule lasted from the middle of the sixth/twelfth century to 668/1269. These scholars were known collectively as the ṭalaba, a term which conferred on them a corporate identity. The ṭalaba had their own special place within the Almohad power structure, with members of the dynasty itself above and civil functionaries (including non-ṭalaba ‘ulamā’) below. Acting as true ‘doctrinarians’ of the regime, they were recruited throughout the empire, trained for their mission and sent out to spread the Almohad doctrine. Wherever they established themselves, the ṭalaba received the official correspondence from the caliph containing the information that they were then to make known to the population. They attended meetings in their capital at Marrakesh when summoned by the caliph and
accompanied him on his military expeditions. In short, the ṭalaba comprised an extraordinarily effective system for the dissemination of Almohad doctrine, thanks to which it spread throughout North Africa and al-Andalus (though not without encountering a certain amount of resistance). As with the Fāṭimids, the ṭalaba not only actively co-operated with the political establishment, they actually constituted one of its fundamental supporting elements. In both cases the ‘ulamāʾ claimed allegiance to a specific ideological programme and occupied a particular space within a hierarchical system that received its inspiration from a single central authority. And the fates of both of these groups were therefore closely tied to those of their respective regimes. Once these dynasties collapsed, the ‘ulamāʾ reverted to their traditional role as the representatives of a religious authority that was essentially separate from the political establishment, a distance across which the ‘ulamāʾ might choose either to advise or to admonish their rulers. In like fashion, the Ottomans converted the ‘ulamāʾ into functionaries who were specifically trained to fulfil an essential role in the administration of the empire, thus forming part of a power structure dominated at its apex by the sultan.

In a period when the world of Islam faced various serious threats from outside, whether from the Christians in the Iberian Peninsula, the Crusaders in Palestine or the Mongol invaders, the need for military resistance provided the ‘ulamāʾ one avenue for intervention in the political arena that was properly theirs: the call to jihad. Particularly after the fall of Jerusalem in 492/1099, the ‘ulamāʾ began to raise their voices in sermons or in written tracts reminding the population and rulers of the religious obligation to repel the invaders. To that end, they also claimed, it was necessary to revive the flagging spiritual state of Islam. This explains why we find tracts written at this time that praise jihad on the one hand and condemn the pernicious innovations (bidaʿ) that had corrupted the purity of Islam on the other. This conjunction of concerns has no better illustration than the figure of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), who not only authored an influential body of works on the need to purge Islam and defend the territory against outside aggression, but also himself played an active part in the defence of Damascus against the Mongols.

At the other end of the Mediterranean, the call to jihad against the Christian armies constituted a powerful tool of legitimisation for the intervention in al-Andalus of the various dynasties of North African origin, beginning in the fifth/eleventh century with the Almoravids and continuing with the Almohads and Marinids. But as the Christian conquests crept relentlessly southwards, the ‘ulamāʾ found themselves increasingly facing the dilemma of
whether to stay put and live under Christian rule or to emigrate to Muslim territory. After the seventh/thirteenth century, most took the latter course, sometimes because they were forcibly expelled by the Christian conquerors. Among the ‘ulamā’ of al-Andalus, North Africa and Egypt there arose an intense debate about what to advise the Muslim population in this respect. The lack of unanimity of opinion reflected in the writings they have left us highlights the complexity of an issue in which once again the debate among the ‘ulamā’ transcends the purely intellectual as its grapples with the concept of the community as a political body.65

Notes

6. Petry, The civilian elite of Cairo, 39–47.
20. İnalcık, The Ottoman empire, 166.
31. Chamberlain, Knowledge and social practice, 27–8, 56.
The ‘ulama’


36. Pouzet, Damas au VIIe/XIIIe, 163.


42. Garcin, Un centre musulman de la Haute-Égypte médiévale, 266f.

43. Saad, Social history of Timbuktu, 86–7.

44. Lapidus, Muslim cities in the later middle ages, 110.


52. Berkey, The transmission of knowledge, 127.


58. Chamberlain, Knowledge and social practice, 62.

59. Etan Kohlberg, A medieval Muslim scholar at work: Ibn Tūwūs and his library, Leiden, 1992, 18; Saad, Social history of Timbuktu, 152.


Glossary

‘abîd, sing. ‘abd: slaves.
‘adl and ‘adâlêt (Turk.): justice.
aghâ (Turk.): chief eunuch.
ahdâth: armed militias of young people, civic militia.
ahl al-bayt: the descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad.
ahl al-kitâb: people in possession of a Scripture revealed by God, such as Jews and Christians.
ajnâd al-ḥalqa: ‘soldiers of the ring’, freeborn soldiers in Mamlûk times.
‘âlim, pl. ‘ulamâ’: religious scholar.
aljâmia, aljamiado (Spanish): Romance language written in Arabic script.
amân: safe conduct.
amîr: prince, military commander
amîr al-muʾminin: Commander of the Faithful, Prince of the Believers (caliphal title). This title implies caliphal authority, which originally included leadership of the entire Muslim community. The term continues to be used as a title by Moroccan rulers to this day.
amîr al-muslimîn: Commander of the Muslims, Prince of the Muslims (Almoravid title).
amr Allâh: God’s order.
al-Andalus: those portions of the Iberian peninsula (i.e., today Spain and Portugal) that submitted to Islamic authority, whose boundaries shifted based upon the successes or failures of Muslim expansion vis-à-vis the Iberian Christian kingdoms from the second/eighth to the ninth/fifteenth centuries.
‘aṣâbiyya: fighting spirit, clan solidarity.
atâbak: see atabeg.
atabeg: military chief, senior commander.
awlâd al-nâs: sons of the mamlûks.
a'yūn: local notables.

'azab (Ottoman): infantryman.

baraka: blessing, grace of God; spiritual power; usually associated with holy men
or sharifs, it can impart benefits to the holy man’s followers, even when visiting
their tombs long after the holy man’s death. Salary paid to the army in
Almohad times.

bay'a: oath of allegiance.

beg: Ottoman title used for holders of military/administrative positions;
an autonomous ruler.

beglerbegi: governor.

beglerbegilik: province.

beglik: Turkish state.

bilād al-makhzan (Maghrib): lands submitted to the authority of the central
government by paying taxes.

bilād al-sība (Maghrib): lands ‘running to waste’ or ‘lands of dissidence’, lands
that resisted the authority of the central government or operated largely
independent of it, even though local leaders often theoretically
acknowledged the sultan’s authority.

Bilād al-Sūdān: ‘land of the blacks’.

da‘ī: ‘summoner’; Ismā’īlī missionary and propagandist.

da‘r al-harb: the abode of war.

da‘r al-islām: the abode of Islam.

da‘r al-ṭirāz: see ṭirāz.

da‘wa: a summons to allegiance; mission.

devshirme: ‘collection of boys’ from Christian households to serve in the
Ottoman army.

Dey: commanding officer of the Janissaries in Algiers.

dhimma: ‘the covenant of protection’ granted to Jews and Christians.

dhimmi: a non-Muslim granted a covenant of protection.

dinar: gold coin.

dīwān (Divan): ministry, office or board (for example, in charge of the army,
and of revenue and expenditure); commercial facility.

emir: see amīr.

faqih: legal scholar.

fatwā, Turk. fetwā: legal opinion.

fiqih: Islamic law.

fitna: disruption; civil and military unrest. It is frequently translated as ‘civil
war’ or ‘civil strife’.

funduq: commercial facility.
Geniza: chamber of the synagogue in Fustat that served as the burial room for the 
various kinds of writing that originated within the Jewish community, 
including letters of traders written in Judaeo-Arabic and, occasionally, Arabic.

ghāzī/Ghāzī: fighter in the holy war or jihad.

ḥadīth: Prophetic Traditions.

ḥājib, pl. ḥujjāb: chamberlain or person who acts as delegate of the ruler.

ḥajj: pilgrimage to Mecca.

ḥalq: a unit composed of military slaves in Saladin’s army. In Mamlūk times, a 
non-mamlūk corps (including the mamlūks’ children, awlād al-nās, and 
masterless veteran mamlūks).

Ḥanafism: one of the four Sunnī legal schools.

Ḥanbalism: one of the four Sunnī legal schools.

ḥarām: forbidden, inviolable, sacred.

ḥijra: migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, signalling 
the beginning of the Islamic calendar; migration from one place (usually 
considered un-Islamic) to another.

ḥisba: control of the market; the precept of ‘commanding good and forbidding evil’.

ḥizb, pl. ḥizb: lit. ‘party’; coalition crossing factional boundaries among the 
Mamlūks.

ḥubs, pl. ḥubās: pious endowment. See also waqf.

ḥuffāz, sing. ḥāfiz: lit. ‘memoriser’. In Almohad times, those trained both as 
scholars and as soldiers who served in the administration of the empire.

‘ibra: revenue per year for a certain area of land.

‘ilm: religious knowledge.

iltizām: tax-farming.

imam: religious and political head of the Muslim community.

imām: prayer leader.

iqṭā’, pl. iqṭā’āt: the allocation of a source of revenue in payment for military 
service; land-tax farms assigned to the military.

jamā’a: lit. ‘community’. From it derives the Spanish term ‘aljama’ that refers 
to Muslim communities under Christian rule. Oligarchy of notables who 
competed for supremacy (Timbuktu).

janissaries (Turk. yeni çeri): ‘new troops’, the sultan’s infantry corps.

jaysh: armed forces. In Morocco, jaysh troops were tribal regiments, derived from 
tribes allied with the government and usually receiving special favours, such as 
tax breaks or regional authority, in exchange for their military service.

jihad: holy war; war conducted according to Islamic norms.

jizya (Turk. jizye): poll- or head-tax.

kādī (Turk.): see qādi
kāfir, pl. kūffār: unbelievers, pagans.
kanun (Turk.): see qānūn.
khan: title of the Mongol rulers.
khānqa: Sufi lodge.
kharāj: land-tax.
khāṭib: ‘spokesman’, preacher of the Friday sermon.
khutba: Friday sermon.
kūfr: see kāfir.
madhhab: legal school.
madrasa (Turk. medrese): college, educational establishment for the teaching of religious knowledge and a source of power for the ‘ulamā’.
maḥdī/Mahdi: ‘the rightly guided one’, Messianic figure who is expected to return at the end of time and to establish the rule of justice upon earth. In the history of the Maghrib – and in other Islamic regions – there have been many claimants to this title, who sought to establish religio-political movements often with the goal of capturing government authority.
majlis, pl. majālīs: gathering, session, council.
makhzan: literally, ‘storehouse’. In the Maghrib, central government and administration, ‘treasury’ state.
malik, pl. mulūk: king.
Mālikism: one of the four Sunnī legal schools, predominant in North Africa and al-Andalus.
mamlūk: slave soldier.
Mamlūk: dynasty.
marabout (French from murābiṭ): a charismatic spiritual leader known for baraka, manifested through miracle working, pious deeds and an ability to intercede between disputing groups. These holy men often played decisive roles in the history of the Maghrib, not only spiritually, but sometimes politically as well.
matjar: the state commercial office under the Fātimids and Mamlūks in Egypt.
Mawlāy: literally ‘my master’, it is a title applied to sharīfs, and particularly to sultans of the Sa’dī and ‘Alawī dynasties. The only exception is for individuals named Muḥammad in which case the term Sīdī is used.
mawlid al-nabī: the festival of the Prophet’s birthday.
medrese: see madrasa.
mellah (mallāh): Jewish quarter in Moroccan towns.
milla, Turk. millet: religious community.
Moriscos: ‘New Christians’, Muslims forced to convert to Catholicism in the Iberian Peninsula.
Mozarabs: Arabised Christians in the Iberian Peninsula.
Mudejars: from the Arabic mudajjan. Muslims living under Christian rule who were permitted to practise Islam and run their own affairs according to their own laws.
ufij: jurisconsult who advised on matters of Islamic law.
uhtasib: market inspector.
ujaddid: religious renewer.
uqta: ‘iqt’ holder.
murabit, pl. murabitun: ‘holy warrior’ or militant reformer; when turned into saint, see marabout.
naib: deputy; lieutenant of the ruler in the government of the country; substitute of a teacher in a madrasa.
ojaq: hearth, corps of Janissaries.
parias (Spanish): tribute paid by the Muslims to the Christians.
pasha: Ottoman title for high-ranking military officers and civilian officials.
qadi (Turk. kadi): judge.
qaid: military commander; provincial governor.
qanun (Turk. kanun): Ottoman state law.
qasaba: fortress or stronghold. The qasba is the fortified part of a city, or a military outpost in regional areas.
qintar: weight measure.
quoghlus: ‘sons of the Sultan’s slaves’.
ra’is (Turk. re’is): headman, leader, chief.
rawk: cadastral survey in Mamluk Egypt.
reconquista: Christian conquest of the lands under Muslim rule in the Iberian Peninsula which resulted in the elimination of al-Andalus.
re’issul-kuttab (Turk.): head of the chancery clerks.
rabat: military fortification; Sufi lodge.
rihla: journey; journey in search of reliable informants.
sanjak (Turk.): district, subdivision of a province.
saqaliba: slaves of Slavic or European provenance.
sekban (Turk.): mercenaries, musketeers paid only on campaign.
Shafi’ism: one of the four Sunni legal schools.
shah: title of the Safavid imam.
shari’a: Islamic religious law.
sharif: descendant of the Prophet; man or family claiming patrilineal descent from the Prophet Muhammad.
shaykh (Turk. sheykh): elder, head or leader of a tribe, a council or a Sufi order. Usually the authority of a shaykh is obtained informally as opposed to a formally appointed position.

shaykh al-islām: the mufti of Istanbul.

sheyhülislām: see shaykh al-islām.

shiḥna: military governor of a town or province.

Sīdi: literally ‘my master’; in the Maghrib it is an honorific title given to sharīfs with the name of Muḥammad.

sipāhī (Turk.): cavalryman.

sūdān: blacks.

Sūfī: mystic.

sultan: ruler.

sūq: market.

ṭā’ifa: division, faction, petty kingdom, Taifa kingdom.

taḍīd: religious renewal.

talaba: lit. students; Almohad religious, military and administrative elites.

taqīlād: imitation of human interpretation of the religious law.

ṭarīqa: way of the Sufi, mystical brotherhood.

tashbīḥ: anthropomorphism.

ṭekke (Turk.): dervish lodge.

tīmār: a military fief, consisting usually of one or more villages or parts of villages, together with the surrounding agricultural land and pasture, the holder of which received the tax income from the land in exchange for military service.

ṭirāz: production of inscribed textiles and luxurious fabrics under governmental supervision.

‘ulamā’ (Turk. ʿulemā): pl. of ʿālim.

umma: community of the faithful, Muslim community.

ʿushr: tithe of the revenue off Muslim land; a 10 per cent tax on imports.

uṣūl: legal methodology.

vakf (Turk.): see waqf.

vezir (Turk.): see wazīr.

wālī: governor.

wālī: saint.

wālī Allāh: God’s friend, saint.

waqf: pious endowment. See also ḥūbs.

waqfīyya: pious endowment deed.

wazīr: vizier.

zakāt: alms-tax.

zāwīya: Sufi lodge; residence of the marabout.
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volume in which all these histories are fully introduced. The following list of suggestions is accordingly intended in the first place to introduce the history of political thought in Islam as a separate subject, not all of which is relevant to actual practice, and secondly to extend the range of references to the ideology of state formation rather than to state formation and organisation itself.

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